mirrors/poky
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://git.yoctoproject.org/poky synced 2026-03-05 06:49:39 +01:00
Code Issues Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

python: update to 2.7.17

Browse Source 
Drop backports, rebase a couple of patches.

This is the second last release of py 2.x; upstream support ends on
1 January 2020, there will be one final 2.x afterwards.

Note that the only thing that still needs python 2.x in oe-core is
u-boot; when the next u-boot update arrives, we should find out
where the py3 migration is for that component before merging the
update.

(From OE-Core rev: 184b60eb905bb75ecc7a0c29a175e624d8555fac)

Signed-off-by: Alexander Kanavin <alex.kanavin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
Alexander Kanavin
2019-11-18 15:28:40 +01:00
committed by Richard Purdie
parent d05b78b245
commit f681fd3b2f
14 changed files with 49 additions and 904 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

90
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python/0001-2.7-bpo-34155-Dont-parse-domains-containing-GH-13079.patch
View File

@@ -1,90 +0,0 @@
From 532ed09c5454bb789a301bb6f1339a0818255610 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Roberto=20C=2E=20S=C3=A1nchez?= <roberto@connexer.com>
Date: Sat, 14 Sep 2019 13:26:38 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] [2.7] bpo-34155: Dont parse domains containing @ (GH-13079)
(GH-16006)
This change skips parsing of email addresses where domains include a "@" character, which can be maliciously used since the local part is returned as a complete address.
(cherry picked from commit 8cb65d1381b027f0b09ee36bfed7f35bb4dec9a9)
Excludes changes to Lib/email/_header_value_parser.py, which did not
exist in 2.7.
Co-authored-by: jpic <jpic@users.noreply.github.com>
https://bugs.python.org/issue34155
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/python/cpython/commit/8cb65d1381b027f0b09ee36bfed7f35bb4dec9a9]
CVE: CVE-2019-16056
Signed-off-by: Chen Qi <Qi.Chen@windriver.com>
---
Lib/email/_parseaddr.py | 11 ++++++++++-
Lib/email/test/test_email.py | 14 ++++++++++++++
.../2019-05-04-13-33-37.bpo-34155.MJll68.rst | 1 +
3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-05-04-13-33-37.bpo-34155.MJll68.rst
diff --git a/Lib/email/_parseaddr.py b/Lib/email/_parseaddr.py
index 690db2c22d..dc49d2e45a 100644
--- a/Lib/email/_parseaddr.py
+++ b/Lib/email/_parseaddr.py
@@ -336,7 +336,12 @@ class AddrlistClass:
aslist.append('@')
self.pos += 1
self.gotonext()
- return EMPTYSTRING.join(aslist) + self.getdomain()
+ domain = self.getdomain()
+ if not domain:
+ # Invalid domain, return an empty address instead of returning a
+ # local part to denote failed parsing.
+ return EMPTYSTRING
+ return EMPTYSTRING.join(aslist) + domain
def getdomain(self):
"""Get the complete domain name from an address."""
@@ -351,6 +356,10 @@ class AddrlistClass:
elif self.field[self.pos] == '.':
self.pos += 1
sdlist.append('.')
+ elif self.field[self.pos] == '@':
+ # bpo-34155: Don't parse domains with two `@` like
+ # `a@malicious.org@important.com`.
+ return EMPTYSTRING
elif self.field[self.pos] in self.atomends:
break
else:
diff --git a/Lib/email/test/test_email.py b/Lib/email/test/test_email.py
index 4b4dee3d34..2efe44ac5a 100644
--- a/Lib/email/test/test_email.py
+++ b/Lib/email/test/test_email.py
@@ -2306,6 +2306,20 @@ class TestMiscellaneous(TestEmailBase):
self.assertEqual(Utils.parseaddr('<>'), ('', ''))
self.assertEqual(Utils.formataddr(Utils.parseaddr('<>')), '')
+ def test_parseaddr_multiple_domains(self):
+ self.assertEqual(
+ Utils.parseaddr('a@b@c'),
+ ('', '')
+ )
+ self.assertEqual(
+ Utils.parseaddr('a@b.c@c'),
+ ('', '')
+ )
+ self.assertEqual(
+ Utils.parseaddr('a@172.17.0.1@c'),
+ ('', '')
+ )
+
def test_noquote_dump(self):
self.assertEqual(
Utils.formataddr(('A Silly Person', 'person@dom.ain')),
diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-05-04-13-33-37.bpo-34155.MJll68.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-05-04-13-33-37.bpo-34155.MJll68.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..50292e29ed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-05-04-13-33-37.bpo-34155.MJll68.rst
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Fix parsing of invalid email addresses with more than one ``@`` (e.g. a@b@c.com.) to not return the part before 2nd ``@`` as valid email address. Patch by maxking & jpic.

