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qemu: upgrade 8.2.3 -> 8.2.7

Browse Source 
This includes fix for: CVE-2024-4693, CVE-2024-6505 and CVE-2024-7730

General changelog for 8.2: https://wiki.qemu.org/ChangeLog/8.2

Droped:
0001-target-riscv-kvm-change-KVM_REG_RISCV_FP_F-to-u32.patch
0002-target-riscv-kvm-change-KVM_REG_RISCV_FP_D-to-u64.patch
0003-target-riscv-kvm-change-timer-regs-size-to-u64.patch
CVE-2024-4467 and CVE-2024-7409 since already contained the fix.

(From OE-Core rev: 7983ad282c37f8c1125da5bab96489e5d0039948)

Signed-off-by: Yogita Urade <yogita.urade@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
This commit is contained in:
Yogita Urade
2024-11-29 08:17:08 +00:00
committed by Steve Sakoman
parent c6ec0e1bfd
commit 2775596cb2
16 changed files with 1 additions and 2550 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

0
meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu-native_8.2.3.bb → meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu-native_8.2.7.bb
View File

0
meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu-system-native_8.2.3.bb → meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu-system-native_8.2.7.bb
View File

14
meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc
View File

@@ -40,18 +40,6 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.qemu.org/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.xz \
file://0005-tests-tcg-Check-that-shmat-does-not-break-proc-self-.patch \ file://0005-tests-tcg-Check-that-shmat-does-not-break-proc-self-.patch \
file://qemu-guest-agent.init \ file://qemu-guest-agent.init \
file://qemu-guest-agent.udev \ file://qemu-guest-agent.udev \
file://CVE-2024-4467-0001.patch \
file://CVE-2024-4467-0002.patch \
file://CVE-2024-4467-0003.patch \
file://CVE-2024-4467-0004.patch \
file://CVE-2024-4467-0005.patch \
file://CVE-2024-7409-0001.patch \
file://CVE-2024-7409-0002.patch \
file://CVE-2024-7409-0003.patch \
file://CVE-2024-7409-0004.patch \
file://0001-target-riscv-kvm-change-KVM_REG_RISCV_FP_F-to-u32.patch \
file://0002-target-riscv-kvm-change-KVM_REG_RISCV_FP_D-to-u64.patch \
file://0003-target-riscv-kvm-change-timer-regs-size-to-u64.patch \
" "
UPSTREAM_CHECK_REGEX = "qemu-(?P<pver>\d+(\.\d+)+)\.tar" UPSTREAM_CHECK_REGEX = "qemu-(?P<pver>\d+(\.\d+)+)\.tar"
@@ -68,7 +56,7 @@ SRC_URI:append:class-native = " \
file://0012-linux-user-workaround-for-missing-MAP_SHARED_VALIDAT.patch \ file://0012-linux-user-workaround-for-missing-MAP_SHARED_VALIDAT.patch \
" "
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "dc747fb366809455317601c4876bd1f6829a32a23e83fb76e45ab12c2a569964" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "1f0604f296ab9acb4854c054764a1ba408643fc299bd54a6500cccfaaca65b55"
CVE_STATUS[CVE-2007-0998] = "not-applicable-config: The VNC server can expose host files uder some circumstances. We don't enable it by default." CVE_STATUS[CVE-2007-0998] = "not-applicable-config: The VNC server can expose host files uder some circumstances. We don't enable it by default."

75
meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/0001-target-riscv-kvm-change-KVM_REG_RISCV_FP_F-to-u32.patch
View File

@@ -1,75 +0,0 @@
From bbdcc89678daa5cb131ef22a6cd41a5f7f9dcea9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Henrique Barboza <dbarboza@ventanamicro.com>
Date: Fri, 8 Dec 2023 15:38:31 -0300
Subject: [PATCH 1/3] target/riscv/kvm: change KVM_REG_RISCV_FP_F to u32
KVM_REG_RISCV_FP_F regs have u32 size according to the API, but by using
kvm_riscv_reg_id() in RISCV_FP_F_REG() we're returning u64 sizes when
running with TARGET_RISCV64. The most likely reason why no one noticed
this is because we're not implementing kvm_cpu_synchronize_state() in
RISC-V yet.
Create a new helper that returns a KVM ID with u32 size and use it in
RISCV_FP_F_REG().
Reported-by: Andrew Jones <ajones@ventanamicro.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Henrique Barboza <dbarboza@ventanamicro.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <ajones@ventanamicro.com>
Message-ID: <20231208183835.2411523-2-dbarboza@ventanamicro.com>
Signed-off-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
(cherry picked from commit 49c211ffca00fdf7c0c29072c224e88527a14838)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
Upstream-Status: Backport [bbdcc89678daa5cb131ef22a6cd41a5f7f9dcea9]
Signed-off-by: Chen Qi <Qi.Chen@windriver.com>
---
target/riscv/kvm/kvm-cpu.c | 11 ++++++++---
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/target/riscv/kvm/kvm-cpu.c b/target/riscv/kvm/kvm-cpu.c
index c1675158fe..2eef2be86a 100644
--- a/target/riscv/kvm/kvm-cpu.c
+++ b/target/riscv/kvm/kvm-cpu.c
@@ -72,6 +72,11 @@ static uint64_t kvm_riscv_reg_id(CPURISCVState *env, uint64_t type,
return id;
}
+static uint64_t kvm_riscv_reg_id_u32(uint64_t type, uint64_t idx)
+{
+ return KVM_REG_RISCV | KVM_REG_SIZE_U32 | type | idx;
+}
+
#define RISCV_CORE_REG(env, name) kvm_riscv_reg_id(env, KVM_REG_RISCV_CORE, \
KVM_REG_RISCV_CORE_REG(name))
@@ -81,7 +86,7 @@ static uint64_t kvm_riscv_reg_id(CPURISCVState *env, uint64_t type,
#define RISCV_TIMER_REG(env, name) kvm_riscv_reg_id(env, KVM_REG_RISCV_TIMER, \
KVM_REG_RISCV_TIMER_REG(name))
-#define RISCV_FP_F_REG(env, idx) kvm_riscv_reg_id(env, KVM_REG_RISCV_FP_F, idx)
+#define RISCV_FP_F_REG(idx) kvm_riscv_reg_id_u32(KVM_REG_RISCV_FP_F, idx)
#define RISCV_FP_D_REG(env, idx) kvm_riscv_reg_id(env, KVM_REG_RISCV_FP_D, idx)
@@ -586,7 +591,7 @@ static int kvm_riscv_get_regs_fp(CPUState *cs)
if (riscv_has_ext(env, RVF)) {
uint32_t reg;
for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
- ret = kvm_get_one_reg(cs, RISCV_FP_F_REG(env, i), &reg);
+ ret = kvm_get_one_reg(cs, RISCV_FP_F_REG(i), &reg);
if (ret) {
return ret;
}
@@ -620,7 +625,7 @@ static int kvm_riscv_put_regs_fp(CPUState *cs)
uint32_t reg;
for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
reg = env->fpr[i];
- ret = kvm_set_one_reg(cs, RISCV_FP_F_REG(env, i), &reg);
+ ret = kvm_set_one_reg(cs, RISCV_FP_F_REG(i), &reg);
if (ret) {
return ret;
}
--
2.25.1

73
meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/0002-target-riscv-kvm-change-KVM_REG_RISCV_FP_D-to-u64.patch
View File

