libsndfile1: Backport fix for CVE-2022-33065

Added missing commits for complete CVE fix

Ref: https://github.com/libsndfile/libsndfile/issues/833
     https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2022-33065

(From OE-Core rev: fc34dde58e8be19d703479c8e025e27294cdb579)

Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
This commit is contained in:
Vijay Anusuri
2024-12-19 17:27:04 +05:30
committed by Steve Sakoman
parent db0505b9ba
commit 284b56a2e2
14 changed files with 916 additions and 1 deletions

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@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
From cd44bfaf3708e778c8670cb7f707a597c3334376 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alex Stewart <alex.stewart@ni.com>
Date: Tue, 17 Oct 2023 11:50:53 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 14/17] nms_adpcm: fix int overflow in sf.frames calc
When calculating sf.frames from the blocks_total PNMS variable, it is
theoretically possible to overflow the blocks_total int boundaries,
leading to undefined behavior.
Cast blocks_total to a long-sized sf_count_t before the calculation, to
provide it with enough numeric space and because that is the final
typing regardless.
CVE: CVE-2022-33065
Fixes: https://github.com/libsndfile/libsndfile/issues/833
Signed-off-by: Alex Stewart <alex.stewart@ni.com>
Upstream-Status: Backport [import from ubuntu https://git.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/libsndfile/tree/debian/patches/CVE-2022-33065/CVE-2022-33065-10.patch?h=ubuntu/jammy-security
Upstream commit https://github.com/libsndfile/libsndfile/commit/cd44bfaf3708e778c8670cb7f707a597c3334376]
CVE: CVE-2022-33065
Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
---
src/nms_adpcm.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/nms_adpcm.c b/src/nms_adpcm.c
index dca85f0b0..61d171c73 100644
--- a/src/nms_adpcm.c
+++ b/src/nms_adpcm.c
@@ -1090,7 +1090,7 @@ nms_adpcm_init (SF_PRIVATE *psf)
else
pnms->blocks_total = psf->datalength / (pnms->shortsperblock * sizeof (short)) ;
- psf->sf.frames = pnms->blocks_total * NMS_SAMPLES_PER_BLOCK ;
+ psf->sf.frames = (sf_count_t) pnms->blocks_total * NMS_SAMPLES_PER_BLOCK ;
psf->codec_close = nms_adpcm_close ;
psf->seek = nms_adpcm_seek ;

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@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
From 915e154e2deb327612ca413c838365b7c9bfbf16 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alex Stewart <alex.stewart@ni.com>
Date: Tue, 17 Oct 2023 11:57:23 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 15/17] pcm: fix int overflow in pcm_init()
Cast the int-sized bytewidth variable to a long-sized sf_count_t type
prior to calculating the blockwidth, to provide the calculation with
enough numeric space and sf_count_t is the final typing regardless.
CVE: CVE-2022-33065
Fixes: https://github.com/libsndfile/libsndfile/issues/833
Signed-off-by: Alex Stewart <alex.stewart@ni.com>
Upstream-Status: Backport [import from ubuntu https://git.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/libsndfile/tree/debian/patches/CVE-2022-33065/CVE-2022-33065-11.patch?h=ubuntu/jammy-security
Upstream commit https://github.com/libsndfile/libsndfile/commit/915e154e2deb327612ca413c838365b7c9bfbf16]
CVE: CVE-2022-33065
Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
---
src/pcm.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/pcm.c b/src/pcm.c
index bdf461839..a42e48681 100644
--- a/src/pcm.c
+++ b/src/pcm.c
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ pcm_init (SF_PRIVATE *psf)
return SFE_INTERNAL ;
} ;
- psf->blockwidth = psf->bytewidth * psf->sf.channels ;
+ psf->blockwidth = (sf_count_t) psf->bytewidth * psf->sf.channels ;
if ((SF_CODEC (psf->sf.format)) == SF_FORMAT_PCM_S8)
chars = SF_CHARS_SIGNED ;

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@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
From ec149a79d457916479489d71b55e4d63015a08ea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alex Stewart <alex.stewart@ni.com>
Date: Tue, 17 Oct 2023 12:01:00 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 16/17] rf64: fix int overflow in rf64_read_header()
When checking for mismatches between the filelength and riff_size, it is
possible to overflow the temporary riff_size value used in the
comparison by adding a static offset; which is probably fine, but it is
offensive to overflow fuzzers.
Since filelength is always a positive value, simply move the offset to
the other side of the comparison operator as a negative value, avoid the
possibility of an overflow.
CVE: CVE-2022-33065
Fixes: https://github.com/libsndfile/libsndfile/issues/833
Signed-off-by: Alex Stewart <alex.stewart@ni.com>
Upstream-Status: Backport [import from ubuntu https://git.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/libsndfile/tree/debian/patches/CVE-2022-33065/CVE-2022-33065-12.patch?h=ubuntu/jammy-security
Upstream commit https://github.com/libsndfile/libsndfile/commit/ec149a79d457916479489d71b55e4d63015a08ea]
CVE: CVE-2022-33065
Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
---
src/rf64.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/rf64.c b/src/rf64.c
index 123db445a..c60399fb3 100644
--- a/src/rf64.c
+++ b/src/rf64.c
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ rf64_read_header (SF_PRIVATE *psf, int *blockalign, int *framesperblock)
} ;
} ;
- if (psf->filelength != riff_size + 8)
+ if (psf->filelength - 8 != riff_size)
psf_log_printf (psf, " Riff size : %D (should be %D)\n", riff_size, psf->filelength - 8) ;
else
psf_log_printf (psf, " Riff size : %D\n", riff_size) ;