101
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python/0001-2.7-bpo-38243-Escape-the-server-title-of-DocXMLRPCSe.patch
View File

@@ -1,101 +0,0 @@
From b161c89c8bd66fe928192e21364678c8e9b8fcc0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dong-hee Na <donghee.na92@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 1 Oct 2019 19:58:01 +0900
Subject: [PATCH] [2.7] bpo-38243: Escape the server title of DocXMLRPCServer
(GH-16447)
Escape the server title of DocXMLRPCServer.DocXMLRPCServer
when rendering the document page as HTML.
CVE: CVE-2019-16935
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/python/cpython/pull/16447/commits/b41cde823d026f2adc21ef14b1c2e92b1006de06]
Signed-off-by: Chen Qi <Qi.Chen@windriver.com>
---
Lib/DocXMLRPCServer.py | 13 +++++++++++-
Lib/test/test_docxmlrpc.py | 20 +++++++++++++++++++
.../2019-09-25-13-21-09.bpo-38243.1pfz24.rst | 3 +++
3 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-09-25-13-21-09.bpo-38243.1pfz24.rst
diff --git a/Lib/DocXMLRPCServer.py b/Lib/DocXMLRPCServer.py
index 4064ec2e48..90b037dd35 100644
--- a/Lib/DocXMLRPCServer.py
+++ b/Lib/DocXMLRPCServer.py
@@ -20,6 +20,16 @@ from SimpleXMLRPCServer import (SimpleXMLRPCServer,
CGIXMLRPCRequestHandler,
resolve_dotted_attribute)
+
+def _html_escape_quote(s):
+ s = s.replace("&", "&amp;") # Must be done first!
+ s = s.replace("<", "&lt;")
+ s = s.replace(">", "&gt;")
+ s = s.replace('"', "&quot;")
+ s = s.replace('\'', "&#x27;")
+ return s
+
+
class ServerHTMLDoc(pydoc.HTMLDoc):
"""Class used to generate pydoc HTML document for a server"""
@@ -210,7 +220,8 @@ class XMLRPCDocGenerator:
methods
)
- return documenter.page(self.server_title, documentation)
+ title = _html_escape_quote(self.server_title)
+ return documenter.page(title, documentation)
class DocXMLRPCRequestHandler(SimpleXMLRPCRequestHandler):
"""XML-RPC and documentation request handler class.
diff --git a/Lib/test/test_docxmlrpc.py b/Lib/test/test_docxmlrpc.py
index 4dff4159e2..c45b892b8b 100644
--- a/Lib/test/test_docxmlrpc.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_docxmlrpc.py
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
from DocXMLRPCServer import DocXMLRPCServer
import httplib
+import re
import sys
from test import test_support
threading = test_support.import_module('threading')
@@ -176,6 +177,25 @@ class DocXMLRPCHTTPGETServer(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertIn("""Try&nbsp;self.<strong>add</strong>,&nbsp;too.""",
response.read())
+ def test_server_title_escape(self):
+ """Test that the server title and documentation
+ are escaped for HTML.
+ """
+ self.serv.set_server_title('test_title<script>')
+ self.serv.set_server_documentation('test_documentation<script>')
+ self.assertEqual('test_title<script>', self.serv.server_title)
+ self.assertEqual('test_documentation<script>',
+ self.serv.server_documentation)
+
+ generated = self.serv.generate_html_documentation()
+ title = re.search(r'<title>(.+?)</title>', generated).group()
+ documentation = re.search(r'<p><tt>(.+?)</tt></p>', generated).group()
+ self.assertEqual('<title>Python: test_title&lt;script&gt;</title>',
+ title)
+ self.assertEqual('<p><tt>test_documentation&lt;script&gt;</tt></p>',
+ documentation)
+
+
def test_main():
test_support.run_unittest(DocXMLRPCHTTPGETServer)
diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-09-25-13-21-09.bpo-38243.1pfz24.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-09-25-13-21-09.bpo-38243.1pfz24.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8f02baed9e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-09-25-13-21-09.bpo-38243.1pfz24.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Escape the server title of :class:`DocXMLRPCServer.DocXMLRPCServer`
+when rendering the document page as HTML.
+(Contributed by Dong-hee Na in :issue:`38243`.)
--
2.17.1

53
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python/builddir.patch → meta/recipes-devtools/python/python/0001-python-Resolve-intermediate-staging-issues.patch
View File