@@ -1,73 +0,0 @@
From 125b95d79e746cbab6b72683b3382dd372e38c61 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Henrique Barboza <dbarboza@ventanamicro.com>
Date: Fri, 8 Dec 2023 15:38:32 -0300
Subject: [PATCH 2/3] target/riscv/kvm: change KVM_REG_RISCV_FP_D to u64
KVM_REG_RISCV_FP_D regs are always u64 size. Using kvm_riscv_reg_id() in
RISCV_FP_D_REG() ends up encoding the wrong size if we're running with
TARGET_RISCV32.
Create a new helper that returns a KVM ID with u64 size and use it with
RISCV_FP_D_REG().
Reported-by: Andrew Jones <ajones@ventanamicro.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Henrique Barboza <dbarboza@ventanamicro.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <ajones@ventanamicro.com>
Message-ID: <20231208183835.2411523-3-dbarboza@ventanamicro.com>
Signed-off-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
(cherry picked from commit 450bd6618fda3d2e2ab02b2fce1c79efd5b66084)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
Upstream-Status: Backport [125b95d79e746cbab6b72683b3382dd372e38c61]
Signed-off-by: Chen Qi <Qi.Chen@windriver.com>
---
target/riscv/kvm/kvm-cpu.c | 11 ++++++++---
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/target/riscv/kvm/kvm-cpu.c b/target/riscv/kvm/kvm-cpu.c
index 2eef2be86a..82ed4455a5 100644
--- a/target/riscv/kvm/kvm-cpu.c
+++ b/target/riscv/kvm/kvm-cpu.c
@@ -77,6 +77,11 @@ static uint64_t kvm_riscv_reg_id_u32(uint64_t type, uint64_t idx)
return KVM_REG_RISCV | KVM_REG_SIZE_U32 | type | idx;
}
+static uint64_t kvm_riscv_reg_id_u64(uint64_t type, uint64_t idx)
+{
+ return KVM_REG_RISCV | KVM_REG_SIZE_U64 | type | idx;
+}
+
#define RISCV_CORE_REG(env, name) kvm_riscv_reg_id(env, KVM_REG_RISCV_CORE, \
KVM_REG_RISCV_CORE_REG(name))
@@ -88,7 +93,7 @@ static uint64_t kvm_riscv_reg_id_u32(uint64_t type, uint64_t idx)
#define RISCV_FP_F_REG(idx) kvm_riscv_reg_id_u32(KVM_REG_RISCV_FP_F, idx)
-#define RISCV_FP_D_REG(env, idx) kvm_riscv_reg_id(env, KVM_REG_RISCV_FP_D, idx)
+#define RISCV_FP_D_REG(idx) kvm_riscv_reg_id_u64(KVM_REG_RISCV_FP_D, idx)
#define KVM_RISCV_GET_CSR(cs, env, csr, reg) \
do { \
@@ -579,7 +584,7 @@ static int kvm_riscv_get_regs_fp(CPUState *cs)
if (riscv_has_ext(env, RVD)) {
uint64_t reg;
for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
- ret = kvm_get_one_reg(cs, RISCV_FP_D_REG(env, i), &reg);
+ ret = kvm_get_one_reg(cs, RISCV_FP_D_REG(i), &reg);
if (ret) {
return ret;
}
@@ -613,7 +618,7 @@ static int kvm_riscv_put_regs_fp(CPUState *cs)
uint64_t reg;
for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
reg = env->fpr[i];
- ret = kvm_set_one_reg(cs, RISCV_FP_D_REG(env, i), &reg);
+ ret = kvm_set_one_reg(cs, RISCV_FP_D_REG(i), &reg);
if (ret) {
return ret;
}
--
2.25.1

107
meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/0003-target-riscv-kvm-change-timer-regs-size-to-u64.patch
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@@ -1,107 +0,0 @@
From cbae1080988e0f1af0fb4c816205f7647f6de16f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Henrique Barboza <dbarboza@ventanamicro.com>
Date: Fri, 8 Dec 2023 15:38:33 -0300
Subject: [PATCH 3/3] target/riscv/kvm: change timer regs size to u64
KVM_REG_RISCV_TIMER regs are always u64 according to the KVM API, but at
this moment we'll return u32 regs if we're running a RISCV32 target.
Use the kvm_riscv_reg_id_u64() helper in RISCV_TIMER_REG() to fix it.
Reported-by: Andrew Jones <ajones@ventanamicro.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Henrique Barboza <dbarboza@ventanamicro.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <ajones@ventanamicro.com>
Message-ID: <20231208183835.2411523-4-dbarboza@ventanamicro.com>
Signed-off-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
(cherry picked from commit 10f86d1b845087d14b58d65dd2a6e3411d1b6529)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
Upstream-Status: Backport [cbae1080988e0f1af0fb4c816205f7647f6de16f]
Signed-off-by: Chen Qi <Qi.Chen@windriver.com>
---
target/riscv/kvm/kvm-cpu.c | 26 +++++++++++++-------------
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/target/riscv/kvm/kvm-cpu.c b/target/riscv/kvm/kvm-cpu.c
index 82ed4455a5..ddbe820e10 100644
--- a/target/riscv/kvm/kvm-cpu.c
+++ b/target/riscv/kvm/kvm-cpu.c
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ static uint64_t kvm_riscv_reg_id_u64(uint64_t type, uint64_t idx)
#define RISCV_CSR_REG(env, name) kvm_riscv_reg_id(env, KVM_REG_RISCV_CSR, \
KVM_REG_RISCV_CSR_REG(name))
-#define RISCV_TIMER_REG(env, name) kvm_riscv_reg_id(env, KVM_REG_RISCV_TIMER, \
+#define RISCV_TIMER_REG(name) kvm_riscv_reg_id_u64(KVM_REG_RISCV_TIMER, \
KVM_REG_RISCV_TIMER_REG(name))
#define RISCV_FP_F_REG(idx) kvm_riscv_reg_id_u32(KVM_REG_RISCV_FP_F, idx)
@@ -111,17 +111,17 @@ static uint64_t kvm_riscv_reg_id_u64(uint64_t type, uint64_t idx)
} \
} while (0)
-#define KVM_RISCV_GET_TIMER(cs, env, name, reg) \
+#define KVM_RISCV_GET_TIMER(cs, name, reg) \
do { \
- int ret = kvm_get_one_reg(cs, RISCV_TIMER_REG(env, name), &reg); \
+ int ret = kvm_get_one_reg(cs, RISCV_TIMER_REG(name), &reg); \
if (ret) { \
abort(); \
} \
} while (0)
-#define KVM_RISCV_SET_TIMER(cs, env, name, reg) \
+#define KVM_RISCV_SET_TIMER(cs, name, reg) \
do { \
- int ret = kvm_set_one_reg(cs, RISCV_TIMER_REG(env, name), &reg); \
+ int ret = kvm_set_one_reg(cs, RISCV_TIMER_REG(name), &reg); \
if (ret) { \
abort(); \
} \
@@ -649,10 +649,10 @@ static void kvm_riscv_get_regs_timer(CPUState *cs)
return;
}
- KVM_RISCV_GET_TIMER(cs, env, time, env->kvm_timer_time);
- KVM_RISCV_GET_TIMER(cs, env, compare, env->kvm_timer_compare);
- KVM_RISCV_GET_TIMER(cs, env, state, env->kvm_timer_state);
- KVM_RISCV_GET_TIMER(cs, env, frequency, env->kvm_timer_frequency);
+ KVM_RISCV_GET_TIMER(cs, time, env->kvm_timer_time);
+ KVM_RISCV_GET_TIMER(cs, compare, env->kvm_timer_compare);
+ KVM_RISCV_GET_TIMER(cs, state, env->kvm_timer_state);
+ KVM_RISCV_GET_TIMER(cs, frequency, env->kvm_timer_frequency);
env->kvm_timer_dirty = true;
}
@@ -666,8 +666,8 @@ static void kvm_riscv_put_regs_timer(CPUState *cs)
return;
}
- KVM_RISCV_SET_TIMER(cs, env, time, env->kvm_timer_time);
- KVM_RISCV_SET_TIMER(cs, env, compare, env->kvm_timer_compare);
+ KVM_RISCV_SET_TIMER(cs, time, env->kvm_timer_time);
+ KVM_RISCV_SET_TIMER(cs, compare, env->kvm_timer_compare);
/*
* To set register of RISCV_TIMER_REG(state) will occur a error from KVM
@@ -676,7 +676,7 @@ static void kvm_riscv_put_regs_timer(CPUState *cs)
* TODO If KVM changes, adapt here.
*/
if (env->kvm_timer_state) {
- KVM_RISCV_SET_TIMER(cs, env, state, env->kvm_timer_state);
+ KVM_RISCV_SET_TIMER(cs, state, env->kvm_timer_state);
}
/*
@@ -685,7 +685,7 @@ static void kvm_riscv_put_regs_timer(CPUState *cs)
* during the migration.
*/
if (migration_is_running(migrate_get_current()->state)) {
- KVM_RISCV_GET_TIMER(cs, env, frequency, reg);
+ KVM_RISCV_GET_TIMER(cs, frequency, reg);
if (reg != env->kvm_timer_frequency) {
error_report("Dst Hosts timer frequency != Src Hosts");
}
--
2.25.1