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@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
From 9f097e492a07c96e3b250d6ac0044499f64f6cea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alex Stewart <alex.stewart@ni.com>
Date: Tue, 17 Oct 2023 12:19:12 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 17/17] ima_adpcm: fix int overflow in ima_reader_init()
When calculating sf.frames, pre-cast samplesperblock to sf_count_t, to
provide the calculation with enough numeric space to avoid overflows.
Other changes in this commit are syntactic, and only to satisfy the git
pre-commit syntax checker.
CVE: CVE-2022-33065
Fixes: https://github.com/libsndfile/libsndfile/issues/833
Signed-off-by: Alex Stewart <alex.stewart@ni.com>
Upstream-Status: Backport [import from ubuntu https://git.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/libsndfile/tree/debian/patches/CVE-2022-33065/CVE-2022-33065-13.patch?h=ubuntu/jammy-security
Upstream commit https://github.com/libsndfile/libsndfile/commit/9f097e492a07c96e3b250d6ac0044499f64f6cea]
CVE: CVE-2022-33065
Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
---
src/ima_adpcm.c | 6 +++---
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- libsndfile-1.0.31.orig/src/ima_adpcm.c
+++ libsndfile-1.0.31/src/ima_adpcm.c
@@ -182,7 +182,12 @@ ima_reader_init (SF_PRIVATE *psf, int bl
if (psf->file.mode != SFM_READ)
return SFE_BAD_MODE_RW ;
- pimasize = sizeof (IMA_ADPCM_PRIVATE) + blockalign * psf->sf.channels + 3 * psf->sf.channels * samplesperblock ;
+ /*
+ ** Allocate enough space for 1 more than a multiple of 8 samples
+ ** to avoid having to branch when pulling apart the nibbles.
+ */
+ count = ((samplesperblock - 2) | 7) + 2 ;
+ pimasize = sizeof (IMA_ADPCM_PRIVATE) + psf->sf.channels * (blockalign + samplesperblock + sizeof (short) * count) ;
if (! (pima = calloc (1, pimasize)))
return SFE_MALLOC_FAILED ;
@@ -233,7 +238,7 @@ ima_reader_init (SF_PRIVATE *psf, int bl
case SF_FORMAT_AIFF :
psf_log_printf (psf, "still need to check block count\n") ;
pima->decode_block = aiff_ima_decode_block ;
- psf->sf.frames = pima->samplesperblock * pima->blocks / pima->channels ;
+ psf->sf.frames = (sf_count_t) pima->samplesperblock * pima->blocks / pima->channels ;
break ;
default :
@@ -386,7 +391,7 @@ aiff_ima_encode_block (SF_PRIVATE *psf,
static int
wavlike_ima_decode_block (SF_PRIVATE *psf, IMA_ADPCM_PRIVATE *pima)
{ int chan, k, predictor, blockindx, indx, indxstart, diff ;
- short step, bytecode, stepindx [2] ;
+ short step, bytecode, stepindx [2] = { 0 } ;
pima->blockcount ++ ;
pima->samplecount = 0 ;

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@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
From 56e6c5408f1ee6d476b234c105fb28b4998e811b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alex Stewart <alex.stewart@ni.com>
Date: Wed, 11 Oct 2023 16:36:02 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 06/17] au: avoid int overflow while calculating data_end
At several points in au_read_header(), we calculate the functional end
of the data segment by adding the (int)au_fmt.dataoffset and the
(int)au_fmt.datasize. This can overflow the implicit int_32 return value
and cause undefined behavior.
Instead, precalculate the value and assign it to a 64-bit
(sf_count_t)data_end variable.
CVE: CVE-2022-33065
Fixes: https://github.com/libsndfile/libsndfile/issues/833
Signed-off-by: Alex Stewart <alex.stewart@ni.com>
Upstream-Status: Backport [import from ubuntu https://git.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/libsndfile/tree/debian/patches/CVE-2022-33065/CVE-2022-33065-2.patch?h=ubuntu/jammy-security
Upstream commit https://github.com/libsndfile/libsndfile/commit/56e6c5408f1ee6d476b234c105fb28b4998e811b]
CVE: CVE-2022-33065
Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
---
src/au.c | 10 ++++++----
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/au.c b/src/au.c
index 62bd691d6..f68f25871 100644
--- a/src/au.c
+++ b/src/au.c
@@ -291,6 +291,7 @@ static int
au_read_header (SF_PRIVATE *psf)
{ AU_FMT au_fmt ;
int marker, dword ;
+ sf_count_t data_end ;
memset (&au_fmt, 0, sizeof (au_fmt)) ;
psf_binheader_readf (psf, "pm", 0, &marker) ;
@@ -317,14 +318,15 @@ au_read_header (SF_PRIVATE *psf)
return SFE_AU_EMBED_BAD_LEN ;
} ;
+ data_end = (sf_count_t) au_fmt.dataoffset + (sf_count_t) au_fmt.datasize ;
if (psf->fileoffset > 0)
- { psf->filelength = au_fmt.dataoffset + au_fmt.datasize ;
+ { psf->filelength = data_end ;
psf_log_printf (psf, " Data Size : %d\n", au_fmt.datasize) ;
}
- else if (au_fmt.datasize == -1 || au_fmt.dataoffset + au_fmt.datasize == psf->filelength)
+ else if (au_fmt.datasize == -1 || data_end == psf->filelength)
psf_log_printf (psf, " Data Size : %d\n", au_fmt.datasize) ;
- else if (au_fmt.dataoffset + au_fmt.datasize < psf->filelength)
- { psf->filelength = au_fmt.dataoffset + au_fmt.datasize ;
+ else if (data_end < psf->filelength)
+ { psf->filelength = data_end ;
psf_log_printf (psf, " Data Size : %d\n", au_fmt.datasize) ;
}
else

