mirrors/poky
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://git.yoctoproject.org/poky synced 2026-06-12 22:53:49 +02:00
Code Issues Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

python3-requests: backport fix for CVE-2026-25645

Browse Source 
When unpacking zip files requests uses predictable paths. Backport a fix
to use randomly generated pathnames to mitigate injection attacks.

(From OE-Core rev: b23ec9773d67f8767904731afa86fe5ede08f97f)

Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit fe846d71b647fb06e6a87cb45a2dd9b0889e2891)
Signed-off-by: Deepak Rathore <deeratho@cisco.com>
Signed-off-by: Yoann Congal <yoann.congal@smile.fr>
Signed-off-by: Paul Barker <paul@pbarker.dev>
This commit is contained in:
Ross Burton
2026-05-07 10:50:26 -07:00
committed by Paul Barker
parent 3758595c3e
commit 1a099cb1fa
2 changed files with 49 additions and 4 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

46
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-requests/CVE-2026-25645.patch Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
From 66d21cb07bd6255b1280291c4fafb71803cdb3b7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Nate Prewitt <nate.prewitt@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 25 Mar 2026 08:57:56 -0600
Subject: [PATCH] Merge commit from fork
Prior to version 2.33.0, the `requests.utils.extract_zipped_paths()` utility function
uses a predictable filename when extracting files from zip archives into the system
temporary directory. If the target file already exists, it is reused without validation.
A local attacker with write access to the temp directory could pre-create a malicious
file that would be loaded in place of the legitimate one. Standard usage of the Requests
library is not affected by this vulnerability. Only applications that call
`extract_zipped_paths()` directly are impacted. Starting in version 2.33.0, the library
extracts files to a non-deterministic location. If developers are unable to upgrade,
they can set `TMPDIR` in their environment to a directory with restricted write access.
CVE: CVE-2026-25645
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/psf/requests/commit/66d21cb07bd6255b1280291c4fafb71803cdb3b7]
Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com>
---
src/requests/utils.py | 13 +++++++------
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/requests/utils.py b/src/requests/utils.py
index d8803e6e91..54959bb8ab 100644
--- a/src/requests/utils.py
+++ b/src/requests/utils.py
@@ -282,12 +282,13 @@ def extract_zipped_paths(path):
return path
# we have a valid zip archive and a valid member of that archive
- tmp = tempfile.gettempdir()
- extracted_path = os.path.join(tmp, member.split("/")[-1])
- if not os.path.exists(extracted_path):
- # use read + write to avoid the creating nested folders, we only want the file, avoids mkdir racing condition
- with atomic_open(extracted_path) as file_handler:
- file_handler.write(zip_file.read(member))
+ suffix = os.path.splitext(member.split("/")[-1])[-1]
+ fd, extracted_path = tempfile.mkstemp(suffix=suffix)
+ try:
+ os.write(fd, zip_file.read(member))
+ finally:
+ os.close(fd)
+
return extracted_path