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CVE-2024-32002: Git is a revision control system. Prior to versions 2.45.1, 2.44.1, 2.43.4, 2.42.2, 2.41.1, 2.40.2, and 2.39.4, repositories with submodules can be crafted in a way that exploits a bug in Git whereby it can be fooled into writing files not into the submodule's worktree but into a `.git/` directory. This allows writing a hook that will be executed while the clone operation is still running, giving the user no opportunity to inspect the code that is being executed. The problem has been patched in versions 2.45.1, 2.44.1, 2.43.4, 2.42.2, 2.41.1, 2.40.2, and 2.39.4. If symbolic link support is disabled in Git (e.g. via `git config --global core.symlinks false`), the described attack won't work. As always, it is best to avoid cloning repositories from untrusted sources. CVE-2024-32004: Git is a revision control system. Prior to versions 2.45.1, 2.44.1, 2.43.4, 2.42.2, 2.41.1, 2.40.2, and 2.39.4, an attacker can prepare a local repository in such a way that, when cloned, will execute arbitrary code during the operation. The problem has been patched in versions 2.45.1, 2.44.1, 2.43.4, 2.42.2, 2.41.1, 2.40.2, and 2.39.4. As a workaround, avoid cloning repositories from untrusted sources. CVE-2024-32020: Git is a revision control system. Prior to versions 2.45.1, 2.44.1, 2.43.4, 2.42.2, 2.41.1, 2.40.2, and 2.39.4, local clones may end up hardlinking files into the target repository's object database when source and target repository reside on the same disk. If the source repository is owned by a different user, then those hardlinked files may be rewritten at any point in time by the untrusted user. Cloning local repositories will cause Git to either copy or hardlink files of the source repository into the target repository. This significantly speeds up such local clones compared to doing a "proper" clone and saves both disk space and compute time. When cloning a repository located on the same disk that is owned by a different user than the current user we also end up creating such hardlinks. These files will continue to be owned and controlled by the potentially-untrusted user and can be rewritten by them at will in the future. The problem has been patched in versions 2.45.1, 2.44.1, 2.43.4, 2.42.2, 2.41.1, 2.40.2, and 2.39.4. CVE-2024-32021: Git is a revision control system. Prior to versions 2.45.1, 2.44.1, 2.43.4, 2.42.2, 2.41.1, 2.40.2, and 2.39.4, when cloning a local source repository that contains symlinks via the filesystem, Git may create hardlinks to arbitrary user-readable files on the same filesystem as the target repository in the `objects/` directory. Cloning a local repository over the filesystem may creating hardlinks to arbitrary user-owned files on the same filesystem in the target Git repository's `objects/` directory. When cloning a repository over the filesystem (without explicitly specifying the `file://` protocol or `--no-local`), the optimizations for local cloning will be used, which include attempting to hard link the object files instead of copying them. While the code includes checks against symbolic links in the source repository, which were added during the fix for CVE-2022-39253, these checks can still be raced because the hard link operation ultimately follows symlinks. If the object on the filesystem appears as a file during the check, and then a symlink during the operation, this will allow the adversary to bypass the check and create hardlinks in the destination objects directory to arbitrary, user-readable files. The problem has been patched in versions 2.45.1, 2.44.1, 2.43.4, 2.42.2, 2.41.1, 2.40.2, and 2.39.4. CVE-2024-32465: Git is a revision control system. The Git project recommends to avoid working in untrusted repositories, and instead to clone it first with `git clone --no-local` to obtain a clean copy. Git has specific protections to make that a safe operation even with an untrusted source repository, but vulnerabilities allow those protections to be bypassed. In the context of cloning local repositories owned by other users, this vulnerability has been covered in CVE-2024-32004. But there are circumstances where the fixes for CVE-2024-32004 are not enough: For example, when obtaining a `.zip` file containing a full copy of a Git repository, it should not be trusted by default to be safe, as e.g. hooks could be configured to run within the context of that repository. The problem has been patched in versions 2.45.1, 2.44.1, 2.43.4, 2.42.2, 2.41.1, 2.40.2, and 2.39.4. As a workaround, avoid using Git in repositories that have been obtained via archives from untrusted sources. References: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-32002 https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-32004 https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-32020 https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-32021 https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-32465 (From OE-Core rev: 209c41377abf6853455b00af3923f1b244a3766b) Signed-off-by: Soumya Sambu <soumya.sambu@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
207 lines
8.6 KiB
Diff
207 lines
8.6 KiB
Diff
From 7b70e9efb18c2cc3f219af399bd384c5801ba1d7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
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Date: Tue, 16 Apr 2024 04:35:33 -0400
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Subject: [PATCH] upload-pack: disable lazy-fetching by default
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The upload-pack command tries to avoid trusting the repository in which
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it's run (e.g., by not running any hooks and not using any config that
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contains arbitrary commands). But if the server side of a fetch or a
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clone is a partial clone, then either upload-pack or its child
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pack-objects may run a lazy "git fetch" under the hood. And it is very
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easy to convince fetch to run arbitrary commands.
