mirror of
https://git.yoctoproject.org/poky
synced 2026-02-06 16:56:37 +01:00
python3: upgrade 3.8.4 -> 3.8.5
Release Date: July 20, 2020 Note: The release you're looking at is Python 3.8.5, a bugfix release for the legacy 3.8 series. Python 3.9 is now the latest feature release series of Python 3. Drop patches fixed in 3.8.5: - CVE-2019-20907 - CVE-2019-26116 References: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-20907 https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-26116 https://www.python.org/downloads/release/python-385/ https://docs.python.org/release/3.8.5/whatsnew/changelog.html#changelog (From OE-Core rev: c68cc11071cfa49d9d986bf7a9e6e1dfff514a39) Signed-off-by: Tim Orling <timothy.t.orling@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
Tim Orling
committed by
Richard Purdie
Richard Purdie
parent
2b16173faf
commit
8a0459c8bd
@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From a06a6bf4e67a50561f6d6fb33534df1d3035ea34 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Rishi <rishi_devan@mail.com>
|
||||
Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2020 13:51:00 +0200
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH] bpo-39017: Avoid infinite loop in the tarfile module
|
||||
(GH-21454)
|
||||
|
||||
Avoid infinite loop when reading specially crafted TAR files using the tarfile module
|
||||
(CVE-2019-20907).
|
||||
(cherry picked from commit 5a8d121a1f3ef5ad7c105ee378cc79a3eac0c7d4)
|
||||
|
||||
Co-authored-by: Rishi <rishi_devan@mail.com>
|
||||
|
||||
Removed testing 'recursion.tar' tar file due to binary data
|
||||
|
||||
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/python/cpython/commit/c55479556db015f48fc8bbca17f64d3e65598559]
|
||||
CVE: CVE-2019-20907
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Andrej Valek <andrej.valek@siemens.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
Lib/tarfile.py | 2 ++
|
||||
.../2020-07-12-22-16-58.bpo-39017.x3Cg-9.rst | 1 +
|
||||
4 files changed, 10 insertions(+)
|
||||
create mode 100644 Lib/test/recursion.tar
|
||||
create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2020-07-12-22-16-58.bpo-39017.x3Cg-9.rst
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/Lib/tarfile.py b/Lib/tarfile.py
|
||||
index d31b9cbb51d65..7a69e1b1aa544 100755
|
||||
--- a/Lib/tarfile.py
|
||||
+++ b/Lib/tarfile.py
|
||||
@@ -1241,6 +1241,8 @@ def _proc_pax(self, tarfile):
|
||||
|
||||
length, keyword = match.groups()
|
||||
length = int(length)
|
||||
+ if length == 0:
|
||||
+ raise InvalidHeaderError("invalid header")
|
||||
value = buf[match.end(2) + 1:match.start(1) + length - 1]
|
||||
|
||||
# Normally, we could just use "utf-8" as the encoding and "strict"
|
||||
diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2020-07-12-22-16-58.bpo-39017.x3Cg-9.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2020-07-12-22-16-58.bpo-39017.x3Cg-9.rst
|
||||
new file mode 100644
|
||||
index 0000000000000..ad26676f8b856
|
||||
--- /dev/null
|
||||
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2020-07-12-22-16-58.bpo-39017.x3Cg-9.rst
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
|
||||
+Avoid infinite loop when reading specially crafted TAR files using the tarfile module (CVE-2019-20907).
|
||||
@@ -1,104 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 668d321476d974c4f51476b33aaca870272523bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: "Miss Islington (bot)"
|
||||
<31488909+miss-islington@users.noreply.github.com>
|
||||
Date: Sat, 18 Jul 2020 13:39:12 -0700
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH] bpo-39603: Prevent header injection in http methods
|
||||
(GH-18485)
|
||||
|
||||
reject control chars in http method in http.client.putrequest to prevent http header injection
|
||||
(cherry picked from commit 8ca8a2e8fb068863c1138f07e3098478ef8be12e)
|
||||
|
||||
Co-authored-by: AMIR <31338382+amiremohamadi@users.noreply.github.com>
|
||||
|
||||
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/python/cpython/commit/668d321476d974c4f51476b33aaca870272523bf]
|
||||
CVE: CVE-2020-26116
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
Lib/http/client.py | 15 +++++++++++++
|
||||
Lib/test/test_httplib.py | 22 +++++++++++++++++++
|
||||
.../2020-02-12-14-17-39.bpo-39603.Gt3RSg.rst | 2 ++
|
||||
3 files changed, 39 insertions(+)
|
||||
create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2020-02-12-14-17-39.bpo-39603.Gt3RSg.rst
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/Lib/http/client.py b/Lib/http/client.py
