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CVE-2024-32002: Git is a revision control system. Prior to versions 2.45.1, 2.44.1, 2.43.4, 2.42.2, 2.41.1, 2.40.2, and 2.39.4, repositories with submodules can be crafted in a way that exploits a bug in Git whereby it can be fooled into writing files not into the submodule's worktree but into a `.git/` directory. This allows writing a hook that will be executed while the clone operation is still running, giving the user no opportunity to inspect the code that is being executed. The problem has been patched in versions 2.45.1, 2.44.1, 2.43.4, 2.42.2, 2.41.1, 2.40.2, and 2.39.4. If symbolic link support is disabled in Git (e.g. via `git config --global core.symlinks false`), the described attack won't work. As always, it is best to avoid cloning repositories from untrusted sources. CVE-2024-32004: Git is a revision control system. Prior to versions 2.45.1, 2.44.1, 2.43.4, 2.42.2, 2.41.1, 2.40.2, and 2.39.4, an attacker can prepare a local repository in such a way that, when cloned, will execute arbitrary code during the operation. The problem has been patched in versions 2.45.1, 2.44.1, 2.43.4, 2.42.2, 2.41.1, 2.40.2, and 2.39.4. As a workaround, avoid cloning repositories from untrusted sources. CVE-2024-32020: Git is a revision control system. Prior to versions 2.45.1, 2.44.1, 2.43.4, 2.42.2, 2.41.1, 2.40.2, and 2.39.4, local clones may end up hardlinking files into the target repository's object database when source and target repository reside on the same disk. If the source repository is owned by a different user, then those hardlinked files may be rewritten at any point in time by the untrusted user. Cloning local repositories will cause Git to either copy or hardlink files of the source repository into the target repository. This significantly speeds up such local clones compared to doing a "proper" clone and saves both disk space and compute time. When cloning a repository located on the same disk that is owned by a different user than the current user we also end up creating such hardlinks. These files will continue to be owned and controlled by the potentially-untrusted user and can be rewritten by them at will in the future. The problem has been patched in versions 2.45.1, 2.44.1, 2.43.4, 2.42.2, 2.41.1, 2.40.2, and 2.39.4. CVE-2024-32021: Git is a revision control system. Prior to versions 2.45.1, 2.44.1, 2.43.4, 2.42.2, 2.41.1, 2.40.2, and 2.39.4, when cloning a local source repository that contains symlinks via the filesystem, Git may create hardlinks to arbitrary user-readable files on the same filesystem as the target repository in the `objects/` directory. Cloning a local repository over the filesystem may creating hardlinks to arbitrary user-owned files on the same filesystem in the target Git repository's `objects/` directory. When cloning a repository over the filesystem (without explicitly specifying the `file://` protocol or `--no-local`), the optimizations for local cloning will be used, which include attempting to hard link the object files instead of copying them. While the code includes checks against symbolic links in the source repository, which were added during the fix for CVE-2022-39253, these checks can still be raced because the hard link operation ultimately follows symlinks. If the object on the filesystem appears as a file during the check, and then a symlink during the operation, this will allow the adversary to bypass the check and create hardlinks in the destination objects directory to arbitrary, user-readable files. The problem has been patched in versions 2.45.1, 2.44.1, 2.43.4, 2.42.2, 2.41.1, 2.40.2, and 2.39.4. CVE-2024-32465: Git is a revision control system. The Git project recommends to avoid working in untrusted repositories, and instead to clone it first with `git clone --no-local` to obtain a clean copy. Git has specific protections to make that a safe operation even with an untrusted source repository, but vulnerabilities allow those protections to be bypassed. In the context of cloning local repositories owned by other users, this vulnerability has been covered in CVE-2024-32004. But there are circumstances where the fixes for CVE-2024-32004 are not enough: For example, when obtaining a `.zip` file containing a full copy of a Git repository, it should not be trusted by default to be safe, as e.g. hooks could be configured to run within the context of that repository. The problem has been patched in versions 2.45.1, 2.44.1, 2.43.4, 2.42.2, 2.41.1, 2.40.2, and 2.39.4. As a workaround, avoid using Git in repositories that have been obtained via archives from untrusted sources. References: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-32002 https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-32004 https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-32020 https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-32021 https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-32465 (From OE-Core rev: 209c41377abf6853455b00af3923f1b244a3766b) Signed-off-by: Soumya Sambu <soumya.sambu@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
90 lines
3.7 KiB
Diff
90 lines
3.7 KiB
Diff
From 150e6b0aedf57d224c3c49038c306477fa159886 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
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Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2024 13:30:26 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH] builtin/clone: stop resolving symlinks when copying files
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When a user performs a local clone without `--no-local`, then we end up
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copying the source repository into the target repository directly. To
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optimize this even further, we try to hardlink files into place instead
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of copying data over, which helps both disk usage and speed.