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The "server" side can be a local repository owned by someone else, who
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would be able to configure commands that are run during a clone with the
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current user's permissions. This issue has been designated
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CVE-2024-32004.
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The fix in this commit's parent helps in this scenario, as well as in
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related scenarios using SSH to clone, where the untrusted .git directory
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is owned by a different user id. But if you received one as a zip file,
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on a USB stick, etc, it may be owned by your user but still untrusted.
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This has been designated CVE-2024-32465.
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To mitigate the issue more completely, let's disable lazy fetching
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entirely during `upload-pack`. While fetching from a partial repository
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should be relatively rare, it is certainly not an unreasonable workflow.
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And thus we need to provide an escape hatch.
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This commit works by respecting a GIT_NO_LAZY_FETCH environment variable
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(to skip the lazy-fetch), and setting it in upload-pack, but only when
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the user has not already done so (which gives us the escape hatch).
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The name of the variable is specifically chosen to match what has
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already been added in 'master' via e6d5479e7a (git: extend
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--no-lazy-fetch to work across subprocesses, 2024-02-27). Since we're
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building this fix as a backport for older versions, we could cherry-pick
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that patch and its earlier steps. However, we don't really need the
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niceties (like a "--no-lazy-fetch" option) that it offers. By using the
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same name, everything should just work when the two are eventually
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merged, but here are a few notes:
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- the blocking of the fetch in e6d5479e7a is incomplete! It sets
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fetch_if_missing to 0 when we setup the repository variable, but
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that isn't enough. pack-objects in particular will call
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prefetch_to_pack() even if that variable is 0. This patch by
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contrast checks the environment variable at the lowest level before
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we call the lazy fetch, where we can be sure to catch all code
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paths.
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Possibly the setting of fetch_if_missing from e6d5479e7a can be
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reverted, but it may be useful to have. For example, some code may
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want to use that flag to change behavior before it gets to the point
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of trying to start the fetch. At any rate, that's all outside the
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scope of this patch.
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- there's documentation for GIT_NO_LAZY_FETCH in e6d5479e7a. We can
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live without that here, because for the most part the user shouldn't
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need to set it themselves. The exception is if they do want to
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override upload-pack's default, and that requires a separate
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documentation section (which is added here)
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- it would be nice to use the NO_LAZY_FETCH_ENVIRONMENT macro added by
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e6d5479e7a, but those definitions have moved from cache.h to
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environment.h between 2.39.3 and master. I just used the raw string
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literals, and we can replace them with the macro once this topic is
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merged to master.
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At least with respect to CVE-2024-32004, this does render this commit's
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parent commit somewhat redundant. However, it is worth retaining that
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commit as defense in depth, and because it may help other issues (e.g.,
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symlink/hardlink TOCTOU races, where zip files are not really an
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interesting attack vector).
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The tests in t0411 still pass, but now we have _two_ mechanisms ensuring
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that the evil command is not run. Let's beef up the existing ones to
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check that they failed for the expected reason, that we refused to run
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upload-pack at all with an alternate user id. And add two new ones for
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the same-user case that both the restriction and its escape hatch.
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Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
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Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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CVE: CVE-2024-32465
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Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/git/git/commit/7b70e9efb18c2cc3f219af399bd384c5801ba1d7]
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Signed-off-by: Soumya Sambu <soumya.sambu@windriver.com>
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---
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Documentation/git-upload-pack.txt | 16 ++++++++++++++++
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builtin/upload-pack.c | 2 ++
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promisor-remote.c | 10 ++++++++++
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t/t0411-clone-from-partial.sh | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
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4 files changed, 46 insertions(+)
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diff --git a/Documentation/git-upload-pack.txt b/Documentation/git-upload-pack.txt
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index 8f87b23..eba0e81 100644
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--- a/Documentation/git-upload-pack.txt
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+++ b/Documentation/git-upload-pack.txt
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@@ -56,6 +56,22 @@ ENVIRONMENT
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admins may need to configure some transports to allow this
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variable to be passed. See the discussion in linkgit:git[1].
