Git is a fast, scalable, distributed revision control system with an
unusually rich command set that provides both high-level operations
and full access to internals. When reading a config value, Git strips
any trailing carriage return and line feed (CRLF). When writing a
config entry, values with a trailing CR are not quoted, causing the CR
to be lost when the config is later read. When initializing a
submodule, if the submodule path contains a trailing CR, the altered
path is read resulting in the submodule being checked out to an
incorrect location. If a symlink exists that points the altered path
to the submodule hooks directory, and the submodule contains an
executable post-checkout hook, the script may be unintentionally
executed after checkout. This vulnerability is fixed in v2.43.7,
v2.44.4, v2.45.4, v2.46.4, v2.47.3, v2.48.2, v2.49.1, and v2.50.1.
Reference:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-48384
Upstream-patch:
05e9cd64ee
(From OE-Core rev: 34cb9674a5ce337a75af0dc415706d0323c427a6)
Signed-off-by: Praveen Kumar <praveen.kumar@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
CVE-2024-32002:
Git is a revision control system. Prior to versions 2.45.1, 2.44.1, 2.43.4,
2.42.2, 2.41.1, 2.40.2, and 2.39.4, repositories with submodules can be
crafted in a way that exploits a bug in Git whereby it can be fooled into
writing files not into the submodule's worktree but into a `.git/` directory.
This allows writing a hook that will be executed while the clone operation
is still running, giving the user no opportunity to inspect the code that is
being executed. The problem has been patched in versions 2.45.1, 2.44.1,
2.43.4, 2.42.2, 2.41.1, 2.40.2, and 2.39.4. If symbolic link support is
disabled in Git (e.g. via `git config --global core.symlinks false`), the
described attack won't work. As always, it is best to avoid cloning
repositories from untrusted sources.
CVE-2024-32004:
Git is a revision control system. Prior to versions 2.45.1, 2.44.1, 2.43.4,
2.42.2, 2.41.1, 2.40.2, and 2.39.4, an attacker can prepare a local repository
in such a way that, when cloned, will execute arbitrary code during the
operation. The problem has been patched in versions 2.45.1, 2.44.1, 2.43.4,
2.42.2, 2.41.1, 2.40.2, and 2.39.4. As a workaround, avoid cloning repositories
from untrusted sources.
CVE-2024-32020:
Git is a revision control system. Prior to versions 2.45.1, 2.44.1, 2.43.4,
2.42.2, 2.41.1, 2.40.2, and 2.39.4, local clones may end up hardlinking files
into the target repository's object database when source and target repository
reside on the same disk. If the source repository is owned by a different user,
then those hardlinked files may be rewritten at any point in time by the
untrusted user. Cloning local repositories will cause Git to either copy or
hardlink files of the source repository into the target repository. This
significantly speeds up such local clones compared to doing a "proper" clone and
saves both disk space and compute time. When cloning a repository located on the
same disk that is owned by a different user than the current user we also end up
creating such hardlinks. These files will continue to be owned and controlled by
the potentially-untrusted user and can be rewritten by them at will in the
future. The problem has been patched in versions 2.45.1, 2.44.1, 2.43.4, 2.42.2,
2.41.1, 2.40.2, and 2.39.4.
CVE-2024-32021:
Git is a revision control system. Prior to versions 2.45.1, 2.44.1, 2.43.4,
2.42.2, 2.41.1, 2.40.2, and 2.39.4, when cloning a local source repository that
contains symlinks via the filesystem, Git may create hardlinks to arbitrary
user-readable files on the same filesystem as the target repository in the
`objects/` directory. Cloning a local repository over the filesystem may
creating hardlinks to arbitrary user-owned files on the same filesystem in the
target Git repository's `objects/` directory. When cloning a repository over the
filesystem (without explicitly specifying the `file://` protocol or `--no-local`),
the optimizations for local cloning will be used, which include attempting to
hard link the object files instead of copying them. While the code includes checks
against symbolic links in the source repository, which were added during the fix
for CVE-2022-39253, these checks can still be raced because the hard link
operation ultimately follows symlinks. If the object on the filesystem appears as
a file during the check, and then a symlink during the operation, this will allow
the adversary to bypass the check and create hardlinks in the destination objects
directory to arbitrary, user-readable files. The problem has been patched in
versions 2.45.1, 2.44.1, 2.43.4, 2.42.2, 2.41.1, 2.40.2, and 2.39.4.
