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shadow: update 4.13 -> 4.14.2
License-Update: formatting, spdx conversion Drop: 0001-Disable-use-of-syslog-for-sysroot.patch (issue fixed upstream) 0001-Fix-can-not-print-full-login.patch 0001-Overhaul-valid_field.patch CVE-2023-29383.patch (backports) libbsd is a new native dependency, as otherwise glibc >= 2.38 is needed. A similar fix is added to musl in order to define non-standard __BEGIN_DECLS/__END_DECLS. (From OE-Core rev: e85069acf304fe0b68583cf79fe3ec4f775dca68) Signed-off-by: Alexander Kanavin <alex@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
Alexander Kanavin
committed by
Richard Purdie
Richard Purdie
parent
1863c0da93
commit
405cc80b6b
@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
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From 85d0444229ee3d14fefcf10d093f49c862826f82 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
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Date: Thu, 14 Apr 2022 23:11:53 +0000
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Subject: [PATCH] Disable use of syslog for shadow-native tools
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Disable use of syslog to prevent sysroot user and group additions from
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writing entries to the host's syslog. This patch should only be used
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with the shadow-native recipe.
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Upstream-Status: Inappropriate [OE specific configuration]
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Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
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Signed-off-by: Peter Kjellerstedt <peter.kjellerstedt@axis.com>
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---
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configure.ac | 2 +-
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src/login_nopam.c | 3 ++-
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2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
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index 924254a..603af81 100644
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--- a/configure.ac
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+++ b/configure.ac
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@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(PASSWD_PROGRAM, "$shadow_cv_passwd_dir/passwd",
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[Path to passwd program.])
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dnl XXX - quick hack, should disappear before anyone notices :).
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-AC_DEFINE(USE_SYSLOG, 1, [Define to use syslog().])
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+#AC_DEFINE(USE_SYSLOG, 1, [Define to use syslog().])
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if test "$ac_cv_func_ruserok" = "yes"; then
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AC_DEFINE(RLOGIN, 1, [Define if login should support the -r flag for rlogind.])
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AC_DEFINE(RUSEROK, 0, [Define to the ruserok() "success" return value (0 or 1).])
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diff --git a/src/login_nopam.c b/src/login_nopam.c
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index df6ba88..fc24e13 100644
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--- a/src/login_nopam.c
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+++ b/src/login_nopam.c
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@@ -29,7 +29,6 @@
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#ifndef USE_PAM
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#ident "$Id$"
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-#include "prototypes.h"
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/*
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* This module implements a simple but effective form of login access
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* control based on login names and on host (or domain) names, internet
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@@ -57,6 +56,8 @@
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#include <netinet/in.h>
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#include <arpa/inet.h> /* for inet_ntoa() */
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+#include "prototypes.h"
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+
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#if !defined(MAXHOSTNAMELEN) || (MAXHOSTNAMELEN < 64)
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#undef MAXHOSTNAMELEN
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#define MAXHOSTNAMELEN 256
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@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
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commit 670cae834827a8f794e6f7464fa57790d911b63c
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Author: SoumyaWind <121475834+SoumyaWind@users.noreply.github.com>
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Date: Tue Dec 27 17:40:17 2022 +0530
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shadow: Fix can not print full login timeout message
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Login timed out message prints only first few bytes when write is immediately followed by exit.
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Calling exit from new handler provides enough time to display full message.
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Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/670cae834827a8f794e6f7464fa57790d911b63c]
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diff --git a/src/login.c b/src/login.c
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index 116e2cb3..c55f4de0 100644
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--- a/src/login.c
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+++ b/src/login.c
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@@ -120,6 +120,7 @@ static void get_pam_user (char **ptr_pam_user);
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static void init_env (void);
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static void alarm_handler (int);
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+static void exit_handler (int);
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/*
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* usage - print login command usage and exit
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@@ -391,11 +392,16 @@ static void init_env (void)
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#endif /* !USE_PAM */
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}
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+static void exit_handler (unused int sig)
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+{
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+ _exit (0);
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+}
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static void alarm_handler (unused int sig)
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{
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write (STDERR_FILENO, tmsg, strlen (tmsg));
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- _exit (0);
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+ signal(SIGALRM, exit_handler);
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+ alarm(2);
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}
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#ifdef USE_PAM
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@@ -1,65 +0,0 @@
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From 2eaea70111f65b16d55998386e4ceb4273c19eb4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: =?UTF-8?q?Christian=20G=C3=B6ttsche?= <cgzones@googlemail.com>
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Date: Fri, 31 Mar 2023 14:46:50 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH] Overhaul valid_field()
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e5905c4b ("Added control character check") introduced checking for
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control characters but had the logic inverted, so it rejects all
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characters that are not control ones.
