build-appliance-image: Update to kirkstone head revision

(From OE-Core rev: d381eeb5e70bd0ce9e78032c909e4a23564f4dd7)

Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>

bitbake/lib/bb/tests/fetch.py

@@ -1335,7 +1335,7 @@ class FetchLatestVersionTest(FetcherTest):
         # combination version pattern
         ("sysprof", "git://git.yoctoproject.org/sysprof.git;protocol=https;branch=master", "cd44ee6644c3641507fb53b8a2a69137f2971219", "")
             : "1.2.0",
-        ("u-boot-mkimage", "git://source.denx.de/u-boot/u-boot.git;branch=master;protocol=https", "62c175fbb8a0f9a926c88294ea9f7e88eb898f6c", "")
+        ("u-boot-mkimage", "git://git.yoctoproject.org/bbfetchtests-u-boot.git;branch=master;protocol=https", "62c175fbb8a0f9a926c88294ea9f7e88eb898f6c", "")
             : "2014.01",
         # version pattern "yyyymmdd"
         ("mobile-broadband-provider-info", "git://git.yoctoproject.org/mobile-broadband-provider-info.git;protocol=https;branch=master", "4ed19e11c2975105b71b956440acdb25d46a347d", "")

documentation/README

@@ -429,5 +429,22 @@ both the Yocto Project and BitBake manuals:
 Submitting documentation changes
 ================================
 
-Please see the top level README file in this repository for details of where
-to send patches.
+Please refer to our contributor guide here: https://docs.yoctoproject.org/contributor-guide/
+for full details on how to submit changes.
+
+As a quick guide, patches should be sent to docs@lists.yoctoproject.org
+The git command to do that would be:
+
+     git send-email -M -1 --to docs@lists.yoctoproject.org
+
+The 'To' header can be set as default for this repository:
+
+     git config sendemail.to docs@lists.yoctoproject.org
+
+Now you can just do 'git send-email origin/master..' to send all local patches.
+
+Read the other sections in this document and documentation/standards.md for
+rules to follow when contributing to the documentation.
+
+Git repository: https://git.yoctoproject.org/yocto-docs
+Mailing list: docs@lists.yoctoproject.org

documentation/brief-yoctoprojectqs/index.rst

@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ following requirements:
    :ref:`dev-manual/start:preparing the build host`
    section in the Yocto Project Development Tasks Manual.
 
--
+-  Ensure that the following utilities have these minimum version numbers:
 
    -  Git &MIN_GIT_VERSION; or greater
    -  tar &MIN_TAR_VERSION; or greater
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ following requirements:
    -  gcc &MIN_GCC_VERSION; or greater.
    -  GNU make &MIN_MAKE_VERSION; or greater
 
-If your build host does not meet any of these three listed version
+If your build host does not satisfy all of the above version
 requirements, you can take steps to prepare the system so that you
 can still use the Yocto Project. See the
 :ref:`ref-manual/system-requirements:required git, tar, python, make and gcc versions`
@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ an entire Linux distribution, including the toolchain, from source.
       page of the Yocto Project Wiki.
 
 #. **Initialize the Build Environment:** From within the ``poky``
-   directory, run the :ref:`ref-manual/structure:\`\`oe-init-build-env\`\``
+   directory, run the :ref:`ref-manual/structure:``oe-init-build-env```
    environment
    setup script to define Yocto Project's build environment on your
    build host.
@@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ an entire Linux distribution, including the toolchain, from source.
       file in the :term:`Build Directory`::
 
          BB_HASHSERVE_UPSTREAM = "hashserv.yoctoproject.org:8686"
-         SSTATE_MIRRORS ?= "file://.* http://cdn.jsdelivr.net/yocto/sstate/all/PATH;downloadfilename=PATH"
+         SSTATE_MIRRORS ?= "file://.* http://sstate.yoctoproject.org/all/PATH;downloadfilename=PATH"
          BB_HASHSERVE = "auto"
          BB_SIGNATURE_HANDLER = "OEEquivHash"
 

documentation/bsp-guide/bsp.rst

@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ directory of that Layer. This directory is what you add to the
 ``conf/bblayers.conf`` file found in your
 :term:`Build Directory`, which is
 established after you run the OpenEmbedded build environment setup
-script (i.e. :ref:`ref-manual/structure:\`\`oe-init-build-env\`\``).
+script (i.e. :ref:`ref-manual/structure:``oe-init-build-env```).
 Adding the root directory allows the :term:`OpenEmbedded Build System`
 to recognize the BSP
 layer and from it build an image. Here is an example::
@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ section.
 
 #. *Initialize the Build Environment:* While in the root directory of
    the Source Directory (i.e. ``poky``), run the
-   :ref:`ref-manual/structure:\`\`oe-init-build-env\`\`` environment
+   :ref:`ref-manual/structure:``oe-init-build-env``` environment
    setup script to define the OpenEmbedded build environment on your
    build host. ::
 
@@ -675,21 +675,21 @@ to the kernel recipe by using a similarly named append file, which is
 located in the BSP Layer for your target device (e.g. the
 ``meta-bsp_root_name/recipes-kernel/linux`` directory).
 
-Suppose you are using the ``linux-yocto_4.4.bb`` recipe to build the
+Suppose you are using the ``linux-yocto_6.12.bb`` recipe to build the
 kernel. In other words, you have selected the kernel in your
 ``"bsp_root_name".conf`` file by adding
 :term:`PREFERRED_PROVIDER` and :term:`PREFERRED_VERSION`
 statements as follows::
 
    PREFERRED_PROVIDER_virtual/kernel ?= "linux-yocto"
-   PREFERRED_VERSION_linux-yocto ?= "4.4%"
+   PREFERRED_VERSION_linux-yocto ?= "6.12%"
 
 .. note::
 
    When the preferred provider is assumed by default, the :term:`PREFERRED_PROVIDER`
    statement does not appear in the ``"bsp_root_name".conf`` file.
 
-You would use the ``linux-yocto_4.4.bbappend`` file to append specific
+You would use the ``linux-yocto_6.12.bbappend`` file to append specific
 BSP settings to the kernel, thus configuring the kernel for your
 particular BSP.
 
@@ -699,14 +699,19 @@ in the Yocto Project Linux Kernel Development Manual.
 
 An alternate scenario is when you create your own kernel recipe for the
 BSP. A good example of this is the Raspberry Pi BSP. If you examine the
-``recipes-kernel/linux`` directory you see the following::
+``recipes-kernel/linux`` directory in that layer you see the following
+Raspberry Pi-specific recipes and associated files::
 
+   files/
+   linux-raspberrypi_6.12.bb
+   linux-raspberrypi_6.1.bb
+   linux-raspberrypi_6.6.bb
    linux-raspberrypi-dev.bb
    linux-raspberrypi.inc
-   linux-raspberrypi_4.14.bb
-   linux-raspberrypi_4.9.bb
-
-The directory contains three kernel recipes and a common include file.
+   linux-raspberrypi-v7_6.12.bb
+   linux-raspberrypi-v7_6.1.bb
+   linux-raspberrypi-v7_6.6.bb
+   linux-raspberrypi-v7.inc
 
 Developing a Board Support Package (BSP)
 ========================================
@@ -1179,7 +1184,7 @@ Use these steps to create a BSP layer:
 
 -  *Create a Kernel Recipe:* Create a kernel recipe in
    ``recipes-kernel/linux`` by either using a kernel append file or a
-   new custom kernel recipe file (e.g. ``linux-yocto_4.12.bb``). The BSP
+   new custom kernel recipe file (e.g. ``linux-yocto_6.12.bb``). The BSP
    layers mentioned in the previous step also contain different kernel
    examples. See the ":ref:`kernel-dev/common:modifying an existing recipe`"
    section in the Yocto Project Linux Kernel Development Manual for

documentation/conf.py

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
 # documentation root, use os.path.abspath to make it absolute, like shown here.
 #
 import os
+import re
 import sys
 import datetime
 try:
@@ -165,6 +166,24 @@ latex_elements = {
     'preamble': '\\setcounter{tocdepth}{2}',
 }
 
+
+from sphinx.search import SearchEnglish
+from sphinx.search import languages
+class DashFriendlySearchEnglish(SearchEnglish):
+
+    # Accept words that can include 'inner' hyphens or dots
+    _word_re = re.compile(r'[\w]+(?:[\.\-][\w]+)*')
+
+    js_splitter_code = r"""
+function splitQuery(query) {
+    return query
+        .split(/[^\p{Letter}\p{Number}_\p{Emoji_Presentation}\-\.]+/gu)
+        .filter(term => term.length > 0);
+}
+"""
+
+languages['en'] = DashFriendlySearchEnglish
+
 # Make the EPUB builder prefer PNG to SVG because of issues rendering Inkscape SVG
 from sphinx.builders.epub3 import Epub3Builder
 Epub3Builder.supported_image_types = ['image/png', 'image/gif', 'image/jpeg']

documentation/contributor-guide/submit-changes.rst

@@ -735,6 +735,38 @@ argument to ``git format-patch`` with a version number::
 
    git format-patch -v2 <ref-branch>
 
+
+After generating updated patches (v2, v3, and so on) via ``git
+format-patch``, ideally developers will add a patch version changelog
+to each patch that describes what has changed between each revision of
+the patch. Add patch version changelogs after the ``---`` marker in the
+patch, indicating that this information is part of this patch, but is not
+suitable for inclusion in the commit message (i.e. the git history) itself.
+Providing a patch version changelog makes it easier for maintainers and
+reviewers to succinctly understand what changed in all versions of the
+patch, without having to consult alternate sources of information, such as
+searching through messages on a mailing list. For example::
+
+   <patch title>
+
+   <commit message>
+
+   <Signed-off-by/other trailers>
+   ---
+   changes in v4:
+   - provide a clearer commit message
+   - fix spelling mistakes
+
+   changes in v3:
+   - replace func() to use other_func() instead
+
+   changes in v2:
+   - this patch was added in v2
+   ---
+   <diffstat output>
+
+   <unified diff>
+
 Lastly please ensure that you also test your revised changes. In particular
 please don't just edit the patch file written out by ``git format-patch`` and
 resend it.

documentation/dev-manual/debugging.rst

@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ section:
    use the BitBake ``-e`` option to examine variable values after a
    recipe has been parsed.
 
--  ":ref:`dev-manual/debugging:viewing package information with \`\`oe-pkgdata-util\`\``"
+-  ":ref:`dev-manual/debugging:viewing package information with ``oe-pkgdata-util```"
    describes how to use the ``oe-pkgdata-util`` utility to query
    :term:`PKGDATA_DIR` and
    display package-related information for built packages.

documentation/dev-manual/new-recipe.rst

@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ necessary when adding a recipe to build a new piece of software to be
 included in a build.
 
 You can find a complete description of the ``devtool add`` command in
-the ":ref:`sdk-manual/extensible:a closer look at \`\`devtool add\`\``" section
+the ":ref:`sdk-manual/extensible:a closer look at ``devtool add```" section
 in the Yocto Project Application Development and the Extensible Software
 Development Kit (eSDK) manual.
 

documentation/dev-manual/sbom.rst

@@ -30,16 +30,9 @@ To make this happen, you must inherit the
 
    INHERIT += "create-spdx"
 
-Upon building an image, you will then get:
-
--  :term:`SPDX` output in JSON format as an ``IMAGE-MACHINE.spdx.json`` file in
-   ``tmp/deploy/images/MACHINE/`` inside the :term:`Build Directory`.
-
--  This toplevel file is accompanied by an ``IMAGE-MACHINE.spdx.index.json``
-   containing an index of JSON :term:`SPDX` files for individual recipes.
-
--  The compressed archive ``IMAGE-MACHINE.spdx.tar.zst`` contains the index
-   and the files for the single recipes.
+Upon building an image, you will then get the compressed archive
+``IMAGE-MACHINE.spdx.tar.zst`` contains the index and the files for the single
+recipes.
 
 The :ref:`ref-classes-create-spdx` class offers options to include
 more information in the output :term:`SPDX` data:
@@ -56,7 +49,7 @@ more information in the output :term:`SPDX` data:
 
 Though the toplevel :term:`SPDX` output is available in
 ``tmp/deploy/images/MACHINE/`` inside the :term:`Build Directory`, ancillary
-generated files are available in ``tmp/deploy/spdx/MACHINE`` too, such as:
+generated files are available in ``tmp/deploy/spdx`` too, such as:
 
 -  The individual :term:`SPDX` JSON files in the ``IMAGE-MACHINE.spdx.tar.zst``
    archive.

documentation/dev-manual/security-subjects.rst

@@ -52,19 +52,24 @@ for them for significant issues.
 Security-related discussions at the Yocto Project
 -------------------------------------------------
 
-We have set up two security-related mailing lists:
+We have set up two security-related emails/mailing lists:
 
-  -  Public List: yocto [dash] security [at] yoctoproject[dot] org
+  -  Public Mailing List: yocto [dash] security [at] yoctoproject[dot] org
 
-    This is a public mailing list for anyone to subscribe to. This list is an
-    open list to discuss public security issues/patches and security-related
-    initiatives. For more information, including subscription information,
-    please see the  :yocto_lists:`yocto-security mailing list info page </g/yocto-security>`.
+     This is a public mailing list for anyone to subscribe to. This list is an
+     open list to discuss public security issues/patches and security-related
+     initiatives. For more information, including subscription information,
+     please see the  :yocto_lists:`yocto-security mailing list info page
+     </g/yocto-security>`.
 
-  - Private List: security [at] yoctoproject [dot] org
+     This list requires moderator approval for new topics to be posted, to avoid
+     private security reports to be posted by mistake.
 
-    This is a private mailing list for reporting non-published potential
-    vulnerabilities. The list is monitored by the Yocto Project Security team.
+  -  Yocto Project Security Team: security [at] yoctoproject [dot] org
+
+     This is an email for reporting non-published potential vulnerabilities.
+     Emails sent to this address are forwarded to the Yocto Project Security
+     Team members.
 
 
 What you should do if you find a security vulnerability

documentation/dev-manual/start.rst

@@ -543,6 +543,7 @@ your Yocto Project build host:
          DISKPART> select vdisk file="<path_to_VHDX_file>"
          DISKPART> attach vdisk readonly
          DISKPART> compact vdisk
+         DISKPART> detach
          DISKPART> exit
 
 .. note::

documentation/dev-manual/upgrading-recipes.rst

@@ -333,7 +333,7 @@ Manually Upgrading a Recipe
 
 If for some reason you choose not to upgrade recipes using
 :ref:`dev-manual/upgrading-recipes:Using the Auto Upgrade Helper (AUH)` or
-by :ref:`dev-manual/upgrading-recipes:Using \`\`devtool upgrade\`\``,
+by :ref:`dev-manual/upgrading-recipes:Using ``devtool upgrade```,
 you can manually edit the recipe files to upgrade the versions.
 
 .. note::

documentation/dev-manual/wic.rst

@@ -514,7 +514,7 @@ or ::
 
    For more information on how to use the ``bmaptool``
    to flash a device with an image, see the
-   ":ref:`dev-manual/bmaptool:flashing images using \`\`bmaptool\`\``"
+   ":ref:`dev-manual/bmaptool:flashing images using ``bmaptool```"
    section.
 
 Using a Modified Kickstart File

documentation/kernel-dev/common.rst

@@ -746,7 +746,7 @@ the extensible SDK and ``devtool``.
 
    Before attempting this procedure, be sure you have performed the
    steps to get ready for updating the kernel as described in the
-   ":ref:`kernel-dev/common:getting ready to develop using \`\`devtool\`\``"
+   ":ref:`kernel-dev/common:getting ready to develop using ``devtool```"
    section.
 
 Patching the kernel involves changing or adding configurations to an
@@ -759,7 +759,7 @@ output at boot time through ``printk`` statements in the kernel's
 ``calibrate.c`` source code file. Applying the patch and booting the
 modified image causes the added messages to appear on the emulator's
 console. The example is a continuation of the setup procedure found in
-the ":ref:`kernel-dev/common:getting ready to develop using \`\`devtool\`\``" Section.
+the ":ref:`kernel-dev/common:getting ready to develop using ``devtool```" Section.
 
 1. *Check Out the Kernel Source Files:* First you must use ``devtool``
    to checkout the kernel source code in its workspace. Be sure you are
@@ -768,7 +768,7 @@ the ":ref:`kernel-dev/common:getting ready to develop using \`\`devtool\`\``" Se
    .. note::
 
       See this step in the
-      ":ref:`kernel-dev/common:getting ready to develop using \`\`devtool\`\``"
+      ":ref:`kernel-dev/common:getting ready to develop using ``devtool```"
       section for more information.
 
    Use the following ``devtool`` command to check out the code::
@@ -883,7 +883,7 @@ the ":ref:`kernel-dev/common:getting ready to develop using \`\`devtool\`\``" Se
    .. note::
 
       See Step 3 of the
-      ":ref:`kernel-dev/common:getting ready to develop using \`\`devtool\`\``"
+      ":ref:`kernel-dev/common:getting ready to develop using ``devtool```"
       section for information on setting up this layer.
 
    Once the command
@@ -1271,7 +1271,7 @@ appear in the ``.config`` file, which is in the :term:`Build Directory`.
 
    For more information about where the ``.config`` file is located, see the
    example in the
-   ":ref:`kernel-dev/common:using \`\`menuconfig\`\``"
+   ":ref:`kernel-dev/common:using ``menuconfig```"
    section.
 
 It is simple to create a configuration fragment. One method is to use
@@ -1367,7 +1367,7 @@ when you override a policy configuration in a hardware configuration
 fragment.
 
 In order to run this task, you must have an existing ``.config`` file.
-See the ":ref:`kernel-dev/common:using \`\`menuconfig\`\``" section for
+See the ":ref:`kernel-dev/common:using ``menuconfig```" section for
 information on how to create a configuration file.
 
 Here is sample output from the ``do_kernel_configcheck`` task:
@@ -1440,7 +1440,7 @@ and
 tasks until they produce no warnings.
 
 For more information on how to use the ``menuconfig`` tool, see the
-:ref:`kernel-dev/common:using \`\`menuconfig\`\`` section.
+:ref:`kernel-dev/common:using ``menuconfig``` section.
 
 Fine-Tuning the Kernel Configuration File
 -----------------------------------------

documentation/kernel-dev/intro.rst

@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ general information and references for further information.
    Using ``devtool`` and the eSDK requires that you have a clean build
    of the image and that you are set up with the appropriate eSDK. For
    more information, see the
-   ":ref:`kernel-dev/common:getting ready to develop using \`\`devtool\`\``"
+   ":ref:`kernel-dev/common:getting ready to develop using ``devtool```"
    section.
 
    Using traditional kernel development requires that you have the

documentation/migration-guides/migration-4.0.rst

@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ Python changes
   The new Python packaging classes that should be used are
   :ref:`python_flit_core <ref-classes-python_flit_core>`,
   :ref:`python_setuptools_build_meta <ref-classes-python_setuptools_build_meta>`
-  and :ref:`python_poetry_core <ref-classes-python_poetry_core>`.  
+  and :ref:`python_poetry_core <ref-classes-python_poetry_core>`.
 
 - The :ref:`setuptools3 <ref-classes-setuptools3>` class ``do_install()`` task now
   installs the ``wheel`` binary archive. In current versions of ``setuptools`` the

documentation/migration-guides/release-4.0.rst

@@ -32,3 +32,7 @@ Release 4.0 (kirkstone)
    release-notes-4.0.23
    release-notes-4.0.24
    release-notes-4.0.25
+   release-notes-4.0.26
+   release-notes-4.0.27
+   release-notes-4.0.28
+   release-notes-4.0.29

documentation/migration-guides/release-notes-4.0.26.rst

@@ -0,0 +1,263 @@
+Release notes for Yocto-4.0.26 (Kirkstone)
+------------------------------------------
+
+Security Fixes in Yocto-4.0.26
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+
+-  bind: Fix :cve_nist:`2024-11187` and :cve_nist:`2024-12705`
+-  binutils: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-0840`
+-  elfutils: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-1352` and :cve_nist:`2025-1372`
+-  ffmpeg: Fix CVE-2024-28661, :cve_nist:`2024-35369`, :cve_nist:`2024-36613`, :cve_nist:`2024-36616`,
+   :cve_nist:`2024-36617`, :cve_nist:`2024-36618`, :cve_nist:`2025-0518` and :cve_nist:`2025-25473`
+-  ffmpeg: Ignore :cve_nist:`2023-46407`, :cve_nist:`2023-47470`, :cve_nist:`2024-7272`,
+   :cve_nist:`2024-22860`, :cve_nist:`2024-22861` and :cve_nist:`2024-22862`
+-  freetype: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-27363`
+-  gnutls: Fix :cve_nist:`2024-12243`
+-  grub: Fix :cve_nist:`2024-45774`, :cve_nist:`2024-45775`, :cve_nist:`2024-45776`,
+   :cve_nist:`2024-45777`, :cve_nist:`2024-45778`, :cve_nist:`2024-45779`, :cve_nist:`2024-45780`,
+   :cve_nist:`2024-45781`, :cve_nist:`2024-45782`, :cve_nist:`2024-45783`, :cve_nist:`2024-56737`,
+   :cve_nist:`2025-0622`, :cve_nist:`2025-0624`, :cve_nist:`2025-0677`, :cve_nist:`2025-0684`,
+   :cve_nist:`2025-0685`, :cve_nist:`2025-0686`, :cve_nist:`2025-0689`, :cve_nist:`2025-0678`,
+   :cve_nist:`2025-0690`, :cve_nist:`2025-1118` and :cve_nist:`2025-1125`
+-  gstreamer1.0-rtsp-server: fix :cve_nist:`2024-44331`
+-  libarchive: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-25724`
+-  libarchive: Ignore :cve_nist:`2025-1632`
+-  libcap: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-1390`
+-  linux-yocto/5.10: Fix :cve_nist:`2024-36476`, :cve_nist:`2024-43098`, :cve_nist:`2024-47143`,
+   :cve_nist:`2024-48881`, :cve_nist:`2024-50051`, :cve_nist:`2024-50074`, :cve_nist:`2024-50082`,
+   :cve_nist:`2024-50083`, :cve_nist:`2024-50099`, :cve_nist:`2024-50115`, :cve_nist:`2024-50116`,
+   :cve_nist:`2024-50117`, :cve_nist:`2024-50142`, :cve_nist:`2024-50148`, :cve_nist:`2024-50150`,
+   :cve_nist:`2024-50151`, :cve_nist:`2024-50167`, :cve_nist:`2024-50168`, :cve_nist:`2024-50171`,
+   :cve_nist:`2024-50185`, :cve_nist:`2024-50192`, :cve_nist:`2024-50193`, :cve_nist:`2024-50194`,
+   :cve_nist:`2024-50195`, :cve_nist:`2024-50198`, :cve_nist:`2024-50201`, :cve_nist:`2024-50202`,
+   :cve_nist:`2024-50205`, :cve_nist:`2024-50208`, :cve_nist:`2024-50209`, :cve_nist:`2024-50229`,
+   :cve_nist:`2024-50230`, :cve_nist:`2024-50233`, :cve_nist:`2024-50234`, :cve_nist:`2024-50236`,
+   :cve_nist:`2024-50237`, :cve_nist:`2024-50251`, :cve_nist:`2024-50262`, :cve_nist:`2024-50264`,
+   :cve_nist:`2024-50265`, :cve_nist:`2024-50267`, :cve_nist:`2024-50268`, :cve_nist:`2024-50269`,
+   :cve_nist:`2024-50273`, :cve_nist:`2024-50278`, :cve_nist:`2024-50279`, :cve_nist:`2024-50282`,
+   :cve_nist:`2024-50287`, :cve_nist:`2024-50292`, :cve_nist:`2024-50296`, :cve_nist:`2024-50299`,
+   :cve_nist:`2024-50301`, :cve_nist:`2024-50302`, :cve_nist:`2024-53042`, :cve_nist:`2024-53052`,
+   :cve_nist:`2024-53057`, :cve_nist:`2024-53059`, :cve_nist:`2024-53060`, :cve_nist:`2024-53061`,
+   :cve_nist:`2024-53063`, :cve_nist:`2024-53066`, :cve_nist:`2024-53096`, :cve_nist:`2024-53097`,
+   :cve_nist:`2024-53101`, :cve_nist:`2024-53103`, :cve_nist:`2024-53104`, :cve_nist:`2024-53145`,
+   :cve_nist:`2024-53146`, :cve_nist:`2024-53150`, :cve_nist:`2024-53155`, :cve_nist:`2024-53156`,
+   :cve_nist:`2024-53157`, :cve_nist:`2024-53161`, :cve_nist:`2024-53165`, :cve_nist:`2024-53171`,
+   :cve_nist:`2024-53173`, :cve_nist:`2024-53174`, :cve_nist:`2024-53194`, :cve_nist:`2024-53197`,
+   :cve_nist:`2024-53217`, :cve_nist:`2024-53226`, :cve_nist:`2024-53227`, :cve_nist:`2024-53237`,
+   :cve_nist:`2024-53239`, :cve_nist:`2024-55916`, :cve_nist:`2024-56548`, :cve_nist:`2024-56558`,
+   :cve_nist:`2024-56567`, :cve_nist:`2024-56568`, :cve_nist:`2024-56569`, :cve_nist:`2024-56572`,
+   :cve_nist:`2024-56574`, :cve_nist:`2024-56581`, :cve_nist:`2024-56587`, :cve_nist:`2024-56593`,
+   :cve_nist:`2024-56595`, :cve_nist:`2024-56596`, :cve_nist:`2024-56598`, :cve_nist:`2024-56600`,
+   :cve_nist:`2024-56601`, :cve_nist:`2024-56602`, :cve_nist:`2024-56603`, :cve_nist:`2024-56605`,
+   :cve_nist:`2024-56606`, :cve_nist:`2024-56615`, :cve_nist:`2024-56619`, :cve_nist:`2024-56623`,
+   :cve_nist:`2024-56629`, :cve_nist:`2024-56634`, :cve_nist:`2024-56642`, :cve_nist:`2024-56643`,
+   :cve_nist:`2024-56648`, :cve_nist:`2024-56650`, :cve_nist:`2024-56659`, :cve_nist:`2024-56662`,
+   :cve_nist:`2024-56670`, :cve_nist:`2024-56688`, :cve_nist:`2024-56698`, :cve_nist:`2024-56704`,
+   :cve_nist:`2024-56716`, :cve_nist:`2024-56720`, :cve_nist:`2024-56723`, :cve_nist:`2024-56724`,
+   :cve_nist:`2024-56728`, :cve_nist:`2024-56739`, :cve_nist:`2024-56746`, :cve_nist:`2024-56747`,
+   :cve_nist:`2024-56748`, :cve_nist:`2024-56754`, :cve_nist:`2024-56756`, :cve_nist:`2024-56770`,
+   :cve_nist:`2024-56779`, :cve_nist:`2024-56780`, :cve_nist:`2024-56781`, :cve_nist:`2024-56785`,
+   :cve_nist:`2024-57802`, :cve_nist:`2024-57807`, :cve_nist:`2024-57850`, :cve_nist:`2024-57874`,
+   :cve_nist:`2024-57890`, :cve_nist:`2024-57896`, :cve_nist:`2024-57900`, :cve_nist:`2024-57901`,
+   :cve_nist:`2024-57902`, :cve_nist:`2024-57910`, :cve_nist:`2024-57911`, :cve_nist:`2024-57913`,
+   :cve_nist:`2024-57922`, :cve_nist:`2024-57938`, :cve_nist:`2024-57939`, :cve_nist:`2024-57946`,
+   :cve_nist:`2024-57951`, :cve_nist:`2025-21638`, :cve_nist:`2025-21687`, :cve_nist:`2025-21689`,
+   :cve_nist:`2025-21692`, :cve_nist:`2025-21694`, :cve_nist:`2025-21697` and :cve_nist:`2025-21699`
+-  linux-yocto/5.15: Fix :cve_nist:`2024-57979`, :cve_nist:`2024-58034`, :cve_nist:`2024-58052`,
+   :cve_nist:`2024-58055`, :cve_nist:`2024-58058`, :cve_nist:`2024-58063`, :cve_nist:`2024-58069`,
+   :cve_nist:`2024-58071`, :cve_nist:`2024-58076`, :cve_nist:`2024-58083`, :cve_nist:`2025-21700`,
+   :cve_nist:`2025-21703`, :cve_nist:`2025-21715`, :cve_nist:`2025-21722`, :cve_nist:`2025-21727`,
+   :cve_nist:`2025-21731`, :cve_nist:`2025-21753`, :cve_nist:`2025-21756`, :cve_nist:`2025-21760`,
+   :cve_nist:`2025-21761`, :cve_nist:`2025-21762`, :cve_nist:`2025-21763`, :cve_nist:`2025-21764`,
+   :cve_nist:`2025-21796`, :cve_nist:`2025-21811`, :cve_nist:`2025-21887`, :cve_nist:`2025-21898`,
+   :cve_nist:`2025-21904`, :cve_nist:`2025-21905`, :cve_nist:`2025-21912`, :cve_nist:`2025-21917`,
+   :cve_nist:`2025-21919`, :cve_nist:`2025-21920`, :cve_nist:`2025-21922`, :cve_nist:`2025-21934`,
+   :cve_nist:`2025-21943`, :cve_nist:`2025-21948` and :cve_nist:`2025-21951`
+-  libpcre2: Ignore :cve_nist:`2022-1586`
+-  libtasn1: Fix :cve_nist:`2024-12133`
+-  libxml2: Fix :cve_nist:`2022-49043`, :cve_nist:`2024-56171`, :cve_nist:`2025-24928` and
+   :cve_nist:`2025-27113`
+-  libxslt: Fix :cve_nist:`2024-55549` and :cve_nist:`2025-24855`
+-  llvm: Fix :cve_nist:`2024-0151`
+-  mpg123: Fix :cve_nist:`2024-10573`
+-  openssh: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-26465`
+-  ovmf: Revert Fix for CVE-2023-45236 :cve_nist:`2023-45237`
+-  perl: Ignore :cve_nist:`2023-47038`
+-  puzzles: Ignore :cve_nist:`2024-13769`, :cve_nist:`2024-13770` and :cve_nist:`2025-0837`
+-  python3: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-0938`
+-  ruby: Fix :cve_nist:`2024-41946`, :cve_nist:`2025-27219` and :cve_nist:`2025-27220`
+-  subversion: Ignore :cve_nist:`2024-45720`
+-  systemd: Fix :cve_nist:`2022-3821`, :cve_nist:`2022-4415`, :cve_nist:`2022-45873` and
+   :cve_nist:`2023-7008`
+-  tiff: mark :cve_nist:`2023-30774` as patched with existing patch
+-  u-boot: Fix :cve_nist:`2022-2347`, :cve_nist:`2022-30767`, :cve_nist:`2022-30790`,
+   :cve_nist:`2024-57254`, :cve_nist:`2024-57255`, :cve_nist:`2024-57256`, :cve_nist:`2024-57257`,
+   :cve_nist:`2024-57258` and :cve_nist:`2024-57259`
+-  vim: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-1215`, :cve_nist:`2025-22134`, :cve_nist:`2025-24014`,
+   :cve_nist:`2025-26603`, :cve_nist:`2025-27423` and :cve_nist:`2025-29768`
+-  xserver-xorg: Fix :cve_nist:`2022-49737`, :cve_nist:`2025-26594`, :cve_nist:`2025-26595`,
+   :cve_nist:`2025-26596`, :cve_nist:`2025-26597`, :cve_nist:`2025-26598`, :cve_nist:`2025-26599`,
+   :cve_nist:`2025-26600` and :cve_nist:`2025-26601`
+-  xwayland: Fix :cve_nist:`2022-49737`, :cve_nist:`2024-9632`, :cve_nist:`2024-21885`,
+   :cve_nist:`2024-21886`, :cve_nist:`2024-31080`, :cve_nist:`2024-31081`, :cve_nist:`2024-31083`,
+   :cve_nist:`2025-26594`, :cve_nist:`2025-26595`, :cve_nist:`2025-26596`, :cve_nist:`2025-26597`,
+   :cve_nist:`2025-26598`, :cve_nist:`2025-26599`, :cve_nist:`2025-26600` and :cve_nist:`2025-26601`
+-  zlib: Fix :cve_nist:`2014-9485`
+
+
+
+Fixes in Yocto-4.0.26
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+-  bind: Upgrade to 9.18.33
+-  bitbake: cache: bump cache version
+-  bitbake: siggen.py: Improve taskhash reproducibility
+-  boost: fix do_fetch error
+-  build-appliance-image: Update to kirkstone head revision
+-  contributor-guide/submit-changes: add policy on AI generated code
+-  cve-update-nvd2-native: handle missing vulnStatus
+-  docs: Add favicon for the documentation html
+-  docs: Remove all mention of core-image-lsb
+-  libtasn1: upgrade to 4.20.0
+-  libxcrypt-compat: Remove libcrypt.so to fix conflict with libcrypt
+-  libxml2: fix compilation of explicit child axis in pattern
+-  linux-yocto/5.10: update to v5.10.234
+-  linux-yocto/5.15: update to v5.15.179
+-  mesa: Fix missing GLES3 headers in SDK sysroot
+-  mesa: Update :term:`SRC_URI`
+-  meta: Enable '-o pipefail' for the SDK installer
+-  migration-guides: add release notes for 4.0.25
+-  poky.conf: add ubuntu2404 to :term:`SANITY_TESTED_DISTROS`
+-  poky.conf: bump version for 4.0.26
+-  procps: replaced one use of fputs(3) with a write(2) call
+-  ref-manual: don't refer to poky-lsb
+-  scripts/install-buildtools: Update to 4.0.24
+-  scritps/runqemu: Ensure we only have two serial ports
+-  systemd: upgrade to 250.14
+-  tzcode-native: Fix compiler setting from 2023d version
+-  tzcode: Update :term:`SRC_URI`
+-  tzdata/tzcode-native: upgrade 2025a
+-  vim: Upgrade to 9.1.1198
+-  virglrenderer: fix do_fetch error
+-  vulnerabilities/classes: remove references to cve-check text format
+-  xz: Update :term:`SRC_URI`
+-  yocto-uninative: Update to 4.7 for glibc 2.41
+
+
+Known Issues in Yocto-4.0.26
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+- N/A
+
+
+Contributors to Yocto-4.0.26
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+Thanks to the following people who contributed to this release:
+
+-  Aleksandar Nikolic
+-  Alessio Cascone
+-  Antonin Godard
+-  Archana Polampalli
+-  Ashish Sharma
+-  Bruce Ashfield
+-  Carlos Dominguez
+-  Deepesh Varatharajan
+-  Divya Chellam
+-  Guocai He
+-  Hitendra Prajapati
+-  Hongxu Jia
+-  Jiaying Song
+-  Johannes Kauffmann
+-  Kai Kang
+-  Lee Chee Yang
+-  Libo Chen
+-  Marta Rybczynska
+-  Michael Halstead
+-  Mingli Yu
+-  Moritz Haase
+-  Narpat Mali
+-  Paulo Neves
+-  Peter Marko
+-  Priyal Doshi
+-  Richard Purdie
+-  Robert Yang
+-  Ross Burton
+-  Sakib Sajal
+-  Steve Sakoman
+-  Vijay Anusuri
+-  Yogita Urade
+-  Zhang Peng
+
+
+Repositories / Downloads for Yocto-4.0.26
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+poky
+
+-  Repository Location: :yocto_git:`/poky`
+-  Branch: :yocto_git:`kirkstone </poky/log/?h=kirkstone>`
+-  Tag:  :yocto_git:`yocto-4.0.26 </poky/log/?h=yocto-4.0.26>`
+-  Git Revision: :yocto_git:`d70d287a77d5026b698ac237ab865b2dafd36bb8 </poky/commit/?id=d70d287a77d5026b698ac237ab865b2dafd36bb8>`
+-  Release Artefact: poky-d70d287a77d5026b698ac237ab865b2dafd36bb8
+-  sha: 3ebfadb8bff4c1ca12b3cf3e4ef6e3ac2ce52b73570266daa98436c9959249f2
+-  Download Locations:
+   https://downloads.yoctoproject.org/releases/yocto/yocto-4.0.26/poky-d70d287a77d5026b698ac237ab865b2dafd36bb8.tar.bz2
+   https://mirrors.kernel.org/yocto/yocto/yocto-4.0.26/poky-d70d287a77d5026b698ac237ab865b2dafd36bb8.tar.bz2
+
+openembedded-core
+
+-  Repository Location: :oe_git:`/openembedded-core`
+-  Branch: :oe_git:`kirkstone </openembedded-core/log/?h=kirkstone>`
+-  Tag:  :oe_git:`yocto-4.0.26 </openembedded-core/log/?h=yocto-4.0.26>`
+-  Git Revision: :oe_git:`1efbe1004bc82e7c14c1e8bd4ce644f5015c3346 </openembedded-core/commit/?id=1efbe1004bc82e7c14c1e8bd4ce644f5015c3346>`
+-  Release Artefact: oecore-1efbe1004bc82e7c14c1e8bd4ce644f5015c3346
+-  sha: d3805e034dabd0865dbf55488b2c16d4ea0351d37aa826f0054a6bfdde5a8be9
+-  Download Locations:
+   https://downloads.yoctoproject.org/releases/yocto/yocto-4.0.26/oecore-1efbe1004bc82e7c14c1e8bd4ce644f5015c3346.tar.bz2
+   https://mirrors.kernel.org/yocto/yocto/yocto-4.0.26/oecore-1efbe1004bc82e7c14c1e8bd4ce644f5015c3346.tar.bz2
+
+meta-mingw
+
+-  Repository Location: :yocto_git:`/meta-mingw`
+-  Branch: :yocto_git:`kirkstone </meta-mingw/log/?h=kirkstone>`
+-  Tag:  :yocto_git:`yocto-4.0.26 </meta-mingw/log/?h=yocto-4.0.26>`
+-  Git Revision: :yocto_git:`87c22abb1f11be430caf4372e6b833dc7d77564e </meta-mingw/commit/?id=87c22abb1f11be430caf4372e6b833dc7d77564e>`
+-  Release Artefact: meta-mingw-87c22abb1f11be430caf4372e6b833dc7d77564e
+-  sha: f0bc4873e2e0319fb9d6d6ab9b98eb3f89664d4339a167d2db6a787dd12bc1a8
+-  Download Locations:
+   https://downloads.yoctoproject.org/releases/yocto/yocto-4.0.26/meta-mingw-87c22abb1f11be430caf4372e6b833dc7d77564e.tar.bz2
+   https://mirrors.kernel.org/yocto/yocto/yocto-4.0.26/meta-mingw-87c22abb1f11be430caf4372e6b833dc7d77564e.tar.bz2
+
+meta-gplv2
+
+-  Repository Location: :yocto_git:`/meta-gplv2`
+-  Branch: :yocto_git:`kirkstone </meta-gplv2/log/?h=kirkstone>`
+-  Tag:  :yocto_git:`yocto-4.0.26 </meta-gplv2/log/?h=yocto-4.0.26>`
+-  Git Revision: :yocto_git:`d2f8b5cdb285b72a4ed93450f6703ca27aa42e8a </meta-gplv2/commit/?id=d2f8b5cdb285b72a4ed93450f6703ca27aa42e8a>`
+-  Release Artefact: meta-gplv2-d2f8b5cdb285b72a4ed93450f6703ca27aa42e8a
+-  sha: c386f59f8a672747dc3d0be1d4234b6039273d0e57933eb87caa20f56b9cca6d
+-  Download Locations:
+   https://downloads.yoctoproject.org/releases/yocto/yocto-4.0.26/meta-gplv2-d2f8b5cdb285b72a4ed93450f6703ca27aa42e8a.tar.bz2
+   https://mirrors.kernel.org/yocto/yocto/yocto-4.0.26/meta-gplv2-d2f8b5cdb285b72a4ed93450f6703ca27aa42e8a.tar.bz2
+
+bitbake
+
+-  Repository Location: :oe_git:`/bitbake`
+-  Branch: :oe_git:`2.0 </bitbake/log/?h=2.0>`
+-  Tag:  :oe_git:`yocto-4.0.26 </bitbake/log/?h=yocto-4.0.26>`
+-  Git Revision: :oe_git:`046871d9fd76efdca7b72718b328d8f545523f7e </bitbake/commit/?id=046871d9fd76efdca7b72718b328d8f545523f7e>`
+-  Release Artefact: bitbake-046871d9fd76efdca7b72718b328d8f545523f7e
+-  sha: e9df0a9f5921b583b539188d66b23f120e1751000e7822e76c3391d5c76ee21a
+-  Download Locations:
+   https://downloads.yoctoproject.org/releases/yocto/yocto-4.0.26/bitbake-046871d9fd76efdca7b72718b328d8f545523f7e.tar.bz2
+   https://mirrors.kernel.org/yocto/yocto/yocto-4.0.26/bitbake-046871d9fd76efdca7b72718b328d8f545523f7e.tar.bz2
+
+yocto-docs
+
+-  Repository Location: :yocto_git:`/yocto-docs`
+-  Branch: :yocto_git:`kirkstone </yocto-docs/log/?h=kirkstone>`
+-  Tag: :yocto_git:`yocto-4.0.26 </yocto-docs/log/?h=yocto-4.0.26>`
+-  Git Revision: :yocto_git:`9b4c36f7b02dd4bedfec90206744a1e90e37733c </yocto-docs/commit/?id=9b4c36f7b02dd4bedfec90206744a1e90e37733c>`
+

documentation/migration-guides/release-notes-4.0.27.rst

@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
+Release notes for Yocto-4.0.27 (Kirkstone)
+------------------------------------------
+
+Security Fixes in Yocto-4.0.27
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+-  binutils: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-1178`
+-  busybox: fix :cve_nist:`2023-39810`
+-  connman :fix :cve_nist:`2025-32743`
+-  curl: Ignore :cve_nist:`2025-0725`
+-  ghostscript: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-27830`, :cve_nist:`2025-27831`, :cve_nist:`2025-27832`,
+   :cve_nist:`2025-27834`, :cve_nist:`2025-27835` and :cve_nist:`2025-27836`
+-  ghostscript: Ignore :cve_nist:`2024-29507`, :cve_nist:`2025-27833` and :cve_nist:`2025-27837`
+-  glib-2.0: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-3360`
+-  go: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-22871`
+-  libarchive: Ignore :cve_nist:`2024-48615`
+-  libpam: Fix :cve_nist:`2024-10041`
+-  libsoup-2.4: Fix :cve_nist:`2024-52532`, :cve_nist:`2025-32906` and :cve_nist:`2025-32909`
+-  libsoup: Fix :cve_nist:`2024-52532`, :cve_nist:`2025-32906`, :cve_nist:`2025-32909`,
+   :cve_nist:`2025-32910`, :cve_nist:`2025-32911`, :cve_nist:`2025-32912`, :cve_nist:`2025-32913`
+   and :cve_nist:`2025-32914`
+-  libxml2: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-32414` and :cve_nist:`2025-32415`
+-  ofono: Fix :cve_nist:`2024-7537`
+-  perl: Fix :cve_nist:`2024-56406`
+-  ppp: Fix :cve_nist:`2024-58250`
+-  python3-setuptools: Fix :cve_nist:`2024-6345`
+-  qemu: Ignore :cve_nist:`2023-1386`
+-  ruby: Fix :cve_nist:`2024-43398`
+-  sqlite3: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-29088`
+-  systemd: Ignore :cve_nist:`2022-3821`, :cve_nist:`2022-4415` and :cve_nist:`2022-45873`
+
+
+Fixes in Yocto-4.0.27
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+-  Revert "cve-update-nvd2-native: Tweak to work better with NFS DL_DIR"
+-  build-appliance-image: Update to kirkstone head revision
+-  cve-update-nvd2-native: add workaround for json5 style list
+-  docs: Fix dead links that use the :term:`DISTRO` macro
+-  docs: manuals: remove repeated word
+-  docs: poky.yaml: introduce DISTRO_LATEST_TAG
+-  glibc: Add single-threaded fast path to rand()
+-  glibc: stable 2.35 branch updates
+-  module.bbclass: add KBUILD_EXTRA_SYMBOLS to install
+-  perl: enable _GNU_SOURCE define via d_gnulibc
+-  poky.conf: bump version for 4.0.27
+-  ref-manual/variables.rst: document autotools class related variables
+-  scripts/install-buildtools: Update to 4.0.26
+-  systemd: backport patch to fix journal issue
+-  systemd: systemd-journald fails to setup LogNamespace
+-  tzdata/tzcode-native: upgrade to 2025b
+
+
+Known Issues in Yocto-4.0.27
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+- N/A
+
+
+Contributors to Yocto-4.0.27
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+-  Aleksandar Nikolic
+-  Alexander Kanavin
+-  Alon Bar-Lev
+-  Andrew Kreimer
+-  Antonin Godard
+-  Chen Qi
+-  Deepesh Varatharajan
+-  Divya Chellam
+-  Haitao Liu
+-  Haixiao Yan
+-  Hitendra Prajapati
+-  Peter Marko
+-  Praveen Kumar
+-  Priyal Doshi
+-  Shubham Kulkarni
+-  Soumya Sambu
+-  Steve Sakoman
+-  Vijay Anusuri
+-  Yogita Urade
+
+
+Repositories / Downloads for Yocto-4.0.27
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+poky
+
+-  Repository Location: :yocto_git:`/poky`
+-  Branch: :yocto_git:`kirkstone </poky/log/?h=kirkstone>`
+-  Tag:  :yocto_git:`yocto-4.0.27 </poky/log/?h=yocto-4.0.27>`
+-  Git Revision: :yocto_git:`ab9a994a8cd8e06b519a693db444030999d273b7 </poky/commit/?id=ab9a994a8cd8e06b519a693db444030999d273b7>`
+-  Release Artefact: poky-ab9a994a8cd8e06b519a693db444030999d273b7
+-  sha: 77a366c17cf29eef15c6ff3f44e73f81c07288c723fd4a6dbd8c7ee9b79933f3
+-  Download Locations:
+   https://downloads.yoctoproject.org/releases/yocto/yocto-4.0.27/poky-ab9a994a8cd8e06b519a693db444030999d273b7.tar.bz2
+   https://mirrors.kernel.org/yocto/yocto/yocto-4.0.27/poky-ab9a994a8cd8e06b519a693db444030999d273b7.tar.bz2
+
+openembedded-core
+
+-  Repository Location: :oe_git:`/openembedded-core`
+-  Branch: :oe_git:`kirkstone </openembedded-core/log/?h=kirkstone>`
+-  Tag:  :oe_git:`yocto-4.0.27 </openembedded-core/log/?h=yocto-4.0.27>`
+-  Git Revision: :oe_git:`e8be08a624b2d024715a5c8b0c37f2345a02336b </openembedded-core/commit/?id=e8be08a624b2d024715a5c8b0c37f2345a02336b>`
+-  Release Artefact: oecore-e8be08a624b2d024715a5c8b0c37f2345a02336b
+-  sha: cc5b0fadab021c6dc61f37fc4ff01a1cf657e7c219488ce264bede42f7f6212f
+-  Download Locations:
+   https://downloads.yoctoproject.org/releases/yocto/yocto-4.0.27/oecore-e8be08a624b2d024715a5c8b0c37f2345a02336b.tar.bz2
+   https://mirrors.kernel.org/yocto/yocto/yocto-4.0.27/oecore-e8be08a624b2d024715a5c8b0c37f2345a02336b.tar.bz2
+
+meta-mingw
+
+-  Repository Location: :yocto_git:`/meta-mingw`
+-  Branch: :yocto_git:`kirkstone </meta-mingw/log/?h=kirkstone>`
+-  Tag:  :yocto_git:`yocto-4.0.27 </meta-mingw/log/?h=yocto-4.0.27>`
+-  Git Revision: :yocto_git:`87c22abb1f11be430caf4372e6b833dc7d77564e </meta-mingw/commit/?id=87c22abb1f11be430caf4372e6b833dc7d77564e>`
+-  Release Artefact: meta-mingw-87c22abb1f11be430caf4372e6b833dc7d77564e
+-  sha: f0bc4873e2e0319fb9d6d6ab9b98eb3f89664d4339a167d2db6a787dd12bc1a8
+-  Download Locations:
+   https://downloads.yoctoproject.org/releases/yocto/yocto-4.0.27/meta-mingw-87c22abb1f11be430caf4372e6b833dc7d77564e.tar.bz2
+   https://mirrors.kernel.org/yocto/yocto/yocto-4.0.27/meta-mingw-87c22abb1f11be430caf4372e6b833dc7d77564e.tar.bz2
+
+meta-gplv2
+
+-  Repository Location: :yocto_git:`/meta-gplv2`
+-  Branch: :yocto_git:`kirkstone </meta-gplv2/log/?h=kirkstone>`
+-  Tag:  :yocto_git:`yocto-4.0.27 </meta-gplv2/log/?h=yocto-4.0.27>`
+-  Git Revision: :yocto_git:`d2f8b5cdb285b72a4ed93450f6703ca27aa42e8a </meta-gplv2/commit/?id=d2f8b5cdb285b72a4ed93450f6703ca27aa42e8a>`
+-  Release Artefact: meta-gplv2-d2f8b5cdb285b72a4ed93450f6703ca27aa42e8a
+-  sha: c386f59f8a672747dc3d0be1d4234b6039273d0e57933eb87caa20f56b9cca6d
+-  Download Locations:
+   https://downloads.yoctoproject.org/releases/yocto/yocto-4.0.27/meta-gplv2-d2f8b5cdb285b72a4ed93450f6703ca27aa42e8a.tar.bz2
+   https://mirrors.kernel.org/yocto/yocto/yocto-4.0.27/meta-gplv2-d2f8b5cdb285b72a4ed93450f6703ca27aa42e8a.tar.bz2
+
+bitbake
+
+-  Repository Location: :oe_git:`/bitbake`
+-  Branch: :oe_git:`2.0 </bitbake/log/?h=2.0>`
+-  Tag:  :oe_git:`yocto-4.0.27 </bitbake/log/?h=yocto-4.0.27>`
+-  Git Revision: :oe_git:`046871d9fd76efdca7b72718b328d8f545523f7e </bitbake/commit/?id=046871d9fd76efdca7b72718b328d8f545523f7e>`
+-  Release Artefact: bitbake-046871d9fd76efdca7b72718b328d8f545523f7e
+-  sha: e9df0a9f5921b583b539188d66b23f120e1751000e7822e76c3391d5c76ee21a
+-  Download Locations:
+   https://downloads.yoctoproject.org/releases/yocto/yocto-4.0.27/bitbake-046871d9fd76efdca7b72718b328d8f545523f7e.tar.bz2
+   https://mirrors.kernel.org/yocto/yocto/yocto-4.0.27/bitbake-046871d9fd76efdca7b72718b328d8f545523f7e.tar.bz2
+
+yocto-docs
+
+-  Repository Location: :yocto_git:`/yocto-docs`
+-  Branch: :yocto_git:`kirkstone </yocto-docs/log/?h=kirkstone>`
+-  Tag: :yocto_git:`yocto-4.0.27 </yocto-docs/log/?h=yocto-4.0.27>`
+-  Git Revision: :yocto_git:`0d51e553d5f83eea6634e03ddc9c7740bf72fcea </yocto-docs/commit/?id=0d51e553d5f83eea6634e03ddc9c7740bf72fcea>`
+