112
meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2024-4467-0001.patch
View File

@@ -1,112 +0,0 @@
From bd385a5298d7062668e804d73944d52aec9549f1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 16 Aug 2024 08:29:04 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] qcow2: Don't open data_file with BDRV_O_NO_IO
One use case for 'qemu-img info' is verifying that untrusted images
don't reference an unwanted external file, be it as a backing file or an
external data file. To make sure that calling 'qemu-img info' can't
already have undesired side effects with a malicious image, just don't
open the data file at all with BDRV_O_NO_IO. If nothing ever tries to do
I/O, we don't need to have it open.
This changes the output of iotests case 061, which used 'qemu-img info'
to show that opening an image with an invalid data file fails. After
this patch, it succeeds. Replace this part of the test with a qemu-io
call, but keep the final 'qemu-img info' to show that the invalid data
file is correctly displayed in the output.
Fixes: CVE-2024-4467
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Hanna Czenczek <hreitz@redhat.com>
CVE: CVE-2024-4667
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/bd385a5298d7062668e804d73944d52aec9549f1]
Signed-off-by: Yogita Urade <yogita.urade@windriver.com>
---
block/qcow2.c | 17 ++++++++++++++++-
tests/qemu-iotests/061 | 6 ++++--
tests/qemu-iotests/061.out | 8 ++++++--
3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/block/qcow2.c b/block/qcow2.c
index 13e032bd5..7af7c0bee 100644
--- a/block/qcow2.c
+++ b/block/qcow2.c
@@ -1636,7 +1636,22 @@ qcow2_do_open(BlockDriverState *bs, QDict *options, int flags,
goto fail;
}
- if (open_data_file) {
+ if (open_data_file && (flags & BDRV_O_NO_IO)) {
+ /*
+ * Don't open the data file for 'qemu-img info' so that it can be used
+ * to verify that an untrusted qcow2 image doesn't refer to external
+ * files.
+ *
+ * Note: This still makes has_data_file() return true.
+ */
+ if (s->incompatible_features & QCOW2_INCOMPAT_DATA_FILE) {
+ s->data_file = NULL;
+ } else {
+ s->data_file = bs->file;
+ }
+ qdict_extract_subqdict(options, NULL, "data-file.");
+ qdict_del(options, "data-file");
+ } else if (open_data_file) {
/* Open external data file */
bdrv_graph_co_rdunlock();
s->data_file = bdrv_co_open_child(NULL, options, "data-file", bs,
diff --git a/tests/qemu-iotests/061 b/tests/qemu-iotests/061
index 53c7d428e..b71ac097d 100755
--- a/tests/qemu-iotests/061
+++ b/tests/qemu-iotests/061
@@ -326,12 +326,14 @@ $QEMU_IMG amend -o "data_file=foo" "$TEST_IMG"
echo
_make_test_img -o "compat=1.1,data_file=$TEST_IMG.data" 64M
$QEMU_IMG amend -o "data_file=foo" "$TEST_IMG"
-_img_info --format-specific
+$QEMU_IO -c "read 0 4k" "$TEST_IMG" 2>&1 | _filter_testdir | _filter_imgfmt
+$QEMU_IO -c "open -o data-file.filename=$TEST_IMG.data,file.filename=$TEST_IMG" -c "read 0 4k" | _filter_qemu_io
TEST_IMG="data-file.filename=$TEST_IMG.data,file.filename=$TEST_IMG" _img_info --format-specific --image-opts
echo
$QEMU_IMG amend -o "data_file=" --image-opts "data-file.filename=$TEST_IMG.data,file.filename=$TEST_IMG"
-_img_info --format-specific
+$QEMU_IO -c "read 0 4k" "$TEST_IMG" 2>&1 | _filter_testdir | _filter_imgfmt
+$QEMU_IO -c "open -o data-file.filename=$TEST_IMG.data,file.filename=$TEST_IMG" -c "read 0 4k" | _filter_qemu_io
TEST_IMG="data-file.filename=$TEST_IMG.data,file.filename=$TEST_IMG" _img_info --format-specific --image-opts
echo
diff --git a/tests/qemu-iotests/061.out b/tests/qemu-iotests/061.out
index 139fc6817..24c33add7 100644
--- a/tests/qemu-iotests/061.out
+++ b/tests/qemu-iotests/061.out
@@ -545,7 +545,9 @@ Formatting 'TEST_DIR/t.IMGFMT', fmt=IMGFMT size=67108864
qemu-img: data-file can only be set for images that use an external data file
Formatting 'TEST_DIR/t.IMGFMT', fmt=IMGFMT size=67108864 data_file=TEST_DIR/t.IMGFMT.data
-qemu-img: Could not open 'TEST_DIR/t.IMGFMT': Could not open 'foo': No such file or directory
+qemu-io: can't open device TEST_DIR/t.IMGFMT: Could not open 'foo': No such file or directory
+read 4096/4096 bytes at offset 0
+4 KiB, X ops; XX:XX:XX.X (XXX YYY/sec and XXX ops/sec)
image: TEST_DIR/t.IMGFMT
file format: IMGFMT
virtual size: 64 MiB (67108864 bytes)
@@ -560,7 +562,9 @@ Format specific information:
corrupt: false
extended l2: false
-qemu-img: Could not open 'TEST_DIR/t.IMGFMT': 'data-file' is required for this image
+qemu-io: can't open device TEST_DIR/t.IMGFMT: 'data-file' is required for this image
+read 4096/4096 bytes at offset 0
+4 KiB, X ops; XX:XX:XX.X (XXX YYY/sec and XXX ops/sec)
image: TEST_DIR/t.IMGFMT
file format: IMGFMT
virtual size: 64 MiB (67108864 bytes)
--
2.40.0

55
meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2024-4467-0002.patch
View File

