Files
poky/meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12086-0002.patch
Archana Polampalli 1e04a4df0a rsync: fix CVE-2024-12086
A flaw was found in rsync. It could allow a server to enumerate the contents of an
arbitrary file from the client's machine. This issue occurs when files are being
copied from a client to a server. During this process, the rsync server will send
checksums of local data to the client to compare with in order to determine what
data needs to be sent to the server. By sending specially constructed checksum values
for arbitrary files, an attacker may be able to reconstruct the data of those files
byte-by-byte based on the responses from the client.

(From OE-Core rev: b49c8f58c20d7deb354a86a34488cb798c49eba3)

Signed-off-by: Archana Polampalli <archana.polampalli@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
2025-01-24 07:49:28 -08:00

109 lines
2.8 KiB
Diff

From b4a27ca25d0abb6fcf14f41b7e11f3a6e1d8a4ff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Andrew Tridgell <andrew@tridgell.net>
Date: Sat, 23 Nov 2024 12:26:10 +1100
Subject: [PATCH] added secure_relative_open()
this is an open that enforces no symlink following for all path
components in a relative path
CVE: CVE-2024-12086
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.samba.org/?p=rsync.git;a=commit;h=b4a27ca25d0abb6fcf14f41b7e11f3a6e1d8a4ff]
Signed-off-by: Archana Polampalli <archana.polampalli@windriver.com>
---
syscall.c | 74 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 74 insertions(+)
diff --git a/syscall.c b/syscall.c
index b4b0f1f1..cffc814b 100644
--- a/syscall.c
+++ b/syscall.c
@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#endif
+#include "ifuncs.h"
+
extern int dry_run;
extern int am_root;
extern int am_sender;
@@ -707,3 +709,75 @@ int do_open_nofollow(const char *pathname, int flags)
return fd;
}
+
+/*
+ open a file relative to a base directory. The basedir can be NULL,
+ in which case the current working directory is used. The relpath
+ must be a relative path, and the relpath must not contain any
+ elements in the path which follow symlinks (ie. like O_NOFOLLOW, but
+ applies to all path components, not just the last component)
+*/
+int secure_relative_open(const char *basedir, const char *relpath, int flags, mode_t mode)
+{
+ if (!relpath || relpath[0] == '/') {
+ // must be a relative path
+ errno = EINVAL;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+#if !defined(O_NOFOLLOW) || !defined(O_DIRECTORY)
+ // really old system, all we can do is live with the risks
+ if (!basedir) {
+ return open(relpath, flags, mode);
+ }
+ char fullpath[MAXPATHLEN];
+ pathjoin(fullpath, sizeof fullpath, basedir, relpath);
+ return open(fullpath, flags, mode);
+#else
+ int dirfd = AT_FDCWD;
+ if (basedir != NULL) {
+ dirfd = openat(AT_FDCWD, basedir, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY);
+ if (dirfd == -1) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ int retfd = -1;
+
+ char *path_copy = my_strdup(relpath, __FILE__, __LINE__);
+ if (!path_copy) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ for (const char *part = strtok(path_copy, "/");
+ part != NULL;
+ part = strtok(NULL, "/"))
+ {
+ int next_fd = openat(dirfd, part, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY | O_NOFOLLOW);
+ if (next_fd == -1 && errno == ENOTDIR) {
+ if (strtok(NULL, "/") != NULL) {
+ // this is not the last component of the path
+ errno = ELOOP;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ // this could be the last component of the path, try as a file
+ retfd = openat(dirfd, part, flags | O_NOFOLLOW, mode);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ if (next_fd == -1) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ if (dirfd != AT_FDCWD) close(dirfd);
+ dirfd = next_fd;
+ }
+
+ // the path must be a directory
+ errno = EINVAL;
+
+cleanup:
+ free(path_copy);
+ if (dirfd != AT_FDCWD) {
+ close(dirfd);
+ }
+ return retfd;
+#endif // O_NOFOLLOW, O_DIRECTORY
+}
--
2.40.0