@@ -1,5 +1,10 @@
When cross compiling python, we used to need to install the Makefile, pyconfig.h
and the python library to their final location before being able to compile the
From 77bcb3238b2853d511714544e0f84a37be6c79bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
Date: Wed, 14 Nov 2012 14:31:24 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] python: Resolve intermediate staging issues
When cross compiling python, we used to need to install the Makefile, pyconfig.h
and the python library to their final location before being able to compile the
rest of python. This change allows us to point python at its own source when
building, avoiding a variety of sysroot staging issues and simplifying the main
python recipe.
@@ -7,10 +12,29 @@ python recipe.
Upstream-Status: Inappropriate
RP 2012/11/13
Index: Python-2.7.9/Lib/sysconfig.py
===================================================================
--- Python-2.7.9.orig/Lib/sysconfig.py
+++ Python-2.7.9/Lib/sysconfig.py
---
Lib/distutils/sysconfig.py | 3 +++
Lib/sysconfig.py | 5 ++++-
2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/Lib/distutils/sysconfig.py b/Lib/distutils/sysconfig.py
index 2f4b8ca..15bceb5 100644
--- a/Lib/distutils/sysconfig.py
+++ b/Lib/distutils/sysconfig.py
@@ -31,6 +31,9 @@ else:
# sys.executable can be empty if argv[0] has been changed and Python is
# unable to retrieve the real program name
project_base = os.getcwd()
+_PYTHONBUILDDIR = os.environ.get("PYTHONBUILDDIR", None)
+if _PYTHONBUILDDIR:
+ project_base = _PYTHONBUILDDIR
if os.name == "nt" and "pcbuild" in project_base[-8:].lower():
project_base = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(project_base, os.path.pardir))
# PC/VS7.1
diff --git a/Lib/sysconfig.py b/Lib/sysconfig.py
index 9c8350d..bddbe2e 100644
--- a/Lib/sysconfig.py
+++ b/Lib/sysconfig.py
@@ -93,6 +93,7 @@ _PREFIX = os.path.normpath(sys.prefix)
_EXEC_PREFIX = os.path.normpath(sys.exec_prefix)
_CONFIG_VARS = None
@@ -30,17 +54,6 @@ Index: Python-2.7.9/Lib/sysconfig.py
_PROJECT_BASE = os.path.dirname(_safe_realpath(sys.executable))
else:
# sys.executable can be empty if argv[0] has been changed and Python is
Index: Python-2.7.9/Lib/distutils/sysconfig.py
===================================================================
--- Python-2.7.9.orig/Lib/distutils/sysconfig.py
+++ Python-2.7.9/Lib/distutils/sysconfig.py
@@ -26,6 +26,9 @@ EXEC_PREFIX = os.path.normpath(sys.exec_
# live in project/PCBuild9. If we're dealing with an x64 Windows build,
# it'll live in project/PCbuild/amd64.
project_base = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(sys.executable))
+_PYTHONBUILDDIR = os.environ.get("PYTHONBUILDDIR", None)
+if _PYTHONBUILDDIR:
+ project_base = _PYTHONBUILDDIR
if os.name == "nt" and "pcbuild" in project_base[-8:].lower():
project_base = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(project_base, os.path.pardir))
# PC/VS7.1
--
2.17.1

123
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python/CVE-2018-20852.patch
View File

@@ -1,123 +0,0 @@
From 979daae300916adb399ab5b51410b6ebd0888f13 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Xtreak <tir.karthi@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 15 Jun 2019 20:59:43 +0530
Subject: [PATCH] [2.7] bpo-35121: prefix dot in domain for proper subdomain
validation (GH-10258) (GH-13426)
This is a manual backport of ca7fe5063593958e5efdf90f068582837f07bd14 since 2.7 has `http.cookiejar` in `cookielib`
https://bugs.python.org/issue35121
CVE: CVE-2018-20852
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/python/cpython/pull/13426]
Signed-off-by: Anuj Mittal <anuj.mittal@intel.com>
---
Lib/cookielib.py | 13 ++++++--
Lib/test/test_cookielib.py | 30 +++++++++++++++++++
.../2019-05-20-00-35-12.bpo-35121.RRi-HU.rst | 4 +++
3 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-05-20-00-35-12.bpo-35121.RRi-HU.rst
diff --git a/Lib/cookielib.py b/Lib/cookielib.py
index 2dd7c48728e0..0b471a42f296 100644
--- a/Lib/cookielib.py
+++ b/Lib/cookielib.py
@@ -1139,6 +1139,11 @@ def return_ok_domain(self, cookie, request):
req_host, erhn = eff_request_host(request)
domain = cookie.domain
+ if domain and not domain.startswith("."):
+ dotdomain = "." + domain
+ else:
+ dotdomain = domain
+
# strict check of non-domain cookies: Mozilla does this, MSIE5 doesn't
if (cookie.version == 0 and
(self.strict_ns_domain & self.DomainStrictNonDomain) and
@@ -1151,7 +1156,7 @@ def return_ok_domain(self, cookie, request):
_debug(" effective request-host name %s does not domain-match "
"RFC 2965 cookie domain %s", erhn, domain)
return False
- if cookie.version == 0 and not ("."+erhn).endswith(domain):
+ if cookie.version == 0 and not ("."+erhn).endswith(dotdomain):
_debug(" request-host %s does not match Netscape cookie domain "
"%s", req_host, domain)
return False
@@ -1165,7 +1170,11 @@ def domain_return_ok(self, domain, request):
req_host = "."+req_host
if not erhn.startswith("."):
erhn = "."+erhn
- if not (req_host.endswith(domain) or erhn.endswith(domain)):
+ if domain and not domain.startswith("."):
+ dotdomain = "." + domain
+ else:
+ dotdomain = domain
+ if not (req_host.endswith(dotdomain) or erhn.endswith(dotdomain)):
#_debug(" request domain %s does not match cookie domain %s",
# req_host, domain)
return False
diff --git a/Lib/test/test_cookielib.py b/Lib/test/test_cookielib.py
index f2dd9727d137..7f7ff614d61d 100644
--- a/Lib/test/test_cookielib.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_cookielib.py
@@ -368,6 +368,7 @@ def test_domain_return_ok(self):
("http://foo.bar.com/", ".foo.bar.com", True),
("http://foo.bar.com/", "foo.bar.com", True),
("http://foo.bar.com/", ".bar.com", True),
+ ("http://foo.bar.com/", "bar.com", True),
("http://foo.bar.com/", "com", True),
("http://foo.com/", "rhubarb.foo.com", False),
("http://foo.com/", ".foo.com", True),
@@ -378,6 +379,8 @@ def test_domain_return_ok(self):
("http://foo/", "foo", True),
("http://foo/", "foo.local", True),
("http://foo/", ".local", True),
+ ("http://barfoo.com", ".foo.com", False),
+ ("http://barfoo.com", "foo.com", False),
]:
request = urllib2.Request(url)
r = pol.domain_return_ok(domain, request)
@@ -938,6 +941,33 @@ def test_domain_block(self):
c.add_cookie_header(req)
self.assertFalse(req.has_header("Cookie"))
+ c.clear()
+
+ pol.set_blocked_domains([])
+ req = Request("http://acme.com/")
+ res = FakeResponse(headers, "http://acme.com/")
+ cookies = c.make_cookies(res, req)
+ c.extract_cookies(res, req)
+ self.assertEqual(len(c), 1)
+
+ req = Request("http://acme.com/")
+ c.add_cookie_header(req)
+ self.assertTrue(req.has_header("Cookie"))
+
+ req = Request("http://badacme.com/")
+ c.add_cookie_header(req)
+ self.assertFalse(pol.return_ok(cookies[0], req))
+ self.assertFalse(req.has_header("Cookie"))
+
+ p = pol.set_blocked_domains(["acme.com"])
+ req = Request("http://acme.com/")
+ c.add_cookie_header(req)
+ self.assertFalse(req.has_header("Cookie"))
+
+ req = Request("http://badacme.com/")
+ c.add_cookie_header(req)
+ self.assertFalse(req.has_header("Cookie"))
+
def test_secure(self):
from cookielib import CookieJar, DefaultCookiePolicy
diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-05-20-00-35-12.bpo-35121.RRi-HU.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-05-20-00-35-12.bpo-35121.RRi-HU.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..77251806163b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-05-20-00-35-12.bpo-35121.RRi-HU.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+Don't send cookies of domain A without Domain attribute to domain B when
+domain A is a suffix match of domain B while using a cookiejar with
+:class:`cookielib.DefaultCookiePolicy` policy. Patch by Karthikeyan
+Singaravelan.

