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1e04a4df0a
A flaw was found in rsync. It could allow a server to enumerate the contents of an arbitrary file from the client's machine. This issue occurs when files are being copied from a client to a server. During this process, the rsync server will send checksums of local data to the client to compare with in order to determine what data needs to be sent to the server. By sending specially constructed checksum values for arbitrary files, an attacker may be able to reconstruct the data of those files byte-by-byte based on the responses from the client. (From OE-Core rev: b49c8f58c20d7deb354a86a34488cb798c49eba3) Signed-off-by: Archana Polampalli <archana.polampalli@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
42 lines
1.4 KiB
Diff
42 lines
1.4 KiB
Diff
From 9f86ddc9652247233f32b241a79d5aa4fb9d4afa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Andrew Tridgell <andrew@tridgell.net>
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Date: Tue, 26 Nov 2024 09:16:31 +1100
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Subject: [PATCH] disallow ../ elements in relpath for secure_relative_open
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CVE: CVE-2024-12086
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Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.samba.org/?p=rsync.git;a=commit;h=9f86ddc9652247233f32b241a79d5aa4fb9d4afa]
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Signed-off-by: Archana Polampalli <archana.polampalli@windriver.com>
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---
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syscall.c | 7 +++++++
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1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
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diff --git a/syscall.c b/syscall.c
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index cffc814b..081357bb 100644
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--- a/syscall.c
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+++ b/syscall.c
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@@ -716,6 +716,8 @@ int do_open_nofollow(const char *pathname, int flags)
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must be a relative path, and the relpath must not contain any
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elements in the path which follow symlinks (ie. like O_NOFOLLOW, but
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applies to all path components, not just the last component)
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+
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+ The relpath must also not contain any ../ elements in the path
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*/
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int secure_relative_open(const char *basedir, const char *relpath, int flags, mode_t mode)
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{
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@@ -724,6 +726,11 @@ int secure_relative_open(const char *basedir, const char *relpath, int flags, mo
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errno = EINVAL;
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return -1;
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}
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+ if (strncmp(relpath, "../", 3) == 0 || strstr(relpath, "/../")) {
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+ // no ../ elements allowed in the relpath
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+ errno = EINVAL;
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+ return -1;
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+ }
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#if !defined(O_NOFOLLOW) || !defined(O_DIRECTORY)
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// really old system, all we can do is live with the risks
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--
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2.40.0
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