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@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
From 839fa9131820d689b2038c81531b618b2932fbe3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alex Stewart <alex.stewart@ni.com>
Date: Wed, 11 Oct 2023 16:46:29 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 07/17] avr: fix int overflow in avr_read_header()
Pre-cast hdr.frames to sf_count_t, to provide the calculation with
enough numeric space to avoid an int-overflow.
CVE: CVE-2022-33065
Fixes: https://github.com/libsndfile/libsndfile/issues/833
Signed-off-by: Alex Stewart <alex.stewart@ni.com>
Upstream-Status: Backport [import from ubuntu https://git.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/libsndfile/tree/debian/patches/CVE-2022-33065/CVE-2022-33065-3.patch?h=ubuntu/jammy-security
Upstream commit https://github.com/libsndfile/libsndfile/commit/839fa9131820d689b2038c81531b618b2932fbe3]
CVE: CVE-2022-33065
Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
---
src/avr.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/avr.c b/src/avr.c
index 6c78ff69b..1bc1ffc90 100644
--- a/src/avr.c
+++ b/src/avr.c
@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ avr_read_header (SF_PRIVATE *psf)
psf->endian = SF_ENDIAN_BIG ;
psf->dataoffset = AVR_HDR_SIZE ;
- psf->datalength = hdr.frames * (hdr.rez / 8) ;
+ psf->datalength = (sf_count_t) hdr.frames * (hdr.rez / 8) ;
if (psf->fileoffset > 0)
psf->filelength = AVR_HDR_SIZE + psf->datalength ;

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@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
From 1116fa173ea8785c9d881936b2174be6a58c0055 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alex Stewart <alex.stewart@ni.com>
Date: Wed, 11 Oct 2023 16:54:21 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 08/17] sds: fix int overflow warning in sample calculations
The sds_*byte_read() functions compose their uint_32 sample buffers by
shifting 7bit samples into a 32bit wide buffer, and adding them
together. Because the 7bit samples are stored in 32bit ints, code
fuzzers become concerned that the addition operation can overflow and
cause undefined behavior.
Instead, bitwise-OR the bytes together - which should accomplish the
same arithmetic operation, without risking an int-overflow.
CVE: CVE-2022-33065
Fixes: https://github.com/libsndfile/libsndfile/issues/833
Signed-off-by: Alex Stewart <alex.stewart@ni.com>
Do the same for the 3byte and 4byte read functions.
Upstream-Status: Backport [import from ubuntu https://git.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/libsndfile/tree/debian/patches/CVE-2022-33065/CVE-2022-33065-4.patch?h=ubuntu/jammy-security
Upstream commit https://github.com/libsndfile/libsndfile/commit/1116fa173ea8785c9d881936b2174be6a58c0055]
CVE: CVE-2022-33065
Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
---
src/sds.c | 6 +++---
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/sds.c b/src/sds.c
index 6bc761716..2a0f164c3 100644
--- a/src/sds.c
+++ b/src/sds.c
@@ -454,7 +454,7 @@ sds_2byte_read (SF_PRIVATE *psf, SDS_PRIVATE *psds)
ucptr = psds->read_data + 5 ;
for (k = 0 ; k < 120 ; k += 2)
- { sample = arith_shift_left (ucptr [k], 25) + arith_shift_left (ucptr [k + 1], 18) ;
+ { sample = arith_shift_left (ucptr [k], 25) | arith_shift_left (ucptr [k + 1], 18) ;
psds->read_samples [k / 2] = (int) (sample - 0x80000000) ;
} ;
@@ -498,7 +498,7 @@ sds_3byte_read (SF_PRIVATE *psf, SDS_PRIVATE *psds)
ucptr = psds->read_data + 5 ;
for (k = 0 ; k < 120 ; k += 3)
- { sample = (((uint32_t) ucptr [k]) << 25) + (ucptr [k + 1] << 18) + (ucptr [k + 2] << 11) ;
+ { sample = (((uint32_t) ucptr [k]) << 25) | (ucptr [k + 1] << 18) | (ucptr [k + 2] << 11) ;
psds->read_samples [k / 3] = (int) (sample - 0x80000000) ;
} ;
@@ -542,7 +542,7 @@ sds_4byte_read (SF_PRIVATE *psf, SDS_PRIVATE *psds)
ucptr = psds->read_data + 5 ;
for (k = 0 ; k < 120 ; k += 4)
- { sample = (((uint32_t) ucptr [k]) << 25) + (ucptr [k + 1] << 18) + (ucptr [k + 2] << 11) + (ucptr [k + 3] << 4) ;
+ { sample = (((uint32_t) ucptr [k]) << 25) | (ucptr [k + 1] << 18) | (ucptr [k + 2] << 11) | (ucptr [k + 3] << 4) ;
psds->read_samples [k / 4] = (int) (sample - 0x80000000) ;
} ;

