python: update to 3.7.3

License-update: copyright years

(From OE-Core rev: 845b9a4ed2b83d716688a7b0d8bf13f37e79a025)

Signed-off-by: Alexander Kanavin <alex.kanavin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Backported patches removed. ]
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
[Bug fix only update]
Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster808@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
Alexander Kanavin
2019-10-01 22:58:16 +03:00
committed by Richard Purdie
parent b58c50811b
commit d1a785686f
5 changed files with 5 additions and 285 deletions

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
From 4865615a2bc2b78c739e4c33f536712c7f9af061 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From 17796e353acf08acd604610f34840a4a9d2f4b54 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alexander Kanavin <alex.kanavin@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 31 Jan 2019 16:46:30 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] distutils/sysconfig: append

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
From 1397979ee445ff6826aa5469511e003539f77bb2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From 12900d498bb77bcc990868a80eaf0ab257b88fff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 14 May 2013 15:00:26 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] python3: Add target and native recipes

View File

@@ -1,124 +0,0 @@
From e5123d81ffb3be35a1b2767d6ced1a097aaf77be Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Miss Islington (bot)"
<31488909+miss-islington@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Sat, 9 Mar 2019 18:58:25 -0800
Subject: [PATCH] bpo-35121: prefix dot in domain for proper subdomain
validation (GH-10258) (GH-12261)
Don't send cookies of domain A without Domain attribute to domain B when domain A is a suffix match of domain B while using a cookiejar with `http.cookiejar.DefaultCookiePolicy` policy. Patch by Karthikeyan Singaravelan.
(cherry picked from commit ca7fe5063593958e5efdf90f068582837f07bd14)
Co-authored-by: Xtreak <tir.karthi@gmail.com>
Upstream-Status: Backport
CVE: CVE-2018-20852
Signed-off-by: Anuj Mittal <anuj.mittal@intel.com>
---
Lib/http/cookiejar.py | 13 ++++++--
Lib/test/test_http_cookiejar.py | 30 +++++++++++++++++++
.../2018-10-31-15-39-17.bpo-35121.EgHv9k.rst | 4 +++
3 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2018-10-31-15-39-17.bpo-35121.EgHv9k.rst
diff --git a/Lib/http/cookiejar.py b/Lib/http/cookiejar.py
index e0f1032b2816..00cb1250a07e 100644
--- a/Lib/http/cookiejar.py
+++ b/Lib/http/cookiejar.py
@@ -1145,6 +1145,11 @@ def return_ok_domain(self, cookie, request):
req_host, erhn = eff_request_host(request)
domain = cookie.domain
+ if domain and not domain.startswith("."):
+ dotdomain = "." + domain
+ else:
+ dotdomain = domain
+
# strict check of non-domain cookies: Mozilla does this, MSIE5 doesn't
if (cookie.version == 0 and
(self.strict_ns_domain & self.DomainStrictNonDomain) and
@@ -1157,7 +1162,7 @@ def return_ok_domain(self, cookie, request):
_debug(" effective request-host name %s does not domain-match "
"RFC 2965 cookie domain %s", erhn, domain)
return False
- if cookie.version == 0 and not ("."+erhn).endswith(domain):
