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QEMU: CVE-2022-3165 VNC: integer underflow in vnc_client_cut_text_ext leads to CPU exhaustion

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Upstream-Status: Backport from https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/d307040b18

(From OE-Core rev: c7eb6da6fa68caf2fb0becbbebeea5e8ea2c9c56)

Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
Hitendra Prajapati
2022-11-08 18:21:38 +05:30
committed by Richard Purdie
parent 37595eeddf
commit 52e9ab5da1
2 changed files with 62 additions and 1 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

2
meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc
View File

@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@ inherit pkgconfig ptest python3-dir
LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=441c28d2cf86e15a37fa47e15a72fbac \
file://COPYING.LIB;endline=24;md5=8c5efda6cf1e1b03dcfd0e6c0d271c7f"
SRC_URI = "https://download.qemu.org/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.xz \
file://powerpc_rom.bin \
file://run-ptest \
@@ -92,6 +91,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.qemu.org/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.xz \
file://0019-target-ppc-Implement-Vector-Mask-Move-insns.patch \
file://0020-target-ppc-move-xs-n-madd-am-ds-p-xs-n-msub-am-ds-p-.patch \
file://0021-target-ppc-implement-xs-n-maddqp-o-xs-n-msubqp-o.patch \
file://CVE-2022-3165.patch \
"
UPSTREAM_CHECK_REGEX = "qemu-(?P<pver>\d+(\.\d+)+)\.tar"

61
meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2022-3165.patch Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
From a15f7d9913d050fb72a79bbbefa5c2329d92e71d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
Date: Tue, 8 Nov 2022 17:10:00 +0530
Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2022-3165
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/d307040b18]
CVE: CVE-2022-3165
Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
ui/vnc-clipboard: fix integer underflow in vnc_client_cut_text_ext
Extended ClientCutText messages start with a 4-byte header. If len < 4,
an integer underflow occurs in vnc_client_cut_text_ext. The result is
used to decompress data in a while loop in inflate_buffer, leading to
CPU consumption and denial of service. Prevent this by checking dlen in
protocol_client_msg.
Fixes: CVE-2022-3165
("ui/vnc: clipboard support")
Reported-by: default avatarTangPeng <tangpeng@qianxin.com>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Matteo Cascella's avatarMauro Matteo Cascella <mcascell@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220925204511.1103214-1-mcascell@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann's avatarGerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
---
ui/vnc.c | 11 ++++++++---
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/ui/vnc.c b/ui/vnc.c
index af02522e8..a14b6861b 100644
--- a/ui/vnc.c
+++ b/ui/vnc.c
@@ -2442,8 +2442,8 @@ static int protocol_client_msg(VncState *vs, uint8_t *data, size_t len)
if (len == 1) {
return 8;
}
+ uint32_t dlen = abs(read_s32(data, 4));
if (len == 8) {
- uint32_t dlen = abs(read_s32(data, 4));
if (dlen > (1 << 20)) {
error_report("vnc: client_cut_text msg payload has %u bytes"
" which exceeds our limit of 1MB.", dlen);
@@ -2456,8 +2456,13 @@ static int protocol_client_msg(VncState *vs, uint8_t *data, size_t len)
}
if (read_s32(data, 4) < 0) {
- vnc_client_cut_text_ext(vs, abs(read_s32(data, 4)),
- read_u32(data, 8), data + 12);
+ if (dlen < 4) {
+ error_report("vnc: malformed payload (header less than 4 bytes)"
+ " in extended clipboard pseudo-encoding.");
+ vnc_client_error(vs);
+ break;
+ }
+ vnc_client_cut_text_ext(vs, dlen, read_u32(data, 8), data + 12);
break;
}
vnc_client_cut_text(vs, read_u32(data, 4), data + 8);
--
2.25.1