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python3: Fix CVE-2024-8088
There is a HIGH severity vulnerability affecting the CPython "zipfile"
module. When iterating over names of entries in a zip archive (for example,
methodsof "zipfile.ZipFile" like "namelist()", "iterdir()", "extractall()",
etc) the process can be put into an infinite loop with a maliciously crafted
zip archive. This defect applies when reading only metadata or extracting
the contents of the zip archive. Programs that are not handling
user-controlled zip archives are not affected.
References:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-8088
Upstream-Patch:
7ae310c56a
(From OE-Core rev: 2d98276ba70ed6c44afecd42a7352f1b3030438f)
Signed-off-by: Soumya Sambu <soumya.sambu@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
This commit is contained in:
Soumya Sambu
committed by
Steve Sakoman
Steve Sakoman
parent
9541ad9650
commit
31ea437bf7
128
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2024-8088.patch
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128
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2024-8088.patch
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@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
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From dcc5182f27c1500006a1ef78e10613bb45788dea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: "Miss Islington (bot)"
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<31488909+miss-islington@users.noreply.github.com>
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Date: Mon, 12 Aug 2024 02:35:17 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH] gh-122905: Sanitize names in zipfile.Path. (GH-122906)
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(#122923)
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CVE: CVE-2024-8088
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Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/python/cpython/commit/dcc5182f27c1500006a1ef78e10613bb45788dea]
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Signed-off-by: Soumya Sambu <soumya.sambu@windriver.com>
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---
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Lib/test/test_zipfile/_path/test_path.py | 17 +++++
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Lib/zipfile/_path/__init__.py | 64 ++++++++++++++++++-
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...-08-11-14-08-04.gh-issue-122905.7tDsxA.rst | 1 +
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3 files changed, 81 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
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create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2024-08-11-14-08-04.gh-issue-122905.7tDsxA.rst
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diff --git a/Lib/test/test_zipfile/_path/test_path.py b/Lib/test/test_zipfile/_path/test_path.py
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index 06d5aab..90885db 100644
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--- a/Lib/test/test_zipfile/_path/test_path.py
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+++ b/Lib/test/test_zipfile/_path/test_path.py
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@@ -577,3 +577,20 @@ class TestPath(unittest.TestCase):
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zipfile.Path(alpharep)
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with self.assertRaises(KeyError):
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alpharep.getinfo('does-not-exist')
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+
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+ def test_malformed_paths(self):
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+ """
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+ Path should handle malformed paths.
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+ """
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+ data = io.BytesIO()
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+ zf = zipfile.ZipFile(data, "w")
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+ zf.writestr("/one-slash.txt", b"content")
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+ zf.writestr("//two-slash.txt", b"content")
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+ zf.writestr("../parent.txt", b"content")
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+ zf.filename = ''
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+ root = zipfile.Path(zf)
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+ assert list(map(str, root.iterdir())) == [
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+ 'one-slash.txt',
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+ 'two-slash.txt',
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+ 'parent.txt',
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+ ]
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diff --git a/Lib/zipfile/_path/__init__.py b/Lib/zipfile/_path/__init__.py
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index 78c4135..42f9fde 100644
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--- a/Lib/zipfile/_path/__init__.py
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+++ b/Lib/zipfile/_path/__init__.py
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@@ -83,7 +83,69 @@ class InitializedState:
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super().__init__(*args, **kwargs)
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-class CompleteDirs(InitializedState, zipfile.ZipFile):
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+class SanitizedNames:
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+ """
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+ ZipFile mix-in to ensure names are sanitized.
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+ """
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+
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+ def namelist(self):
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+ return list(map(self._sanitize, super().namelist()))
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+
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+ @staticmethod
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+ def _sanitize(name):
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+ r"""
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+ Ensure a relative path with posix separators and no dot names.
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+
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+ Modeled after
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+ https://github.com/python/cpython/blob/bcc1be39cb1d04ad9fc0bd1b9193d3972835a57c/Lib/zipfile/__init__.py#L1799-L1813
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+ but provides consistent cross-platform behavior.
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+
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+ >>> san = SanitizedNames._sanitize
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+ >>> san('/foo/bar')
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+ 'foo/bar'
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+ >>> san('//foo.txt')
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+ 'foo.txt'
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+ >>> san('foo/.././bar.txt')
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+ 'foo/bar.txt'
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+ >>> san('foo../.bar.txt')
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+ 'foo../.bar.txt'
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+ >>> san('\\foo\\bar.txt')
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+ 'foo/bar.txt'
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+ >>> san('D:\\foo.txt')
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+ 'D/foo.txt'
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+ >>> san('\\\\server\\share\\file.txt')
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+ 'server/share/file.txt'
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+ >>> san('\\\\?\\GLOBALROOT\\Volume3')
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+ '?/GLOBALROOT/Volume3'
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+ >>> san('\\\\.\\PhysicalDrive1\\root')
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+ 'PhysicalDrive1/root'
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+
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+ Retain any trailing slash.
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+ >>> san('abc/')
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+ 'abc/'
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+
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+ Raises a ValueError if the result is empty.
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+ >>> san('../..')
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+ Traceback (most recent call last):
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+ ...
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+ ValueError: Empty filename
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+ """
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+
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+ def allowed(part):
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+ return part and part not in {'..', '.'}
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+
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+ # Remove the drive letter.
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+ # Don't use ntpath.splitdrive, because that also strips UNC paths
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+ bare = re.sub('^([A-Z]):', r'\1', name, flags=re.IGNORECASE)
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+ clean = bare.replace('\\', '/')
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+ parts = clean.split('/')
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+ joined = '/'.join(filter(allowed, parts))
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+ if not joined:
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+ raise ValueError("Empty filename")
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+ return joined + '/' * name.endswith('/')
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+
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+
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+class CompleteDirs(InitializedState, SanitizedNames, zipfile.ZipFile):
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"""
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A ZipFile subclass that ensures that implied directories
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are always included in the namelist.
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diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2024-08-11-14-08-04.gh-issue-122905.7tDsxA.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2024-08-11-14-08-04.gh-issue-122905.7tDsxA.rst
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new file mode 100644
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index 0000000..1be44c9
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--- /dev/null
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+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2024-08-11-14-08-04.gh-issue-122905.7tDsxA.rst
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@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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+:class:`zipfile.Path` objects now sanitize names from the zipfile.
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--
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2.40.0
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