+ if cookie.version == 0 and not ("."+erhn).endswith(dotdomain):
_debug(" request-host %s does not match Netscape cookie domain "
"%s", req_host, domain)
return False
@@ -1171,7 +1176,11 @@ def domain_return_ok(self, domain, request):
req_host = "."+req_host
if not erhn.startswith("."):
erhn = "."+erhn
- if not (req_host.endswith(domain) or erhn.endswith(domain)):
+ if domain and not domain.startswith("."):
+ dotdomain = "." + domain
+ else:
+ dotdomain = domain
+ if not (req_host.endswith(dotdomain) or erhn.endswith(dotdomain)):
#_debug(" request domain %s does not match cookie domain %s",
# req_host, domain)
return False
diff --git a/Lib/test/test_http_cookiejar.py b/Lib/test/test_http_cookiejar.py
index abc625d672a7..6e1b30881310 100644
--- a/Lib/test/test_http_cookiejar.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_http_cookiejar.py
@@ -415,6 +415,7 @@ def test_domain_return_ok(self):
("http://foo.bar.com/", ".foo.bar.com", True),
("http://foo.bar.com/", "foo.bar.com", True),
("http://foo.bar.com/", ".bar.com", True),
+ ("http://foo.bar.com/", "bar.com", True),
("http://foo.bar.com/", "com", True),
("http://foo.com/", "rhubarb.foo.com", False),
("http://foo.com/", ".foo.com", True),
@@ -425,6 +426,8 @@ def test_domain_return_ok(self):
("http://foo/", "foo", True),
("http://foo/", "foo.local", True),
("http://foo/", ".local", True),
+ ("http://barfoo.com", ".foo.com", False),
+ ("http://barfoo.com", "foo.com", False),
]:
request = urllib.request.Request(url)
r = pol.domain_return_ok(domain, request)
@@ -959,6 +962,33 @@ def test_domain_block(self):
c.add_cookie_header(req)
self.assertFalse(req.has_header("Cookie"))
+ c.clear()
+
+ pol.set_blocked_domains([])
+ req = urllib.request.Request("http://acme.com/")
+ res = FakeResponse(headers, "http://acme.com/")
+ cookies = c.make_cookies(res, req)
+ c.extract_cookies(res, req)
+ self.assertEqual(len(c), 1)
+
+ req = urllib.request.Request("http://acme.com/")
+ c.add_cookie_header(req)
+ self.assertTrue(req.has_header("Cookie"))
+
+ req = urllib.request.Request("http://badacme.com/")
+ c.add_cookie_header(req)
+ self.assertFalse(pol.return_ok(cookies[0], req))
+ self.assertFalse(req.has_header("Cookie"))
+
+ p = pol.set_blocked_domains(["acme.com"])
+ req = urllib.request.Request("http://acme.com/")
+ c.add_cookie_header(req)
+ self.assertFalse(req.has_header("Cookie"))
+
+ req = urllib.request.Request("http://badacme.com/")
+ c.add_cookie_header(req)
+ self.assertFalse(req.has_header("Cookie"))
+
def test_secure(self):
for ns in True, False:
for whitespace in " ", "":
diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2018-10-31-15-39-17.bpo-35121.EgHv9k.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2018-10-31-15-39-17.bpo-35121.EgHv9k.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..d2eb8f1f352c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2018-10-31-15-39-17.bpo-35121.EgHv9k.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+Don't send cookies of domain A without Domain attribute to domain B
+when domain A is a suffix match of domain B while using a cookiejar
+with :class:`http.cookiejar.DefaultCookiePolicy` policy. Patch by
+Karthikeyan Singaravelan.

