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CVE-2024-32002: Git is a revision control system. Prior to versions 2.45.1, 2.44.1, 2.43.4, 2.42.2, 2.41.1, 2.40.2, and 2.39.4, repositories with submodules can be crafted in a way that exploits a bug in Git whereby it can be fooled into writing files not into the submodule's worktree but into a `.git/` directory. This allows writing a hook that will be executed while the clone operation is still running, giving the user no opportunity to inspect the code that is being executed. The problem has been patched in versions 2.45.1, 2.44.1, 2.43.4, 2.42.2, 2.41.1, 2.40.2, and 2.39.4. If symbolic link support is disabled in Git (e.g. via `git config --global core.symlinks false`), the described attack won't work. As always, it is best to avoid cloning repositories from untrusted sources. CVE-2024-32004: Git is a revision control system. Prior to versions 2.45.1, 2.44.1, 2.43.4, 2.42.2, 2.41.1, 2.40.2, and 2.39.4, an attacker can prepare a local repository in such a way that, when cloned, will execute arbitrary code during the operation. The problem has been patched in versions 2.45.1, 2.44.1, 2.43.4, 2.42.2, 2.41.1, 2.40.2, and 2.39.4. As a workaround, avoid cloning repositories from untrusted sources. CVE-2024-32020: Git is a revision control system. Prior to versions 2.45.1, 2.44.1, 2.43.4, 2.42.2, 2.41.1, 2.40.2, and 2.39.4, local clones may end up hardlinking files into the target repository's object database when source and target repository reside on the same disk. If the source repository is owned by a different user, then those hardlinked files may be rewritten at any point in time by the untrusted user. Cloning local repositories will cause Git to either copy or hardlink files of the source repository into the target repository. This significantly speeds up such local clones compared to doing a "proper" clone and saves both disk space and compute time. When cloning a repository located on the same disk that is owned by a different user than the current user we also end up creating such hardlinks. These files will continue to be owned and controlled by the potentially-untrusted user and can be rewritten by them at will in the future. The problem has been patched in versions 2.45.1, 2.44.1, 2.43.4, 2.42.2, 2.41.1, 2.40.2, and 2.39.4. CVE-2024-32021: Git is a revision control system. Prior to versions 2.45.1, 2.44.1, 2.43.4, 2.42.2, 2.41.1, 2.40.2, and 2.39.4, when cloning a local source repository that contains symlinks via the filesystem, Git may create hardlinks to arbitrary user-readable files on the same filesystem as the target repository in the `objects/` directory. Cloning a local repository over the filesystem may creating hardlinks to arbitrary user-owned files on the same filesystem in the target Git repository's `objects/` directory. When cloning a repository over the filesystem (without explicitly specifying the `file://` protocol or `--no-local`), the optimizations for local cloning will be used, which include attempting to hard link the object files instead of copying them. While the code includes checks against symbolic links in the source repository, which were added during the fix for CVE-2022-39253, these checks can still be raced because the hard link operation ultimately follows symlinks. If the object on the filesystem appears as a file during the check, and then a symlink during the operation, this will allow the adversary to bypass the check and create hardlinks in the destination objects directory to arbitrary, user-readable files. The problem has been patched in versions 2.45.1, 2.44.1, 2.43.4, 2.42.2, 2.41.1, 2.40.2, and 2.39.4. CVE-2024-32465: Git is a revision control system. The Git project recommends to avoid working in untrusted repositories, and instead to clone it first with `git clone --no-local` to obtain a clean copy. Git has specific protections to make that a safe operation even with an untrusted source repository, but vulnerabilities allow those protections to be bypassed. In the context of cloning local repositories owned by other users, this vulnerability has been covered in CVE-2024-32004. But there are circumstances where the fixes for CVE-2024-32004 are not enough: For example, when obtaining a `.zip` file containing a full copy of a Git repository, it should not be trusted by default to be safe, as e.g. hooks could be configured to run within the context of that repository. The problem has been patched in versions 2.45.1, 2.44.1, 2.43.4, 2.42.2, 2.41.1, 2.40.2, and 2.39.4. As a workaround, avoid using Git in repositories that have been obtained via archives from untrusted sources. References: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-32002 https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-32004 https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-32020 https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-32021 https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-32465 (From OE-Core rev: 209c41377abf6853455b00af3923f1b244a3766b) Signed-off-by: Soumya Sambu <soumya.sambu@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
214 lines
8.3 KiB
Diff
214 lines
8.3 KiB
Diff
From 6fac5b2f352efc8c246d6d5be63a66b7b0fc0209 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com>
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Date: Thu, 1 Sep 2022 01:17:56 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH] submodule--helper: add "const" to passed "module_clone_data"
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Add "const" to the "struct module_clone_data" that we pass to
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clone_submodule(), which makes the ownership clear, and stops us from
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clobbering the "clone_data->path".