|
||||
index 019380a720318..c2ad0471bfee5 100644
|
||||
--- a/Lib/http/client.py
|
||||
+++ b/Lib/http/client.py
|
||||
@@ -147,6 +147,10 @@
|
||||
# _is_allowed_url_pchars_re = re.compile(r"^[/!$&'()*+,;=:@%a-zA-Z0-9._~-]+$")
|
||||
# We are more lenient for assumed real world compatibility purposes.
|
||||
|
||||
+# These characters are not allowed within HTTP method names
|
||||
+# to prevent http header injection.
|
||||
+_contains_disallowed_method_pchar_re = re.compile('[\x00-\x1f]')
|
||||
+
|
||||
# We always set the Content-Length header for these methods because some
|
||||
# servers will otherwise respond with a 411
|
||||
_METHODS_EXPECTING_BODY = {'PATCH', 'POST', 'PUT'}
|
||||
@@ -1087,6 +1091,8 @@ def putrequest(self, method, url, skip_host=False,
|
||||
else:
|
||||
raise CannotSendRequest(self.__state)
|
||||
|
||||
+ self._validate_method(method)
|
||||
+
|
||||
# Save the method for use later in the response phase
|
||||
self._method = method
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1177,6 +1183,15 @@ def _encode_request(self, request):
|
||||
# ASCII also helps prevent CVE-2019-9740.
|
||||
return request.encode('ascii')
|
||||
|
||||
+ def _validate_method(self, method):
|
||||
+ """Validate a method name for putrequest."""
|
||||
+ # prevent http header injection
|
||||
+ match = _contains_disallowed_method_pchar_re.search(method)
|
||||
+ if match:
|
||||
+ raise ValueError(
|
||||
+ f"method can't contain control characters. {method!r} "
|
||||
+ f"(found at least {match.group()!r})")
|
||||
+
|
||||
def _validate_path(self, url):
|
||||
"""Validate a url for putrequest."""
|
||||
# Prevent CVE-2019-9740.
|
||||
diff --git a/Lib/test/test_httplib.py b/Lib/test/test_httplib.py
|
||||
index 8f0e27a1fb836..5a5fcecbc9c15 100644
|
||||
--- a/Lib/test/test_httplib.py
|
||||
+++ b/Lib/test/test_httplib.py
|
||||
@@ -364,6 +364,28 @@ def test_headers_debuglevel(self):
|
||||
self.assertEqual(lines[3], "header: Second: val2")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
+class HttpMethodTests(TestCase):
|
||||
+ def test_invalid_method_names(self):
|
||||
+ methods = (
|
||||
+ 'GET\r',
|
||||
+ 'POST\n',
|
||||
+ 'PUT\n\r',
|
||||
+ 'POST\nValue',
|
||||
+ 'POST\nHOST:abc',
|
||||
+ 'GET\nrHost:abc\n',
|
||||
+ 'POST\rRemainder:\r',
|
||||
+ 'GET\rHOST:\n',
|
||||
+ '\nPUT'
|
||||
+ )
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ for method in methods:
|
||||
+ with self.assertRaisesRegex(
|
||||
+ ValueError, "method can't contain control characters"):
|
||||
+ conn = client.HTTPConnection('example.com')
|
||||
+ conn.sock = FakeSocket(None)
|
||||
+ conn.request(method=method, url="/")
|
||||
+
|
||||
+
|
||||
class TransferEncodingTest(TestCase):
|
||||
expected_body = b"It's just a flesh wound"
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2020-02-12-14-17-39.bpo-39603.Gt3RSg.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2020-02-12-14-17-39.bpo-39603.Gt3RSg.rst
|
||||
new file mode 100644
|
||||
index 0000000000000..990affc3edd9d
|
||||
--- /dev/null
|
||||
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2020-02-12-14-17-39.bpo-39603.Gt3RSg.rst
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
|
||||
+Prevent http header injection by rejecting control characters in
|
||||
+http.client.putrequest(...).
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user