CVE-2024-32465:
Git is a revision control system. The Git project recommends to avoid working in
untrusted repositories, and instead to clone it first with `git clone --no-local`
to obtain a clean copy. Git has specific protections to make that a safe
operation even with an untrusted source repository, but vulnerabilities allow
those protections to be bypassed. In the context of cloning local repositories
owned by other users, this vulnerability has been covered in CVE-2024-32004. But
there are circumstances where the fixes for CVE-2024-32004 are not enough: For
example, when obtaining a `.zip` file containing a full copy of a Git repository,
it should not be trusted by default to be safe, as e.g. hooks could be configured
to run within the context of that repository. The problem has been patched in
versions 2.45.1, 2.44.1, 2.43.4, 2.42.2, 2.41.1, 2.40.2, and 2.39.4. As a
workaround, avoid using Git in repositories that have been obtained via archives
from untrusted sources.
References:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-32002https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-32004https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-32020https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-32021https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-32465
(From OE-Core rev: 209c41377abf6853455b00af3923f1b244a3766b)
Signed-off-by: Soumya Sambu <soumya.sambu@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
This is specific to Git-for-Windows.
(From OE-Core rev: 472a3e05270deace2862973dee2e65e60f9c0c19)
Signed-off-by: Archana Polampalli <archana.polampalli@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
Git is a revision control system. Prior to versions 2.30.9, 2.31.8, 2.32.7,
2.33.8, 2.34.8, 2.35.8, 2.36.6, 2.37.7, 2.38.5, 2.39.3, and 2.40.1, by feeding
specially crafted input to `git apply --reject`, a path outside the working
tree can be overwritten with partially controlled contents (corresponding to
the rejected hunk(s) from the given patch). A fix is available in versions
2.30.9, 2.31.8, 2.32.7, 2.33.8, 2.34.8, 2.35.8, 2.36.6, 2.37.7, 2.38.5, 2.39.3,
and 2.40.1. As a workaround, avoid using `git apply` with `--reject` when applying
patches from an untrusted source. Use `git apply --stat` to inspect a patch before
applying; avoid applying one that create a conflict where a link corresponding to
the `*.rej` file exists.
References:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-25652
Upstream patches:
9db05711c9
(From OE-Core rev: 335ad8a6d795cd94b872370e44a033ce3fbf4890)
Signed-off-by: Archana Polampalli <archana.polampalli@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
Git is a revision control system. Prior to versions 2.30.9, 2.31.8, 2.32.7, 2.33.8,
2.34.8, 2.35.8, 2.36.6, 2.37.7, 2.38.5, 2.39.3, and 2.40.1, a specially crafted
`.gitmodules` file with submodule URLs that are longer than 1024 characters can used
to exploit a bug in `config.c::git_config_copy_or_rename_section_in_file()`. This bug
can be used to inject arbitrary configuration into a user's `$GIT_DIR/config` when
attempting to remove the configuration section associated with that submodule. When the
attacker injects configuration values which specify executables to run (such as
`core.pager`, `core.editor`, `core.sshCommand`, etc.) this can lead to a remote code
execution. A fix A fix is available in versions 2.30.9, 2.31.8, 2.32.7, 2.33.8, 2.34.8,
2.35.8, 2.36.6, 2.37.7, 2.38.5, 2.39.3, and 2.40.1. As a workaround, avoid running
`git submodule deinit` on untrusted repositories or without prior inspection of any
submodule sections in `$GIT_DIR/config`.
References:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-29007
Upstream patches:
528290f8c629198213c9a5bb10fd5ee91cfe60853bb3d6bac5
(From OE-Core rev: 1b55343b6346437b80b8a8180ae1bc9f480d92ef)
Signed-off-by: Archana Polampalli <archana.polampalli@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
This release addresses the security issues CVE-2022-39253 and
CVE-2022-39260.
* CVE-2022-39253:
When relying on the `--local` clone optimization, Git dereferences
symbolic links in the source repository before creating hardlinks
(or copies) of the dereferenced link in the destination repository.
This can lead to surprising behavior where arbitrary files are
present in a repository's `$GIT_DIR` when cloning from a malicious
repository.
Git will no longer dereference symbolic links via the `--local`
clone mechanism, and will instead refuse to clone repositories that
have symbolic links present in the `$GIT_DIR/objects` directory.
Additionally, the value of `protocol.file.allow` is changed to be
"user" by default.
* CVE-2022-39260:
An overly-long command string given to `git shell` can result in
overflow in `split_cmdline()`, leading to arbitrary heap writes and
remote code execution when `git shell` is exposed and the directory
`$HOME/git-shell-commands` exists.
`git shell` is taught to refuse interactive commands that are
longer than 4MiB in size. `split_cmdline()` is hardened to reject
inputs larger than 2GiB.
Credit for finding CVE-2022-39253 goes to Cory Snider of Mirantis. The
fix was authored by Taylor Blau, with help from Johannes Schindelin.
