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The current security-related documentation is a bit hard to find and hidden within the development manual. However these are processes that are not part of a development task but is rather a vulnerability reporting process. Create a new "Security" section in the documentation to gather this information. This will be directly visible in the sidebar when opening the documentation. Split the previous security-subjects.rst document into 2 documents: - security-team.rst: defines the roles of the security teams and its members. - reporting-vulnerabilities.rst: guide to report vulnerabilities to the security team. The plan is to backport these documents to active releases. As a consequence, this section should be free of instructions and information that only make sense for a specific release. It should _not_ contain documents on how to enable security features with Yocto on target devices, this is unrelated and can be left in the development manual (for example: dev-manual/vulnerabilities.rst to deal with CVEs). (From yocto-docs rev: 3fd0f37d708d88534dd6dbb51dc264911c349352) Signed-off-by: Antonin Godard <antonin.godard@bootlin.com> (cherry picked from commit 81e14ca2d5cff9e2104c556655144b069633790c) Signed-off-by: Antonin Godard <antonin.godard@bootlin.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
111 lines
5.4 KiB
ReStructuredText
111 lines
5.4 KiB
ReStructuredText
.. SPDX-License-Identifier: CC-BY-SA-2.0-UK
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Security team
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*************
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The Yocto Project/OpenEmbedded security team coordinates the work on security
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subjects in the project. All general discussion takes place publicly. The
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Security Team only uses confidential communication tools to deal with private
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vulnerability reports before they are released.
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Security team appointment
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=========================
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The Yocto Project Security Team consists of at least three members. When new
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members are needed, the Yocto Project Technical Steering Committee (YP TSC)
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asks for nominations by public channels including a nomination deadline.
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Self-nominations are possible. When the limit time is
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reached, the YP TSC posts the list of candidates for the comments of project
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participants and developers. Comments may be sent publicly or privately to the
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YP and OE TSCs. The candidates are approved by both YP TSC and OpenEmbedded
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Technical Steering Committee (OE TSC) and the final list of the team members
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is announced publicly. The aim is to have people representing technical
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leadership, security knowledge and infrastructure present with enough people
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to provide backup/coverage but keep the notification list small enough to
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minimize information risk and maintain trust.
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YP Security Team members may resign at any time.
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Security Team Operations
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========================
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The work of the Security Team might require high confidentiality. Team members
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are individuals selected by merit and do not represent the companies they work
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for. They do not share information about confidential issues outside of the team
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and do not hint about ongoing embargoes.
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Team members can bring in domain experts as needed. Those people should be
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added to individual issues only and adhere to the same standards as the YP
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Security Team.
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The YP security team organizes its meetings and communication as needed.
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When the YP Security team receives a report about a potential security
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vulnerability, they quickly analyze and notify the reporter of the result.
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They might also request more information.
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If the issue is confirmed and affects the code maintained by the YP, they
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confidentially notify maintainers of that code and work with them to prepare
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a fix.
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If the issue is confirmed and affects an upstream project, the YP security team
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notifies the project. Usually, the upstream project analyzes the problem again.
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If they deem it a real security problem in their software, they develop and
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release a fix following their security policy. They may want to include the
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original reporter in the loop. There is also sometimes some coordination for
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handling patches, backporting patches etc, or just understanding the problem
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or what caused it.
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When the fix is publicly available, the YP security team member or the
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package maintainer sends patches against the YP code base, following usual
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procedures, including public code review.
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What Yocto Security Team does when it receives a security vulnerability
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=======================================================================
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The YP Security Team team performs a quick analysis and would usually report
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the flaw to the upstream project. Normally the upstream project analyzes the
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problem. If they deem it a real security problem in their software, they
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develop and release a fix following their own security policy. They may want
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to include the original reporter in the loop. There is also sometimes some
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coordination for handling patches, backporting patches etc, or just
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understanding the problem or what caused it.
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The security policy of the upstream project might include a notification to
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Linux distributions or other important downstream projects in advance to
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discuss coordinated disclosure. These mailing lists are normally non-public.
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When the upstream project releases a version with the fix, they are responsible
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for contacting `Mitre <https://www.cve.org/>`__ to get a CVE number assigned and
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the CVE record published.
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If an upstream project does not respond quickly
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===============================================
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If an upstream project does not fix the problem in a reasonable time,
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the Yocto's Security Team will contact other interested parties (usually
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other distributions) in the community and together try to solve the
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vulnerability as quickly as possible.
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The Yocto Project Security team adheres to the 90 days disclosure policy
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by default. An increase of the embargo time is possible when necessary.
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Security Team Members
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=====================
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For secure communications, please send your messages encrypted using the GPG
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keys. Remember, message headers are not encrypted so do not include sensitive
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information in the subject line.
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- Ross Burton: <ross [at] burtonini [dot] com> `Public key <https://keys.openpgp.org/search?q=ross%40burtonini.com>`__
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- Michael Halstead: <mhalstead [at] linuxfoundation [dot] org>
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`Public key <https://pgp.mit.edu/pks/lookup?op=vindex&search=0x3373170601861969>`__
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or `Public key <https://keyserver.ubuntu.com/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0xd1f2407285e571ed12a407a73373170601861969>`__
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- Richard Purdie: <richard.purdie [at] linuxfoundation [dot] org> `Public key <https://keys.openpgp.org/search?q=richard.purdie%40linuxfoundation.org>`__
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- Marta Rybczynska: <marta DOT rybczynska [at] syslinbit [dot] com> `Public key <https://keys.openpgp.org/search?q=marta.rybczynska@syslinbit.com>`__
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- Steve Sakoman: <steve [at] sakoman [dot] com> `Public key <https://keys.openpgp.org/search?q=steve%40sakoman.com>`__
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