dmidecode: fix CVE-2023-30630

Dmidecode before 3.5 allows -dump-bin to overwrite a local file.
This has security relevance because, for example, execution of
Dmidecode via Sudo is plausible.

References:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-30630
https://lists.nongnu.org/archive/html/dmidecode-devel/2023-04/msg00016.html
https://lists.nongnu.org/archive/html/dmidecode-devel/2023-04/msg00017.html

Backport: fixes fuzz in the CVE-2023-30630_2.patch in kirkstone

(From OE-Core rev: 4f83427a0a01e8285c9eb42d2a635d1ff7b23779)

Signed-off-by: Yogita Urade <yogita.urade@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
(cherry picked from commit f92e59a0894145a828dc9ac74bf8c7a9355e0587)
Signed-off-by: Dhairya Nagodra <dnagodra@cisco.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
This commit is contained in:
Yogita Urade
2023-07-28 10:01:09 +00:00
committed by Steve Sakoman
parent e01d123ba1
commit f4c5d9a3a6
5 changed files with 527 additions and 0 deletions

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@@ -0,0 +1,237 @@
From d8cfbc808f387e87091c25e7d5b8c2bb348bb206 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de>
Date: Tue, 27 Jun 2023 09:40:23 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] dmidecode: Write the whole dump file at once
When option --dump-bin is used, write the whole dump file at once,
instead of opening and closing the file separately for the table
and then for the entry point.
As the file writing function is no longer generic, it gets moved
from util.c to dmidecode.c.
One minor functional change resulting from the new implementation is
that the entry point is written first now, so the messages printed
are swapped.
Signed-off-by: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Jerry Hoemann <jerry.hoemann@hpe.com>
CVE: CVE-2023-30630
Reference: https://github.com/mirror/dmidecode/commit/39b2dd7b6ab719b920e96ed832cfb4bdd664e808
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/mirror/dmidecode/commit/d8cfbc808f387e87091c25e7d5b8c2bb348bb206]
Signed-off-by: Yogita Urade <yogita.urade@windriver.com>
---
dmidecode.c | 79 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
util.c | 40 ---------------------------
util.h | 1 -
3 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 62 deletions(-)
diff --git a/dmidecode.c b/dmidecode.c
index 9aeff91..5477309 100644
--- a/dmidecode.c
+++ b/dmidecode.c
@@ -5427,11 +5427,56 @@ static void dmi_table_string(const struct dmi_header *h, const u8 *data, u16 ver
}
}
-static void dmi_table_dump(const u8 *buf, u32 len)
+static int dmi_table_dump(const u8 *ep, u32 ep_len, const u8 *table,
+ u32 table_len)
{
+ FILE *f;
+
+ f = fopen(opt.dumpfile, "wb");
+ if (!f)
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", opt.dumpfile);
+ perror("fopen");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (!(opt.flags & FLAG_QUIET))
+ pr_comment("Writing %d bytes to %s.", ep_len, opt.dumpfile);
+ if (fwrite(ep, ep_len, 1, f) != 1)
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", opt.dumpfile);
+ perror("fwrite");
+ goto err_close;
+ }
+
+ if (fseek(f, 32, SEEK_SET) != 0)
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", opt.dumpfile);
+ perror("fseek");
+ goto err_close;
+ }
+
if (!(opt.flags & FLAG_QUIET))
- pr_comment("Writing %d bytes to %s.", len, opt.dumpfile);
- write_dump(32, len, buf, opt.dumpfile, 0);
+ pr_comment("Writing %d bytes to %s.", table_len, opt.dumpfile);
+ if (fwrite(table, table_len, 1, f) != 1)
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", opt.dumpfile);
+ perror("fwrite");
+ goto err_close;
+ }
+
+ if (fclose(f))
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", opt.dumpfile);