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@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
From 23188c9b1c34f06ca7f17243425d59403e9eb0db Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alex Stewart <alex.stewart@ni.com>
Date: Wed, 11 Oct 2023 17:26:51 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 09/17] aiff: fix int overflow when counting header elements
aiff_read_basc_chunk() tries to count the AIFF header size by keeping
track of the bytes returned by psf_binheader_readf(). Though improbable,
it is technically possible for these added bytes to exceed the int-sized
`count` accumulator.
Use a 64-bit sf_count_t type for `count`, to ensure that it always has
enough numeric space.
CVE: CVE-2022-33065
Fixes: https://github.com/libsndfile/libsndfile/issues/833
Signed-off-by: Alex Stewart <alex.stewart@ni.com>
Upstream-Status: Backport [import from ubuntu https://git.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/libsndfile/tree/debian/patches/CVE-2022-33065/CVE-2022-33065-5.patch?h=ubuntu/jammy-security
Upstream commit https://github.com/libsndfile/libsndfile/commit/23188c9b1c34f06ca7f17243425d59403e9eb0db]
CVE: CVE-2022-33065
Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
---
src/aiff.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/aiff.c b/src/aiff.c
index ac3655e9d..6d8f1bc83 100644
--- a/src/aiff.c
+++ b/src/aiff.c
@@ -1702,7 +1702,7 @@ static int
aiff_read_basc_chunk (SF_PRIVATE * psf, int datasize)
{ const char * type_str ;
basc_CHUNK bc ;
- int count ;
+ sf_count_t count ;
count = psf_binheader_readf (psf, "E442", &bc.version, &bc.numBeats, &bc.rootNote) ;
count += psf_binheader_readf (psf, "E222", &bc.scaleType, &bc.sigNumerator, &bc.sigDenominator) ;

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@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
From 00bd0320d895ef5f3027c75a9df26546bc18f8b7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alex Stewart <alex.stewart@ni.com>
Date: Wed, 11 Oct 2023 17:43:02 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 10/17] ircam: fix int overflow in ircam_read_header()
When reading the IRCAM header, it is possible for the calculated
blockwidth to exceed the bounds of a signed int32.
Use a 64bit sf_count_t to store the blockwidth.
CVE: CVE-2022-33065
Fixes: https://github.com/libsndfile/libsndfile/issues/833
Signed-off-by: Alex Stewart <alex.stewart@ni.com>
Upstream-Status: Backport [import from ubuntu https://git.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/libsndfile/tree/debian/patches/CVE-2022-33065/CVE-2022-33065-6.patch?h=ubuntu/jammy-security
Upstream commit https://github.com/libsndfile/libsndfile/commit/00bd0320d895ef5f3027c75a9df26546bc18f8b7]
CVE: CVE-2022-33065
Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
---
src/common.h | 2 +-
src/ircam.c | 10 +++++-----
2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/common.h b/src/common.h
index cd9ac8b07..01f6ae095 100644
--- a/src/common.h
+++ b/src/common.h
@@ -439,7 +439,7 @@ typedef struct sf_private_tag
sf_count_t datalength ; /* Length in bytes of the audio data. */
sf_count_t dataend ; /* Offset to file tailer. */
- int blockwidth ; /* Size in bytes of one set of interleaved samples. */
+ sf_count_t blockwidth ; /* Size in bytes of one set of interleaved samples. */
int bytewidth ; /* Size in bytes of one sample (one channel). */
void *dither ;
diff --git a/src/ircam.c b/src/ircam.c
index 8e7cdba81..3d73ba442 100644
--- a/src/ircam.c
+++ b/src/ircam.c
@@ -171,35 +171,35 @@ ircam_read_header (SF_PRIVATE *psf)
switch (encoding)
{ case IRCAM_PCM_16 :
psf->bytewidth = 2 ;
- psf->blockwidth = psf->sf.channels * psf->bytewidth ;
+ psf->blockwidth = (sf_count_t) psf->sf.channels * psf->bytewidth ;
psf->sf.format = SF_FORMAT_IRCAM | SF_FORMAT_PCM_16 ;
break ;
case IRCAM_PCM_32 :
psf->bytewidth = 4 ;
- psf->blockwidth = psf->sf.channels * psf->bytewidth ;
+ psf->blockwidth = (sf_count_t) psf->sf.channels * psf->bytewidth ;
psf->sf.format = SF_FORMAT_IRCAM | SF_FORMAT_PCM_32 ;
break ;
case IRCAM_FLOAT :
psf->bytewidth = 4 ;
- psf->blockwidth = psf->sf.channels * psf->bytewidth ;
+ psf->blockwidth = (sf_count_t) psf->sf.channels * psf->bytewidth ;
psf->sf.format = SF_FORMAT_IRCAM | SF_FORMAT_FLOAT ;
break ;
case IRCAM_ALAW :
psf->bytewidth = 1 ;
- psf->blockwidth = psf->sf.channels * psf->bytewidth ;
+ psf->blockwidth = (sf_count_t) psf->sf.channels * psf->bytewidth ;
psf->sf.format = SF_FORMAT_IRCAM | SF_FORMAT_ALAW ;
break ;
case IRCAM_ULAW :
psf->bytewidth = 1 ;
- psf->blockwidth = psf->sf.channels * psf->bytewidth ;
+ psf->blockwidth = (sf_count_t) psf->sf.channels * psf->bytewidth ;
psf->sf.format = SF_FORMAT_IRCAM | SF_FORMAT_ULAW ;
break ;