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Cast the character to `unsigned char` before passing to the character
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checking functions to avoid UB.
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Use strpbrk(3) for the illegal character test and return early.
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Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/2eaea70111f65b16d55998386e4ceb4273c19eb4]
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Signed-off-by: Xiangyu Chen <xiangyu.chen@windriver.com>
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---
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lib/fields.c | 24 ++++++++++--------------
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1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/lib/fields.c b/lib/fields.c
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index fb51b582..53929248 100644
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--- a/lib/fields.c
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+++ b/lib/fields.c
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@@ -37,26 +37,22 @@ int valid_field (const char *field, const char *illegal)
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/* For each character of field, search if it appears in the list
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* of illegal characters. */
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+ if (illegal && NULL != strpbrk (field, illegal)) {
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+ return -1;
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+ }
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+
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+ /* Search if there are non-printable or control characters */
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for (cp = field; '\0' != *cp; cp++) {
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- if (strchr (illegal, *cp) != NULL) {
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+ unsigned char c = *cp;
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+ if (!isprint (c)) {
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+ err = 1;
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+ }
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+ if (iscntrl (c)) {
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err = -1;
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break;
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}
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}
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- if (0 == err) {
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- /* Search if there are non-printable or control characters */
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- for (cp = field; '\0' != *cp; cp++) {
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- if (!isprint (*cp)) {
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- err = 1;
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- }
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- if (!iscntrl (*cp)) {
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- err = -1;
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- break;
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- }
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- }
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- }
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-
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return err;
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}
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--
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2.34.1
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@@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
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From e5905c4b84d4fb90aefcd96ee618411ebfac663d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: tomspiderlabs <128755403+tomspiderlabs@users.noreply.github.com>
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Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2023 23:39:38 +0000
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Subject: [PATCH] Added control character check
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Added control character check, returning -1 (to "err") if control characters are present.
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CVE: CVE-2023-29383
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Upstream-Status: Backport
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Reference to upstream:
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https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/e5905c4b84d4fb90aefcd96ee618411ebfac663d
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Signed-off-by: Xiangyu Chen <xiangyu.chen@windriver.com>
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---
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lib/fields.c | 11 +++++++----
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1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/lib/fields.c b/lib/fields.c
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index 640be931..fb51b582 100644
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--- a/lib/fields.c
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+++ b/lib/fields.c
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@@ -21,9 +21,9 @@
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*
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* The supplied field is scanned for non-printable and other illegal
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* characters.
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- * + -1 is returned if an illegal character is present.
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- * + 1 is returned if no illegal characters are present, but the field
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- * contains a non-printable character.
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+ * + -1 is returned if an illegal or control character is present.
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+ * + 1 is returned if no illegal or control characters are present,
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+ * but the field contains a non-printable character.
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* + 0 is returned otherwise.
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*/
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int valid_field (const char *field, const char *illegal)
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@@ -45,10 +45,13 @@ int valid_field (const char *field, const char *illegal)
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}
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if (0 == err) {
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- /* Search if there are some non-printable characters */
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+ /* Search if there are non-printable or control characters */
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for (cp = field; '\0' != *cp; cp++) {
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if (!isprint (*cp)) {
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err = 1;
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+ }
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+ if (!iscntrl (*cp)) {
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+ err = -1;
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break;
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}
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}
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--
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2.34.1
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@@ -1,147 +0,0 @@
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From 25dbe2ce166a13322b7536ff2f738786ea2e61e7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
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Date: Sat, 10 Jun 2023 16:20:05 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH] gpasswd(1): Fix password leak
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How to trigger this password leak?