+ perror("fclose");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+
+err_close:
+ fclose(f);
+ return -1;
}
static void dmi_table_decode(u8 *buf, u32 len, u16 num, u16 ver, u32 flags)
@@ -5648,11 +5693,6 @@ static void dmi_table(off_t base, u32 len, u16 num, u32 ver, const char *devmem,
return;
}
- if (opt.flags & FLAG_DUMP_BIN)
- dmi_table_dump(buf, len);
- else
- dmi_table_decode(buf, len, num, ver >> 8, flags);
-
free(buf);
}
@@ -5688,8 +5728,9 @@ static void overwrite_smbios3_address(u8 *buf)
static int smbios3_decode(u8 *buf, const char *devmem, u32 flags)
{
- u32 ver;
+ u32 ver, len;
u64 offset;
+ u8 *table;
/* Don't let checksum run beyond the buffer */
if (buf[0x06] > 0x20)
@@ -5725,10 +5766,7 @@ static int smbios3_decode(u8 *buf, const char *devmem, u32 flags)
memcpy(crafted, buf, 32);
overwrite_smbios3_address(crafted);
- if (!(opt.flags & FLAG_QUIET))
- pr_comment("Writing %d bytes to %s.", crafted[0x06],
- opt.dumpfile);
- write_dump(0, crafted[0x06], crafted, opt.dumpfile, 1);
+ dmi_table_dump(crafted, crafted[0x06], table, len);
}
return 1;
@@ -5737,6 +5775,8 @@ static int smbios3_decode(u8 *buf, const char *devmem, u32 flags)
static int smbios_decode(u8 *buf, const char *devmem, u32 flags)
{
u16 ver;
+ u32 len;
+ u8 *table;
/* Don't let checksum run beyond the buffer */
if (buf[0x05] > 0x20)
@@ -5786,10 +5826,7 @@ static int smbios_decode(u8 *buf, const char *devmem, u32 flags)
memcpy(crafted, buf, 32);
overwrite_dmi_address(crafted + 0x10);
- if (!(opt.flags & FLAG_QUIET))
- pr_comment("Writing %d bytes to %s.", crafted[0x05],
- opt.dumpfile);
- write_dump(0, crafted[0x05], crafted, opt.dumpfile, 1);
+ dmi_table_dump(crafted, crafted[0x05], table, len);
}
return 1;
@@ -5797,6 +5834,9 @@ static int smbios_decode(u8 *buf, const char *devmem, u32 flags)
static int legacy_decode(u8 *buf, const char *devmem, u32 flags)
{
+ u32 len;
+ u8 *table;
+
if (!checksum(buf, 0x0F))
return 0;
@@ -5815,10 +5855,7 @@ static int legacy_decode(u8 *buf, const char *devmem, u32 flags)
memcpy(crafted, buf, 16);
overwrite_dmi_address(crafted);
- if (!(opt.flags & FLAG_QUIET))
- pr_comment("Writing %d bytes to %s.", 0x0F,
- opt.dumpfile);
- write_dump(0, 0x0F, crafted, opt.dumpfile, 1);
+ dmi_table_dump(crafted, 0x0F, table, len);
}
return 1;
diff --git a/util.c b/util.c
index 04aaadd..1547096 100644
--- a/util.c
+++ b/util.c
@@ -259,46 +259,6 @@ out:
return p;
}
-int write_dump(size_t base, size_t len, const void *data, const char *dumpfile, int add)
-{
- FILE *f;
-
- f = fopen(dumpfile, add ? "r+b" : "wb");
- if (!f)
- {
- fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", dumpfile);
- perror("fopen");
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (fseek(f, base, SEEK_SET) != 0)
- {
- fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", dumpfile);
- perror("fseek");
- goto err_close;
- }
-
- if (fwrite(data, len, 1, f) != 1)
- {
- fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", dumpfile);
- perror("fwrite");
- goto err_close;
- }
-
- if (fclose(f))
- {
- fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", dumpfile);
- perror("fclose");
- return -1;
- }
-
- return 0;
-
-err_close:
- fclose(f);
- return -1;
-}
-
/* Returns end - start + 1, assuming start < end */
u64 u64_range(u64 start, u64 end)
{
diff --git a/util.h b/util.h
index 3094cf8..ef24eb9 100644
--- a/util.h
+++ b/util.h
@@ -27,5 +27,4 @@
int checksum(const u8 *buf, size_t len);
void *read_file(off_t base, size_t *len, const char *filename);
void *mem_chunk(off_t base, size_t len, const char *devmem);
-int write_dump(size_t base, size_t len, const void *data, const char *dumpfile, int add);
u64 u64_range(u64 start, u64 end);
--
2.35.5