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@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
From 590608bbbded2ca0966dc89c5d9b6bf659f4cb71 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alex Stewart <alex.stewart@ni.com>
Date: Wed, 11 Oct 2023 16:12:22 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 11/17] mat4/mat5: fix int overflow when calculating blockwidth
Pre-cast the components of the blockwidth calculation to sf_count_t to
avoid overflowing integers during calculation.
CVE: CVE-2022-33065
Fixes: https://github.com/libsndfile/libsndfile/issues/833
Signed-off-by: Alex Stewart <alex.stewart@ni.com>
Upstream-Status: Backport [import from ubuntu https://git.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/libsndfile/tree/debian/patches/CVE-2022-33065/CVE-2022-33065-7.patch?h=ubuntu/jammy-security
Upstream commit https://github.com/libsndfile/libsndfile/commit/590608bbbded2ca0966dc89c5d9b6bf659f4cb71]
CVE: CVE-2022-33065
Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
---
src/mat4.c | 2 +-
src/mat5.c | 2 +-
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/mat4.c b/src/mat4.c
index 575683ba1..9f046f0c6 100644
--- a/src/mat4.c
+++ b/src/mat4.c
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ mat4_open (SF_PRIVATE *psf)
psf->container_close = mat4_close ;
- psf->blockwidth = psf->bytewidth * psf->sf.channels ;
+ psf->blockwidth = (sf_count_t) psf->bytewidth * psf->sf.channels ;
switch (subformat)
{ case SF_FORMAT_PCM_16 :
diff --git a/src/mat5.c b/src/mat5.c
index da5a6eca0..20f0ea64b 100644
--- a/src/mat5.c
+++ b/src/mat5.c
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ mat5_open (SF_PRIVATE *psf)
psf->container_close = mat5_close ;
- psf->blockwidth = psf->bytewidth * psf->sf.channels ;
+ psf->blockwidth = (sf_count_t) psf->bytewidth * psf->sf.channels ;
switch (subformat)
{ case SF_FORMAT_PCM_U8 :

