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poky/meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2025-6021.patch
Divya Chellam 58aa4f3e1b libxml2: fix CVE-2025-6021
A flaw was found in libxml2's xmlBuildQName function, where integer
overflows in buffer size calculations can lead to a stack-based buffer
overflow. This issue can result in memory corruption or a denial
of service when processing crafted input.

Reference:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-6021

Upstream-patch:
17d950ae33

(From OE-Core rev: 99a239d9146c5ecf158cd9db7823ec1aff45fd48)

Signed-off-by: Divya Chellam <divya.chellam@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
2025-07-21 09:17:59 -07:00

60 lines
1.7 KiB
Diff

From 17d950ae33c23f87692aa179bacedb6743f3188a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Nick Wellnhofer <wellnhofer@aevum.de>
Date: Tue, 27 May 2025 12:53:17 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] [CVE-2025-6021] tree: Fix integer overflow in xmlBuildQName
Fixes #926.
CVE: CVE-2025-6021
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libxml2/-/commit/17d950ae33c23f87692aa179bacedb6743f3188a]
Signed-off-by: Divya Chellam <divya.chellam@windriver.com>
---
tree.c | 12 +++++++++---
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tree.c b/tree.c
index f097cf8..5bc95b8 100644
--- a/tree.c
+++ b/tree.c
@@ -47,6 +47,10 @@
#include "private/error.h"
#include "private/tree.h"
+#ifndef SIZE_MAX
+ #define SIZE_MAX ((size_t)-1)
+#endif
+
int __xmlRegisterCallbacks = 0;
/************************************************************************
@@ -167,10 +171,10 @@ xmlGetParameterEntityFromDtd(const xmlDtd *dtd, const xmlChar *name) {
xmlChar *
xmlBuildQName(const xmlChar *ncname, const xmlChar *prefix,
xmlChar *memory, int len) {
- int lenn, lenp;
+ size_t lenn, lenp;
xmlChar *ret;
- if (ncname == NULL) return(NULL);
+ if ((ncname == NULL) || (len < 0)) return(NULL);
if (prefix == NULL) return((xmlChar *) ncname);
#ifdef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
@@ -181,8 +185,10 @@ xmlBuildQName(const xmlChar *ncname, const xmlChar *prefix,
lenn = strlen((char *) ncname);
lenp = strlen((char *) prefix);
+ if (lenn >= SIZE_MAX - lenp - 1)
+ return(NULL);
- if ((memory == NULL) || (len < lenn + lenp + 2)) {
+ if ((memory == NULL) || ((size_t) len < lenn + lenp + 2)) {
ret = (xmlChar *) xmlMallocAtomic(lenn + lenp + 2);
if (ret == NULL)
return(NULL);
--
2.40.0