documentation/migration-guides/release-notes-4.0.28.rst

@@ -0,0 +1,224 @@
+Release notes for Yocto-4.0.28 (Kirkstone)
+------------------------------------------
+
+Security Fixes in Yocto-4.0.28
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+-  binutils: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-1180`, :cve_nist:`2025-1182`, :cve_nist:`2025-5244` and
+   :cve_nist:`2025-5245`
+-  connman: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-32366`
+-  ffmpeg: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-1373`, :cve_nist:`2025-22919` and :cve_nist:`2025-22921`
+-  ffmpeg: Ignore :cve_nist:`2022-48434`
+-  ghostscript: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-48708`
+-  git: Fix :cve_nist:`2024-50349` and :cve_nist:`2024-52006`
+-  glib-2.0: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-4373`
+-  glibc: Fix for :cve_nist:`2025-4802`
+-  go: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-4673`
+-  go: ignore :cve_nist:`2024-3566`
+-  icu: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-5222`
+-  iputils: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-47268`
+-  libsoup-2.4: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-2784`, :cve_nist:`2025-4476`, :cve_nist:`2025-4948`,
+   :cve_nist:`2025-4969`, :cve_nist:`2025-32050`, :cve_nist:`2025-32052`, :cve_nist:`2025-32053`,
+   :cve_nist:`2025-32907`, :cve_nist:`2025-32910`, :cve_nist:`2025-32911`, :cve_nist:`2025-32912`,
+   :cve_nist:`2025-32913`, :cve_nist:`2025-32914`, :cve_nist:`2025-46420` and :cve_nist:`2025-46421`
+-  libsoup: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-2784`, :cve_nist:`2025-4476`, :cve_nist:`2025-4948`,
+   :cve_nist:`2025-4969`, :cve_nist:`2025-32050`, :cve_nist:`2025-32051`, :cve_nist:`2025-32052`,
+   :cve_nist:`2025-32053`, :cve_nist:`2025-32907`, :cve_nist:`2025-46420` and :cve_nist:`2025-46421`
+-  linux-yocto/5.15: Fix :cve_nist:`2024-26952`, :cve_nist:`2025-21941`, :cve_nist:`2025-21957`,
+   :cve_nist:`2025-21959`, :cve_nist:`2025-21962`, :cve_nist:`2025-21963`, :cve_nist:`2025-21964`,
+   :cve_nist:`2025-21968`, :cve_nist:`2025-21996`, :cve_nist:`2025-22018`, :cve_nist:`2025-22020`,
+   :cve_nist:`2025-22035`, :cve_nist:`2025-22054`, :cve_nist:`2025-22056`, :cve_nist:`2025-22063`,
+   :cve_nist:`2025-22066`, :cve_nist:`2025-22081`, :cve_nist:`2025-22097`, :cve_nist:`2025-23136`,
+   :cve_nist:`2025-37785`, :cve_nist:`2025-37803`, :cve_nist:`2025-37805`, :cve_nist:`2025-38152`,
+   :cve_nist:`2025-39728` and :cve_nist:`2025-39735`
+-  net-tools: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-46836`
+-  openssh: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-32728`
+-  python3: Fix :cve_nist:`2024-12718`, :cve_nist:`2025-0938`, :cve_nist:`2025-4138`,
+   :cve_nist:`2025-4330`, :cve_nist:`2025-4435`, :cve_nist:`2025-4516` and :cve_nist:`2025-4517`
+-  python3-requests: Fix :cve_nist:`2024-47081`
+-  python3-setuptools: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-47273`
+-  ruby: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-27221`
+-  screen: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-46802`, :cve_nist:`2025-46804` and :cve_nist:`2025-46805`
+-  taglib: Fix :cve_nist:`2023-47466`
+
+
+Fixes in Yocto-4.0.28
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+-  babeltrace/libatomic-ops: correct the :term:`SRC_URI`
+-  brief-yoctoprojectqs/ref-manual: Switch to new CDN
+-  bsp guide: update kernel version example to 6.12
+-  bsp-guide: update lonely "4.12" kernel reference to "6.12"
+-  build-appliance-image: Update to kirkstone head revision
+-  cmake: Correctly handle cost data of tests with arbitrary chars in name
+-  conf.py: tweak SearchEnglish to be hyphen-friendly
+-  contributor-guide/submit-changes: encourage patch version changelogs
+-  dev-manual/sbom.rst: fix wrong build outputs
+-  docs: Clean up explanation of minimum required version numbers
+-  docs: README: specify how to contribute instead of pointing at another file
+-  docs: conf.py: silence SyntaxWarning on js_splitter_code
+-  e2fsprogs: removed 'sed -u' option
+-  ffmpeg: Add "libswresample libavcodec" to :term:`CVE_PRODUCT`
+-  ffmpeg: upgrade to 5.0.3
+-  gcc: AArch64 - Fix strict-align cpymem/setmem
+-  glibc: nptl Fix indentation
+-  glibc: nptl Remove unnecessary catch-all-wake in condvar group switch
+-  glibc: nptl Remove unnecessary quadruple check in pthread_cond_wait
+-  glibc: nptl Update comments and indentation for new condvar implementation
+-  glibc: nptl Use a single loop in pthread_cond_wait instaed of a nested loop
+-  glibc: nptl Use all of g1_start and g_signals
+-  glibc: nptl rename __condvar_quiesce_and_switch_g1
+-  glibc: pthreads NPTL lost wakeup fix 2
+-  kernel.bbclass: add original package name to :term:`RPROVIDES` for -image and -base
+-  libpng: Improve ptest
+-  linux-yocto/5.15: update to v5.15.184
+-  migration-guides: add release notes for 4.0.26 and 4.0.27
+-  nfs-utils: don't use signals to shut down nfs server.
+-  poky.conf: bump version for 4.0.28
+-  python3: upgrade to 3.10.18
+-  ref-manual/release-process: update releases.svg
+-  ref-manual/variables.rst: document :term:`INHIBIT_DEFAULT_RUST_DEPS`
+   :term:`INHIBIT_UPDATERCD_BBCLASS` :term:`SSTATE_SKIP_CREATION` :term:`WIC_CREATE_EXTRA_ARGS`
+   :term:`IMAGE_ROOTFS_MAXSIZE` :term:`INITRAMFS_MAXSIZE`
+-  ref-manual: clarify :term:`KCONFIG_MODE` default behaviour
+-  ref-manual: classes: nativesdk: move note to appropriate section
+-  ref-manual: classes: reword to clarify that native/nativesdk options are exclusive
+-  ref-manual: kernel-fitimage.bbclass does not use :term:`SPL_SIGN_KEYNAME`
+-  scripts/install-buildtools: Update to 4.0.27
+-  sphinx-lint: role missing opening tag colon
+-  sphinx-lint: trailing whitespace
+-  sphinx-lint: unbalanced inline literal markup
+-  sysstat: correct the :term:`SRC_URI`
+-  systemtap: add sysroot Python paths to configure flags
+-  test-manual/intro: remove Buildbot version used
+-  util-linux: Add fix to isolate test fstab entries using CUSTOM_FSTAB
+-  xz: Update :term:`LICENSE` variable for xz packages
+
+
+Known Issues in Yocto-4.0.28
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+- N/A
+
+
+Contributors to Yocto-4.0.28
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+-  Aditya Tayade
+-  Adrian Freihofer
+-  Aleksandar Nikolic
+-  Alper Ak
+-  Antonin Godard
+-  Archana Polampalli
+-  Ashish Sharma
+-  Bruce Ashfield
+-  Carlos Sánchez de La Lama
+-  Changqing Li
+-  Christos Gavros
+-  Colin Pinnell McAllister
+-  Deepesh Varatharajan
+-  Divya Chellam
+-  Enrico Jörns
+-  Etienne Cordonnier
+-  Guocai He
+-  Harish Sadineni
+-  Hitendra Prajapati
+-  Jiaying Song
+-  Lee Chee Yang
+-  Martin Jansa
+-  Moritz Haase
+-  NeilBrown
+-  Peter Marko
+-  Poonam Jadhav
+-  Praveen Kumar
+-  Quentin Schulz
+-  Richard Purdie
+-  Robert P. J. Day
+-  Soumya Sambu
+-  Steve Sakoman
+-  Sundeep KOKKONDA
+-  Sunil Dora
+-  Trevor Woerner
+-  Vijay Anusuri
+-  Virendra Thakur
+-  Yi Zhao
+-  aszh07
+
+
+Repositories / Downloads for Yocto-4.0.28
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+poky
+
+-  Repository Location: :yocto_git:`/poky`
+-  Branch: :yocto_git:`kirkstone </poky/log/?h=kirkstone>`
+-  Tag:  :yocto_git:`yocto-4.0.28 </poky/log/?h=yocto-4.0.28>`
+-  Git Revision: :yocto_git:`78c9cb3eaf071932567835742608404d5ce23cc4 </poky/commit/?id=78c9cb3eaf071932567835742608404d5ce23cc4>`
+-  Release Artefact: poky-78c9cb3eaf071932567835742608404d5ce23cc4
+-  sha: 9c73c6f89e70c2041a52851e5cc582e5a2f05ad2fdc110d2c518f2c4994e8de3
+-  Download Locations:
+   https://downloads.yoctoproject.org/releases/yocto/yocto-4.0.28/poky-78c9cb3eaf071932567835742608404d5ce23cc4.tar.bz2
+   https://mirrors.kernel.org/yocto/yocto/yocto-4.0.28/poky-78c9cb3eaf071932567835742608404d5ce23cc4.tar.bz2
+
+openembedded-core
+
+-  Repository Location: :oe_git:`/openembedded-core`
+-  Branch: :oe_git:`kirkstone </openembedded-core/log/?h=kirkstone>`
+-  Tag:  :oe_git:`yocto-4.0.28 </openembedded-core/log/?h=yocto-4.0.28>`
+-  Git Revision: :oe_git:`75e54301c5076eb0454aee33c870adf078f563fd </openembedded-core/commit/?id=75e54301c5076eb0454aee33c870adf078f563fd>`
+-  Release Artefact: oecore-75e54301c5076eb0454aee33c870adf078f563fd
+-  sha: c5ffceab90881c4041ec4304da8b7b32d9c1f89a4c63ee7b8cbd53c796b0187b
+-  Download Locations:
+   https://downloads.yoctoproject.org/releases/yocto/yocto-4.0.28/oecore-75e54301c5076eb0454aee33c870adf078f563fd.tar.bz2
+   https://mirrors.kernel.org/yocto/yocto/yocto-4.0.28/oecore-75e54301c5076eb0454aee33c870adf078f563fd.tar.bz2
+
+meta-mingw
+
+-  Repository Location: :yocto_git:`/meta-mingw`
+-  Branch: :yocto_git:`kirkstone </meta-mingw/log/?h=kirkstone>`
+-  Tag:  :yocto_git:`yocto-4.0.28 </meta-mingw/log/?h=yocto-4.0.28>`
+-  Git Revision: :yocto_git:`87c22abb1f11be430caf4372e6b833dc7d77564e </meta-mingw/commit/?id=87c22abb1f11be430caf4372e6b833dc7d77564e>`
+-  Release Artefact: meta-mingw-87c22abb1f11be430caf4372e6b833dc7d77564e
+-  sha: f0bc4873e2e0319fb9d6d6ab9b98eb3f89664d4339a167d2db6a787dd12bc1a8
+-  Download Locations:
+   https://downloads.yoctoproject.org/releases/yocto/yocto-4.0.28/meta-mingw-87c22abb1f11be430caf4372e6b833dc7d77564e.tar.bz2
+   https://mirrors.kernel.org/yocto/yocto/yocto-4.0.28/meta-mingw-87c22abb1f11be430caf4372e6b833dc7d77564e.tar.bz2
+
+meta-gplv2
+
+-  Repository Location: :yocto_git:`/meta-gplv2`
+-  Branch: :yocto_git:`kirkstone </meta-gplv2/log/?h=kirkstone>`
+-  Tag:  :yocto_git:`yocto-4.0.28 </meta-gplv2/log/?h=yocto-4.0.28>`
+-  Git Revision: :yocto_git:`d2f8b5cdb285b72a4ed93450f6703ca27aa42e8a </meta-gplv2/commit/?id=d2f8b5cdb285b72a4ed93450f6703ca27aa42e8a>`
+-  Release Artefact: meta-gplv2-d2f8b5cdb285b72a4ed93450f6703ca27aa42e8a
+-  sha: c386f59f8a672747dc3d0be1d4234b6039273d0e57933eb87caa20f56b9cca6d
+-  Download Locations:
+   https://downloads.yoctoproject.org/releases/yocto/yocto-4.0.28/meta-gplv2-d2f8b5cdb285b72a4ed93450f6703ca27aa42e8a.tar.bz2
+   https://mirrors.kernel.org/yocto/yocto/yocto-4.0.28/meta-gplv2-d2f8b5cdb285b72a4ed93450f6703ca27aa42e8a.tar.bz2
+
+bitbake
+
+-  Repository Location: :oe_git:`/bitbake`
+-  Branch: :oe_git:`2.0 </bitbake/log/?h=2.0>`
+-  Tag:  :oe_git:`yocto-4.0.28 </bitbake/log/?h=yocto-4.0.28>`
+-  Git Revision: :oe_git:`046871d9fd76efdca7b72718b328d8f545523f7e </bitbake/commit/?id=046871d9fd76efdca7b72718b328d8f545523f7e>`
+-  Release Artefact: bitbake-046871d9fd76efdca7b72718b328d8f545523f7e
+-  sha: e9df0a9f5921b583b539188d66b23f120e1751000e7822e76c3391d5c76ee21a
+-  Download Locations:
+   https://downloads.yoctoproject.org/releases/yocto/yocto-4.0.28/bitbake-046871d9fd76efdca7b72718b328d8f545523f7e.tar.bz2
+   https://mirrors.kernel.org/yocto/yocto/yocto-4.0.28/bitbake-046871d9fd76efdca7b72718b328d8f545523f7e.tar.bz2
+
+meta-yocto
+
+-  Repository Location: :yocto_git:`/meta-yocto`
+-  Branch: :yocto_git:`kirkstone </meta-yocto/log/?h=kirkstone>`
+-  Tag: :yocto_git:`yocto-4.0.28 </meta-yocto/log/?h=yocto-4.0.28>`
+-  Git Revision: :yocto_git:`0bf3dcef1caa80fb047bf9c3514314ab658e30ea </meta-yocto/commit/?id=0bf3dcef1caa80fb047bf9c3514314ab658e30ea>`
+
+yocto-docs
+
+-  Repository Location: :yocto_git:`/yocto-docs`
+-  Branch: :yocto_git:`kirkstone </yocto-docs/log/?h=kirkstone>`
+-  Tag: :yocto_git:`yocto-4.0.28 </yocto-docs/log/?h=yocto-4.0.28>`
+-  Git Revision: :yocto_git:`97cd3ee7f3bf1de8454708d1852ea9cdbd45c39b </yocto-docs/commit/?id=97cd3ee7f3bf1de8454708d1852ea9cdbd45c39b>`
+

documentation/migration-guides/release-notes-4.0.29.rst

@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
+Release notes for Yocto-4.0.29 (Kirkstone)
+------------------------------------------
+
+Security Fixes in Yocto-4.0.29
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+-  avahi: Fix :cve_nist:`2024-52615`
+-  binutils: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-7545` and :cve_nist:`2025-7546`
+-  coreutils: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-5278`
+-  curl: Fix :cve_nist:`2024-11053` and :cve_nist:`2025-0167`
+-  dropbear: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-47203`
+-  ffmpeg: Ignore :cve_nist:`2022-3109` and :cve_nist:`2022-3341`
+-  gdk-pixbuf: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-7345`
+-  ghostscript: Ignore :cve_nist:`2025-46646`
+-  gnupg: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-30258`
+-  gnutls: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-6395`, :cve_nist:`2025-32988`, :cve_nist:`2025-32989` and
+   :cve_nist:`2025-32990`
+-  iputils: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-48964`
+-  libarchive: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-5914`, :cve_nist:`2025-5915`, :cve_nist:`2025-5916` and
+   :cve_nist:`2025-5917`
+-  libpam: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-6020`
+-  libsoup-2.4: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-4945`
+-  libsoup-2.4: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-4969` (update patch)
+-  libsoup: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-4945`, :cve_nist:`2025-6021`, :cve_nist:`2025-6170`,
+   :cve_nist:`2025-49794` and :cve_nist:`2025-49796`
+-  ncurses: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-6141`
+-  ofono: Fix :cve_nist:`2023-4232` and :cve_nist:`2023-4235`
+-  openssl: Fix :cve_nist:`2024-41996`
+-  python3-urllib3: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-50181`
+-  ruby: Fix :cve_nist:`2024-43398` (update patches)
+-  sqlite3: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-6965` and :cve_nist:`2025-7458`
+-  sqlite3: Ignore :cve_nist:`2025-3277`
+-  systemd: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-4598`
+-  xwayland: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-49175`, :cve_nist:`2025-49176`, :cve_nist:`2025-49177`,
+   :cve_nist:`2025-49178`, :cve_nist:`2025-49179` and :cve_nist:`2025-49180`
+
+
+Fixes in Yocto-4.0.29
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+-  bintuils: stable 2.38 branch update
+-  bitbake: test/fetch: Switch u-boot based test to use our own mirror
+-  build-appliance-image: Update to kirkstone head revision
+-  conf.py: improve SearchEnglish to handle terms with dots
+-  db: ignore implicit-int and implicit-function-declaration issues fatal with gcc-14
+-  dev-manual/start.rst: added missing command in Optimize your VHDX file using DiskPart
+-  glibc: stable 2.35 branch updates
+-  gnutls: patch read buffer overrun in the "pre_shared_key" extension
+-  gnutls: patch reject zero-length version in certificate request
+-  linux-yocto/5.15: update to v5.15.186
+-  migration-guides: add release notes for 4.0.28
+-  oeqa/core/decorator: add decorators to skip based on :term:`HOST_ARCH`
+-  openssl: upgrade to 3.0.17
+-  orc: set :term:`CVE_PRODUCT`
+-  overview-manual/concepts.rst: fix sayhello hardcoded bindir
+-  poky.conf: bump version for 4.0.29
+-  python3: update CVE product
+-  ref-manual: document :term:`KERNEL_SPLIT_MODULES` variable
+-  scripts/install-buildtools: Update to 4.0.28
+-  sudo: upgrade to 1.9.17p1
+-  tcf-agent: correct the :term:`SRC_URI`
+
+
+Known Issues in Yocto-4.0.29
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+- N/A 
+
+
+Contributors to Yocto-4.0.29
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+-  Aleksandar Nikolic
+-  Antonin Godard
+-  Archana Polampalli
+-  Bruce Ashfield
+-  Changqing Li
+-  Chen Qi
+-  Colin Pinnell McAllister
+-  Daniel Díaz
+-  Deepesh Varatharajan
+-  Divya Chellam
+-  Dixit Parmar
+-  Enrico Jörns
+-  Guocai He
+-  Hitendra Prajapati
+-  Lee Chee Yang
+-  Marco Cavallini
+-  Martin Jansa
+-  Peter Marko
+-  Praveen Kumar
+-  Richard Purdie
+-  Rob Woolley
+-  Ross Burton
+-  Steve Sakoman
+-  Vijay Anusuri
+-  Yash Shinde
+-  Yogita Urade
+-  Zhang Peng
+
+
+Repositories / Downloads for Yocto-4.0.29
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+poky
+
+-  Repository Location: :yocto_git:`/poky`
+-  Branch: :yocto_git:`kirkstone </poky/log/?h=kirkstone>`
+-  Tag:  :yocto_git:`yocto-4.0.29 </poky/log/?h=yocto-4.0.29>`
+-  Git Revision: :yocto_git:`81ab000fa437ca04f584a3327b076f7a512dc6d0 </poky/commit/?id=81ab000fa437ca04f584a3327b076f7a512dc6d0>`
+-  Release Artefact: poky-81ab000fa437ca04f584a3327b076f7a512dc6d0
+-  sha: 2fecf3cac5c2361c201b5ae826960af92289862ec9be13837a8431138e534fd2
+-  Download Locations:
+   https://downloads.yoctoproject.org/releases/yocto/yocto-4.0.29/poky-81ab000fa437ca04f584a3327b076f7a512dc6d0.tar.bz2
+   https://mirrors.kernel.org/yocto/yocto/yocto-4.0.29/poky-81ab000fa437ca04f584a3327b076f7a512dc6d0.tar.bz2
+
+openembedded-core
+
+-  Repository Location: :oe_git:`/openembedded-core`
+-  Branch: :oe_git:`kirkstone </openembedded-core/log/?h=kirkstone>`
+-  Tag:  :oe_git:`yocto-4.0.29 </openembedded-core/log/?h=yocto-4.0.29>`
+-  Git Revision: :oe_git:`bd620eb14660075fd0f7476bbbb65d5da6293874 </openembedded-core/commit/?id=bd620eb14660075fd0f7476bbbb65d5da6293874>`
+-  Release Artefact: oecore-bd620eb14660075fd0f7476bbbb65d5da6293874
+-  sha: f32ab195c7090268e6e87ccf8db2813cf705c517030654326d14b25d926de88e
+-  Download Locations:
+   https://downloads.yoctoproject.org/releases/yocto/yocto-4.0.29/oecore-bd620eb14660075fd0f7476bbbb65d5da6293874.tar.bz2
+   https://mirrors.kernel.org/yocto/yocto/yocto-4.0.29/oecore-bd620eb14660075fd0f7476bbbb65d5da6293874.tar.bz2
+
+meta-mingw
+
+-  Repository Location: :yocto_git:`/meta-mingw`
+-  Branch: :yocto_git:`kirkstone </meta-mingw/log/?h=kirkstone>`
+-  Tag:  :yocto_git:`yocto-4.0.29 </meta-mingw/log/?h=yocto-4.0.29>`
+-  Git Revision: :yocto_git:`87c22abb1f11be430caf4372e6b833dc7d77564e </meta-mingw/commit/?id=87c22abb1f11be430caf4372e6b833dc7d77564e>`
+-  Release Artefact: meta-mingw-87c22abb1f11be430caf4372e6b833dc7d77564e
+-  sha: f0bc4873e2e0319fb9d6d6ab9b98eb3f89664d4339a167d2db6a787dd12bc1a8
+-  Download Locations:
+   https://downloads.yoctoproject.org/releases/yocto/yocto-4.0.29/meta-mingw-87c22abb1f11be430caf4372e6b833dc7d77564e.tar.bz2
+   https://mirrors.kernel.org/yocto/yocto/yocto-4.0.29/meta-mingw-87c22abb1f11be430caf4372e6b833dc7d77564e.tar.bz2
+
+meta-gplv2
+
+-  Repository Location: :yocto_git:`/meta-gplv2`
+-  Branch: :yocto_git:`kirkstone </meta-gplv2/log/?h=kirkstone>`
+-  Tag:  :yocto_git:`yocto-4.0.29 </meta-gplv2/log/?h=yocto-4.0.29>`
+-  Git Revision: :yocto_git:`d2f8b5cdb285b72a4ed93450f6703ca27aa42e8a </meta-gplv2/commit/?id=d2f8b5cdb285b72a4ed93450f6703ca27aa42e8a>`
+-  Release Artefact: meta-gplv2-d2f8b5cdb285b72a4ed93450f6703ca27aa42e8a
+-  sha: c386f59f8a672747dc3d0be1d4234b6039273d0e57933eb87caa20f56b9cca6d
+-  Download Locations:
+   https://downloads.yoctoproject.org/releases/yocto/yocto-4.0.29/meta-gplv2-d2f8b5cdb285b72a4ed93450f6703ca27aa42e8a.tar.bz2
+   https://mirrors.kernel.org/yocto/yocto/yocto-4.0.29/meta-gplv2-d2f8b5cdb285b72a4ed93450f6703ca27aa42e8a.tar.bz2
+
+bitbake
+
+-  Repository Location: :oe_git:`/bitbake`
+-  Branch: :oe_git:`2.0 </bitbake/log/?h=2.0>`
+-  Tag:  :oe_git:`yocto-4.0.29 </bitbake/log/?h=yocto-4.0.29>`
+-  Git Revision: :oe_git:`8e2d1f8de055549b2101614d85454fcd1d0f94b2 </bitbake/commit/?id=8e2d1f8de055549b2101614d85454fcd1d0f94b2>`
+-  Release Artefact: bitbake-8e2d1f8de055549b2101614d85454fcd1d0f94b2
+-  sha: fad4e7699bae62082118e89785324b031b0af0743064caee87c91ba28549afb0
+-  Download Locations:
+   https://downloads.yoctoproject.org/releases/yocto/yocto-4.0.29/bitbake-8e2d1f8de055549b2101614d85454fcd1d0f94b2.tar.bz2
+   https://mirrors.kernel.org/yocto/yocto/yocto-4.0.29/bitbake-8e2d1f8de055549b2101614d85454fcd1d0f94b2.tar.bz2
+
+meta-yocto
+
+-  Repository Location: :yocto_git:`/meta-yocto`
+-  Branch: :yocto_git:`kirkstone </meta-yocto/log/?h=kirkstone>`
+-  Tag: :yocto_git:`yocto-4.0.29 </meta-yocto/log/?h=yocto-4.0.29>`
+-  Git Revision: :yocto_git:`e916d3bad58f955b73e2c67aba975e63cd191394 </meta-yocto/commit/?id=e916d3bad58f955b73e2c67aba975e63cd191394>`
+
+yocto-docs
+
+-  Repository Location: :yocto_git:`/yocto-docs`
+-  Branch: :yocto_git:`kirkstone </yocto-docs/log/?h=kirkstone>`
+-  Tag: :yocto_git:`yocto-4.0.29 </yocto-docs/log/?h=yocto-4.0.29>`
+-  Git Revision: :yocto_git:`bf855ecaf4bec4cef9bbfea2e50caa65a8339828 </yocto-docs/commit/?id=bf855ecaf4bec4cef9bbfea2e50caa65a8339828>`
+

documentation/overview-manual/concepts.rst

@@ -983,7 +983,7 @@ package.
 
   For more information on the ``oe-pkgdata-util`` utility, see the section
   :ref:`dev-manual/debugging:Viewing Package Information with
-  \`\`oe-pkgdata-util\`\`` of the Yocto Project Development Tasks Manual.
+  ``oe-pkgdata-util``` of the Yocto Project Development Tasks Manual.
 
 To add a custom package variant of the ``${PN}`` recipe named
 ``${PN}-extra`` (name is arbitrary), one can add it to the
@@ -2438,8 +2438,8 @@ The contents of ``sayhello_0.1.bb`` are::
    S = "${WORKDIR}/git"
 
    do_install(){
-      install -d ${D}/usr/bin
-      install -m 0700 sayhello ${D}/usr/bin
+      install -d ${D}${bindir}
+      install -m 0700 sayhello ${D}${bindir}
    }
 
 After placing the recipes in a custom layer we can run ``bitbake sayhello``

documentation/overview-manual/yp-intro.rst

@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ platforms as well as software stacks that can be maintained and scaled.
 
 For further introductory information on the Yocto Project, you might be
 interested in this
-`article <https://www.embedded.com/electronics-blogs/say-what-/4458600/Why-the-Yocto-Project-for-my-IoT-Project->`__
+`article <https://www.embedded.com/why-the-yocto-project-for-my-iot-project/>`__
 by Drew Moseley and in this short introductory
 `video <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=utZpKM7i5Z4>`__.
 

documentation/ref-manual/classes.rst

@@ -1855,7 +1855,8 @@ a couple different ways:
       Not using this naming convention can lead to subtle problems
       caused by existing code that depends on that naming convention.
 
--  Create or modify a target recipe that contains the following::
+-  Or, create a :ref:`ref-classes-native` variant of any target recipe (e.g.
+   ``myrecipe.bb``) by adding the following to the recipe::
 
       BBCLASSEXTEND = "native"
 
@@ -1886,7 +1887,18 @@ couple different ways:
    inherit statement in the recipe after all other inherit statements so
    that the :ref:`ref-classes-nativesdk` class is inherited last.
 
--  Create a :ref:`ref-classes-nativesdk` variant of any recipe by adding the following::
+   .. note::
+
+      When creating a recipe, you must follow this naming convention::
+
+              nativesdk-myrecipe.bb
+
+
+      Not doing so can lead to subtle problems because there is code that
+      depends on the naming convention.
+
+-  Or, create a :ref:`ref-classes-nativesdk` variant of any target recipe (e.g.
+   ``myrecipe.bb``) by adding the following to the recipe::
 
        BBCLASSEXTEND = "nativesdk"
 
@@ -1895,16 +1907,6 @@ couple different ways:
    specify any functionality specific to the respective SDK machine or
    target case.
 
-.. note::
-
-   When creating a recipe, you must follow this naming convention::
-
-           nativesdk-myrecipe.bb
-
-
-   Not doing so can lead to subtle problems because there is code that
-   depends on the naming convention.
-
 Although applied differently, the :ref:`ref-classes-nativesdk` class is used with both
 methods. The advantage of the second method is that you do not need to
 have two separate recipes (assuming you need both) for the SDK machine
@@ -3036,6 +3038,22 @@ class assuming :term:`PATCHRESOLVE` is set to "user", the
 :ref:`ref-classes-cml1` class, and the :ref:`ref-classes-devshell` class all
 use the :ref:`ref-classes-terminal` class.
 
+.. _ref-classes-testexport:
+
+``testexport``
+==============
+
+Based on the :ref:`ref-classes-testimage` class, the
+:ref:`ref-classes-testexport` class can be used to export the test environment
+outside of the :term:`OpenEmbedded Build System`. This will generate the
+directory structure to execute the runtime tests using the
+:oe_git:`runexported.py </openembedded-core/tree/meta/lib/oeqa/runexported.py>`
+Python script.
+
+For more details on how to use :ref:`ref-classes-testexport`, see
+the :ref:`test-manual/runtime-testing:Exporting Tests` section in the Yocto
+Project Test Environment Manual.
+
 .. _ref-classes-testimage:
 
 ``testimage``
@@ -3161,6 +3179,9 @@ It is intended to be inherited from U-Boot recipes.
 
 The variables used by this class are:
 
+-  :term:`SPL_DTB_BINARY`: Name of the SPL device tree binary. Can be set to an
+   empty string to indicate that no SPL should be created and added to the FIT
+   image.
 -  :term:`SPL_MKIMAGE_DTCOPTS`: DTC options for U-Boot ``mkimage`` when
    building the FIT image.
 -  :term:`SPL_SIGN_ENABLE`: enable signing the FIT image.

documentation/ref-manual/devtool-reference.rst

@@ -432,7 +432,7 @@ You can read more on the ``devtool upgrade`` workflow in the
 ":ref:`sdk-manual/extensible:use \`\`devtool upgrade\`\` to create a version of the recipe that supports a newer version of the software`"
 section in the Yocto Project Application Development and the Extensible
 Software Development Kit (eSDK) manual. You can also see an example of
-how to use ``devtool upgrade`` in the ":ref:`dev-manual/upgrading-recipes:using \`\`devtool upgrade\`\``"
+how to use ``devtool upgrade`` in the ":ref:`dev-manual/upgrading-recipes:using ``devtool upgrade```"
 section in the Yocto Project Development Tasks Manual.
 
 .. _devtool-resetting-a-recipe:

documentation/ref-manual/structure.rst

@@ -498,7 +498,7 @@ generated during the :ref:`ref-tasks-packagedata` task. The files stored in this
 directory contain information about each output package produced by the
 OpenEmbedded build system, and are used in different ways by the build system
 such as ":ref:`dev-manual/debugging:viewing package information with
-\`\`oe-pkgdata-util\`\``".
+``oe-pkgdata-util```".
 
 .. _structure-build-tmp-sstate-control:
 

documentation/ref-manual/svg/releases.svg

@@ -2,11 +2,11 @@
 <svg
    version="1.1"
    id="svg2"
-   width="1523.001"
-   height="504.30499"
-   viewBox="0 0 1523.001 504.30497"
+   width="1992.7236"
+   height="613.35602"
+   viewBox="0 0 1992.7236 613.35599"
    sodipodi:docname="releases.svg"
-   inkscape:version="1.3.2 (091e20ef0f, 2023-11-25, custom)"
+   inkscape:version="1.4.1 (93de688d07, 2025-03-30)"
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    inkscape:export-xdpi="96"
    inkscape:export-ydpi="96"
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@
        scale_width="1"
        end_linecap_type="zerowidth"
        not_jump="false"
-       message="&lt;b&gt;Ctrl + click&lt;/b&gt; on existing node and move it" />
+       message="" />
     <marker
        style="overflow:visible"
        id="marker5783"
@@ -412,9 +412,9 @@
      inkscape:window-height="2069"
      id="namedview4"
      showgrid="true"
-     inkscape:zoom="2.1971372"
-     inkscape:cx="1068.2082"
-     inkscape:cy="287.87461"
+     inkscape:zoom="1.5536106"
+     inkscape:cx="1158.2696"
+     inkscape:cy="273.55632"
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@@ -433,8 +433,8 @@
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        height="19.28739"
-       x="1612.0239"
-       y="5.9667883"
+       x="2054.0239"
+       y="1.9667883"
        ry="0.96689767" />
     <rect
        style="opacity:0.5;fill:#333333;fill-opacity:1;fill-rule:evenodd;stroke:none;stroke-width:1.85786;stroke-opacity:1"

documentation/ref-manual/system-requirements.rst

@@ -58,20 +58,35 @@ Supported Linux Distributions
 Currently, the &DISTRO; release ("&DISTRO_NAME;") of the Yocto Project is
 supported on the following distributions:
 
--  Ubuntu 20.04 (LTS)
-
--  Ubuntu 22.04 (LTS)
-
--  Fedora 38
-
--  Debian GNU/Linux 11.x (Bullseye)
+..
+   Can be generated with yocto-autobuilder-helper's scripts/yocto-supported-distros:
+   yocto-supported-distros --release kirkstone --config yocto-autobuilder2/config.py --output-format docs --poky-distros
 
 -  AlmaLinux 8
+-  AlmaLinux 9
+-  Debian 11
+-  Debian 12
+-  Fedora 39
+-  Fedora 40
+-  Fedora 41
+-  Rocky Linux 8
+-  Rocky Linux 9
+-  Ubuntu 20.04 (LTS)
+-  Ubuntu 22.04 (LTS)
+-  Ubuntu 24.04 (LTS)
+-  Ubuntu 24.10
 
 The following distribution versions are still tested, even though the
 organizations publishing them no longer make updates publicly available:
 
--  Ubuntu 18.04 (LTS)
+..
+   This list contains EOL distros that are still tested on the Autobuilder
+   (meaning there are running workers for them).
+   See https://endoflife.date for information of EOL releases.
+
+-  Fedora 39
+-  Fedora 40
+-  Ubuntu 20.04 (LTS)
 
 Note that the Yocto Project doesn't have access to private updates
 that some of these versions may have. Therefore, our testing has
@@ -80,19 +95,33 @@ limited value if you have access to such updates.
 Finally, here are the distribution versions which were previously
 tested on former revisions of "&DISTRO_NAME;", but no longer are:
 
--  Ubuntu 18.04 (LTS)
-
--  Ubuntu 20.04 (LTS)
-
--  Ubuntu 22.04 (LTS)
+..
+   Can be generated with yocto-autobuilder-helper's scripts/yocto-supported-distros:
+   yocto-supported-distros --release kirkstone --config yocto-autobuilder2/config.py --output-format docs --old-distros
 
+-  CentOS 7
+-  CentOS 8
+-  Debian 10
+-  Debian 8
+-  Debian 9
+-  Fedora 29
+-  Fedora 30
+-  Fedora 31
+-  Fedora 32
+-  Fedora 33
+-  Fedora 34
+-  Fedora 35
+-  Fedora 36
 -  Fedora 37
-
--  Debian GNU/Linux 11.x (Bookworm)
-
+-  Fedora 38
+-  OpenSUSE Leap 15.0
+-  OpenSUSE Leap 15.1
+-  OpenSUSE Leap 15.2
 -  OpenSUSE Leap 15.3
-
--  AlmaLinux 8
+-  Ubuntu 16.04
+-  Ubuntu 18.04
+-  Ubuntu 19.04
+-  Ubuntu 21.10
 
 .. note::
 

documentation/ref-manual/tasks.rst

@@ -740,7 +740,7 @@ tool, which you then use to modify the kernel configuration.
            $ bitbake linux-yocto -c menuconfig
 
 
-See the ":ref:`kernel-dev/common:using \`\`menuconfig\`\``"
+See the ":ref:`kernel-dev/common:using ``menuconfig```"
 section in the Yocto Project Linux Kernel Development Manual for more
 information on this configuration tool.
 
@@ -764,7 +764,7 @@ which can then be applied by subsequent tasks such as
 
 Runs ``make menuconfig`` for the kernel. For information on
 ``menuconfig``, see the
-":ref:`kernel-dev/common:using \`\`menuconfig\`\``"
+":ref:`kernel-dev/common:using ``menuconfig```"
 section in the Yocto Project Linux Kernel Development Manual.
 
 .. _ref-tasks-savedefconfig:

documentation/ref-manual/terms.rst

@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ universal, the list includes them just in case:
       This term refers to the area used by the OpenEmbedded build system for
       builds. The area is created when you ``source`` the setup environment
       script that is found in the Source Directory
-      (i.e. :ref:`ref-manual/structure:\`\`oe-init-build-env\`\``). The
+      (i.e. :ref:`ref-manual/structure:``oe-init-build-env```). The
       :term:`TOPDIR` variable points to the Build Directory.
 
       You have a lot of flexibility when creating the :term:`Build Directory`.

documentation/ref-manual/variables.rst

@@ -1806,7 +1806,7 @@ system and gives an overview of their function and contents.
       ``${TMPDIR}/deploy``.
 
       For more information on the structure of the Build Directory, see
-      ":ref:`ref-manual/structure:the build directory --- \`\`build/\`\``" section.
+      ":ref:`ref-manual/structure:the build directory --- ``build/```" section.
       For more detail on the contents of the ``deploy`` directory, see the
       ":ref:`overview-manual/concepts:images`",
       ":ref:`overview-manual/concepts:package feeds`", and
@@ -1850,7 +1850,7 @@ system and gives an overview of their function and contents.
       <ref-classes-image>` class.
 
       For more information on the structure of the Build Directory, see
-      ":ref:`ref-manual/structure:the build directory --- \`\`build/\`\``" section.
+      ":ref:`ref-manual/structure:the build directory --- ``build/```" section.
       For more detail on the contents of the ``deploy`` directory, see the
       ":ref:`overview-manual/concepts:images`" and
       ":ref:`overview-manual/concepts:application development sdk`" sections both in
@@ -2801,6 +2801,10 @@ system and gives an overview of their function and contents.
       For guidance on how to create your own file permissions settings
       table file, examine the existing ``fs-perms.txt``.
 
+   :term:`FIT_CONF_PREFIX`
+      When using the :ref:`ref-classes-kernel-fitimage`, this is the prefix
+      used for creating FIT configuration nodes. Its default value is "conf-".
+
    :term:`FIT_DESC`
       Specifies the description string encoded into a fitImage. The default
       value is set by the :ref:`kernel-fitimage <ref-classes-kernel-fitimage>`
@@ -3531,6 +3535,12 @@ system and gives an overview of their function and contents.
       added to the image by using the :term:`IMAGE_ROOTFS_EXTRA_SPACE`
       variable.
 
+      When using Wic tool, beware that a second overhead factor is also applied.
+      This overhead value is defined by the ``--overhead-factor`` option, which
+      defaults to "1.3" when omitted. See the
+      :ref:`ref-manual/kickstart:command: part or partition` chapter in
+      :doc:`/ref-manual/kickstart` for details.
+
    :term:`IMAGE_PKGTYPE`
       Defines the package type (i.e. DEB, RPM, IPK, or TAR) used by the
       OpenEmbedded build system. The variable is defined appropriately by
@@ -3617,6 +3627,36 @@ system and gives an overview of their function and contents.
 
          IMAGE_ROOTFS_EXTRA_SPACE = "41943040"
 
+   :term:`IMAGE_ROOTFS_MAXSIZE`
+      Defines the maximum allowed size of the generated image in kilobytes.
+      The build will fail if the generated image size exceeds this value.
+
+      The generated image size undergoes several calculation steps before being
+      compared to :term:`IMAGE_ROOTFS_MAXSIZE`.
+      In the first step, the size of the directory pointed to by :term:`IMAGE_ROOTFS`
+      is calculated.
+      In the second step, the result from the first step is multiplied
+      by :term:`IMAGE_OVERHEAD_FACTOR`.
+      In the third step, the result from the second step is compared with
+      :term:`IMAGE_ROOTFS_SIZE`. The larger value of these is added to
+      :term:`IMAGE_ROOTFS_EXTRA_SPACE`.
+      In the fourth step, the result from the third step is checked for
+      a decimal part. If it has one, it is rounded up to the next integer.
+      If it does not, it is simply converted into an integer.
+      In the fifth step, the :term:`IMAGE_ROOTFS_ALIGNMENT` is added to the result
+      from the fourth step and "1" is subtracted.
+      In the sixth step, the remainder of the division between the result
+      from the fifth step and :term:`IMAGE_ROOTFS_ALIGNMENT` is subtracted from the
+      result of the fifth step. In this way, the result from the fourth step is
+      rounded up to the nearest multiple of :term:`IMAGE_ROOTFS_ALIGNMENT`.
+
+      Thus, if the :term:`IMAGE_ROOTFS_MAXSIZE` is set, is compared with the result
+      of the above calculations and is independent of the final image type.
+      No default value is set for :term:`IMAGE_ROOTFS_MAXSIZE`.
+
+      It's a good idea to set this variable for images that need to fit on a limited
+      space (e.g. SD card, a fixed-size partition, ...).
+
    :term:`IMAGE_ROOTFS_SIZE`
       Defines the size in Kbytes for the generated image. The OpenEmbedded
       build system determines the final size for the generated image using
@@ -3822,6 +3862,23 @@ system and gives an overview of their function and contents.
       Set the variable to "1" to prevent the default dependencies from
       being added.
 
+   :term:`INHIBIT_DEFAULT_RUST_DEPS`
+      Prevents the :ref:`ref-classes-rust` class from automatically adding
+      its default build-time dependencies.
+
+      When a recipe inherits the :ref:`ref-classes-rust` class, several
+      tools such as ``rust-native`` and ``${RUSTLIB_DEP}`` (only added when cross-compiling) are added
+      to :term:`DEPENDS` to support the ``rust`` build process.
+
+      To prevent the build system from adding these dependencies automatically,
+      set the :term:`INHIBIT_DEFAULT_RUST_DEPS` variable as follows::
+
+         INHIBIT_DEFAULT_RUST_DEPS = "1"
+
+      By default, the value of :term:`INHIBIT_DEFAULT_RUST_DEPS` is empty. Setting
+      it to "0" does not disable inhibition. Only the empty string will disable
+      inhibition.
+
    :term:`INHIBIT_PACKAGE_DEBUG_SPLIT`
       Prevents the OpenEmbedded build system from splitting out debug
       information during packaging. By default, the build system splits out
@@ -3869,6 +3926,25 @@ system and gives an overview of their function and contents.
          even if the toolchain's binaries are strippable, there are other files
          needed for the build that are not strippable.
 
+   :term:`INHIBIT_UPDATERCD_BBCLASS`
+      Prevents the :ref:`ref-classes-update-rc.d` class from automatically
+      installing and registering SysV init scripts for packages.
+
+      When a recipe inherits the :ref:`ref-classes-update-rc.d` class, init
+      scripts are typically installed and registered for the packages listed in
+      :term:`INITSCRIPT_PACKAGES`. This ensures that the relevant
+      services are started and stopped at the appropriate runlevels using the
+      traditional SysV init system.
+
+      To prevent the build system from adding these scripts and configurations
+      automatically, set the :term:`INHIBIT_UPDATERCD_BBCLASS` variable as follows::
+
+         INHIBIT_UPDATERCD_BBCLASS = "1"
+
+      By default, the value of :term:`INHIBIT_UPDATERCD_BBCLASS` is empty. Setting
+      it to "0" does not disable inhibition. Only the empty string will disable
+      inhibition.
+
    :term:`INIT_MANAGER`
       Specifies the system init manager to use. Available options are:
 
@@ -4010,6 +4086,20 @@ system and gives an overview of their function and contents.
       See the :term:`MACHINE` variable for additional
       information.
 
+   :term:`INITRAMFS_MAXSIZE`
+      Defines the maximum allowed size of the :term:`Initramfs` image in Kbytes.
+      The build will fail if the :term:`Initramfs` image size exceeds this value.
+
+      The :term:`Initramfs` image size undergoes several calculation steps before
+      being compared to :term:`INITRAMFS_MAXSIZE`.
+      These steps are the same as those used for :term:`IMAGE_ROOTFS_MAXSIZE`
+      and are described in detail in that entry.
+
+      Thus, :term:`INITRAMFS_MAXSIZE` is compared with the result of the calculations
+      and is independent of the final image type (e.g. compressed).
+      A default value for :term:`INITRAMFS_MAXSIZE` is set in
+      :oe_git:`meta/conf/bitbake.conf </openembedded-core/tree/meta/conf/bitbake.conf>`.
+
    :term:`INITRAMFS_MULTICONFIG`
       Defines the multiconfig to create a multiconfig dependency to be used by the :ref:`kernel <ref-classes-kernel>` class.
 
@@ -4197,15 +4287,8 @@ system and gives an overview of their function and contents.
       options not explicitly specified will be disabled in the kernel
       config.
 
-      In case :term:`KCONFIG_MODE` is not set the behaviour will depend on where
-      the ``defconfig`` file is coming from. An "in-tree" ``defconfig`` file
-      will be handled in ``alldefconfig`` mode, a ``defconfig`` file placed
-      in ``${WORKDIR}`` through a meta-layer will be handled in
-      ``allnoconfig`` mode.
-
-      An "in-tree" ``defconfig`` file can be selected via the
-      :term:`KBUILD_DEFCONFIG` variable. :term:`KCONFIG_MODE` does not need to
-      be explicitly set.
+      In case :term:`KCONFIG_MODE` is not set the ``defconfig`` file
+      will be handled in ``allnoconfig`` mode.
 
       A ``defconfig`` file compatible with ``allnoconfig`` mode can be
       generated by copying the ``.config`` file from a working Linux kernel
@@ -4498,6 +4581,27 @@ system and gives an overview of their function and contents.
       the :term:`KERNEL_PATH` variable. Both variables are common variables
       used by external Makefiles to point to the kernel source directory.
 
+   :term:`KERNEL_SPLIT_MODULES`
+      When inheriting the :ref:`ref-classes-kernel-module-split` class, this
+      variable controls whether kernel modules are split into separate packages
+      or bundled into a single package.
+
+      For some use cases, a monolithic kernel module package
+      :term:`KERNEL_PACKAGE_NAME` that contains all modules built from the
+      kernel sources may be preferred to speed up the installation.
+
+      By default, this variable is set to ``1``, resulting in one package per
+      module. Setting it to any other value will generate a single monolithic
+      package containing all kernel modules.
+
+      .. note::
+
+         If :term:`KERNEL_SPLIT_MODULES` is set to 0, it is still possible to
+         install all kernel modules at once by adding ``kernel-modules`` (assuming
+         :term:`KERNEL_PACKAGE_NAME` is ``kernel-modules``) to :term:`IMAGE_INSTALL`.
+         The way it works is that a placeholder "kernel-modules" package will be
+         created and will depend on every other individual kernel module packages.
+
    :term:`KERNEL_SRC`
       The location of the kernel sources. This variable is set to the value
       of the :term:`STAGING_KERNEL_DIR` within
@@ -6099,7 +6203,7 @@ system and gives an overview of their function and contents.
       For examples of how this data is used, see the
       ":ref:`overview-manual/concepts:automatically added runtime dependencies`"
       section in the Yocto Project Overview and Concepts Manual and the
-      ":ref:`dev-manual/debugging:viewing package information with \`\`oe-pkgdata-util\`\``"
+      ":ref:`dev-manual/debugging:viewing package information with ``oe-pkgdata-util```"
       section in the Yocto Project Development Tasks Manual. For more
       information on the shared, global-state directory, see
       :term:`STAGING_DIR_HOST`.
@@ -7697,6 +7801,11 @@ system and gives an overview of their function and contents.
       section in the Yocto Project Board Support Package Developer's Guide
       for additional information.
 
+   :term:`SPL_DTB_BINARY`
+      When inheriting the :ref:`ref-classes-uboot-sign` class, the
+      :term:`SPL_DTB_BINARY` variable contains the name of the SPL binary to be
+      compiled.
+
    :term:`SPL_MKIMAGE_DTCOPTS`
       Options for the device tree compiler passed to ``mkimage -D`` feature
       while creating a FIT image with the :ref:`ref-classes-uboot-sign`
@@ -7717,7 +7826,7 @@ system and gives an overview of their function and contents.
       class.
 
    :term:`SPL_SIGN_KEYNAME`
-      The name of keys used by the :ref:`ref-classes-kernel-fitimage` class
+      The name of keys used by the :ref:`ref-classes-uboot-sign` class
       for signing U-Boot FIT image stored in the :term:`SPL_SIGN_KEYDIR`
       directory. If we have for example a ``dev.key`` key and a ``dev.crt``
       certificate stored in the :term:`SPL_SIGN_KEYDIR` directory, you will
@@ -7978,7 +8087,7 @@ system and gives an overview of their function and contents.
       The Yocto Project actually shares the cache data objects built by its
       autobuilder::
 
-         SSTATE_MIRRORS ?= "file://.* http://cdn.jsdelivr.net/yocto/sstate/all/PATH;downloadfilename=PATH"
+         SSTATE_MIRRORS ?= "file://.* http://sstate.yoctoproject.org/all/PATH;downloadfilename=PATH"
 
       As such binary artifacts are built for the generic QEMU machines
       supported by the various Poky releases, they are less likely to be
@@ -8004,6 +8113,26 @@ system and gives an overview of their function and contents.
       For details on the process, see the
       :ref:`staging <ref-classes-staging>` class.
 
+   :term:`SSTATE_SKIP_CREATION`
+      The :term:`SSTATE_SKIP_CREATION` variable can be used to skip the
+      creation of :ref:`shared state <overview-manual/concepts:shared state cache>`
+      tarball files. It makes sense e.g. for image creation tasks as tarring images
+      and keeping them in sstate would consume a lot of disk space.
+
+      In general it is not recommended to use this variable as missing sstate
+      artefacts adversely impact the build, particularly for entries in the
+      middle of dependency chains. The case it can make sense is where the
+      size and time costs of the artefact are similar to just running the
+      tasks. This generally only applies to end artefact output like images.
+
+      The syntax to disable it for one task is::
+
+         SSTATE_SKIP_CREATION:task-image-complete = "1"
+
+      The syntax to disable it for the whole recipe is::
+
+         SSTATE_SKIP_CREATION = "1"
+
    :term:`STAGING_BASE_LIBDIR_NATIVE`
       Specifies the path to the ``/lib`` subdirectory of the sysroot
       directory for the build host.
@@ -8909,7 +9038,7 @@ system and gives an overview of their function and contents.
       :doc:`/sdk-manual/index` manual.
 
       Note that this variable applies to building an SDK, not an eSDK,
-      in which case the term:`TOOLCHAIN_HOST_TASK_ESDK` setting should be
+      in which case the :term:`TOOLCHAIN_HOST_TASK_ESDK` setting should be
       used instead.
 
    :term:`TOOLCHAIN_HOST_TASK_ESDK`
@@ -9579,6 +9708,20 @@ system and gives an overview of their function and contents.
       can control with this variable, see the
       ":ref:`ref-classes-insane`" section.
 
+   :term:`WIC_CREATE_EXTRA_ARGS`
+      If the :term:`IMAGE_FSTYPES` variable contains "wic", the build
+      will generate a
+      :ref:`Wic image <dev-manual/wic:creating partitioned images using wic>`
+      automatically when BitBake builds an image recipe. As part of
+      this process BitBake will invoke the "`wic create`" command. The
+      :term:`WIC_CREATE_EXTRA_ARGS` variable is placed at the end of this
+      command which allows the user to supply additional arguments.
+
+      One such useful purpose for this mechanism is to add the ``-D`` (or
+      ``--debug``) argument to the "`wic create`" command. This increases the
+      amount of debugging information written out to the Wic log during the
+      Wic creation process.
+
    :term:`WKS_FILE`
       Specifies the location of the Wic kickstart file that is used by the
       OpenEmbedded build system to create a partitioned image

documentation/sdk-manual/working-projects.rst

@@ -56,9 +56,10 @@ project:
 
          #include <stdio.h>
 
-         main()
+         int main()
              {
                  printf("Hello World!\n");
+                 return 0;
              }
 
    -  ``configure.ac``::

documentation/test-manual/intro.rst

@@ -51,13 +51,11 @@ fashion. Basically, during the development of a Yocto Project release,
 the Autobuilder tests if things work. The Autobuilder builds all test
 targets and runs all the tests.
 
-The Yocto Project uses now uses standard upstream
-Buildbot (`version 3.8 <https://docs.buildbot.net/3.8.0/>`__) to
-drive its integration and testing. Buildbot has a plug-in interface
-that the Yocto Project customizes using code from the
-``yocto-autobuilder2`` repository, adding its own console UI plugin. The
-resulting UI plug-in allows you to visualize builds in a way suited to
-the project's needs.
+The Yocto Project uses standard upstream Buildbot to drive its integration and
+testing. Buildbot has a plug-in interface that the Yocto Project customizes
+using code from the :yocto_git:`yocto-autobuilder2 </yocto-autobuilder2>`
+repository, adding its own console UI plugin. The resulting UI plug-in allows
+you to visualize builds in a way suited to the project's needs.
 