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@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
From 47101389dd52b50123a3ec59fed4d2021752e489 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de>
Date: Tue, 27 Jun 2023 10:03:53 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] dmidecode: Do not let --dump-bin overwrite an existing file
Make sure that the file passed to option --dump-bin does not already
exist. In practice, it is rather unlikely that an honest user would
want to overwrite an existing dump file, while this possibility
could be used by a rogue user to corrupt a system file.
Signed-off-by: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Jerry Hoemann <jerry.hoemann@hpe.com>
CVE: CVE-2023-30630
Upstream-Status: Backport
[https://github.com/mirror/dmidecode/commit/6ca381c1247c81f74e1ca4e7706f70bdda72e6f2]
Signed-off-by: Yogita Urade <yogita.urade@windriver.com>
---
dmidecode.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
man/dmidecode.8 | 3 ++-
2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/dmidecode.c b/dmidecode.c
index ae461de..6446040 100644
--- a/dmidecode.c
+++ b/dmidecode.c
@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@
* https://www.dmtf.org/sites/default/files/DSP0270_1.0.1.pdf
*/
+#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <strings.h>
@@ -5133,13 +5134,22 @@ static void dmi_table_string(const struct dmi_header *h, const u8 *data, u16 ver
static int dmi_table_dump(const u8 *ep, u32 ep_len, const u8 *table,
u32 table_len)
{
+ int fd;
FILE *f;
- f = fopen(opt.dumpfile, "wb");
+ fd = open(opt.dumpfile, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, 0666);
+ if (fd == -1)
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", opt.dumpfile);
+ perror("open");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ f = fdopen(fd, "wb");
if (!f)
{
fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", opt.dumpfile);
- perror("fopen");
+ perror("fdopen");
return -1;
}
diff --git a/man/dmidecode.8 b/man/dmidecode.8
index 64dc7e7..d5b7f01 100644
--- a/man/dmidecode.8
+++ b/man/dmidecode.8
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.TH DMIDECODE 8 "January 2019" "dmidecode"
+.TH DMIDECODE 8 "February 2023" "dmidecode"
.\"
.SH NAME
dmidecode \- \s-1DMI\s0 table decoder
@@ -132,6 +132,7 @@ hexadecimal and \s-1ASCII\s0. This option is mainly useful for debugging.
Do not decode the entries, instead dump the DMI data to a file in binary
form. The generated file is suitable to pass to \fB--from-dump\fR
later.
+\fIFILE\fP must not exist.
.TP
.BR " " " " "--from-dump FILE"
Read the DMI data from a binary file previously generated using