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+`GIT_NO_LAZY_FETCH`::
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+ When cloning or fetching from a partial repository (i.e., one
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+ itself cloned with `--filter`), the server-side `upload-pack`
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+ may need to fetch extra objects from its upstream in order to
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+ complete the request. By default, `upload-pack` will refuse to
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+ perform such a lazy fetch, because `git fetch` may run arbitrary
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+ commands specified in configuration and hooks of the source
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+ repository (and `upload-pack` tries to be safe to run even in
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+ untrusted `.git` directories).
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++
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+This is implemented by having `upload-pack` internally set the
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+`GIT_NO_LAZY_FETCH` variable to `1`. If you want to override it
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+(because you are fetching from a partial clone, and you are sure
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+you trust it), you can explicitly set `GIT_NO_LAZY_FETCH` to
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+`0`.
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+
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SEE ALSO
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--------
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linkgit:gitnamespaces[7]
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diff --git a/builtin/upload-pack.c b/builtin/upload-pack.c
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index 125af53..9ecaafe 100644
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--- a/builtin/upload-pack.c
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+++ b/builtin/upload-pack.c
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@@ -34,6 +34,8 @@ int cmd_upload_pack(int argc, const char **argv, const char *prefix)
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packet_trace_identity("upload-pack");
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read_replace_refs = 0;
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+ /* TODO: This should use NO_LAZY_FETCH_ENVIRONMENT */
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+ xsetenv("GIT_NO_LAZY_FETCH", "1", 0);
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argc = parse_options(argc, argv, prefix, options, upload_pack_usage, 0);
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diff --git a/promisor-remote.c b/promisor-remote.c
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index db2ebdc..e73df68 100644
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--- a/promisor-remote.c
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+++ b/promisor-remote.c
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@@ -19,6 +19,16 @@ static int fetch_objects(struct repository *repo,
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int i;
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FILE *child_in;
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+ /* TODO: This should use NO_LAZY_FETCH_ENVIRONMENT */
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+ if (git_env_bool("GIT_NO_LAZY_FETCH", 0)) {
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+ static int warning_shown;
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+ if (!warning_shown) {
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+ warning_shown = 1;
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+ warning(_("lazy fetching disabled; some objects may not be available"));
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+ }
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+ return -1;
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+ }
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+
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child.git_cmd = 1;
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child.in = -1;
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if (repo != the_repository)
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diff --git a/t/t0411-clone-from-partial.sh b/t/t0411-clone-from-partial.sh
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index eb3360d..b3d6ddc 100755
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--- a/t/t0411-clone-from-partial.sh
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+++ b/t/t0411-clone-from-partial.sh
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@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ test_expect_success 'local clone must not fetch from promisor remote and execute
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test_must_fail git clone \
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--upload-pack="GIT_TEST_ASSUME_DIFFERENT_OWNER=true git-upload-pack" \
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evil clone1 2>err &&
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+ grep "detected dubious ownership" err &&
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! grep "fake-upload-pack running" err &&
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test_path_is_missing script-executed
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'
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@@ -37,6 +38,7 @@ test_expect_success 'clone from file://... must not fetch from promisor remote a
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test_must_fail git clone \
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--upload-pack="GIT_TEST_ASSUME_DIFFERENT_OWNER=true git-upload-pack" \
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"file://$(pwd)/evil" clone2 2>err &&
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+ grep "detected dubious ownership" err &&
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! grep "fake-upload-pack running" err &&
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test_path_is_missing script-executed
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'
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@@ -46,6 +48,7 @@ test_expect_success 'fetch from file://... must not fetch from promisor remote a
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test_must_fail git fetch \
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--upload-pack="GIT_TEST_ASSUME_DIFFERENT_OWNER=true git-upload-pack" \
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"file://$(pwd)/evil" 2>err &&
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+ grep "detected dubious ownership" err &&
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! grep "fake-upload-pack running" err &&
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test_path_is_missing script-executed
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'
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@@ -57,4 +60,19 @@ test_expect_success 'pack-objects should fetch from promisor remote and execute
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test_path_is_file script-executed
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'
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+test_expect_success 'clone from promisor remote does not lazy-fetch by default' '
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+ rm -f script-executed &&
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+ test_must_fail git clone evil no-lazy 2>err &&
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+ grep "lazy fetching disabled" err &&
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+ test_path_is_missing script-executed
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+'
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+
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+test_expect_success 'promisor lazy-fetching can be re-enabled' '
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+ rm -f script-executed &&
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+ test_must_fail env GIT_NO_LAZY_FETCH=0 \
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+ git clone evil lazy-ok 2>err &&
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+ grep "fake-upload-pack running" err &&
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+ test_path_is_file script-executed
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+'
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+
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test_done
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--
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2.40.0
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