@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
From 2eb42a728d27a43fdcad5f37d3f65706ce6deba5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 16 Aug 2024 09:35:24 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] iotests/244: Don't store data-file with protocol in image
We want to disable filename parsing for data files because it's too easy
to abuse in malicious image files. Make the test ready for the change by
passing the data file explicitly in command line options.
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Hanna Czenczek <hreitz@redhat.com>
CVE: CVE-2024-4467
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/2eb42a728d27a43fdcad5f37d3f65706ce6deba5]
Signed-off-by: Yogita Urade <yogita.urade@windriver.com>
---
tests/qemu-iotests/244 | 19 ++++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tests/qemu-iotests/244 b/tests/qemu-iotests/244
index 3e61fa25b..bb9cc6512 100755
--- a/tests/qemu-iotests/244
+++ b/tests/qemu-iotests/244
@@ -215,9 +215,22 @@ $QEMU_IMG convert -f $IMGFMT -O $IMGFMT -n -C "$TEST_IMG.src" "$TEST_IMG"
$QEMU_IMG compare -f $IMGFMT -F $IMGFMT "$TEST_IMG.src" "$TEST_IMG"
# blkdebug doesn't support copy offloading, so this tests the error path
-$QEMU_IMG amend -f $IMGFMT -o "data_file=blkdebug::$TEST_IMG.data" "$TEST_IMG"
-$QEMU_IMG convert -f $IMGFMT -O $IMGFMT -n -C "$TEST_IMG.src" "$TEST_IMG"
-$QEMU_IMG compare -f $IMGFMT -F $IMGFMT "$TEST_IMG.src" "$TEST_IMG"
+test_img_with_blkdebug="json:{
+ 'driver': 'qcow2',
+ 'file': {
+ 'driver': 'file',
+ 'filename': '$TEST_IMG'
+ },
+ 'data-file': {
+ 'driver': 'blkdebug',
+ 'image': {
+ 'driver': 'file',
+ 'filename': '$TEST_IMG.data'
+ }
+ }
+}"
+$QEMU_IMG convert -f $IMGFMT -O $IMGFMT -n -C "$TEST_IMG.src" "$test_img_with_blkdebug"
+$QEMU_IMG compare -f $IMGFMT -F $IMGFMT "$TEST_IMG.src" "$test_img_with_blkdebug"
echo
echo "=== Flushing should flush the data file ==="
--
2.40.0

57
meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2024-4467-0003.patch
View File

@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
From 7e1110664ecbc4826f3c978ccb06b6c1bce823e6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 16 Aug 2024 10:24:58 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] iotests/270: Don't store data-file with json: prefix in image
We want to disable filename parsing for data files because it's too easy
to abuse in malicious image files. Make the test ready for the change by
passing the data file explicitly in command line options.
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Hanna Czenczek <hreitz@redhat.com>
CVE: CVE-2024-4467
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/7e1110664ecbc4826f3c978ccb06b6c1bce823e6]
Signed-off-by: Yogita Urade <yogita.urade@windriver.com>
---
tests/qemu-iotests/270 | 14 +++++++++++---
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tests/qemu-iotests/270 b/tests/qemu-iotests/270
index 74352342d..c37b674aa 100755
--- a/tests/qemu-iotests/270
+++ b/tests/qemu-iotests/270
@@ -60,8 +60,16 @@ _make_test_img -o cluster_size=2M,data_file="$TEST_IMG.orig" \
# "write" 2G of data without using any space.
# (qemu-img create does not like it, though, because null-co does not
# support image creation.)
-$QEMU_IMG amend -o data_file="json:{'driver':'null-co',,'size':'4294967296'}" \
- "$TEST_IMG"
+test_img_with_null_data="json:{
+ 'driver': '$IMGFMT',
+ 'file': {
+ 'filename': '$TEST_IMG'
+ },
+ 'data-file': {
+ 'driver': 'null-co',
+ 'size':'4294967296'
+ }
+}"
# This gives us a range of:
# 2^31 - 512 + 768 - 1 = 2^31 + 255 > 2^31
@@ -74,7 +82,7 @@ $QEMU_IMG amend -o data_file="json:{'driver':'null-co',,'size':'4294967296'}" \
# on L2 boundaries, we need large L2 tables; hence the cluster size of
# 2 MB. (Anything from 256 kB should work, though, because then one L2
# table covers 8 GB.)
-$QEMU_IO -c "write 768 $((2 ** 31 - 512))" "$TEST_IMG" | _filter_qemu_io
+$QEMU_IO -c "write 768 $((2 ** 31 - 512))" "$test_img_with_null_data" | _filter_qemu_io
_check_test_img
--
2.40.0

1187
meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2024-4467-0004.patch
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File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

239
meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2024-4467-0005.patch
View File