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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When gpasswd(1) asks for the new password, it asks twice (as is usual
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for confirming the new password). Each of those 2 password prompts
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uses agetpass() to get the password. If the second agetpass() fails,
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the first password, which has been copied into the 'static' buffer
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'pass' via STRFCPY(), wasn't being zeroed.
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agetpass() is defined in <./libmisc/agetpass.c> (around line 91), and
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can fail for any of the following reasons:
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- malloc(3) or readpassphrase(3) failure.
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These are going to be difficult to trigger. Maybe getting the system
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to the limits of memory utilization at that exact point, so that the
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next malloc(3) gets ENOMEM, and possibly even the OOM is triggered.
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About readpassphrase(3), ENFILE and EINTR seem the only plausible
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ones, and EINTR probably requires privilege or being the same user;
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but I wouldn't discard ENFILE so easily, if a process starts opening
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files.
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- The password is longer than PASS_MAX.
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The is plausible with physical access. However, at that point, a
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keylogger will be a much simpler attack.
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And, the attacker must be able to know when the second password is being
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introduced, which is not going to be easy.
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How to read the password after the leak?
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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Provoking the leak yourself at the right point by entering a very long
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password is easy, and inspecting the process stack at that point should
|
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be doable. Try to find some consistent patterns.
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|
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Then, search for those patterns in free memory, right after the victim
|
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leaks their password.
|
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|
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Once you get the leak, a program should read all the free memory
|
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searching for patterns that gpasswd(1) leaves nearby the leaked
|
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password.
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|
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On 6/10/23 03:14, Seth Arnold wrote:
|
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> An attacker process wouldn't be able to use malloc(3) for this task.
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> There's a handful of tools available for userspace to allocate memory:
|
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>
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> - brk / sbrk
|
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> - mmap MAP_ANONYMOUS
|
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> - mmap /dev/zero
|
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> - mmap some other file
|
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> - shm_open
|
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> - shmget
|
||||
>
|
||||
> Most of these return only pages of zeros to a process. Using mmap of an
|
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> existing file, you can get some of the contents of the file demand-loaded
|
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> into the memory space on the first use.
|
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>
|
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> The MAP_UNINITIALIZED flag only works if the kernel was compiled with
|
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> CONFIG_MMAP_ALLOW_UNINITIALIZED. This is rare.
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>
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> malloc(3) doesn't zero memory, to our collective frustration, but all the
|
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> garbage in the allocations is from previous allocations in the current
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> process. It isn't leftover from other processes.
|
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>
|
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> The avenues available for reading the memory:
|
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> - /dev/mem and /dev/kmem (requires root, not available with Secure Boot)
|
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> - /proc/pid/mem (requires ptrace privileges, mediated by YAMA)
|
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> - ptrace (requires ptrace privileges, mediated by YAMA)
|
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> - causing memory to be swapped to disk, and then inspecting the swap
|
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>
|
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> These all require a certain amount of privileges.
|
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|
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How to fix it?
|
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
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|
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memzero(), which internally calls explicit_bzero(3), or whatever
|
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alternative the system provides with a slightly different name, will
|
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make sure that the buffer is zeroed in memory, and optimizations are not
|
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allowed to impede this zeroing.
|
||||
|
||||
This is not really 100% effective, since compilers may place copies of
|
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the string somewhere hidden in the stack. Those copies won't get zeroed
|
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by explicit_bzero(3). However, that's arguably a compiler bug, since
|
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compilers should make everything possible to avoid optimizing strings
|
||||
that are later passed to explicit_bzero(3). But we all know that
|
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sometimes it's impossible to have perfect knowledge in the compiler, so
|
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this is plausible. Nevertheless, there's nothing we can do against such
|
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issues, except minimizing the time such passwords are stored in plain
|
||||
text.
|
||||
|
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Security concerns
|
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
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|
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We believe this isn't easy to exploit. Nevertheless, and since the fix
|
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is trivial, this fix should probably be applied soon, and backported to
|
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all supported distributions, to prevent someone else having more
|
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imagination than us to find a way.
|
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|
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Affected versions
|
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
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|
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All. Bug introduced in shadow 19990709. That's the second commit in
|
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the git history.