216
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python/CVE-2019-9740.patch
View File

@@ -1,216 +0,0 @@
From bb8071a4cae5ab3fe321481dd3d73662ffb26052 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Victor Stinner <victor.stinner@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 21 May 2019 15:12:33 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] bpo-30458: Disallow control chars in http URLs (GH-12755)
(GH-13154) (GH-13315)
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Disallow control chars in http URLs in urllib2.urlopen. This
addresses a potential security problem for applications that do not
sanity check their URLs where http request headers could be injected.
Disable https related urllib tests on a build without ssl (GH-13032)
These tests require an SSL enabled build. Skip these tests when
python is built without SSL to fix test failures.
Use httplib.InvalidURL instead of ValueError as the new error case's
exception. (GH-13044)
Backport Co-Authored-By: Miro Hrončok <miro@hroncok.cz>
(cherry picked from commit 7e200e0763f5b71c199aaf98bd5588f291585619)
Notes on backport to Python 2.7:
* test_urllib tests urllib.urlopen() which quotes the URL and so is
not vulerable to HTTP Header Injection.
* Add tests to test_urllib2 on urllib2.urlopen().
* Reject non-ASCII characters: range 0x80-0xff.
Upstream-Status: Backport
CVE: CVE-2019-9740
CVE: CVE-2019-9947
Signed-off-by: Anuj Mittal <anuj.mittal@intel.com>
---
Lib/httplib.py | 16 ++++++
Lib/test/test_urllib.py | 25 +++++++++
Lib/test/test_urllib2.py | 51 ++++++++++++++++++-
Lib/test/test_xmlrpc.py | 8 ++-
.../2019-04-10-08-53-30.bpo-30458.51E-DA.rst | 1 +
5 files changed, 99 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-04-10-08-53-30.bpo-30458.51E-DA.rst
diff --git a/Lib/httplib.py b/Lib/httplib.py
index 60a8fb4e355f..1b41c346e090 100644
--- a/Lib/httplib.py
+++ b/Lib/httplib.py
@@ -247,6 +247,16 @@
_is_legal_header_name = re.compile(r'\A[^:\s][^:\r\n]*\Z').match
_is_illegal_header_value = re.compile(r'\n(?![ \t])|\r(?![ \t\n])').search
+# These characters are not allowed within HTTP URL paths.
+# See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3986#section-3.3 and the
+# https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3986#appendix-A pchar definition.
+# Prevents CVE-2019-9740. Includes control characters such as \r\n.
+# Restrict non-ASCII characters above \x7f (0x80-0xff).
+_contains_disallowed_url_pchar_re = re.compile('[\x00-\x20\x7f-\xff]')
+# Arguably only these _should_ allowed:
+# _is_allowed_url_pchars_re = re.compile(r"^[/!$&'()*+,;=:@%a-zA-Z0-9._~-]+$")
+# We are more lenient for assumed real world compatibility purposes.
+
# We always set the Content-Length header for these methods because some
# servers will otherwise respond with a 411
_METHODS_EXPECTING_BODY = {'PATCH', 'POST', 'PUT'}
@@ -927,6 +937,12 @@ def putrequest(self, method, url, skip_host=0, skip_accept_encoding=0):
self._method = method
if not url:
url = '/'
+ # Prevent CVE-2019-9740.
+ match = _contains_disallowed_url_pchar_re.search(url)
+ if match:
+ raise InvalidURL("URL can't contain control characters. %r "
+ "(found at least %r)"
+ % (url, match.group()))
hdr = '%s %s %s' % (method, url, self._http_vsn_str)
self._output(hdr)
diff --git a/Lib/test/test_urllib.py b/Lib/test/test_urllib.py
index 1ce9201c0693..d7778d4194f3 100644
--- a/Lib/test/test_urllib.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_urllib.py
@@ -257,6 +257,31 @@ def test_url_fragment(self):
finally:
self.unfakehttp()
+ def test_url_with_control_char_rejected(self):
+ for char_no in range(0, 0x21) + range(0x7f, 0x100):
+ char = chr(char_no)
+ schemeless_url = "//localhost:7777/test%s/" % char
+ self.fakehttp(b"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n\r\nHello.")
+ try:
+ # urllib quotes the URL so there is no injection.
+ resp = urllib.urlopen("http:" + schemeless_url)
+ self.assertNotIn(char, resp.geturl())
+ finally:
+ self.unfakehttp()
+
+ def test_url_with_newline_header_injection_rejected(self):
+ self.fakehttp(b"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n\r\nHello.")
+ host = "localhost:7777?a=1 HTTP/1.1\r\nX-injected: header\r\nTEST: 123"
+ schemeless_url = "//" + host + ":8080/test/?test=a"
+ try:
+ # urllib quotes the URL so there is no injection.
+ resp = urllib.urlopen("http:" + schemeless_url)
+ self.assertNotIn(' ', resp.geturl())
+ self.assertNotIn('\r', resp.geturl())
+ self.assertNotIn('\n', resp.geturl())
+ finally:
+ self.unfakehttp()
+
def test_read_bogus(self):
# urlopen() should raise IOError for many error codes.
self.fakehttp('''HTTP/1.1 401 Authentication Required
diff --git a/Lib/test/test_urllib2.py b/Lib/test/test_urllib2.py
index 6d24d5ddf83c..9531818e16b2 100644
--- a/Lib/test/test_urllib2.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_urllib2.py
@@ -15,6 +15,9 @@
except ImportError:
ssl = None
+from test.test_urllib import FakeHTTPMixin
+
+
# XXX
# Request
# CacheFTPHandler (hard to write)
@@ -1262,7 +1265,7 @@ def _test_basic_auth(self, opener, auth_handler, auth_header,
self.assertEqual(len(http_handler.requests), 1)
self.assertFalse(http_handler.requests[0].has_header(auth_header))
-class MiscTests(unittest.TestCase):
+class MiscTests(unittest.TestCase, FakeHTTPMixin):
def test_build_opener(self):
class MyHTTPHandler(urllib2.HTTPHandler): pass
@@ -1317,6 +1320,52 @@ def test_unsupported_algorithm(self):
"Unsupported digest authentication algorithm 'invalid'"
)
+ @unittest.skipUnless(ssl, "ssl module required")
+ def test_url_with_control_char_rejected(self):
+ for char_no in range(0, 0x21) + range(0x7f, 0x100):
+ char = chr(char_no)
+ schemeless_url = "//localhost:7777/test%s/" % char
+ self.fakehttp(b"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n\r\nHello.")
+ try:
+ # We explicitly test urllib.request.urlopen() instead of the top
+ # level 'def urlopen()' function defined in this... (quite ugly)
+ # test suite. They use different url opening codepaths. Plain
+ # urlopen uses FancyURLOpener which goes via a codepath that
+ # calls urllib.parse.quote() on the URL which makes all of the
+ # above attempts at injection within the url _path_ safe.
+ escaped_char_repr = repr(char).replace('\\', r'\\')
+ InvalidURL = httplib.InvalidURL
+ with self.assertRaisesRegexp(
+ InvalidURL, "contain control.*" + escaped_char_repr):
+ urllib2.urlopen("http:" + schemeless_url)
+ with self.assertRaisesRegexp(
+ InvalidURL, "contain control.*" + escaped_char_repr):
+ urllib2.urlopen("https:" + schemeless_url)
+ finally:
+ self.unfakehttp()
+
+ @unittest.skipUnless(ssl, "ssl module required")
+ def test_url_with_newline_header_injection_rejected(self):
+ self.fakehttp(b"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n\r\nHello.")
+ host = "localhost:7777?a=1 HTTP/1.1\r\nX-injected: header\r\nTEST: 123"
+ schemeless_url = "//" + host + ":8080/test/?test=a"
+ try:
+ # We explicitly test urllib2.urlopen() instead of the top
+ # level 'def urlopen()' function defined in this... (quite ugly)
+ # test suite. They use different url opening codepaths. Plain
+ # urlopen uses FancyURLOpener which goes via a codepath that
+ # calls urllib.parse.quote() on the URL which makes all of the
+ # above attempts at injection within the url _path_ safe.
+ InvalidURL = httplib.InvalidURL
+ with self.assertRaisesRegexp(
+ InvalidURL, r"contain control.*\\r.*(found at least . .)"):
+ urllib2.urlopen("http:" + schemeless_url)
+ with self.assertRaisesRegexp(InvalidURL, r"contain control.*\\n"):
+ urllib2.urlopen("https:" + schemeless_url)
+ finally:
+ self.unfakehttp()
+
+
class RequestTests(unittest.TestCase):
diff --git a/Lib/test/test_xmlrpc.py b/Lib/test/test_xmlrpc.py
index 36b3be67fd6b..90ccb30716ff 100644
--- a/Lib/test/test_xmlrpc.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_xmlrpc.py
@@ -659,7 +659,13 @@ def test_dotted_attribute(self):
def test_partial_post(self):
# Check that a partial POST doesn't make the server loop: issue #14001.
conn = httplib.HTTPConnection(ADDR, PORT)
- conn.request('POST', '/RPC2 HTTP/1.0\r\nContent-Length: 100\r\n\r\nbye')
+ conn.send('POST /RPC2 HTTP/1.0\r\n'
+ 'Content-Length: 100\r\n\r\n'
+ 'bye HTTP/1.1\r\n'
+ 'Host: %s:%s\r\n'
+ 'Accept-Encoding: identity\r\n'
+ 'Content-Length: 0\r\n\r\n'
+ % (ADDR, PORT))
conn.close()
class SimpleServerEncodingTestCase(BaseServerTestCase):
diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-04-10-08-53-30.bpo-30458.51E-DA.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-04-10-08-53-30.bpo-30458.51E-DA.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..47cb899df1af
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-04-10-08-53-30.bpo-30458.51E-DA.rst
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Address CVE-2019-9740 by disallowing URL paths with embedded whitespace or control characters through into the underlying http client request. Such potentially malicious header injection URLs now cause an httplib.InvalidURL exception to be raised.