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There is an important edge case in this context though, namely when we
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try to hardlink symlinks from the source repository into the target
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repository. Depending on both platform and filesystem the resulting
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behaviour here can be different:
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- On macOS and NetBSD, calling link(3P) with a symlink target creates
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a hardlink to the file pointed to by the symlink.
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- On Linux, calling link(3P) instead creates a hardlink to the symlink
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itself.
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To unify this behaviour, 36596fd2df (clone: better handle symlinked
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files at .git/objects/, 2019-07-10) introduced logic to resolve symlinks
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before we try to link(3P) files. Consequently, the new behaviour was to
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always create a hard link to the target of the symlink on all platforms.
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Eventually though, we figured out that following symlinks like this can
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cause havoc when performing a local clone of a malicious repository,
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which resulted in CVE-2022-39253. This issue was fixed via 6f054f9fb3
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(builtin/clone.c: disallow `--local` clones with symlinks, 2022-07-28),
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by refusing symlinks in the source repository.
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But even though we now shouldn't ever link symlinks anymore, the code
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that resolves symlinks still exists. In the best case the code does not
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end up doing anything because there are no symlinks anymore. In the
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worst case though this can be abused by an adversary that rewrites the
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source file after it has been checked not to be a symlink such that it
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actually is a symlink when we call link(3P). Thus, it is still possible
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to recreate CVE-2022-39253 due to this time-of-check-time-of-use bug.
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Remove the call to `realpath()`. This doesn't yet address the actual
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vulnerability, which will be handled in a subsequent commit.
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Reported-by: Apple Product Security <product-security@apple.com>
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Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
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Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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CVE: CVE-2024-32021
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Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/git/git/commit/150e6b0aedf57d224c3c49038c306477fa159886]
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Signed-off-by: Soumya Sambu <soumya.sambu@windriver.com>
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---
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builtin/clone.c | 6 +-----
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1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 5 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/builtin/clone.c b/builtin/clone.c
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index 11f6b4b..2778d20 100644
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--- a/builtin/clone.c
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+++ b/builtin/clone.c
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@@ -310,7 +310,6 @@ static void copy_or_link_directory(struct strbuf *src, struct strbuf *dest,
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int src_len, dest_len;
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struct dir_iterator *iter;
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int iter_status;
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- struct strbuf realpath = STRBUF_INIT;
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/*
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* Refuse copying directories by default which aren't owned by us. The
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@@ -362,8 +361,7 @@ static void copy_or_link_directory(struct strbuf *src, struct strbuf *dest,
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if (unlink(dest->buf) && errno != ENOENT)
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die_errno(_("failed to unlink '%s'"), dest->buf);
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if (!option_no_hardlinks) {
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- strbuf_realpath(&realpath, src->buf, 1);
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- if (!link(realpath.buf, dest->buf))
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+ if (!link(src->buf, dest->buf))
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continue;
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if (option_local > 0)
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die_errno(_("failed to create link '%s'"), dest->buf);
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@@ -377,8 +375,6 @@ static void copy_or_link_directory(struct strbuf *src, struct strbuf *dest,
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strbuf_setlen(src, src_len);
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die(_("failed to iterate over '%s'"), src->buf);
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}
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-
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- strbuf_release(&realpath);
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}
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static void clone_local(const char *src_repo, const char *dest_repo)
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--
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2.40.0
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