|
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|
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Fixes: 45c6603cc86c ("[svn-upgrade] Integrating new upstream version, shadow (19990709)")
|
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|
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CVE: CVE-2023-4641
|
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Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/65c88a43a23c2391dcc90c0abda3e839e9c57904]
|
||||
|
||||
Reported-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
|
||||
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
|
||||
Cc: Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com>
|
||||
Cc: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
|
||||
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
|
||||
Cc: Balint Reczey <rbalint@debian.org>
|
||||
Cc: Sam James <sam@gentoo.org>
|
||||
Cc: David Runge <dvzrv@archlinux.org>
|
||||
Cc: Andreas Jaeger <aj@suse.de>
|
||||
Cc: <~hallyn/shadow@lists.sr.ht>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Xiangyu Chen <xiangyu.chen@windriver.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
src/gpasswd.c | 1 +
|
||||
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
|
||||
|
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diff --git a/src/gpasswd.c b/src/gpasswd.c
|
||||
index 5983f787..2d8869ef 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/gpasswd.c
|
||||
+++ b/src/gpasswd.c
|
||||
@@ -896,6 +896,7 @@ static void change_passwd (struct group *gr)
|
||||
strzero (cp);
|
||||
cp = getpass (_("Re-enter new password: "));
|
||||
if (NULL == cp) {
|
||||
+ memzero (pass, sizeof pass);
|
||||
exit (1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.34.1
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
||||
From 21583da072aa66901d859ac00ce209bac87ddecc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From a773c6b240d27e23d6be41decef0edf24fcee523 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Chen Qi <Qi.Chen@windriver.com>
|
||||
Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2014 15:53:34 +0800
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH] commonio.c-fix-unexpected-open-failure-in-chroot-env
|
||||
@@ -15,35 +15,37 @@ Note that this patch doesn't change the logic in the code, it just expands
|
||||
the codes.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Chen Qi <Qi.Chen@windriver.com>
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
lib/commonio.c | 16 ++++++++++++----
|
||||
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/lib/commonio.c b/lib/commonio.c
|
||||
index 9a02ce1..61384ec 100644
|
||||
index 73fdb3a..d1231e9 100644
|
||||
--- a/lib/commonio.c
|
||||
+++ b/lib/commonio.c
|
||||
@@ -616,10 +616,18 @@ int commonio_open (struct commonio_db *db, int mode)
|
||||
@@ -606,10 +606,18 @@ int commonio_open (struct commonio_db *db, int mode)
|
||||
db->cursor = NULL;
|
||||
db->changed = false;
|
||||
|
||||
- fd = open (db->filename,
|
||||
- (db->readonly ? O_RDONLY : O_RDWR)
|
||||
- | O_NOCTTY | O_NONBLOCK | O_NOFOLLOW);
|
||||
- | O_NOCTTY | O_NONBLOCK | O_NOFOLLOW | O_CLOEXEC);
|
||||
- saved_errno = errno;
|
||||
+ if (db->readonly) {
|
||||
+ fd = open (db->filename,
|
||||
+ (true ? O_RDONLY : O_RDWR)
|
||||
+ | O_NOCTTY | O_NONBLOCK | O_NOFOLLOW);
|
||||
+ | O_NOCTTY | O_NONBLOCK | O_NOFOLLOW | O_CLOEXEC);
|
||||
+ saved_errno = errno;
|
||||
+ } else {
|
||||
+ fd = open (db->filename,
|
||||
+ (false ? O_RDONLY : O_RDWR)
|
||||
+ | O_NOCTTY | O_NONBLOCK | O_NOFOLLOW);
|
||||
+ | O_NOCTTY | O_NONBLOCK | O_NOFOLLOW| O_CLOEXEC);