55
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python/bpo-35907-cve-2019-9948-fix.patch
View File

@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
From 179a5f75f1121dab271fe8f90eb35145f9dcbbda Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sihoon Lee <push0ebp@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 02:41:06 +0900
Subject: [PATCH] Update test_urllib.py and urllib.py\nchange assertEqual into
assertRasies in DummyURLopener test, and simplify mitigation
Upstream-Status: Submitted https://github.com/python/cpython/pull/11842
CVE: CVE-2019-9948
Signed-off-by: Martin Jansa <Martin.Jansa@gmail.com>
---
Lib/test/test_urllib.py | 11 +++--------
Lib/urllib.py | 4 ++--
2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Lib/test/test_urllib.py b/Lib/test/test_urllib.py
index e5f210e62a18..1e23dfb0bb16 100644
--- a/Lib/test/test_urllib.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_urllib.py
@@ -1027,14 +1027,9 @@ def test_local_file_open(self):
class DummyURLopener(urllib.URLopener):
def open_local_file(self, url):
return url
- self.assertEqual(DummyURLopener().open(
- 'local-file://example'), '//example')
- self.assertEqual(DummyURLopener().open(
- 'local_file://example'), '//example')
- self.assertRaises(IOError, urllib.urlopen,
- 'local-file://example')
- self.assertRaises(IOError, urllib.urlopen,
- 'local_file://example')
+ for url in ('local_file://example', 'local-file://example'):
+ self.assertRaises(IOError, DummyURLopener().open, url)
+ self.assertRaises(IOError, urllib.urlopen, url)
# Just commented them out.
# Can't really tell why keep failing in windows and sparc.
diff --git a/Lib/urllib.py b/Lib/urllib.py
index a24e9a5c68fb..39b834054e9e 100644
--- a/Lib/urllib.py
+++ b/Lib/urllib.py
@@ -203,10 +203,10 @@ def open(self, fullurl, data=None):
name = 'open_' + urltype
self.type = urltype
name = name.replace('-', '_')
-
+
# bpo-35907: # disallow the file reading with the type not allowed
if not hasattr(self, name) or \
- (self == _urlopener and name == 'open_local_file'):
+ getattr(self, name) == self.open_local_file:
if proxy:
return self.open_unknown_proxy(proxy, fullurl, data)
else:

55
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python/bpo-35907-cve-2019-9948.patch
View File

@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
From 8f99cc799e4393bf1112b9395b2342f81b3f45ef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: push0ebp <push0ebp@shl-MacBook-Pro.local>
Date: Thu, 14 Feb 2019 02:05:46 +0900
Subject: [PATCH] bpo-35907: Avoid file reading as disallowing the unnecessary
URL scheme in urllib
Upstream-Status: Submitted https://github.com/python/cpython/pull/11842
CVE: CVE-2019-9948
Signed-off-by: Martin Jansa <Martin.Jansa@gmail.com>
---
Lib/test/test_urllib.py | 12 ++++++++++++
Lib/urllib.py | 5 ++++-
2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/Lib/test/test_urllib.py b/Lib/test/test_urllib.py
index 1ce9201c0693..e5f210e62a18 100644
--- a/Lib/test/test_urllib.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_urllib.py
@@ -1023,6 +1023,18 @@ def open_spam(self, url):
"spam://c:|windows%/:=&?~#+!$,;'@()*[]|/path/"),
"//c:|windows%/:=&?~#+!$,;'@()*[]|/path/")
+ def test_local_file_open(self):
+ class DummyURLopener(urllib.URLopener):
+ def open_local_file(self, url):
+ return url
+ self.assertEqual(DummyURLopener().open(
+ 'local-file://example'), '//example')
+ self.assertEqual(DummyURLopener().open(
+ 'local_file://example'), '//example')
+ self.assertRaises(IOError, urllib.urlopen,
+ 'local-file://example')
+ self.assertRaises(IOError, urllib.urlopen,
+ 'local_file://example')
# Just commented them out.
# Can't really tell why keep failing in windows and sparc.
diff --git a/Lib/urllib.py b/Lib/urllib.py
index d85504a5cb7e..a24e9a5c68fb 100644
--- a/Lib/urllib.py
+++ b/Lib/urllib.py
@@ -203,7 +203,10 @@ def open(self, fullurl, data=None):
name = 'open_' + urltype
self.type = urltype
name = name.replace('-', '_')
- if not hasattr(self, name):
+
+ # bpo-35907: # disallow the file reading with the type not allowed
+ if not hasattr(self, name) or \
+ (self == _urlopener and name == 'open_local_file'):
if proxy:
return self.open_unknown_proxy(proxy, fullurl, data)
else:

28
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python/bpo-36216-cve-2019-9636-fix.patch
View File

@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
From 06b5ee585d6e76bdbb4002f642d864d860cbbd2b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Steve Dower <steve.dower@python.org>
Date: Tue, 12 Mar 2019 08:23:33 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] bpo-36216: Only print test messages when verbose
CVE: CVE-2019-9636
Upstream-Status: Backport https://github.com/python/cpython/pull/12291/commits/06b5ee585d6e76bdbb4002f642d864d860cbbd2b
Signed-off-by: Martin Jansa <Martin.Jansa@gmail.com>
---
Lib/test/test_urlparse.py | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/Lib/test/test_urlparse.py b/Lib/test/test_urlparse.py
index 73b0228ea8e3..1830d0b28688 100644
--- a/Lib/test/test_urlparse.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_urlparse.py
@@ -644,7 +644,8 @@ def test_urlsplit_normalization(self):
for scheme in [u"http", u"https", u"ftp"]:
for c in denorm_chars:
url = u"{}://netloc{}false.netloc/path".format(scheme, c)
- print "Checking %r" % url
+ if test_support.verbose:
+ print "Checking %r" % url
with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
urlparse.urlsplit(url)

111
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python/bpo-36216-cve-2019-9636.patch
View File

@@ -1,111 +0,0 @@
From 3e3669c9c41a27e1466e2c28b3906e3dd0ce3e7e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Steve Dower <steve.dower@python.org>
Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2019 08:25:22 -0800
Subject: [PATCH] bpo-36216: Add check for characters in netloc that normalize
to separators (GH-12201)
CVE: CVE-2019-9636
Upstream-Status: Backport https://github.com/python/cpython/pull/12216/commits/3e3669c9c41a27e1466e2c28b3906e3dd0ce3e7e
Signed-off-by: Martin Jansa <Martin.Jansa@gmail.com>
---
Doc/library/urlparse.rst | 20 ++++++++++++++++
Lib/test/test_urlparse.py | 24 +++++++++++++++++++
Lib/urlparse.py | 17 +++++++++++++
.../2019-03-06-09-38-40.bpo-36216.6q1m4a.rst | 3 +++
4 files changed, 64 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-03-06-09-38-40.bpo-36216.6q1m4a.rst
diff --git a/Lib/test/test_urlparse.py b/Lib/test/test_urlparse.py
index 4e1ded73c266..73b0228ea8e3 100644
--- a/Lib/test/test_urlparse.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_urlparse.py
@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
from test import test_support
+import sys
+import unicodedata
import unittest
import urlparse
@@ -624,6 +626,28 @@ def test_portseparator(self):
self.assertEqual(urlparse.urlparse("http://www.python.org:80"),
('http','www.python.org:80','','','',''))
+ def test_urlsplit_normalization(self):
+ # Certain characters should never occur in the netloc,
+ # including under normalization.
+ # Ensure that ALL of them are detected and cause an error
+ illegal_chars = u'/:#?@'
+ hex_chars = {'{:04X}'.format(ord(c)) for c in illegal_chars}
+ denorm_chars = [
+ c for c in map(unichr, range(128, sys.maxunicode))
+ if (hex_chars & set(unicodedata.decomposition(c).split()))
+ and c not in illegal_chars
+ ]
+ # Sanity check that we found at least one such character
+ self.assertIn(u'\u2100', denorm_chars)
+ self.assertIn(u'\uFF03', denorm_chars)
+
+ for scheme in [u"http", u"https", u"ftp"]:
+ for c in denorm_chars:
+ url = u"{}://netloc{}false.netloc/path".format(scheme, c)
+ print "Checking %r" % url
+ with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
+ urlparse.urlsplit(url)
+
def test_main():
test_support.run_unittest(UrlParseTestCase)
diff --git a/Lib/urlparse.py b/Lib/urlparse.py
index f7c2b032b097..54eda08651ab 100644
--- a/Lib/urlparse.py
+++ b/Lib/urlparse.py
@@ -165,6 +165,21 @@ def _splitnetloc(url, start=0):
delim = min(delim, wdelim) # use earliest delim position
return url[start:delim], url[delim:] # return (domain, rest)
+def _checknetloc(netloc):
+ if not netloc or not isinstance(netloc, unicode):
+ return
+ # looking for characters like \u2100 that expand to 'a/c'
+ # IDNA uses NFKC equivalence, so normalize for this check
+ import unicodedata
+ netloc2 = unicodedata.normalize('NFKC', netloc)
+ if netloc == netloc2:
+ return
+ _, _, netloc = netloc.rpartition('@') # anything to the left of '@' is okay
+ for c in '/?#@:':
+ if c in netloc2:
+ raise ValueError("netloc '" + netloc2 + "' contains invalid " +
+ "characters under NFKC normalization")
+
def urlsplit(url, scheme='', allow_fragments=True):
"""Parse a URL into 5 components:
<scheme>://<netloc>/<path>?<query>#<fragment>
@@ -193,6 +208,7 @@ def urlsplit(url, scheme='', allow_fragments=True):
url, fragment = url.split('#', 1)
if '?' in url:
url, query = url.split('?', 1)
+ _checknetloc(netloc)
v = SplitResult(scheme, netloc, url, query, fragment)
_parse_cache[key] = v
return v
@@ -216,6 +232,7 @@ def urlsplit(url, scheme='', allow_fragments=True):
url, fragment = url.split('#', 1)
if '?' in url:
url, query = url.split('?', 1)
+ _checknetloc(netloc)
v = SplitResult(scheme, netloc, url, query, fragment)
_parse_cache[key] = v
return v
diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-03-06-09-38-40.bpo-36216.6q1m4a.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-03-06-09-38-40.bpo-36216.6q1m4a.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..1e1ad92c6feb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-03-06-09-38-40.bpo-36216.6q1m4a.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Changes urlsplit() to raise ValueError when the URL contains characters that
+decompose under IDNA encoding (NFKC-normalization) into characters that
+affect how the URL is parsed.
\ No newline at end of file