@@ -1,239 +0,0 @@
From 7ead946998610657d38d1a505d5f25300d4ca613 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 25 Apr 2024 14:56:02 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] block: Parse filenames only when explicitly requested
When handling image filenames from legacy options such as -drive or from
tools, these filenames are parsed for protocol prefixes, including for
the json:{} pseudo-protocol.
This behaviour is intended for filenames that come directly from the
command line and for backing files, which may come from the image file
itself. Higher level management tools generally take care to verify that
untrusted images don't contain a bad (or any) backing file reference;
'qemu-img info' is a suitable tool for this.
However, for other files that can be referenced in images, such as
qcow2 data files or VMDK extents, the string from the image file is
usually not verified by management tools - and 'qemu-img info' wouldn't
be suitable because in contrast to backing files, it already opens these
other referenced files. So here the string should be interpreted as a
literal local filename. More complex configurations need to be specified
explicitly on the command line or in QMP...
CVE: CVE-2024-4467
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/7ead946998610657d38d1a505d5f25300d4ca613]
Signed-off-by: Yogita Urade <yogita.urade@windriver.com>
---
block.c | 94 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------
1 file changed, 57 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)
diff --git a/block.c b/block.c
index 25e1ebc60..f3cb32cd7 100644
--- a/block.c
+++ b/block.c
@@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ static BlockDriverState *bdrv_open_inherit(const char *filename,
BlockDriverState *parent,
const BdrvChildClass *child_class,
BdrvChildRole child_role,
+ bool parse_filename,
Error **errp);
static bool bdrv_recurse_has_child(BlockDriverState *bs,
@@ -2047,7 +2048,8 @@ static void parse_json_protocol(QDict *options, const char **pfilename,
* block driver has been specified explicitly.
*/
static int bdrv_fill_options(QDict **options, const char *filename,
- int *flags, Error **errp)
+ int *flags, bool allow_parse_filename,
+ Error **errp)
{
const char *drvname;
bool protocol = *flags & BDRV_O_PROTOCOL;
@@ -2089,7 +2091,7 @@ static int bdrv_fill_options(QDict **options, const char *filename,
if (protocol && filename) {
if (!qdict_haskey(*options, "filename")) {
qdict_put_str(*options, "filename", filename);
- parse_filename = true;
+ parse_filename = allow_parse_filename;
} else {
error_setg(errp, "Can't specify 'file' and 'filename' options at "
"the same time");
@@ -3675,7 +3677,8 @@ int bdrv_open_backing_file(BlockDriverState *bs, QDict *parent_options,
}
backing_hd = bdrv_open_inherit(backing_filename, reference, options, 0, bs,
- &child_of_bds, bdrv_backing_role(bs), errp);
+ &child_of_bds, bdrv_backing_role(bs), true,
+ errp);
if (!backing_hd) {
bs->open_flags |= BDRV_O_NO_BACKING;
error_prepend(errp, "Could not open backing file: ");
@@ -3712,7 +3715,8 @@ free_exit:
static BlockDriverState *
bdrv_open_child_bs(const char *filename, QDict *options, const char *bdref_key,
BlockDriverState *parent, const BdrvChildClass *child_class,
- BdrvChildRole child_role, bool allow_none, Error **errp)
+ BdrvChildRole child_role, bool allow_none,
+ bool parse_filename, Error **errp)
{
BlockDriverState *bs = NULL;
QDict *image_options;
@@ -3743,7 +3747,8 @@ bdrv_open_child_bs(const char *filename, QDict *options, const char *bdref_key,
}
bs = bdrv_open_inherit(filename, reference, image_options, 0,
- parent, child_class, child_role, errp);
+ parent, child_class, child_role, parse_filename,
+ errp);
if (!bs) {
goto done;
}
@@ -3753,6 +3758,33 @@ done:
return bs;
}
+static BdrvChild *bdrv_open_child_common(const char *filename,
+ QDict *options, const char *bdref_key,
+ BlockDriverState *parent,
+ const BdrvChildClass *child_class,
+ BdrvChildRole child_role,
+ bool allow_none, bool parse_filename,
+ Error **errp)
+{
+ BlockDriverState *bs;
+ BdrvChild *child;
+
+ GLOBAL_STATE_CODE();
+
+ bs = bdrv_open_child_bs(filename, options, bdref_key, parent, child_class,
+ child_role, allow_none, parse_filename, errp);
+ if (bs == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ bdrv_graph_wrlock();
+ child = bdrv_attach_child(parent, bs, bdref_key, child_class, child_role,
+ errp);
+ bdrv_graph_wrunlock();
+
+ return child;
+}
+
/*
* Opens a disk image whose options are given as BlockdevRef in another block
* device's options.
@@ -3778,31 +3810,15 @@ BdrvChild *bdrv_open_child(const char *filename,
BdrvChildRole child_role,
bool allow_none, Error **errp)
{
- BlockDriverState *bs;
- BdrvChild *child;
- AioContext *ctx;
-
- GLOBAL_STATE_CODE();
-
- bs = bdrv_open_child_bs(filename, options, bdref_key, parent, child_class,
- child_role, allow_none, errp);
- if (bs == NULL) {
- return NULL;
- }
-
- bdrv_graph_wrlock();
- ctx = bdrv_get_aio_context(bs);
- aio_context_acquire(ctx);
- child = bdrv_attach_child(parent, bs, bdref_key, child_class, child_role,
- errp);
- aio_context_release(ctx);
- bdrv_graph_wrunlock();
-
- return child;
+ return bdrv_open_child_common(filename, options, bdref_key, parent,
+ child_class, child_role, allow_none, false,
+ errp);
}
/*
- * Wrapper on bdrv_open_child() for most popular case: open primary child of bs.
+ * This does mostly the same as bdrv_open_child(), but for opening the primary
+ * child of a node. A notable difference from bdrv_open_child() is that it
+ * enables filename parsing for protocol names (including json:).
*
* The caller must hold the lock of the main AioContext and no other AioContext.
* @parent can move to a different AioContext in this function. Callers must
@@ -3819,8 +3835,8 @@ int bdrv_open_file_child(const char *filename,
role = parent->drv->is_filter ?
(BDRV_CHILD_FILTERED | BDRV_CHILD_PRIMARY) : BDRV_CHILD_IMAGE;
- if (!bdrv_open_child(filename, options, bdref_key, parent,
- &child_of_bds, role, false, errp))
+ if (!bdrv_open_child_common(filename, options, bdref_key, parent,
+ &child_of_bds, role, false, true, errp))
{
return -EINVAL;
}
@@ -3865,7 +3881,8 @@ BlockDriverState *bdrv_open_blockdev_ref(BlockdevRef *ref, Error **errp)
}
- bs = bdrv_open_inherit(NULL, reference, qdict, 0, NULL, NULL, 0, errp);
+ bs = bdrv_open_inherit(NULL, reference, qdict, 0, NULL, NULL, 0, false,
+ errp);
obj = NULL;
qobject_unref(obj);
visit_free(v);
@@ -3962,7 +3979,7 @@ static BlockDriverState * no_coroutine_fn
bdrv_open_inherit(const char *filename, const char *reference, QDict *options,
int flags, BlockDriverState *parent,
const BdrvChildClass *child_class, BdrvChildRole child_role,
- Error **errp)
+ bool parse_filename, Error **errp)
{
int ret;
BlockBackend *file = NULL;
@@ -4011,9 +4028,11 @@ bdrv_open_inherit(const char *filename, const char *reference, QDict *options,
}
/* json: syntax counts as explicit options, as if in the QDict */
- parse_json_protocol(options, &filename, &local_err);
- if (local_err) {
- goto fail;
+ if (parse_filename) {
+ parse_json_protocol(options, &filename, &local_err);
+ if (local_err) {
+ goto fail;
+ }
}
bs->explicit_options = qdict_clone_shallow(options);
@@ -4038,7 +4057,8 @@ bdrv_open_inherit(const char *filename, const char *reference, QDict *options,
parent->open_flags, parent->options);
}
- ret = bdrv_fill_options(&options, filename, &flags, &local_err);
+ ret = bdrv_fill_options(&options, filename, &flags, parse_filename,
+ &local_err);
if (ret < 0) {
goto fail;
}
@@ -4107,7 +4127,7 @@ bdrv_open_inherit(const char *filename, const char *reference, QDict *options,
file_bs = bdrv_open_child_bs(filename, options, "file", bs,
&child_of_bds, BDRV_CHILD_IMAGE,
- true, &local_err);
+ true, true, &local_err);
if (local_err) {
goto fail;
}
@@ -4270,7 +4290,7 @@ BlockDriverState *bdrv_open(const char *filename, const char *reference,
GLOBAL_STATE_CODE();
return bdrv_open_inherit(filename, reference, options, flags, NULL,
- NULL, 0, errp);
+ NULL, 0, true, errp);
}
/* Return true if the NULL-terminated @list contains @str */
--
2.40.0

167
meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2024-7409-0001.patch
View File