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@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
From c76ddda0ba0aa99a55945e3290095c2ec493c892 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de>
Date: Tue, 27 Jun 2023 10:25:50 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Consistently use read_file() when reading from a dump file
Use read_file() instead of mem_chunk() to read the entry point from a
dump file. This is faster, and consistent with how we then read the
actual DMI table from that dump file.
This made no functional difference so far, which is why it went
unnoticed for years. But now that a file type check was added to the
mem_chunk() function, we must stop using it to read from regular
files.
This will again allow root to use the --from-dump option.
Signed-off-by: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de>
Tested-by: Jerry Hoemann <jerry.hoemann@hpe.com>
CVE: CVE-2023-30630
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.nongnu.org/cgit/dmidecode.git/commit/?id=c76ddda0ba0aa99a55945e3290095c2ec493c892]
Signed-off-by: Yogita Urade <yogita.urade@windriver.com>
---
dmidecode.c | 11 +++++++++--
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/dmidecode.c b/dmidecode.c
index 98f9692..b4dbc9d 100644
--- a/dmidecode.c
+++ b/dmidecode.c
@@ -5997,17 +5997,25 @@ int main(int argc, char * const argv[])
pr_comment("dmidecode %s", VERSION);
/* Read from dump if so instructed */
+ size = 0x20;
if (opt.flags & FLAG_FROM_DUMP)
{
if (!(opt.flags & FLAG_QUIET))
pr_info("Reading SMBIOS/DMI data from file %s.",
opt.dumpfile);
- if ((buf = mem_chunk(0, 0x20, opt.dumpfile)) == NULL)
+ if ((buf = read_file(0, &size, opt.dumpfile)) == NULL)
{
ret = 1;
goto exit_free;
}
+ /* Truncated entry point can't be processed */
+ if (size < 0x20)
+ {
+ ret = 1;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
if (memcmp(buf, "_SM3_", 5) == 0)
{
if (smbios3_decode(buf, opt.dumpfile, 0))
@@ -6031,7 +6039,6 @@ int main(int argc, char * const argv[])
* contain one of several types of entry points, so read enough for
* the largest one, then determine what type it contains.
*/
- size = 0x20;
if (!(opt.flags & FLAG_NO_SYSFS)
&& (buf = read_file(0, &size, SYS_ENTRY_FILE)) != NULL)
{
--
2.40.0