Credit for finding CVE-2022-39260 goes to Kevin Backhouse of GitHub.
The fix was authored by Kevin Backhouse, Jeff King, and Taylor Blau.
(From OE-Core rev: 43badfadb92a1d6684801f81fa2ed9c8b5652bb6)
Signed-off-by: Tim Orling <tim.orling@konsulko.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
by default git pulls in several code fragments not being licensed
under just GPL-2.0-only.
obstack and poll are licensed under GPL-2.0-or-later
reftable being BSD-3-Clause
sha1dc and inet_ntop being MIT
netmalloc being Bosst-1.0 aka BSL-1.0
regex being LGPL-2.1-or-later
(From OE-Core rev: d12513f066baca13a5be0c00792b1bd7d8b07c17)
Signed-off-by: Konrad Weihmann <kweihmann@outlook.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5184e651651ed949d198882a10f406cef5939b7b)
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
This includes a fix for CVE-2022-24765
(From OE-Core rev: a17dc42d82b12d7f891c903a02a0302b31829c88)
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
Everyone I've talked to doesn't see this as a major issue. The CVE
asks for a documentation improvement on the --mirror option to
git clone as deleted content could be leaked into a mirror. For OE's
general users/use cases, we wouldn't build or ship docs so this wouldn't
affect us.
(From OE-Core rev: 5dfe2dd5482c9a446f8e722fe51903d205e6770d)
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
It can be useful to use git on target (e.g. with some wrapper like
etckeeper for keeping track of changes to /etc), and for such cases,
it is likely one has no need for pulling from/pushing to http[s]
repositories. From the INSTALL file:
- "libcurl" library ... If you do not use http:// or https://
repositories, and do not want to put patches into an IMAP
mailbox, you do not have to have them (use NO_CURL).
- "expat" library; git-http-push uses it for remote lock
management over DAV. Similar to "curl" above, this is
optional (with NO_EXPAT).
Setting --without-expat and --without-curl reduces the size of the
installed "git" package from 18M to 12M, in addition to avoiding
pulling those libraries into the rootfs.
(From OE-Core rev: 49f81198c5d233a9a2612c3b8366681dd85bea59)
Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <rasmus.villemoes@prevas.dk>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
An automated conversion using scripts/contrib/convert-spdx-licenses.py to
convert to use the standard SPDX license identifiers. Two recipes in meta-selftest
were not converted as they're that way specifically for testing. A change in
linux-firmware was also skipped and may need a more manual tweak.
(From OE-Core rev: ceda3238cdbf1beb216ae9ddb242470d5dfc25e0)
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
This allows automated updates, and better aligns with how
documentation is handled in oe-core.
(From OE-Core rev: 22b267724148144d919b7281cf2250fc2e35a092)
Signed-off-by: Alexander Kanavin <alex@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
This is the result of automated script conversion:
scripts/contrib/convert-overrides.py <oe-core directory>
converting the metadata to use ":" as the override character instead of "_".
(From OE-Core rev: 42344347be29f0997cc2f7636d9603b1fe1875ae)
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
checkout: fix bug that makes checkout follow symlinks in leading path
Upstream-Status: Acepted [684dd4c2b4]
CVE: CVE-2021-21300
(From OE-Core rev: 1b680f6aca14c92d03d32c4974292788140d7a65)
Signed-off-by: Minjae Kim <flowergom@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
Added HOMEPAGE and DESCRIPTION for recipes with missing decriptions or homepage
[YOCTO #13471]
(From OE-Core rev: bb05814335e7101bfd8df0a11dc18a044e867bed)
Signed-off-by: Dorinda Bassey <dorindabassey@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
Disable iconv, as configure.ac attempts to run a
cross-compiled test program otherwise.
(From OE-Core rev: 6b18acfbe61aef449743f5ce0dfd77f83f5cb2a5)
Signed-off-by: Alexander Kanavin <alex.kanavin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
On a system with selinux turned on, trying to access a directory
that is in a tree that doesn't exist returns the error permission
denined rather then no such file or directory, which causes git
to die.
git clone git://git.yoctoproject.org/poky
Cloning into 'poky'...
fatal: unable to access '/opt/poky/3.0+snapshot/sysroots/x86_64-pokysdk-linux/etc/gitconfig': Permission denied
Switch to using the system gitconfig of the host.
(From OE-Core rev: 5e44fb4dd106e3c4b9f072b25a93e54fa7bb1bce)
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Puhlman <jpuhlman@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
Some tools are not written in Perl anymore, so they should be in PN no PN-perltools.
(From OE-Core rev: 8a2e4dac4f5086fbfc094fb1f16e91108ee1b247)
Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