 A ``helper`` layer provides configuration and job management through
 scripts found in the ``yocto-autobuilder-helper`` repository. The

documentation/toaster-manual/reference.rst

@@ -548,7 +548,7 @@ database.
 
 You need to run the ``buildslist`` command first to identify existing
 builds in the database before using the
-:ref:`toaster-manual/reference:\`\`builddelete\`\`` command. Here is an
+:ref:`toaster-manual/reference:``builddelete``` command. Here is an
 example that assumes default repository and build directory names:
 
 .. code-block:: shell
@@ -557,7 +557,7 @@ example that assumes default repository and build directory names:
    $ python ../bitbake/lib/toaster/manage.py buildslist
 
 If your Toaster database had only one build, the above
-:ref:`toaster-manual/reference:\`\`buildslist\`\``
+:ref:`toaster-manual/reference:``buildslist```
 command would return something like the following::
 
    1: qemux86 poky core-image-minimal
@@ -578,7 +578,7 @@ the database.
 
 Prior to running the ``builddelete`` command, you need to get the ID
 associated with builds by using the
-:ref:`toaster-manual/reference:\`\`buildslist\`\`` command.
+:ref:`toaster-manual/reference:``buildslist``` command.
 
 ``perf``
 --------

meta-poky/conf/distro/poky.conf

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 DISTRO = "poky"
 DISTRO_NAME = "Poky (Yocto Project Reference Distro)"
 #DISTRO_VERSION = "3.4+snapshot-${METADATA_REVISION}"
-DISTRO_VERSION = "4.0.27"
+DISTRO_VERSION = "4.0.30"
 DISTRO_CODENAME = "kirkstone"
 SDK_VENDOR = "-pokysdk"
 SDK_VERSION = "${@d.getVar('DISTRO_VERSION').replace('snapshot-${METADATA_REVISION}', 'snapshot')}"

meta-selftest/files/static-group

@@ -25,3 +25,4 @@ weston:x:525:
 wayland:x:526:
 render:x:527:
 sgx:x:528:
+audio:x:529:

meta/classes/insane.bbclass

@@ -1182,24 +1182,27 @@ python do_qa_patch() {
             msg += "    devtool modify %s\n" % d.getVar('PN')
             msg += "    devtool finish --force-patch-refresh %s <layer_path>\n\n" % d.getVar('PN')
             msg += "Don't forget to review changes done by devtool!\n"
-            if bb.utils.filter('ERROR_QA', 'patch-fuzz', d):
-                bb.error(msg)
-            elif bb.utils.filter('WARN_QA', 'patch-fuzz', d):
-                bb.warn(msg)
-            msg = "Patch log indicates that patches do not apply cleanly."
+            msg += "\nPatch log indicates that patches do not apply cleanly."
             oe.qa.handle_error("patch-fuzz", msg, d)
 
     # Check if the patch contains a correctly formatted and spelled Upstream-Status
     import re
     from oe import patch
 
+    allpatches = False
+    if bb.utils.filter('ERROR_QA', 'patch-status-noncore', d) or bb.utils.filter('WARN_QA', 'patch-status-noncore', d):
+        allpatches = True
+
     coremeta_path = os.path.join(d.getVar('COREBASE'), 'meta', '')
     for url in patch.src_patches(d):
        (_, _, fullpath, _, _, _) = bb.fetch.decodeurl(url)
 
        # skip patches not in oe-core
+       patchtype = "patch-status-core"
        if not os.path.abspath(fullpath).startswith(coremeta_path):
-           continue
+           patchtype = "patch-status-noncore"
+           if not allpatches:
+               continue
 
        kinda_status_re = re.compile(r"^.*upstream.*status.*$", re.IGNORECASE | re.MULTILINE)
        strict_status_re = re.compile(r"^Upstream-Status: (Pending|Submitted|Denied|Accepted|Inappropriate|Backport|Inactive-Upstream)( .+)?$", re.MULTILINE)
@@ -1212,9 +1215,13 @@ python do_qa_patch() {
 
            if not match_strict:
                if match_kinda:
-                   bb.error("Malformed Upstream-Status in patch\n%s\nPlease correct according to %s :\n%s" % (fullpath, guidelines, match_kinda.group(0)))
+                   msg = "Malformed Upstream-Status in patch\n%s\nPlease correct according to %s :\n%s" % (fullpath, guidelines, match_kinda.group(0))
+                   oe.qa.handle_error(patchtype, msg, d)
                else:
-                   bb.error("Missing Upstream-Status in patch\n%s\nPlease add according to %s ." % (fullpath, guidelines))
+                   msg = "Missing Upstream-Status in patch\n%s\nPlease add according to %s ." % (fullpath, guidelines)
+                   oe.qa.handle_error(patchtype, msg, d)
+
+    oe.qa.exit_if_errors(d)
 }
 
 python do_qa_configure() {
@@ -1331,6 +1338,7 @@ python do_qa_unpack() {
         bb.warn('%s: the directory %s (%s) pointed to by the S variable doesn\'t exist - please set S within the recipe to point to where the source has been unpacked to' % (d.getVar('PN'), d.getVar('S', False), s_dir))
 
     unpack_check_src_uri(d.getVar('PN'), d)
+    oe.qa.exit_if_errors(d)
 }
 
 # The Staging Func, to check all staging

meta/classes/kernel.bbclass

@@ -706,9 +706,10 @@ RDEPENDS:${KERNEL_PACKAGE_NAME} = "${KERNEL_PACKAGE_NAME}-base (= ${EXTENDPKGV})
 # not wanted in images as standard
 RRECOMMENDS:${KERNEL_PACKAGE_NAME}-base ?= "${KERNEL_PACKAGE_NAME}-image (= ${EXTENDPKGV})"
 PKG:${KERNEL_PACKAGE_NAME}-image = "${KERNEL_PACKAGE_NAME}-image-${@legitimize_package_name(d.getVar('KERNEL_VERSION'))}"
+RPROVIDES:${KERNEL_PACKAGE_NAME}-image += "${KERNEL_PACKAGE_NAME}-image"
 RDEPENDS:${KERNEL_PACKAGE_NAME}-image += "${@oe.utils.conditional('KERNEL_IMAGETYPE', 'vmlinux', '${KERNEL_PACKAGE_NAME}-vmlinux (= ${EXTENDPKGV})', '', d)}"
 PKG:${KERNEL_PACKAGE_NAME}-base = "${KERNEL_PACKAGE_NAME}-${@legitimize_package_name(d.getVar('KERNEL_VERSION'))}"
-RPROVIDES:${KERNEL_PACKAGE_NAME}-base += "${KERNEL_PACKAGE_NAME}-${KERNEL_VERSION}"
+RPROVIDES:${KERNEL_PACKAGE_NAME}-base += "${KERNEL_PACKAGE_NAME}-${KERNEL_VERSION} ${KERNEL_PACKAGE_NAME}-base"
 ALLOW_EMPTY:${KERNEL_PACKAGE_NAME} = "1"
 ALLOW_EMPTY:${KERNEL_PACKAGE_NAME}-base = "1"
 ALLOW_EMPTY:${KERNEL_PACKAGE_NAME}-image = "1"

meta/conf/distro/include/default-distrovars.inc

@@ -52,4 +52,4 @@ KERNEL_IMAGETYPES ??= "${KERNEL_IMAGETYPE}"
 # fetch from the network (and warn you if not). To disable the test set
 # the variable to be empty.
 # Git example url: git://git.yoctoproject.org/yocto-firewall-test;protocol=git;rev=master;branch=master
-CONNECTIVITY_CHECK_URIS ?= "https://yoctoproject.org/connectivity.html"
+CONNECTIVITY_CHECK_URIS ?= "https://www.yoctoproject.org/connectivity.html"

meta/conf/distro/include/ptest-packagelists.inc

@@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ PTESTS_FAST = "\
     libnl-ptest \
     libmodule-build-perl-ptest \
     libpcre-ptest \
-    libpng-ptest \
     libssh2-ptest \
     libtimedate-perl-ptest \
     libtest-needs-perl-ptest \
@@ -88,6 +87,7 @@ PTESTS_SLOW = "\
     glib-2.0-ptest \
     gstreamer1.0-ptest \
     libevent-ptest \
+    libpng-ptest \
     lttng-tools-ptest \
     openssh-ptest \
     openssl-ptest \

meta/lib/oeqa/core/decorator/data.py

@@ -194,3 +194,27 @@ class skipIfQemu(OETestDecorator):
         self.logger.debug("Checking if qemu MACHINE")
         if self.case.td.get('MACHINE', '').startswith('qemu'):
              self.case.skipTest('Test only runs on real hardware')
+
+@registerDecorator
+class skipIfArch(OETestDecorator):
+    """
+    Skip test if HOST_ARCH is present in the tuple specified.
+    """
+
+    attrs = ('archs',)
+    def setUpDecorator(self):
+        arch = self.case.td['HOST_ARCH']
+        if arch in self.archs:
+             self.case.skipTest('Test skipped on %s' % arch)
+
+@registerDecorator
+class skipIfNotArch(OETestDecorator):
+    """
+    Skip test if HOST_ARCH is not present in the tuple specified.
+    """
+
+    attrs = ('archs',)
+    def setUpDecorator(self):
+        arch = self.case.td['HOST_ARCH']
+        if arch not in self.archs:
+             self.case.skipTest('Test skipped on %s' % arch)

meta/lib/oeqa/sdk/buildtools-cases/https.py

@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ class HTTPTests(OESDKTestCase):
     """
 
     def test_wget(self):
-        self._run('env -i wget --debug --output-document /dev/null https://yoctoproject.org/connectivity.html')
+        self._run('env -i wget --debug --output-document /dev/null https://www.yoctoproject.org/connectivity.html')
 
     def test_python(self):
         # urlopen() returns a file-like object on success and throws an exception otherwise
-        self._run('python3 -c \'import urllib.request; urllib.request.urlopen("https://yoctoproject.org/connectivity.html")\'')
+        self._run('python3 -c \'import urllib.request; urllib.request.urlopen("https://www.yoctoproject.org/connectivity.html")\'')

meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/files/0001-Include-cstddef-in-the-header-for-C.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+From 10c9a571f1c0472799f72b1924b039aab231e95f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Oleksandr Kravchuk <open.source@oleksandr-kravchuk.com>
+Date: Thu, 16 Dec 2021 16:19:50 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Include cstddef in the header for C++
+
+So C++ compiler always has access to the definition of size_t.
+
+Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Kravchuk <open.source@oleksandr-kravchuk.com>
+Signed-off-by: Youngseok Jeong <youngseok1.jeong@lge.com>
+Upstream-Status: Backport [v0.3.3 https://github.com/sbabic/libubootenv/pull/19/commits/764226a7de2ea79b182d92829922489537c766fa]
+---
+ src/libuboot.h | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/libuboot.h b/src/libuboot.h
+index 88f0558..1f305f4 100644
+--- a/src/libuboot.h
++++ b/src/libuboot.h
+@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@
+  */
+ 
+ #ifdef __cplusplus
++#include <cstddef>
++
+ extern "C" {
+ #endif
+ 

meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/libubootenv_0.3.2.bb

@@ -10,7 +10,11 @@ LICENSE = "LGPL-2.1-only"
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://Licenses/lgpl-2.1.txt;md5=4fbd65380cdd255951079008b364516c"
 SECTION = "libs"
 
-SRC_URI = "git://github.com/sbabic/libubootenv;protocol=https;branch=master"
+SRC_URI = " \
+    git://github.com/sbabic/libubootenv;protocol=https;branch=master \
+    file://0001-Include-cstddef-in-the-header-for-C.patch \
+"
+
 SRCREV = "ba7564f5006d09bec51058cf4f5ac90d4dc18b3c"
 
 S = "${WORKDIR}/git"

meta/recipes-connectivity/avahi/avahi_0.8.bb

@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://github.com/lathiat/avahi/releases/download/v${PV}/avahi-${PV}
            file://CVE-2023-38472.patch \
            file://CVE-2023-38473.patch \
            file://CVE-2024-52616.patch \
+           file://CVE-2024-52615.patch \
            "
 
 UPSTREAM_CHECK_URI = "https://github.com/lathiat/avahi/releases/"

meta/recipes-connectivity/avahi/files/CVE-2024-52615.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,228 @@
+From 4e2e1ea0908d7e6ad7f38ae04fdcdf2411f8b942 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Michal Sekletar <msekleta@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 27 Nov 2024 18:07:32 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] core/wide-area: fix for CVE-2024-52615
+
+CVE: CVE-2024-52615
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/avahi/avahi/commit/4e2e1ea0908d7e6ad7f38ae04fdcdf2411f8b942]
+
+Signed-off-by: Zhang Peng <peng.zhang1.cn@windriver.com>
+---
+ avahi-core/wide-area.c | 128 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
+ 1 file changed, 69 insertions(+), 59 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/avahi-core/wide-area.c b/avahi-core/wide-area.c
+index 00a15056e..06df7afc6 100644
+--- a/avahi-core/wide-area.c
++++ b/avahi-core/wide-area.c
+@@ -81,6 +81,10 @@ struct AvahiWideAreaLookup {
+ 
+     AvahiAddress dns_server_used;
+ 
++    int fd;
++    AvahiWatch *watch;
++    AvahiProtocol proto;
++
+     AVAHI_LLIST_FIELDS(AvahiWideAreaLookup, lookups);
+     AVAHI_LLIST_FIELDS(AvahiWideAreaLookup, by_key);
+ };
+@@ -88,9 +92,6 @@ struct AvahiWideAreaLookup {
+ struct AvahiWideAreaLookupEngine {
+     AvahiServer *server;
+ 
+-    int fd_ipv4, fd_ipv6;
+-    AvahiWatch *watch_ipv4, *watch_ipv6;
+-
+     /* Cache */
+     AVAHI_LLIST_HEAD(AvahiWideAreaCacheEntry, cache);
+     AvahiHashmap *cache_by_key;
+@@ -125,35 +126,67 @@ static AvahiWideAreaLookup* find_lookup(AvahiWideAreaLookupEngine *e, uint16_t i
+     return l;
+ }
+ 
++static void socket_event(AVAHI_GCC_UNUSED AvahiWatch *w, int fd, AVAHI_GCC_UNUSED AvahiWatchEvent events, void *userdata);
++
+ static int send_to_dns_server(AvahiWideAreaLookup *l, AvahiDnsPacket *p) {
++    AvahiWideAreaLookupEngine *e;
+     AvahiAddress *a;
++    AvahiServer *s;
++    AvahiWatch *w;
++    int r;
+ 
+     assert(l);
+     assert(p);
+ 
+-    if (l->engine->n_dns_servers <= 0)
++    e = l->engine;
++    assert(e);
++
++    s = e->server;
++    assert(s);
++
++    if (e->n_dns_servers <= 0)
+         return -1;
+ 
+-    assert(l->engine->current_dns_server < l->engine->n_dns_servers);
++    assert(e->current_dns_server < e->n_dns_servers);
+ 
+-    a = &l->engine->dns_servers[l->engine->current_dns_server];
++    a = &e->dns_servers[e->current_dns_server];
+     l->dns_server_used = *a;
+ 
+-    if (a->proto == AVAHI_PROTO_INET) {
++    if (l->fd >= 0) {
++        /* We are reusing lookup object and sending packet to another server so let's cleanup before we establish connection to new server. */
++        s->poll_api->watch_free(l->watch);
++        l->watch = NULL;
+ 
+-        if (l->engine->fd_ipv4 < 0)
+-            return -1;
++        close(l->fd);
++        l->fd = -EBADF;
++    }
+ 
+-        return avahi_send_dns_packet_ipv4(l->engine->fd_ipv4, AVAHI_IF_UNSPEC, p, NULL, &a->data.ipv4, AVAHI_DNS_PORT);
++    assert(a->proto == AVAHI_PROTO_INET || a->proto == AVAHI_PROTO_INET6);
+ 
+-    } else {
+-        assert(a->proto == AVAHI_PROTO_INET6);
++    if (a->proto == AVAHI_PROTO_INET)
++        r = s->config.use_ipv4 ? avahi_open_unicast_socket_ipv4() : -1;
++    else
++        r = s->config.use_ipv6 ? avahi_open_unicast_socket_ipv6() : -1;
+ 
+-        if (l->engine->fd_ipv6 < 0)
+-            return -1;
++    if (r < 0) {
++        avahi_log_error(__FILE__ ": Failed to create socket for wide area lookup");
++        return -1;
++    }
+ 
+-        return avahi_send_dns_packet_ipv6(l->engine->fd_ipv6, AVAHI_IF_UNSPEC, p, NULL, &a->data.ipv6, AVAHI_DNS_PORT);
++    w = s->poll_api->watch_new(s->poll_api, r, AVAHI_WATCH_IN, socket_event, l);
++    if (!w) {
++        close(r);
++        avahi_log_error(__FILE__ ": Failed to create socket watch for wide area lookup");
++        return -1;
+     }
++
++    l->fd = r;
++    l->watch = w;
++    l->proto = a->proto;
++
++    return a->proto == AVAHI_PROTO_INET ?
++                avahi_send_dns_packet_ipv4(l->fd, AVAHI_IF_UNSPEC, p, NULL, &a->data.ipv4, AVAHI_DNS_PORT):
++                avahi_send_dns_packet_ipv6(l->fd, AVAHI_IF_UNSPEC, p, NULL, &a->data.ipv6, AVAHI_DNS_PORT);
+ }
+ 
+ static void next_dns_server(AvahiWideAreaLookupEngine *e) {
+@@ -246,6 +279,9 @@ AvahiWideAreaLookup *avahi_wide_area_lookup_new(
+     l->dead = 0;
+     l->key = avahi_key_ref(key);
+     l->cname_key = avahi_key_new_cname(l->key);
++    l->fd = -EBADF;
++    l->watch = NULL;
++    l->proto = AVAHI_PROTO_UNSPEC;
+     l->callback = callback;
+     l->userdata = userdata;
+ 
+@@ -314,6 +350,12 @@ static void lookup_destroy(AvahiWideAreaLookup *l) {
+     if (l->cname_key)
+         avahi_key_unref(l->cname_key);
+ 
++    if (l->watch)
++            l->engine->server->poll_api->watch_free(l->watch);
++
++    if (l->fd >= 0)
++        close(l->fd);
++
+     avahi_free(l);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -572,14 +614,20 @@ static void handle_packet(AvahiWideAreaLookupEngine *e, AvahiDnsPacket *p) {
+ }
+ 
+ static void socket_event(AVAHI_GCC_UNUSED AvahiWatch *w, int fd, AVAHI_GCC_UNUSED AvahiWatchEvent events, void *userdata) {
+-    AvahiWideAreaLookupEngine *e = userdata;
++    AvahiWideAreaLookup *l = userdata;
++    AvahiWideAreaLookupEngine *e = l->engine;
+     AvahiDnsPacket *p = NULL;
+ 
+-    if (fd == e->fd_ipv4)
+-        p = avahi_recv_dns_packet_ipv4(e->fd_ipv4, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
++    assert(l);
++    assert(e);
++    assert(l->fd == fd);
++
++    if (l->proto == AVAHI_PROTO_INET)
++        p = avahi_recv_dns_packet_ipv4(l->fd, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+     else {
+-        assert(fd == e->fd_ipv6);
+-        p = avahi_recv_dns_packet_ipv6(e->fd_ipv6, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
++        assert(l->proto == AVAHI_PROTO_INET6);
++
++        p = avahi_recv_dns_packet_ipv6(l->fd, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+     }
+ 
+     if (p) {
+@@ -598,32 +646,6 @@ AvahiWideAreaLookupEngine *avahi_wide_area_engine_new(AvahiServer *s) {
+     e->server = s;
+     e->cleanup_dead = 0;
+ 
+-    /* Create sockets */
+-    e->fd_ipv4 = s->config.use_ipv4 ? avahi_open_unicast_socket_ipv4() : -1;
+-    e->fd_ipv6 = s->config.use_ipv6 ? avahi_open_unicast_socket_ipv6() : -1;
+-
+-    if (e->fd_ipv4 < 0 && e->fd_ipv6 < 0) {
+-        avahi_log_error(__FILE__": Failed to create wide area sockets: %s", strerror(errno));
+-
+-        if (e->fd_ipv6 >= 0)
+-            close(e->fd_ipv6);
+-
+-        if (e->fd_ipv4 >= 0)
+-            close(e->fd_ipv4);
+-
+-        avahi_free(e);
+-        return NULL;
+-    }
+-
+-    /* Create watches */
+-
+-    e->watch_ipv4 = e->watch_ipv6 = NULL;
+-
+-    if (e->fd_ipv4 >= 0)
+-        e->watch_ipv4 = s->poll_api->watch_new(e->server->poll_api, e->fd_ipv4, AVAHI_WATCH_IN, socket_event, e);
+-    if (e->fd_ipv6 >= 0)
+-        e->watch_ipv6 = s->poll_api->watch_new(e->server->poll_api, e->fd_ipv6, AVAHI_WATCH_IN, socket_event, e);
+-
+     e->n_dns_servers = e->current_dns_server = 0;
+ 
+     /* Initialize cache */
+@@ -651,18 +673,6 @@ void avahi_wide_area_engine_free(AvahiWideAreaLookupEngine *e) {
+     avahi_hashmap_free(e->lookups_by_id);
+     avahi_hashmap_free(e->lookups_by_key);
+ 
+-    if (e->watch_ipv4)
+-        e->server->poll_api->watch_free(e->watch_ipv4);
+-
+-    if (e->watch_ipv6)
+-        e->server->poll_api->watch_free(e->watch_ipv6);
+-
+-    if (e->fd_ipv6 >= 0)
+-        close(e->fd_ipv6);
+-
+-    if (e->fd_ipv4 >= 0)
+-        close(e->fd_ipv4);
+-
+     avahi_free(e);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -680,7 +690,7 @@ void avahi_wide_area_set_servers(AvahiWideAreaLookupEngine *e, const AvahiAddres
+ 
+     if (a) {
+         for (e->n_dns_servers = 0; n > 0 && e->n_dns_servers < AVAHI_WIDE_AREA_SERVERS_MAX; a++, n--)
+-            if ((a->proto == AVAHI_PROTO_INET && e->fd_ipv4 >= 0) || (a->proto == AVAHI_PROTO_INET6 && e->fd_ipv6 >= 0))
++            if (a->proto == AVAHI_PROTO_INET || a->proto == AVAHI_PROTO_INET6)
+                 e->dns_servers[e->n_dns_servers++] = *a;
+     } else {
+         assert(n == 0);

meta/recipes-connectivity/connman/connman/CVE-2025-32366.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+From 8d3be0285f1d4667bfe85dba555c663eb3d704b4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Yoonje Shin <ioerts@kookmin.ac.kr>
+Date: Mon, 12 May 2025 10:48:18 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] dnsproxy: Address CVE-2025-32366 vulnerability
+
+In Connman parse_rr in dnsproxy.c has a memcpy length
+that depends on an RR RDLENGTH value (i.e., *rdlen=ntohs(rr->rdlen)
+and memcpy(response+offset,*end,*rdlen)). Here, rdlen may be larger
+than the amount of remaining packet data in the current state of
+parsing. As a result, values of stack memory locations may be sent
+over the network in a response.
+
+This patch adds a check to ensure that (*end + *rdlen) does not exceed
+the valid range. If the condition is violated, the function returns
+-EINVAL.
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-32366
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/network/connman/connman.git/commit/?id=8d3be0285f1d4667bfe85dba555c663eb3d704b4]
+
+Signed-off-by: Praveen Kumar <praveen.kumar@windriver.com>
+---
+ src/dnsproxy.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/dnsproxy.c b/src/dnsproxy.c
+index 334dd00..74aed50 100644
+--- a/src/dnsproxy.c
++++ b/src/dnsproxy.c
+@@ -950,6 +950,9 @@ static int parse_rr(unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *start,
+	if ((unsigned int) (offset + *rdlen) > *response_size)
+		return -ENOBUFS;
+
++	if ((*end + *rdlen) > max)
++		return -EINVAL;
++
+	memcpy(response + offset, *end, *rdlen);
+
+	*end += *rdlen;
+--
+2.40.0

meta/recipes-connectivity/connman/connman_1.41.bb

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${KERNELORG_MIRROR}/linux/network/${BPN}/${BP}.tar.xz \
            file://CVE-2022-32292.patch \
            file://CVE-2023-28488.patch \
            file://CVE-2025-32743.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-32366.patch \
            "
 
 SRC_URI:append:libc-musl = " file://0002-resolve-musl-does-not-implement-res_ninit.patch"

meta/recipes-connectivity/nfs-utils/nfs-utils/nfsserver

@@ -66,34 +66,14 @@ start_nfsd(){
 	start-stop-daemon --start --exec "$NFS_NFSD" -- "$@"
 	echo done
 }
-delay_nfsd(){
-	for delay in 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
-	do
-		if pidof nfsd >/dev/null
-		then
-			echo -n .
-			sleep 1
-		else
-			return 0
-		fi
-	done
-	return 1
-}
 stop_nfsd(){
-	# WARNING: this kills any process with the executable
-	# name 'nfsd'.
 	echo -n 'stopping nfsd: '
-	start-stop-daemon --stop --quiet --signal 1 --name nfsd
-	if delay_nfsd || {
-		echo failed
-		echo ' using signal 9: '
-		start-stop-daemon --stop --quiet --signal 9 --name nfsd
-		delay_nfsd
-	}
+	$NFS_NFSD 0
+	if pidof nfsd
 	then
-		echo done
-	else
 		echo failed
+	else
+		echo done
 	fi
 }
 

meta/recipes-connectivity/ofono/ofono/CVE-2023-4232.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+From 2ff2da7ac374a790f8b2a0216bcb4e3126498225 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Sicelo A. Mhlongo" <absicsz@gmail.com>
+Date: Wed, 4 Dec 2024 10:18:52 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] smsutil: check status report fits in buffer
+
+Fixes CVE-2023-4232
+
+CVE: CVE-2023-4232
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/network/ofono/ofono.git/commit/?id=2ff2da7ac374a790f8b2a0216bcb4e3126498225]
+Signed-off-by: Archana Polampalli <archana.polampalli@windriver.com>
+---
+ src/smsutil.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/smsutil.c b/src/smsutil.c
+index ac89f16c..a706e26f 100644
+--- a/src/smsutil.c
++++ b/src/smsutil.c
+@@ -1088,6 +1088,9 @@ static gboolean decode_status_report(const unsigned char *pdu, int len,
+		if ((len - offset) < expected)
+			return FALSE;
+
++		if (expected > (int)sizeof(out->status_report.ud))
++			return FALSE;
++
+		memcpy(out->status_report.ud, pdu + offset, expected);
+	}
+
+--
+2.30.2

meta/recipes-connectivity/ofono/ofono/CVE-2023-4235.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+From 02aa0f9bad3d9e47a152fc045d0f51874d901d7e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Sicelo A. Mhlongo" <absicsz@gmail.com>
+Date: Wed, 4 Dec 2024 10:18:51 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] smsutil: check deliver reports fit in buffer
+
+Fixes CVE-2023-4235
+
+CVE: CVE-2023-4235
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/network/ofono/ofono.git/commit/?id=02aa0f9bad3d9e47a152fc045d0f51874d901d7e]
+Signed-off-by: Archana Polampalli <archana.polampalli@windriver.com>
+---
+ src/smsutil.c | 6 ++++++
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/smsutil.c b/src/smsutil.c
+index 484bfd0b..ac89f16c 100644
+--- a/src/smsutil.c
++++ b/src/smsutil.c
+@@ -1240,10 +1240,16 @@ static gboolean decode_deliver_report(const unsigned char *pdu, int len,
+			return FALSE;
+
+		if (out->type == SMS_TYPE_DELIVER_REPORT_ERROR) {
++			if (expected > (int) sizeof(out->deliver_err_report.ud))
++				return FALSE;
++
+			out->deliver_err_report.udl = udl;
+			memcpy(out->deliver_err_report.ud,
+					pdu + offset, expected);
+		} else {
++			if (expected > (int) sizeof(out->deliver_ack_report.ud))
++				return FALSE;
++
+			out->deliver_ack_report.udl = udl;
+			memcpy(out->deliver_ack_report.ud,
+					pdu + offset, expected);
+--
+2.30.2

meta/recipes-connectivity/ofono/ofono_1.34.bb

@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ SRC_URI = "\
     file://CVE-2024-7547.patch \
     file://CVE-2024-7540_CVE-2024-7541_CVE-2024-7542.patch \
     file://CVE-2024-7537.patch \
+    file://CVE-2023-4232.patch \
+    file://CVE-2023-4235.patch \
 "
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "c0b96d3013447ec2bcb74579bef90e4e59c68dbfa4b9c6fbce5d12401a43aac7"
 

meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2025-32728.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+From fc86875e6acb36401dfc1dfb6b628a9d1460f367 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed, 9 Apr 2025 07:00:03 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] upstream: Fix logic error in DisableForwarding option. This
+ option
+
+was documented as disabling X11 and agent forwarding but it failed to do so.
+Spotted by Tim Rice.
+
+OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fffc89195968f7eedd2fc57f0b1f1ef3193f5ed1
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/fc86875e6acb36401dfc1dfb6b628a9d1460f367]
+CVE: CVE-2025-32728
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ session.c | 5 +++--
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
+index e67d24d..625e97f 100644
+--- a/session.c
++++ b/session.c
+@@ -2182,7 +2182,8 @@ session_auth_agent_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
+ 	if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+ 		sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
+ 	if (!auth_opts->permit_agent_forwarding_flag ||
+-	    !options.allow_agent_forwarding) {
++	    !options.allow_agent_forwarding ||
++	    options.disable_forwarding) {
+ 		debug_f("agent forwarding disabled");
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+@@ -2568,7 +2569,7 @@ session_setup_x11fwd(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
+ 		ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "X11 forwarding disabled by key options.");
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+-	if (!options.x11_forwarding) {
++	if (!options.x11_forwarding || options.disable_forwarding) {
+ 		debug("X11 forwarding disabled in server configuration file.");
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_8.9p1.bb

@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-${PV}.tar
            file://CVE-2023-51385.patch \
            file://CVE-2024-6387.patch \
            file://CVE-2025-26465.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-32728.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "fd497654b7ab1686dac672fb83dfb4ba4096e8b5ffcdaccd262380ae58bec5e7"
 

meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-50781-1.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,618 @@
+From 24734088e1034392de981151dfe57e3a379ada18 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 15 Mar 2022 13:58:08 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 1/3] rsa: add implicit rejection in PKCS#1 v1.5
+
+The RSA decryption as implemented before required very careful handling
+of both the exit code returned by OpenSSL and the potentially returned
+ciphertext. Looking at the recent security vulnerabilities
+(CVE-2020-25659 and CVE-2020-25657) it is unlikely that most users of
+OpenSSL do it correctly.
+
+Given that correct code requires side channel secure programming in
+application code, we can classify the existing RSA decryption methods
+as CWE-676, which in turn likely causes CWE-208 and CWE-385 in
+application code.
+
+To prevent that, we can use a technique called "implicit rejection".
+For that we generate a random message to be returned in case the
+padding check fails. We generate the message based on static secret
+data (the private exponent) and the provided ciphertext (so that the
+attacker cannot determine that the returned value is randomly generated
+instead of result of decryption and de-padding). We return it in case
+any part of padding check fails.
+
+The upshot of this approach is that then not only is the length of the
+returned message useless as the Bleichenbacher oracle, so are the
+actual bytes of the returned message. So application code doesn't have
+to perform any operations on the returned message in side-channel free
+way to remain secure against Bleichenbacher attacks.
+
+Note: this patch implements a specific algorithm, shared with Mozilla
+NSS, so that the attacker cannot use one library as an oracle against the
+other in heterogeneous environments.
+
+CVE: CVE-2023-50781
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+[https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/7fc67e0a33102aa47bbaa56533eeecb98c0450f7]
+
+Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13817)
+
+Signed-off-by: Jiaying Song <jiaying.song.cn@windriver.com>
+---
+ crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c                     |  95 +++++++-
+ crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c                      | 252 ++++++++++++++++++++++
+ doc/man1/openssl-pkeyutl.pod.in           |   5 +
+ doc/man1/openssl-rsautl.pod.in            |   5 +
+ doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod            |   7 +
+ doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_decrypt.pod             |  12 ++
+ doc/man3/RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1.pod |   7 +-
+ doc/man3/RSA_public_encrypt.pod           |  11 +-
+ include/crypto/rsa.h                      |   4 +
+ 9 files changed, 393 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c
+index 0fc642e777..330302ae55 100644
+--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c
++++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c
+@@ -17,6 +17,9 @@
+ #include "crypto/bn.h"
+ #include "rsa_local.h"
+ #include "internal/constant_time.h"
++#include <openssl/evp.h>
++#include <openssl/sha.h>
++#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+ 
+ static int rsa_ossl_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                                   unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+@@ -377,8 +380,13 @@ static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+     BIGNUM *f, *ret;
+     int j, num = 0, r = -1;
+     unsigned char *buf = NULL;
++    unsigned char d_hash[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH] = {0};
++    HMAC_CTX *hmac = NULL;
++    unsigned int md_len = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
++    unsigned char kdk[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH] = {0};
+     BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+     int local_blinding = 0;
++    EVP_MD *md = NULL;
+     /*
+      * Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind
+      * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store
+@@ -408,6 +416,11 @@ static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+         goto err;
+     }
+ 
++    if (flen < 1) {
++        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL);
++        goto err;
++    }
++
+     /* make data into a big number */
+     if (BN_bin2bn(from, (int)flen, f) == NULL)
+         goto err;
+@@ -472,13 +485,91 @@ static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+         if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx))
+             goto err;
+ 
++    /*
++     * derive the Key Derivation Key from private exponent and public
++     * ciphertext
++     */
++    if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY)) {
++        /*
++         * because we use d as a handle to rsa->d we need to keep it local and
++         * free before any further use of rsa->d
++         */
++        BIGNUM *d = BN_new();
++        if (d == NULL) {
++            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++            goto err;
++        }
++        if (rsa->d == NULL) {
++            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_MISSING_PRIVATE_KEY);
++            BN_free(d);
++            goto err;
++        }
++        BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
++        if (BN_bn2binpad(d, buf, num) < 0) {
++            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++            BN_free(d);
++            goto err;
++        }
++        BN_free(d);
++
++        /*
++         * we use hardcoded hash so that migrating between versions that use
++         * different hash doesn't provide a Bleichenbacher oracle:
++         * if the attacker can see that different versions return different
++         * messages for the same ciphertext, they'll know that the message is
++         * syntethically generated, which means that the padding check failed
++         */
++        md = EVP_MD_fetch(rsa->libctx, "sha256", NULL);
++        if (md == NULL) {
++            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++            goto err;
++        }
++
++        if (EVP_Digest(buf, num, d_hash, NULL, md, NULL) <= 0) {
++            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++            goto err;
++        }
++
++        hmac = HMAC_CTX_new();
++        if (hmac == NULL) {
++            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++            goto err;
++        }
++
++        if (HMAC_Init_ex(hmac, d_hash, sizeof(d_hash), md, NULL) <= 0) {
++            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++            goto err;
++        }
++
++        if (flen < num) {
++            memset(buf, 0, num - flen);
++            if (HMAC_Update(hmac, buf, num - flen) <= 0) {
++                ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++                goto err;
++            }
++        }
++        if (HMAC_Update(hmac, from, flen) <= 0) {
++            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++            goto err;
++        }
++
++        md_len = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
++        if (HMAC_Final(hmac, kdk, &md_len) <= 0) {
++            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++            goto err;
++        }
++    }
++
+     j = BN_bn2binpad(ret, buf, num);
+     if (j < 0)
+         goto err;
+ 
+     switch (padding) {
+     case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+-        r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to, num, buf, j, num);
++        if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY)
++            r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to, num, buf, j, num);
++        else
++            r = ossl_rsa_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(rsa->libctx, to, num, buf, j, num, kdk);
+         break;
+     case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
+         r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to, num, buf, j, num, NULL, 0);
+@@ -501,6 +592,8 @@ static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+ #endif
+ 
+  err:
++    HMAC_CTX_free(hmac);
++    EVP_MD_free(md);
+     BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+     BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+     OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, num);
+diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
+index 51507fc030..5cd2b26879 100644
+--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
++++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
+@@ -21,10 +21,14 @@
+ #include <openssl/rand.h>
+ /* Just for the SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH value */
+ #include <openssl/prov_ssl.h>
++#include <openssl/evp.h>
++#include <openssl/sha.h>
++#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+ #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+ #include "crypto/rsa.h"
+ #include "rsa_local.h"
+ 
++
+ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+                                  const unsigned char *from, int flen)
+ {
+@@ -273,6 +277,254 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+     return constant_time_select_int(good, mlen, -1);
+ }
+ 
++
++static int ossl_rsa_prf(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx,
++                        unsigned char *to, int tlen,
++                        const char *label, int llen,
++                        const unsigned char *kdk,
++                        uint16_t bitlen)
++{
++    int pos;
++    int ret = -1;
++    uint16_t iter = 0;
++    unsigned char be_iter[sizeof(iter)];
++    unsigned char be_bitlen[sizeof(bitlen)];
++    HMAC_CTX *hmac = NULL;
++    EVP_MD *md = NULL;
++    unsigned char hmac_out[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
++    unsigned int md_len;
++
++    if (tlen * 8 != bitlen) {
++        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++        return ret;
++    }
++
++    be_bitlen[0] = (bitlen >> 8) & 0xff;
++    be_bitlen[1] = bitlen & 0xff;
++
++    hmac = HMAC_CTX_new();
++    if (hmac == NULL) {
++        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++        goto err;
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * we use hardcoded hash so that migrating between versions that use
++     * different hash doesn't provide a Bleichenbacher oracle:
++     * if the attacker can see that different versions return different
++     * messages for the same ciphertext, they'll know that the message is
++     * syntethically generated, which means that the padding check failed
++     */
++    md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx, "sha256", NULL);
++    if (md == NULL) {
++        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++        goto err;
++    }
++
++    if (HMAC_Init_ex(hmac, kdk, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, md, NULL) <= 0) {
++        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++        goto err;
++    }
++
++    for (pos = 0; pos < tlen; pos += SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, iter++) {
++        if (HMAC_Init_ex(hmac, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL) <= 0) {
++            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++            goto err;
++        }
++
++        be_iter[0] = (iter >> 8) & 0xff;
++        be_iter[1] = iter & 0xff;
++
++        if (HMAC_Update(hmac, be_iter, sizeof(be_iter)) <= 0) {
++            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++            goto err;
++        }
++        if (HMAC_Update(hmac, (unsigned char *)label, llen) <= 0) {
++            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++            goto err;
++        }
++        if (HMAC_Update(hmac, be_bitlen, sizeof(be_bitlen)) <= 0) {
++            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++            goto err;
++        }
++
++        /*
++         * HMAC_Final requires the output buffer to fit the whole MAC
++         * value, so we need to use the intermediate buffer for the last
++         * unaligned block
++         */
++        md_len = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
++        if (pos + SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH > tlen) {
++            if (HMAC_Final(hmac, hmac_out, &md_len) <= 0) {
++                ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++                goto err;
++            }
++            memcpy(to + pos, hmac_out, tlen - pos);
++        } else {
++            if (HMAC_Final(hmac, to + pos, &md_len) <= 0) {
++                ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++                goto err;
++            }
++        }
++    }
++
++    ret = 0;
++
++err:
++    HMAC_CTX_free(hmac);
++    EVP_MD_free(md);
++    return ret;
++}
++
++/*
++ * ossl_rsa_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2() checks and removes the PKCS#1 type 2
++ * padding from a decrypted RSA message. Unlike the
++ * RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2() it will not return an error in case it
++ * detects a padding error, rather it will return a deterministically generated
++ * random message. In other words it will perform an implicit rejection
++ * of an invalid padding. This means that the returned value does not indicate
++ * if the padding of the encrypted message was correct or not, making
++ * side channel attacks like the ones described by Bleichenbacher impossible
++ * without access to the full decrypted value and a brute-force search of
++ * remaining padding bytes
++ */
++int ossl_rsa_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx,
++                                        unsigned char *to, int tlen,
++                                        const unsigned char *from, int flen,
++                                        int num, unsigned char *kdk)
++{
++/*
++ * We need to generate a random length for the synthethic message, to avoid
++ * bias towards zero and avoid non-constant timeness of DIV, we prepare
++ * 128 values to check if they are not too large for the used key size,
++ * and use 0 in case none of them are small enough, as 2^-128 is a good enough
++ * safety margin
++ */
++#define MAX_LEN_GEN_TRIES 128
++    unsigned char *synthetic = NULL;
++    int synthethic_length;
++    uint16_t len_candidate;
++    unsigned char candidate_lengths[MAX_LEN_GEN_TRIES * sizeof(len_candidate)];
++    uint16_t len_mask;
++    uint16_t max_sep_offset;
++    int synth_msg_index = 0;
++    int ret = -1;
++    int i, j;
++    unsigned int good, found_zero_byte;
++    int zero_index = 0, msg_index;
++
++    /*
++     * If these checks fail then either the message in publicly invalid, or
++     * we've been called incorrectly. We can fail immediately.
++     * Since this code is called only internally by openssl, those are just
++     * sanity checks
++     */
++    if (num != flen || tlen <= 0 || flen <= 0) {
++        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++        return -1;
++    }
++
++    /* Generate a random message to return in case the padding checks fail */
++    synthetic = OPENSSL_malloc(flen);
++    if (synthetic == NULL) {
++        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++        return -1;
++    }
++
++    if (ossl_rsa_prf(ctx, synthetic, flen, "message", 7, kdk, flen * 8) < 0)
++        goto err;
++
++    /* decide how long the random message should be */
++    if (ossl_rsa_prf(ctx, candidate_lengths, sizeof(candidate_lengths),
++                     "length", 6, kdk,
++                     MAX_LEN_GEN_TRIES * sizeof(len_candidate) * 8) < 0)
++        goto err;
++
++    /*
++     * max message size is the size of the modulus size less 2 bytes for
++     * version and padding type and a minimum of 8 bytes padding
++     */
++    len_mask = max_sep_offset = flen - 2 - 8;
++    /*
++     * we want a mask so lets propagate the high bit to all positions less
++     * significant than it
++     */
++    len_mask |= len_mask >> 1;
++    len_mask |= len_mask >> 2;
++    len_mask |= len_mask >> 4;
++    len_mask |= len_mask >> 8;
++
++    synthethic_length = 0;
++    for (i = 0; i < MAX_LEN_GEN_TRIES * (int)sizeof(len_candidate);
++            i += sizeof(len_candidate)) {
++        len_candidate = (candidate_lengths[i] << 8) | candidate_lengths[i + 1];
++        len_candidate &= len_mask;
++
++        synthethic_length = constant_time_select_int(
++            constant_time_lt(len_candidate, max_sep_offset),
++            len_candidate, synthethic_length);
++    }
++
++    synth_msg_index = flen - synthethic_length;
++
++    /* we have alternative message ready, check the real one */
++    good = constant_time_is_zero(from[0]);
++    good &= constant_time_eq(from[1], 2);
++
++    /* then look for the padding|message separator (the first zero byte) */
++    found_zero_byte = 0;
++    for (i = 2; i < flen; i++) {
++        unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(from[i]);
++        zero_index = constant_time_select_int(~found_zero_byte & equals0,
++                                              i, zero_index);
++        found_zero_byte |= equals0;
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * padding must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into
++     * |from|. If we never found a 0-byte, then |zero_index| is 0 and the check
++     * also fails.
++     */
++    good &= constant_time_ge(zero_index, 2 + 8);
++
++    /*
++     * Skip the zero byte. This is incorrect if we never found a zero-byte
++     * but in this case we also do not copy the message out.
++     */
++    msg_index = zero_index + 1;
++
++    /*
++     * old code returned an error in case the decrypted message wouldn't fit
++     * into the |to|, since that would leak information, return the synthethic
++     * message instead
++     */
++    good &= constant_time_ge(tlen, num - msg_index);
++
++    msg_index = constant_time_select_int(good, msg_index, synth_msg_index);
++
++    /*
++     * since at this point the |msg_index| does not provide the signal
++     * indicating if the padding check failed or not, we don't have to worry
++     * about leaking the length of returned message, we still need to ensure
++     * that we read contents of both buffers so that cache accesses don't leak
++     * the value of |good|
++     */
++    for (i = msg_index, j = 0; i < flen && j < tlen; i++, j++)
++        to[j] = constant_time_select_8(good, from[i], synthetic[i]);
++    ret = j;
++
++err:
++    /*
++     * the only time ret < 0 is when the ciphertext is publicly invalid
++     * or we were called with invalid parameters, so we don't have to perform
++     * a side-channel secure raising of the error
++     */
++    if (ret < 0)
++        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++    OPENSSL_free(synthetic);
++    return ret;
++}
++
+ /*
+  * ossl_rsa_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2_TLS() checks and removes the PKCS1 type 2
+  * padding from a decrypted RSA message in a TLS signature. The result is stored
+diff --git a/doc/man1/openssl-pkeyutl.pod.in b/doc/man1/openssl-pkeyutl.pod.in
+index 2f6ef0021d..015265a74d 100644
+--- a/doc/man1/openssl-pkeyutl.pod.in
++++ b/doc/man1/openssl-pkeyutl.pod.in
+@@ -273,6 +273,11 @@ signed or verified directly instead of using a B<DigestInfo> structure. If a
+ digest is set, then the B<DigestInfo> structure is used and its length
+ must correspond to the digest type.
+ 
++Note, for B<pkcs1> padding, as a protection against Bleichenbacher attack,
++the decryption will not fail in case of padding check failures. Use B<none>
++and manual inspection of the decrypted message to verify if the decrypted
++value has correct PKCS#1 v1.5 padding.
++
+ For B<oaep> mode only encryption and decryption is supported.
+ 
+ For B<x931> if the digest type is set it is used to format the block data
+diff --git a/doc/man1/openssl-rsautl.pod.in b/doc/man1/openssl-rsautl.pod.in
+index 0a32fd965b..4c462abc8c 100644
+--- a/doc/man1/openssl-rsautl.pod.in
++++ b/doc/man1/openssl-rsautl.pod.in
+@@ -105,6 +105,11 @@ The padding to use: PKCS#1 v1.5 (the default), PKCS#1 OAEP,
+ ANSI X9.31, or no padding, respectively.
+ For signatures, only B<-pkcs> and B<-raw> can be used.
+ 
++Note: because of protection against Bleichenbacher attacks, decryption
++using PKCS#1 v1.5 mode will not return errors in case padding check failed.
++Use B<-raw> and inspect the returned value manually to check if the
++padding is correct.
++
+ =item B<-hexdump>
+ 
+ Hex dump the output data.
+diff --git a/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod b/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod
+index 3075eaafd6..e788f38809 100644
+--- a/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod
++++ b/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod
+@@ -386,6 +386,13 @@ this behaviour should be tolerated then
+ OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_NEGOTIATED_VERSION should be set to the actual
+ negotiated protocol version. Otherwise it should be left unset.
+ 
++Similarly to the B<RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING> above, since OpenSSL version
++3.1.0, the use of B<RSA_PKCS1_PADDING> will return a randomly generated message
++instead of padding errors in case padding checks fail. Applications that
++want to remain secure while using earlier versions of OpenSSL, still need to
++handle both the error code from the RSA decryption operation and the
++returned message in a side channel secure manner.
++
+ =head2 DSA parameters
+ 
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dsa_paramgen_bits() sets the number of bits used for DSA
+diff --git a/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_decrypt.pod b/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_decrypt.pod
+index b6f9bad5f1..898535a7a2 100644
+--- a/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_decrypt.pod
++++ b/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_decrypt.pod
+@@ -51,6 +51,18 @@ return 1 for success and 0 or a negative value for failure. In particular a
+ return value of -2 indicates the operation is not supported by the public key
+ algorithm.
+ 
++=head1 WARNINGS
++
++In OpenSSL versions before 3.1.0, when used in PKCS#1 v1.5 padding,
++both the return value from the EVP_PKEY_decrypt() and the B<outlen> provided
++information useful in mounting a Bleichenbacher attack against the
++used private key. They had to processed in a side-channel free way.
++
++Since version 3.1.0, the EVP_PKEY_decrypt() method when used with PKCS#1
++v1.5 padding doesn't return an error in case it detects an error in padding,
++instead it returns a pseudo-randomly generated message, removing the need
++of side-channel secure code from applications using OpenSSL.
++
+ =head1 EXAMPLES
+ 
+ Decrypt data using OAEP (for RSA keys):
+diff --git a/doc/man3/RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1.pod b/doc/man3/RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1.pod
+index 9f7025c497..36ae18563f 100644
+--- a/doc/man3/RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1.pod
++++ b/doc/man3/RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1.pod
+@@ -121,8 +121,8 @@ L<ERR_get_error(3)>.
+ 
+ =head1 WARNINGS
+ 
+-The result of RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2() is a very sensitive
+-information which can potentially be used to mount a Bleichenbacher
++The result of RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2() is exactly the
++information which is used to mount a classical Bleichenbacher
+ padding oracle attack. This is an inherent weakness in the PKCS #1
+ v1.5 padding design. Prefer PKCS1_OAEP padding. If that is not
+ possible, the result of RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2() should be
+@@ -137,6 +137,9 @@ as this would create a small timing side channel which could be
+ used to mount a Bleichenbacher attack against any padding mode
+ including PKCS1_OAEP.
+ 
++You should prefer the use of EVP PKEY APIs for PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption
++as they implement the necessary workarounds internally.
++
+ =head1 SEE ALSO
+ 
+ L<RSA_public_encrypt(3)>,
+diff --git a/doc/man3/RSA_public_encrypt.pod b/doc/man3/RSA_public_encrypt.pod
+index 1d38073aea..bd3f835ac6 100644
+--- a/doc/man3/RSA_public_encrypt.pod
++++ b/doc/man3/RSA_public_encrypt.pod
+@@ -52,8 +52,8 @@ Encrypting user data directly with RSA is insecure.
+ 
+ =back
+ 
+-B<flen> must not be more than RSA_size(B<rsa>) - 11 for the PKCS #1 v1.5
+-based padding modes, not more than RSA_size(B<rsa>) - 42 for
++When encrypting B<flen> must not be more than RSA_size(B<rsa>) - 11 for the
++PKCS #1 v1.5 based padding modes, not more than RSA_size(B<rsa>) - 42 for
+ RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING and exactly RSA_size(B<rsa>) for RSA_NO_PADDING.
+ When a padding mode other than RSA_NO_PADDING is in use, then
+ RSA_public_encrypt() will include some random bytes into the ciphertext
+@@ -92,6 +92,13 @@ which can potentially be used to mount a Bleichenbacher padding oracle
+ attack. This is an inherent weakness in the PKCS #1 v1.5 padding
+ design. Prefer RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING.
+ 
++In OpenSSL before version 3.1.0, both the return value and the length of
++returned value could be used to mount the Bleichenbacher attack.
++Since version 3.1.0, OpenSSL does not return an error in case of padding
++checks failed. Instead it generates a random message based on used private
++key and provided ciphertext so that application code doesn't have to implement
++a side-channel secure error handling.
++
+ =head1 CONFORMING TO
+ 
+ SSL, PKCS #1 v2.0
+diff --git a/include/crypto/rsa.h b/include/crypto/rsa.h
+index 949873d0ee..f267e5d9d1 100644
+--- a/include/crypto/rsa.h
++++ b/include/crypto/rsa.h
+@@ -83,6 +83,10 @@ int ossl_rsa_param_decode(RSA *rsa, const X509_ALGOR *alg);
+ RSA *ossl_rsa_key_from_pkcs8(const PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf,
+                              OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, const char *propq);
+ 
++int ossl_rsa_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx,
++                                        unsigned char *to, int tlen,
++                                        const unsigned char *from, int flen,
++                                        int num, unsigned char *kdk);
+ int ossl_rsa_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2_TLS(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *to,
+                                             size_t tlen,
+                                             const unsigned char *from,
+-- 
+2.34.1
+

meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-50781-2.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,358 @@
+From e92f0cd3b03e5aca948b03df7e3d02e536700f68 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 27 Oct 2022 19:16:58 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 2/3] rsa: Add option to disable implicit rejection
+
+CVE: CVE-2023-50781
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+[https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/5ab3ec1bb1eaa795d775f5896818cfaa84d33a1a]
+
+Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13817)
+
+Signed-off-by: Jiaying Song <jiaying.song.cn@windriver.com>
+---
+ crypto/cms/cms_env.c                          |  7 +++++
+ crypto/evp/ctrl_params_translate.c            |  6 +++++
+ crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c                         | 16 ++++++++----
+ crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c                        | 20 +++++++++++++-
+ doc/man1/openssl-pkeyutl.pod.in               | 10 +++++++
+ doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod                |  2 ++
+ doc/man7/provider-asym_cipher.pod             |  9 +++++++
+ include/openssl/core_names.h                  |  2 ++
+ include/openssl/rsa.h                         |  5 ++++
+ .../implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c     | 26 +++++++++++++++++--
+ 10 files changed, 95 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/cms/cms_env.c b/crypto/cms/cms_env.c
+index 445a16fb77..49b0289114 100644
+--- a/crypto/cms/cms_env.c
++++ b/crypto/cms/cms_env.c
+@@ -581,6 +581,13 @@ static int cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
+     if (!ossl_cms_env_asn1_ctrl(ri, 1))
+         goto err;
+ 
++    if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "RSA"))
++        /* upper layer CMS code incorrectly assumes that a successful RSA
++         * decryption means that the key matches ciphertext (which never
++         * was the case, implicit rejection or not), so to make it work
++         * disable implicit rejection for RSA keys */
++        EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl_str(ktri->pctx, "rsa_pkcs1_implicit_rejection", "0");
++
+     if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ktri->pctx, NULL, &eklen,
+                          ktri->encryptedKey->data,
+                          ktri->encryptedKey->length) <= 0)
+diff --git a/crypto/evp/ctrl_params_translate.c b/crypto/evp/ctrl_params_translate.c
+index 44d0895bcf..db7325439a 100644
+--- a/crypto/evp/ctrl_params_translate.c
++++ b/crypto/evp/ctrl_params_translate.c
+@@ -2269,6 +2269,12 @@ static const struct translation_st evp_pkey_ctx_translations[] = {
+       EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_LABEL, NULL, NULL,
+       OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_LABEL, OSSL_PARAM_OCTET_PTR, NULL },
+ 
++    { SET, EVP_PKEY_RSA, 0, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
++      EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_IMPLICIT_REJECTION, NULL,
++      "rsa_pkcs1_implicit_rejection",
++      OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_IMPLICIT_REJECTION, OSSL_PARAM_UNSIGNED_INTEGER,
++      NULL },
++
+     { SET, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, 0, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_GEN,
+       EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD, "rsa_pss_keygen_md", NULL,
+       OSSL_ALG_PARAM_DIGEST, OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING, fix_md },
+diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c
+index 330302ae55..4bdacd5ed9 100644
+--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c
++++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c
+@@ -395,6 +395,12 @@ static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+     BIGNUM *unblind = NULL;
+     BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
+ 
++    /*
++     * we need the value of the private exponent to perform implicit rejection
++     */
++    if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) && (padding == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING))
++        padding = RSA_PKCS1_NO_IMPLICIT_REJECT_PADDING;
++
+     if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(rsa->libctx)) == NULL)
+         goto err;
+     BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+@@ -489,7 +495,7 @@ static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+      * derive the Key Derivation Key from private exponent and public
+      * ciphertext
+      */
+-    if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY)) {
++    if (padding == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) {
+         /*
+          * because we use d as a handle to rsa->d we need to keep it local and
+          * free before any further use of rsa->d
+@@ -565,11 +571,11 @@ static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+         goto err;
+ 
+     switch (padding) {
++    case RSA_PKCS1_NO_IMPLICIT_REJECT_PADDING:
++        r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to, num, buf, j, num);
++        break;
+     case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+-        if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY)
+-            r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to, num, buf, j, num);
+-        else
+-            r = ossl_rsa_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(rsa->libctx, to, num, buf, j, num, kdk);
++        r = ossl_rsa_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(rsa->libctx, to, num, buf, j, num, kdk);
+         break;
+     case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
+         r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to, num, buf, j, num, NULL, 0);
+diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c
+index 0bf5ac098a..81b031f81b 100644
+--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c
++++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c
+@@ -52,6 +52,8 @@ typedef struct {
+     /* OAEP label */
+     unsigned char *oaep_label;
+     size_t oaep_labellen;
++    /* if to use implicit rejection in PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption */
++    int implicit_rejection;
+ } RSA_PKEY_CTX;
+ 
+ /* True if PSS parameters are restricted */
+@@ -72,6 +74,7 @@ static int pkey_rsa_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
+     /* Maximum for sign, auto for verify */
+     rctx->saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
+     rctx->min_saltlen = -1;
++    rctx->implicit_rejection = 1;
+     ctx->data = rctx;
+     ctx->keygen_info = rctx->gentmp;
+     ctx->keygen_info_count = 2;
+@@ -97,6 +100,7 @@ static int pkey_rsa_copy(EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst, const EVP_PKEY_CTX *src)
+     dctx->md = sctx->md;
+     dctx->mgf1md = sctx->mgf1md;
+     dctx->saltlen = sctx->saltlen;
++    dctx->implicit_rejection = sctx->implicit_rejection;
+     if (sctx->oaep_label) {
+         OPENSSL_free(dctx->oaep_label);
+         dctx->oaep_label = OPENSSL_memdup(sctx->oaep_label, sctx->oaep_labellen);
+@@ -347,6 +351,7 @@ static int pkey_rsa_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                             const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)
+ {
+     int ret;
++    int pad_mode;
+     RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
+     /*
+      * Discard const. Its marked as const because this may be a cached copy of
+@@ -367,7 +372,12 @@ static int pkey_rsa_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                                 rctx->oaep_labellen,
+                                                 rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md);
+     } else {
+-        ret = RSA_private_decrypt(inlen, in, out, rsa, rctx->pad_mode);
++        if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING &&
++              rctx->implicit_rejection == 0)
++            pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_NO_IMPLICIT_REJECT_PADDING;
++        else
++            pad_mode = rctx->pad_mode;
++        ret = RSA_private_decrypt(inlen, in, out, rsa, pad_mode);
+     }
+     *outlen = constant_time_select_s(constant_time_msb_s(ret), *outlen, ret);
+     ret = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_msb(ret), ret, 1);
+@@ -591,6 +601,14 @@ static int pkey_rsa_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2)
+         *(unsigned char **)p2 = rctx->oaep_label;
+         return rctx->oaep_labellen;
+ 
++    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_IMPLICIT_REJECTION:
++        if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) {
++            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
++            return -2;
++        }
++        rctx->implicit_rejection = p1;
++        return 1;
++
+     case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DIGESTINIT:
+     case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN:
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
+diff --git a/doc/man1/openssl-pkeyutl.pod.in b/doc/man1/openssl-pkeyutl.pod.in
+index 015265a74d..5e62551d34 100644
+--- a/doc/man1/openssl-pkeyutl.pod.in
++++ b/doc/man1/openssl-pkeyutl.pod.in
+@@ -305,6 +305,16 @@ explicitly set in PSS mode then the signing digest is used.
+ Sets the digest used for the OAEP hash function. If not explicitly set then
+ SHA1 is used.
+ 
++=item B<rsa_pkcs1_implicit_rejection:>I<flag>
++
++Disables (when set to 0) or enables (when set to 1) the use of implicit
++rejection with PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption. When enabled (the default), as a
++protection against Bleichenbacher attack, the library will generate a
++deterministic random plaintext that it will return to the caller in case
++of padding check failure.
++When disabled, it's the callers' responsibility to handle the returned
++errors in a side-channel free manner.
++
+ =back
+ 
+ =head1 RSA-PSS ALGORITHM
+diff --git a/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod b/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod
+index e788f38809..3844aa2199 100644
+--- a/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod
++++ b/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod
+@@ -392,6 +392,8 @@ instead of padding errors in case padding checks fail. Applications that
+ want to remain secure while using earlier versions of OpenSSL, still need to
+ handle both the error code from the RSA decryption operation and the
+ returned message in a side channel secure manner.
++This protection against Bleichenbacher attacks can be disabled by setting
++the OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_IMPLICIT_REJECTION (an unsigned integer) to 0.
+ 
+ =head2 DSA parameters
+ 
+diff --git a/doc/man7/provider-asym_cipher.pod b/doc/man7/provider-asym_cipher.pod
+index 0976a263a8..2a8426a6ed 100644
+--- a/doc/man7/provider-asym_cipher.pod
++++ b/doc/man7/provider-asym_cipher.pod
+@@ -234,6 +234,15 @@ The TLS protocol version first requested by the client.
+ 
+ The negotiated TLS protocol version.
+ 
++=item "implicit-rejection" (B<OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_IMPLICIT_REJECTION>) <unsigned integer>
++
++Gets of sets the use of the implicit rejection mechanism for RSA PKCS#1 v1.5
++decryption. When set (non zero value), the decryption API will return
++a deterministically random value if the PKCS#1 v1.5 padding check fails.
++This makes explotation of the Bleichenbacher significantly harder, even
++if the code using the RSA decryption API is not implemented in side-channel
++free manner. Set by default.
++
+ =back
+ 
+ OSSL_FUNC_asym_cipher_gettable_ctx_params() and OSSL_FUNC_asym_cipher_settable_ctx_params()
+diff --git a/include/openssl/core_names.h b/include/openssl/core_names.h
+index 6bed5a8a67..5a350b537f 100644
+--- a/include/openssl/core_names.h
++++ b/include/openssl/core_names.h
+@@ -292,6 +292,7 @@ extern "C" {
+ #define OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_DIST_ID             "distid"
+ #define OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY             "pub"
+ #define OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY            "priv"
++#define OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_IMPLICIT_REJECTION  "implicit-rejection"
+ 
+ /* Diffie-Hellman/DSA Parameters */
+ #define OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P               "p"
+@@ -467,6 +468,7 @@ extern "C" {
+ #define OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_LABEL               "oaep-label"
+ #define OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_CLIENT_VERSION       "tls-client-version"
+ #define OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_NEGOTIATED_VERSION   "tls-negotiated-version"
++#define OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_IMPLICIT_REJECTION       "implicit-rejection"
+ 
+ /*
+  * Encoder / decoder parameters
+diff --git a/include/openssl/rsa.h b/include/openssl/rsa.h
+index a55c9727c6..247f9014e3 100644
+--- a/include/openssl/rsa.h
++++ b/include/openssl/rsa.h
+@@ -183,6 +183,8 @@ int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_rsa_oaep_label(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char **label);
+ 
+ # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PRIMES  (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 13)
+ 
++# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_IMPLICIT_REJECTION (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 14)
++
+ # define RSA_PKCS1_PADDING          1
+ # define RSA_NO_PADDING             3
+ # define RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING     4
+@@ -192,6 +194,9 @@ int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_rsa_oaep_label(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char **label);
+ # define RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING      6
+ # define RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING 7
+ 
++/* internal RSA_ only */
++# define RSA_PKCS1_NO_IMPLICIT_REJECT_PADDING 8
++
+ # define RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE    11
+ 
+ # define RSA_set_app_data(s,arg)         RSA_set_ex_data(s,0,arg)
+diff --git a/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c b/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c
+index c8921acd6e..11a91e62b1 100644
+--- a/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c
++++ b/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c
+@@ -75,6 +75,8 @@ typedef struct {
+     /* TLS padding */
+     unsigned int client_version;
+     unsigned int alt_version;
++    /* PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption mode */
++    unsigned int implicit_rejection;
+ } PROV_RSA_CTX;
+ 
+ static void *rsa_newctx(void *provctx)
+@@ -107,6 +109,7 @@ static int rsa_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa, const OSSL_PARAM params[],
+     RSA_free(prsactx->rsa);
+     prsactx->rsa = vrsa;
+     prsactx->operation = operation;
++    prsactx->implicit_rejection = 1;
+ 
+     switch (RSA_test_flags(prsactx->rsa, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_MASK)) {
+     case RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSA:
+@@ -199,6 +202,7 @@ static int rsa_decrypt(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
+ {
+     PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
+     int ret;
++    int pad_mode;
+     size_t len = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa);
+ 
+     if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+@@ -276,8 +280,12 @@ static int rsa_decrypt(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
+         }
+         OPENSSL_free(tbuf);
+     } else {
+-        ret = RSA_private_decrypt(inlen, in, out, prsactx->rsa,
+-                                  prsactx->pad_mode);
++        if ((prsactx->implicit_rejection == 0) &&
++                (prsactx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING))
++            pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_NO_IMPLICIT_REJECT_PADDING;
++        else
++            pad_mode = prsactx->pad_mode;
++        ret = RSA_private_decrypt(inlen, in, out, prsactx->rsa, pad_mode);
+     }
+     *outlen = constant_time_select_s(constant_time_msb_s(ret), *outlen, ret);
+     ret = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_msb(ret), 0, 1);
+@@ -401,6 +409,10 @@ static int rsa_get_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params)
+     if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_uint(p, prsactx->alt_version))
+         return 0;
+ 
++    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_IMPLICIT_REJECTION);
++    if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_uint(p, prsactx->implicit_rejection))
++        return 0;
++
+     return 1;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -412,6 +424,7 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
+                     NULL, 0),
+     OSSL_PARAM_uint(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_CLIENT_VERSION, NULL),
+     OSSL_PARAM_uint(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_NEGOTIATED_VERSION, NULL),
++    OSSL_PARAM_uint(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_IMPLICIT_REJECTION, NULL),
+     OSSL_PARAM_END
+ };
+ 
+@@ -549,6 +562,14 @@ static int rsa_set_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+             return 0;
+         prsactx->alt_version = alt_version;
+     }
++    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_IMPLICIT_REJECTION);
++    if (p != NULL) {
++        unsigned int implicit_rejection;
++
++        if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p, &implicit_rejection))
++            return 0;
++        prsactx->implicit_rejection = implicit_rejection;
++    }
+ 
+     return 1;
+ }
+@@ -562,6 +583,7 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
+     OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_LABEL, NULL, 0),
+     OSSL_PARAM_uint(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_CLIENT_VERSION, NULL),
+     OSSL_PARAM_uint(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_NEGOTIATED_VERSION, NULL),
++    OSSL_PARAM_uint(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_IMPLICIT_REJECTION, NULL),
+     OSSL_PARAM_END
+ };
+ 
+-- 
+2.34.1
+

meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-50781-3.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+From ba78f7b0599ba5bfb5032dd2664465c5b13388e3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2022 18:25:49 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 3/3] smime/pkcs7: disable the Bleichenbacher workaround
+
+CVE: CVE-2023-50781
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+[https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/056dade341d2589975a3aae71f81c8d7061583c7]
+
+Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13817)
+
+Signed-off-by: Jiaying Song <jiaying.song.cn@windriver.com>
+---
+ crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c | 7 +++++++
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c b/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
+index e9de097da1..6d3124da87 100644
+--- a/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
++++ b/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
+@@ -170,6 +170,13 @@ static int pkcs7_decrypt_rinfo(unsigned char **pek, int *peklen,
+     if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pctx) <= 0)
+         goto err;
+ 
++    if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "RSA"))
++        /* upper layer pkcs7 code incorrectly assumes that a successful RSA
++         * decryption means that the key matches ciphertext (which never
++         * was the case, implicit rejection or not), so to make it work
++         * disable implicit rejection for RSA keys */
++        EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl_str(pctx, "rsa_pkcs1_implicit_rejection", "0");
++
+     if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pctx, NULL, &eklen,
+                          ri->enc_key->data, ri->enc_key->length) <= 0)
+         goto err;
+-- 
+2.34.1
+

meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-50781-4.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,441 @@
+From 8ae4f0e68ebb7435be494b58676827ae91695371 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2021 14:58:04 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] rsa: add test vectors for the implicit rejection in RSA
+ PKCS#1 v1.5
+
+CVE: CVE-2023-50781
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/8ae4f0e68ebb7435be494b58676827ae91695371]
+
+Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13817)
+Signed-off-by: Jiaying Song <jiaying.song.cn@windriver.com>
+---
+ .../30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt   | 408 ++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 408 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt b/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt
+index 080c4d02af..1405465098 100644
+--- a/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt
++++ b/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt
+@@ -277,6 +277,414 @@ Derive = RSA-2048
+ Result = KEYOP_INIT_ERROR
+ Reason = operation not supported for this keytype
+ 
++# Test vectors for the Bleichenbacher workaround
++
++PrivateKey = RSA-2048-2
++-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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++-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
++
++# corresponding public key
++PublicKey = RSA-2048-2-PUBLIC
++-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
++MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAyMyDlxQJjaVsqiNkD5Pc
++iZfBY3KWj8Gwxt9RE8HJTosh5IrSKX5lQZARtObY9ec7G3iyV0ADIdHva2AtTsjO
++jRQclJBetK0wZjmkkgZTS25/JgdCPpff/RM8iNchOZ3vvH6WzNy9fzquH+iScSv7
++SSmBfVEWZkQKH6y3ogj16hZZEK3Yo/LUlyAjYMy2MgJPDQcWnBkY8xb3lLFDrvVO
++yHUipMApePlomYC/+/ZJwwfoGBm/+IQJY41IvZS+FStZ/2SfoL1inQ/6GBPDq/S1
++a9PC6lRl3/oUWJKSqdiiStJr5+4FEHQbY4LUPIPVv6QKRmE9BivkRVF9vK8MtOGn
++aQIDAQAB
++-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
++
++PrivPubKeyPair = RSA-2048-2:RSA-2048-2-PUBLIC
++
++# RSA decrypt
++
++# a random positive test case
++Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
++Input = 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
++Output = "lorem ipsum dolor sit amet"
++
++# a random negative test case decrypting to empty
++Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
++Input = 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
++Output =
++
++# invalid decrypting to max length message
++Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
++Input = 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
++Output = 22d850137b9eebe092b24f602dc5bb7918c16bd89ddbf20467b119d205f9c2e4bd7d2592cf1e532106e0f33557565923c73a02d4f09c0c22bea89148183e60317f7028b3aa1f261f91c979393101d7e15f4067e63979b32751658ef769610fe97cf9cef3278b3117d384051c3b1d82c251c2305418c8f6840530e631aad63e70e20e025bcd8efb54c92ec6d3b106a2f8e64eeff7d38495b0fc50c97138af4b1c0a67a1c4e27b077b8439332edfa8608dfeae653cd6a628ac550395f7e74390e42c11682234870925eeaa1fa71b76cf1f2ee3bda69f6717033ff8b7c95c9799e7a3bea5e7e4a1c359772fb6b1c6e6c516661dfe30c3
++
++# invalid decrypting to message with length specified by second to last value from PRF
++Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
++Input = 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
++Output = 0f9b
++
++# invalid decrypting to message with length specified by third to last value from PRF
++Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
++Input = 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
++Output = 4f02
++
++# positive test with 11 byte long value
++Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
++Input = 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
++Output = "lorem ipsum"
++
++# positive test with 11 byte long value and zero padded ciphertext
++Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
++Input = 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
++Output = "lorem ipsum"
++
++# positive test with 11 byte long value and zero truncated ciphertext
++Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
++Input = 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
++Output = "lorem ipsum"
++
++# positive test with 11 byte long value and double zero padded ciphertext
++Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
++Input = 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
++Output = "lorem ipsum"
++
++# positive test with 11 byte long value and double zero truncated ciphertext
++Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
++Input = 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
++Output = "lorem ipsum"
++
++# positive that generates a 0 byte long synthethic message internally
++Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
++Input = 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
++Output = "lorem ipsum"
++
++# positive that generates a 245 byte long synthethic message internally
++Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
++Input = 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
++Output = "lorem ipsum"
++
++# a random negative test that generates an 11 byte long message
++Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
++Input = 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
++Output = af9ac70191c92413cb9f2d
++
++# an otherwise correct plaintext, but with wrong first byte
++# (0x01 instead of 0x00), generates a random 11 byte long plaintext
++Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
++Input = 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
++Output = a1f8c9255c35cfba403ccc
++
++# an otherwise correct plaintext, but with wrong second byte
++# (0x01 instead of 0x02), generates a random 11 byte long plaintext
++Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
++Input = 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
++Output = e6d700309ca0ed62452254
++
++# an invalid ciphertext, with a zero byte in first byte of
++# ciphertext, decrypts to a random 11 byte long synthethic
++# plaintext
++Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
++Input = 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
++Output = ba27b1842e7c21c0e7ef6a
++
++# an invalid ciphertext, with a zero byte removed from first byte of
++# ciphertext, decrypts to a random 11 byte long synthethic
++# plaintext
++Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
++Input = 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
++Output = ba27b1842e7c21c0e7ef6a
++
++# an invalid ciphertext, with two zero bytes in first bytes of
++# ciphertext, decrypts to a random 11 byte long synthethic
++# plaintext
++Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
++Input = 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
++Output = d5cf555b1d6151029a429a
++
++# an invalid ciphertext, with two zero bytes removed from first bytes of
++# ciphertext, decrypts to a random 11 byte long synthethic
++# plaintext
++Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
++Input = 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
++Output = d5cf555b1d6151029a429a
++
++# and invalid ciphertext, otherwise valid but starting with 000002, decrypts
++# to random 11 byte long synthethic plaintext
++Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
++Input = 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
++Output = 3d4a054d9358209e9cbbb9
++
++# negative test with otherwise valid padding but a zero byte in first byte
++# of padding
++Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
++Input = 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
++Output = 1f037dd717b07d3e7f7359
++
++# negative test with otherwise valid padding but a zero byte at the eigth
++# byte of padding
++Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
++Input = a7a340675a82c30e22219a55bc07cdf36d47d01834c1834f917f18b517419ce9de2a96460e745024436470ed85e94297b283537d52189c406a3f533cb405cc6a9dba46b482ce98b6e3dd52d8fce2237425617e38c11fbc46b61897ef200d01e4f25f5f6c4c5b38cd0de38ba11908b86595a8036a08a42a3d05b79600a97ac18ba368a08d6cf6ccb624f6e8002afc75599fba4de3d4f3ba7d208391ebe8d21f8282b18e2c10869eb2702e68f9176b42b0ddc9d763f0c86ba0ff92c957aaeab76d9ab8da52ea297ec11d92d770146faa1b300e0f91ef969b53e7d2907ffc984e9a9c9d11fb7d6cba91972059b46506b035efec6575c46d7114a6b935864858445f
++Output = 63cb0bf65fc8255dd29e17
++
++# negative test with an otherwise valid plaintext but with missing separator
++# byte
++Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
++Input = 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
++Output = 6f09a0b62699337c497b0b
++
++# Test vectors for the Bleichenbacher workaround (2049 bit key size)
++
++PrivateKey = RSA-2049
++-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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++-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
++
++# corresponding public key
++PublicKey = RSA-2049-PUBLIC
++-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
++MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEBVfiJVWoXdfHHp3hqULGL
++woyemG7eVmfKs5uEEk6Q66dcHbCDrD5EO7qU3CNWD3XjqBaToqQ73HQm2MTq/mjI
++XeD+dX9uSbue1EfmAkMIANuwTOsi5/pXoY0zj7ZgJs20Z+cMwEDn02fvQDx78ePf
++YkZQCUYx8h6v0vtbyRX/BDeazRES9zLAtGYHwXjTiiD1LtpQny+cBAXVEGnoDM+U
++FVTQRwRnUFw89UHqCJffyfQAzsspj/x1M3LZ9pM68XTMQO2W1GcDFzO5f4zd0/kr
++w6A+qFdsQX8kAHteT3UBEFtUTen63N/635jftLsFuBmfP4Ws/ZH3qaCUuaOD9QSQ
++lwIDAQAB
++-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
++
++PrivPubKeyPair = RSA-2049:RSA-2049-PUBLIC
++
++# RSA decrypt
++
++# malformed that generates length specified by 3rd last value from PRF
++Decrypt = RSA-2049
++Input = 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
++Output = 42
++
++# simple positive test case
++Decrypt = RSA-2049
++Input = 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
++Output = "lorem ipsum"
++
++# positive test case with null padded ciphertext
++Decrypt = RSA-2049
++Input = 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
++Output = "lorem ipsum"
++
++# positive test case with null truncated ciphertext
++Decrypt = RSA-2049
++Input = 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
++Output = "lorem ipsum"
++
++# positive test case with double null padded ciphertext
++Decrypt = RSA-2049
++Input = 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
++Output = "lorem ipsum"
++
++# positive test case with double null truncated ciphertext
++Decrypt = RSA-2049
++Input = 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
++Output = "lorem ipsum"
++
++# a random negative test case that generates an 11 byte long message
++Decrypt = RSA-2049
++Input = 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
++Output = 1189b6f5498fd6df532b00
++
++# otherwise correct plaintext, but with wrong first byte (0x01 instead of 0x00)
++Decrypt = RSA-2049
++Input = 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
++Output = f6d0f5b78082fe61c04674
++
++# otherwise correct plaintext, but with wrong second byte (0x01 instead of 0x02)
++Decrypt = RSA-2049
++Input = 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
++Output = 1ab287fcef3ff17067914d
++
++# RSA decrypt with 3072 bit keys
++PrivateKey = RSA-3072
++-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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++-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
++
++PublicKey = RSA-3072-PUBLIC
++-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----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++-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
++
++PrivPubKeyPair = RSA-3072:RSA-3072-PUBLIC
++
++# a random invalid ciphertext that generates an empty synthethic one
++Decrypt = RSA-3072
++Input = 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
++Output =
++
++# a random invalid that has PRF output with a length one byte too long
++# in the last value
++Decrypt = RSA-3072
++Input = 7db0390d75fcf9d4c59cf27b264190d856da9abd11e92334d0e5f71005cfed865a711dfa28b791188374b61916dbc11339bf14b06f5f3f68c206c5607380e13da3129bfb744157e1527dd6fdf6651248b028a496ae1b97702d44706043cdaa7a59c0f41367303f21f268968bf3bd2904db3ae5239b55f8b438d93d7db9d1666c071c0857e2ec37757463769c54e51f052b2a71b04c2869e9e7049a1037b8429206c99726f07289bac18363e7eb2a5b417f47c37a55090cda676517b3549c873f2fe95da9681752ec9864b069089a2ed2f340c8b04ee00079055a817a3355b46ac7dc00d17f4504ccfbcfcadb0c04cb6b22069e179385ae1eafabad5521bac2b8a8ee1dfff59a22eb3fdacfc87175d10d7894cfd869d056057dd9944b869c1784fcc27f731bc46171d39570fbffbadf082d33f6352ecf44aca8d9478e53f5a5b7c852b401e8f5f74da49da91e65bdc97765a9523b7a0885a6f8afe5759d58009fbfa837472a968e6ae92026a5e0202a395483095302d6c3985b5f5831c521a271
++Output = 56a3bea054e01338be9b7d7957539c
++
++# a random invalid that generates a synthethic of maximum size
++Decrypt = RSA-3072
++Input = 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
++Output = 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
++
++# a positive test case that decrypts to 9 byte long value
++Decrypt = RSA-3072
++Input = 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
++Output = "forty two"
++
++# a positive test case with null padded ciphertext
++Decrypt = RSA-3072
++Input = 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
++Output = "forty two"
++
++# a positive test case with null truncated ciphertext
++Decrypt = RSA-3072
++Input = 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
++Output = "forty two"
++
++# a positive test case with double null padded ciphertext
++Decrypt = RSA-3072
++Input = 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
++Output = "forty two"
++
++# a positive test case with double null truncated ciphertext
++Decrypt = RSA-3072
++Input = 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
++Output = "forty two"
++
++# a random negative test case that generates a 9 byte long message
++Decrypt = RSA-3072
++Input = 5c8555f5cef627c15d37f85c7f5fd6e499264ea4b8e3f9112023aeb722eb38d8eac2be3751fd5a3785ab7f2d59fa3728e5be8c3de78a67464e30b21ee23b5484bb3cd06d0e1c6ad25649c8518165653eb80488bfb491b20c04897a6772f69292222fc5ef50b5cf9efc6d60426a449b6c489569d48c83488df629d695653d409ce49a795447fcec2c58a1a672e4a391401d428baaf781516e11e323d302fcf20f6eab2b2dbe53a48c987e407c4d7e1cb41131329138313d330204173a4f3ff06c6fadf970f0ed1005d0b27e35c3d11693e0429e272d583e57b2c58d24315c397856b34485dcb077665592b747f889d34febf2be8fce66c265fd9fc3575a6286a5ce88b4b413a08efc57a07a8f57a999605a837b0542695c0d189e678b53662ecf7c3d37d9dbeea585eebfaf79141118e06762c2381fe27ca6288edddc19fd67cd64f16b46e06d8a59ac530f22cd83cc0bc4e37feb52015cbb2283043ccf5e78a4eb7146827d7a466b66c8a4a4826c1bad68123a7f2d00fc1736525ff90c058f56
++Output = 257906ca6de8307728
++
++# a random negative test case that generates a 9 byte long message based on
++# second to last value from PRF
++Decrypt = RSA-3072
++Input = 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
++Output = 043383c929060374ed
++
++# a random negative test that generates message based on 3rd last value from
++# PRF
++Decrypt = RSA-3072
++Input = 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
++Output = 70263fa6050534b9e0
++
++# an otherwise valid plaintext, but with wrong first byte (0x01 instead of 0x00)
++Decrypt = RSA-3072
++Input = 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
++Output = 6d8d3a094ff3afff4c
++
++# an otherwise valid plaintext, but with wrong second byte (0x01 instead of 0x02)
++Decrypt = RSA-3072
++Input = 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
++Output = c6ae80ffa80bc184b0
++
++# an otherwise valid plaintext, but with zero byte in first byte of padding
++Decrypt = RSA-3072
++Input = 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
++Output = a8a9301daa01bb25c7
++
++# an otherwise valid plaintext, but with zero byte in eight byte of padding
++Decrypt = RSA-3072
++Input = 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
++Output = 6c716fe01d44398018
++
++# an otherwise valid plaintext, but with null separator missing
++Decrypt = RSA-3072
++Input = 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
++Output = aa2de6cde4e2442884
++
+ # RSA PSS key tests
+ 
+ # PSS only key, no parameter restrictions
+-- 
+2.34.1
+

meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-50781-5.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,284 @@
+From c693522a96b6fb2bb4b55a53d86550811bc0d7df Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 3 Nov 2022 17:45:58 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] rsa: Skip the synthethic plaintext test with old FIPS
+ provider
+
+since the 3.0.0 FIPS provider doesn't implement the Bleichenbacher
+workaround, the decryption fails instead of providing a synthetic
+plaintext, so skip them then
+
+CVE: CVE-2023-50781
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/ddecbef6e389d263b728b7fa30fd3d9ce13feddb]
+
+Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13817)
+Signed-off-by: Jiaying Song <jiaying.song.cn@windriver.com>
+---
+ .../30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt   | 66 ++++++++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 63 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt b/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt
+index d569e78..4bd7c72 100644
+--- a/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt
++++ b/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt
+@@ -253,12 +253,12 @@ Decrypt = RSA-2048
+ Input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
+ Output = "Hello World"
+ 
++# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
++FIPSversion = >3.0.0
+ # Corrupted ciphertext
+-FIPSversion = <3.2.0
+ Decrypt = RSA-2048
+ Input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
+-Output = "Hello World"
+-Result = KEYOP_ERROR
++Output = 4cbb988d6a46228379132b0b5f8c249b3860043848c93632fb982c807c7c82fffc7a9ef83f4908f890373ac181ffea6381e103bcaa27e65638b6ecebef38b59ed4226a9d12af675cfcb634d8c40e7a7aff
+ 
+ # OAEP padding
+ Decrypt = RSA-2048
+@@ -330,21 +330,29 @@ Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
+ Input = 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
+ Output = "lorem ipsum dolor sit amet"
+ 
++# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
++FIPSversion = >3.0.0
+ # a random negative test case decrypting to empty
+ Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
+ Input = 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
+ Output =
+ 
++# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
++FIPSversion = >3.0.0
+ # invalid decrypting to max length message
+ Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
+ Input = 48cceab10f39a4db32f60074feea473cbcdb7accf92e150417f76b44756b190e843e79ec12aa85083a21f5437e7bad0a60482e601198f9d86923239c8786ee728285afd0937f7dde12717f28389843d7375912b07b991f4fdb0190fced8ba665314367e8c5f9d2981d0f5128feeb46cb50fc237e64438a86df198dd0209364ae3a842d77532b66b7ef263b83b1541ed671b120dfd660462e2107a4ee7b964e734a7bd68d90dda61770658a3c242948532da32648687e0318286473f675b412d6468f013f14d760a358dfcad3cda2afeec5e268a37d250c37f722f468a70dfd92d7294c3c1ee1e7f8843b7d16f9f37ef35748c3ae93aa155cdcdfeb4e78567303
+ Output = 22d850137b9eebe092b24f602dc5bb7918c16bd89ddbf20467b119d205f9c2e4bd7d2592cf1e532106e0f33557565923c73a02d4f09c0c22bea89148183e60317f7028b3aa1f261f91c979393101d7e15f4067e63979b32751658ef769610fe97cf9cef3278b3117d384051c3b1d82c251c2305418c8f6840530e631aad63e70e20e025bcd8efb54c92ec6d3b106a2f8e64eeff7d38495b0fc50c97138af4b1c0a67a1c4e27b077b8439332edfa8608dfeae653cd6a628ac550395f7e74390e42c11682234870925eeaa1fa71b76cf1f2ee3bda69f6717033ff8b7c95c9799e7a3bea5e7e4a1c359772fb6b1c6e6c516661dfe30c3
+ 
++# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
++FIPSversion = >3.0.0
+ # invalid decrypting to message with length specified by second to last value from PRF
+ Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
+ Input = 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
+ Output = 0f9b
+ 
++# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
++FIPSversion = >3.0.0
+ # invalid decrypting to message with length specified by third to last value from PRF
+ Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
+ Input = 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
+@@ -385,23 +393,31 @@ Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
+ Input = 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
+ Output = "lorem ipsum"
+ 
++# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
++FIPSversion = >3.0.0
+ # a random negative test that generates an 11 byte long message
+ Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
+ Input = 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
+ Output = af9ac70191c92413cb9f2d
+ 
++# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
++FIPSversion = >3.0.0
+ # an otherwise correct plaintext, but with wrong first byte
+ # (0x01 instead of 0x00), generates a random 11 byte long plaintext
+ Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
+ Input = 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
+ Output = a1f8c9255c35cfba403ccc
+ 
++# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
++FIPSversion = >3.0.0
+ # an otherwise correct plaintext, but with wrong second byte
+ # (0x01 instead of 0x02), generates a random 11 byte long plaintext
+ Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
+ Input = 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
+ Output = e6d700309ca0ed62452254
+ 
++# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
++FIPSversion = >3.0.0
+ # an invalid ciphertext, with a zero byte in first byte of
+ # ciphertext, decrypts to a random 11 byte long synthethic
+ # plaintext
+@@ -409,6 +425,8 @@ Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
+ Input = 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
+ Output = ba27b1842e7c21c0e7ef6a
+ 
++# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
++FIPSversion = >3.0.0
+ # an invalid ciphertext, with a zero byte removed from first byte of
+ # ciphertext, decrypts to a random 11 byte long synthethic
+ # plaintext
+@@ -416,6 +434,8 @@ Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
+ Input = 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
+ Output = ba27b1842e7c21c0e7ef6a
+ 
++# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
++FIPSversion = >3.0.0
+ # an invalid ciphertext, with two zero bytes in first bytes of
+ # ciphertext, decrypts to a random 11 byte long synthethic
+ # plaintext
+@@ -423,6 +443,8 @@ Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
+ Input = 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
+ Output = d5cf555b1d6151029a429a
+ 
++# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
++FIPSversion = >3.0.0
+ # an invalid ciphertext, with two zero bytes removed from first bytes of
+ # ciphertext, decrypts to a random 11 byte long synthethic
+ # plaintext
+@@ -430,24 +452,32 @@ Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
+ Input = 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
+ Output = d5cf555b1d6151029a429a
+ 
++# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
++FIPSversion = >3.0.0
+ # and invalid ciphertext, otherwise valid but starting with 000002, decrypts
+ # to random 11 byte long synthethic plaintext
+ Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
+ Input = 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
+ Output = 3d4a054d9358209e9cbbb9
+ 
++# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
++FIPSversion = >3.0.0
+ # negative test with otherwise valid padding but a zero byte in first byte
+ # of padding
+ Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
+ Input = 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
+ Output = 1f037dd717b07d3e7f7359
+ 
++# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
++FIPSversion = >3.0.0
+ # negative test with otherwise valid padding but a zero byte at the eigth
+ # byte of padding
+ Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
+ Input = 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
+ Output = 63cb0bf65fc8255dd29e17
+ 
++# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
++FIPSversion = >3.0.0
+ # negative test with an otherwise valid plaintext but with missing separator
+ # byte
+ Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
+@@ -501,6 +531,8 @@ PrivPubKeyPair = RSA-2049:RSA-2049-PUBLIC
+ 
+ # RSA decrypt
+ 
++# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
++FIPSversion = >3.0.0
+ # malformed that generates length specified by 3rd last value from PRF
+ Decrypt = RSA-2049
+ Input = 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
+@@ -531,16 +563,22 @@ Decrypt = RSA-2049
+ Input = 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
+ Output = "lorem ipsum"
+ 
++# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
++FIPSversion = >3.0.0
+ # a random negative test case that generates an 11 byte long message
+ Decrypt = RSA-2049
+ Input = 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
+ Output = 1189b6f5498fd6df532b00
+ 
++# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
++FIPSversion = >3.0.0
+ # otherwise correct plaintext, but with wrong first byte (0x01 instead of 0x00)
+ Decrypt = RSA-2049
+ Input = 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
+ Output = f6d0f5b78082fe61c04674
+ 
++# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
++FIPSversion = >3.0.0
+ # otherwise correct plaintext, but with wrong second byte (0x01 instead of 0x02)
+ Decrypt = RSA-2049
+ Input = 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
+@@ -603,17 +641,23 @@ ooCElYcob01/JWzoXl61Z5sdrMH5CVZJty5foHKusAN5AgMBAAE=
+ 
+ PrivPubKeyPair = RSA-3072:RSA-3072-PUBLIC
+ 
++# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
++FIPSversion = >3.0.0
+ # a random invalid ciphertext that generates an empty synthethic one
+ Decrypt = RSA-3072
+ Input = 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
+ Output =
+ 
++# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
++FIPSversion = >3.0.0
+ # a random invalid that has PRF output with a length one byte too long
+ # in the last value
+ Decrypt = RSA-3072
+ Input = 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
+ Output = 56a3bea054e01338be9b7d7957539c
+ 
++# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
++FIPSversion = >3.0.0
+ # a random invalid that generates a synthethic of maximum size
+ Decrypt = RSA-3072
+ Input = 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
+@@ -644,43 +688,59 @@ Decrypt = RSA-3072
+ Input = 1ec97ac981dfd9dcc7a7389fdfa9d361141dac80c23a060410d472c16094e6cdffc0c3684d84aa402d7051dfccb2f6da33f66985d2a259f5b7fbf39ac537e95c5b7050eb18844a0513abef812cc8e74a3c5240009e6e805dcadf532bc1a2702d5acc9e585fad5b89d461fcc1397351cdce35171523758b171dc041f412e42966de7f94856477356d06f2a6b40e3ff0547562a4d91bbf1338e9e049facbee8b20171164505468cd308997447d3dc4b0acb49e7d368fedd8c734251f30a83491d2506f3f87318cc118823244a393dc7c5c739a2733d93e1b13db6840a9429947357f47b23fbe39b7d2d61e5ee26f9946c4632f6c4699e452f412a26641d4751135400713cd56ec66f0370423d55d2af70f5e7ad0adea8e4a0d904a01e4ac272eba4af1a029dd53eb71f115bf31f7a6c8b19a6523adeecc0d4c3c107575e38572a8f8474ccad163e46e2e8b08111132aa97a16fb588c9b7e37b3b3d7490381f3c55d1a9869a0fd42cd86fed59ecec78cb6b2dfd06a497f5afe3419691314ba0
+ Output = "forty two"
+ 
++# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
++FIPSversion = >3.0.0
+ # a random negative test case that generates a 9 byte long message
+ Decrypt = RSA-3072
+ Input = 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
+ Output = 257906ca6de8307728
+ 
++# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
++FIPSversion = >3.0.0
+ # a random negative test case that generates a 9 byte long message based on
+ # second to last value from PRF
+ Decrypt = RSA-3072
+ Input = 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
+ Output = 043383c929060374ed
+ 
++# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
++FIPSversion = >3.0.0
+ # a random negative test that generates message based on 3rd last value from
+ # PRF
+ Decrypt = RSA-3072
+ Input = 7b22d5e62d287968c6622171a1f75db4b0fd15cdf3134a1895d235d56f8d8fe619f2bf4868174a91d7601a82975d2255190d28b869141d7c395f0b8c4e2be2b2c1b4ffc12ce749a6f6803d4cfe7fba0a8d6949c04151f981c0d84592aa2ff25d1bd3ce5d10cb03daca6b496c6ad40d30bfa8acdfd02cdb9326c4bdd93b949c9dc46caa8f0e5f429785bce64136a429a3695ee674b647452bea1b0c6de9c5f1e8760d5ef6d5a9cfff40457b023d3c233c1dcb323e7808103e73963b2eafc928c9eeb0ee3294955415c1ddd9a1bb7e138fecd79a3cb89c57bd2305524624814aaf0fd1acbf379f7f5b39421f12f115ba488d380586095bb53f174fae424fa4c8e3b299709cd344b9f949b1ab57f1c645d7ed3c8f81d5594197355029fee8960970ff59710dc0e5eb50ea6f4c3938e3f89ed7933023a2c2ddffaba07be147f686828bd7d520f300507ed6e71bdaee05570b27bc92741108ac2eb433f028e138dd6d63067bc206ea2d826a7f41c0d613daed020f0f30f4e272e9618e0a8c39018a83
+ Output = 70263fa6050534b9e0
+ 
++# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
++FIPSversion = >3.0.0
+ # an otherwise valid plaintext, but with wrong first byte (0x01 instead of 0x00)
+ Decrypt = RSA-3072
+ Input = 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
+ Output = 6d8d3a094ff3afff4c
+ 
++# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
++FIPSversion = >3.0.0
+ # an otherwise valid plaintext, but with wrong second byte (0x01 instead of 0x02)
+ Decrypt = RSA-3072
+ Input = 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
+ Output = c6ae80ffa80bc184b0
+ 
++# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
++FIPSversion = >3.0.0
+ # an otherwise valid plaintext, but with zero byte in first byte of padding
+ Decrypt = RSA-3072
+ Input = 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
+ Output = a8a9301daa01bb25c7
+ 
++# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
++FIPSversion = >3.0.0
+ # an otherwise valid plaintext, but with zero byte in eight byte of padding
+ Decrypt = RSA-3072
+ Input = 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
+ Output = 6c716fe01d44398018
+ 
++# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
++FIPSversion = >3.0.0
+ # an otherwise valid plaintext, but with null separator missing
+ Decrypt = RSA-3072
+ Input = 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
+-- 
+2.34.1
+

meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-50781-6.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+From 455db0c94c0b83083ce8b792982c03aa56fc866f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2022 17:42:11 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] rsa: add test for the option to disable implicit rejection
+
+CVE: CVE-2023-50781
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/455db0c94c0b83083ce8b792982c03aa56fc866f]
+
+Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13817)
+Signed-off-by: Jiaying Song <jiaying.song.cn@windriver.com>
+---
+ .../30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt    | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt b/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt
+index 0ad654fc60..a3d01eec45 100644
+--- a/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt
++++ b/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt
+@@ -253,6 +253,14 @@ Decrypt = RSA-2048
+ Input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
+ Output = "Hello World"
+ 
++# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
++FIPSversion = >3.0.0
++# Note: disable the Bleichenbacher workaround to see if it passes
++Decrypt = RSA-2048
++Ctrl = rsa_pkcs1_implicit_rejection:0
++Input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
++Output = "Hello World"
++
+ # The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
+ FIPSversion = >3.0.0
+ # Corrupted ciphertext
+@@ -261,6 +269,16 @@ Decrypt = RSA-2048
+ Input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
+ Output = 4cbb988d6a46228379132b0b5f8c249b3860043848c93632fb982c807c7c82fffc7a9ef83f4908f890373ac181ffea6381e103bcaa27e65638b6ecebef38b59ed4226a9d12af675cfcb634d8c40e7a7aff
+ 
++# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
++FIPSversion = >3.0.0
++# Corrupted ciphertext
++# Note: disable the Bleichenbacher workaround to see if it fails
++Decrypt = RSA-2048
++Ctrl = rsa_pkcs1_implicit_rejection:0
++Input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
++Output = "Hello World"
++Result = KEYOP_ERROR
++
+ # OAEP padding
+ Decrypt = RSA-2048
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+-- 
+2.34.1
+

meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2024-41996.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+From e70e34d857d4003199bcb5d3b52ca8102ccc1b98 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+Date: Mon, 5 Aug 2024 17:54:14 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] dh_kmgmt.c: Avoid expensive public key validation for known
+ safe-prime groups
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+The partial validation is fully sufficient to check the key validity.
+
+Thanks to Szilárd Pfeiffer for reporting the issue.
+
+Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25088)
+
+CVE: CVE-2024-41996
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/e70e34d857d4003199bcb5d3b52ca8102ccc1b98]
+
+Signed-off-by: Archana Polampalli <archana.polampalli@windriver.com>
+---
+ providers/implementations/keymgmt/dh_kmgmt.c | 8 +++++---
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/providers/implementations/keymgmt/dh_kmgmt.c b/providers/implementations/keymgmt/dh_kmgmt.c
+index 795a3f2..3e7a811 100644
+--- a/providers/implementations/keymgmt/dh_kmgmt.c
++++ b/providers/implementations/keymgmt/dh_kmgmt.c
+@@ -387,9 +387,11 @@ static int dh_validate_public(const DH *dh, int checktype)
+     if (pub_key == NULL)
+         return 0;
+
+-    /* The partial test is only valid for named group's with q = (p - 1) / 2 */
+-    if (checktype == OSSL_KEYMGMT_VALIDATE_QUICK_CHECK
+-        && ossl_dh_is_named_safe_prime_group(dh))
++    /*
++     * The partial test is only valid for named group's with q = (p - 1) / 2
++     * but for that case it is also fully sufficient to check the key validity.
++     */
++    if (ossl_dh_is_named_safe_prime_group(dh))
+         return ossl_dh_check_pub_key_partial(dh, pub_key, &res);
+
+     return DH_check_pub_key_ex(dh, pub_key);
+--
+2.40.0

meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_3.0.17.bb

@@ -12,13 +12,20 @@ SRC_URI = "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/releases/download/openssl-${PV}/op
            file://0001-buildinfo-strip-sysroot-and-debug-prefix-map-from-co.patch \
            file://afalg.patch \
            file://0001-Configure-do-not-tweak-mips-cflags.patch \
-           "
+           file://CVE-2024-41996.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-50781-1.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-50781-2.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-50781-3.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-50781-4.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-50781-5.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-50781-6.patch \
+          "
 
 SRC_URI:append:class-nativesdk = " \
            file://environment.d-openssl.sh \
            "
 