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
From 4ec860910a4ee91ed4fdf1c0a49f2dad96d595c9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alex Stewart <alex.stewart@ni.com>
Date: Mon, 16 Oct 2023 12:37:47 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 12/17] common: fix int overflow in psf_binheader_readf()
The psf_binheader_readf() function attempts to count and return the
number of bytes traversed in the header. During this accumulation, it is
possible to overflow the int-sized byte_count variable.
Avoid this overflow by checking that the accumulated bytes do not exceed
INT_MAX and throwing an error if they do. This implies that files with
multi-gigabyte headers threaten to produce this error, but I imagine
those files don't really exist - and this error is better than the
undefined behavior which would have resulted previously.
CVE: CVE-2022-33065
Fixes: https://github.com/libsndfile/libsndfile/issues/833
Signed-off-by: Alex Stewart <alex.stewart@ni.com>
Upstream-Status: Backport [import from ubuntu https://git.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/libsndfile/tree/debian/patches/CVE-2022-33065/CVE-2022-33065-8.patch?h=ubuntu/jammy-security
Upstream commit https://github.com/libsndfile/libsndfile/commit/4ec860910a4ee91ed4fdf1c0a49f2dad96d595c9]
CVE: CVE-2022-33065
Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
---
src/common.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
--- libsndfile-1.0.31.orig/src/common.c
+++ libsndfile-1.0.31/src/common.c
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
#include <config.h>
+#include <limits.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <string.h>
#if HAVE_UNISTD_H
@@ -962,6 +963,7 @@ psf_binheader_readf (SF_PRIVATE *psf, ch
double *doubleptr ;
char c ;
int byte_count = 0, count = 0 ;
+ int read_bytes = 0 ;
if (! format)
return psf_ftell (psf) ;
@@ -970,6 +972,7 @@ psf_binheader_readf (SF_PRIVATE *psf, ch
while ((c = *format++))
{
+ read_bytes = 0 ;
if (psf->header.indx + 16 >= psf->header.len && psf_bump_header_allocation (psf, 16))
return count ;
@@ -986,7 +989,7 @@ psf_binheader_readf (SF_PRIVATE *psf, ch
intptr = va_arg (argptr, unsigned int*) ;
*intptr = 0 ;
ucptr = (unsigned char*) intptr ;
- byte_count += header_read (psf, ucptr, sizeof (int)) ;
+ read_bytes = header_read (psf, ucptr, sizeof (int)) ;
*intptr = GET_MARKER (ucptr) ;
break ;
@@ -994,7 +997,7 @@ psf_binheader_readf (SF_PRIVATE *psf, ch
intptr = va_arg (argptr, unsigned int*) ;
*intptr = 0 ;
ucptr = (unsigned char*) intptr ;
- byte_count += header_read (psf, sixteen_bytes, sizeof (sixteen_bytes)) ;
+ read_bytes = header_read (psf, sixteen_bytes, sizeof (sixteen_bytes)) ;
{ int k ;
intdata = 0 ;
for (k = 0 ; k < 16 ; k++)
@@ -1006,14 +1009,14 @@ psf_binheader_readf (SF_PRIVATE *psf, ch
case '1' :
charptr = va_arg (argptr, char*) ;
*charptr = 0 ;
- byte_count += header_read (psf, charptr, sizeof (char)) ;
+ read_bytes = header_read (psf, charptr, sizeof (char)) ;
break ;
case '2' : /* 2 byte value with the current endian-ness */
shortptr = va_arg (argptr, unsigned short*) ;
*shortptr = 0 ;
ucptr = (unsigned char*) shortptr ;
- byte_count += header_read (psf, ucptr, sizeof (short)) ;
+ read_bytes = header_read (psf, ucptr, sizeof (short)) ;
if (psf->rwf_endian == SF_ENDIAN_BIG)
*shortptr = GET_BE_SHORT (ucptr) ;
else
@@ -1023,7 +1026,7 @@ psf_binheader_readf (SF_PRIVATE *psf, ch
case '3' : /* 3 byte value with the current endian-ness */
intptr = va_arg (argptr, unsigned int*) ;
*intptr = 0 ;
- byte_count += header_read (psf, sixteen_bytes, 3) ;
+ read_bytes = header_read (psf, sixteen_bytes, 3) ;
if (psf->rwf_endian == SF_ENDIAN_BIG)
*intptr = GET_BE_3BYTE (sixteen_bytes) ;
else
@@ -1034,7 +1037,7 @@ psf_binheader_readf (SF_PRIVATE *psf, ch
intptr = va_arg (argptr, unsigned int*) ;
*intptr = 0 ;
ucptr = (unsigned char*) intptr ;
- byte_count += header_read (psf, ucptr, sizeof (int)) ;
+ read_bytes = header_read (psf, ucptr, sizeof (int)) ;
if (psf->rwf_endian == SF_ENDIAN_BIG)
*intptr = psf_get_be32 (ucptr, 0) ;
else
@@ -1044,7 +1047,7 @@ psf_binheader_readf (SF_PRIVATE *psf, ch
case '8' : /* 8 byte value with the current endian-ness */
countptr = va_arg (argptr, sf_count_t *) ;
*countptr = 0 ;
- byte_count += header_read (psf, sixteen_bytes, 8) ;
+ read_bytes = header_read (psf, sixteen_bytes, 8) ;
if (psf->rwf_endian == SF_ENDIAN_BIG)
countdata = psf_get_be64 (sixteen_bytes, 0) ;
else
@@ -1055,7 +1058,7 @@ psf_binheader_readf (SF_PRIVATE *psf, ch
case 'f' : /* Float conversion */
floatptr = va_arg (argptr, float *) ;
*floatptr = 0.0 ;
- byte_count += header_read (psf, floatptr, sizeof (float)) ;
+ read_bytes = header_read (psf, floatptr, sizeof (float)) ;
if (psf->rwf_endian == SF_ENDIAN_BIG)
*floatptr = float32_be_read ((unsigned char*) floatptr) ;
else
@@ -1065,7 +1068,7 @@ psf_binheader_readf (SF_PRIVATE *psf, ch
case 'd' : /* double conversion */
doubleptr = va_arg (argptr, double *) ;
*doubleptr = 0.0 ;
- byte_count += header_read (psf, doubleptr, sizeof (double)) ;
+ read_bytes = header_read (psf, doubleptr, sizeof (double)) ;
if (psf->rwf_endian == SF_ENDIAN_BIG)
*doubleptr = double64_be_read ((unsigned char*) doubleptr) ;
else
@@ -1089,7 +1092,7 @@ psf_binheader_readf (SF_PRIVATE *psf, ch
charptr = va_arg (argptr, char*) ;
count = va_arg (argptr, size_t) ;
memset (charptr, 0, count) ;
- byte_count += header_read (psf, charptr, count) ;
+ read_bytes = header_read (psf, charptr, count) ;
break ;
case 'G' :
@@ -1100,7 +1103,7 @@ psf_binheader_readf (SF_PRIVATE *psf, ch
if (psf->header.indx + count >= psf->header.len && psf_bump_header_allocation (psf, count))
return 0 ;
- byte_count += header_gets (psf, charptr, count) ;
+ read_bytes = header_gets (psf, charptr, count) ;
break ;
case 'z' :
@@ -1124,7 +1127,7 @@ psf_binheader_readf (SF_PRIVATE *psf, ch
case 'j' : /* Seek to position from current position. */
count = va_arg (argptr, size_t) ;
header_seek (psf, count, SEEK_CUR) ;
- byte_count += count ;
+ read_bytes = count ;
break ;
default :
@@ -1132,8 +1135,17 @@ psf_binheader_readf (SF_PRIVATE *psf, ch
psf->error = SFE_INTERNAL ;
break ;
} ;
+
+ if (read_bytes > 0 && byte_count > (INT_MAX - read_bytes))
+ { psf_log_printf (psf, "Header size exceeds INT_MAX. Aborting.", c) ;
+ psf->error = SFE_INTERNAL ;
+ break ;
+ } else
+ { byte_count += read_bytes ;
} ;
+ } ; /*end while*/
+
va_end (argptr) ;
return byte_count ;