@@ -1,167 +0,0 @@
From fb1c2aaa981e0a2fa6362c9985f1296b74f055ac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 7 Aug 2024 08:50:01 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] nbd/server: Plumb in new args to nbd_client_add()
Upcoming patches to fix a CVE need to track an opaque pointer passed
in by the owner of a client object, as well as request for a time
limit on how fast negotiation must complete. Prepare for that by
changing the signature of nbd_client_new() and adding an accessor to
get at the opaque pointer, although for now the two servers
(qemu-nbd.c and blockdev-nbd.c) do not change behavior even though
they pass in a new default timeout value.
Suggested-by: Vladimir Sementsov-Ogievskiy <vsementsov@yandex-team.ru>
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Message-ID: <20240807174943.771624-11-eblake@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
[eblake: s/LIMIT/MAX_SECS/ as suggested by Dan]
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
CVE: CVE-2024-7409
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/qemu/qemu/commit/fb1c2aaa981e0a2fa6362c9985f1296b74f055ac]
Signed-off-by: Archana Polampalli <archana.polampalli@windriver.com>
---
blockdev-nbd.c | 6 ++++--
include/block/nbd.h | 11 ++++++++++-
nbd/server.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++---
qemu-nbd.c | 4 +++-
4 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/blockdev-nbd.c b/blockdev-nbd.c
index 213012435..267a1de90 100644
--- a/blockdev-nbd.c
+++ b/blockdev-nbd.c
@@ -64,8 +64,10 @@ static void nbd_accept(QIONetListener *listener, QIOChannelSocket *cioc,
nbd_update_server_watch(nbd_server);
qio_channel_set_name(QIO_CHANNEL(cioc), "nbd-server");
- nbd_client_new(cioc, nbd_server->tlscreds, nbd_server->tlsauthz,
- nbd_blockdev_client_closed);
+ /* TODO - expose handshake timeout as QMP option */
+ nbd_client_new(cioc, NBD_DEFAULT_HANDSHAKE_MAX_SECS,
+ nbd_server->tlscreds, nbd_server->tlsauthz,
+ nbd_blockdev_client_closed, NULL);
}
static void nbd_update_server_watch(NBDServerData *s)
diff --git a/include/block/nbd.h b/include/block/nbd.h
index 4e7bd6342..1d4d65922 100644
--- a/include/block/nbd.h
+++ b/include/block/nbd.h
@@ -33,6 +33,12 @@ typedef struct NBDMetaContexts NBDMetaContexts;
extern const BlockExportDriver blk_exp_nbd;
+/*
+ * NBD_DEFAULT_HANDSHAKE_MAX_SECS: Number of seconds in which client must
+ * succeed at NBD_OPT_GO before being forcefully dropped as too slow.
+ */
+#define NBD_DEFAULT_HANDSHAKE_MAX_SECS 10
+
/* Handshake phase structs - this struct is passed on the wire */
typedef struct NBDOption {
@@ -403,9 +409,12 @@ AioContext *nbd_export_aio_context(NBDExport *exp);
NBDExport *nbd_export_find(const char *name);
void nbd_client_new(QIOChannelSocket *sioc,
+ uint32_t handshake_max_secs,
QCryptoTLSCreds *tlscreds,
const char *tlsauthz,
- void (*close_fn)(NBDClient *, bool));
+ void (*close_fn)(NBDClient *, bool),
+ void *owner);
+void *nbd_client_owner(NBDClient *client);
void nbd_client_get(NBDClient *client);
void nbd_client_put(NBDClient *client);
diff --git a/nbd/server.c b/nbd/server.c
index 091b57119..f8881936e 100644
--- a/nbd/server.c
+++ b/nbd/server.c
@@ -124,12 +124,14 @@ struct NBDMetaContexts {
struct NBDClient {
int refcount; /* atomic */
void (*close_fn)(NBDClient *client, bool negotiated);
+ void *owner;
QemuMutex lock;
NBDExport *exp;
QCryptoTLSCreds *tlscreds;
char *tlsauthz;
+ uint32_t handshake_max_secs;
QIOChannelSocket *sioc; /* The underlying data channel */
QIOChannel *ioc; /* The current I/O channel which may differ (eg TLS) */
@@ -3160,6 +3162,7 @@ static coroutine_fn void nbd_co_client_start(void *opaque)
qemu_co_mutex_init(&client->send_lock);
+ /* TODO - utilize client->handshake_max_secs */
if (nbd_negotiate(client, &local_err)) {
if (local_err) {
error_report_err(local_err);
@@ -3174,14 +3177,17 @@ static coroutine_fn void nbd_co_client_start(void *opaque)
}
/*
- * Create a new client listener using the given channel @sioc.
+ * Create a new client listener using the given channel @sioc and @owner.
* Begin servicing it in a coroutine. When the connection closes, call
- * @close_fn with an indication of whether the client completed negotiation.
+ * @close_fn with an indication of whether the client completed negotiation
+ * within @handshake_max_secs seconds (0 for unbounded).
*/
void nbd_client_new(QIOChannelSocket *sioc,
+ uint32_t handshake_max_secs,
QCryptoTLSCreds *tlscreds,
const char *tlsauthz,
- void (*close_fn)(NBDClient *, bool))
+ void (*close_fn)(NBDClient *, bool),
+ void *owner)
{
NBDClient *client;
Coroutine *co;
@@ -3194,13 +3200,21 @@ void nbd_client_new(QIOChannelSocket *sioc,
object_ref(OBJECT(client->tlscreds));
}
client->tlsauthz = g_strdup(tlsauthz);
+ client->handshake_max_secs = handshake_max_secs;
client->sioc = sioc;
qio_channel_set_delay(QIO_CHANNEL(sioc), false);
object_ref(OBJECT(client->sioc));
client->ioc = QIO_CHANNEL(sioc);
object_ref(OBJECT(client->ioc));
client->close_fn = close_fn;
+ client->owner = owner;
co = qemu_coroutine_create(nbd_co_client_start, client);
qemu_coroutine_enter(co);
}
+
+void *
+nbd_client_owner(NBDClient *client)
+{
+ return client->owner;
+}
diff --git a/qemu-nbd.c b/qemu-nbd.c
index 186e6468b..5fa399c0b 100644
--- a/qemu-nbd.c
+++ b/qemu-nbd.c
@@ -389,7 +389,9 @@ static void nbd_accept(QIONetListener *listener, QIOChannelSocket *cioc,
nb_fds++;
nbd_update_server_watch();
- nbd_client_new(cioc, tlscreds, tlsauthz, nbd_client_closed);
+ /* TODO - expose handshake timeout as command line option */
+ nbd_client_new(cioc, NBD_DEFAULT_HANDSHAKE_MAX_SECS,
+ tlscreds, tlsauthz, nbd_client_closed, NULL);
}
static void nbd_update_server_watch(void)
--
2.40.0

175
meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2024-7409-0002.patch
View File