View File

@@ -1,154 +0,0 @@
From daad2c482c91de32d8305abbccc76a5de8b3a8be Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Steve Dower <steve.dower@microsoft.com>
Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2019 09:08:18 -0800
Subject: [PATCH] bpo-36216: Add check for characters in netloc that normalize
to separators (GH-12201)
Upstream-Status: Backport
CVE: CVE-2019-9636
Signed-off-by: Anuj Mittal <anuj.mittal@intel.com>
---
Doc/library/urllib.parse.rst | 18 +++++++++++++++
Lib/test/test_urlparse.py | 23 +++++++++++++++++++
Lib/urllib/parse.py | 17 ++++++++++++++
.../2019-03-06-09-38-40.bpo-36216.6q1m4a.rst | 3 +++
4 files changed, 61 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-03-06-09-38-40.bpo-36216.6q1m4a.rst
diff --git a/Doc/library/urllib.parse.rst b/Doc/library/urllib.parse.rst
index 0c8f0f607314..b565e1edd321 100644
--- a/Doc/library/urllib.parse.rst
+++ b/Doc/library/urllib.parse.rst
@@ -124,6 +124,11 @@ or on combining URL components into a URL string.
Unmatched square brackets in the :attr:`netloc` attribute will raise a
:exc:`ValueError`.
+ Characters in the :attr:`netloc` attribute that decompose under NFKC
+ normalization (as used by the IDNA encoding) into any of ``/``, ``?``,
+ ``#``, ``@``, or ``:`` will raise a :exc:`ValueError`. If the URL is
+ decomposed before parsing, no error will be raised.
+
.. versionchanged:: 3.2
Added IPv6 URL parsing capabilities.
@@ -136,6 +141,10 @@ or on combining URL components into a URL string.
Out-of-range port numbers now raise :exc:`ValueError`, instead of
returning :const:`None`.
+ .. versionchanged:: 3.7.3
+ Characters that affect netloc parsing under NFKC normalization will
+ now raise :exc:`ValueError`.
+
.. function:: parse_qs(qs, keep_blank_values=False, strict_parsing=False, encoding='utf-8', errors='replace', max_num_fields=None)
@@ -257,10 +266,19 @@ or on combining URL components into a URL string.
Unmatched square brackets in the :attr:`netloc` attribute will raise a
:exc:`ValueError`.
+ Characters in the :attr:`netloc` attribute that decompose under NFKC
+ normalization (as used by the IDNA encoding) into any of ``/``, ``?``,
+ ``#``, ``@``, or ``:`` will raise a :exc:`ValueError`. If the URL is
+ decomposed before parsing, no error will be raised.
+
.. versionchanged:: 3.6
Out-of-range port numbers now raise :exc:`ValueError`, instead of
returning :const:`None`.
+ .. versionchanged:: 3.7.3
+ Characters that affect netloc parsing under NFKC normalization will
+ now raise :exc:`ValueError`.
+
.. function:: urlunsplit(parts)
diff --git a/Lib/test/test_urlparse.py b/Lib/test/test_urlparse.py
index be50b47603aa..e6638aee2244 100644
--- a/Lib/test/test_urlparse.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_urlparse.py
@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+import sys
+import unicodedata
import unittest
import urllib.parse
@@ -984,6 +986,27 @@ def test_all(self):
expected.append(name)
self.assertCountEqual(urllib.parse.__all__, expected)
+ def test_urlsplit_normalization(self):
+ # Certain characters should never occur in the netloc,
+ # including under normalization.
+ # Ensure that ALL of them are detected and cause an error
+ illegal_chars = '/:#?@'
+ hex_chars = {'{:04X}'.format(ord(c)) for c in illegal_chars}
+ denorm_chars = [
+ c for c in map(chr, range(128, sys.maxunicode))
+ if (hex_chars & set(unicodedata.decomposition(c).split()))
+ and c not in illegal_chars
+ ]
+ # Sanity check that we found at least one such character
+ self.assertIn('\u2100', denorm_chars)
+ self.assertIn('\uFF03', denorm_chars)
+
+ for scheme in ["http", "https", "ftp"]:
+ for c in denorm_chars:
+ url = "{}://netloc{}false.netloc/path".format(scheme, c)
+ with self.subTest(url=url, char='{:04X}'.format(ord(c))):
+ with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
+ urllib.parse.urlsplit(url)
class Utility_Tests(unittest.TestCase):
"""Testcase to test the various utility functions in the urllib."""
diff --git a/Lib/urllib/parse.py b/Lib/urllib/parse.py
index f691ab74f87f..39c5d6a80824 100644
--- a/Lib/urllib/parse.py
+++ b/Lib/urllib/parse.py
@@ -391,6 +391,21 @@ def _splitnetloc(url, start=0):
delim = min(delim, wdelim) # use earliest delim position
return url[start:delim], url[delim:] # return (domain, rest)
+def _checknetloc(netloc):
+ if not netloc or netloc.isascii():
+ return
+ # looking for characters like \u2100 that expand to 'a/c'
+ # IDNA uses NFKC equivalence, so normalize for this check
+ import unicodedata
+ netloc2 = unicodedata.normalize('NFKC', netloc)
+ if netloc == netloc2:
+ return
+ _, _, netloc = netloc.rpartition('@') # anything to the left of '@' is okay
+ for c in '/?#@:':
+ if c in netloc2:
+ raise ValueError("netloc '" + netloc2 + "' contains invalid " +
+ "characters under NFKC normalization")
+
def urlsplit(url, scheme='', allow_fragments=True):
"""Parse a URL into 5 components:
<scheme>://<netloc>/<path>?<query>#<fragment>
@@ -419,6 +434,7 @@ def urlsplit(url, scheme='', allow_fragments=True):
url, fragment = url.split('#', 1)
if '?' in url:
url, query = url.split('?', 1)
+ _checknetloc(netloc)
v = SplitResult('http', netloc, url, query, fragment)
_parse_cache[key] = v
return _coerce_result(v)
@@ -442,6 +458,7 @@ def urlsplit(url, scheme='', allow_fragments=True):
url, fragment = url.split('#', 1)
if '?' in url:
url, query = url.split('?', 1)
+ _checknetloc(netloc)
v = SplitResult(scheme, netloc, url, query, fragment)
_parse_cache[key] = v
return _coerce_result(v)
diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-03-06-09-38-40.bpo-36216.6q1m4a.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-03-06-09-38-40.bpo-36216.6q1m4a.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5546394157f9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-03-06-09-38-40.bpo-36216.6q1m4a.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Changes urlsplit() to raise ValueError when the URL contains characters that
+decompose under IDNA encoding (NFKC-normalization) into characters that
+affect how the URL is parsed.