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,231 @@
From 6e162cb767e81cd15f4dc2a2fa253d2e36adfd70 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alex Stewart <alex.stewart@ni.com>
Date: Thu, 19 Oct 2023 14:07:19 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 13/17] nms_adpcm: fix int overflow in signal estimate
It is possible (though functionally incorrect) for the signal estimate
calculation in nms_adpcm_update() to overflow the int value of s_e,
resulting in undefined behavior.
Since adpcm state signal values are never practically larger than
16 bits, use smaller numeric sizes throughout the file to avoid the
overflow.
CVE: CVE-2022-33065
Fixes: https://github.com/libsndfile/libsndfile/issues/833
Authored-by: Arthur Taylor <art@ified.ca>
Signed-off-by: Alex Stewart <alex.stewart@ni.com>
Upstream-Status: Backport [import from ubuntu https://git.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/libsndfile/tree/debian/patches/CVE-2022-33065/CVE-2022-33065-9.patch?h=ubuntu/jammy-security
Upstream commit https://github.com/libsndfile/libsndfile/commit/6e162cb767e81cd15f4dc2a2fa253d2e36adfd70]
CVE: CVE-2022-33065
Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
---
src/nms_adpcm.c | 81 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------
1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-)
--- libsndfile-1.2.0.orig/src/nms_adpcm.c
+++ libsndfile-1.2.0/src/nms_adpcm.c
@@ -48,36 +48,36 @@
/* Variable names from ITU G.726 spec */
struct nms_adpcm_state
{ /* Log of the step size multiplier. Operated on by codewords. */
- int yl ;
+ short yl ;
/* Quantizer step size multiplier. Generated from yl. */
- int y ;
+ short y ;
/* Coefficents of the pole predictor */
- int a [2] ;
+ short a [2] ;
/* Coefficents of the zero predictor */
- int b [6] ;
+ short b [6] ;
/* Previous quantized deltas (multiplied by 2^14) */
- int d_q [7] ;
+ short d_q [7] ;
/* d_q [x] + s_ez [x], used by the pole-predictor for signs only. */
- int p [3] ;
+ short p [3] ;
/* Previous reconstructed signal values. */
- int s_r [2] ;
+ short s_r [2] ;
/* Zero predictor components of the signal estimate. */
- int s_ez ;
+ short s_ez ;
/* Signal estimate, (including s_ez). */
- int s_e ;
+ short s_e ;
/* The most recent codeword (enc:generated, dec:inputted) */
- int Ik ;
+ char Ik ;
- int parity ;
+ char parity ;
/*
** Offset into code tables for the bitrate.
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ typedef struct
} NMS_ADPCM_PRIVATE ;
/* Pre-computed exponential interval used in the antilog approximation. */
-static unsigned int table_expn [] =
+static unsigned short table_expn [] =
{ 0x4000, 0x4167, 0x42d5, 0x444c, 0x45cb, 0x4752, 0x48e2, 0x4a7a,
0x4c1b, 0x4dc7, 0x4f7a, 0x5138, 0x52ff, 0x54d1, 0x56ac, 0x5892,
0x5a82, 0x5c7e, 0x5e84, 0x6096, 0x62b4, 0x64dd, 0x6712, 0x6954,
@@ -117,21 +117,21 @@ static unsigned int table_expn [] =
} ;
/* Table mapping codewords to scale factor deltas. */
-static int table_scale_factor_step [] =
+static short table_scale_factor_step [] =
{ 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x4b0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, /* 2-bit */
-0x3c, 0x0, 0x90, 0x0, 0x2ee, 0x0, 0x898, 0x0, /* 3-bit */
-0x30, 0x12, 0x6b, 0xc8, 0x188, 0x2e0, 0x551, 0x1150, /* 4-bit */
} ;
/* Table mapping codewords to quantized delta interval steps. */
-static unsigned int table_step [] =
+static unsigned short table_step [] =
{ 0x73F, 0, 0, 0, 0x1829, 0, 0, 0, /* 2-bit */
0x3EB, 0, 0xC18, 0, 0x1581, 0, 0x226E, 0, /* 3-bit */
0x20C, 0x635, 0xA83, 0xF12, 0x1418, 0x19E3, 0x211A, 0x2BBA, /* 4-bit */
} ;
/* Binary search lookup table for quantizing using table_step. */
-static int table_step_search [] =
+static short table_step_search [] =
{ 0, 0x1F6D, 0, -0x1F6D, 0, 0, 0, 0, /* 2-bit */
0x1008, 0x1192, 0, -0x219A, 0x1656, -0x1656, 0, 0, /* 3-bit */
0x872, 0x1277, -0x8E6, -0x232B, 0xD06, -0x17D7, -0x11D3, 0, /* 4-bit */
@@ -179,23 +179,23 @@ static sf_count_t nms_adpcm_seek (SF_PRI
** Maps [1,20480] to [1,1024] in an exponential relationship. This is
** approximately ret = b^exp where b = e^(ln(1024)/ln(20480)) ~= 1.0003385
*/
-static inline int