|
||||
+ saved_errno = errno;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
db->fp = NULL;
|
||||
if (fd >= 0) {
|
||||
#ifdef WITH_TCB
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.30.2
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ BUGTRACKER = "http://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/issues"
|
||||
SECTION = "base/utils"
|
||||
LICENSE = "BSD-3-Clause"
|
||||
LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=c9a450b7be84eac23e6353efecb60b5b \
|
||||
file://src/passwd.c;beginline=2;endline=30;md5=758c26751513b6795395275969dd3be1 \
|
||||
file://src/passwd.c;beginline=2;endline=7;md5=67bcf314687820b2f010d4863fce3fc5 \
|
||||
"
|
||||
|
||||
DEPENDS = "virtual/crypt"
|
||||
@@ -14,10 +14,6 @@ GITHUB_BASE_URI = "https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/releases"
|
||||
SRC_URI = "${GITHUB_BASE_URI}/download/${PV}/${BP}.tar.gz \
|
||||
${@bb.utils.contains('PACKAGECONFIG', 'pam', '${PAM_SRC_URI}', '', d)} \
|
||||
file://useradd \
|
||||
file://0001-Fix-can-not-print-full-login.patch \
|
||||
file://CVE-2023-29383.patch \
|
||||
file://0001-Overhaul-valid_field.patch \
|
||||
file://CVE-2023-4641.patch \
|
||||
"
|
||||
|
||||
SRC_URI:append:class-target = " \
|
||||
@@ -26,14 +22,9 @@ SRC_URI:append:class-target = " \
|
||||
"
|
||||
|
||||
SRC_URI:append:class-native = " \
|
||||
file://0001-Disable-use-of-syslog-for-sysroot.patch \
|
||||
file://commonio.c-fix-unexpected-open-failure-in-chroot-env.patch \
|
||||
"
|
||||
SRC_URI:append:class-nativesdk = " \
|
||||
file://0001-Disable-use-of-syslog-for-sysroot.patch \
|
||||
"
|
||||
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "813057047499c7fe81108adcf0cffa3ad4ec75e19a80151f9cbaa458ff2e86cd"
|
||||
|
||||
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "a305edf5d19bddbdf5e836d2d609fa8bff2d35458819de4d9f06306a1cf24342"
|
||||
|
||||
# Additional Policy files for PAM
|
||||
PAM_SRC_URI = "file://pam.d/chfn \
|
||||
@@ -44,7 +35,7 @@ PAM_SRC_URI = "file://pam.d/chfn \
|
||||
file://pam.d/passwd \
|
||||
file://pam.d/su"
|
||||
|
||||
inherit autotools gettext github-releases
|
||||
inherit autotools gettext github-releases pkgconfig
|
||||
|
||||
export CONFIG_SHELL="/bin/sh"
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -54,6 +45,8 @@ EXTRA_OECONF += "--without-libcrack \
|
||||
--without-sssd \
|
||||
${NSCDOPT}"
|
||||
|
||||
CFLAGS:append:libc-musl = " -DLIBBSD_OVERLAY"
|
||||
|
||||
NSCDOPT = ""
|
||||
NSCDOPT:class-native = "--without-nscd"
|
||||
NSCDOPT:class-nativesdk = "--without-nscd"
|
||||
@@ -73,13 +66,14 @@ PAM_PLUGINS = "libpam-runtime \
|
||||
|
||||
PACKAGECONFIG ??= "${@bb.utils.filter('DISTRO_FEATURES', 'pam', d)} \
|
||||
${@bb.utils.contains('DISTRO_FEATURES', 'xattr', 'attr', '', d)}"
|
||||
PACKAGECONFIG:class-native ??= "${@bb.utils.contains('DISTRO_FEATURES', 'xattr', 'attr', '', d)}"
|
||||
PACKAGECONFIG:class-native ??= "${@bb.utils.contains('DISTRO_FEATURES', 'xattr', 'attr', '', d)} libbsd"
|
||||
PACKAGECONFIG:class-nativesdk = ""
|
||||
PACKAGECONFIG[pam] = "--with-libpam,--without-libpam,libpam,${PAM_PLUGINS}"
|
||||
PACKAGECONFIG[attr] = "--with-attr,--without-attr,attr"
|
||||
PACKAGECONFIG[acl] = "--with-acl,--without-acl,acl"
|
||||
PACKAGECONFIG[audit] = "--with-audit,--without-audit,audit"
|
||||
PACKAGECONFIG[selinux] = "--with-selinux,--without-selinux,libselinux libsemanage"
|
||||
PACKAGECONFIG[libbsd] = "--with-libbsd,--without-libbsd,libbsd"
|
||||
|
||||
RDEPENDS:${PN} = "shadow-securetty \
|
||||
base-passwd \
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user