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1a099cb1fa
When unpacking zip files requests uses predictable paths. Backport a fix to use randomly generated pathnames to mitigate injection attacks. (From OE-Core rev: b23ec9773d67f8767904731afa86fe5ede08f97f) Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org> (cherry picked from commit fe846d71b647fb06e6a87cb45a2dd9b0889e2891) Signed-off-by: Deepak Rathore <deeratho@cisco.com> Signed-off-by: Yoann Congal <yoann.congal@smile.fr> Signed-off-by: Paul Barker <paul@pbarker.dev>
47 lines
2.1 KiB
Diff
47 lines
2.1 KiB
Diff
From 66d21cb07bd6255b1280291c4fafb71803cdb3b7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Nate Prewitt <nate.prewitt@gmail.com>
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Date: Wed, 25 Mar 2026 08:57:56 -0600
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Subject: [PATCH] Merge commit from fork
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Prior to version 2.33.0, the `requests.utils.extract_zipped_paths()` utility function
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uses a predictable filename when extracting files from zip archives into the system
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temporary directory. If the target file already exists, it is reused without validation.
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A local attacker with write access to the temp directory could pre-create a malicious
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file that would be loaded in place of the legitimate one. Standard usage of the Requests
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library is not affected by this vulnerability. Only applications that call
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`extract_zipped_paths()` directly are impacted. Starting in version 2.33.0, the library
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extracts files to a non-deterministic location. If developers are unable to upgrade,
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they can set `TMPDIR` in their environment to a directory with restricted write access.
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CVE: CVE-2026-25645
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Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/psf/requests/commit/66d21cb07bd6255b1280291c4fafb71803cdb3b7]
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Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com>
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---
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src/requests/utils.py | 13 +++++++------
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1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/src/requests/utils.py b/src/requests/utils.py
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index d8803e6e91..54959bb8ab 100644
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--- a/src/requests/utils.py
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+++ b/src/requests/utils.py
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@@ -282,12 +282,13 @@ def extract_zipped_paths(path):
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return path
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# we have a valid zip archive and a valid member of that archive
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- tmp = tempfile.gettempdir()
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- extracted_path = os.path.join(tmp, member.split("/")[-1])
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- if not os.path.exists(extracted_path):
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- # use read + write to avoid the creating nested folders, we only want the file, avoids mkdir racing condition
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- with atomic_open(extracted_path) as file_handler:
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- file_handler.write(zip_file.read(member))
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+ suffix = os.path.splitext(member.split("/")[-1])[-1]
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+ fd, extracted_path = tempfile.mkstemp(suffix=suffix)
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+ try:
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+ os.write(fd, zip_file.read(member))
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+ finally:
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+ os.close(fd)
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+
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return extracted_path
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