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We still need to add to the "reference" member, which is a "struct
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string_list". Let's do this by having clone_submodule() create its
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own, and copy the contents over, allowing us to pass it as a
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separate parameter.
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This new "struct string_list" still leaks memory, just as the "struct
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module_clone_data" did before. let's not fix that for now, to fix that
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we'll need to add some "goto cleanup" to the relevant code. That will
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eventually be done in follow-up commits, this change makes it easier
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to fix the memory leak.
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The scope of the new "reference" variable in add_submodule() could be
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narrowed to the "else" block, but as we'll eventually free it with a
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"goto cleanup" let's declare it at the start of the function.
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Signed-off-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com>
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Reviewed-by: Glen Choo <chooglen@google.com>
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Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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CVE: CVE-2024-32002
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Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/git/git/commit/6fac5b2f352efc8c246d6d5be63a66b7b0fc0209]
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Signed-off-by: Soumya Sambu <soumya.sambu@windriver.com>
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---
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builtin/submodule--helper.c | 52 ++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
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1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/builtin/submodule--helper.c b/builtin/submodule--helper.c
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index 79868c3..d1d64db 100644
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--- a/builtin/submodule--helper.c
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+++ b/builtin/submodule--helper.c
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@@ -1630,14 +1630,13 @@ struct module_clone_data {
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const char *name;
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const char *url;
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const char *depth;
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- struct string_list reference;
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unsigned int quiet: 1;
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unsigned int progress: 1;
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unsigned int dissociate: 1;
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unsigned int require_init: 1;
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int single_branch;
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};
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-#define MODULE_CLONE_DATA_INIT { .reference = STRING_LIST_INIT_NODUP, .single_branch = -1 }
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+#define MODULE_CLONE_DATA_INIT { .single_branch = -1 }
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struct submodule_alternate_setup {
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const char *submodule_name;
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@@ -1750,22 +1749,24 @@ static void prepare_possible_alternates(const char *sm_name,
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free(error_strategy);
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}
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-static int clone_submodule(struct module_clone_data *clone_data)
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+static int clone_submodule(const struct module_clone_data *clone_data,
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+ struct string_list *reference)
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{
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char *p, *sm_gitdir;
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char *sm_alternate = NULL, *error_strategy = NULL;
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struct strbuf sb = STRBUF_INIT;
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struct child_process cp = CHILD_PROCESS_INIT;
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+ const char *clone_data_path;
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submodule_name_to_gitdir(&sb, the_repository, clone_data->name);
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sm_gitdir = absolute_pathdup(sb.buf);
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strbuf_reset(&sb);
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if (!is_absolute_path(clone_data->path))
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- clone_data->path = xstrfmt("%s/%s", get_git_work_tree(),
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- clone_data->path);
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+ clone_data_path = xstrfmt("%s/%s", get_git_work_tree(),
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+ clone_data->path);
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else
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- clone_data->path = xstrdup(clone_data->path);
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+ clone_data_path = xstrdup(clone_data->path);
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if (validate_submodule_git_dir(sm_gitdir, clone_data->name) < 0)
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die(_("refusing to create/use '%s' in another submodule's "
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@@ -1775,7 +1776,7 @@ static int clone_submodule(struct module_clone_data *clone_data)
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if (safe_create_leading_directories_const(sm_gitdir) < 0)
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die(_("could not create directory '%s'"), sm_gitdir);
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- prepare_possible_alternates(clone_data->name, &clone_data->reference);
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+ prepare_possible_alternates(clone_data->name, reference);
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strvec_push(&cp.args, "clone");
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strvec_push(&cp.args, "--no-checkout");
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@@ -1784,10 +1785,10 @@ static int clone_submodule(struct module_clone_data *clone_data)
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if (clone_data->progress)
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strvec_push(&cp.args, "--progress");
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if (clone_data->depth && *(clone_data->depth))
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- strvec_pushl(&cp.args, "--depth", clone_data->depth, NULL);
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- if (clone_data->reference.nr) {
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+ strvec_pushl(&cp.args, "--depth", clone_data->depth, NULL);
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+ if (reference->nr) {
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struct string_list_item *item;
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- for_each_string_list_item(item, &clone_data->reference)
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+ for_each_string_list_item(item, reference)
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strvec_pushl(&cp.args, "--reference",
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item->string, NULL);
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}
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@@ -1802,7 +1803,7 @@ static int clone_submodule(struct module_clone_data *clone_data)
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strvec_push(&cp.args, "--");