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@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
From 2b83c4b898f8325313162f588765411e8e3e5561 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de>
Date: Tue, 27 Jun 2023 10:58:11 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Don't read beyond sysfs entry point buffer
Functions smbios_decode() and smbios3_decode() include a check
against buffer overrun. This check assumes that the buffer length is
always 32 bytes. This is true when reading from /dev/mem or from a
dump file, however when reading from sysfs, the buffer length is the
size of the actual sysfs attribute file, typically 31 bytes for an
SMBIOS 2.x entry point and 24 bytes for an SMBIOS 3.x entry point.
In the unlikely event of a malformed entry point, with encoded length
larger than expected but smaller than or equal to 32, we would hit a
buffer overrun. So properly pass the actual buffer length as an
argument and perform the check against it.
In practice, this will never happen, because on the Linux kernel
side, the size of the sysfs attribute file is decided from the entry
point length field. So it is technically impossible for them not to
match. But user-space code should not make such assumptions.
Signed-off-by: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de>
CVE: CVE-2023-30630
Upstream-Status: Backport
[https://git.savannah.nongnu.org/cgit/dmidecode.git/commit/?id=2b83c4b898f8325313162f588765411e8e3e5561]
Signed-off-by: Yogita Urade <yogita.urade@windriver.com>
---
dmidecode.c | 24 ++++++++++++------------
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/dmidecode.c b/dmidecode.c
index b4dbc9d..870d94e 100644
--- a/dmidecode.c
+++ b/dmidecode.c
@@ -5736,14 +5736,14 @@ static void overwrite_smbios3_address(u8 *buf)
buf[0x17] = 0;
}
-static int smbios3_decode(u8 *buf, const char *devmem, u32 flags)
+static int smbios3_decode(u8 *buf, size_t buf_len, const char *devmem, u32 flags)
{
u32 ver, len;
u64 offset;
u8 *table;
/* Don't let checksum run beyond the buffer */
- if (buf[0x06] > 0x20)
+ if (buf[0x06] > buf_len)
{
fprintf(stderr,
"Entry point length too large (%u bytes, expected %u).\n",
@@ -5782,14 +5782,14 @@ static int smbios3_decode(u8 *buf, const char *devmem, u32 flags)
return 1;
}
-static int smbios_decode(u8 *buf, const char *devmem, u32 flags)
+static int smbios_decode(u8 *buf, size_t buf_len, const char *devmem, u32 flags)
{
u16 ver;
u32 len;
u8 *table;
/* Don't let checksum run beyond the buffer */
- if (buf[0x05] > 0x20)
+ if (buf[0x05] > buf_len)
{
fprintf(stderr,
"Entry point length too large (%u bytes, expected %u).\n",
@@ -6018,12 +6018,12 @@ int main(int argc, char * const argv[])
if (memcmp(buf, "_SM3_", 5) == 0)
{
- if (smbios3_decode(buf, opt.dumpfile, 0))
+ if (smbios3_decode(buf, size, opt.dumpfile, 0))
found++;
}
else if (memcmp(buf, "_SM_", 4) == 0)
{
- if (smbios_decode(buf, opt.dumpfile, 0))
+ if (smbios_decode(buf, size, opt.dumpfile, 0))
found++;
}
else if (memcmp(buf, "_DMI_", 5) == 0)
@@ -6046,12 +6046,12 @@ int main(int argc, char * const argv[])
pr_info("Getting SMBIOS data from sysfs.");
if (size >= 24 && memcmp(buf, "_SM3_", 5) == 0)
{
- if (smbios3_decode(buf, SYS_TABLE_FILE, FLAG_NO_FILE_OFFSET))
+ if (smbios3_decode(buf, size, SYS_TABLE_FILE, FLAG_NO_FILE_OFFSET))
found++;
}
else if (size >= 31 && memcmp(buf, "_SM_", 4) == 0)
{
- if (smbios_decode(buf, SYS_TABLE_FILE, FLAG_NO_FILE_OFFSET))
+ if (smbios_decode(buf, size, SYS_TABLE_FILE, FLAG_NO_FILE_OFFSET))
found++;
}
else if (size >= 15 && memcmp(buf, "_DMI_", 5) == 0)
@@ -6088,12 +6088,12 @@ int main(int argc, char * const argv[])
if (memcmp(buf, "_SM3_", 5) == 0)
{
- if (smbios3_decode(buf, opt.devmem, 0))
+ if (smbios3_decode(buf, 0x20, opt.devmem, 0))
found++;
}
else if (memcmp(buf, "_SM_", 4) == 0)
{
- if (smbios_decode(buf, opt.devmem, 0))
+ if (smbios_decode(buf, 0x20, opt.devmem, 0))
found++;
}
goto done;
@@ -6114,7 +6114,7 @@ memory_scan:
{
if (memcmp(buf + fp, "_SM3_", 5) == 0)
{
- if (smbios3_decode(buf + fp, opt.devmem, 0))
+ if (smbios3_decode(buf + fp, 0x20, opt.devmem, 0))
{
found++;
goto done;
@@ -6127,7 +6127,7 @@ memory_scan:
{
if (memcmp(buf + fp, "_SM_", 4) == 0 && fp <= 0xFFE0)
{
- if (smbios_decode(buf + fp, opt.devmem, 0))
+ if (smbios_decode(buf + fp, 0x20, opt.devmem, 0))
{
found++;
goto done;
--
2.35.5

View File

@@ -6,6 +6,10 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE;md5=b234ee4d69f5fce4486a80fdaf4a4263"
SRC_URI = "${SAVANNAH_NONGNU_MIRROR}/dmidecode/${BP}.tar.xz \
file://0001-Committing-changes-from-do_unpack_extra.patch \
file://CVE-2023-30630_1.patch \
file://CVE-2023-30630_2.patch \
file://CVE-2023-30630_3.patch \
file://CVE-2023-30630_4.patch \
"
COMPATIBLE_HOST = "(i.86|x86_64|aarch64|arm|powerpc|powerpc64).*-linux"