81
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python/bpo-36742-cve-2019-10160.patch
View File

@@ -1,81 +0,0 @@
From 5a1033fe5be764a135adcfff2fdc14edc3e5f327 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Changqing Li <changqing.li@windriver.com>
Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2019 16:32:19 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] bpo-36742: Fixes handling of pre-normalization characters in
urlsplit() bpo-36742: Corrects fix to handle decomposition in usernames
Upstream-Status: Backport
https://github.com/python/cpython/commit/98a4dcefbbc3bce5ab07e7c0830a183157250259
https://github.com/python/cpython/commit/f61599b050c621386a3fc6bc480359e2d3bb93de#diff-b577545d73dd0cdb2c337a4c5f89e1d7
CVE: CVE-2019-10160
Signed-off-by: Changqing Li <changqing.li@windriver.com>
---
Lib/test/test_urlparse.py | 19 +++++++++++++------
Lib/urlparse.py | 14 +++++++++-----
2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Lib/test/test_urlparse.py b/Lib/test/test_urlparse.py
index 1830d0b..857ed96 100644
--- a/Lib/test/test_urlparse.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_urlparse.py
@@ -641,13 +641,20 @@ class UrlParseTestCase(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertIn(u'\u2100', denorm_chars)
self.assertIn(u'\uFF03', denorm_chars)
+ # bpo-36742: Verify port separators are ignored when they
+ # existed prior to decomposition
+ urlparse.urlsplit(u'http://\u30d5\u309a:80')
+ with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
+ urlparse.urlsplit(u'http://\u30d5\u309a\ufe1380')
+
for scheme in [u"http", u"https", u"ftp"]:
- for c in denorm_chars:
- url = u"{}://netloc{}false.netloc/path".format(scheme, c)
- if test_support.verbose:
- print "Checking %r" % url
- with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
- urlparse.urlsplit(url)
+ for netloc in [u"netloc{}false.netloc", u"n{}user@netloc"]:
+ for c in denorm_chars:
+ url = u"{}://{}/path".format(scheme, netloc.format(c))
+ if test_support.verbose:
+ print "Checking %r" % url
+ with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
+ urlparse.urlsplit(url)
def test_main():
test_support.run_unittest(UrlParseTestCase)
diff --git a/Lib/urlparse.py b/Lib/urlparse.py
index 54eda08..e34b368 100644
--- a/Lib/urlparse.py
+++ b/Lib/urlparse.py
@@ -171,14 +171,18 @@ def _checknetloc(netloc):
# looking for characters like \u2100 that expand to 'a/c'
# IDNA uses NFKC equivalence, so normalize for this check
import unicodedata
- netloc2 = unicodedata.normalize('NFKC', netloc)
- if netloc == netloc2:
+ n = netloc.replace(u'@', u'') # ignore characters already included
+ n = n.replace(u':', u'') # but not the surrounding text
+ n = n.replace(u'#', u'')
+ n = n.replace(u'?', u'')
+
+ netloc2 = unicodedata.normalize('NFKC', n)
+ if n == netloc2:
return
- _, _, netloc = netloc.rpartition('@') # anything to the left of '@' is okay
for c in '/?#@:':
if c in netloc2:
- raise ValueError("netloc '" + netloc2 + "' contains invalid " +
- "characters under NFKC normalization")
+ raise ValueError(u"netloc '" + netloc + u"' contains invalid " +
+ u"characters under NFKC normalization")
def urlsplit(url, scheme='', allow_fragments=True):
"""Parse a URL into 5 components:
--
2.7.4