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strvec_push(&cp.args, clone_data->url);
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- strvec_push(&cp.args, clone_data->path);
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+ strvec_push(&cp.args, clone_data_path);
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cp.git_cmd = 1;
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prepare_submodule_repo_env(&cp.env_array);
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@@ -1810,25 +1811,25 @@ static int clone_submodule(struct module_clone_data *clone_data)
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if(run_command(&cp))
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die(_("clone of '%s' into submodule path '%s' failed"),
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- clone_data->url, clone_data->path);
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+ clone_data->url, clone_data_path);
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} else {
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char *path;
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- if (clone_data->require_init && !access(clone_data->path, X_OK) &&
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- !is_empty_dir(clone_data->path))
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- die(_("directory not empty: '%s'"), clone_data->path);
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- if (safe_create_leading_directories_const(clone_data->path) < 0)
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- die(_("could not create directory '%s'"), clone_data->path);
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+ if (clone_data->require_init && !access(clone_data_path, X_OK) &&
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+ !is_empty_dir(clone_data_path))
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+ die(_("directory not empty: '%s'"), clone_data_path);
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+ if (safe_create_leading_directories_const(clone_data_path) < 0)
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+ die(_("could not create directory '%s'"), clone_data_path);
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path = xstrfmt("%s/index", sm_gitdir);
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unlink_or_warn(path);
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free(path);
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}
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- connect_work_tree_and_git_dir(clone_data->path, sm_gitdir, 0);
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+ connect_work_tree_and_git_dir(clone_data_path, sm_gitdir, 0);
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- p = git_pathdup_submodule(clone_data->path, "config");
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+ p = git_pathdup_submodule(clone_data_path, "config");
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if (!p)
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- die(_("could not get submodule directory for '%s'"), clone_data->path);
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+ die(_("could not get submodule directory for '%s'"), clone_data_path);
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/* setup alternateLocation and alternateErrorStrategy in the cloned submodule if needed */
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git_config_get_string("submodule.alternateLocation", &sm_alternate);
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@@ -1853,6 +1854,7 @@ static int module_clone(int argc, const char **argv, const char *prefix)
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{
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int dissociate = 0, quiet = 0, progress = 0, require_init = 0;
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struct module_clone_data clone_data = MODULE_CLONE_DATA_INIT;
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+ struct string_list reference = STRING_LIST_INIT_NODUP;
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struct option module_clone_options[] = {
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OPT_STRING(0, "prefix", &clone_data.prefix,
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@@ -1867,7 +1869,7 @@ static int module_clone(int argc, const char **argv, const char *prefix)
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OPT_STRING(0, "url", &clone_data.url,
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N_("string"),
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N_("url where to clone the submodule from")),
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- OPT_STRING_LIST(0, "reference", &clone_data.reference,
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+ OPT_STRING_LIST(0, "reference", &reference,
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N_("repo"),
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N_("reference repository")),
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OPT_BOOL(0, "dissociate", &dissociate,
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@@ -1905,7 +1907,7 @@ static int module_clone(int argc, const char **argv, const char *prefix)
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usage_with_options(git_submodule_helper_usage,
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module_clone_options);
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- clone_submodule(&clone_data);
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+ clone_submodule(&clone_data, &reference);
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return 0;
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}
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@@ -3029,6 +3031,7 @@ static int add_submodule(const struct add_data *add_data)
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{
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char *submod_gitdir_path;
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struct module_clone_data clone_data = MODULE_CLONE_DATA_INIT;
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+ struct string_list reference = STRING_LIST_INIT_NODUP;
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/* perhaps the path already exists and is already a git repo, else clone it */
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if (is_directory(add_data->sm_path)) {
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@@ -3045,6 +3048,7 @@ static int add_submodule(const struct add_data *add_data)
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free(submod_gitdir_path);
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} else {
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struct child_process cp = CHILD_PROCESS_INIT;
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+
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submod_gitdir_path = xstrfmt(".git/modules/%s", add_data->sm_name);
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if (is_directory(submod_gitdir_path)) {
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@@ -3084,13 +3088,13 @@ static int add_submodule(const struct add_data *add_data)
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clone_data.quiet = add_data->quiet;
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clone_data.progress = add_data->progress;
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if (add_data->reference_path)
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- string_list_append(&clone_data.reference,
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+ string_list_append(&reference,
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xstrdup(add_data->reference_path));
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clone_data.dissociate = add_data->dissociate;
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if (add_data->depth >= 0)
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clone_data.depth = xstrfmt("%d", add_data->depth);
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- if (clone_submodule(&clone_data))
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+ if (clone_submodule(&clone_data, &reference))
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return -1;
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prepare_submodule_repo_env(&cp.env_array);
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--
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2.40.0
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