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poky/meta/recipes-devtools/git/git/CVE-2024-32002-0004.patch
Soumya Sambu d08e8d726d git: Fix multiple CVEs
CVE-2024-32002:
Git is a revision control system. Prior to versions 2.45.1, 2.44.1, 2.43.4,
2.42.2, 2.41.1, 2.40.2, and 2.39.4, repositories with submodules can be
crafted in a way that exploits a bug in Git whereby it can be fooled into
writing files not into the submodule's worktree but into a `.git/` directory.
This allows writing a hook that will be executed while the clone operation
is still running, giving the user no opportunity to inspect the code that is
being executed. The problem has been patched in versions 2.45.1, 2.44.1,
2.43.4, 2.42.2, 2.41.1, 2.40.2, and 2.39.4. If symbolic link support is
disabled in Git (e.g. via `git config --global core.symlinks false`), the
described attack won't work. As always, it is best to avoid cloning
repositories from untrusted sources.

CVE-2024-32004:
Git is a revision control system. Prior to versions 2.45.1, 2.44.1, 2.43.4,
2.42.2, 2.41.1, 2.40.2, and 2.39.4, an attacker can prepare a local repository
in such a way that, when cloned, will execute arbitrary code during the
operation. The problem has been patched in versions 2.45.1, 2.44.1, 2.43.4,
2.42.2, 2.41.1, 2.40.2, and 2.39.4. As a workaround, avoid cloning repositories
from untrusted sources.

CVE-2024-32020:
Git is a revision control system. Prior to versions 2.45.1, 2.44.1, 2.43.4,
2.42.2, 2.41.1, 2.40.2, and 2.39.4, local clones may end up hardlinking files
into the target repository's object database when source and target repository
reside on the same disk. If the source repository is owned by a different user,
then those hardlinked files may be rewritten at any point in time by the
untrusted user. Cloning local repositories will cause Git to either copy or
hardlink files of the source repository into the target repository. This
significantly speeds up such local clones compared to doing a "proper" clone and
saves both disk space and compute time. When cloning a repository located on the
same disk that is owned by a different user than the current user we also end up
creating such hardlinks. These files will continue to be owned and controlled by
the potentially-untrusted user and can be rewritten by them at will in the
future. The problem has been patched in versions 2.45.1, 2.44.1, 2.43.4, 2.42.2,
2.41.1, 2.40.2, and 2.39.4.

CVE-2024-32021:
Git is a revision control system. Prior to versions 2.45.1, 2.44.1, 2.43.4,
2.42.2, 2.41.1, 2.40.2, and 2.39.4, when cloning a local source repository that
contains symlinks via the filesystem, Git may create hardlinks to arbitrary
user-readable files on the same filesystem as the target repository in the
`objects/` directory. Cloning a local repository over the filesystem may
creating hardlinks to arbitrary user-owned files on the same filesystem in the
target Git repository's `objects/` directory. When cloning a repository over the
filesystem (without explicitly specifying the `file://` protocol or `--no-local`),
the optimizations for local cloning will be used, which include attempting to
hard link the object files instead of copying them. While the code includes checks
against symbolic links in the source repository, which were added during the fix
for CVE-2022-39253, these checks can still be raced because the hard link
operation ultimately follows symlinks. If the object on the filesystem appears as
a file during the check, and then a symlink during the operation, this will allow
the adversary to bypass the check and create hardlinks in the destination objects
directory to arbitrary, user-readable files. The problem has been patched in
versions 2.45.1, 2.44.1, 2.43.4, 2.42.2, 2.41.1, 2.40.2, and 2.39.4.

CVE-2024-32465:
Git is a revision control system. The Git project recommends to avoid working in
untrusted repositories, and instead to clone it first with `git clone --no-local`
to obtain a clean copy. Git has specific protections to make that a safe
operation even with an untrusted source repository, but vulnerabilities allow
those protections to be bypassed. In the context of cloning local repositories
owned by other users, this vulnerability has been covered in CVE-2024-32004. But
there are circumstances where the fixes for CVE-2024-32004 are not enough: For
example, when obtaining a `.zip` file containing a full copy of a Git repository,
it should not be trusted by default to be safe, as e.g. hooks could be configured
to run within the context of that repository. The problem has been patched in
versions 2.45.1, 2.44.1, 2.43.4, 2.42.2, 2.41.1, 2.40.2, and 2.39.4. As a
workaround, avoid using Git in repositories that have been obtained via archives
from untrusted sources.

References:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-32002
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-32004
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-32020
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-32021
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-32465

(From OE-Core rev: 209c41377abf6853455b00af3923f1b244a3766b)

Signed-off-by: Soumya Sambu <soumya.sambu@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
2024-06-01 19:07:52 -07:00

151 lines
5.0 KiB
Diff

From 97065761333fd62db1912d81b489db938d8c991d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2024 11:19:22 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] submodules: submodule paths must not contain symlinks
When creating a submodule path, we must be careful not to follow
symbolic links. Otherwise we may follow a symbolic link pointing to
a gitdir (which are valid symbolic links!) e.g. while cloning.
On case-insensitive filesystems, however, we blindly replace a directory
that has been created as part of the `clone` operation with a symlink
when the path to the latter differs only in case from the former's path.
Let's simply avoid this situation by expecting not ever having to
overwrite any existing file/directory/symlink upon cloning. That way, we
won't even replace a directory that we just created.
This addresses CVE-2024-32002.
Reported-by: Filip Hejsek <filip.hejsek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
CVE: CVE-2024-32002
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/git/git/commit/97065761333fd62db1912d81b489db938d8c991d]
Signed-off-by: Soumya Sambu <soumya.sambu@windriver.com>
---
builtin/submodule--helper.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
t/t7406-submodule-update.sh | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 77 insertions(+)
diff --git a/builtin/submodule--helper.c b/builtin/submodule--helper.c
index 1158dcc..d4147d8 100644
--- a/builtin/submodule--helper.c
+++ b/builtin/submodule--helper.c
@@ -1749,11 +1749,34 @@ static void prepare_possible_alternates(const char *sm_name,
free(error_strategy);
}
+static int dir_contains_only_dotgit(const char *path)
+{
+ DIR *dir = opendir(path);
+ struct dirent *e;
+ int ret = 1;
+
+ if (!dir)
+ return 0;
+
+ e = readdir_skip_dot_and_dotdot(dir);
+ if (!e)
+ ret = 0;
+ else if (strcmp(DEFAULT_GIT_DIR_ENVIRONMENT, e->d_name) ||
+ (e = readdir_skip_dot_and_dotdot(dir))) {
+ error("unexpected item '%s' in '%s'", e->d_name, path);
+ ret = 0;
+ }
+
+ closedir(dir);
+ return ret;
+}
+
static int clone_submodule(const struct module_clone_data *clone_data,
struct string_list *reference)
{
char *p, *sm_gitdir;
char *sm_alternate = NULL, *error_strategy = NULL;
+ struct stat st;
struct strbuf sb = STRBUF_INIT;
struct child_process cp = CHILD_PROCESS_INIT;
const char *clone_data_path = clone_data->path;
@@ -1772,6 +1795,10 @@ static int clone_submodule(const struct module_clone_data *clone_data,
"git dir"), sm_gitdir);
if (!file_exists(sm_gitdir)) {
+ if (clone_data->require_init && !stat(clone_data_path, &st) &&
+ !is_empty_dir(clone_data_path))
+ die(_("directory not empty: '%s'"), clone_data_path);
+
if (safe_create_leading_directories_const(sm_gitdir) < 0)
die(_("could not create directory '%s'"), sm_gitdir);
@@ -1811,6 +1838,14 @@ static int clone_submodule(const struct module_clone_data *clone_data,
if(run_command(&cp))
die(_("clone of '%s' into submodule path '%s' failed"),
clone_data->url, clone_data_path);
+
+ if (clone_data->require_init && !stat(clone_data_path, &st) &&
+ !dir_contains_only_dotgit(clone_data_path)) {
+ char *dot_git = xstrfmt("%s/.git", clone_data_path);
+ unlink(dot_git);
+ free(dot_git);
+ die(_("directory not empty: '%s'"), clone_data_path);
+ }
} else {
char *path;
diff --git a/t/t7406-submodule-update.sh b/t/t7406-submodule-update.sh
index 53d419c..00ffdb6 100755
--- a/t/t7406-submodule-update.sh
+++ b/t/t7406-submodule-update.sh
@@ -1062,4 +1062,46 @@ test_expect_success 'submodule update --quiet passes quietness to fetch with a s
)
'
+test_expect_success CASE_INSENSITIVE_FS,SYMLINKS \
+ 'submodule paths must not follow symlinks' '
+ # This is only needed because we want to run this in a self-contained
+ # test without having to spin up an HTTP server; However, it would not
+ # be needed in a real-world scenario where the submodule is simply
+ # hosted on a public site.
+ test_config_global protocol.file.allow always &&
+ # Make sure that Git tries to use symlinks on Windows
+ test_config_global core.symlinks true &&
+ tell_tale_path="$PWD/tell.tale" &&
+ git init hook &&
+ (
+ cd hook &&
+ mkdir -p y/hooks &&
+ write_script y/hooks/post-checkout <<-EOF &&
+ echo HOOK-RUN >&2
+ echo hook-run >"$tell_tale_path"
+ EOF
+ git add y/hooks/post-checkout &&
+ test_tick &&
+ git commit -m post-checkout
+ ) &&
+ hook_repo_path="$(pwd)/hook" &&
+ git init captain &&
+ (
+ cd captain &&
+ git submodule add --name x/y "$hook_repo_path" A/modules/x &&
+ test_tick &&
+ git commit -m add-submodule &&
+ printf .git >dotgit.txt &&
+ git hash-object -w --stdin <dotgit.txt >dot-git.hash &&
+ printf "120000 %s 0\ta\n" "$(cat dot-git.hash)" >index.info &&
+ git update-index --index-info <index.info &&
+ test_tick &&
+ git commit -m add-symlink
+ ) &&
+ test_path_is_missing "$tell_tale_path" &&
+ test_must_fail git clone --recursive captain hooked 2>err &&
+ grep "directory not empty" err &&
+ test_path_is_missing "$tell_tale_path"
+'
+
test_done
--
2.40.0