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "57e03c50feab5d31b152af2b764f10379aecd8ee92f16c985983ce4a99f7ef86"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "dfdd77e4ea1b57ff3a6dbde6b0bdc3f31db5ac99e7fdd4eaf9e1fbb6ec2db8ce"
 
 inherit lib_package multilib_header multilib_script ptest perlnative
 MULTILIB_SCRIPTS = "${PN}-bin:${bindir}/c_rehash"

meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/CVE-2022-37660-0001.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,254 @@
+From 9d3f347a2b14652e767d51142600206a32676b62 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
+Date: Mon, 24 Jan 2022 20:57:19 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] DPP3: Add PKEX initiator retries and fallback from v2 to v1
+ for hostapd
+
+This extends hostapd with the design used in wpa_supplicant for PKEX
+initiator retries and automatic version fallback from v2 to v1 (the
+latter is enabled only with CONFIG_DPP3=y).
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
+
+CVE: CVE-2022-37660
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/?id=9d3f347a2b14652e767d51142600206a32676b62]
+
+Signed-off-by: Divya Chellam <divya.chellam@windriver.com>
+---
+ src/ap/dpp_hostapd.c | 188 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 171 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/ap/dpp_hostapd.c b/src/ap/dpp_hostapd.c
+index 13e1fc5..6c30ba3 100644
+--- a/src/ap/dpp_hostapd.c
++++ b/src/ap/dpp_hostapd.c
+@@ -216,6 +216,163 @@ static void hostapd_dpp_auth_resp_retry(struct hostapd_data *hapd)
+ }
+ 
+ 
++static int hostapd_dpp_allow_ir(struct hostapd_data *hapd, unsigned int freq)
++{
++	int i, j;
++
++	if (!hapd->iface->hw_features)
++		return -1;
++
++	for (i = 0; i < hapd->iface->num_hw_features; i++) {
++		struct hostapd_hw_modes *mode = &hapd->iface->hw_features[i];
++
++		for (j = 0; j < mode->num_channels; j++) {
++			struct hostapd_channel_data *chan = &mode->channels[j];
++
++			if (chan->freq != (int) freq)
++				continue;
++
++			if (chan->flag & (HOSTAPD_CHAN_DISABLED |
++					  HOSTAPD_CHAN_NO_IR |
++					  HOSTAPD_CHAN_RADAR))
++				continue;
++
++			return 1;
++		}
++	}
++
++	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
++		   "DPP: Frequency %u MHz not supported or does not allow PKEX initiation in the current channel list",
++		   freq);
++
++	return 0;
++}
++
++
++static int hostapd_dpp_pkex_next_channel(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
++					 struct dpp_pkex *pkex)
++{
++	if (pkex->freq == 2437)
++		pkex->freq = 5745;
++	else if (pkex->freq == 5745)
++		pkex->freq = 5220;
++	else if (pkex->freq == 5220)
++		pkex->freq = 60480;
++	else
++		return -1; /* no more channels to try */
++
++	if (hostapd_dpp_allow_ir(hapd, pkex->freq) == 1) {
++		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: Try to initiate on %u MHz",
++			   pkex->freq);
++		return 0;
++	}
++
++	/* Could not use this channel - try the next one */
++	return hostapd_dpp_pkex_next_channel(hapd, pkex);
++}
++
++
++static int hostapd_dpp_pkex_init(struct hostapd_data *hapd, bool v2)
++{
++	struct dpp_pkex *pkex;
++	struct wpabuf *msg;
++	unsigned int wait_time;
++
++	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: Initiating PKEXv%d", v2 ? 2 : 1);
++	dpp_pkex_free(hapd->dpp_pkex);
++	hapd->dpp_pkex = dpp_pkex_init(hapd->msg_ctx, hapd->dpp_pkex_bi,
++				       hapd->own_addr,
++				       hapd->dpp_pkex_identifier,
++				       hapd->dpp_pkex_code, v2);
++	pkex = hapd->dpp_pkex;
++	if (!pkex)
++		return -1;
++
++	msg = hapd->dpp_pkex->exchange_req;
++	wait_time = 2000; /* TODO: hapd->max_remain_on_chan; */
++	pkex->freq = 2437;
++	wpa_msg(hapd->msg_ctx, MSG_INFO, DPP_EVENT_TX "dst=" MACSTR
++		" freq=%u type=%d", MAC2STR(broadcast), pkex->freq,
++		v2 ? DPP_PA_PKEX_EXCHANGE_REQ :
++		DPP_PA_PKEX_V1_EXCHANGE_REQ);
++	hostapd_drv_send_action(hapd, pkex->freq, 0, broadcast,
++				wpabuf_head(msg), wpabuf_len(msg));
++	pkex->exch_req_wait_time = wait_time;
++	pkex->exch_req_tries = 1;
++
++	return 0;
++}
++
++
++static void hostapd_dpp_pkex_retry_timeout(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx)
++{
++	struct hostapd_data *hapd = eloop_ctx;
++	struct dpp_pkex *pkex = hapd->dpp_pkex;
++
++	if (!pkex || !pkex->exchange_req)
++		return;
++	if (pkex->exch_req_tries >= 5) {
++		if (hostapd_dpp_pkex_next_channel(hapd, pkex) < 0) {
++#ifdef CONFIG_DPP3
++			if (pkex->v2) {
++				wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
++					   "DPP: Fall back to PKEXv1");
++				hostapd_dpp_pkex_init(hapd, false);
++				return;
++			}
++#endif /* CONFIG_DPP3 */
++			wpa_msg(hapd->msg_ctx, MSG_INFO, DPP_EVENT_FAIL
++				"No response from PKEX peer");
++			dpp_pkex_free(pkex);
++			hapd->dpp_pkex = NULL;
++			return;
++		}
++		pkex->exch_req_tries = 0;
++	}
++
++	pkex->exch_req_tries++;
++	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: Retransmit PKEX Exchange Request (try %u)",
++		   pkex->exch_req_tries);
++	wpa_msg(hapd->msg_ctx, MSG_INFO, DPP_EVENT_TX "dst=" MACSTR
++		" freq=%u type=%d",
++		MAC2STR(broadcast), pkex->freq,
++		pkex->v2 ? DPP_PA_PKEX_EXCHANGE_REQ :
++		DPP_PA_PKEX_V1_EXCHANGE_REQ);
++	hostapd_drv_send_action(hapd, pkex->freq, pkex->exch_req_wait_time,
++				broadcast,
++				wpabuf_head(pkex->exchange_req),
++				wpabuf_len(pkex->exchange_req));
++}
++
++
++static void hostapd_dpp_pkex_tx_status(struct hostapd_data *hapd, const u8 *dst,
++				       const u8 *data, size_t data_len, int ok)
++{
++	struct dpp_pkex *pkex = hapd->dpp_pkex;
++
++	if (pkex->failed) {
++		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
++			   "DPP: Terminate PKEX exchange due to an earlier error");
++		if (pkex->t > pkex->own_bi->pkex_t)
++			pkex->own_bi->pkex_t = pkex->t;
++		dpp_pkex_free(pkex);
++		hapd->dpp_pkex = NULL;
++		return;
++	}
++
++	if (pkex->exch_req_wait_time && pkex->exchange_req) {
++		/* Wait for PKEX Exchange Response frame and retry request if
++		 * no response is seen. */
++		eloop_cancel_timeout(hostapd_dpp_pkex_retry_timeout, hapd,
++				     NULL);
++		eloop_register_timeout(pkex->exch_req_wait_time / 1000,
++				       (pkex->exch_req_wait_time % 1000) * 1000,
++				       hostapd_dpp_pkex_retry_timeout, hapd,
++				       NULL);
++	}
++}
++
++
+ void hostapd_dpp_tx_status(struct hostapd_data *hapd, const u8 *dst,
+ 			   const u8 *data, size_t data_len, int ok)
+ {
+@@ -227,6 +384,11 @@ void hostapd_dpp_tx_status(struct hostapd_data *hapd, const u8 *dst,
+ 		" result=%s", MAC2STR(dst), ok ? "SUCCESS" : "FAILED");
+ 
+ 	if (!hapd->dpp_auth) {
++		if (hapd->dpp_pkex) {
++			hostapd_dpp_pkex_tx_status(hapd, dst, data, data_len,
++						   ok);
++			return;
++		}
+ 		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+ 			   "DPP: Ignore TX status since there is no ongoing authentication exchange");
+ 		return;
+@@ -1783,6 +1945,9 @@ hostapd_dpp_rx_pkex_exchange_resp(struct hostapd_data *hapd, const u8 *src,
+ 		return;
+ 	}
+ 
++	eloop_cancel_timeout(hostapd_dpp_pkex_retry_timeout, hapd, NULL);
++	hapd->dpp_pkex->exch_req_wait_time = 0;
++
+ 	msg = dpp_pkex_rx_exchange_resp(hapd->dpp_pkex, src, buf, len);
+ 	if (!msg) {
+ 		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: Failed to process the response");
+@@ -2172,26 +2337,14 @@ int hostapd_dpp_pkex_add(struct hostapd_data *hapd, const char *cmd)
+ 		return -1;
+ 
+ 	if (os_strstr(cmd, " init=1") || os_strstr(cmd, " init=2")) {
+-		struct wpabuf *msg;
++#ifdef CONFIG_DPP3
++		bool v2 = true;
++#else /* CONFIG_DPP3 */
+ 		bool v2 = os_strstr(cmd, " init=2") != NULL;
++#endif /* CONFIG_DPP3 */
+ 
+-		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: Initiating PKEX");
+-		dpp_pkex_free(hapd->dpp_pkex);
+-		hapd->dpp_pkex = dpp_pkex_init(hapd->msg_ctx, own_bi,
+-					       hapd->own_addr,
+-					       hapd->dpp_pkex_identifier,
+-					       hapd->dpp_pkex_code, v2);
+-		if (!hapd->dpp_pkex)
++		if (hostapd_dpp_pkex_init(hapd, v2) < 0)
+ 			return -1;
+-
+-		msg = hapd->dpp_pkex->exchange_req;
+-		/* TODO: Which channel to use? */
+-		wpa_msg(hapd->msg_ctx, MSG_INFO, DPP_EVENT_TX "dst=" MACSTR
+-			" freq=%u type=%d", MAC2STR(broadcast), 2437,
+-			v2 ? DPP_PA_PKEX_EXCHANGE_REQ :
+-			DPP_PA_PKEX_V1_EXCHANGE_REQ);
+-		hostapd_drv_send_action(hapd, 2437, 0, broadcast,
+-					wpabuf_head(msg), wpabuf_len(msg));
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* TODO: Support multiple PKEX info entries */
+@@ -2319,6 +2472,7 @@ void hostapd_dpp_deinit(struct hostapd_data *hapd)
+ #endif /* CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS */
+ 	if (!hapd->dpp_init_done)
+ 		return;
++	eloop_cancel_timeout(hostapd_dpp_pkex_retry_timeout, hapd, NULL);
+ 	eloop_cancel_timeout(hostapd_dpp_reply_wait_timeout, hapd, NULL);
+ 	eloop_cancel_timeout(hostapd_dpp_auth_conf_wait_timeout, hapd, NULL);
+ 	eloop_cancel_timeout(hostapd_dpp_init_timeout, hapd, NULL);
+-- 
+2.40.0
+

meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/CVE-2022-37660-0002.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
+From 80213629981a21825e4688fde1b590e4c4d4bcea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
+Date: Mon, 24 Jan 2022 20:21:24 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] DPP3: Start with PKEXv2 and fall back to v1
+
+Use automatic PKEX version negotiation as the initiator by starting with
+PKEXv2 and if no response is received, trying again with PKEXv1. For
+now, this is enabled only in wpa_supplicant CONFIG_DPP3=y builds.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
+
+CVE: CVE-2022-37660
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/?id=80213629981a21825e4688fde1b590e4c4d4bcea]
+
+Signed-off-by: Divya Chellam <divya.chellam@windriver.com>
+---
+ wpa_supplicant/dpp_supplicant.c | 81 +++++++++++++++++++++------------
+ 1 file changed, 52 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/dpp_supplicant.c b/wpa_supplicant/dpp_supplicant.c
+index 584654a..43c85d3 100644
+--- a/wpa_supplicant/dpp_supplicant.c
++++ b/wpa_supplicant/dpp_supplicant.c
+@@ -2557,6 +2557,45 @@ static int wpas_dpp_pkex_next_channel(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
+ }
+ 
+ 
++static int wpas_dpp_pkex_init(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, bool v2)
++{
++	struct dpp_pkex *pkex;
++	struct wpabuf *msg;
++	unsigned int wait_time;
++
++	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: Initiating PKEXv%d", v2 ? 2 : 1);
++	dpp_pkex_free(wpa_s->dpp_pkex);
++	wpa_s->dpp_pkex = dpp_pkex_init(wpa_s, wpa_s->dpp_pkex_bi,
++					wpa_s->own_addr,
++					wpa_s->dpp_pkex_identifier,
++					wpa_s->dpp_pkex_code, v2);
++	pkex = wpa_s->dpp_pkex;
++	if (!pkex)
++		return -1;
++
++	msg = pkex->exchange_req;
++	wait_time = wpa_s->max_remain_on_chan;
++	if (wait_time > 2000)
++		wait_time = 2000;
++	pkex->freq = 2437;
++	wpa_msg(wpa_s, MSG_INFO, DPP_EVENT_TX "dst=" MACSTR
++		" freq=%u type=%d",
++		MAC2STR(broadcast), pkex->freq,
++		v2 ? DPP_PA_PKEX_EXCHANGE_REQ :
++		DPP_PA_PKEX_V1_EXCHANGE_REQ);
++	offchannel_send_action(wpa_s, pkex->freq, broadcast,
++			       wpa_s->own_addr, broadcast,
++			       wpabuf_head(msg), wpabuf_len(msg),
++			       wait_time, wpas_dpp_tx_pkex_status, 0);
++	if (wait_time == 0)
++		wait_time = 2000;
++	pkex->exch_req_wait_time = wait_time;
++	pkex->exch_req_tries = 1;
++
++	return 0;
++}
++
++
+ static void wpas_dpp_pkex_retry_timeout(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx)
+ {
+ 	struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s = eloop_ctx;
+@@ -2566,6 +2605,14 @@ static void wpas_dpp_pkex_retry_timeout(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx)
+ 		return;
+ 	if (pkex->exch_req_tries >= 5) {
+ 		if (wpas_dpp_pkex_next_channel(wpa_s, pkex) < 0) {
++#ifdef CONFIG_DPP3
++			if (pkex->v2) {
++				wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
++					   "DPP: Fall back to PKEXv1");
++				wpas_dpp_pkex_init(wpa_s, false);
++				return;
++			}
++#endif /* CONFIG_DPP3 */
+ 			wpa_msg(wpa_s, MSG_INFO, DPP_EVENT_FAIL
+ 				"No response from PKEX peer");
+ 			dpp_pkex_free(pkex);
+@@ -3271,7 +3318,6 @@ int wpas_dpp_pkex_add(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, const char *cmd)
+ {
+ 	struct dpp_bootstrap_info *own_bi;
+ 	const char *pos, *end;
+-	unsigned int wait_time;
+ 
+ 	pos = os_strstr(cmd, " own=");
+ 	if (!pos)
+@@ -3315,37 +3361,14 @@ int wpas_dpp_pkex_add(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, const char *cmd)
+ 		return -1;
+ 
+ 	if (os_strstr(cmd, " init=1") || os_strstr(cmd, " init=2")) {
+-		struct dpp_pkex *pkex;
+-		struct wpabuf *msg;
++#ifdef CONFIG_DPP3
++		bool v2 = true;
++#else /* CONFIG_DPP3 */
+ 		bool v2 = os_strstr(cmd, " init=2") != NULL;
++#endif /* CONFIG_DPP3 */
+ 
+-		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: Initiating PKEX");
+-		dpp_pkex_free(wpa_s->dpp_pkex);
+-		wpa_s->dpp_pkex = dpp_pkex_init(wpa_s, own_bi, wpa_s->own_addr,
+-						wpa_s->dpp_pkex_identifier,
+-						wpa_s->dpp_pkex_code, v2);
+-		pkex = wpa_s->dpp_pkex;
+-		if (!pkex)
++		if (wpas_dpp_pkex_init(wpa_s, v2) < 0)
+ 			return -1;
+-
+-		msg = pkex->exchange_req;
+-		wait_time = wpa_s->max_remain_on_chan;
+-		if (wait_time > 2000)
+-			wait_time = 2000;
+-		pkex->freq = 2437;
+-		wpa_msg(wpa_s, MSG_INFO, DPP_EVENT_TX "dst=" MACSTR
+-			" freq=%u type=%d",
+-			MAC2STR(broadcast), pkex->freq,
+-			v2 ? DPP_PA_PKEX_EXCHANGE_REQ :
+-			DPP_PA_PKEX_V1_EXCHANGE_REQ);
+-		offchannel_send_action(wpa_s, pkex->freq, broadcast,
+-				       wpa_s->own_addr, broadcast,
+-				       wpabuf_head(msg), wpabuf_len(msg),
+-				       wait_time, wpas_dpp_tx_pkex_status, 0);
+-		if (wait_time == 0)
+-			wait_time = 2000;
+-		pkex->exch_req_wait_time = wait_time;
+-		pkex->exch_req_tries = 1;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* TODO: Support multiple PKEX info entries */
+-- 
+2.40.0
+

meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/CVE-2022-37660-0003.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,196 @@
+From bdcccbc2755dd1a75731496782e02b5435fb9534 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
+Date: Tue, 25 Jan 2022 20:06:49 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] DPP: Change PKEX version configuration design
+
+Use a separate ver=<1|2> parameter to DPP_PKEX_ADD instead of
+overloading init=1 with version indication. This allows additional
+options for forcing v1-only and v2-only in addition to automatic mode
+(start with v2 and fall back to v1, if needed).
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
+
+CVE: CVE-2022-37660
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/?id=bdcccbc2755dd1a75731496782e02b5435fb9534]
+
+Signed-off-by: Divya Chellam <divya.chellam@windriver.com>
+---
+ src/ap/dpp_hostapd.c            | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
+ src/common/dpp.h                |  1 +
+ wpa_supplicant/dpp_supplicant.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
+ 3 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/ap/dpp_hostapd.c b/src/ap/dpp_hostapd.c
+index 6c30ba3..fdfdcf9 100644
+--- a/src/ap/dpp_hostapd.c
++++ b/src/ap/dpp_hostapd.c
+@@ -272,11 +272,19 @@ static int hostapd_dpp_pkex_next_channel(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
+ }
+ 
+ 
+-static int hostapd_dpp_pkex_init(struct hostapd_data *hapd, bool v2)
++enum hostapd_dpp_pkex_ver {
++	PKEX_VER_AUTO,
++	PKEX_VER_ONLY_1,
++	PKEX_VER_ONLY_2,
++};
++
++static int hostapd_dpp_pkex_init(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
++				 enum hostapd_dpp_pkex_ver ver)
+ {
+ 	struct dpp_pkex *pkex;
+ 	struct wpabuf *msg;
+ 	unsigned int wait_time;
++	bool v2 = ver != PKEX_VER_ONLY_1;
+ 
+ 	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: Initiating PKEXv%d", v2 ? 2 : 1);
+ 	dpp_pkex_free(hapd->dpp_pkex);
+@@ -287,6 +295,7 @@ static int hostapd_dpp_pkex_init(struct hostapd_data *hapd, bool v2)
+ 	pkex = hapd->dpp_pkex;
+ 	if (!pkex)
+ 		return -1;
++	pkex->forced_ver = ver != PKEX_VER_AUTO;
+ 
+ 	msg = hapd->dpp_pkex->exchange_req;
+ 	wait_time = 2000; /* TODO: hapd->max_remain_on_chan; */
+@@ -314,10 +323,10 @@ static void hostapd_dpp_pkex_retry_timeout(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx)
+ 	if (pkex->exch_req_tries >= 5) {
+ 		if (hostapd_dpp_pkex_next_channel(hapd, pkex) < 0) {
+ #ifdef CONFIG_DPP3
+-			if (pkex->v2) {
++			if (pkex->v2 && !pkex->forced_ver) {
+ 				wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+ 					   "DPP: Fall back to PKEXv1");
+-				hostapd_dpp_pkex_init(hapd, false);
++				hostapd_dpp_pkex_init(hapd, PKEX_VER_ONLY_1);
+ 				return;
+ 			}
+ #endif /* CONFIG_DPP3 */
+@@ -2336,14 +2345,28 @@ int hostapd_dpp_pkex_add(struct hostapd_data *hapd, const char *cmd)
+ 	if (!hapd->dpp_pkex_code)
+ 		return -1;
+ 
+-	if (os_strstr(cmd, " init=1") || os_strstr(cmd, " init=2")) {
++	if (os_strstr(cmd, " init=1")) {
+ #ifdef CONFIG_DPP3
+-		bool v2 = true;
++		enum hostapd_dpp_pkex_ver ver = PKEX_VER_AUTO;
+ #else /* CONFIG_DPP3 */
+-		bool v2 = os_strstr(cmd, " init=2") != NULL;
++		enum hostapd_dpp_pkex_ver ver = PKEX_VER_ONLY_1;
+ #endif /* CONFIG_DPP3 */
+ 
+-		if (hostapd_dpp_pkex_init(hapd, v2) < 0)
++		pos = os_strstr(cmd, " ver=");
++		if (pos) {
++			int v;
++
++			pos += 5;
++			v = atoi(pos);
++			if (v == 1)
++				ver = PKEX_VER_ONLY_1;
++			else if (v == 2)
++				ver = PKEX_VER_ONLY_2;
++			else
++				return -1;
++		}
++
++		if (hostapd_dpp_pkex_init(hapd, ver) < 0)
+ 			return -1;
+ 	}
+ 
+diff --git a/src/common/dpp.h b/src/common/dpp.h
+index 8d62a0e..bfea446 100644
+--- a/src/common/dpp.h
++++ b/src/common/dpp.h
+@@ -177,6 +177,7 @@ struct dpp_pkex {
+ 	unsigned int exchange_done:1;
+ 	unsigned int failed:1;
+ 	unsigned int v2:1;
++	unsigned int forced_ver:1;
+ 	struct dpp_bootstrap_info *own_bi;
+ 	u8 own_mac[ETH_ALEN];
+ 	u8 peer_mac[ETH_ALEN];
+diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/dpp_supplicant.c b/wpa_supplicant/dpp_supplicant.c
+index 43c85d3..61b300f 100644
+--- a/wpa_supplicant/dpp_supplicant.c
++++ b/wpa_supplicant/dpp_supplicant.c
+@@ -2557,11 +2557,19 @@ static int wpas_dpp_pkex_next_channel(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
+ }
+ 
+ 
+-static int wpas_dpp_pkex_init(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, bool v2)
++enum wpas_dpp_pkex_ver {
++	PKEX_VER_AUTO,
++	PKEX_VER_ONLY_1,
++	PKEX_VER_ONLY_2,
++};
++
++static int wpas_dpp_pkex_init(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
++			      enum wpas_dpp_pkex_ver ver)
+ {
+ 	struct dpp_pkex *pkex;
+ 	struct wpabuf *msg;
+ 	unsigned int wait_time;
++	bool v2 = ver != PKEX_VER_ONLY_1;
+ 
+ 	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: Initiating PKEXv%d", v2 ? 2 : 1);
+ 	dpp_pkex_free(wpa_s->dpp_pkex);
+@@ -2572,6 +2580,7 @@ static int wpas_dpp_pkex_init(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, bool v2)
+ 	pkex = wpa_s->dpp_pkex;
+ 	if (!pkex)
+ 		return -1;
++	pkex->forced_ver = ver != PKEX_VER_AUTO;
+ 
+ 	msg = pkex->exchange_req;
+ 	wait_time = wpa_s->max_remain_on_chan;
+@@ -2606,10 +2615,10 @@ static void wpas_dpp_pkex_retry_timeout(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx)
+ 	if (pkex->exch_req_tries >= 5) {
+ 		if (wpas_dpp_pkex_next_channel(wpa_s, pkex) < 0) {
+ #ifdef CONFIG_DPP3
+-			if (pkex->v2) {
++			if (pkex->v2 && !pkex->forced_ver) {
+ 				wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+ 					   "DPP: Fall back to PKEXv1");
+-				wpas_dpp_pkex_init(wpa_s, false);
++				wpas_dpp_pkex_init(wpa_s, PKEX_VER_ONLY_1);
+ 				return;
+ 			}
+ #endif /* CONFIG_DPP3 */
+@@ -3360,14 +3369,28 @@ int wpas_dpp_pkex_add(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, const char *cmd)
+ 	if (!wpa_s->dpp_pkex_code)
+ 		return -1;
+ 
+-	if (os_strstr(cmd, " init=1") || os_strstr(cmd, " init=2")) {
++	if (os_strstr(cmd, " init=1")) {
+ #ifdef CONFIG_DPP3
+-		bool v2 = true;
++		enum wpas_dpp_pkex_ver ver = PKEX_VER_AUTO;
+ #else /* CONFIG_DPP3 */
+-		bool v2 = os_strstr(cmd, " init=2") != NULL;
++		enum wpas_dpp_pkex_ver ver = PKEX_VER_ONLY_1;
+ #endif /* CONFIG_DPP3 */
+ 
+-		if (wpas_dpp_pkex_init(wpa_s, v2) < 0)
++		pos = os_strstr(cmd, " ver=");
++		if (pos) {
++			int v;
++
++			pos += 5;
++			v = atoi(pos);
++			if (v == 1)
++				ver = PKEX_VER_ONLY_1;
++			else if (v == 2)
++				ver = PKEX_VER_ONLY_2;
++			else
++				return -1;
++		}
++
++		if (wpas_dpp_pkex_init(wpa_s, ver) < 0)
+ 			return -1;
+ 	}
+ 
+-- 
+2.40.0
+

meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/CVE-2022-37660-0004.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,941 @@
+From d7be749335f2585658cf98c4f0e7d6cd5ac06865 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
+Date: Tue, 25 Jan 2022 00:35:36 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] DPP3: PKEX over TCP
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
+
+CVE: CVE-2022-37660
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/?id=d7be749335f2585658cf98c4f0e7d6cd5ac06865]
+
+Signed-off-by: Divya Chellam <divya.chellam@windriver.com>
+---
+ src/ap/dpp_hostapd.c            | 155 ++++++++++++++--
+ src/common/dpp.h                |  13 ++
+ src/common/dpp_pkex.c           |  18 +-
+ src/common/dpp_tcp.c            | 308 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ wpa_supplicant/dpp_supplicant.c | 122 ++++++++++++-
+ 5 files changed, 580 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/ap/dpp_hostapd.c b/src/ap/dpp_hostapd.c
+index fdfdcf9..d956be9 100644
+--- a/src/ap/dpp_hostapd.c
++++ b/src/ap/dpp_hostapd.c
+@@ -28,12 +28,16 @@ static void hostapd_dpp_auth_conf_wait_timeout(void *eloop_ctx,
+ static void hostapd_dpp_auth_success(struct hostapd_data *hapd, int initiator);
+ static void hostapd_dpp_init_timeout(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx);
+ static int hostapd_dpp_auth_init_next(struct hostapd_data *hapd);
++static void hostapd_dpp_set_testing_options(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
++					    struct dpp_authentication *auth);
+ #ifdef CONFIG_DPP2
+ static void hostapd_dpp_reconfig_reply_wait_timeout(void *eloop_ctx,
+ 						    void *timeout_ctx);
+ static void hostapd_dpp_handle_config_obj(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
+ 					  struct dpp_authentication *auth,
+ 					  struct dpp_config_obj *conf);
++static int hostapd_dpp_process_conf_obj(void *ctx,
++					struct dpp_authentication *auth);
+ #endif /* CONFIG_DPP2 */
+ 
+ static const u8 broadcast[ETH_ALEN] = { 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff };
+@@ -272,6 +276,75 @@ static int hostapd_dpp_pkex_next_channel(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
+ }
+ 
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_DPP2
++static int hostapd_dpp_pkex_done(void *ctx, void *conn,
++				 struct dpp_bootstrap_info *peer_bi)
++{
++	struct hostapd_data *hapd = ctx;
++	const char *cmd = hapd->dpp_pkex_auth_cmd;
++	const char *pos;
++	u8 allowed_roles = DPP_CAPAB_CONFIGURATOR;
++	struct dpp_bootstrap_info *own_bi = NULL;
++	struct dpp_authentication *auth;
++
++	if (!cmd)
++		cmd = "";
++	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: Start authentication after PKEX (cmd: %s)",
++		   cmd);
++
++	pos = os_strstr(cmd, " own=");
++	if (pos) {
++		pos += 5;
++		own_bi = dpp_bootstrap_get_id(hapd->iface->interfaces->dpp,
++					      atoi(pos));
++		if (!own_bi) {
++			wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
++				   "DPP: Could not find bootstrapping info for the identified local entry");
++			return -1;
++		}
++
++		if (peer_bi->curve != own_bi->curve) {
++			wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
++				   "DPP: Mismatching curves in bootstrapping info (peer=%s own=%s)",
++				   peer_bi->curve->name, own_bi->curve->name);
++			return -1;
++		}
++	}
++
++	pos = os_strstr(cmd, " role=");
++	if (pos) {
++		pos += 6;
++		if (os_strncmp(pos, "configurator", 12) == 0)
++			allowed_roles = DPP_CAPAB_CONFIGURATOR;
++		else if (os_strncmp(pos, "enrollee", 8) == 0)
++			allowed_roles = DPP_CAPAB_ENROLLEE;
++		else if (os_strncmp(pos, "either", 6) == 0)
++			allowed_roles = DPP_CAPAB_CONFIGURATOR |
++				DPP_CAPAB_ENROLLEE;
++		else
++			return -1;
++	}
++
++	auth = dpp_auth_init(hapd->iface->interfaces->dpp, hapd->msg_ctx,
++			     peer_bi, own_bi, allowed_roles, 0,
++			     hapd->iface->hw_features,
++			     hapd->iface->num_hw_features);
++	if (!auth)
++		return -1;
++
++	hostapd_dpp_set_testing_options(hapd, auth);
++	if (dpp_set_configurator(auth, cmd) < 0) {
++		dpp_auth_deinit(auth);
++		return -1;
++	}
++
++	return dpp_tcp_auth(hapd->iface->interfaces->dpp, conn, auth,
++			    hapd->conf->dpp_name, DPP_NETROLE_AP,
++			    hostapd_dpp_process_conf_obj);
++}
++#endif /* CONFIG_DPP2 */
++
++
+ enum hostapd_dpp_pkex_ver {
+ 	PKEX_VER_AUTO,
+ 	PKEX_VER_ONLY_1,
+@@ -279,7 +352,9 @@ enum hostapd_dpp_pkex_ver {
+ };
+ 
+ static int hostapd_dpp_pkex_init(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
+-				 enum hostapd_dpp_pkex_ver ver)
++				 enum hostapd_dpp_pkex_ver ver,
++				 const struct hostapd_ip_addr *ipaddr,
++				 int tcp_port)
+ {
+ 	struct dpp_pkex *pkex;
+ 	struct wpabuf *msg;
+@@ -288,15 +363,26 @@ static int hostapd_dpp_pkex_init(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
+ 
+ 	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: Initiating PKEXv%d", v2 ? 2 : 1);
+ 	dpp_pkex_free(hapd->dpp_pkex);
+-	hapd->dpp_pkex = dpp_pkex_init(hapd->msg_ctx, hapd->dpp_pkex_bi,
+-				       hapd->own_addr,
+-				       hapd->dpp_pkex_identifier,
+-				       hapd->dpp_pkex_code, v2);
+-	pkex = hapd->dpp_pkex;
++	hapd->dpp_pkex = NULL;
++	pkex = dpp_pkex_init(hapd->msg_ctx, hapd->dpp_pkex_bi, hapd->own_addr,
++			     hapd->dpp_pkex_identifier,
++			     hapd->dpp_pkex_code, v2);
+ 	if (!pkex)
+ 		return -1;
+ 	pkex->forced_ver = ver != PKEX_VER_AUTO;
+ 
++	if (ipaddr) {
++#ifdef CONFIG_DPP2
++		return dpp_tcp_pkex_init(hapd->iface->interfaces->dpp, pkex,
++					 ipaddr, tcp_port,
++					 hapd->msg_ctx, hapd,
++					 hostapd_dpp_pkex_done);
++#else /* CONFIG_DPP2 */
++		return -1;
++#endif /* CONFIG_DPP2 */
++	}
++
++	hapd->dpp_pkex = pkex;
+ 	msg = hapd->dpp_pkex->exchange_req;
+ 	wait_time = 2000; /* TODO: hapd->max_remain_on_chan; */
+ 	pkex->freq = 2437;
+@@ -326,7 +412,8 @@ static void hostapd_dpp_pkex_retry_timeout(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx)
+ 			if (pkex->v2 && !pkex->forced_ver) {
+ 				wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+ 					   "DPP: Fall back to PKEXv1");
+-				hostapd_dpp_pkex_init(hapd, PKEX_VER_ONLY_1);
++				hostapd_dpp_pkex_init(hapd, PKEX_VER_ONLY_1,
++						      NULL, 0);
+ 				return;
+ 			}
+ #endif /* CONFIG_DPP3 */
+@@ -1883,7 +1970,7 @@ static void hostapd_dpp_rx_peer_disc_req(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
+ 
+ static void
+ hostapd_dpp_rx_pkex_exchange_req(struct hostapd_data *hapd, const u8 *src,
+-				 const u8 *buf, size_t len,
++				 const u8 *hdr, const u8 *buf, size_t len,
+ 				 unsigned int freq, bool v2)
+ {
+ 	struct wpabuf *msg;
+@@ -1897,14 +1984,14 @@ hostapd_dpp_rx_pkex_exchange_req(struct hostapd_data *hapd, const u8 *src,
+ 	if (!hapd->dpp_pkex_code || !hapd->dpp_pkex_bi) {
+ 		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+ 			   "DPP: No PKEX code configured - ignore request");
+-		return;
++		goto try_relay;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if (hapd->dpp_pkex) {
+ 		/* TODO: Support parallel operations */
+ 		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+ 			   "DPP: Already in PKEX session - ignore new request");
+-		return;
++		goto try_relay;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	hapd->dpp_pkex = dpp_pkex_rx_exchange_req(hapd->msg_ctx,
+@@ -1916,7 +2003,7 @@ hostapd_dpp_rx_pkex_exchange_req(struct hostapd_data *hapd, const u8 *src,
+ 	if (!hapd->dpp_pkex) {
+ 		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+ 			   "DPP: Failed to process the request - ignore it");
+-		return;
++		goto try_relay;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	msg = hapd->dpp_pkex->exchange_resp;
+@@ -1933,6 +2020,17 @@ hostapd_dpp_rx_pkex_exchange_req(struct hostapd_data *hapd, const u8 *src,
+ 		dpp_pkex_free(hapd->dpp_pkex);
+ 		hapd->dpp_pkex = NULL;
+ 	}
++
++	return;
++
++try_relay:
++#ifdef CONFIG_DPP2
++	if (v2)
++		dpp_relay_rx_action(hapd->iface->interfaces->dpp,
++				    src, hdr, buf, len, freq, NULL, NULL, hapd);
++#else /* CONFIG_DPP2 */
++	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: No relay functionality included - skip");
++#endif /* CONFIG_DPP2 */
+ }
+ 
+ 
+@@ -2132,12 +2230,12 @@ void hostapd_dpp_rx_action(struct hostapd_data *hapd, const u8 *src,
+ 		/* This is for PKEXv2, but for now, process only with
+ 		 * CONFIG_DPP3 to avoid issues with a capability that has not
+ 		 * been tested with other implementations. */
+-		hostapd_dpp_rx_pkex_exchange_req(hapd, src, buf, len, freq,
++		hostapd_dpp_rx_pkex_exchange_req(hapd, src, hdr, buf, len, freq,
+ 						 true);
+ 		break;
+ #endif /* CONFIG_DPP3 */
+ 	case DPP_PA_PKEX_V1_EXCHANGE_REQ:
+-		hostapd_dpp_rx_pkex_exchange_req(hapd, src, buf, len, freq,
++		hostapd_dpp_rx_pkex_exchange_req(hapd, src, hdr, buf, len, freq,
+ 						 false);
+ 		break;
+ 	case DPP_PA_PKEX_EXCHANGE_RESP:
+@@ -2303,6 +2401,29 @@ int hostapd_dpp_pkex_add(struct hostapd_data *hapd, const char *cmd)
+ {
+ 	struct dpp_bootstrap_info *own_bi;
+ 	const char *pos, *end;
++	int tcp_port = DPP_TCP_PORT;
++	struct hostapd_ip_addr *ipaddr = NULL;
++#ifdef CONFIG_DPP2
++	struct hostapd_ip_addr ipaddr_buf;
++	char *addr;
++
++	pos = os_strstr(cmd, " tcp_port=");
++	if (pos) {
++		pos += 10;
++		tcp_port = atoi(pos);
++	}
++
++	addr = get_param(cmd, " tcp_addr=");
++	if (addr) {
++		int res;
++
++		res = hostapd_parse_ip_addr(addr, &ipaddr_buf);
++		os_free(addr);
++		if (res)
++			return -1;
++		ipaddr = &ipaddr_buf;
++	}
++#endif /* CONFIG_DPP2 */
+ 
+ 	pos = os_strstr(cmd, " own=");
+ 	if (!pos)
+@@ -2366,8 +2487,14 @@ int hostapd_dpp_pkex_add(struct hostapd_data *hapd, const char *cmd)
+ 				return -1;
+ 		}
+ 
+-		if (hostapd_dpp_pkex_init(hapd, ver) < 0)
++		if (hostapd_dpp_pkex_init(hapd, ver, ipaddr, tcp_port) < 0)
+ 			return -1;
++	} else {
++#ifdef CONFIG_DPP2
++		dpp_controller_pkex_add(hapd->iface->interfaces->dpp, own_bi,
++					hapd->dpp_pkex_code,
++					hapd->dpp_pkex_identifier);
++#endif /* CONFIG_DPP2 */
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* TODO: Support multiple PKEX info entries */
+diff --git a/src/common/dpp.h b/src/common/dpp.h
+index bfea446..ca33fe3 100644
+--- a/src/common/dpp.h
++++ b/src/common/dpp.h
+@@ -550,6 +550,9 @@ int dpp_auth_conf_rx(struct dpp_authentication *auth, const u8 *hdr,
+ 		     const u8 *attr_start, size_t attr_len);
+ int dpp_notify_new_qr_code(struct dpp_authentication *auth,
+ 			   struct dpp_bootstrap_info *peer_bi);
++void dpp_controller_pkex_add(struct dpp_global *dpp,
++			     struct dpp_bootstrap_info *bi,
++			     const char *code, const char *identifier);
+ struct dpp_configuration * dpp_configuration_alloc(const char *type);
+ int dpp_akm_psk(enum dpp_akm akm);
+ int dpp_akm_sae(enum dpp_akm akm);
+@@ -688,12 +691,22 @@ struct dpp_authentication * dpp_controller_get_auth(struct dpp_global *dpp,
+ 						    unsigned int id);
+ void dpp_controller_new_qr_code(struct dpp_global *dpp,
+ 				struct dpp_bootstrap_info *bi);
++int dpp_tcp_pkex_init(struct dpp_global *dpp, struct dpp_pkex *pkex,
++		      const struct hostapd_ip_addr *addr, int port,
++		      void *msg_ctx, void *cb_ctx,
++		      int (*pkex_done)(void *ctx, void *conn,
++				       struct dpp_bootstrap_info *bi));
+ int dpp_tcp_init(struct dpp_global *dpp, struct dpp_authentication *auth,
+ 		 const struct hostapd_ip_addr *addr, int port,
+ 		 const char *name, enum dpp_netrole netrole, void *msg_ctx,
+ 		 void *cb_ctx,
+ 		 int (*process_conf_obj)(void *ctx,
+ 					 struct dpp_authentication *auth));
++int dpp_tcp_auth(struct dpp_global *dpp, void *_conn,
++		 struct dpp_authentication *auth, const char *name,
++		 enum dpp_netrole netrole,
++		 int (*process_conf_obj)(void *ctx,
++					 struct dpp_authentication *auth));
+ 
+ struct wpabuf * dpp_build_presence_announcement(struct dpp_bootstrap_info *bi);
+ void dpp_notify_chirp_received(void *msg_ctx, int id, const u8 *src,
+diff --git a/src/common/dpp_pkex.c b/src/common/dpp_pkex.c
+index 38349fa..72084d9 100644
+--- a/src/common/dpp_pkex.c
++++ b/src/common/dpp_pkex.c
+@@ -469,8 +469,10 @@ struct dpp_pkex * dpp_pkex_rx_exchange_req(void *msg_ctx,
+ 	pkex->t = bi->pkex_t;
+ 	pkex->msg_ctx = msg_ctx;
+ 	pkex->own_bi = bi;
+-	os_memcpy(pkex->own_mac, own_mac, ETH_ALEN);
+-	os_memcpy(pkex->peer_mac, peer_mac, ETH_ALEN);
++	if (own_mac)
++		os_memcpy(pkex->own_mac, own_mac, ETH_ALEN);
++	if (peer_mac)
++		os_memcpy(pkex->peer_mac, peer_mac, ETH_ALEN);
+ 	if (identifier) {
+ 		pkex->identifier = os_strdup(identifier);
+ 		if (!pkex->identifier)
+@@ -742,7 +744,8 @@ struct wpabuf * dpp_pkex_rx_exchange_resp(struct dpp_pkex *pkex,
+ 	}
+ #endif /* CONFIG_DPP2 */
+ 
+-	os_memcpy(pkex->peer_mac, peer_mac, ETH_ALEN);
++	if (peer_mac)
++		os_memcpy(pkex->peer_mac, peer_mac, ETH_ALEN);
+ 
+ 	attr_status = dpp_get_attr(buf, buflen, DPP_ATTR_STATUS,
+ 				   &attr_status_len);
+@@ -1341,9 +1344,12 @@ dpp_pkex_finish(struct dpp_global *dpp, struct dpp_pkex *pkex, const u8 *peer,
+ 		return NULL;
+ 	bi->id = dpp_next_id(dpp);
+ 	bi->type = DPP_BOOTSTRAP_PKEX;
+-	os_memcpy(bi->mac_addr, peer, ETH_ALEN);
+-	bi->num_freq = 1;
+-	bi->freq[0] = freq;
++	if (peer)
++		os_memcpy(bi->mac_addr, peer, ETH_ALEN);
++	if (freq) {
++		bi->num_freq = 1;
++		bi->freq[0] = freq;
++	}
+ 	bi->curve = pkex->own_bi->curve;
+ 	bi->pubkey = pkex->peer_bootstrap_key;
+ 	pkex->peer_bootstrap_key = NULL;
+diff --git a/src/common/dpp_tcp.c b/src/common/dpp_tcp.c
+index fb8ef1c..1a8a7c7 100644
+--- a/src/common/dpp_tcp.c
++++ b/src/common/dpp_tcp.c
+@@ -24,10 +24,12 @@ struct dpp_connection {
+ 	struct dpp_controller *ctrl;
+ 	struct dpp_relay_controller *relay;
+ 	struct dpp_global *global;
++	struct dpp_pkex *pkex;
+ 	struct dpp_authentication *auth;
+ 	void *msg_ctx;
+ 	void *cb_ctx;
+ 	int (*process_conf_obj)(void *ctx, struct dpp_authentication *auth);
++	int (*pkex_done)(void *ctx, void *conn, struct dpp_bootstrap_info *bi);
+ 	int sock;
+ 	u8 mac_addr[ETH_ALEN];
+ 	unsigned int freq;
+@@ -71,6 +73,9 @@ struct dpp_controller {
+ 	struct dl_list conn; /* struct dpp_connection */
+ 	char *configurator_params;
+ 	enum dpp_netrole netrole;
++	struct dpp_bootstrap_info *pkex_bi;
++	char *pkex_code;
++	char *pkex_identifier;
+ 	void *msg_ctx;
+ 	void *cb_ctx;
+ 	int (*process_conf_obj)(void *ctx, struct dpp_authentication *auth);
+@@ -102,6 +107,7 @@ static void dpp_connection_free(struct dpp_connection *conn)
+ 	wpabuf_free(conn->msg);
+ 	wpabuf_free(conn->msg_out);
+ 	dpp_auth_deinit(conn->auth);
++	dpp_pkex_free(conn->pkex);
+ 	os_free(conn->name);
+ 	os_free(conn);
+ }
+@@ -525,6 +531,8 @@ int dpp_relay_rx_action(struct dpp_global *dpp, const u8 *src, const u8 *hdr,
+ 		/* TODO: Could send this to all configured Controllers. For now,
+ 		 * only the first Controller is supported. */
+ 		ctrl = dpp_relay_controller_get_ctx(dpp, cb_ctx);
++	} else if (type == DPP_PA_PKEX_EXCHANGE_REQ) {
++		ctrl = dpp_relay_controller_get_ctx(dpp, cb_ctx);
+ 	} else {
+ 		if (!r_bootstrap)
+ 			return -1;
+@@ -609,6 +617,8 @@ static void dpp_controller_free(struct dpp_controller *ctrl)
+ 		eloop_unregister_sock(ctrl->sock, EVENT_TYPE_READ);
+ 	}
+ 	os_free(ctrl->configurator_params);
++	os_free(ctrl->pkex_code);
++	os_free(ctrl->pkex_identifier);
+ 	os_free(ctrl);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -955,6 +965,143 @@ static int dpp_controller_rx_reconfig_auth_resp(struct dpp_connection *conn,
+ }
+ 
+ 
++static int dpp_controller_rx_pkex_exchange_req(struct dpp_connection *conn,
++					       const u8 *hdr, const u8 *buf,
++					       size_t len)
++{
++	struct dpp_controller *ctrl = conn->ctrl;
++
++	if (!ctrl)
++		return 0;
++
++	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: PKEX Exchange Request");
++
++	/* TODO: Support multiple PKEX codes by iterating over all the enabled
++	 * values here */
++
++	if (!ctrl->pkex_code || !ctrl->pkex_bi) {
++		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
++			   "DPP: No PKEX code configured - ignore request");
++		return 0;
++	}
++
++	if (conn->pkex || conn->auth) {
++		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
++			   "DPP: Already in PKEX/Authentication session - ignore new PKEX request");
++		return 0;
++	}
++
++	conn->pkex = dpp_pkex_rx_exchange_req(conn->ctrl->global, ctrl->pkex_bi,
++					      NULL, NULL,
++					      ctrl->pkex_identifier,
++					      ctrl->pkex_code,
++					      buf, len, true);
++	if (!conn->pkex) {
++		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
++			   "DPP: Failed to process the request");
++		return -1;
++	}
++
++	return dpp_tcp_send_msg(conn, conn->pkex->exchange_resp);
++}
++
++
++static int dpp_controller_rx_pkex_exchange_resp(struct dpp_connection *conn,
++						const u8 *hdr, const u8 *buf,
++						size_t len)
++{
++	struct dpp_pkex *pkex = conn->pkex;
++	struct wpabuf *msg;
++	int res;
++
++	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: PKEX Exchange Response");
++
++	if (!pkex || !pkex->initiator || pkex->exchange_done) {
++		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: No matching PKEX session");
++		return 0;
++	}
++
++	msg = dpp_pkex_rx_exchange_resp(pkex, NULL, buf, len);
++	if (!msg) {
++		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: Failed to process the response");
++		return -1;
++	}
++
++	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: Send PKEX Commit-Reveal Request");
++	res = dpp_tcp_send_msg(conn, msg);
++	wpabuf_free(msg);
++	return res;
++}
++
++
++static int dpp_controller_rx_pkex_commit_reveal_req(struct dpp_connection *conn,
++						    const u8 *hdr,
++						    const u8 *buf, size_t len)
++{
++	struct dpp_pkex *pkex = conn->pkex;
++	struct wpabuf *msg;
++	int res;
++	struct dpp_bootstrap_info *bi;
++
++	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: PKEX Commit-Reveal Request");
++
++	if (!pkex || pkex->initiator || !pkex->exchange_done) {
++		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: No matching PKEX session");
++		return 0;
++	}
++
++	msg = dpp_pkex_rx_commit_reveal_req(pkex, hdr, buf, len);
++	if (!msg) {
++		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: Failed to process the request");
++		return -1;
++	}
++
++	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: Send PKEX Commit-Reveal Response");
++	res = dpp_tcp_send_msg(conn, msg);
++	wpabuf_free(msg);
++	if (res < 0)
++		return res;
++	bi = dpp_pkex_finish(conn->global, pkex, NULL, 0);
++	if (!bi)
++		return -1;
++	conn->pkex = NULL;
++	return 0;
++}
++
++
++static int
++dpp_controller_rx_pkex_commit_reveal_resp(struct dpp_connection *conn,
++					  const u8 *hdr,
++					  const u8 *buf, size_t len)
++{
++	struct dpp_pkex *pkex = conn->pkex;
++	int res;
++	struct dpp_bootstrap_info *bi;
++
++	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: PKEX Commit-Reveal Response");
++
++	if (!pkex || !pkex->initiator || !pkex->exchange_done) {
++		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: No matching PKEX session");
++		return 0;
++	}
++
++	res = dpp_pkex_rx_commit_reveal_resp(pkex, hdr, buf, len);
++	if (res < 0) {
++		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: Failed to process the response");
++		return res;
++	}
++
++	bi = dpp_pkex_finish(conn->global, pkex, NULL, 0);
++	if (!bi)
++		return -1;
++	conn->pkex = NULL;
++
++	if (!conn->pkex_done)
++		return -1;
++	return conn->pkex_done(conn->cb_ctx, conn, bi);
++}
++
++
+ static int dpp_controller_rx_action(struct dpp_connection *conn, const u8 *msg,
+ 				    size_t len)
+ {
+@@ -1014,6 +1161,22 @@ static int dpp_controller_rx_action(struct dpp_connection *conn, const u8 *msg,
+ 	case DPP_PA_RECONFIG_AUTH_RESP:
+ 		return dpp_controller_rx_reconfig_auth_resp(conn, msg, pos,
+ 							    end - pos);
++	case DPP_PA_PKEX_V1_EXCHANGE_REQ:
++		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
++			   "DPP: Ignore PKEXv1 Exchange Request - not supported over TCP");
++		return -1;
++	case DPP_PA_PKEX_EXCHANGE_REQ:
++		return dpp_controller_rx_pkex_exchange_req(conn, msg, pos,
++							   end - pos);
++	case DPP_PA_PKEX_EXCHANGE_RESP:
++		return dpp_controller_rx_pkex_exchange_resp(conn, msg, pos,
++							    end - pos);
++	case DPP_PA_PKEX_COMMIT_REVEAL_REQ:
++		return dpp_controller_rx_pkex_commit_reveal_req(conn, msg, pos,
++								end - pos);
++	case DPP_PA_PKEX_COMMIT_REVEAL_RESP:
++		return dpp_controller_rx_pkex_commit_reveal_resp(conn, msg, pos,
++								 end - pos);
+ 	default:
+ 		/* TODO: missing messages types */
+ 		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+@@ -1559,6 +1722,101 @@ fail:
+ }
+ 
+ 
++int dpp_tcp_pkex_init(struct dpp_global *dpp, struct dpp_pkex *pkex,
++		      const struct hostapd_ip_addr *addr, int port,
++		      void *msg_ctx, void *cb_ctx,
++		      int (*pkex_done)(void *ctx, void *conn,
++				       struct dpp_bootstrap_info *bi))
++{
++	struct dpp_connection *conn;
++	struct sockaddr_storage saddr;
++	socklen_t addrlen;
++	const u8 *hdr, *pos, *end;
++	char txt[100];
++
++	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: Initialize TCP connection to %s port %d",
++		   hostapd_ip_txt(addr, txt, sizeof(txt)), port);
++	if (dpp_ipaddr_to_sockaddr((struct sockaddr *) &saddr, &addrlen,
++				   addr, port) < 0) {
++		dpp_pkex_free(pkex);
++		return -1;
++	}
++
++	conn = os_zalloc(sizeof(*conn));
++	if (!conn) {
++		dpp_pkex_free(pkex);
++		return -1;
++	}
++
++	conn->msg_ctx = msg_ctx;
++	conn->cb_ctx = cb_ctx;
++	conn->pkex_done = pkex_done;
++	conn->global = dpp;
++	conn->pkex = pkex;
++	conn->sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
++	if (conn->sock < 0)
++		goto fail;
++
++	if (fcntl(conn->sock, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK) != 0) {
++		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: fnctl(O_NONBLOCK) failed: %s",
++			   strerror(errno));
++		goto fail;
++	}
++
++	if (connect(conn->sock, (struct sockaddr *) &saddr, addrlen) < 0) {
++		if (errno != EINPROGRESS) {
++			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: Failed to connect: %s",
++				   strerror(errno));
++			goto fail;
++		}
++
++		/*
++		 * Continue connecting in the background; eloop will call us
++		 * once the connection is ready (or failed).
++		 */
++	}
++
++	if (eloop_register_sock(conn->sock, EVENT_TYPE_WRITE,
++				dpp_conn_tx_ready, conn, NULL) < 0)
++		goto fail;
++	conn->write_eloop = 1;
++
++	hdr = wpabuf_head(pkex->exchange_req);
++	end = hdr + wpabuf_len(pkex->exchange_req);
++	hdr += 2; /* skip Category and Actiom */
++	pos = hdr + DPP_HDR_LEN;
++	conn->msg_out = dpp_tcp_encaps(hdr, pos, end - pos);
++	if (!conn->msg_out)
++		goto fail;
++	/* Message will be sent in dpp_conn_tx_ready() */
++
++	/* TODO: eloop timeout to clear a connection if it does not complete
++	 * properly */
++	dl_list_add(&dpp->tcp_init, &conn->list);
++	return 0;
++fail:
++	dpp_connection_free(conn);
++	return -1;
++}
++
++
++static int dpp_tcp_auth_start(struct dpp_connection *conn,
++			      struct dpp_authentication *auth)
++{
++	const u8 *hdr, *pos, *end;
++
++	hdr = wpabuf_head(auth->req_msg);
++	end = hdr + wpabuf_len(auth->req_msg);
++	hdr += 2; /* skip Category and Actiom */
++	pos = hdr + DPP_HDR_LEN;
++	conn->msg_out = dpp_tcp_encaps(hdr, pos, end - pos);
++	if (!conn->msg_out)
++		return -1;
++	/* Message will be sent in dpp_conn_tx_ready() */
++	return 0;
++}
++
++
+ int dpp_tcp_init(struct dpp_global *dpp, struct dpp_authentication *auth,
+ 		 const struct hostapd_ip_addr *addr, int port, const char *name,
+ 		 enum dpp_netrole netrole, void *msg_ctx, void *cb_ctx,
+@@ -1568,7 +1826,6 @@ int dpp_tcp_init(struct dpp_global *dpp, struct dpp_authentication *auth,
+ 	struct dpp_connection *conn;
+ 	struct sockaddr_storage saddr;
+ 	socklen_t addrlen;
+-	const u8 *hdr, *pos, *end;
+ 	char txt[100];
+ 
+ 	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: Initialize TCP connection to %s port %d",
+@@ -1620,14 +1877,8 @@ int dpp_tcp_init(struct dpp_global *dpp, struct dpp_authentication *auth,
+ 		goto fail;
+ 	conn->write_eloop = 1;
+ 
+-	hdr = wpabuf_head(auth->req_msg);
+-	end = hdr + wpabuf_len(auth->req_msg);
+-	hdr += 2; /* skip Category and Actiom */
+-	pos = hdr + DPP_HDR_LEN;
+-	conn->msg_out = dpp_tcp_encaps(hdr, pos, end - pos);
+-	if (!conn->msg_out)
++	if (dpp_tcp_auth_start(conn, auth) < 0)
+ 		goto fail;
+-	/* Message will be sent in dpp_conn_tx_ready() */
+ 
+ 	/* TODO: eloop timeout to clear a connection if it does not complete
+ 	 * properly */
+@@ -1639,6 +1890,30 @@ fail:
+ }
+ 
+ 
++int dpp_tcp_auth(struct dpp_global *dpp, void *_conn,
++		 struct dpp_authentication *auth, const char *name,
++		 enum dpp_netrole netrole,
++		 int (*process_conf_obj)(void *ctx,
++					 struct dpp_authentication *auth))
++{
++	struct dpp_connection *conn = _conn;
++
++	/* Continue with Authentication exchange on an existing TCP connection.
++	 */
++	conn->process_conf_obj = process_conf_obj;
++	os_free(conn->name);
++	conn->name = os_strdup(name ? name : "Test");
++	conn->netrole = netrole;
++	conn->auth = auth;
++
++	if (dpp_tcp_auth_start(conn, auth) < 0)
++		return -1;
++
++	dpp_conn_tx_ready(conn->sock, conn, NULL);
++	return 0;
++}
++
++
+ int dpp_controller_start(struct dpp_global *dpp,
+ 			 struct dpp_controller_config *config)
+ {
+@@ -1789,6 +2064,23 @@ void dpp_controller_new_qr_code(struct dpp_global *dpp,
+ }
+ 
+ 
++void dpp_controller_pkex_add(struct dpp_global *dpp,
++			     struct dpp_bootstrap_info *bi,
++			     const char *code, const char *identifier)
++{
++	struct dpp_controller *ctrl = dpp->controller;
++
++	if (!ctrl)
++		return;
++
++	ctrl->pkex_bi = bi;
++	os_free(ctrl->pkex_code);
++	ctrl->pkex_code = code ? os_strdup(code) : NULL;
++	os_free(ctrl->pkex_identifier);
++	ctrl->pkex_identifier = identifier ? os_strdup(identifier) : NULL;
++}
++
++
+ void dpp_tcp_init_flush(struct dpp_global *dpp)
+ {
+ 	struct dpp_connection *conn, *tmp;
+diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/dpp_supplicant.c b/wpa_supplicant/dpp_supplicant.c
+index 61b300f..aab94cb 100644
+--- a/wpa_supplicant/dpp_supplicant.c
++++ b/wpa_supplicant/dpp_supplicant.c
+@@ -2557,6 +2557,71 @@ static int wpas_dpp_pkex_next_channel(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
+ }
+ 
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_DPP2
++static int wpas_dpp_pkex_done(void *ctx, void *conn,
++			      struct dpp_bootstrap_info *peer_bi)
++{
++	struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s = ctx;
++	const char *cmd = wpa_s->dpp_pkex_auth_cmd;
++	const char *pos;
++	u8 allowed_roles = DPP_CAPAB_CONFIGURATOR;
++	struct dpp_bootstrap_info *own_bi = NULL;
++	struct dpp_authentication *auth;
++
++	if (!cmd)
++		cmd = "";
++	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: Start authentication after PKEX (cmd: %s)",
++		   cmd);
++
++	pos = os_strstr(cmd, " own=");
++	if (pos) {
++		pos += 5;
++		own_bi = dpp_bootstrap_get_id(wpa_s->dpp, atoi(pos));
++		if (!own_bi) {
++			wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
++				   "DPP: Could not find bootstrapping info for the identified local entry");
++			return -1;
++		}
++
++		if (peer_bi->curve != own_bi->curve) {
++			wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
++				   "DPP: Mismatching curves in bootstrapping info (peer=%s own=%s)",
++				   peer_bi->curve->name, own_bi->curve->name);
++			return -1;
++		}
++	}
++
++	pos = os_strstr(cmd, " role=");
++	if (pos) {
++		pos += 6;
++		if (os_strncmp(pos, "configurator", 12) == 0)
++			allowed_roles = DPP_CAPAB_CONFIGURATOR;
++		else if (os_strncmp(pos, "enrollee", 8) == 0)
++			allowed_roles = DPP_CAPAB_ENROLLEE;
++		else if (os_strncmp(pos, "either", 6) == 0)
++			allowed_roles = DPP_CAPAB_CONFIGURATOR |
++				DPP_CAPAB_ENROLLEE;
++		else
++			return -1;
++	}
++
++	auth = dpp_auth_init(wpa_s->dpp, wpa_s, peer_bi, own_bi, allowed_roles,
++			     0, wpa_s->hw.modes, wpa_s->hw.num_modes);
++	if (!auth)
++		return -1;
++
++	wpas_dpp_set_testing_options(wpa_s, auth);
++	if (dpp_set_configurator(auth, cmd) < 0) {
++		dpp_auth_deinit(auth);
++		return -1;
++	}
++
++	return dpp_tcp_auth(wpa_s->dpp, conn, auth, wpa_s->conf->dpp_name,
++			    DPP_NETROLE_STA, wpas_dpp_process_conf_obj);
++}
++#endif /* CONFIG_DPP2 */
++
++
+ enum wpas_dpp_pkex_ver {
+ 	PKEX_VER_AUTO,
+ 	PKEX_VER_ONLY_1,
+@@ -2564,7 +2629,9 @@ enum wpas_dpp_pkex_ver {
+ };
+ 
+ static int wpas_dpp_pkex_init(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
+-			      enum wpas_dpp_pkex_ver ver)
++			      enum wpas_dpp_pkex_ver ver,
++			      const struct hostapd_ip_addr *ipaddr,
++			      int tcp_port)
+ {
+ 	struct dpp_pkex *pkex;
+ 	struct wpabuf *msg;
+@@ -2573,15 +2640,24 @@ static int wpas_dpp_pkex_init(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
+ 
+ 	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: Initiating PKEXv%d", v2 ? 2 : 1);
+ 	dpp_pkex_free(wpa_s->dpp_pkex);
+-	wpa_s->dpp_pkex = dpp_pkex_init(wpa_s, wpa_s->dpp_pkex_bi,
+-					wpa_s->own_addr,
+-					wpa_s->dpp_pkex_identifier,
+-					wpa_s->dpp_pkex_code, v2);
+-	pkex = wpa_s->dpp_pkex;
++	wpa_s->dpp_pkex = NULL;
++	pkex = dpp_pkex_init(wpa_s, wpa_s->dpp_pkex_bi, wpa_s->own_addr,
++			     wpa_s->dpp_pkex_identifier,
++			     wpa_s->dpp_pkex_code, v2);
+ 	if (!pkex)
+ 		return -1;
+ 	pkex->forced_ver = ver != PKEX_VER_AUTO;
+ 
++	if (ipaddr) {
++#ifdef CONFIG_DPP2
++		return dpp_tcp_pkex_init(wpa_s->dpp, pkex, ipaddr, tcp_port,
++					 wpa_s, wpa_s, wpas_dpp_pkex_done);
++#else /* CONFIG_DPP2 */
++		return -1;
++#endif /* CONFIG_DPP2 */
++	}
++
++	wpa_s->dpp_pkex = pkex;
+ 	msg = pkex->exchange_req;
+ 	wait_time = wpa_s->max_remain_on_chan;
+ 	if (wait_time > 2000)
+@@ -2618,7 +2694,8 @@ static void wpas_dpp_pkex_retry_timeout(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx)
+ 			if (pkex->v2 && !pkex->forced_ver) {
+ 				wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+ 					   "DPP: Fall back to PKEXv1");
+-				wpas_dpp_pkex_init(wpa_s, PKEX_VER_ONLY_1);
++				wpas_dpp_pkex_init(wpa_s, PKEX_VER_ONLY_1,
++						   NULL, 0);
+ 				return;
+ 			}
+ #endif /* CONFIG_DPP3 */
+@@ -3327,6 +3404,29 @@ int wpas_dpp_pkex_add(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, const char *cmd)
+ {
+ 	struct dpp_bootstrap_info *own_bi;
+ 	const char *pos, *end;
++	int tcp_port = DPP_TCP_PORT;
++	struct hostapd_ip_addr *ipaddr = NULL;
++#ifdef CONFIG_DPP2
++	struct hostapd_ip_addr ipaddr_buf;
++	char *addr;
++
++	pos = os_strstr(cmd, " tcp_port=");
++	if (pos) {
++		pos += 10;
++		tcp_port = atoi(pos);
++	}
++
++	addr = get_param(cmd, " tcp_addr=");
++	if (addr) {
++		int res;
++
++		res = hostapd_parse_ip_addr(addr, &ipaddr_buf);
++		os_free(addr);
++		if (res)
++			return -1;
++		ipaddr = &ipaddr_buf;
++	}
++#endif /* CONFIG_DPP2 */
+ 
+ 	pos = os_strstr(cmd, " own=");
+ 	if (!pos)
+@@ -3390,8 +3490,14 @@ int wpas_dpp_pkex_add(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, const char *cmd)
+ 				return -1;
+ 		}
+ 
+-		if (wpas_dpp_pkex_init(wpa_s, ver) < 0)
++		if (wpas_dpp_pkex_init(wpa_s, ver, ipaddr, tcp_port) < 0)
+ 			return -1;
++	} else {
++#ifdef CONFIG_DPP2
++		dpp_controller_pkex_add(wpa_s->dpp, own_bi,
++					wpa_s->dpp_pkex_code,
++					wpa_s->dpp_pkex_identifier);
++#endif /* CONFIG_DPP2 */
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* TODO: Support multiple PKEX info entries */
+-- 
+2.40.0
+

meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/CVE-2022-37660-0005.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
+From 15af83cf1846870873a011ed4d714732f01cd2e4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
+Date: Tue, 19 Jul 2022 21:23:04 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] DPP: Delete PKEX code and identifier on success completion of
+ PKEX
+
+We are not supposed to reuse these without being explicitly requested to
+perform PKEX again. There is not a strong use case for being able to
+provision an Enrollee multiple times with PKEX, so this should have no
+issues on the Enrollee. For a Configurator, there might be some use
+cases that would benefit from being able to use the same code with
+multiple Enrollee devices, e.g., for guess access with a laptop and a
+smart phone. That case will now require a new DPP_PKEX_ADD command on
+the Configurator after each completion of the provisioning exchange.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
+
+CVE: CVE-2022-37660
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/?id=15af83cf1846870873a011ed4d714732f01cd2e4]
+
+Signed-off-by: Divya Chellam <divya.chellam@windriver.com>
+---
+ src/ap/dpp_hostapd.c            | 22 +++++++++++++++++++++-
+ wpa_supplicant/dpp_supplicant.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++++++-
+ 2 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/ap/dpp_hostapd.c b/src/ap/dpp_hostapd.c
+index d956be9..73b09ba 100644
+--- a/src/ap/dpp_hostapd.c
++++ b/src/ap/dpp_hostapd.c
+@@ -276,6 +276,22 @@ static int hostapd_dpp_pkex_next_channel(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
+ }
+ 
+ 
++static void hostapd_dpp_pkex_clear_code(struct hostapd_data *hapd)
++{
++	if (!hapd->dpp_pkex_code && !hapd->dpp_pkex_identifier)
++		return;
++
++	/* Delete PKEX code and identifier on successful completion of
++	 * PKEX. We are not supposed to reuse these without being
++	 * explicitly requested to perform PKEX again. */
++	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: Delete PKEX code/identifier");
++	os_free(hapd->dpp_pkex_code);
++	hapd->dpp_pkex_code = NULL;
++	os_free(hapd->dpp_pkex_identifier);
++	hapd->dpp_pkex_identifier = NULL;
++}
++
++
+ #ifdef CONFIG_DPP2
+ static int hostapd_dpp_pkex_done(void *ctx, void *conn,
+ 				 struct dpp_bootstrap_info *peer_bi)
+@@ -287,6 +303,8 @@ static int hostapd_dpp_pkex_done(void *ctx, void *conn,
+ 	struct dpp_bootstrap_info *own_bi = NULL;
+ 	struct dpp_authentication *auth;
+ 
++	hostapd_dpp_pkex_clear_code(hapd);
++
+ 	if (!cmd)
+ 		cmd = "";
+ 	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: Start authentication after PKEX (cmd: %s)",
+@@ -2114,6 +2132,7 @@ hostapd_dpp_rx_pkex_commit_reveal_req(struct hostapd_data *hapd, const u8 *src,
+ 				wpabuf_head(msg), wpabuf_len(msg));
+ 	wpabuf_free(msg);
+ 
++	hostapd_dpp_pkex_clear_code(hapd);
+ 	bi = dpp_pkex_finish(hapd->iface->interfaces->dpp, pkex, src, freq);
+ 	if (!bi)
+ 		return;
+@@ -2145,6 +2164,7 @@ hostapd_dpp_rx_pkex_commit_reveal_resp(struct hostapd_data *hapd, const u8 *src,
+ 		return;
+ 	}
+ 
++	hostapd_dpp_pkex_clear_code(hapd);
+ 	bi = dpp_pkex_finish(hapd->iface->interfaces->dpp, pkex, src, freq);
+ 	if (!bi)
+ 		return;
+@@ -2518,7 +2538,7 @@ int hostapd_dpp_pkex_remove(struct hostapd_data *hapd, const char *id)
+ 			return -1;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if ((id_val != 0 && id_val != 1) || !hapd->dpp_pkex_code)
++	if ((id_val != 0 && id_val != 1))
+ 		return -1;
+ 
+ 	/* TODO: Support multiple PKEX entries */
+diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/dpp_supplicant.c b/wpa_supplicant/dpp_supplicant.c
+index aab94cb..015ae66 100644
+--- a/wpa_supplicant/dpp_supplicant.c
++++ b/wpa_supplicant/dpp_supplicant.c
+@@ -2557,6 +2557,22 @@ static int wpas_dpp_pkex_next_channel(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
+ }
+ 
+ 
++static void wpas_dpp_pkex_clear_code(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s)
++{
++	if (!wpa_s->dpp_pkex_code && !wpa_s->dpp_pkex_identifier)
++		return;
++
++	/* Delete PKEX code and identifier on successful completion of
++	 * PKEX. We are not supposed to reuse these without being
++	 * explicitly requested to perform PKEX again. */
++	os_free(wpa_s->dpp_pkex_code);
++	wpa_s->dpp_pkex_code = NULL;
++	os_free(wpa_s->dpp_pkex_identifier);
++	wpa_s->dpp_pkex_identifier = NULL;
++
++}
++
++
+ #ifdef CONFIG_DPP2
+ static int wpas_dpp_pkex_done(void *ctx, void *conn,
+ 			      struct dpp_bootstrap_info *peer_bi)
+@@ -2568,6 +2584,8 @@ static int wpas_dpp_pkex_done(void *ctx, void *conn,
+ 	struct dpp_bootstrap_info *own_bi = NULL;
+ 	struct dpp_authentication *auth;
+ 
++	wpas_dpp_pkex_clear_code(wpa_s);
++
+ 	if (!cmd)
+ 		cmd = "";
+ 	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: Start authentication after PKEX (cmd: %s)",
+@@ -2872,6 +2890,7 @@ wpas_dpp_pkex_finish(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, const u8 *peer,
+ {
+ 	struct dpp_bootstrap_info *bi;
+ 
++	wpas_dpp_pkex_clear_code(wpa_s);
+ 	bi = dpp_pkex_finish(wpa_s->dpp, wpa_s->dpp_pkex, peer, freq);
+ 	if (!bi)
+ 		return NULL;
+@@ -3521,7 +3540,7 @@ int wpas_dpp_pkex_remove(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, const char *id)
+ 			return -1;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if ((id_val != 0 && id_val != 1) || !wpa_s->dpp_pkex_code)
++	if ((id_val != 0 && id_val != 1))
+ 		return -1;
+ 
+ 	/* TODO: Support multiple PKEX entries */
+-- 
+2.40.0
+

meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.10.bb

@@ -38,6 +38,11 @@ SRC_URI = "http://w1.fi/releases/wpa_supplicant-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://0001-SAE-Check-for-invalid-Rejected-Groups-element-length.patch \
            file://0002-SAE-Check-for-invalid-Rejected-Groups-element-length.patch \
            file://0003-SAE-Reject-invalid-Rejected-Groups-element-in-the-pa.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-37660-0001.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-37660-0002.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-37660-0003.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-37660-0004.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-37660-0005.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "20df7ae5154b3830355f8ab4269123a87affdea59fe74fe9292a91d0d7e17b2f"
 

meta/recipes-core/coreutils/coreutils/CVE-2025-5278.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+From ed9ae6a4a02d322378739a895ae2090ca2bf6cdc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?P=C3=A1draig=20Brady?= <P@draigBrady.com>
+Date: Tue, 20 May 2025 16:03:44 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] sort: fix buffer under-read (CWE-127)
+
+* src/sort.c (begfield): Check pointer adjustment
+to avoid Out-of-range pointer offset (CWE-823).
+(limfield): Likewise.
+* tests/sort/sort-field-limit.sh: Add a new test,
+which triggers with ASAN or Valgrind.
+* tests/local.mk: Reference the new test.
+* NEWS: Mention bug fix introduced in v7.2 (2009).
+Fixes https://bugs.gnu.org/78507
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-5278
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://cgit.git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/coreutils.git/commit/?id=8c9602e3a145e9596dc1a63c6ed67865814b6633]
+[Adjusted for 9.0 version and adjusted test case to not use valgrind.]
+
+Signed-off-by: Chen Qi <Qi.Chen@windriver.com>
+---
+ src/sort.c                     | 12 ++++++++++--
+ tests/local.mk                 |  1 +
+ tests/misc/sort-field-limit.sh | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 3 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100755 tests/misc/sort-field-limit.sh
+
+diff --git a/src/sort.c b/src/sort.c
+index 5f4c817de..07b96d34b 100644
+--- a/src/sort.c
++++ b/src/sort.c
+@@ -1642,7 +1642,11 @@ begfield (struct line const *line, struct keyfield const *key)
+       ++ptr;
+ 
+   /* Advance PTR by SCHAR (if possible), but no further than LIM.  */
+-  ptr = MIN (lim, ptr + schar);
++  size_t remaining_bytes = lim - ptr;
++  if (schar < remaining_bytes)
++    ptr += schar;
++  else
++    ptr = lim;
+ 
+   return ptr;
+ }
+@@ -1743,7 +1747,11 @@ limfield (struct line const *line, struct keyfield const *key)
+           ++ptr;
+ 
+       /* Advance PTR by ECHAR (if possible), but no further than LIM.  */
+-      ptr = MIN (lim, ptr + echar);
++      size_t remaining_bytes = lim - ptr;
++      if (echar < remaining_bytes)
++        ptr += echar;
++      else
++        ptr = lim;
+     }
+ 
+   return ptr;
+diff --git a/tests/local.mk b/tests/local.mk
+index 228d0e368..ced85c44c 100644
+--- a/tests/local.mk
++++ b/tests/local.mk
+@@ -373,6 +373,7 @@ all_tests =					\
+   tests/misc/sort-debug-keys.sh			\
+   tests/misc/sort-debug-warn.sh			\
+   tests/misc/sort-discrim.sh			\
++  tests/misc/sort-field-limit.sh		\
+   tests/misc/sort-files0-from.pl		\
+   tests/misc/sort-float.sh			\
+   tests/misc/sort-h-thousands-sep.sh		\
+diff --git a/tests/misc/sort-field-limit.sh b/tests/misc/sort-field-limit.sh
+new file mode 100755
+index 000000000..dc5b4c964
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/tests/misc/sort-field-limit.sh
+@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
++#!/bin/sh
++# From 7.2-9.7, this would trigger an out of bounds mem read
++
++# Copyright (C) 2025 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
++
++# This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
++# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
++# the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
++# (at your option) any later version.
++
++# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
++# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
++# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
++# GNU General Public License for more details.
++
++# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
++# along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
++
++. "${srcdir=.}/tests/init.sh"; path_prepend_ ./src
++print_ver_ sort
++getlimits_
++
++# This issue triggers with valgrind or ASAN
++valgrind --error-exitcode=1 sort --version 2>/dev/null &&
++  VALGRIND='valgrind --error-exitcode=1'
++
++{ printf '%s\n' aa bb; } > in || framework_failure_
++
++_POSIX2_VERSION=200809 sort +0.${SIZE_MAX}R in > out || fail=1
++compare in out || fail=1
++
++_POSIX2_VERSION=200809 sort +1 -1.${SIZE_MAX}R in > out || fail=1
++compare in out || fail=1
++
++Exit $fail
+-- 
+2.34.1
+

meta/recipes-core/coreutils/coreutils_9.0.bb

@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/coreutils/${BP}.tar.xz \
            file://0001-uname-report-processor-and-hardware-correctly.patch \
            file://0001-local.mk-fix-cross-compiling-problem.patch \
            file://e8b56ebd536e82b15542a00c888109471936bfda.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-5278.patch \
            file://run-ptest \
            file://0001-split-do-not-shrink-hold-buffer.patch \
            "

meta/recipes-core/dropbear/dropbear.inc

@@ -31,6 +31,9 @@ SRC_URI = "http://matt.ucc.asn.au/dropbear/releases/dropbear-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
 	   file://CVE-2021-36369.patch \
 	   file://CVE-2023-36328.patch \
 	   file://CVE-2023-48795.patch \
+           file://0001-Add-m_snprintf-that-won-t-return-negative.patch \
+           file://0001-Handle-arbitrary-length-paths-and-commands-in-multih.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-47203.patch \
 	   "
 
 PAM_SRC_URI = "file://0005-dropbear-enable-pam.patch \

meta/recipes-core/dropbear/dropbear/0001-Add-m_snprintf-that-won-t-return-negative.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+From ac2433cb8daa1279d14f8b2cd4c7e1f3405787d4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Johnston <matt@ucc.asn.au>
+Date: Fri, 1 Apr 2022 12:10:48 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] Add m_snprintf() that won't return negative
+
+Origin: https://github.com/mkj/dropbear/commit/ac2433cb8daa1279d14f8b2cd4c7e1f3405787d4
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/mkj/dropbear/commit/ac2433cb8daa1279d14f8b2cd4c7e1f3405787d4]
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
+---
+ dbutil.c | 13 +++++++++++++
+ dbutil.h |  2 ++
+ 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/dbutil.c b/dbutil.c
+index 5af6330..d4c3298 100644
+--- a/dbutil.c
++++ b/dbutil.c
+@@ -691,3 +691,16 @@ void fsync_parent_dir(const char* fn) {
+ 	m_free(fn_dir);
+ #endif
+ }
++
++int m_snprintf(char *str, size_t size, const char *format, ...) {
++	va_list param;
++	int ret;
++
++	va_start(param, format);
++	ret = vsnprintf(str, size, format, param);
++	va_end(param);
++	if (ret < 0) {
++		dropbear_exit("snprintf failed");
++	}
++	return ret;
++}
+diff --git a/dbutil.h b/dbutil.h
+index 2a1c82c..71cffe8 100644
+--- a/dbutil.h
++++ b/dbutil.h
+@@ -70,6 +70,8 @@ void m_close(int fd);
+ void setnonblocking(int fd);
+ void disallow_core(void);
+ int m_str_to_uint(const char* str, unsigned int *val);
++/* The same as snprintf() but exits rather than returning negative */
++int m_snprintf(char *str, size_t size, const char *format, ...);
+ 
+ /* Used to force mp_ints to be initialised */
+ #define DEF_MP_INT(X) mp_int X = {0, 0, 0, NULL}

meta/recipes-core/dropbear/dropbear/0001-Handle-arbitrary-length-paths-and-commands-in-multih.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+From fe15c36664a984de9e1b2386ac52d4b8577cac93 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Johnston <matt@ucc.asn.au>
+Date: Mon, 1 Apr 2024 11:50:26 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] Handle arbitrary length paths and commands in
+ multihop_passthrough_args()
+
+Origin: https://github.com/mkj/dropbear/commit/7894254afa9b1d3a836911b7ccea1fe18391b881
+Origin: https://github.com/mkj/dropbear/commit/2f1177e55f33afd676e08c9449ab7ab517fc3b30
+Origin: https://github.com/mkj/dropbear/commit/697b1f86c0b2b0caf12e9e32bab29161093ab5d4
+Origin: https://github.com/mkj/dropbear/commit/dd03da772bfad6174425066ff9752b60e25ed183
+Origin: https://github.com/mkj/dropbear/commit/d59436a4d56de58b856142a5d489a4a8fc7382ed
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [see commits above]
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
+---
+ cli-runopts.c | 63 +++++++++++++++++++++------------------------------
+ 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/cli-runopts.c b/cli-runopts.c
+index 255b47e..9798f62 100644
+--- a/cli-runopts.c
++++ b/cli-runopts.c
+@@ -523,61 +523,50 @@ static void loadidentityfile(const char* filename, int warnfail) {
+ 
+ #if DROPBEAR_CLI_MULTIHOP
+ 
+-static char*
+-multihop_passthrough_args() {
+-	char *ret;
+-	int total;
+-	unsigned int len = 0;
++/* Fill out -i, -y, -W options that make sense for all
++ * the intermediate processes */
++static char* multihop_passthrough_args(void) {
++	char *args = NULL;
++	unsigned int len, total;
++#if DROPBEAR_CLI_PUBKEY_AUTH
+ 	m_list_elem *iter;
+-	/* Fill out -i, -y, -W options that make sense for all
+-	 * the intermediate processes */
++#endif
++	/* Sufficient space for non-string args */
++	len = 100;
++
++	/* String arguments have arbitrary length, so determine space required */
+ #if DROPBEAR_CLI_PUBKEY_AUTH
+ 	for (iter = cli_opts.privkeys->first; iter; iter = iter->next)
+ 	{
+ 		sign_key * key = (sign_key*)iter->item;
+-		len += 3 + strlen(key->filename);
++		len += 4 + strlen(key->filename);
+ 	}
+-#endif /* DROPBEAR_CLI_PUBKEY_AUTH */
++#endif
+ 
+-	len += 30; /* space for -W <size>, terminator. */
+-	ret = m_malloc(len);
++	args = m_malloc(len);
+ 	total = 0;
+ 
+-	if (cli_opts.no_hostkey_check)
+-	{
+-		int written = snprintf(ret+total, len-total, "-y -y ");
+-		total += written;
+-	}
+-	else if (cli_opts.always_accept_key)
+-	{
+-		int written = snprintf(ret+total, len-total, "-y ");
+-		total += written;
++	/* Create new argument string */
++
++	if (cli_opts.no_hostkey_check) {
++		total += m_snprintf(args+total, len-total, "-y -y ");
++	} else if (cli_opts.always_accept_key) {
++		total += m_snprintf(args+total, len-total, "-y ");
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if (opts.recv_window != DEFAULT_RECV_WINDOW)
+-	{
+-		int written = snprintf(ret+total, len-total, "-W %u ", opts.recv_window);
+-		total += written;
++	if (opts.recv_window != DEFAULT_RECV_WINDOW) {
++		total += m_snprintf(args+total, len-total, "-W %u ", opts.recv_window);
+ 	}
+ 
+ #if DROPBEAR_CLI_PUBKEY_AUTH
+ 	for (iter = cli_opts.privkeys->first; iter; iter = iter->next)
+ 	{
+ 		sign_key * key = (sign_key*)iter->item;
+-		const size_t size = len - total;
+-		int written = snprintf(ret+total, size, "-i %s ", key->filename);
+-		dropbear_assert((unsigned int)written < size);
+-		total += written;
++		total += m_snprintf(args+total, len-total, "-i %s ", key->filename);
+ 	}
+ #endif /* DROPBEAR_CLI_PUBKEY_AUTH */
+ 
+-	/* if args were passed, total will be not zero, and it will have a space at the end, so remove that */
+-	if (total > 0) 
+-	{
+-		total--;
+-	}
+-
+-	return ret;
++	return args;
+ }
+ 
+ /* Sets up 'onion-forwarding' connections. This will spawn
+@@ -608,7 +597,7 @@ static void parse_multihop_hostname(const char* orighostarg, const char* argv0)
+ 			&& strchr(cli_opts.username, '@')) {
+ 		unsigned int len = strlen(orighostarg) + strlen(cli_opts.username) + 2;
+ 		hostbuf = m_malloc(len);
+-		snprintf(hostbuf, len, "%s@%s", cli_opts.username, orighostarg);
++		m_snprintf(hostbuf, len, "%s@%s", cli_opts.username, orighostarg);
+ 	} else {
+ 		hostbuf = m_strdup(orighostarg);
+ 	}
+@@ -642,7 +631,7 @@ static void parse_multihop_hostname(const char* orighostarg, const char* argv0)
+ 			+ strlen(passthrough_args)
+ 			+ 30;
+ 		cli_opts.proxycmd = m_malloc(cmd_len);
+-		snprintf(cli_opts.proxycmd, cmd_len, "%s -B %s:%s %s %s", 
++		m_snprintf(cli_opts.proxycmd, cmd_len, "%s -B %s:%s %s %s",
+ 				argv0, cli_opts.remotehost, cli_opts.remoteport, 
+ 				passthrough_args, remainder);
+ #ifndef DISABLE_ZLIB

meta/recipes-core/dropbear/dropbear/CVE-2025-47203.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,344 @@
+From e5a0ef27c227f7ae69d9a9fec98a056494409b9b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Johnston <matt@ucc.asn.au>
+Date: Mon, 5 May 2025 23:14:19 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] Execute multihop commands directly, no shell
+
+This avoids problems with shell escaping if arguments contain special
+characters.
+
+Origin: https://github.com/mkj/dropbear/commit/e5a0ef27c227f7ae69d9a9fec98a056494409b9b
+Bug: https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2025/05/13/1
+Bug-Debian: https://deb.freexian.com/extended-lts/tracker/CVE-2025-47203
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-47203
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/mkj/dropbear/commit/e5a0ef27c227f7ae69d9a9fec98a056494409b9b]
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
+---
+ cli-main.c    | 60 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
+ cli-runopts.c | 84 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------
+ dbutil.c      |  9 +++++--
+ dbutil.h      |  1 +
+ runopts.h     |  5 ++++
+ 5 files changed, 104 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/cli-main.c b/cli-main.c
+index 7f455d1..53c55c1 100644
+--- a/cli-main.c
++++ b/cli-main.c
+@@ -73,9 +73,8 @@ int main(int argc, char ** argv) {
+ 
+ 	pid_t proxy_cmd_pid = 0;
+ #if DROPBEAR_CLI_PROXYCMD
+-	if (cli_opts.proxycmd) {
++	if (cli_opts.proxycmd || cli_opts.proxyexec) {
+ 		cli_proxy_cmd(&sock_in, &sock_out, &proxy_cmd_pid);
+-		m_free(cli_opts.proxycmd);
+ 		if (signal(SIGINT, kill_proxy_sighandler) == SIG_ERR ||
+ 			signal(SIGTERM, kill_proxy_sighandler) == SIG_ERR ||
+ 			signal(SIGHUP, kill_proxy_sighandler) == SIG_ERR) {
+@@ -96,7 +95,8 @@ int main(int argc, char ** argv) {
+ }
+ #endif /* DBMULTI stuff */
+ 
+-static void exec_proxy_cmd(const void *user_data_cmd) {
++#if DROPBEAR_CLI_PROXYCMD
++static void shell_proxy_cmd(const void *user_data_cmd) {
+ 	const char *cmd = user_data_cmd;
+ 	char *usershell;
+ 
+@@ -105,40 +105,62 @@ static void exec_proxy_cmd(const void *user_data_cmd) {
+ 	dropbear_exit("Failed to run '%s'\n", cmd);
+ }
+ 
+-#if DROPBEAR_CLI_PROXYCMD
++static void exec_proxy_cmd(const void *unused) {
++	(void)unused;
++	run_command(cli_opts.proxyexec[0], cli_opts.proxyexec, ses.maxfd);
++	dropbear_exit("Failed to run '%s'\n", cli_opts.proxyexec[0]);
++}
++
+ static void cli_proxy_cmd(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, pid_t *pid_out) {
+-	char * ex_cmd = NULL;
+-	size_t ex_cmdlen;
++	char * cmd_arg = NULL;
++	void (*exec_fn)(const void *user_data) = NULL;
+ 	int ret;
+ 
++	/* exactly one of cli_opts.proxycmd or cli_opts.proxyexec should be set */
++
+ 	/* File descriptor "-j &3" */
+-	if (*cli_opts.proxycmd == '&') {
++	if (cli_opts.proxycmd && *cli_opts.proxycmd == '&') {
+ 		char *p = cli_opts.proxycmd + 1;
+ 		int sock = strtoul(p, &p, 10);
+ 		/* must be a single number, and not stdin/stdout/stderr */
+ 		if (sock > 2 && sock < 1024 && *p == '\0') {
+ 			*sock_in = sock;
+ 			*sock_out = sock;
+-			return;
++			goto cleanup;
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 
+-	/* Normal proxycommand */
+-
+-	/* So that spawn_command knows which shell to run */
+-	fill_passwd(cli_opts.own_user);
+-
+-	ex_cmdlen = strlen(cli_opts.proxycmd) + 6; /* "exec " + command + '\0' */
+-	ex_cmd = m_malloc(ex_cmdlen);
+-	snprintf(ex_cmd, ex_cmdlen, "exec %s", cli_opts.proxycmd);
++	if (cli_opts.proxycmd) {
++		/* Normal proxycommand */
++		size_t shell_cmdlen;
++		/* So that spawn_command knows which shell to run */
++		fill_passwd(cli_opts.own_user);
++
++		shell_cmdlen = strlen(cli_opts.proxycmd) + 6; /* "exec " + command + '\0' */
++		cmd_arg = m_malloc(shell_cmdlen);
++		snprintf(cmd_arg, shell_cmdlen, "exec %s", cli_opts.proxycmd);
++		exec_fn = shell_proxy_cmd;
++	} else {
++		/* No shell */
++		exec_fn = exec_proxy_cmd;
++	}
+ 
+-	ret = spawn_command(exec_proxy_cmd, ex_cmd,
+-			sock_out, sock_in, NULL, pid_out);
+-	m_free(ex_cmd);
++	ret = spawn_command(exec_fn, cmd_arg, sock_out, sock_in, NULL, pid_out);
+ 	if (ret == DROPBEAR_FAILURE) {
+ 		dropbear_exit("Failed running proxy command");
+ 		*sock_in = *sock_out = -1;
+ 	}
++
++cleanup:
++	m_free(cli_opts.proxycmd);
++	m_free(cmd_arg);
++	if (cli_opts.proxyexec) {
++		char **a = NULL;
++		for (a = cli_opts.proxyexec; *a; a++) {
++			m_free_direct(*a);
++		}
++		m_free(cli_opts.proxyexec);
++	}
+ }
+ 
+ static void kill_proxy_sighandler(int UNUSED(signo)) {
+diff --git a/cli-runopts.c b/cli-runopts.c
+index 9798f62..0f3dcd0 100644
+--- a/cli-runopts.c
++++ b/cli-runopts.c
+@@ -525,47 +525,69 @@ static void loadidentityfile(const char* filename, int warnfail) {
+ 
+ /* Fill out -i, -y, -W options that make sense for all
+  * the intermediate processes */
+-static char* multihop_passthrough_args(void) {
+-	char *args = NULL;
+-	unsigned int len, total;
++static char** multihop_args(const char* argv0, const char* prior_hops) {
++	/* null terminated array */
++	char **args = NULL;
++	size_t max_args = 14, pos = 0, len;
+ #if DROPBEAR_CLI_PUBKEY_AUTH
+ 	m_list_elem *iter;
+ #endif
+-	/* Sufficient space for non-string args */
+-	len = 100;
+ 
+-	/* String arguments have arbitrary length, so determine space required */
+ #if DROPBEAR_CLI_PUBKEY_AUTH
+ 	for (iter = cli_opts.privkeys->first; iter; iter = iter->next)
+ 	{
+-		sign_key * key = (sign_key*)iter->item;
+-		len += 4 + strlen(key->filename);
++		/* "-i file" for each */
++		max_args += 2;
+ 	}
+ #endif
+ 
+-	args = m_malloc(len);
+-	total = 0;
++	args = m_malloc(sizeof(char*) * max_args);
++	pos = 0;
+ 
+-	/* Create new argument string */
++	args[pos] = m_strdup(argv0);
++	pos++;
+ 
+ 	if (cli_opts.no_hostkey_check) {
+-		total += m_snprintf(args+total, len-total, "-y -y ");
++		args[pos] = m_strdup("-y");
++		pos++;
++		args[pos] = m_strdup("-y");
++		pos++;
+ 	} else if (cli_opts.always_accept_key) {
+-		total += m_snprintf(args+total, len-total, "-y ");
++		args[pos] = m_strdup("-y");
++		pos++;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if (opts.recv_window != DEFAULT_RECV_WINDOW) {
+-		total += m_snprintf(args+total, len-total, "-W %u ", opts.recv_window);
++		args[pos] = m_strdup("-W");
++		pos++;
++		args[pos] = m_malloc(11);
++		m_snprintf(args[pos], 11, "%u", opts.recv_window);
++		pos++;
+ 	}
+ 
+ #if DROPBEAR_CLI_PUBKEY_AUTH
+ 	for (iter = cli_opts.privkeys->first; iter; iter = iter->next)
+ 	{
+ 		sign_key * key = (sign_key*)iter->item;
+-		total += m_snprintf(args+total, len-total, "-i %s ", key->filename);
++		args[pos] = m_strdup("-i");
++		pos++;
++		args[pos] = m_strdup(key->filename);
++		pos++;
+ 	}
+ #endif /* DROPBEAR_CLI_PUBKEY_AUTH */
+ 
++	/* last hop */
++	args[pos] = m_strdup("-B");
++	pos++;
++	len = strlen(cli_opts.remotehost) + strlen(cli_opts.remoteport) + 2;
++	args[pos] = m_malloc(len);
++	snprintf(args[pos], len, "%s:%s", cli_opts.remotehost, cli_opts.remoteport);
++	pos++;
++
++	/* hostnames of prior hops */
++	args[pos] = m_strdup(prior_hops);
++	pos++;
++
+ 	return args;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -585,7 +607,7 @@ static void parse_multihop_hostname(const char* orighostarg, const char* argv0)
+ 	char *userhostarg = NULL;
+ 	char *hostbuf = NULL;
+ 	char *last_hop = NULL;
+-	char *remainder = NULL;
++	char *prior_hops = NULL;
+ 
+ 	/* both scp and rsync parse a user@host argument
+ 	 * and turn it into "-l user host". This breaks
+@@ -603,6 +625,8 @@ static void parse_multihop_hostname(const char* orighostarg, const char* argv0)
+ 	}
+ 	userhostarg = hostbuf;
+ 
++	/* Split off any last hostname and use that as remotehost/remoteport.
++	 * That is used for authorized_keys checking etc */
+ 	last_hop = strrchr(userhostarg, ',');
+ 	if (last_hop) {
+ 		if (last_hop == userhostarg) {
+@@ -610,36 +634,28 @@ static void parse_multihop_hostname(const char* orighostarg, const char* argv0)
+ 		}
+ 		*last_hop = '\0';
+ 		last_hop++;
+-		remainder = userhostarg;
++		prior_hops = userhostarg;
+ 		userhostarg = last_hop;
+ 	}
+ 
++	/* Update cli_opts.remotehost and cli_opts.remoteport */
+ 	parse_hostname(userhostarg);
+ 
+-	if (last_hop) {
+-		/* Set up the proxycmd */
+-		unsigned int cmd_len = 0;
+-		char *passthrough_args = multihop_passthrough_args();
++	/* Construct any multihop proxy command. Use proxyexec to
++	 * avoid worrying about shell escaping. */
++	if (prior_hops) {
++		cli_opts.proxyexec = multihop_args(argv0, prior_hops);
++		/* Any -J argument has been copied to proxyexec */
+ 		if (cli_opts.proxycmd) {
+ 			dropbear_exit("-J can't be used with multihop mode");
+ 		}
+-		if (cli_opts.remoteport == NULL) {
+-			cli_opts.remoteport = "22";
+-		}
+-		cmd_len = strlen(argv0) + strlen(remainder) 
+-			+ strlen(cli_opts.remotehost) + strlen(cli_opts.remoteport)
+-			+ strlen(passthrough_args)
+-			+ 30;
+-		cli_opts.proxycmd = m_malloc(cmd_len);
+-		m_snprintf(cli_opts.proxycmd, cmd_len, "%s -B %s:%s %s %s",
+-				argv0, cli_opts.remotehost, cli_opts.remoteport, 
+-				passthrough_args, remainder);
++
+ #ifndef DISABLE_ZLIB
+-		/* The stream will be incompressible since it's encrypted. */
++		/* This outer stream will be incompressible since it's encrypted. */
+ 		opts.compress_mode = DROPBEAR_COMPRESS_OFF;
+ #endif
+-		m_free(passthrough_args);
+ 	}
++
+ 	m_free(hostbuf);
+ }
+ #endif /* !DROPBEAR_CLI_MULTIHOP */
+diff --git a/dbutil.c b/dbutil.c
+index d4c3298..a51c1f9 100644
+--- a/dbutil.c
++++ b/dbutil.c
+@@ -347,7 +347,6 @@ int spawn_command(void(*exec_fn)(const void *user_data), const void *exec_data,
+ void run_shell_command(const char* cmd, unsigned int maxfd, char* usershell) {
+ 	char * argv[4];
+ 	char * baseshell = NULL;
+-	unsigned int i;
+ 
+ 	baseshell = basename(usershell);
+ 
+@@ -369,6 +368,12 @@ void run_shell_command(const char* cmd, unsigned int maxfd, char* usershell) {
+ 		argv[1] = NULL;
+ 	}
+ 
++	run_command(usershell, argv, maxfd);
++}
++
++void run_command(const char* argv0, char** args, unsigned int maxfd) {
++	unsigned int i;
++
+ 	/* Re-enable SIGPIPE for the executed process */
+ 	if (signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL) == SIG_ERR) {
+ 		dropbear_exit("signal() error");
+@@ -380,7 +385,7 @@ void run_shell_command(const char* cmd, unsigned int maxfd, char* usershell) {
+ 		m_close(i);
+ 	}
+ 
+-	execv(usershell, argv);
++	execv(argv0, args);
+ }
+ 
+ #if DEBUG_TRACE
+diff --git a/dbutil.h b/dbutil.h
+index 71cffe8..5d86485 100644
+--- a/dbutil.h
++++ b/dbutil.h
+@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ char * stripcontrol(const char * text);
+ int spawn_command(void(*exec_fn)(const void *user_data), const void *exec_data,
+ 		int *writefd, int *readfd, int *errfd, pid_t *pid);
+ void run_shell_command(const char* cmd, unsigned int maxfd, char* usershell);
++void run_command(const char* argv0, char** args, unsigned int maxfd);
+ #if ENABLE_CONNECT_UNIX
+ int connect_unix(const char* addr);
+ #endif
+diff --git a/runopts.h b/runopts.h
+index 01201d2..b49dc13 100644
+--- a/runopts.h
++++ b/runopts.h
+@@ -179,7 +179,12 @@ typedef struct cli_runopts {
+ 	unsigned int netcat_port;
+ #endif
+ #if DROPBEAR_CLI_PROXYCMD
++	/* A proxy command to run via the user's shell */
+ 	char *proxycmd;
++#endif
++#if DROPBEAR_CLI_MULTIHOP
++	/* Similar to proxycmd, but is arguments for execve(), not shell */
++	char **proxyexec;
+ #endif
+ 	char *bind_address;
+ 	char *bind_port;

meta/recipes-core/glib-2.0/glib-2.0/CVE-2025-4373-01.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+From cc647f9e46d55509a93498af19659baf9c80f2e3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Michael Catanzaro <mcatanzaro@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 10 Apr 2025 10:57:20 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH 1/2] gstring: carefully handle gssize parameters
+
+Wherever we use gssize to allow passing -1, we need to ensure we don't
+overflow the value by assigning a gsize to it without checking if the
+size exceeds the maximum gssize. The safest way to do this is to just
+use normal gsize everywhere instead and use gssize only for the
+parameter.
+
+Our computers don't have enough RAM to write tests for this. I tried
+forcing string->len to high values for test purposes, but this isn't
+valid and will just cause out of bounds reads/writes due to
+string->allocated_len being unexpectedly small, so I don't think we can
+test this easily.
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-4373
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/-/commit/cc647f9e46d55509a93498af19659baf9c80f2e3]
+
+Signed-off-by: Praveen Kumar <praveen.kumar@windriver.com>
+---
+ glib/gstring.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
+ 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/glib/gstring.c b/glib/gstring.c
+index 0a509e5..d6f8735 100644
+--- a/glib/gstring.c
++++ b/glib/gstring.c
+@@ -424,8 +424,9 @@ g_string_insert_len (GString     *string,
+     return string;
+
+   if (len < 0)
+-    len = strlen (val);
+-  len_unsigned = len;
++    len_unsigned = strlen (val);
++  else
++    len_unsigned = len;
+
+   if (pos < 0)
+     pos_unsigned = string->len;
+@@ -723,10 +724,12 @@ g_string_insert_c (GString *string,
+   g_string_maybe_expand (string, 1);
+
+   if (pos < 0)
+-    pos = string->len;
++    pos_unsigned = string->len;
+   else
+-    g_return_val_if_fail ((gsize) pos <= string->len, string);
+-  pos_unsigned = pos;
++    {
++      pos_unsigned = pos;
++      g_return_val_if_fail (pos_unsigned <= string->len, string);
++    }
+
+   /* If not just an append, move the old stuff */
+   if (pos_unsigned < string->len)
+@@ -759,6 +762,7 @@ g_string_insert_unichar (GString  *string,
+                          gssize    pos,
+                          gunichar  wc)
+ {
++  gsize pos_unsigned;
+   gint charlen, first, i;
+   gchar *dest;
+
+@@ -800,15 +804,18 @@ g_string_insert_unichar (GString  *string,
+   g_string_maybe_expand (string, charlen);
+
+   if (pos < 0)
+-    pos = string->len;
++    pos_unsigned = string->len;
+   else
+-    g_return_val_if_fail ((gsize) pos <= string->len, string);
++    {
++      pos_unsigned = pos;
++      g_return_val_if_fail (pos_unsigned <= string->len, string);
++    }
+
+   /* If not just an append, move the old stuff */
+-  if ((gsize) pos < string->len)
+-    memmove (string->str + pos + charlen, string->str + pos, string->len - pos);
++  if (pos_unsigned < string->len)
++    memmove (string->str + pos_unsigned + charlen, string->str + pos_unsigned, string->len - pos_unsigned);
+
+-  dest = string->str + pos;
++  dest = string->str + pos_unsigned;
+   /* Code copied from g_unichar_to_utf() */
+   for (i = charlen - 1; i > 0; --i)
+     {
+@@ -866,6 +873,7 @@ g_string_overwrite_len (GString     *string,
+                         const gchar *val,
+                         gssize       len)
+ {
++  gssize len_unsigned;
+   gsize end;
+
+   g_return_val_if_fail (string != NULL, NULL);
+@@ -877,14 +885,16 @@ g_string_overwrite_len (GString     *string,
+   g_return_val_if_fail (pos <= string->len, string);
+
+   if (len < 0)
+-    len = strlen (val);
++    len_unsigned = strlen (val);
++  else
++    len_unsigned = len;
+
+-  end = pos + len;
++  end = pos + len_unsigned;
+
+   if (end > string->len)
+     g_string_maybe_expand (string, end - string->len);
+
+-  memcpy (string->str + pos, val, len);
++  memcpy (string->str + pos, val, len_unsigned);
+
+   if (end > string->len)
+     {
+--
+2.40.0

meta/recipes-core/glib-2.0/glib-2.0/CVE-2025-4373-02.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+From 4d435bb4809793c445846db8fb87e3c9184c4703 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Bloomfield <peterbloomfield@bellsouth.net>
+Date: Fri, 11 Apr 2025 05:52:33 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 2/2] gstring: Make len_unsigned unsigned
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-4373
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/-/commit/4d435bb4809793c445846db8fb87e3c9184c4703]
+
+Signed-off-by: Praveen Kumar <praveen.kumar@windriver.com>
+---
+ glib/gstring.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/glib/gstring.c b/glib/gstring.c
+index d6f8735..d097e2f 100644
+--- a/glib/gstring.c
++++ b/glib/gstring.c
+@@ -873,7 +873,7 @@ g_string_overwrite_len (GString     *string,
+                         const gchar *val,
+                         gssize       len)
+ {
+-  gssize len_unsigned;
++  gsize len_unsigned;
+   gsize end;
+
+   g_return_val_if_fail (string != NULL, NULL);
+--
+2.40.0

meta/recipes-core/glib-2.0/glib-2.0/CVE-2025-7039-01.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+From 285db475ecaa4d2cc39ce326b4c63aacb87ca6ad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alexander Kanavin <alex@linutronix.de>
+Date: Tue, 22 Aug 2023 19:57:48 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] glib/gfileutils.c: use 64 bits for value in get_tmp_file()
+
+On 32 bit systems 'long' value will overflow in 2038 and become negative.
+As it is used to index into letters array, and % operation preserves signs,
+data corruption will then occur.
+
+Signed-off-by: Alexander Kanavin <alex@linutronix.de>
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-7039
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/-/commit/285db475ecaa4d2cc39ce326b4c63aacb87ca6ad]
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
+---
+ glib/gfileutils.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/glib/gfileutils.c b/glib/gfileutils.c
+index 9646c696e..bd3cc179a 100644
+--- a/glib/gfileutils.c
++++ b/glib/gfileutils.c
+@@ -1475,7 +1475,7 @@ get_tmp_file (gchar            *tmpl,
+   static const char letters[] =
+     "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789";
+   static const int NLETTERS = sizeof (letters) - 1;
+-  glong value;
++  gint64 value;
+   gint64 now_us;
+   static int counter = 0;
+ 
+@@ -1496,7 +1496,7 @@ get_tmp_file (gchar            *tmpl,
+ 
+   for (count = 0; count < 100; value += 7777, ++count)
+     {
+-      glong v = value;
++      gint64 v = value;
+ 
+       /* Fill in the random bits.  */
+       XXXXXX[0] = letters[v % NLETTERS];

meta/recipes-core/glib-2.0/glib-2.0/CVE-2025-7039-02.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+From 61e963284889ddb4544e6f1d5261c16120f6fcc3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Michael Catanzaro <mcatanzaro@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2025 10:58:07 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH] gfileutils: fix computation of temporary file name
+
+We need to ensure that the value we use to index into the letters array
+is always positive.
+
+Fixes #3716
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-7039
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/-/commit/61e963284889ddb4544e6f1d5261c16120f6fcc3]
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
+---
+ glib/gfileutils.c | 8 ++++----
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/glib/gfileutils.c b/glib/gfileutils.c
+index c7d3339d1..286b1b154 100644
+--- a/glib/gfileutils.c
++++ b/glib/gfileutils.c
+@@ -1475,9 +1475,9 @@ get_tmp_file (gchar            *tmpl,
+   static const char letters[] =
+     "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789";
+   static const int NLETTERS = sizeof (letters) - 1;
+-  gint64 value;
+-  gint64 now_us;
+-  static int counter = 0;
++  guint64 value;
++  guint64 now_us;
++  static guint counter = 0;
+ 
+   g_return_val_if_fail (tmpl != NULL, -1);
+ 
+@@ -1496,7 +1496,7 @@ get_tmp_file (gchar            *tmpl,
+ 
+   for (count = 0; count < 100; value += 7777, ++count)
+     {
+-      gint64 v = value;
++      guint64 v = value;
+ 
+       /* Fill in the random bits.  */
+       XXXXXX[0] = letters[v % NLETTERS];

meta/recipes-core/glib-2.0/glib-2.0_2.72.3.bb

@@ -60,6 +60,10 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNOME_MIRROR}/glib/${SHRT_VER}/glib-${PV}.tar.xz \
            file://CVE-2025-3360-04.patch \
            file://CVE-2025-3360-05.patch \
            file://CVE-2025-3360-06.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-4373-01.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-4373-02.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-7039-01.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-7039-02.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI:append:class-native = " file://relocate-modules.patch"
 
@@ -95,3 +99,6 @@ def find_meson_cross_files(d):
 python () {
     find_meson_cross_files(d)
 }
+
+# not-applicable-platform: Issue only applies on Windows
+CVE_CHECK_IGNORE += "CVE-2025-4056"

meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc-version.inc

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 SRCBRANCH ?= "release/2.35/master"
 PV = "2.35"
-SRCREV_glibc ?= "d2febe7c407665c18cfea1930c65f41899ab3aa3"
+SRCREV_glibc ?= "a66bc3941ff298e474d5f02d0c3303401951141f"
 SRCREV_localedef ?= "794da69788cbf9bf57b59a852f9f11307663fa87"
 
