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6964579627
Proxy-Authorization and Proxy-Authenticate headers persisted on
cross-origin redirects potentially leaking sensitive information.
Reference:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-4673
Upstream-patch:
b897e97c36
(From OE-Core rev: c07547c19e5372ed5eaac8530b2dd651302542a8)
Signed-off-by: Praveen Kumar <praveen.kumar@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
71 lines
3.0 KiB
Diff
71 lines
3.0 KiB
Diff
From b897e97c36cb62629a458bc681723ca733404e32 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Neal Patel <nealpatel@google.com>
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Date: Wed, 21 May 2025 14:11:44 -0400
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Subject: [PATCH] net/http: strip sensitive proxy headers from redirect
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requests
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Similarly to Authentication entries, Proxy-Authentication entries should be stripped to ensure sensitive information is not leaked on redirects outside of the original domain.
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https://fetch.spec.whatwg.org/#authentication-entries
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Thanks to Takeshi Kaneko (GMO Cybersecurity by Ierae, Inc.) for reporting this issue.
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Updates golang/go#73816
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Fixes golang/go#73905
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Fixes CVE-2025-4673
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Change-Id: I1615f31977a2fd014fbc12aae43f82692315a6d0
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Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/679255
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LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
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Reviewed-by: Michael Knyszek <mknyszek@google.com>
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CVE: CVE-2025-4673
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Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/golang/go/commit/b897e97c36cb62629a458bc681723ca733404e32]
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Signed-off-by: Praveen Kumar <praveen.kumar@windriver.com>
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---
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src/net/http/client.go | 3 ++-
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src/net/http/client_test.go | 5 ++++-
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2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/src/net/http/client.go b/src/net/http/client.go
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index 13b6152..d1c9407 100644
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--- a/src/net/http/client.go
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+++ b/src/net/http/client.go
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@@ -806,7 +806,8 @@ func (c *Client) makeHeadersCopier(ireq *Request) func(req *Request, stripSensit
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for k, vv := range ireqhdr {
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sensitive := false
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switch CanonicalHeaderKey(k) {
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- case "Authorization", "Www-Authenticate", "Cookie", "Cookie2":
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+ case "Authorization", "Www-Authenticate", "Cookie", "Cookie2",
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+ "Proxy-Authorization", "Proxy-Authenticate":
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sensitive = true
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}
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if !(sensitive && stripSensitiveHeaders) {
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diff --git a/src/net/http/client_test.go b/src/net/http/client_test.go
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index 8bf1808..66ad370 100644
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--- a/src/net/http/client_test.go
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+++ b/src/net/http/client_test.go
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@@ -1562,7 +1562,9 @@ func testClientStripHeadersOnRepeatedRedirect(t *testing.T, mode testMode) {
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if r.Host+r.URL.Path != "a.example.com/" {
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if h := r.Header.Get("Authorization"); h != "" {
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t.Errorf("on request to %v%v, Authorization=%q, want no header", r.Host, r.URL.Path, h)
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- }
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+ } else if h := r.Header.Get("Proxy-Authorization"); h != "" {
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+ t.Errorf("on request to %v%v, Proxy-Authorization=%q, want no header", r.Host, r.URL.Path, h)
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+ }
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}
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// Follow a chain of redirects from a to b and back to a.
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// The Authorization header is stripped on the first redirect to b,
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@@ -1590,6 +1592,7 @@ func testClientStripHeadersOnRepeatedRedirect(t *testing.T, mode testMode) {
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req, _ := NewRequest("GET", proto+"://a.example.com/", nil)
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req.Header.Add("Cookie", "foo=bar")
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req.Header.Add("Authorization", "secretpassword")
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+ req.Header.Add("Proxy-Authorization", "secretpassword")
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res, err := c.Do(req)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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--
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2.40.0
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