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curl: fix CVE-2018-16890 CVE-2019-3822 CVE-2019-3823
(From OE-Core rev: 75a4b4d8fb14414bbe2e38be8ccda0af94ef9b40) Signed-off-by: Kevin Weng <t-keweng@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster808@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
Andrii Bordunov via Openembedded-core
committed by
Richard Purdie
Richard Purdie
parent
20ee17a579
commit
1b62838428
50
meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2018-16890.patch
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50
meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2018-16890.patch
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@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
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From 53d3c2f92b4a7561b1006494badf8cf2ef9110c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
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Date: Wed, 2 Jan 2019 20:33:08 +0100
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Subject: [PATCH 1/3] NTLM: fix size check condition for type2 received data
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Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/CVE-2018-16890.html
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Reported-by: Wenxiang Qian
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CVE-2018-16890
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Upstream-Status: Backport
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[https://github.com/curl/curl/commit
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/b780b30d1377adb10bbe774835f49e9b237fb9bb]
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CVE: CVE-2018-16890
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Signed-off-by: Kevin Weng <t-keweng@microsoft.com>
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---
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lib/vauth/ntlm.c | 7 ++++---
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1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/lib/vauth/ntlm.c b/lib/vauth/ntlm.c
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index cdb8d8f0d..0212756ab 100644
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--- a/lib/vauth/ntlm.c
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+++ b/lib/vauth/ntlm.c
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@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
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* | (__| |_| | _ <| |___
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* \___|\___/|_| \_\_____|
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*
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- * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2017, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al.
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+ * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2019, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al.
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*
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* This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which
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* you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms
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@@ -182,10 +182,11 @@ static CURLcode ntlm_decode_type2_target(struct Curl_easy *data,
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target_info_len = Curl_read16_le(&buffer[40]);
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target_info_offset = Curl_read32_le(&buffer[44]);
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if(target_info_len > 0) {
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- if(((target_info_offset + target_info_len) > size) ||
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+ if((target_info_offset >= size) ||
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+ ((target_info_offset + target_info_len) > size) ||
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(target_info_offset < 48)) {
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infof(data, "NTLM handshake failure (bad type-2 message). "
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- "Target Info Offset Len is set incorrect by the peer\n");
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+ "Target Info Offset Len is set incorrect by the peer\n");
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return CURLE_BAD_CONTENT_ENCODING;
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}
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--
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2.22.0
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47
meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2019-3822.patch
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47
meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2019-3822.patch
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@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
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From 761b51f66c7b1cd2cd6c71b807bfdb6a27c49b30 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
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Date: Thu, 3 Jan 2019 12:59:28 +0100
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Subject: [PATCH 2/3] ntlm: fix *_type3_message size check to avoid buffer
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overflow
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Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/CVE-2019-3822.html
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Reported-by: Wenxiang Qian
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CVE-2019-3822
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Upstream-Status: Backport
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[https://github.com/curl/curl/commit
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/50c9484278c63b958655a717844f0721263939cc]
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CVE: CVE-2019-3822
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Signed-off-by: Kevin Weng <t-keweng@microsoft.com>
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---
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lib/vauth/ntlm.c | 11 +++++++----
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1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/lib/vauth/ntlm.c b/lib/vauth/ntlm.c
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index 0212756ab..3be0403d9 100644
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--- a/lib/vauth/ntlm.c
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+++ b/lib/vauth/ntlm.c
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@@ -777,11 +777,14 @@ CURLcode Curl_auth_create_ntlm_type3_message(struct Curl_easy *data,
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});
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#ifdef USE_NTRESPONSES
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- if(size < (NTLM_BUFSIZE - ntresplen)) {
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- DEBUGASSERT(size == (size_t)ntrespoff);
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- memcpy(&ntlmbuf[size], ptr_ntresp, ntresplen);
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- size += ntresplen;
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+ /* ntresplen + size should not be risking an integer overflow here */
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+ if(ntresplen + size > sizeof(ntlmbuf)) {
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+ failf(data, "incoming NTLM message too big");
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+ return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
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}
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+ DEBUGASSERT(size == (size_t)ntrespoff);
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+ memcpy(&ntlmbuf[size], ptr_ntresp, ntresplen);
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+ size += ntresplen;
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DEBUG_OUT({
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fprintf(stderr, "\n ntresp=");
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--
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2.22.0
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55
meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2019-3823.patch
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55
meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2019-3823.patch
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@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
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From 40f6c913f63cdbfa81daa7ac7f1c7415bb99edeb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
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Date: Sat, 19 Jan 2019 00:42:47 +0100
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Subject: [PATCH 3/3] smtp: avoid risk of buffer overflow in strtol
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If the incoming len 5, but the buffer does not have a termination
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after 5 bytes, the strtol() call may keep reading through the line
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buffer until is exceeds its boundary. Fix by ensuring that we are
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using a bounded read with a temporary buffer on the stack.
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Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/CVE-2019-3823.html
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Reported-by: Brian Carpenter (Geeknik Labs)
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CVE-2019-3823
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Upstream-Status: Backport
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[https://github.com/curl/curl/commit
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/39df4073e5413fcdbb5a38da0c1ce6f1c0ceb484]
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CVE: CVE-2019-3823
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Signed-off-by: Kevin Weng <t-keweng@microsoft.com>
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---
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lib/smtp.c | 8 ++++++--
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1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/lib/smtp.c b/lib/smtp.c
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index ecf10a41a..1b9f92d30 100644
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--- a/lib/smtp.c
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+++ b/lib/smtp.c
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@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
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* | (__| |_| | _ <| |___
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* \___|\___/|_| \_\_____|
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*
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- * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2018, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al.
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+ * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2019, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al.
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*
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* This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which
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* you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms
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@@ -207,8 +207,12 @@ static bool smtp_endofresp(struct connectdata *conn, char *line, size_t len,
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Section 4. Examples of RFC-4954 but some e-mail servers ignore this and
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only send the response code instead as per Section 4.2. */
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if(line[3] == ' ' || len == 5) {
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+ char tmpline[6];
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+
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result = TRUE;
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- *resp = curlx_sltosi(strtol(line, NULL, 10));
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+ memset(tmpline, '\0', sizeof(tmpline));
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+ memcpy(tmpline, line, (len == 5 ? 5 : 3));
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+ *resp = curlx_sltosi(strtol(tmpline, NULL, 10));
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/* Make sure real server never sends internal value */
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if(*resp == 1)
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--
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2.22.0
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@@ -13,6 +13,9 @@ SRC_URI = "http://curl.haxx.se/download/curl-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
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file://CVE-2018-16842.patch \
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file://CVE-2019-5435.patch \
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file://CVE-2019-5436.patch \
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file://CVE-2018-16890.patch \
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file://CVE-2019-3822.patch \
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file://CVE-2019-3823.patch \
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"
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SRC_URI[md5sum] = "31d0a9f48dc796a7db351898a1e5058a"
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