@@ -1,175 +0,0 @@
From c8a76dbd90c2f48df89b75bef74917f90a59b623 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 6 Aug 2024 13:53:00 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] nbd/server: CVE-2024-7409: Cap default max-connections to 100
Allowing an unlimited number of clients to any web service is a recipe
for a rudimentary denial of service attack: the client merely needs to
open lots of sockets without closing them, until qemu no longer has
any more fds available to allocate.
For qemu-nbd, we default to allowing only 1 connection unless more are
explicitly asked for (-e or --shared); this was historically picked as
a nice default (without an explicit -t, a non-persistent qemu-nbd goes
away after a client disconnects, without needing any additional
follow-up commands), and we are not going to change that interface now
(besides, someday we want to point people towards qemu-storage-daemon
instead of qemu-nbd).
But for qemu proper, and the newer qemu-storage-daemon, the QMP
nbd-server-start command has historically had a default of unlimited
number of connections, in part because unlike qemu-nbd it is
inherently persistent until nbd-server-stop. Allowing multiple client
sockets is particularly useful for clients that can take advantage of
MULTI_CONN (creating parallel sockets to increase throughput),
although known clients that do so (such as libnbd's nbdcopy) typically
use only 8 or 16 connections (the benefits of scaling diminish once
more sockets are competing for kernel attention). Picking a number
large enough for typical use cases, but not unlimited, makes it
slightly harder for a malicious client to perform a denial of service
merely by opening lots of connections withot progressing through the
handshake.
This change does not eliminate CVE-2024-7409 on its own, but reduces
the chance for fd exhaustion or unlimited memory usage as an attack
surface. On the other hand, by itself, it makes it more obvious that
with a finite limit, we have the problem of an unauthenticated client
holding 100 fds opened as a way to block out a legitimate client from
being able to connect; thus, later patches will further add timeouts
to reject clients that are not making progress.
This is an INTENTIONAL change in behavior, and will break any client
of nbd-server-start that was not passing an explicit max-connections
parameter, yet expects more than 100 simultaneous connections. We are
not aware of any such client (as stated above, most clients aware of
MULTI_CONN get by just fine on 8 or 16 connections, and probably cope
with later connections failing by relying on the earlier connections;
libvirt has not yet been passing max-connections, but generally
creates NBD servers with the intent for a single client for the sake
of live storage migration; meanwhile, the KubeSAN project anticipates
a large cluster sharing multiple clients [up to 8 per node, and up to
100 nodes in a cluster], but it currently uses qemu-nbd with an
explicit --shared=0 rather than qemu-storage-daemon with
nbd-server-start).
We considered using a deprecation period (declare that omitting
max-parameters is deprecated, and make it mandatory in 3 releases -
then we don't need to pick an arbitrary default); that has zero risk
of breaking any apps that accidentally depended on more than 100
connections, and where such breakage might not be noticed under unit
testing but only under the larger loads of production usage. But it
does not close the denial-of-service hole until far into the future,
and requires all apps to change to add the parameter even if 100 was
good enough. It also has a drawback that any app (like libvirt) that
is accidentally relying on an unlimited default should seriously
consider their own CVE now, at which point they are going to change to
pass explicit max-connections sooner than waiting for 3 qemu releases.
Finally, if our changed default breaks an app, that app can always
pass in an explicit max-parameters with a larger value.
It is also intentional that the HMP interface to nbd-server-start is
not changed to expose max-connections (any client needing to fine-tune
things should be using QMP).
Suggested-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Message-ID: <20240807174943.771624-12-eblake@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
[ericb: Expand commit message to summarize Dan's argument for why we
break corner-case back-compat behavior without a deprecation period]
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
CVE: CVE-2024-7409
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/qemu/qemu/commit/c8a76dbd90c2f48df89b75bef74917f90a59b623]
Signed-off-by: Archana Polampalli <archana.polampalli@windriver.com>
---
block/monitor/block-hmp-cmds.c | 3 ++-
blockdev-nbd.c | 8 ++++++++
include/block/nbd.h | 7 +++++++
qapi/block-export.json | 4 ++--
4 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/block/monitor/block-hmp-cmds.c b/block/monitor/block-hmp-cmds.c
index c729cbf1e..78a697585 100644
--- a/block/monitor/block-hmp-cmds.c
+++ b/block/monitor/block-hmp-cmds.c
@@ -415,7 +415,8 @@ void hmp_nbd_server_start(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict)
goto exit;
}
- nbd_server_start(addr, NULL, NULL, 0, &local_err);
+ nbd_server_start(addr, NULL, NULL, NBD_DEFAULT_MAX_CONNECTIONS,
+ &local_err);
qapi_free_SocketAddress(addr);
if (local_err != NULL) {
goto exit;
diff --git a/blockdev-nbd.c b/blockdev-nbd.c
index 267a1de90..24ba5382d 100644
--- a/blockdev-nbd.c
+++ b/blockdev-nbd.c
@@ -170,6 +170,10 @@ void nbd_server_start(SocketAddress *addr, const char *tls_creds,
void nbd_server_start_options(NbdServerOptions *arg, Error **errp)
{
+ if (!arg->has_max_connections) {
+ arg->max_connections = NBD_DEFAULT_MAX_CONNECTIONS;
+ }
+
nbd_server_start(arg->addr, arg->tls_creds, arg->tls_authz,
arg->max_connections, errp);
}
@@ -182,6 +186,10 @@ void qmp_nbd_server_start(SocketAddressLegacy *addr,
{
SocketAddress *addr_flat = socket_address_flatten(addr);
+ if (!has_max_connections) {
+ max_connections = NBD_DEFAULT_MAX_CONNECTIONS;
+ }
+
nbd_server_start(addr_flat, tls_creds, tls_authz, max_connections, errp);
qapi_free_SocketAddress(addr_flat);
}
diff --git a/include/block/nbd.h b/include/block/nbd.h
index 1d4d65922..d4f8b21ae 100644
--- a/include/block/nbd.h
+++ b/include/block/nbd.h
@@ -39,6 +39,13 @@ extern const BlockExportDriver blk_exp_nbd;
*/
#define NBD_DEFAULT_HANDSHAKE_MAX_SECS 10
+/*
+ * NBD_DEFAULT_MAX_CONNECTIONS: Number of client sockets to allow at
+ * once; must be large enough to allow a MULTI_CONN-aware client like
+ * nbdcopy to create its typical number of 8-16 sockets.
+ */
+#define NBD_DEFAULT_MAX_CONNECTIONS 100
+
/* Handshake phase structs - this struct is passed on the wire */
typedef struct NBDOption {
diff --git a/qapi/block-export.json b/qapi/block-export.json
index 7874a49ba..1d255d77e 100644
--- a/qapi/block-export.json
+++ b/qapi/block-export.json
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
# @max-connections: The maximum number of connections to allow at the
# same time, 0 for unlimited. Setting this to 1 also stops the
# server from advertising multiple client support (since 5.2;
-# default: 0)
+# default: 100)
#
# Since: 4.2
##
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@
# @max-connections: The maximum number of connections to allow at the
# same time, 0 for unlimited. Setting this to 1 also stops the
# server from advertising multiple client support (since 5.2;
-# default: 0).
+# default: 100).
#
# Returns: error if the server is already running.
#
--
2.40.0

126
meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2024-7409-0003.patch
View File

@@ -1,126 +0,0 @@
From b9b72cb3ce15b693148bd09cef7e50110566d8a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 8 Aug 2024 16:05:08 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] nbd/server: CVE-2024-7409: Drop non-negotiating clients
A client that opens a socket but does not negotiate is merely hogging
qemu's resources (an open fd and a small amount of memory); and a
malicious client that can access the port where NBD is listening can
attempt a denial of service attack by intentionally opening and
abandoning lots of unfinished connections. The previous patch put a
default bound on the number of such ongoing connections, but once that
limit is hit, no more clients can connect (including legitimate ones).
The solution is to insist that clients complete handshake within a
reasonable time limit, defaulting to 10 seconds. A client that has
not successfully completed NBD_OPT_GO by then (including the case of
where the client didn't know TLS credentials to even reach the point
of NBD_OPT_GO) is wasting our time and does not deserve to stay
connected. Later patches will allow fine-tuning the limit away from
the default value (including disabling it for doing integration
testing of the handshake process itself).
Note that this patch in isolation actually makes it more likely to see
qemu SEGV after nbd-server-stop, as any client socket still connected
when the server shuts down will now be closed after 10 seconds rather
than at the client's whims. That will be addressed in the next patch.
For a demo of this patch in action:
$ qemu-nbd -f raw -r -t -e 10 file &
$ nbdsh --opt-mode -c '
H = list()
for i in range(20):
print(i)
H.insert(i, nbd.NBD())
H[i].set_opt_mode(True)
H[i].connect_uri("nbd://localhost")
'
$ kill $!
where later connections get to start progressing once earlier ones are
forcefully dropped for taking too long, rather than hanging.
Suggested-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Message-ID: <20240807174943.771624-13-eblake@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
[eblake: rebase to changes earlier in series, reduce scope of timer]
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
CVE: CVE-2024-7409
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/b9b72cb3ce15b693148bd09cef7e50110566d8a0]
Signed-off-by: Archana Polampalli <archana.polampalli@windriver.com>
---
nbd/server.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
nbd/trace-events | 1 +
2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/nbd/server.c b/nbd/server.c
index f8881936e..6155e329a 100644
--- a/nbd/server.c
+++ b/nbd/server.c
@@ -3155,22 +3155,48 @@ static void nbd_client_receive_next_request(NBDClient *client)
}
}
+static void nbd_handshake_timer_cb(void *opaque)
+{
+ QIOChannel *ioc = opaque;
+
+ trace_nbd_handshake_timer_cb();
+ qio_channel_shutdown(ioc, QIO_CHANNEL_SHUTDOWN_BOTH, NULL);
+}
+
static coroutine_fn void nbd_co_client_start(void *opaque)
{
NBDClient *client = opaque;
Error *local_err = NULL;
+ QEMUTimer *handshake_timer = NULL;
qemu_co_mutex_init(&client->send_lock);
- /* TODO - utilize client->handshake_max_secs */
+ /*
+ * Create a timer to bound the time spent in negotiation. If the
+ * timer expires, it is likely nbd_negotiate will fail because the
+ * socket was shutdown.
+ */
+ if (client->handshake_max_secs > 0) {
+ handshake_timer = aio_timer_new(qemu_get_aio_context(),
+ QEMU_CLOCK_REALTIME,
+ SCALE_NS,
+ nbd_handshake_timer_cb,
+ client->sioc);
+ timer_mod(handshake_timer,
+ qemu_clock_get_ns(QEMU_CLOCK_REALTIME) +
+ client->handshake_max_secs * NANOSECONDS_PER_SECOND);
+ }
+
if (nbd_negotiate(client, &local_err)) {
if (local_err) {
error_report_err(local_err);
}
+ timer_free(handshake_timer);
client_close(client, false);
return;
}
+ timer_free(handshake_timer);
WITH_QEMU_LOCK_GUARD(&client->lock) {
nbd_client_receive_next_request(client);
}
diff --git a/nbd/trace-events b/nbd/trace-events
index 00ae3216a..cbd0a4ab7 100644
--- a/nbd/trace-events
+++ b/nbd/trace-events
@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ nbd_co_receive_request_payload_received(uint64_t cookie, uint64_t len) "Payload
nbd_co_receive_ext_payload_compliance(uint64_t from, uint64_t len) "client sent non-compliant write without payload flag: from=0x%" PRIx64 ", len=0x%" PRIx64
nbd_co_receive_align_compliance(const char *op, uint64_t from, uint64_t len, uint32_t align) "client sent non-compliant unaligned %s request: from=0x%" PRIx64 ", len=0x%" PRIx64 ", align=0x%" PRIx32
nbd_trip(void) "Reading request"
+nbd_handshake_timer_cb(void) "client took too long to negotiate"
# client-connection.c
nbd_connect_thread_sleep(uint64_t timeout) "timeout %" PRIu64
--
2.40.0

