mirrors/poky
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://git.yoctoproject.org/poky synced 2026-02-20 08:29:42 +01:00
Code Issues Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

curl: several security fixes

Browse Source 
Fixes below listed bugs:
1. CVE-2015-3143
2. CVE-2015-3144
3. CVE-2015-3145

Dropped: 4. CVE-2015-3148
SPNEGO was introduced in 7.39 so this version not affected

(From OE-Core rev: e525ef63ed2b4f3a250caf0748637b7f16b34d90)

Signed-off-by: Maxin B. John <maxin.john@enea.com>
Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster808@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
Maxin B. John
2015-04-23 15:11:00 +02:00
committed by Richard Purdie
parent c930052636
commit 0c1c0877e8
3 changed files with 153 additions and 0 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

38
meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2015-3143.patch Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
From d7d1bc8f08eea1a85ab0d794bc1561659462d937 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
Date: Thu, 16 Apr 2015 13:26:46 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] ConnectionExists: for NTLM re-use, require credentials to
match
Upstream-Status: Backport
CVE-2015-3143
Bug: http://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20150422A.html
Reported-by: Paras Sethia
Signed-off-by: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
Signed-off-by: Maxin B. John <maxin.john@enea.com>
---
lib/url.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/lib/url.c b/lib/url.c
index 018bb88..ee3d176 100644
--- a/lib/url.c
+++ b/lib/url.c
@@ -3207,11 +3207,11 @@ ConnectionExists(struct SessionHandle *data,
strcmp(check->localdev, needle->localdev))
continue;
}
if((!(needle->handler->flags & PROTOPT_CREDSPERREQUEST)) ||
- wantNTLMhttp) {
+ (wantNTLMhttp || check->ntlm.state != NTLMSTATE_NONE)) {
/* This protocol requires credentials per connection or is HTTP+NTLM,
so verify that we're using the same name and password as well */
if(!strequal(needle->user, check->user) ||
!strequal(needle->passwd, check->passwd)) {
/* one of them was different */
--
2.1.4

45
meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2015-3144.patch Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
From 6218ded6001ea330e589f92b6b2fa12777752b5d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
Date: Thu, 16 Apr 2015 23:52:04 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] fix_hostname: zero length host name caused -1 index offset
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Upstream-Status: Backport
If a URL is given with a zero-length host name, like in "http://:80" or
just ":80", `fix_hostname()` will index the host name pointer with a -1
offset (as it blindly assumes a non-zero length) and both read and
assign that address.
CVE-2015-3144
Bug: http://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20150422D.html
Reported-by: Hanno Böck
Signed-off-by: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
Signed-off-by: Maxin B. John <maxin.john@enea.com>
---
lib/url.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/lib/url.c b/lib/url.c
index ee3d176..f033dbc 100644
--- a/lib/url.c
+++ b/lib/url.c
@@ -3625,11 +3625,11 @@ static void fix_hostname(struct SessionHandle *data,
/* set the name we use to display the host name */
host->dispname = host->name;
len = strlen(host->name);
- if(host->name[len-1] == '.')
+ if(len && (host->name[len-1] == '.'))
/* strip off a single trailing dot if present, primarily for SNI but
there's no use for it */
host->name[len-1]=0;
if(!is_ASCII_name(host->name)) {
--
2.1.4

70
meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2015-3145.patch Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
From ea595c516bc936a514753597aa6c59fd6eb0765e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
Date: Thu, 16 Apr 2015 16:37:40 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] cookie: cookie parser out of boundary memory access
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Upstream-Status: Backport
The internal libcurl function called sanitize_cookie_path() that cleans
up the path element as given to it from a remote site or when read from
a file, did not properly validate the input. If given a path that
consisted of a single double-quote, libcurl would index a newly
allocated memory area with index -1 and assign a zero to it, thus
destroying heap memory it wasn't supposed to.
CVE-2015-3145
Bug: http://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20150422C.html
Reported-by: Hanno Böck
Signed-off-by: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
Signed-off-by: Maxin B. John <maxin.john@enea.com>
---
lib/cookie.c | 12 +++++++-----
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/cookie.c b/lib/cookie.c
index 0864f6b..0127926 100644
--- a/lib/cookie.c
+++ b/lib/cookie.c
@@ -223,15 +223,18 @@ static char *sanitize_cookie_path(const char *cookie_path)
char *new_path = strdup(cookie_path);
if(!new_path)
return NULL;
/* some stupid site sends path attribute with '"'. */
+ len = strlen(new_path);
if(new_path[0] == '\"') {
- memmove((void *)new_path, (const void *)(new_path + 1), strlen(new_path));
+ memmove((void *)new_path, (const void *)(new_path + 1), len);
+ len--;
}
- if(new_path[strlen(new_path) - 1] == '\"') {
- new_path[strlen(new_path) - 1] = 0x0;
+ if(len && (new_path[len - 1] == '\"')) {
+ new_path[len - 1] = 0x0;
+ len--;
}
/* RFC6265 5.2.4 The Path Attribute */
if(new_path[0] != '/') {
/* Let cookie-path be the default-path. */
@@ -239,12 +242,11 @@ static char *sanitize_cookie_path(const char *cookie_path)
new_path = strdup("/");
return new_path;
}
/* convert /hoge/ to /hoge */
- len = strlen(new_path);
- if(1 < len && new_path[len - 1] == '/') {
+ if(len && new_path[len - 1] == '/') {
new_path[len - 1] = 0x0;
}
return new_path;
}
--
2.1.4