 GLIBC_GIT_URI ?= "git://sourceware.org/git/glibc.git"

meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc/0026-PR25847-1.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,455 @@
+From 31d9848830e496f57d4182b518467c4c63bfd4bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Frank Barrus <frankbarrus_sw@shaggy.cc>
+Date: Mon, 16 Jun 2025 22:37:54 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] pthreads NPTL: lost wakeup fix 2
+
+This fixes the lost wakeup (from a bug in signal stealing) with a change
+in the usage of g_signals[] in the condition variable internal state.
+It also completely eliminates the concept and handling of signal stealing,
+as well as the need for signalers to block to wait for waiters to wake
+up every time there is a G1/G2 switch.  This greatly reduces the average
+and maximum latency for pthread_cond_signal.
+
+The g_signals[] field now contains a signal count that is relative to
+the current g1_start value.  Since it is a 32-bit field, and the LSB is
+still reserved (though not currently used anymore), it has a 31-bit value
+that corresponds to the low 31 bits of the sequence number in g1_start.
+(since g1_start also has an LSB flag, this means bits 31:1 in g_signals
+correspond to bits 31:1 in g1_start, plus the current signal count)
+
+By making the signal count relative to g1_start, there is no longer
+any ambiguity or A/B/A issue, and thus any checks before blocking,
+including the futex call itself, are guaranteed not to block if the G1/G2
+switch occurs, even if the signal count remains the same.  This allows
+initially safely blocking in G2 until the switch to G1 occurs, and
+then transitioning from G1 to a new G1 or G2, and always being able to
+distinguish the state change.  This removes the race condition and A/B/A
+problems that otherwise ocurred if a late (pre-empted) waiter were to
+resume just as the futex call attempted to block on g_signal since
+otherwise there was no last opportunity to re-check things like whether
+the current G1 group was already closed.
+
+By fixing these issues, the signal stealing code can be eliminated,
+since there is no concept of signal stealing anymore.  The code to block
+for all waiters to exit g_refs can also be removed, since any waiters
+that are still in the g_refs region can be guaranteed to safely wake
+up and exit.  If there are still any left at this time, they are all
+sent one final futex wakeup to ensure that they are not blocked any
+longer, but there is no need for the signaller to block and wait for
+them to wake up and exit the g_refs region.
+
+The signal count is then effectively "zeroed" but since it is now
+relative to g1_start, this is done by advancing it to a new value that
+can be observed by any pending blocking waiters.  Any late waiters can
+always tell the difference, and can thus just cleanly exit if they are
+in a stale G1 or G2.  They can never steal a signal from the current
+G1 if they are not in the current G1, since the signal value that has
+to match in the cmpxchg has the low 31 bits of the g1_start value
+contained in it, and that's first checked, and then it won't match if
+there's a G1/G2 change.
+
+Note: the 31-bit sequence number used in g_signals is designed to
+handle wrap-around when checking the signal count, but if the entire
+31-bit wraparound (2 billion signals) occurs while there is still a
+late waiter that has not yet resumed, and it happens to then match
+the current g1_start low bits, and the pre-emption occurs after the
+normal "closed group" checks (which are 64-bit) but then hits the
+futex syscall and signal consuming code, then an A/B/A issue could
+still result and cause an incorrect assumption about whether it
+should block.  This particular scenario seems unlikely in practice.
+Note that once awake from the futex, the waiter would notice the
+closed group before consuming the signal (since that's still a 64-bit
+check that would not be aliased in the wrap-around in g_signals),
+so the biggest impact would be blocking on the futex until the next
+full wakeup from a G1/G2 switch.
+
+The following commits have been cherry-picked from Glibc master branch:
+Bug : https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=25847
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+[https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=commit;h=1db84775f831a1494993ce9c118deaf9537cc50a]
+
+Signed-off-by: Sunil Dora <sunilkumar.dora@windriver.com>
+---
+ nptl/pthread_cond_common.c | 106 +++++++++------------------
+ nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c   | 144 ++++++++++++-------------------------
+ 2 files changed, 81 insertions(+), 169 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/nptl/pthread_cond_common.c b/nptl/pthread_cond_common.c
+index fb035f72c3..8dd7037923 100644
+--- a/nptl/pthread_cond_common.c
++++ b/nptl/pthread_cond_common.c
+@@ -201,7 +201,6 @@ static bool __attribute__ ((unused))
+ __condvar_quiesce_and_switch_g1 (pthread_cond_t *cond, uint64_t wseq,
+     unsigned int *g1index, int private)
+ {
+-  const unsigned int maxspin = 0;
+   unsigned int g1 = *g1index;
+ 
+   /* If there is no waiter in G2, we don't do anything.  The expression may
+@@ -222,85 +221,46 @@ __condvar_quiesce_and_switch_g1 (pthread_cond_t *cond, uint64_t wseq,
+      * New waiters arriving concurrently with the group switching will all go
+        into G2 until we atomically make the switch.  Waiters existing in G2
+        are not affected.
+-     * Waiters in G1 will be closed out immediately by setting a flag in
+-       __g_signals, which will prevent waiters from blocking using a futex on
+-       __g_signals and also notifies them that the group is closed.  As a
+-       result, they will eventually remove their group reference, allowing us
+-       to close switch group roles.  */
+-
+-  /* First, set the closed flag on __g_signals.  This tells waiters that are
+-     about to wait that they shouldn't do that anymore.  This basically
+-     serves as an advance notificaton of the upcoming change to __g1_start;
+-     waiters interpret it as if __g1_start was larger than their waiter
+-     sequence position.  This allows us to change __g1_start after waiting
+-     for all existing waiters with group references to leave, which in turn
+-     makes recovery after stealing a signal simpler because it then can be
+-     skipped if __g1_start indicates that the group is closed (otherwise,
+-     we would have to recover always because waiters don't know how big their
+-     groups are).  Relaxed MO is fine.  */
+-  atomic_fetch_or_relaxed (cond->__data.__g_signals + g1, 1);
+-
+-  /* Wait until there are no group references anymore.  The fetch-or operation
+-     injects us into the modification order of __g_refs; release MO ensures
+-     that waiters incrementing __g_refs after our fetch-or see the previous
+-     changes to __g_signals and to __g1_start that had to happen before we can
+-     switch this G1 and alias with an older group (we have two groups, so
+-     aliasing requires switching group roles twice).  Note that nobody else
+-     can have set the wake-request flag, so we do not have to act upon it.
+-
+-     Also note that it is harmless if older waiters or waiters from this G1
+-     get a group reference after we have quiesced the group because it will
+-     remain closed for them either because of the closed flag in __g_signals
+-     or the later update to __g1_start.  New waiters will never arrive here
+-     but instead continue to go into the still current G2.  */
+-  unsigned r = atomic_fetch_or_release (cond->__data.__g_refs + g1, 0);
+-  while ((r >> 1) > 0)
+-    {
+-      for (unsigned int spin = maxspin; ((r >> 1) > 0) && (spin > 0); spin--)
+-	{
+-	  /* TODO Back off.  */
+-	  r = atomic_load_relaxed (cond->__data.__g_refs + g1);
+-	}
+-      if ((r >> 1) > 0)
+-	{
+-	  /* There is still a waiter after spinning.  Set the wake-request
+-	     flag and block.  Relaxed MO is fine because this is just about
+-	     this futex word.
+-
+-	     Update r to include the set wake-request flag so that the upcoming
+-	     futex_wait only blocks if the flag is still set (otherwise, we'd
+-	     violate the basic client-side futex protocol).  */
+-	  r = atomic_fetch_or_relaxed (cond->__data.__g_refs + g1, 1) | 1;
+-
+-	  if ((r >> 1) > 0)
+-	    futex_wait_simple (cond->__data.__g_refs + g1, r, private);
+-	  /* Reload here so we eventually see the most recent value even if we
+-	     do not spin.   */
+-	  r = atomic_load_relaxed (cond->__data.__g_refs + g1);
+-	}
+-    }
+-  /* Acquire MO so that we synchronize with the release operation that waiters
+-     use to decrement __g_refs and thus happen after the waiters we waited
+-     for.  */
+-  atomic_thread_fence_acquire ();
++     * Waiters in G1 will be closed out immediately by the advancing of
++       __g_signals to the next "lowseq" (low 31 bits of the new g1_start),
++       which will prevent waiters from blocking using a futex on
++       __g_signals since it provides enough signals for all possible
++       remaining waiters.  As a result, they can each consume a signal
++       and they will eventually remove their group reference.  */
+ 
+   /* Update __g1_start, which finishes closing this group.  The value we add
+      will never be negative because old_orig_size can only be zero when we
+      switch groups the first time after a condvar was initialized, in which
+-     case G1 will be at index 1 and we will add a value of 1.  See above for
+-     why this takes place after waiting for quiescence of the group.
++     case G1 will be at index 1 and we will add a value of 1.
+      Relaxed MO is fine because the change comes with no additional
+      constraints that others would have to observe.  */
+   __condvar_add_g1_start_relaxed (cond,
+       (old_orig_size << 1) + (g1 == 1 ? 1 : - 1));
+ 
+-  /* Now reopen the group, thus enabling waiters to again block using the
+-     futex controlled by __g_signals.  Release MO so that observers that see
+-     no signals (and thus can block) also see the write __g1_start and thus
+-     that this is now a new group (see __pthread_cond_wait_common for the
+-     matching acquire MO loads).  */
+-  atomic_store_release (cond->__data.__g_signals + g1, 0);
+-
++  unsigned int lowseq = ((old_g1_start + old_orig_size) << 1) & ~1U;
++
++  /* If any waiters still hold group references (and thus could be blocked),
++     then wake them all up now and prevent any running ones from blocking.
++     This is effectively a catch-all for any possible current or future
++     bugs that can allow the group size to reach 0 before all G1 waiters
++     have been awakened or at least given signals to consume, or any
++     other case that can leave blocked (or about to block) older waiters..  */
++  if ((atomic_fetch_or_release (cond->__data.__g_refs + g1, 0) >> 1) > 0)
++   {
++    /* First advance signals to the end of the group (i.e. enough signals
++       for the entire G1 group) to ensure that waiters which have not
++       yet blocked in the futex will not block.
++       Note that in the vast majority of cases, this should never
++       actually be necessary, since __g_signals will have enough
++       signals for the remaining g_refs waiters.  As an optimization,
++       we could check this first before proceeding, although that
++       could still leave the potential for futex lost wakeup bugs
++       if the signal count was non-zero but the futex wakeup
++       was somehow lost.  */
++    atomic_store_release (cond->__data.__g_signals + g1, lowseq);
++
++    futex_wake (cond->__data.__g_signals + g1, INT_MAX, private);
++   }
+   /* At this point, the old G1 is now a valid new G2 (but not in use yet).
+      No old waiter can neither grab a signal nor acquire a reference without
+      noticing that __g1_start is larger.
+@@ -311,6 +271,10 @@ __condvar_quiesce_and_switch_g1 (pthread_cond_t *cond, uint64_t wseq,
+   g1 ^= 1;
+   *g1index ^= 1;
+ 
++  /* Now advance the new G1 g_signals to the new lowseq, giving it
++     an effective signal count of 0 to start.  */
++  atomic_store_release (cond->__data.__g_signals + g1, lowseq);
++
+   /* These values are just observed by signalers, and thus protected by the
+      lock.  */
+   unsigned int orig_size = wseq - (old_g1_start + old_orig_size);
+diff --git a/nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c b/nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c
+index 20c348a503..1cb3dbf7b0 100644
+--- a/nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c
++++ b/nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c
+@@ -238,9 +238,7 @@ __condvar_cleanup_waiting (void *arg)
+    signaled), and a reference count.
+ 
+    The group reference count is used to maintain the number of waiters that
+-   are using the group's futex.  Before a group can change its role, the
+-   reference count must show that no waiters are using the futex anymore; this
+-   prevents ABA issues on the futex word.
++   are using the group's futex.
+ 
+    To represent which intervals in the waiter sequence the groups cover (and
+    thus also which group slot contains G1 or G2), we use a 64b counter to
+@@ -300,11 +298,12 @@ __condvar_cleanup_waiting (void *arg)
+        last reference.
+      * Reference count used by waiters concurrently with signalers that have
+        acquired the condvar-internal lock.
+-   __g_signals: The number of signals that can still be consumed.
++   __g_signals: The number of signals that can still be consumed, relative to
++     the current g1_start.  (i.e. bits 31 to 1 of __g_signals are bits
++     31 to 1 of g1_start with the signal count added)
+      * Used as a futex word by waiters.  Used concurrently by waiters and
+        signalers.
+-     * LSB is true iff this group has been completely signaled (i.e., it is
+-       closed).
++     * LSB is currently reserved and 0.
+    __g_size: Waiters remaining in this group (i.e., which have not been
+      signaled yet.
+      * Accessed by signalers and waiters that cancel waiting (both do so only
+@@ -328,18 +327,6 @@ __condvar_cleanup_waiting (void *arg)
+    sufficient because if a waiter can see a sufficiently large value, it could
+    have also consume a signal in the waiters group.
+ 
+-   Waiters try to grab a signal from __g_signals without holding a reference
+-   count, which can lead to stealing a signal from a more recent group after
+-   their own group was already closed.  They cannot always detect whether they
+-   in fact did because they do not know when they stole, but they can
+-   conservatively add a signal back to the group they stole from; if they
+-   did so unnecessarily, all that happens is a spurious wake-up.  To make this
+-   even less likely, __g1_start contains the index of the current g2 too,
+-   which allows waiters to check if there aliasing on the group slots; if
+-   there wasn't, they didn't steal from the current G1, which means that the
+-   G1 they stole from must have been already closed and they do not need to
+-   fix anything.
+-
+    It is essential that the last field in pthread_cond_t is __g_signals[1]:
+    The previous condvar used a pointer-sized field in pthread_cond_t, so a
+    PTHREAD_COND_INITIALIZER from that condvar implementation might only
+@@ -435,6 +422,9 @@ __pthread_cond_wait_common (pthread_cond_t *cond, pthread_mutex_t *mutex,
+     {
+       while (1)
+ 	{
++          uint64_t g1_start = __condvar_load_g1_start_relaxed (cond);
++          unsigned int lowseq = (g1_start & 1) == g ? signals : g1_start & ~1U;
++
+ 	  /* Spin-wait first.
+ 	     Note that spinning first without checking whether a timeout
+ 	     passed might lead to what looks like a spurious wake-up even
+@@ -446,35 +436,45 @@ __pthread_cond_wait_common (pthread_cond_t *cond, pthread_mutex_t *mutex,
+ 	     having to compare against the current time seems to be the right
+ 	     choice from a performance perspective for most use cases.  */
+ 	  unsigned int spin = maxspin;
+-	  while (signals == 0 && spin > 0)
++	  while (spin > 0 && ((int)(signals - lowseq) < 2))
+ 	    {
+ 	      /* Check that we are not spinning on a group that's already
+ 		 closed.  */
+-	      if (seq < (__condvar_load_g1_start_relaxed (cond) >> 1))
+-		goto done;
++	      if (seq < (g1_start >> 1))
++		break;
+ 
+ 	      /* TODO Back off.  */
+ 
+ 	      /* Reload signals.  See above for MO.  */
+ 	      signals = atomic_load_acquire (cond->__data.__g_signals + g);
++              g1_start = __condvar_load_g1_start_relaxed (cond);
++              lowseq = (g1_start & 1) == g ? signals : g1_start & ~1U;
+ 	      spin--;
+ 	    }
+ 
+-	  /* If our group will be closed as indicated by the flag on signals,
+-	     don't bother grabbing a signal.  */
+-	  if (signals & 1)
+-	    goto done;
+-
+-	  /* If there is an available signal, don't block.  */
+-	  if (signals != 0)
++          if (seq < (g1_start >> 1))
++	    {
++              /* If the group is closed already,
++	         then this waiter originally had enough extra signals to
++	         consume, up until the time its group was closed.  */
++	       goto done;
++            }
++
++	  /* If there is an available signal, don't block.
++             If __g1_start has advanced at all, then we must be in G1
++	     by now, perhaps in the process of switching back to an older
++	     G2, but in either case we're allowed to consume the available
++	     signal and should not block anymore.  */
++	  if ((int)(signals - lowseq) >= 2)
+ 	    break;
+ 
+ 	  /* No signals available after spinning, so prepare to block.
+ 	     We first acquire a group reference and use acquire MO for that so
+ 	     that we synchronize with the dummy read-modify-write in
+ 	     __condvar_quiesce_and_switch_g1 if we read from that.  In turn,
+-	     in this case this will make us see the closed flag on __g_signals
+-	     that designates a concurrent attempt to reuse the group's slot.
++	     in this case this will make us see the advancement of __g_signals
++	     to the upcoming new g1_start that occurs with a concurrent
++	     attempt to reuse the group's slot.
+ 	     We use acquire MO for the __g_signals check to make the
+ 	     __g1_start check work (see spinning above).
+ 	     Note that the group reference acquisition will not mask the
+@@ -482,15 +482,24 @@ __pthread_cond_wait_common (pthread_cond_t *cond, pthread_mutex_t *mutex,
+ 	     an atomic read-modify-write operation and thus extend the release
+ 	     sequence.  */
+ 	  atomic_fetch_add_acquire (cond->__data.__g_refs + g, 2);
+-	  if (((atomic_load_acquire (cond->__data.__g_signals + g) & 1) != 0)
+-	      || (seq < (__condvar_load_g1_start_relaxed (cond) >> 1)))
++	  signals = atomic_load_acquire (cond->__data.__g_signals + g);
++          g1_start = __condvar_load_g1_start_relaxed (cond);
++          lowseq = (g1_start & 1) == g ? signals : g1_start & ~1U;
++
++          if (seq < (g1_start >> 1))
+ 	    {
+-	      /* Our group is closed.  Wake up any signalers that might be
+-		 waiting.  */
++              /* group is closed already, so don't block */
+ 	      __condvar_dec_grefs (cond, g, private);
+ 	      goto done;
+ 	    }
+ 
++	  if ((int)(signals - lowseq) >= 2)
++	    {
++	      /* a signal showed up or G1/G2 switched after we grabbed the refcount */
++	      __condvar_dec_grefs (cond, g, private);
++	      break;
++            }
++
+ 	  // Now block.
+ 	  struct _pthread_cleanup_buffer buffer;
+ 	  struct _condvar_cleanup_buffer cbuffer;
+@@ -501,7 +510,7 @@ __pthread_cond_wait_common (pthread_cond_t *cond, pthread_mutex_t *mutex,
+ 	  __pthread_cleanup_push (&buffer, __condvar_cleanup_waiting, &cbuffer);
+ 
+ 	  err = __futex_abstimed_wait_cancelable64 (
+-	    cond->__data.__g_signals + g, 0, clockid, abstime, private);
++	    cond->__data.__g_signals + g, signals, clockid, abstime, private);
+ 
+ 	  __pthread_cleanup_pop (&buffer, 0);
+ 
+@@ -524,6 +533,8 @@ __pthread_cond_wait_common (pthread_cond_t *cond, pthread_mutex_t *mutex,
+ 	  signals = atomic_load_acquire (cond->__data.__g_signals + g);
+ 	}
+ 
++       if (seq < (__condvar_load_g1_start_relaxed (cond) >> 1))
++	 goto done;
+     }
+   /* Try to grab a signal.  Use acquire MO so that we see an up-to-date value
+      of __g1_start below (see spinning above for a similar case).  In
+@@ -532,69 +543,6 @@ __pthread_cond_wait_common (pthread_cond_t *cond, pthread_mutex_t *mutex,
+   while (!atomic_compare_exchange_weak_acquire (cond->__data.__g_signals + g,
+ 						&signals, signals - 2));
+ 
+-  /* We consumed a signal but we could have consumed from a more recent group
+-     that aliased with ours due to being in the same group slot.  If this
+-     might be the case our group must be closed as visible through
+-     __g1_start.  */
+-  uint64_t g1_start = __condvar_load_g1_start_relaxed (cond);
+-  if (seq < (g1_start >> 1))
+-    {
+-      /* We potentially stole a signal from a more recent group but we do not
+-	 know which group we really consumed from.
+-	 We do not care about groups older than current G1 because they are
+-	 closed; we could have stolen from these, but then we just add a
+-	 spurious wake-up for the current groups.
+-	 We will never steal a signal from current G2 that was really intended
+-	 for G2 because G2 never receives signals (until it becomes G1).  We
+-	 could have stolen a signal from G2 that was conservatively added by a
+-	 previous waiter that also thought it stole a signal -- but given that
+-	 that signal was added unnecessarily, it's not a problem if we steal
+-	 it.
+-	 Thus, the remaining case is that we could have stolen from the current
+-	 G1, where "current" means the __g1_start value we observed.  However,
+-	 if the current G1 does not have the same slot index as we do, we did
+-	 not steal from it and do not need to undo that.  This is the reason
+-	 for putting a bit with G2's index into__g1_start as well.  */
+-      if (((g1_start & 1) ^ 1) == g)
+-	{
+-	  /* We have to conservatively undo our potential mistake of stealing
+-	     a signal.  We can stop trying to do that when the current G1
+-	     changes because other spinning waiters will notice this too and
+-	     __condvar_quiesce_and_switch_g1 has checked that there are no
+-	     futex waiters anymore before switching G1.
+-	     Relaxed MO is fine for the __g1_start load because we need to
+-	     merely be able to observe this fact and not have to observe
+-	     something else as well.
+-	     ??? Would it help to spin for a little while to see whether the
+-	     current G1 gets closed?  This might be worthwhile if the group is
+-	     small or close to being closed.  */
+-	  unsigned int s = atomic_load_relaxed (cond->__data.__g_signals + g);
+-	  while (__condvar_load_g1_start_relaxed (cond) == g1_start)
+-	    {
+-	      /* Try to add a signal.  We don't need to acquire the lock
+-		 because at worst we can cause a spurious wake-up.  If the
+-		 group is in the process of being closed (LSB is true), this
+-		 has an effect similar to us adding a signal.  */
+-	      if (((s & 1) != 0)
+-		  || atomic_compare_exchange_weak_relaxed
+-		       (cond->__data.__g_signals + g, &s, s + 2))
+-		{
+-		  /* If we added a signal, we also need to add a wake-up on
+-		     the futex.  We also need to do that if we skipped adding
+-		     a signal because the group is being closed because
+-		     while __condvar_quiesce_and_switch_g1 could have closed
+-		     the group, it might stil be waiting for futex waiters to
+-		     leave (and one of those waiters might be the one we stole
+-		     the signal from, which cause it to block using the
+-		     futex).  */
+-		  futex_wake (cond->__data.__g_signals + g, 1, private);
+-		  break;
+-		}
+-	      /* TODO Back off.  */
+-	    }
+-	}
+-    }
+-
+  done:
+ 
+   /* Confirm that we have been woken.  We do that before acquiring the mutex
+-- 
+2.49.0
+

meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc/0026-PR25847-2.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
+From 6aab1191e35a3da66e8c49d95178a9d77c119a1f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Malte Skarupke <malteskarupke@fastmail.fm>
+Date: Mon, 16 Jun 2025 23:17:53 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] nptl: Update comments and indentation for new condvar
+ implementation
+
+Some comments were wrong after the most recent commit. This fixes that.
+Also fixing indentation where it was using spaces instead of tabs.
+
+The following commits have been cherry-picked from Glibc master branch:
+Bug : https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=25847
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+[https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=commit;h=0cc973160c23bb67f895bc887dd6942d29f8fee3]
+
+Signed-off-by: Sunil Dora <sunilkumar.dora@windriver.com>
+---
+ nptl/pthread_cond_common.c |  5 +++--
+ nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c   | 39 +++++++++++++++++++-------------------
+ 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/nptl/pthread_cond_common.c b/nptl/pthread_cond_common.c
+index 8dd7037923..306a207dd6 100644
+--- a/nptl/pthread_cond_common.c
++++ b/nptl/pthread_cond_common.c
+@@ -221,8 +221,9 @@ __condvar_quiesce_and_switch_g1 (pthread_cond_t *cond, uint64_t wseq,
+      * New waiters arriving concurrently with the group switching will all go
+        into G2 until we atomically make the switch.  Waiters existing in G2
+        are not affected.
+-     * Waiters in G1 will be closed out immediately by the advancing of
+-       __g_signals to the next "lowseq" (low 31 bits of the new g1_start),
++     * Waiters in G1 have already received a signal and been woken. If they
++       haven't woken yet, they will be closed out immediately by the advancing
++       of __g_signals to the next "lowseq" (low 31 bits of the new g1_start),
+        which will prevent waiters from blocking using a futex on
+        __g_signals since it provides enough signals for all possible
+        remaining waiters.  As a result, they can each consume a signal
+diff --git a/nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c b/nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c
+index 1cb3dbf7b0..cee1968756 100644
+--- a/nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c
++++ b/nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c
+@@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ __condvar_cleanup_waiting (void *arg)
+    figure out whether they are in a group that has already been completely
+    signaled (i.e., if the current G1 starts at a later position that the
+    waiter's position).  Waiters cannot determine whether they are currently
+-   in G2 or G1 -- but they do not have too because all they are interested in
++   in G2 or G1 -- but they do not have to because all they are interested in
+    is whether there are available signals, and they always start in G2 (whose
+    group slot they know because of the bit in the waiter sequence.  Signalers
+    will simply fill the right group until it is completely signaled and can
+@@ -412,7 +412,7 @@ __pthread_cond_wait_common (pthread_cond_t *cond, pthread_mutex_t *mutex,
+     }
+ 
+   /* Now wait until a signal is available in our group or it is closed.
+-     Acquire MO so that if we observe a value of zero written after group
++     Acquire MO so that if we observe (signals == lowseq) after group
+      switching in __condvar_quiesce_and_switch_g1, we synchronize with that
+      store and will see the prior update of __g1_start done while switching
+      groups too.  */
+@@ -422,8 +422,8 @@ __pthread_cond_wait_common (pthread_cond_t *cond, pthread_mutex_t *mutex,
+     {
+       while (1)
+ 	{
+-          uint64_t g1_start = __condvar_load_g1_start_relaxed (cond);
+-          unsigned int lowseq = (g1_start & 1) == g ? signals : g1_start & ~1U;
++	  uint64_t g1_start = __condvar_load_g1_start_relaxed (cond);
++	  unsigned int lowseq = (g1_start & 1) == g ? signals : g1_start & ~1U;
+ 
+ 	  /* Spin-wait first.
+ 	     Note that spinning first without checking whether a timeout
+@@ -447,21 +447,21 @@ __pthread_cond_wait_common (pthread_cond_t *cond, pthread_mutex_t *mutex,
+ 
+ 	      /* Reload signals.  See above for MO.  */
+ 	      signals = atomic_load_acquire (cond->__data.__g_signals + g);
+-              g1_start = __condvar_load_g1_start_relaxed (cond);
+-              lowseq = (g1_start & 1) == g ? signals : g1_start & ~1U;
++	      g1_start = __condvar_load_g1_start_relaxed (cond);
++	      lowseq = (g1_start & 1) == g ? signals : g1_start & ~1U;
+ 	      spin--;
+ 	    }
+ 
+-          if (seq < (g1_start >> 1))
++	  if (seq < (g1_start >> 1))
+ 	    {
+-              /* If the group is closed already,
++	      /* If the group is closed already,
+ 	         then this waiter originally had enough extra signals to
+ 	         consume, up until the time its group was closed.  */
+ 	       goto done;
+-            }
++	    }
+ 
+ 	  /* If there is an available signal, don't block.
+-             If __g1_start has advanced at all, then we must be in G1
++	     If __g1_start has advanced at all, then we must be in G1
+ 	     by now, perhaps in the process of switching back to an older
+ 	     G2, but in either case we're allowed to consume the available
+ 	     signal and should not block anymore.  */
+@@ -483,22 +483,23 @@ __pthread_cond_wait_common (pthread_cond_t *cond, pthread_mutex_t *mutex,
+ 	     sequence.  */
+ 	  atomic_fetch_add_acquire (cond->__data.__g_refs + g, 2);
+ 	  signals = atomic_load_acquire (cond->__data.__g_signals + g);
+-          g1_start = __condvar_load_g1_start_relaxed (cond);
+-          lowseq = (g1_start & 1) == g ? signals : g1_start & ~1U;
++	  g1_start = __condvar_load_g1_start_relaxed (cond);
++	  lowseq = (g1_start & 1) == g ? signals : g1_start & ~1U;
+ 
+-          if (seq < (g1_start >> 1))
++	  if (seq < (g1_start >> 1))
+ 	    {
+-              /* group is closed already, so don't block */
++	      /* group is closed already, so don't block */
+ 	      __condvar_dec_grefs (cond, g, private);
+ 	      goto done;
+ 	    }
+ 
+ 	  if ((int)(signals - lowseq) >= 2)
+ 	    {
+-	      /* a signal showed up or G1/G2 switched after we grabbed the refcount */
++	      /* a signal showed up or G1/G2 switched after we grabbed the
++	         refcount */
+ 	      __condvar_dec_grefs (cond, g, private);
+ 	      break;
+-            }
++	    }
+ 
+ 	  // Now block.
+ 	  struct _pthread_cleanup_buffer buffer;
+@@ -536,10 +537,8 @@ __pthread_cond_wait_common (pthread_cond_t *cond, pthread_mutex_t *mutex,
+        if (seq < (__condvar_load_g1_start_relaxed (cond) >> 1))
+ 	 goto done;
+     }
+-  /* Try to grab a signal.  Use acquire MO so that we see an up-to-date value
+-     of __g1_start below (see spinning above for a similar case).  In
+-     particular, if we steal from a more recent group, we will also see a
+-     more recent __g1_start below.  */
++  /* Try to grab a signal.  See above for MO.  (if we do another loop
++     iteration we need to see the correct value of g1_start)  */
+   while (!atomic_compare_exchange_weak_acquire (cond->__data.__g_signals + g,
+ 						&signals, signals - 2));
+ 
+-- 
+2.49.0
+

meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc/0026-PR25847-3.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+From 28a5082045429fdc5a4744d45fdc5b5202528eaa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Malte Skarupke <malteskarupke@fastmail.fm>
+Date: Mon, 16 Jun 2025 23:29:49 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] nptl: Remove unnecessary catch-all-wake in condvar group
+ switch
+
+This wake is unnecessary. We only switch groups after every sleeper in a group
+has been woken. Sure, they may take a while to actually wake up and may still
+hold a reference, but waking them a second time doesn't speed that up. Instead
+this just makes the code more complicated and may hide problems.
+
+In particular this safety wake wouldn't even have helped with the bug that was
+fixed by Barrus' patch: The bug there was that pthread_cond_signal would not
+switch g1 when it should, so we wouldn't even have entered this code path.
+
+The following commits have been cherry-picked from Glibc master branch:
+Bug : https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=25847
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+[https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=commit;h=b42cc6af11062c260c7dfa91f1c89891366fed3e]
+
+Signed-off-by: Sunil Dora <sunilkumar.dora@windriver.com>
+---
+ nptl/pthread_cond_common.c | 30 +-----------------------------
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 29 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/nptl/pthread_cond_common.c b/nptl/pthread_cond_common.c
+index 306a207dd6..f976a533a1 100644
+--- a/nptl/pthread_cond_common.c
++++ b/nptl/pthread_cond_common.c
+@@ -221,13 +221,7 @@ __condvar_quiesce_and_switch_g1 (pthread_cond_t *cond, uint64_t wseq,
+      * New waiters arriving concurrently with the group switching will all go
+        into G2 until we atomically make the switch.  Waiters existing in G2
+        are not affected.
+-     * Waiters in G1 have already received a signal and been woken. If they
+-       haven't woken yet, they will be closed out immediately by the advancing
+-       of __g_signals to the next "lowseq" (low 31 bits of the new g1_start),
+-       which will prevent waiters from blocking using a futex on
+-       __g_signals since it provides enough signals for all possible
+-       remaining waiters.  As a result, they can each consume a signal
+-       and they will eventually remove their group reference.  */
++     * Waiters in G1 have already received a signal and been woken.  */
+ 
+   /* Update __g1_start, which finishes closing this group.  The value we add
+      will never be negative because old_orig_size can only be zero when we
+@@ -240,28 +234,6 @@ __condvar_quiesce_and_switch_g1 (pthread_cond_t *cond, uint64_t wseq,
+ 
+   unsigned int lowseq = ((old_g1_start + old_orig_size) << 1) & ~1U;
+ 
+-  /* If any waiters still hold group references (and thus could be blocked),
+-     then wake them all up now and prevent any running ones from blocking.
+-     This is effectively a catch-all for any possible current or future
+-     bugs that can allow the group size to reach 0 before all G1 waiters
+-     have been awakened or at least given signals to consume, or any
+-     other case that can leave blocked (or about to block) older waiters..  */
+-  if ((atomic_fetch_or_release (cond->__data.__g_refs + g1, 0) >> 1) > 0)
+-   {
+-    /* First advance signals to the end of the group (i.e. enough signals
+-       for the entire G1 group) to ensure that waiters which have not
+-       yet blocked in the futex will not block.
+-       Note that in the vast majority of cases, this should never
+-       actually be necessary, since __g_signals will have enough
+-       signals for the remaining g_refs waiters.  As an optimization,
+-       we could check this first before proceeding, although that
+-       could still leave the potential for futex lost wakeup bugs
+-       if the signal count was non-zero but the futex wakeup
+-       was somehow lost.  */
+-    atomic_store_release (cond->__data.__g_signals + g1, lowseq);
+-
+-    futex_wake (cond->__data.__g_signals + g1, INT_MAX, private);
+-   }
+   /* At this point, the old G1 is now a valid new G2 (but not in use yet).
+      No old waiter can neither grab a signal nor acquire a reference without
+      noticing that __g1_start is larger.
+-- 
+2.49.0
+

meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc/0026-PR25847-4.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+From 16b9af737c77b153fca4f36cbdbe94f7416c0b42 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Malte Skarupke <malteskarupke@fastmail.fm>
+Date: Mon, 16 Jun 2025 23:38:40 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] nptl: Remove unnecessary quadruple check in pthread_cond_wait
+
+pthread_cond_wait was checking whether it was in a closed group no less than
+four times. Checking once is enough. Here are the four checks:
+
+1. While spin-waiting. This was dead code: maxspin is set to 0 and has been
+   for years.
+2. Before deciding to go to sleep, and before incrementing grefs: I kept this
+3. After incrementing grefs. There is no reason to think that the group would
+   close while we do an atomic increment. Obviously it could close at any
+   point, but that doesn't mean we have to recheck after every step. This
+   check was equally good as check 2, except it has to do more work.
+4. When we find ourselves in a group that has a signal. We only get here after
+   we check that we're not in a closed group. There is no need to check again.
+   The check would only have helped in cases where the compare_exchange in the
+   next line would also have failed. Relying on the compare_exchange is fine.
+
+Removing the duplicate checks clarifies the code.
+
+The following commits have been cherry-picked from Glibc master branch:
+Bug : https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=25847
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+[https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=commit;h=4f7b051f8ee3feff1b53b27a906f245afaa9cee1]
+
+Signed-off-by: Sunil Dora <sunilkumar.dora@windriver.com>
+---
+ nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c | 49 ----------------------------------------
+ 1 file changed, 49 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c b/nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c
+index cee1968756..47e834cade 100644
+--- a/nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c
++++ b/nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c
+@@ -366,7 +366,6 @@ static __always_inline int
+ __pthread_cond_wait_common (pthread_cond_t *cond, pthread_mutex_t *mutex,
+     clockid_t clockid, const struct __timespec64 *abstime)
+ {
+-  const int maxspin = 0;
+   int err;
+   int result = 0;
+ 
+@@ -425,33 +424,6 @@ __pthread_cond_wait_common (pthread_cond_t *cond, pthread_mutex_t *mutex,
+ 	  uint64_t g1_start = __condvar_load_g1_start_relaxed (cond);
+ 	  unsigned int lowseq = (g1_start & 1) == g ? signals : g1_start & ~1U;
+ 
+-	  /* Spin-wait first.
+-	     Note that spinning first without checking whether a timeout
+-	     passed might lead to what looks like a spurious wake-up even
+-	     though we should return ETIMEDOUT (e.g., if the caller provides
+-	     an absolute timeout that is clearly in the past).  However,
+-	     (1) spurious wake-ups are allowed, (2) it seems unlikely that a
+-	     user will (ab)use pthread_cond_wait as a check for whether a
+-	     point in time is in the past, and (3) spinning first without
+-	     having to compare against the current time seems to be the right
+-	     choice from a performance perspective for most use cases.  */
+-	  unsigned int spin = maxspin;
+-	  while (spin > 0 && ((int)(signals - lowseq) < 2))
+-	    {
+-	      /* Check that we are not spinning on a group that's already
+-		 closed.  */
+-	      if (seq < (g1_start >> 1))
+-		break;
+-
+-	      /* TODO Back off.  */
+-
+-	      /* Reload signals.  See above for MO.  */
+-	      signals = atomic_load_acquire (cond->__data.__g_signals + g);
+-	      g1_start = __condvar_load_g1_start_relaxed (cond);
+-	      lowseq = (g1_start & 1) == g ? signals : g1_start & ~1U;
+-	      spin--;
+-	    }
+-
+ 	  if (seq < (g1_start >> 1))
+ 	    {
+ 	      /* If the group is closed already,
+@@ -482,24 +454,6 @@ __pthread_cond_wait_common (pthread_cond_t *cond, pthread_mutex_t *mutex,
+ 	     an atomic read-modify-write operation and thus extend the release
+ 	     sequence.  */
+ 	  atomic_fetch_add_acquire (cond->__data.__g_refs + g, 2);
+-	  signals = atomic_load_acquire (cond->__data.__g_signals + g);
+-	  g1_start = __condvar_load_g1_start_relaxed (cond);
+-	  lowseq = (g1_start & 1) == g ? signals : g1_start & ~1U;
+-
+-	  if (seq < (g1_start >> 1))
+-	    {
+-	      /* group is closed already, so don't block */
+-	      __condvar_dec_grefs (cond, g, private);
+-	      goto done;
+-	    }
+-
+-	  if ((int)(signals - lowseq) >= 2)
+-	    {
+-	      /* a signal showed up or G1/G2 switched after we grabbed the
+-	         refcount */
+-	      __condvar_dec_grefs (cond, g, private);
+-	      break;
+-	    }
+ 
+ 	  // Now block.
+ 	  struct _pthread_cleanup_buffer buffer;
+@@ -533,9 +487,6 @@ __pthread_cond_wait_common (pthread_cond_t *cond, pthread_mutex_t *mutex,
+ 	  /* Reload signals.  See above for MO.  */
+ 	  signals = atomic_load_acquire (cond->__data.__g_signals + g);
+ 	}
+-
+-       if (seq < (__condvar_load_g1_start_relaxed (cond) >> 1))
+-	 goto done;
+     }
+   /* Try to grab a signal.  See above for MO.  (if we do another loop
+      iteration we need to see the correct value of g1_start)  */
+-- 
+2.49.0
+

meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc/0026-PR25847-5.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+From d9ffb50dc55f77e584a5d0275eea758c7a6b04e3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Malte Skarupke <malteskarupke@fastmail.fm>
+Date: Mon, 16 Jun 2025 23:53:35 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] nptl: Use a single loop in pthread_cond_wait instaed of a
+ nested loop
+
+The loop was a little more complicated than necessary. There was only one
+break statement out of the inner loop, and the outer loop was nearly empty.
+So just remove the outer loop, moving its code to the one break statement in
+the inner loop. This allows us to replace all gotos with break statements.
+
+The following commits have been cherry-picked from Glibc master branch:
+Bug : https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=25847
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+[https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=commit;h=929a4764ac90382616b6a21f099192b2475da674]
+
+Signed-off-by: Sunil Dora <sunilkumar.dora@windriver.com>
+---
+ nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++---------------------
+ 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c b/nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c
+index 47e834cade..5c86880105 100644
+--- a/nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c
++++ b/nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c
+@@ -410,17 +410,15 @@ __pthread_cond_wait_common (pthread_cond_t *cond, pthread_mutex_t *mutex,
+       return err;
+     }
+ 
+-  /* Now wait until a signal is available in our group or it is closed.
+-     Acquire MO so that if we observe (signals == lowseq) after group
+-     switching in __condvar_quiesce_and_switch_g1, we synchronize with that
+-     store and will see the prior update of __g1_start done while switching
+-     groups too.  */
+-  unsigned int signals = atomic_load_acquire (cond->__data.__g_signals + g);
+-
+-  do
+-    {
++
+       while (1)
+ 	{
++	  /* Now wait until a signal is available in our group or it is closed.
++	     Acquire MO so that if we observe (signals == lowseq) after group
++	     switching in __condvar_quiesce_and_switch_g1, we synchronize with that
++	     store and will see the prior update of __g1_start done while switching
++	     groups too.  */
++	  unsigned int signals = atomic_load_acquire (cond->__data.__g_signals + g);
+ 	  uint64_t g1_start = __condvar_load_g1_start_relaxed (cond);
+ 	  unsigned int lowseq = (g1_start & 1) == g ? signals : g1_start & ~1U;
+ 
+@@ -429,7 +427,7 @@ __pthread_cond_wait_common (pthread_cond_t *cond, pthread_mutex_t *mutex,
+ 	      /* If the group is closed already,
+ 	         then this waiter originally had enough extra signals to
+ 	         consume, up until the time its group was closed.  */
+-	       goto done;
++	       break;
+ 	    }
+ 
+ 	  /* If there is an available signal, don't block.
+@@ -438,8 +436,16 @@ __pthread_cond_wait_common (pthread_cond_t *cond, pthread_mutex_t *mutex,
+ 	     G2, but in either case we're allowed to consume the available
+ 	     signal and should not block anymore.  */
+ 	  if ((int)(signals - lowseq) >= 2)
+-	    break;
+-
++           {
++             /* Try to grab a signal.  See above for MO.  (if we do another loop
++                iteration we need to see the correct value of g1_start)  */
++                     if (atomic_compare_exchange_weak_acquire (
++                               cond->__data.__g_signals + g,
++                       &signals, signals - 2))
++                       break;
++                     else
++                       continue;
++           }
+ 	  /* No signals available after spinning, so prepare to block.
+ 	     We first acquire a group reference and use acquire MO for that so
+ 	     that we synchronize with the dummy read-modify-write in
+@@ -479,21 +485,12 @@ __pthread_cond_wait_common (pthread_cond_t *cond, pthread_mutex_t *mutex,
+ 		 the lock during cancellation is not possible.  */
+ 	      __condvar_cancel_waiting (cond, seq, g, private);
+ 	      result = err;
+-	      goto done;
++	      break;
+ 	    }
+ 	  else
+ 	    __condvar_dec_grefs (cond, g, private);
+ 
+-	  /* Reload signals.  See above for MO.  */
+-	  signals = atomic_load_acquire (cond->__data.__g_signals + g);
+ 	}
+-    }
+-  /* Try to grab a signal.  See above for MO.  (if we do another loop
+-     iteration we need to see the correct value of g1_start)  */
+-  while (!atomic_compare_exchange_weak_acquire (cond->__data.__g_signals + g,
+-						&signals, signals - 2));
+-
+- done:
+ 
+   /* Confirm that we have been woken.  We do that before acquiring the mutex
+      to allow for execution of pthread_cond_destroy while having acquired the
+-- 
+2.49.0
+

meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc/0026-PR25847-6.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
+From a2faee6d0dac6e5232255da9afda4d9ed6cfb6e5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Malte Skarupke <malteskarupke@fastmail.fm>
+Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2025 01:37:12 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] nptl: Fix indentation
+
+In my previous change I turned a nested loop into a simple loop. I'm doing
+the resulting indentation changes in a separate commit to make the diff on
+the previous commit easier to review.
+
+The following commits have been cherry-picked from Glibc master branch:
+Bug : https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=25847
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+[https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=commit;h=ee6c14ed59d480720721aaacc5fb03213dc153da]
+
+Signed-off-by: Sunil Dora <sunilkumar.dora@windriver.com>
+---
+ nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c | 132 ++++++++++++++++-----------------------
+ 1 file changed, 54 insertions(+), 78 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c b/nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c
+index 5c86880105..104ebd48ca 100644
+--- a/nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c
++++ b/nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c
+@@ -410,87 +410,63 @@ __pthread_cond_wait_common (pthread_cond_t *cond, pthread_mutex_t *mutex,
+       return err;
+     }
+ 
+-
+-      while (1)
+-	{
+-	  /* Now wait until a signal is available in our group or it is closed.
+-	     Acquire MO so that if we observe (signals == lowseq) after group
+-	     switching in __condvar_quiesce_and_switch_g1, we synchronize with that
+-	     store and will see the prior update of __g1_start done while switching
+-	     groups too.  */
+-	  unsigned int signals = atomic_load_acquire (cond->__data.__g_signals + g);
+-	  uint64_t g1_start = __condvar_load_g1_start_relaxed (cond);
+-	  unsigned int lowseq = (g1_start & 1) == g ? signals : g1_start & ~1U;
+-
+-	  if (seq < (g1_start >> 1))
+-	    {
+-	      /* If the group is closed already,
+-	         then this waiter originally had enough extra signals to
+-	         consume, up until the time its group was closed.  */
+-	       break;
+-	    }
+-
+-	  /* If there is an available signal, don't block.
+-	     If __g1_start has advanced at all, then we must be in G1
+-	     by now, perhaps in the process of switching back to an older
+-	     G2, but in either case we're allowed to consume the available
+-	     signal and should not block anymore.  */
+-	  if ((int)(signals - lowseq) >= 2)
+-           {
+-             /* Try to grab a signal.  See above for MO.  (if we do another loop
+-                iteration we need to see the correct value of g1_start)  */
+-                     if (atomic_compare_exchange_weak_acquire (
+-                               cond->__data.__g_signals + g,
++  while (1)
++    {
++      /* Now wait until a signal is available in our group or it is closed.
++         Acquire MO so that if we observe (signals == lowseq) after group
++         switching in __condvar_quiesce_and_switch_g1, we synchronize with that
++         store and will see the prior update of __g1_start done while switching
++         groups too.  */
++      unsigned int signals = atomic_load_acquire (cond->__data.__g_signals + g);
++      uint64_t g1_start = __condvar_load_g1_start_relaxed (cond);
++      unsigned int lowseq = (g1_start & 1) == g ? signals : g1_start & ~1U;
++
++      if (seq < (g1_start >> 1))
++        {
++          /* If the group is closed already,
++             then this waiter originally had enough extra signals to
++             consume, up until the time its group was closed.  */
++           break;
++        }
++
++      /* If there is an available signal, don't block.
++         If __g1_start has advanced at all, then we must be in G1
++         by now, perhaps in the process of switching back to an older
++         G2, but in either case we're allowed to consume the available
++         signal and should not block anymore.  */
++      if ((int)(signals - lowseq) >= 2)
++        {
++         /* Try to grab a signal.  See above for MO.  (if we do another loop
++            iteration we need to see the correct value of g1_start)  */
++           if (atomic_compare_exchange_weak_acquire (
++                       cond->__data.__g_signals + g,
+                        &signals, signals - 2))
+-                       break;
+-                     else
+-                       continue;
+-           }
+-	  /* No signals available after spinning, so prepare to block.
+-	     We first acquire a group reference and use acquire MO for that so
+-	     that we synchronize with the dummy read-modify-write in
+-	     __condvar_quiesce_and_switch_g1 if we read from that.  In turn,
+-	     in this case this will make us see the advancement of __g_signals
+-	     to the upcoming new g1_start that occurs with a concurrent
+-	     attempt to reuse the group's slot.
+-	     We use acquire MO for the __g_signals check to make the
+-	     __g1_start check work (see spinning above).
+-	     Note that the group reference acquisition will not mask the
+-	     release MO when decrementing the reference count because we use
+-	     an atomic read-modify-write operation and thus extend the release
+-	     sequence.  */
+-	  atomic_fetch_add_acquire (cond->__data.__g_refs + g, 2);
+-
+-	  // Now block.
+-	  struct _pthread_cleanup_buffer buffer;
+-	  struct _condvar_cleanup_buffer cbuffer;
+-	  cbuffer.wseq = wseq;
+-	  cbuffer.cond = cond;
+-	  cbuffer.mutex = mutex;
+-	  cbuffer.private = private;
+-	  __pthread_cleanup_push (&buffer, __condvar_cleanup_waiting, &cbuffer);
+-
+-	  err = __futex_abstimed_wait_cancelable64 (
+-	    cond->__data.__g_signals + g, signals, clockid, abstime, private);
+-
+-	  __pthread_cleanup_pop (&buffer, 0);
+-
+-	  if (__glibc_unlikely (err == ETIMEDOUT || err == EOVERFLOW))
+-	    {
+-	      __condvar_dec_grefs (cond, g, private);
+-	      /* If we timed out, we effectively cancel waiting.  Note that
+-		 we have decremented __g_refs before cancellation, so that a
+-		 deadlock between waiting for quiescence of our group in
+-		 __condvar_quiesce_and_switch_g1 and us trying to acquire
+-		 the lock during cancellation is not possible.  */
+-	      __condvar_cancel_waiting (cond, seq, g, private);
+-	      result = err;
+ 	      break;
+-	    }
+-	  else
+-	    __condvar_dec_grefs (cond, g, private);
+-
++	   else
++	      continue;
+ 	}
++      // Now block.
++      struct _pthread_cleanup_buffer buffer;
++      struct _condvar_cleanup_buffer cbuffer;
++      cbuffer.wseq = wseq;
++      cbuffer.cond = cond;
++      cbuffer.mutex = mutex;
++      cbuffer.private = private;
++      __pthread_cleanup_push (&buffer, __condvar_cleanup_waiting, &cbuffer);
++
++      err = __futex_abstimed_wait_cancelable64 (
++        cond->__data.__g_signals + g, signals, clockid, abstime, private);
++
++      __pthread_cleanup_pop (&buffer, 0);
++
++      if (__glibc_unlikely (err == ETIMEDOUT || err == EOVERFLOW))
++        {
++          /* If we timed out, we effectively cancel waiting.  */
++          __condvar_cancel_waiting (cond, seq, g, private);
++          result = err;
++          break;
++        }
++    }
+ 
+   /* Confirm that we have been woken.  We do that before acquiring the mutex
+      to allow for execution of pthread_cond_destroy while having acquired the
+-- 
+2.49.0
+

meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc/0026-PR25847-7.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+From 2a601ac9041e2ca645acad2c174b1c545cfceafe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Malte Skarupke <malteskarupke@fastmail.fm>
+Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2025 01:53:25 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] nptl: rename __condvar_quiesce_and_switch_g1
+
+This function no longer waits for threads to leave g1, so rename it to
+__condvar_switch_g1
+
+The following commits have been cherry-picked from Glibc master branch:
+Bug : https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=25847
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+[https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=commit;h=4b79e27a5073c02f6bff9aa8f4791230a0ab1867]
+
+Signed-off-by: Sunil Dora <sunilkumar.dora@windriver.com>
+---
+ nptl/pthread_cond_broadcast.c |  4 ++--
+ nptl/pthread_cond_common.c    | 26 ++++++++++++--------------
+ nptl/pthread_cond_signal.c    | 17 ++++++++---------
+ nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c      |  9 ++++-----
+ 4 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/nptl/pthread_cond_broadcast.c b/nptl/pthread_cond_broadcast.c
+index 5ae141ac81..a07435589a 100644
+--- a/nptl/pthread_cond_broadcast.c
++++ b/nptl/pthread_cond_broadcast.c
+@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ ___pthread_cond_broadcast (pthread_cond_t *cond)
+ 				cond->__data.__g_size[g1] << 1);
+       cond->__data.__g_size[g1] = 0;
+ 
+-      /* We need to wake G1 waiters before we quiesce G1 below.  */
++      /* We need to wake G1 waiters before we switch G1 below.  */
+       /* TODO Only set it if there are indeed futex waiters.  We could
+ 	 also try to move this out of the critical section in cases when
+ 	 G2 is empty (and we don't need to quiesce).  */
+@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ ___pthread_cond_broadcast (pthread_cond_t *cond)
+ 
+   /* G1 is complete.  Step (2) is next unless there are no waiters in G2, in
+      which case we can stop.  */
+-  if (__condvar_quiesce_and_switch_g1 (cond, wseq, &g1, private))
++  if (__condvar_switch_g1 (cond, wseq, &g1, private))
+     {
+       /* Step (3): Send signals to all waiters in the old G2 / new G1.  */
+       atomic_fetch_add_relaxed (cond->__data.__g_signals + g1,
+diff --git a/nptl/pthread_cond_common.c b/nptl/pthread_cond_common.c
+index f976a533a1..3baac4dabc 100644
+--- a/nptl/pthread_cond_common.c
++++ b/nptl/pthread_cond_common.c
+@@ -189,16 +189,15 @@ __condvar_get_private (int flags)
+     return FUTEX_SHARED;
+ }
+ 
+-/* This closes G1 (whose index is in G1INDEX), waits for all futex waiters to
+-   leave G1, converts G1 into a fresh G2, and then switches group roles so that
+-   the former G2 becomes the new G1 ending at the current __wseq value when we
+-   eventually make the switch (WSEQ is just an observation of __wseq by the
+-   signaler).
++/* This closes G1 (whose index is in G1INDEX), converts G1 into a fresh G2,
++   and then switches group roles so that the former G2 becomes the new G1
++   ending at the current __wseq value when we eventually make the switch
++   (WSEQ is just an observation of __wseq by the signaler).
+    If G2 is empty, it will not switch groups because then it would create an
+    empty G1 which would require switching groups again on the next signal.
+    Returns false iff groups were not switched because G2 was empty.  */
+ static bool __attribute__ ((unused))
+-__condvar_quiesce_and_switch_g1 (pthread_cond_t *cond, uint64_t wseq,
++__condvar_switch_g1 (pthread_cond_t *cond, uint64_t wseq,
+     unsigned int *g1index, int private)
+ {
+   unsigned int g1 = *g1index;
+@@ -214,8 +213,7 @@ __condvar_quiesce_and_switch_g1 (pthread_cond_t *cond, uint64_t wseq,
+ 	  + cond->__data.__g_size[g1 ^ 1]) == 0)
+ 	return false;
+ 
+-  /* Now try to close and quiesce G1.  We have to consider the following kinds
+-     of waiters:
++  /* We have to consider the following kinds of waiters:
+      * Waiters from less recent groups than G1 are not affected because
+        nothing will change for them apart from __g1_start getting larger.
+      * New waiters arriving concurrently with the group switching will all go
+@@ -223,12 +221,12 @@ __condvar_quiesce_and_switch_g1 (pthread_cond_t *cond, uint64_t wseq,
+        are not affected.
+      * Waiters in G1 have already received a signal and been woken.  */
+ 
+-  /* Update __g1_start, which finishes closing this group.  The value we add
+-     will never be negative because old_orig_size can only be zero when we
+-     switch groups the first time after a condvar was initialized, in which
+-     case G1 will be at index 1 and we will add a value of 1.
+-     Relaxed MO is fine because the change comes with no additional
+-     constraints that others would have to observe.  */
++  /* Update __g1_start, which closes this group.  The value we add will never
++     be negative because old_orig_size can only be zero when we switch groups
++     the first time after a condvar was initialized, in which case G1 will be
++     at index 1 and we will add a value of 1. Relaxed MO is fine because the
++     change comes with no additional constraints that others would have to
++     observe.  */
+   __condvar_add_g1_start_relaxed (cond,
+       (old_orig_size << 1) + (g1 == 1 ? 1 : - 1));
+ 
+diff --git a/nptl/pthread_cond_signal.c b/nptl/pthread_cond_signal.c
+index 14800ba00b..a9bc10dcca 100644
+--- a/nptl/pthread_cond_signal.c
++++ b/nptl/pthread_cond_signal.c
+@@ -69,18 +69,17 @@ ___pthread_cond_signal (pthread_cond_t *cond)
+   bool do_futex_wake = false;
+ 
+   /* If G1 is still receiving signals, we put the signal there.  If not, we
+-     check if G2 has waiters, and if so, quiesce and switch G1 to the former
+-     G2; if this results in a new G1 with waiters (G2 might have cancellations
+-     already, see __condvar_quiesce_and_switch_g1), we put the signal in the
+-     new G1.  */
++     check if G2 has waiters, and if so, switch G1 to the former G2; if this
++     results in a new G1 with waiters (G2 might have cancellations already,
++     see __condvar_switch_g1), we put the signal in the new G1. */
+   if ((cond->__data.__g_size[g1] != 0)
+-      || __condvar_quiesce_and_switch_g1 (cond, wseq, &g1, private))
++      || __condvar_switch_g1 (cond, wseq, &g1, private))
+     {
+       /* Add a signal.  Relaxed MO is fine because signaling does not need to
+-	 establish a happens-before relation (see above).  We do not mask the
+-	 release-MO store when initializing a group in
+-	 __condvar_quiesce_and_switch_g1 because we use an atomic
+-	 read-modify-write and thus extend that store's release sequence.  */
++         establish a happens-before relation (see above).  We do not mask the
++         release-MO store when initializing a group in __condvar_switch_g1
++         because we use an atomic read-modify-write and thus extend that
++         store's release sequence.  */
+       atomic_fetch_add_relaxed (cond->__data.__g_signals + g1, 2);
+       cond->__data.__g_size[g1]--;
+       /* TODO Only set it if there are indeed futex waiters.  */
+diff --git a/nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c b/nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c
+index 104ebd48ca..bb46f3605d 100644
+--- a/nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c
++++ b/nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c
+@@ -382,8 +382,7 @@ __pthread_cond_wait_common (pthread_cond_t *cond, pthread_mutex_t *mutex,
+      because we do not need to establish any happens-before relation with
+      signalers (see __pthread_cond_signal); modification order alone
+      establishes a total order of waiters/signals.  We do need acquire MO
+-     to synchronize with group reinitialization in
+-     __condvar_quiesce_and_switch_g1.  */
++     to synchronize with group reinitialization in __condvar_switch_g1.  */
+   uint64_t wseq = __condvar_fetch_add_wseq_acquire (cond, 2);
+   /* Find our group's index.  We always go into what was G2 when we acquired
+      our position.  */
+@@ -414,9 +413,9 @@ __pthread_cond_wait_common (pthread_cond_t *cond, pthread_mutex_t *mutex,
+     {
+       /* Now wait until a signal is available in our group or it is closed.
+          Acquire MO so that if we observe (signals == lowseq) after group
+-         switching in __condvar_quiesce_and_switch_g1, we synchronize with that
+-         store and will see the prior update of __g1_start done while switching
+-         groups too.  */
++         switching in __condvar_switch_g1, we synchronize with that store and
++         will see the prior update of __g1_start done while switching groups
++         too.  */
+       unsigned int signals = atomic_load_acquire (cond->__data.__g_signals + g);
+       uint64_t g1_start = __condvar_load_g1_start_relaxed (cond);
+       unsigned int lowseq = (g1_start & 1) == g ? signals : g1_start & ~1U;
+-- 
+2.49.0
+

meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc/0026-PR25847-8.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
+From fc074de88796eb2036fbe9bade638e00adfd5cb2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Malte Skarupke <malteskarupke@fastmail.fm>
+Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2025 02:08:36 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] nptl: Use all of g1_start and g_signals
+
+The LSB of g_signals was unused. The LSB of g1_start was used to indicate
+which group is G2. This was used to always go to sleep in pthread_cond_wait
+if a waiter is in G2. A comment earlier in the file says that this is not
+correct to do:
+
+ "Waiters cannot determine whether they are currently in G2 or G1 -- but they
+  do not have to because all they are interested in is whether there are
+  available signals"
+
+I either would have had to update the comment, or get rid of the check. I
+chose to get rid of the check. In fact I don't quite know why it was there.
+There will never be available signals for group G2, so we didn't need the
+special case. Even if there were, this would just be a spurious wake. This
+might have caught some cases where the count has wrapped around, but it
+wouldn't reliably do that, (and even if it did, why would you want to force a
+sleep in that case?) and we don't support that many concurrent waiters
+anyway. Getting rid of it allows us to use one more bit, making us more
+robust to wraparound.
+
+The following commits have been cherry-picked from Glibc master branch:
+Bug : https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=25847
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+[https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=commit;h=91bb902f58264a2fd50fbce8f39a9a290dd23706]
+
+Signed-off-by: Sunil Dora <sunilkumar.dora@windriver.com>
+---
+ nptl/pthread_cond_broadcast.c |  4 ++--
+ nptl/pthread_cond_common.c    | 26 ++++++++++----------------
+ nptl/pthread_cond_signal.c    |  2 +-
+ nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c      | 14 +++++---------
+ 4 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/nptl/pthread_cond_broadcast.c b/nptl/pthread_cond_broadcast.c
+index a07435589a..ef0943cdc5 100644
+--- a/nptl/pthread_cond_broadcast.c
++++ b/nptl/pthread_cond_broadcast.c
+@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ ___pthread_cond_broadcast (pthread_cond_t *cond)
+     {
+       /* Add as many signals as the remaining size of the group.  */
+       atomic_fetch_add_relaxed (cond->__data.__g_signals + g1,
+-				cond->__data.__g_size[g1] << 1);
++				cond->__data.__g_size[g1]);
+       cond->__data.__g_size[g1] = 0;
+ 
+       /* We need to wake G1 waiters before we switch G1 below.  */
+@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ ___pthread_cond_broadcast (pthread_cond_t *cond)
+     {
+       /* Step (3): Send signals to all waiters in the old G2 / new G1.  */
+       atomic_fetch_add_relaxed (cond->__data.__g_signals + g1,
+-				cond->__data.__g_size[g1] << 1);
++				cond->__data.__g_size[g1]);
+       cond->__data.__g_size[g1] = 0;
+       /* TODO Only set it if there are indeed futex waiters.  */
+       do_futex_wake = true;
+diff --git a/nptl/pthread_cond_common.c b/nptl/pthread_cond_common.c
+index 3baac4dabc..e48f914321 100644
+--- a/nptl/pthread_cond_common.c
++++ b/nptl/pthread_cond_common.c
+@@ -208,9 +208,9 @@ __condvar_switch_g1 (pthread_cond_t *cond, uint64_t wseq,
+      behavior.
+      Note that this works correctly for a zero-initialized condvar too.  */
+   unsigned int old_orig_size = __condvar_get_orig_size (cond);
+-  uint64_t old_g1_start = __condvar_load_g1_start_relaxed (cond) >> 1;
+-  if (((unsigned) (wseq - old_g1_start - old_orig_size)
+-	  + cond->__data.__g_size[g1 ^ 1]) == 0)
++  uint64_t old_g1_start = __condvar_load_g1_start_relaxed (cond);
++  uint64_t new_g1_start = old_g1_start + old_orig_size;
++  if (((unsigned) (wseq - new_g1_start) + cond->__data.__g_size[g1 ^ 1]) == 0)
+ 	return false;
+ 
+   /* We have to consider the following kinds of waiters:
+@@ -221,16 +221,10 @@ __condvar_switch_g1 (pthread_cond_t *cond, uint64_t wseq,
+        are not affected.
+      * Waiters in G1 have already received a signal and been woken.  */
+ 
+-  /* Update __g1_start, which closes this group.  The value we add will never
+-     be negative because old_orig_size can only be zero when we switch groups
+-     the first time after a condvar was initialized, in which case G1 will be
+-     at index 1 and we will add a value of 1. Relaxed MO is fine because the
+-     change comes with no additional constraints that others would have to
+-     observe.  */
+-  __condvar_add_g1_start_relaxed (cond,
+-      (old_orig_size << 1) + (g1 == 1 ? 1 : - 1));
+-
+-  unsigned int lowseq = ((old_g1_start + old_orig_size) << 1) & ~1U;
++  /* Update __g1_start, which closes this group.  Relaxed MO is fine because
++     the change comes with no additional constraints that others would have
++     to observe.  */
++  __condvar_add_g1_start_relaxed (cond, old_orig_size);
+ 
+   /* At this point, the old G1 is now a valid new G2 (but not in use yet).
+      No old waiter can neither grab a signal nor acquire a reference without
+@@ -242,13 +236,13 @@ __condvar_switch_g1 (pthread_cond_t *cond, uint64_t wseq,
+   g1 ^= 1;
+   *g1index ^= 1;
+ 
+-  /* Now advance the new G1 g_signals to the new lowseq, giving it
++  /* Now advance the new G1 g_signals to the new g1_start, giving it
+      an effective signal count of 0 to start.  */
+-  atomic_store_release (cond->__data.__g_signals + g1, lowseq);
++  atomic_store_release (cond->__data.__g_signals + g1, (unsigned)new_g1_start);
+ 
+   /* These values are just observed by signalers, and thus protected by the
+      lock.  */
+-  unsigned int orig_size = wseq - (old_g1_start + old_orig_size);
++  unsigned int orig_size = wseq - new_g1_start;
+   __condvar_set_orig_size (cond, orig_size);
+   /* Use and addition to not loose track of cancellations in what was
+      previously G2.  */
+diff --git a/nptl/pthread_cond_signal.c b/nptl/pthread_cond_signal.c
+index a9bc10dcca..07427369aa 100644
+--- a/nptl/pthread_cond_signal.c
++++ b/nptl/pthread_cond_signal.c
+@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ ___pthread_cond_signal (pthread_cond_t *cond)
+          release-MO store when initializing a group in __condvar_switch_g1
+          because we use an atomic read-modify-write and thus extend that
+          store's release sequence.  */
+-      atomic_fetch_add_relaxed (cond->__data.__g_signals + g1, 2);
++      atomic_fetch_add_relaxed (cond->__data.__g_signals + g1, 1);
+       cond->__data.__g_size[g1]--;
+       /* TODO Only set it if there are indeed futex waiters.  */
+       do_futex_wake = true;
+diff --git a/nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c b/nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c
+index bb46f3605d..430cbe8a35 100644
+--- a/nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c
++++ b/nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c
+@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ __condvar_cancel_waiting (pthread_cond_t *cond, uint64_t seq, unsigned int g,
+      not hold a reference on the group.  */
+   __condvar_acquire_lock (cond, private);
+ 
+-  uint64_t g1_start = __condvar_load_g1_start_relaxed (cond) >> 1;
++  uint64_t g1_start = __condvar_load_g1_start_relaxed (cond);
+   if (g1_start > seq)
+     {
+       /* Our group is closed, so someone provided enough signals for it.
+@@ -278,7 +278,6 @@ __condvar_cleanup_waiting (void *arg)
+      * Waiters fetch-add while having acquire the mutex associated with the
+        condvar.  Signalers load it and fetch-xor it concurrently.
+    __g1_start: Starting position of G1 (inclusive)
+-     * LSB is index of current G2.
+      * Modified by signalers while having acquired the condvar-internal lock
+        and observed concurrently by waiters.
+    __g1_orig_size: Initial size of G1
+@@ -299,11 +298,9 @@ __condvar_cleanup_waiting (void *arg)
+      * Reference count used by waiters concurrently with signalers that have
+        acquired the condvar-internal lock.
+    __g_signals: The number of signals that can still be consumed, relative to
+-     the current g1_start.  (i.e. bits 31 to 1 of __g_signals are bits
+-     31 to 1 of g1_start with the signal count added)
++     the current g1_start.  (i.e. g1_start with the signal count added)
+      * Used as a futex word by waiters.  Used concurrently by waiters and
+        signalers.
+-     * LSB is currently reserved and 0.
+    __g_size: Waiters remaining in this group (i.e., which have not been
+      signaled yet.
+      * Accessed by signalers and waiters that cancel waiting (both do so only
+@@ -418,9 +415,8 @@ __pthread_cond_wait_common (pthread_cond_t *cond, pthread_mutex_t *mutex,
+          too.  */
+       unsigned int signals = atomic_load_acquire (cond->__data.__g_signals + g);
+       uint64_t g1_start = __condvar_load_g1_start_relaxed (cond);
+-      unsigned int lowseq = (g1_start & 1) == g ? signals : g1_start & ~1U;
+ 
+-      if (seq < (g1_start >> 1))
++      if (seq < g1_start)
+         {
+           /* If the group is closed already,
+              then this waiter originally had enough extra signals to
+@@ -433,13 +429,13 @@ __pthread_cond_wait_common (pthread_cond_t *cond, pthread_mutex_t *mutex,
+          by now, perhaps in the process of switching back to an older
+          G2, but in either case we're allowed to consume the available
+          signal and should not block anymore.  */
+-      if ((int)(signals - lowseq) >= 2)
++      if ((int)(signals - (unsigned int)g1_start) > 0)
+         {
+          /* Try to grab a signal.  See above for MO.  (if we do another loop
+             iteration we need to see the correct value of g1_start)  */
+            if (atomic_compare_exchange_weak_acquire (
+                        cond->__data.__g_signals + g,
+-                       &signals, signals - 2))
++                       &signals, signals - 1))
+ 	      break;
+ 	   else
+ 	      continue;
+-- 
+2.49.0
+

meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc_2.35.bb

@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ CVE_CHECK_IGNORE += "CVE-2023-4527"
 CVE_CHECK_IGNORE += " \
     CVE-2023-0687 CVE-2023-4813 CVE-2023-4806 CVE-2023-4911 CVE-2023-5156 \
     CVE-2024-2961 CVE-2024-33599 CVE-2024-33600 CVE-2024-33601 CVE-2024-33602 \
+    CVE-2025-0395 CVE-2025-4802 CVE-2025-8058 \
 "
 
 DEPENDS += "gperf-native bison-native"
@@ -61,6 +62,14 @@ SRC_URI =  "${GLIBC_GIT_URI};branch=${SRCBRANCH};name=glibc \
            file://0022-sysdeps-gnu-configure.ac-Set-libc_cv_rootsbindir-onl.patch \
            file://0023-timezone-Make-shell-interpreter-overridable-in-tzsel.patch \
            file://0024-fix-create-thread-failed-in-unprivileged-process-BZ-.patch \
+           file://0026-PR25847-1.patch \
+           file://0026-PR25847-2.patch \
+           file://0026-PR25847-3.patch \
+           file://0026-PR25847-4.patch \
+           file://0026-PR25847-5.patch \
+           file://0026-PR25847-6.patch \
+           file://0026-PR25847-7.patch \
+           file://0026-PR25847-8.patch \
            \
            file://0001-Revert-Linux-Implement-a-useful-version-of-_startup_.patch \
            file://0002-get_nscd_addresses-Fix-subscript-typos-BZ-29605.patch \

meta/recipes-core/images/build-appliance-image_15.0.0.bb

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ IMAGE_FSTYPES = "wic.vmdk wic.vhd wic.vhdx"
 
 inherit core-image setuptools3
 
-SRCREV ?= "5dad8173d4c55283a93302d907339fb1f7696a65"
+SRCREV ?= "49e837cefaa0d1844b32ff788c6e9de246a3a739"
 SRC_URI = "git://git.yoctoproject.org/poky;branch=kirkstone \
            file://Yocto_Build_Appliance.vmx \
            file://Yocto_Build_Appliance.vmxf \

meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2025-49794-CVE-2025-49796.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
+From 71e1e8af5ee46dad1b57bb96cfbf1c3ad21fbd7b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Nick Wellnhofer <wellnhofer@aevum.de>
+Date: Fri, 4 Jul 2025 14:28:26 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] schematron: Fix memory safety issues in
+ xmlSchematronReportOutput
+
+Fix use-after-free (CVE-2025-49794) and type confusion (CVE-2025-49796)
+in xmlSchematronReportOutput.
+
+Fixes #931.
+Fixes #933.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libxml2/-/commit/71e1e8af5ee46dad1b57bb96cfbf1c3ad21fbd7b]
+CVE: CVE-2025-49794 CVE-2025-49796
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+---
+ result/schematron/cve-2025-49794_0.err |  2 ++
+ result/schematron/cve-2025-49796_0.err |  2 ++
+ schematron.c                           | 37 +++++++++++++++-----------
+ test/schematron/cve-2025-49794.sct     | 10 +++++++
+ test/schematron/cve-2025-49794_0.xml   |  6 +++++
+ test/schematron/cve-2025-49796.sct     |  9 +++++++
+ test/schematron/cve-2025-49796_0.xml   |  3 +++
+ 7 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 result/schematron/cve-2025-49794_0.err
+ create mode 100644 result/schematron/cve-2025-49796_0.err
+ create mode 100644 test/schematron/cve-2025-49794.sct
+ create mode 100644 test/schematron/cve-2025-49794_0.xml
+ create mode 100644 test/schematron/cve-2025-49796.sct
+ create mode 100644 test/schematron/cve-2025-49796_0.xml
+
+diff --git a/result/schematron/cve-2025-49794_0.err b/result/schematron/cve-2025-49794_0.err
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..5775231
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/result/schematron/cve-2025-49794_0.err
+@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
++./test/schematron/cve-2025-49794_0.xml:2: element boo0: schematron error : /librar0/boo0 line 2:  
++./test/schematron/cve-2025-49794_0.xml fails to validate
+diff --git a/result/schematron/cve-2025-49796_0.err b/result/schematron/cve-2025-49796_0.err
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..bf875ee
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/result/schematron/cve-2025-49796_0.err
+@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
++./test/schematron/cve-2025-49796_0.xml:2: element boo0: schematron error : /librar0/boo0 line 2:  
++./test/schematron/cve-2025-49796_0.xml fails to validate
+diff --git a/schematron.c b/schematron.c
+index ddbb069..5ebca64 100644
+--- a/schematron.c
++++ b/schematron.c
+@@ -1239,27 +1239,16 @@ exit:
+  *									*
+  ************************************************************************/
+ 
+-static xmlNodePtr
++static xmlXPathObjectPtr
+ xmlSchematronGetNode(xmlSchematronValidCtxtPtr ctxt,
+                      xmlNodePtr cur, const xmlChar *xpath) {
+-    xmlNodePtr node = NULL;
+-    xmlXPathObjectPtr ret;
+ 
+     if ((ctxt == NULL) || (cur == NULL) || (xpath == NULL))
+         return(NULL);
+ 
+     ctxt->xctxt->doc = cur->doc;
+     ctxt->xctxt->node = cur;
+-    ret = xmlXPathEval(xpath, ctxt->xctxt);
+-    if (ret == NULL)
+-        return(NULL);
+-
+-    if ((ret->type == XPATH_NODESET) &&
+-        (ret->nodesetval != NULL) && (ret->nodesetval->nodeNr > 0))
+-	node = ret->nodesetval->nodeTab[0];
+-
+-    xmlXPathFreeObject(ret);
+-    return(node);
++    return(xmlXPathEval(xpath, ctxt->xctxt));
+ }
+ 
+ /**
+@@ -1304,18 +1293,26 @@ xmlSchematronFormatReport(xmlSchematronValidCtxtPtr ctxt,
+ 	    (child->type == XML_CDATA_SECTION_NODE))
+ 	    ret = xmlStrcat(ret, child->content);
+ 	else if (IS_SCHEMATRON(child, "name")) {
++            xmlXPathObject *obj = NULL;
+ 	    xmlChar *path;
+ 
+ 	    path = xmlGetNoNsProp(child, BAD_CAST "path");
+ 
+             node = cur;
+ 	    if (path != NULL) {
+-	        node = xmlSchematronGetNode(ctxt, cur, path);
+-		if (node == NULL)
+-		    node = cur;
++                obj = xmlSchematronGetNode(ctxt, cur, path);
++                if ((obj != NULL) &&
++                    (obj->type == XPATH_NODESET) &&
++                    (obj->nodesetval != NULL) &&
++                    (obj->nodesetval->nodeNr > 0))
++                    node = obj->nodesetval->nodeTab[0];
+ 		xmlFree(path);
+ 	    }
+ 
++	     switch (node->type) {
++                case XML_ELEMENT_NODE:
++                case XML_ATTRIBUTE_NODE:
++
+ 	    if ((node->ns == NULL) || (node->ns->prefix == NULL))
+ 	        ret = xmlStrcat(ret, node->name);
+ 	    else {
+@@ -1323,6 +1320,14 @@ xmlSchematronFormatReport(xmlSchematronValidCtxtPtr ctxt,
+ 	        ret = xmlStrcat(ret, BAD_CAST ":");
+ 	        ret = xmlStrcat(ret, node->name);
+ 	    }
++	    break;
++
++		/* TODO: handle other node types */
++		default:
++	    break;
++            }
++
++            xmlXPathFreeObject(obj);
+ 	} else {
+ 	    child = child->next;
+ 	    continue;
+diff --git a/test/schematron/cve-2025-49794.sct b/test/schematron/cve-2025-49794.sct
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..7fc9ee3
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/test/schematron/cve-2025-49794.sct
+@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
++<sch:schema xmlns:sch="http://purl.oclc.org/dsdl/schematron">
++    <sch:pattern id="">
++        <sch:rule context="boo0">
++            <sch:report test="not(0)">
++                <sch:name path="&#9;e|namespace::*|e"/>
++            </sch:report>
++            <sch:report test="0"></sch:report>
++        </sch:rule>
++    </sch:pattern>
++</sch:schema>
+diff --git a/test/schematron/cve-2025-49794_0.xml b/test/schematron/cve-2025-49794_0.xml
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..debc64b
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/test/schematron/cve-2025-49794_0.xml
+@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
++<librar0>
++    <boo0 t="">
++        <author></author>
++    </boo0>
++    <ins></ins>
++</librar0>
+diff --git a/test/schematron/cve-2025-49796.sct b/test/schematron/cve-2025-49796.sct
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..e9702d7
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/test/schematron/cve-2025-49796.sct
+@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
++<sch:schema xmlns:sch="http://purl.oclc.org/dsdl/schematron">
++    <sch:pattern id="">
++        <sch:rule context="boo0">
++            <sch:report test="not(0)">
++                <sch:name path="/"/>
++            </sch:report>
++        </sch:rule>
++    </sch:pattern>
++</sch:schema>
+diff --git a/test/schematron/cve-2025-49796_0.xml b/test/schematron/cve-2025-49796_0.xml
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..be33c4e
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/test/schematron/cve-2025-49796_0.xml
+@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
++<librar0>
++    <boo0/>
++</librar0>
+-- 
+2.49.0
+

meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2025-6021.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+From acbbeef9f5dcdcc901c5f3fa14d583ef8cfd22f0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Nick Wellnhofer <wellnhofer@aevum.de>
+Date: Tue, 27 May 2025 12:53:17 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] tree: Fix integer overflow in xmlBuildQName
+
+This issue affects memory safety.
+
+Fixes #926.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libxml2/-/commit/acbbeef9f5dcdcc901c5f3fa14d583ef8cfd22f0]
+CVE: CVE-2025-6021
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+---
+ tree.c | 12 +++++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/tree.c b/tree.c
+index 6e04dfb..cdf863c 100644
+--- a/tree.c
++++ b/tree.c
+@@ -50,6 +50,10 @@
+ #include "buf.h"
+ #include "save.h"
+ 
++#ifndef SIZE_MAX
++#define SIZE_MAX ((size_t) -1)
++#endif
++
+ int __xmlRegisterCallbacks = 0;
+ 
+ /************************************************************************
+@@ -222,16 +226,18 @@ xmlGetParameterEntityFromDtd(const xmlDtd *dtd, const xmlChar *name) {
+ xmlChar *
+ xmlBuildQName(const xmlChar *ncname, const xmlChar *prefix,
+ 	      xmlChar *memory, int len) {
+-    int lenn, lenp;
++    size_t lenn, lenp;
+     xmlChar *ret;
+ 
+-    if (ncname == NULL) return(NULL);
++    if ((ncname == NULL) || (len < 0)) return(NULL);
+     if (prefix == NULL) return((xmlChar *) ncname);
+ 
+     lenn = strlen((char *) ncname);
+     lenp = strlen((char *) prefix);
++    if (lenn >= SIZE_MAX - lenp - 1)
++        return(NULL);
+ 
+-    if ((memory == NULL) || (len < lenn + lenp + 2)) {
++    if ((memory == NULL) || ((size_t) len < lenn + lenp + 2)) {
+ 	ret = (xmlChar *) xmlMallocAtomic(lenn + lenp + 2);
+ 	if (ret == NULL) {
+ 	    xmlTreeErrMemory("building QName");
+-- 
+2.49.0
+

meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2025-6170.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+From 5e9ec5c107d3f5b5179c3dbc19df43df041cd55b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
+Date: Fri, 20 Jun 2025 23:05:00 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] [CVE-2025-6170] Fix potential buffer overflows of interactive
+ shell
+
+Fixes #941
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-6170
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libxml2/-/commit/5e9ec5c107d3f5b5179c3dbc19df43df041cd55b]
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
+---
+ debugXML.c                       | 15 ++++++++++-----
+ result/scripts/long_command      |  8 ++++++++
+ test/scripts/long_command.script |  6 ++++++
+ test/scripts/long_command.xml    |  1 +
+ 4 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 result/scripts/long_command
+ create mode 100644 test/scripts/long_command.script
+ create mode 100644 test/scripts/long_command.xml
+
+diff --git a/debugXML.c b/debugXML.c
+index ed56b0f8..452b9573 100644
+--- a/debugXML.c
++++ b/debugXML.c
+@@ -1050,6 +1050,10 @@ xmlCtxtDumpOneNode(xmlDebugCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlNodePtr node)
+     xmlCtxtGenericNodeCheck(ctxt, node);
+ }
+ 
++#define MAX_PROMPT_SIZE     500
++#define MAX_ARG_SIZE        400
++#define MAX_COMMAND_SIZE    100
++
+ /**
+  * xmlCtxtDumpNode:
+  * @output:  the FILE * for the output
+@@ -2802,10 +2806,10 @@ void
+ xmlShell(xmlDocPtr doc, char *filename, xmlShellReadlineFunc input,
+          FILE * output)
+ {
+-    char prompt[500] = "/ > ";
++    char prompt[MAX_PROMPT_SIZE] = "/ > ";
+     char *cmdline = NULL, *cur;
+-    char command[100];
+-    char arg[400];
++    char command[MAX_COMMAND_SIZE];
++    char arg[MAX_ARG_SIZE];
+     int i;
+     xmlShellCtxtPtr ctxt;
+     xmlXPathObjectPtr list;
+@@ -2863,7 +2867,8 @@ xmlShell(xmlDocPtr doc, char *filename, xmlShellReadlineFunc input,
+             cur++;
+         i = 0;
+         while ((*cur != ' ') && (*cur != '\t') &&
+-               (*cur != '\n') && (*cur != '\r')) {
++               (*cur != '\n') && (*cur != '\r') &&
++               (i < (MAX_COMMAND_SIZE - 1))) {
+             if (*cur == 0)
+                 break;
+             command[i++] = *cur++;
+@@ -2878,7 +2883,7 @@ xmlShell(xmlDocPtr doc, char *filename, xmlShellReadlineFunc input,
+         while ((*cur == ' ') || (*cur == '\t'))
+             cur++;
+         i = 0;
+-        while ((*cur != '\n') && (*cur != '\r') && (*cur != 0)) {
++        while ((*cur != '\n') && (*cur != '\r') && (*cur != 0) && (i < (MAX_ARG_SIZE-1))) {
+             if (*cur == 0)
+                 break;
+             arg[i++] = *cur++;
+diff --git a/result/scripts/long_command b/result/scripts/long_command
+new file mode 100644
+index 00000000..e6f00708
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/result/scripts/long_command
+@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
++/ > b > b > Object is a Node Set :
++Set contains 1 nodes:
++1  ELEMENT a:c
++b > Unknown command This_is_a_really_long_command_string_designed_to_test_the_limits_of_the_memory_that_stores_the_comm
++b > b > Unknown command ess_currents_of_time_and_existence
++b > <?xml version="1.0"?>
++<a xmlns:a="bar"><b xmlns:a="foo">Navigating_the_labyrinthine_corridors_of_human_cognition_one_often_encounters_the_perplexing_paradox_that_the_more_we_delve_into_the_intricate_dance_of_neural_pathways_and_synaptic_firings_the_further_we_seem_to_stray_from_a_truly_holistic_understanding_of_consciousness_a_phenomenon_that_remains_as_elusive_as_a_moonbeam_caught_in_a_spiderweb_yet_undeniably_shapes_every_fleeting_thought_every_prof</b></a>
++b > 
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/test/scripts/long_command.script b/test/scripts/long_command.script
+new file mode 100644
+index 00000000..00f6df09
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/test/scripts/long_command.script
+@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
++cd a/b
++set <a:c/>
++xpath //*[namespace-uri()="foo"]
++This_is_a_really_long_command_string_designed_to_test_the_limits_of_the_memory_that_stores_the_command_please_dont_crash foo
++set Navigating_the_labyrinthine_corridors_of_human_cognition_one_often_encounters_the_perplexing_paradox_that_the_more_we_delve_into_the_intricate_dance_of_neural_pathways_and_synaptic_firings_the_further_we_seem_to_stray_from_a_truly_holistic_understanding_of_consciousness_a_phenomenon_that_remains_as_elusive_as_a_moonbeam_caught_in_a_spiderweb_yet_undeniably_shapes_every_fleeting_thought_every_profound_emotion_and_every_grand_aspiration_that_propels_our_species_ever_onward_through_the_relentless_currents_of_time_and_existence
++save -
+diff --git a/test/scripts/long_command.xml b/test/scripts/long_command.xml
+new file mode 100644
+index 00000000..1ba44016
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/test/scripts/long_command.xml
+@@ -0,0 +1 @@
++<a xmlns:a="bar"><b xmlns:a="foo"/></a>

meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2_2.9.14.bb

@@ -39,6 +39,9 @@ SRC_URI += "http://www.w3.org/XML/Test/xmlts20080827.tar;subdir=${BP};name=testt
            file://CVE-2025-24928.patch \
            file://CVE-2025-32414.patch \
            file://CVE-2025-32415.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-6021.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-49794-CVE-2025-49796.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-6170.patch \
            "
 
 SRC_URI[archive.sha256sum] = "60d74a257d1ccec0475e749cba2f21559e48139efba6ff28224357c7c798dfee"

meta/recipes-core/ncurses/files/CVE-2025-6141.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+From 27d1493340d714e7be6e08c0a8f43e48276149c4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Thomas E. Dickey" <dickey@invisible-island.net>
+Date: Sat, 29 Mar 2025 22:52:37 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] snapshot of project "ncurses", label v6_5_20250329
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-6141
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/ThomasDickey/ncurses-snapshots/commit/27d1493340d714e7be6e08c0a8f43e48276149c4]
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
+---
+ ncurses/tinfo/parse_entry.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/ncurses/tinfo/parse_entry.c b/ncurses/tinfo/parse_entry.c
+index a2278c07..c551c780 100644
+--- a/ncurses/tinfo/parse_entry.c
++++ b/ncurses/tinfo/parse_entry.c
+@@ -954,6 +954,8 @@ postprocess_termcap(TERMTYPE2 *tp, bool has_base)
+ 	    bp = tp->Strings[from_ptr->nte_index];
+ 	    if (VALID_STRING(bp)) {
+ 		for (dp = buf2; *bp; bp++) {
++		    if ((size_t) (dp - buf2) >= (sizeof(buf2) - sizeof(TERMTYPE2)))
++			  break;
+ 		    if (bp[0] == '$' && bp[1] == '<') {
+ 			while (*bp && *bp != '>') {
+ 			    ++bp;

meta/recipes-core/ncurses/ncurses_6.3+20220423.bb

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ SRC_URI += "file://0001-tic-hang.patch \
            file://CVE-2023-29491.patch \
            file://CVE-2023-50495.patch \
            file://CVE-2023-45918.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-6141.patch \
            "
 # commit id corresponds to the revision in package version
 SRCREV = "a0bc708bc6954b5d3c0a38d92b683c3ec3135260"

meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/CVE-2025-4598-0001.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+From 2108812a76bd078a2bbd7583308ff18bf01f2383 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Zbigniew=20J=C4=99drzejewski-Szmek?= <zbyszek@in.waw.pl>
+Date: Tue, 29 Apr 2025 14:47:59 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 1/3] coredump: restore compatibility with older patterns
+
+This was broken in f45b8015513d38ee5f7cc361db9c5b88c9aae704. Unfortunately
+the review does not talk about backward compatibility at all. There are
+two places where it matters:
+- During upgrades, the replacement of kernel.core_pattern is asynchronous.
+  For example, during rpm upgrades, it would be updated a post-transaction
+  file trigger. In other scenarios, the update might only happen after
+  reboot. We have a potentially long window where the old pattern is in
+  place. We need to capture coredumps during upgrades too.
+- With --backtrace. The interface of --backtrace, in hindsight, is not
+  great. But there are users of --backtrace which were written to use
+  a specific set of arguments, and we can't just break compatiblity.
+  One example is systemd-coredump-python, but there are also reports of
+  users using --backtrace to generate coredump logs.
+
+Thus, we require the original set of args, and will use the additional args if
+found.
+
+A test is added to verify that --backtrace works with and without the optional
+args.
+
+(cherry picked from commit ded0aac389e647d35bce7ec4a48e718d77c0435b)
+(cherry picked from commit f9b8b75c11bba9b63096904be98cc529c304eb97)
+(cherry picked from commit 385a33b043406ad79a7207f3906c3b15192a3333)
+(cherry picked from commit c6f79626b6d175c6a5b62b8c5d957a83eb882301)
+(cherry picked from commit 9f02346d50e33c24acf879ce4dd5937d56473325)
+(cherry picked from commit ac0aa5d1fdc21db1ef035fce562cb6fc8602b544)
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/systemd/systemd-stable/commit/cadd1b1a1f39fd13b1115a10f563017201d7b56a]
+
+Signed-off-by: Chen Qi <Qi.Chen@windriver.com>
+---
+ src/coredump/coredump.c | 21 ++++++++++++++-------
+ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/coredump/coredump.c b/src/coredump/coredump.c
+index 79280ab986..d598f6f59a 100644
+--- a/src/coredump/coredump.c
++++ b/src/coredump/coredump.c
+@@ -84,8 +84,12 @@ enum {
+         META_ARGV_SIGNAL,       /* %s: number of signal causing dump */
+         META_ARGV_TIMESTAMP,    /* %t: time of dump, expressed as seconds since the Epoch (we expand this to µs granularity) */
+         META_ARGV_RLIMIT,       /* %c: core file size soft resource limit */
+-        META_ARGV_HOSTNAME,     /* %h: hostname */
++        _META_ARGV_REQUIRED,
++        /* The fields below were added to kernel/core_pattern at later points, so they might be missing. */
++        META_ARGV_HOSTNAME = _META_ARGV_REQUIRED,  /* %h: hostname */
+         _META_ARGV_MAX,
++        /* If new fields are added, they should be added here, to maintain compatibility
++         * with callers which don't know about the new fields. */
+ 
+         /* The following indexes are cached for a couple of special fields we use (and
+          * thereby need to be retrieved quickly) for naming coredump files, and attaching
+@@ -96,7 +100,7 @@ enum {
+         _META_MANDATORY_MAX,
+ 
+         /* The rest are similar to the previous ones except that we won't fail if one of
+-         * them is missing. */
++         * them is missing in a message sent over the socket. */
+ 
+         META_EXE = _META_MANDATORY_MAX,
+         META_UNIT,
+@@ -1278,14 +1282,17 @@ static int gather_pid_metadata_from_argv(
+         char *t;
+ 
+         /* We gather all metadata that were passed via argv[] into an array of iovecs that
+-         * we'll forward to the socket unit */
++         * we'll forward to the socket unit.
++         *
++         * We require at least _META_ARGV_REQUIRED args, but will accept more.
++         * We know how to parse _META_ARGV_MAX args. The rest will be ignored. */
+ 
+-        if (argc < _META_ARGV_MAX)
++        if (argc < _META_ARGV_REQUIRED)
+                 return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
+-                                       "Not enough arguments passed by the kernel (%i, expected %i).",
+-                                       argc, _META_ARGV_MAX);
++                                       "Not enough arguments passed by the kernel (%i, expected between %i and %i).",
++                                       argc, _META_ARGV_REQUIRED, _META_ARGV_MAX);
+ 
+-        for (int i = 0; i < _META_ARGV_MAX; i++) {
++        for (int i = 0; i < MIN(argc, _META_ARGV_MAX); i++) {
+ 
+                 t = argv[i];
+ 
+-- 
+2.34.1
+

meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/CVE-2025-4598-0002.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+From fb22bb743556d4d14463b0f0373c24d07d2e7b28 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Zbigniew=20J=C4=99drzejewski-Szmek?= <zbyszek@in.waw.pl>
+Date: Mon, 26 May 2025 12:04:44 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 2/3] coredump: get rid of _META_MANDATORY_MAX
+
+No functional change. This change is done in preparation for future changes.
+Currently, the list of fields which are received on the command line is a
+strict subset of the fields which are always expected to be received on a
+socket. But when we add new kernel args in the future, we'll have two
+non-overlapping sets and this approach will not work. Get rid of the variable
+and enumerate the required fields. This set will never change, so this is
+actually more maintainable.
+
+The message with the hint where to add new fields is switched with
+_META_ARGV_MAX. The new order is more correct.
+
+(cherry-picked from 49f1f2d4a7612bbed5211a73d11d6a94fbe3bb69)
+(cherry-picked from aea6a631bca93e8b04a11aaced694f25f4da155e)
+(cherry picked from cf16b6b6b2e0a656531bfd73ad66be3817b155cd)
+
+(cherry picked from commit b46a4f023cd80b24c8f1aa7a95700bc0cb828cdc)
+(cherry picked from commit 5855552310ed279180c21cb803408aa2ce36053d)
+(cherry picked from commit cc31f2d4146831b9f2fe7bf584468908ff9c4de5)
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/systemd/systemd-stable/commit/2c81e60fe0b8c506a4fe902e45bed6f58f482b39]
+
+Signed-off-by: Chen Qi <Qi.Chen@windriver.com>
+---
+ src/coredump/coredump.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++---------
+ 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/coredump/coredump.c b/src/coredump/coredump.c
+index d598f6f59a..0b27086288 100644
+--- a/src/coredump/coredump.c
++++ b/src/coredump/coredump.c
+@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@
+  * size. See DATA_SIZE_MAX in journal-importer.h. */
+ assert_cc(JOURNAL_SIZE_MAX <= DATA_SIZE_MAX);
+ 
+-enum {
++typedef enum {
+         /* We use these as array indexes for our process metadata cache.
+          *
+          * The first indices of the cache stores the same metadata as the ones passed by
+@@ -87,9 +87,9 @@ enum {
+         _META_ARGV_REQUIRED,
+         /* The fields below were added to kernel/core_pattern at later points, so they might be missing. */
+         META_ARGV_HOSTNAME = _META_ARGV_REQUIRED,  /* %h: hostname */
+-        _META_ARGV_MAX,
+         /* If new fields are added, they should be added here, to maintain compatibility
+          * with callers which don't know about the new fields. */
++        _META_ARGV_MAX,
+ 
+         /* The following indexes are cached for a couple of special fields we use (and
+          * thereby need to be retrieved quickly) for naming coredump files, and attaching
+@@ -97,16 +97,15 @@ enum {
+          * environment. */
+ 
+         META_COMM = _META_ARGV_MAX,
+-        _META_MANDATORY_MAX,
+ 
+         /* The rest are similar to the previous ones except that we won't fail if one of
+          * them is missing in a message sent over the socket. */
+ 
+-        META_EXE = _META_MANDATORY_MAX,
++        META_EXE,
+         META_UNIT,
+         META_PROC_AUXV,
+         _META_MAX
+-};
++} meta_argv_t;
+ 
+ static const char * const meta_field_names[_META_MAX] = {
+         [META_ARGV_PID]       = "COREDUMP_PID=",
+@@ -1192,12 +1191,24 @@ static int process_socket(int fd) {
+         if (r < 0)
+                 goto finish;
+ 
+-        /* Make sure we received at least all fields we need. */
+-        for (int i = 0; i < _META_MANDATORY_MAX; i++)
++        /* Make sure we received all the expected fields. We support being called by an *older*
++         * systemd-coredump from the outside, so we require only the basic set of fields that
++         * was being sent when the support for sending to containers over a socket was added
++         * in a108c43e36d3ceb6e34efe37c014fc2cda856000. */
++        meta_argv_t i;
++        VA_ARGS_FOREACH(i,
++                        META_ARGV_PID,
++                        META_ARGV_UID,
++                        META_ARGV_GID,
++                        META_ARGV_SIGNAL,
++                        META_ARGV_TIMESTAMP,
++                        META_ARGV_RLIMIT,
++                        META_ARGV_HOSTNAME,
++                        META_COMM)
+                 if (!context.meta[i]) {
+                         r = log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
+-                                            "A mandatory argument (%i) has not been sent, aborting.",
+-                                            i);
++                                            "Mandatory argument %s not received on socket, aborting.",
++                                            meta_field_names[i]);
+                         goto finish;
+                 }
+ 
+-- 
+2.34.1
+

meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/CVE-2025-4598-0003.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+From 89730dea979b2d22fd548b622cd88bac99ff1d6b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Zbigniew=20J=C4=99drzejewski-Szmek?= <zbyszek@in.waw.pl>
+Date: Tue, 29 Apr 2025 14:47:59 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 3/3] coredump: use %d in kernel core pattern
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+The kernel provides %d which is documented as
+"dump mode—same as value returned by prctl(2) PR_GET_DUMPABLE".
+
+We already query /proc/pid/auxv for this information, but unfortunately this
+check is subject to a race, because the crashed process may be replaced by an
+attacker before we read this data, for example replacing a SUID process that
+was killed by a signal with another process that is not SUID, tricking us into
+making the coredump of the original process readable by the attacker.
+
+With this patch, we effectively add one more check to the list of conditions
+that need be satisfied if we are to make the coredump accessible to the user.
+
+Reportedy-by: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com>
+
+(cherry-picked from commit 0c49e0049b7665bb7769a13ef346fef92e1ad4d6)
+(cherry-picked from commit c58a8a6ec9817275bb4babaa2c08e0e35090d4e3)
+(cherry picked from commit 19d439189ab85dd7222bdd59fd442bbcc8ea99a7)
+(cherry picked from commit 254ab8d2a7866679cee006d844d078774cbac3c9)
+(cherry picked from commit 7fc7aa5a4d28d7768dfd1eb85be385c3ea949168)
+(cherry picked from commit 19b228662e0fcc6596c0395a0af8486a4b3f1627)
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-4598
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/systemd/systemd-stable/commit/2eb46dce078334805c547cbcf5e6462cf9d2f9f0]
+
+Signed-off-by: Chen Qi <Qi.Chen@windriver.com>
+---
+ man/systemd-coredump.xml     | 11 +++++++++++
+ src/coredump/coredump.c      | 21 ++++++++++++++++++---
+ sysctl.d/50-coredump.conf.in |  2 +-
+ 3 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/man/systemd-coredump.xml b/man/systemd-coredump.xml
+index cb9f47745b..ba7cad12bc 100644
+--- a/man/systemd-coredump.xml
++++ b/man/systemd-coredump.xml
+@@ -259,6 +259,17 @@ COREDUMP_FILENAME=/var/lib/systemd/coredump/core.Web….552351.….zst
+         </listitem>
+       </varlistentry>
+ 
++      <varlistentry>
++        <term><varname>COREDUMP_DUMPABLE=</varname></term>
++
++        <listitem><para>The <constant>PR_GET_DUMPABLE</constant> field as reported by the kernel, see
++        <citerefentry
++        project='man-pages'><refentrytitle>prctl</refentrytitle><manvolnum>2</manvolnum></citerefentry>.
++        </para>
++
++        </listitem>
++      </varlistentry>
++
+       <varlistentry>
+         <term><varname>COREDUMP_OPEN_FDS=</varname></term>
+ 
+diff --git a/src/coredump/coredump.c b/src/coredump/coredump.c
+index 0b27086288..aca6a2eb6b 100644
+--- a/src/coredump/coredump.c
++++ b/src/coredump/coredump.c
+@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ typedef enum {
+         _META_ARGV_REQUIRED,
+         /* The fields below were added to kernel/core_pattern at later points, so they might be missing. */
+         META_ARGV_HOSTNAME = _META_ARGV_REQUIRED,  /* %h: hostname */
++        META_ARGV_DUMPABLE,     /* %d: as set by the kernel */
+         /* If new fields are added, they should be added here, to maintain compatibility
+          * with callers which don't know about the new fields. */
+         _META_ARGV_MAX,
+@@ -115,6 +116,7 @@ static const char * const meta_field_names[_META_MAX] = {
+         [META_ARGV_TIMESTAMP] = "COREDUMP_TIMESTAMP=",
+         [META_ARGV_RLIMIT]    = "COREDUMP_RLIMIT=",
+         [META_ARGV_HOSTNAME]  = "COREDUMP_HOSTNAME=",
++        [META_ARGV_DUMPABLE]  = "COREDUMP_DUMPABLE=",
+         [META_COMM]           = "COREDUMP_COMM=",
+         [META_EXE]            = "COREDUMP_EXE=",
+         [META_UNIT]           = "COREDUMP_UNIT=",
+@@ -125,6 +127,7 @@ typedef struct Context {
+         const char *meta[_META_MAX];
+         size_t meta_size[_META_MAX];
+         pid_t pid;
++        unsigned dumpable;
+         bool is_pid1;
+         bool is_journald;
+ } Context;
+@@ -470,14 +473,16 @@ static int grant_user_access(int core_fd, const Context *context) {
+         if (r < 0)
+                 return r;
+ 
+-        /* We allow access if we got all the data and at_secure is not set and
+-         * the uid/gid matches euid/egid. */
++        /* We allow access if dumpable on the command line was exactly 1, we got all the data,
++         * at_secure is not set, and the uid/gid match euid/egid. */
+         bool ret =
++                context->dumpable == 1 &&
+                 at_secure == 0 &&
+                 uid != UID_INVALID && euid != UID_INVALID && uid == euid &&
+                 gid != GID_INVALID && egid != GID_INVALID && gid == egid;
+-        log_debug("Will %s access (uid="UID_FMT " euid="UID_FMT " gid="GID_FMT " egid="GID_FMT " at_secure=%s)",
++        log_debug("Will %s access (dumpable=%u uid="UID_FMT " euid="UID_FMT " gid="GID_FMT " egid="GID_FMT " at_secure=%s)",
+                   ret ? "permit" : "restrict",
++                  context->dumpable,
+                   uid, euid, gid, egid, yes_no(at_secure));
+         return ret;
+ }
+@@ -1102,6 +1107,16 @@ static int save_context(Context *context, const struct iovec_wrapper *iovw) {
+         if (r < 0)
+                 return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse PID \"%s\": %m", context->meta[META_ARGV_PID]);
+ 
++        /* The value is set to contents of /proc/sys/fs/suid_dumpable, which we set to 2,
++         * if the process is marked as not dumpable, see PR_SET_DUMPABLE(2const). */
++        if (context->meta[META_ARGV_DUMPABLE]) {
++                r = safe_atou(context->meta[META_ARGV_DUMPABLE], &context->dumpable);
++                if (r < 0)
++                        return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse dumpable field \"%s\": %m", context->meta[META_ARGV_DUMPABLE]);
++                if (context->dumpable > 2)
++                        log_notice("Got unexpected %%d/dumpable value %u.", context->dumpable);
++        }
++
+         unit = context->meta[META_UNIT];
+         context->is_pid1 = streq(context->meta[META_ARGV_PID], "1") || streq_ptr(unit, SPECIAL_INIT_SCOPE);
+         context->is_journald = streq_ptr(unit, SPECIAL_JOURNALD_SERVICE);
+diff --git a/sysctl.d/50-coredump.conf.in b/sysctl.d/50-coredump.conf.in
+index 5fb551a8cf..9c10a89828 100644
+--- a/sysctl.d/50-coredump.conf.in
++++ b/sysctl.d/50-coredump.conf.in
+@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
+ # the core dump.
+ #
+ # See systemd-coredump(8) and core(5).
+-kernel.core_pattern=|{{ROOTLIBEXECDIR}}/systemd-coredump %P %u %g %s %t %c %h
++kernel.core_pattern=|{{ROOTLIBEXECDIR}}/systemd-coredump %P %u %g %s %t %c %h %d
+ 
+ # Allow 16 coredumps to be dispatched in parallel by the kernel.
+ # We collect metadata from /proc/%P/, and thus need to make sure the crashed
+-- 
+2.34.1
+

meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/CVE-2025-4598-0004.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+From a0c698c720441782fcf2cb7dfd01e69baf8f1f39 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dan Streetman <ddstreet@ieee.org>
+Date: Thu, 2 Feb 2023 15:58:10 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH] basic/macro: add macro to iterate variadic args
+
+(cherry picked from commit e179f2d89c9f0c951636d74de00136b4075cd1ac)
+(cherry picked from commit cd4f43bf378ff33ce5cfeacd96f7f3726603bddc)
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/systemd/systemd-stable/commit/c288a3aafdf11cd93eb7a21e4d587c6fc218a29c]
+
+Signed-off-by: Chen Qi <Qi.Chen@windriver.com>
+---
+ src/basic/macro.h | 9 +++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/basic/macro.h b/src/basic/macro.h
+index 9e62f9c71c..16242902ec 100644
+--- a/src/basic/macro.h
++++ b/src/basic/macro.h
+@@ -454,4 +454,13 @@ typedef struct {
+ 
+ assert_cc(sizeof(dummy_t) == 0);
+ 
++/* Iterate through each variadic arg. All must be the same type as 'entry' or must be implicitly
++ * convertable. The iteration variable 'entry' must already be defined. */
++#define VA_ARGS_FOREACH(entry, ...)                                     \
++        _VA_ARGS_FOREACH(entry, UNIQ_T(_entries_, UNIQ), UNIQ_T(_current_, UNIQ), ##__VA_ARGS__)
++#define _VA_ARGS_FOREACH(entry, _entries_, _current_, ...)         \
++        for (typeof(entry) _entries_[] = { __VA_ARGS__ }, *_current_ = _entries_; \
++             ((long)(_current_ - _entries_) < (long)ELEMENTSOF(_entries_)) && ({ entry = *_current_; true; }); \
++             _current_++)
++
+ #include "log.h"
+-- 
+2.34.1
+