-nms_adpcm_antilog (int exp)
-{ int ret ;
-
- ret = 0x1000 ;
- ret += (((exp & 0x3f) * 0x166b) >> 12) ;
- ret *= table_expn [(exp & 0x7c0) >> 6] ;
- ret >>= (26 - (exp >> 11)) ;
+static inline short
+nms_adpcm_antilog (short exp)
+{ int_fast32_t r ;
+
+ r = 0x1000 ;
+ r += (((int_fast32_t) (exp & 0x3f) * 0x166b) >> 12) ;
+ r *= table_expn [(exp & 0x7c0) >> 6] ;
+ r >>= (26 - (exp >> 11)) ;
- return ret ;
+ return (short) r ;
} /* nms_adpcm_antilog */
static void
nms_adpcm_update (struct nms_adpcm_state *s)
{ /* Variable names from ITU G.726 spec */
- int a1ul ;
- int fa1 ;
+ short a1ul, fa1 ;
+ int_fast32_t se ;
int i ;
/* Decay and Modify the scale factor in the log domain based on the codeword. */
@@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ nms_adpcm_update (struct nms_adpcm_state
else if (fa1 > 256)
fa1 = 256 ;
- s->a [0] = (0xff * s->a [0]) >> 8 ;
+ s->a [0] = (s->a [0] * 0xff) >> 8 ;
if (s->p [0] != 0 && s->p [1] != 0 && ((s->p [0] ^ s->p [1]) < 0))
s->a [0] -= 192 ;
else
@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ nms_adpcm_update (struct nms_adpcm_state
fa1 = -fa1 ;
}
- s->a [1] = fa1 + ((0xfe * s->a [1]) >> 8) ;
+ s->a [1] = fa1 + ((s->a [1] * 0xfe) >> 8) ;
if (s->p [0] != 0 && s->p [2] != 0 && ((s->p [0] ^ s->p [2]) < 0))
s->a [1] -= 128 ;
else
@@ -250,19 +250,18 @@ nms_adpcm_update (struct nms_adpcm_state
s->a [0] = a1ul ;
} ;
- /* Compute the zero predictor estimate. Rotate past deltas too. */
- s->s_ez = 0 ;
+ /* Compute the zero predictor estimate and rotate past deltas. */
+ se = 0 ;
for (i = 5 ; i >= 0 ; i--)
- { s->s_ez += s->d_q [i] * s->b [i] ;
+ { se += (int_fast32_t) s->d_q [i] * s->b [i] ;
s->d_q [i + 1] = s->d_q [i] ;
} ;
+ s->s_ez = se >> 14 ;
- /* Compute the signal estimate. */
- s->s_e = s->a [0] * s->s_r [0] + s->a [1] * s->s_r [1] + s->s_ez ;
-
- /* Return to scale */
- s->s_ez >>= 14 ;
- s->s_e >>= 14 ;
+ /* Complete the signal estimate. */
+ se += (int_fast32_t) s->a [0] * s->s_r [0] ;
+ se += (int_fast32_t) s->a [1] * s->s_r [1] ;
+ s->s_e = se >> 14 ;
/* Rotate members to prepare for next iteration. */
s->s_r [1] = s->s_r [0] ;
@@ -274,7 +273,7 @@ nms_adpcm_update (struct nms_adpcm_state
static int16_t
nms_adpcm_reconstruct_sample (struct nms_adpcm_state *s, uint8_t I)
{ /* Variable names from ITU G.726 spec */
- int dqx ;
+ int_fast32_t dqx ;
/*
** The ordering of the 12-bit right-shift is a precision loss. It agrees
@@ -308,17 +307,17 @@ nms_adpcm_codec_init (struct nms_adpcm_s
/*
** nms_adpcm_encode_sample()
**
-** Encode a linear 16-bit pcm sample into a 2,3, or 4 bit NMS-ADPCM codeword
+** Encode a linear 16-bit pcm sample into a 2, 3, or 4 bit NMS-ADPCM codeword
** using and updating the predictor state.
*/
static uint8_t
nms_adpcm_encode_sample (struct nms_adpcm_state *s, int16_t sl)
{ /* Variable names from ITU G.726 spec */
- int d ;
+ int_fast32_t d ;
uint8_t I ;
/* Down scale the sample from 16 => ~14 bits. */
- sl = (sl * 0x1fdf) / 0x7fff ;
+ sl = ((int_fast32_t) sl * 0x1fdf) / 0x7fff ;
/* Compute estimate, and delta from actual value */
nms_adpcm_update (s) ;
@@ -407,7 +406,7 @@ nms_adpcm_encode_sample (struct nms_adpc
*/
static int16_t
nms_adpcm_decode_sample (struct nms_adpcm_state *s, uint8_t I)
-{ int sl ;
+{ int_fast32_t sl ;
nms_adpcm_update (s) ;
sl = nms_adpcm_reconstruct_sample (s, I) ;

View File

@@ -11,7 +11,19 @@ LICENSE = "LGPL-2.1-only"
SRC_URI = "https://github.com/libsndfile/libsndfile/releases/download/${PV}/libsndfile-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
file://noopus.patch \
file://0001-flac-Fix-improper-buffer-reusing-732.patch \
file://CVE-2022-33065.patch \
file://CVE-2022-33065-1.patch \
file://CVE-2022-33065-2.patch \
file://CVE-2022-33065-3.patch \
file://CVE-2022-33065-4.patch \
file://CVE-2022-33065-5.patch \
file://CVE-2022-33065-6.patch \
file://CVE-2022-33065-7.patch \
file://CVE-2022-33065-8.patch \
file://CVE-2022-33065-9.patch \
file://CVE-2022-33065-10.patch \
file://CVE-2022-33065-11.patch \
file://CVE-2022-33065-12.patch \
file://CVE-2022-33065-13.patch \
file://CVE-2024-50612.patch \
"
UPSTREAM_CHECK_URI = "https://github.com/libsndfile/libsndfile/releases/"