164
meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2024-7409-0004.patch
View File

@@ -1,164 +0,0 @@
From 3e7ef738c8462c45043a1d39f702a0990406a3b3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 7 Aug 2024 12:23:13 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] nbd/server: CVE-2024-7409: Close stray clients at server-stop
A malicious client can attempt to connect to an NBD server, and then
intentionally delay progress in the handshake, including if it does
not know the TLS secrets. Although the previous two patches reduce
this behavior by capping the default max-connections parameter and
killing slow clients, they did not eliminate the possibility of a
client waiting to close the socket until after the QMP nbd-server-stop
command is executed, at which point qemu would SEGV when trying to
dereference the NULL nbd_server global which is no longer present.
This amounts to a denial of service attack. Worse, if another NBD
server is started before the malicious client disconnects, I cannot
rule out additional adverse effects when the old client interferes
with the connection count of the new server (although the most likely
is a crash due to an assertion failure when checking
nbd_server->connections > 0).
For environments without this patch, the CVE can be mitigated by
ensuring (such as via a firewall) that only trusted clients can
connect to an NBD server. Note that using frameworks like libvirt
that ensure that TLS is used and that nbd-server-stop is not executed
while any trusted clients are still connected will only help if there
is also no possibility for an untrusted client to open a connection
but then stall on the NBD handshake.
Given the previous patches, it would be possible to guarantee that no
clients remain connected by having nbd-server-stop sleep for longer
than the default handshake deadline before finally freeing the global
nbd_server object, but that could make QMP non-responsive for a long
time. So intead, this patch fixes the problem by tracking all client
sockets opened while the server is running, and forcefully closing any
such sockets remaining without a completed handshake at the time of
nbd-server-stop, then waiting until the coroutines servicing those
sockets notice the state change. nbd-server-stop now has a second
AIO_WAIT_WHILE_UNLOCKED (the first is indirectly through the
blk_exp_close_all_type() that disconnects all clients that completed
handshakes), but forced socket shutdown is enough to progress the
coroutines and quickly tear down all clients before the server is
freed, thus finally fixing the CVE.
This patch relies heavily on the fact that nbd/server.c guarantees
that it only calls nbd_blockdev_client_closed() from the main loop
(see the assertion in nbd_client_put() and the hoops used in
nbd_client_put_nonzero() to achieve that); if we did not have that
guarantee, we would also need a mutex protecting our accesses of the
list of connections to survive re-entrancy from independent iothreads.
Although I did not actually try to test old builds, it looks like this
problem has existed since at least commit 862172f45c (v2.12.0, 2017) -
even back when that patch started using a QIONetListener to handle
listening on multiple sockets, nbd_server_free() was already unaware
that the nbd_blockdev_client_closed callback can be reached later by a
client thread that has not completed handshakes (and therefore the
client's socket never got added to the list closed in
nbd_export_close_all), despite that patch intentionally tearing down
the QIONetListener to prevent new clients.
Reported-by: Alexander Ivanov <alexander.ivanov@virtuozzo.com>
Fixes: CVE-2024-7409
CC: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Message-ID: <20240807174943.771624-14-eblake@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
CVE: CVE-2024-7409
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/3e7ef738c8462c45043a1d39f702a0990406a3b3]
Signed-off-by: Archana Polampalli <archana.polampalli@windriver.com>
---
blockdev-nbd.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/blockdev-nbd.c b/blockdev-nbd.c
index 24ba5382d..f73409ae4 100644
--- a/blockdev-nbd.c
+++ b/blockdev-nbd.c
@@ -21,12 +21,18 @@
#include "io/channel-socket.h"
#include "io/net-listener.h"
+typedef struct NBDConn {
+ QIOChannelSocket *cioc;
+ QLIST_ENTRY(NBDConn) next;
+} NBDConn;
+
typedef struct NBDServerData {
QIONetListener *listener;
QCryptoTLSCreds *tlscreds;
char *tlsauthz;
uint32_t max_connections;
uint32_t connections;
+ QLIST_HEAD(, NBDConn) conns;
} NBDServerData;
static NBDServerData *nbd_server;
@@ -51,6 +57,14 @@ int nbd_server_max_connections(void)
static void nbd_blockdev_client_closed(NBDClient *client, bool ignored)
{
+ NBDConn *conn = nbd_client_owner(client);
+
+ assert(qemu_in_main_thread() && nbd_server);
+
+ object_unref(OBJECT(conn->cioc));
+ QLIST_REMOVE(conn, next);
+ g_free(conn);
+
nbd_client_put(client);
assert(nbd_server->connections > 0);
nbd_server->connections--;
@@ -60,14 +74,20 @@ static void nbd_blockdev_client_closed(NBDClient *client, bool ignored)
static void nbd_accept(QIONetListener *listener, QIOChannelSocket *cioc,
gpointer opaque)
{
+ NBDConn *conn = g_new0(NBDConn, 1);
+
+ assert(qemu_in_main_thread() && nbd_server);
nbd_server->connections++;
+ object_ref(OBJECT(cioc));
+ conn->cioc = cioc;
+ QLIST_INSERT_HEAD(&nbd_server->conns, conn, next);
nbd_update_server_watch(nbd_server);
qio_channel_set_name(QIO_CHANNEL(cioc), "nbd-server");
/* TODO - expose handshake timeout as QMP option */
nbd_client_new(cioc, NBD_DEFAULT_HANDSHAKE_MAX_SECS,
nbd_server->tlscreds, nbd_server->tlsauthz,
- nbd_blockdev_client_closed, NULL);
+ nbd_blockdev_client_closed, conn);
}
static void nbd_update_server_watch(NBDServerData *s)
@@ -81,12 +101,25 @@ static void nbd_update_server_watch(NBDServerData *s)
static void nbd_server_free(NBDServerData *server)
{
+ NBDConn *conn, *tmp;
+
if (!server) {
return;
}
+ /*
+ * Forcefully close the listener socket, and any clients that have
+ * not yet disconnected on their own.
+ */
qio_net_listener_disconnect(server->listener);
object_unref(OBJECT(server->listener));
+ QLIST_FOREACH_SAFE(conn, &server->conns, next, tmp) {
+ qio_channel_shutdown(QIO_CHANNEL(conn->cioc), QIO_CHANNEL_SHUTDOWN_BOTH,
+ NULL);
+ }
+
+ AIO_WAIT_WHILE_UNLOCKED(NULL, server->connections > 0);
+
if (server->tlscreds) {
object_unref(OBJECT(server->tlscreds));
}
--
2.40.0

0
meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu_8.2.3.bb → meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu_8.2.7.bb
View File