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openssl: Upgrade 1.1.1t -> 1.1.1v
https://www.openssl.org/news/openssl-1.1.1-notes.html Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.1u and OpenSSL 1.1.1v [1 Aug 2023] * Fix excessive time spent checking DH q parameter value (CVE-2023-3817) * Fix DH_check() excessive time with over sized modulus (CVE-2023-3446) Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.1t and OpenSSL 1.1.1u [30 May 2023] * Mitigate for very slow `OBJ_obj2txt()` performance with gigantic OBJECT IDENTIFIER sub-identities. (CVE-2023-2650) * Fixed documentation of X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() (CVE-2023-0466) * Fixed handling of invalid certificate policies in leaf certificates (CVE-2023-0465) * Limited the number of nodes created in a policy tree ([CVE-2023-0464]) All CVEs for upgrade to 1.1.1u were already patched, so effectively this will apply patches for CVE-2023-3446 and CVE-2023-3817 plus several non-CVE fixes. Because of mips build changes were backported to openssl 1.1.1 branch, backport of a patch from kirkstone is necessary. (From OE-Core rev: be5d49d86553769deaf4754969d2cf6931d6ac34) Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com> Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
This commit is contained in:
Peter Marko
committed by
Steve Sakoman
Steve Sakoman
parent
d76406934a
commit
5e47346311
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
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From 326909baf81a638d51fa8be1d8227518784f5cc4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Alexander Kanavin <alex@linutronix.de>
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Date: Tue, 14 Sep 2021 12:18:25 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH] Configure: do not tweak mips cflags
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This conflicts with mips machine definitons from yocto,
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e.g.
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| Error: -mips3 conflicts with the other architecture options, which imply -mips64r2
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Upstream-Status: Inappropriate [oe-core specific]
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Signed-off-by: Alexander Kanavin <alex@linutronix.de>
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Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
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---
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Configure | 10 ----------
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1 file changed, 10 deletions(-)
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Index: openssl-3.0.4/Configure
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===================================================================
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--- openssl-3.0.4.orig/Configure
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+++ openssl-3.0.4/Configure
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@@ -1243,16 +1243,6 @@ if ($target =~ /^mingw/ && `$config{CC} --target-help 2>&1` =~ m/-mno-cygwin/m)
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push @{$config{shared_ldflag}}, "-mno-cygwin";
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}
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-if ($target =~ /linux.*-mips/ && !$disabled{asm}
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- && !grep { $_ =~ /-m(ips|arch=)/ } (@{$config{CFLAGS}})) {
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- # minimally required architecture flags for assembly modules
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- my $value;
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- $value = '-mips2' if ($target =~ /mips32/);
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- $value = '-mips3' if ($target =~ /mips64/);
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- unshift @{$config{cflags}}, $value;
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- unshift @{$config{cxxflags}}, $value if $config{CXX};
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-}
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-
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# If threads aren't disabled, check how possible they are
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unless ($disabled{threads}) {
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if ($auto_threads) {
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@@ -1,226 +0,0 @@
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From 879f7080d7e141f415c79eaa3a8ac4a3dad0348b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Pauli <pauli@openssl.org>
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Date: Wed, 8 Mar 2023 15:28:20 +1100
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Subject: [PATCH] x509: excessive resource use verifying policy constraints
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A security vulnerability has been identified in all supported versions
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of OpenSSL related to the verification of X.509 certificate chains
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that include policy constraints. Attackers may be able to exploit this
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vulnerability by creating a malicious certificate chain that triggers
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exponential use of computational resources, leading to a denial-of-service
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(DoS) attack on affected systems.
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Fixes CVE-2023-0464
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Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
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(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20569)
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CVE: CVE-2023-0464
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Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=patch;h=879f7080d7e141f415c79eaa3a8ac4a3dad0348b]
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Signed-off-by: Nikhil R <nikhil.r@kpit.com>
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---
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crypto/x509v3/pcy_local.h | 8 +++++++-
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crypto/x509v3/pcy_node.c | 12 +++++++++---
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crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
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3 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/pcy_local.h b/crypto/x509v3/pcy_local.h
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index 5daf78de45..344aa06765 100644
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--- a/crypto/x509v3/pcy_local.h
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+++ b/crypto/x509v3/pcy_local.h
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@@ -111,6 +111,11 @@ struct X509_POLICY_LEVEL_st {
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};
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struct X509_POLICY_TREE_st {
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+ /* The number of nodes in the tree */
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+ size_t node_count;
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+ /* The maximum number of nodes in the tree */
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+ size_t node_maximum;
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+
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/* This is the tree 'level' data */
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X509_POLICY_LEVEL *levels;
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int nlevel;
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@@ -159,7 +164,8 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *tree_find_sk(STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *sk,
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X509_POLICY_NODE *level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
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X509_POLICY_DATA *data,
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X509_POLICY_NODE *parent,
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- X509_POLICY_TREE *tree);
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+ X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
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+ int extra_data);
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void policy_node_free(X509_POLICY_NODE *node);
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int policy_node_match(const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *lvl,
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const X509_POLICY_NODE *node, const ASN1_OBJECT *oid);
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diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/pcy_node.c b/crypto/x509v3/pcy_node.c
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index e2d7b15322..d574fb9d66 100644
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--- a/crypto/x509v3/pcy_node.c
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+++ b/crypto/x509v3/pcy_node.c
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@@ -59,10 +59,15 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *level_find_node(const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
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X509_POLICY_NODE *level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
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X509_POLICY_DATA *data,
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X509_POLICY_NODE *parent,
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- X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
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+ X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
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+ int extra_data)
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{
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X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
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+ /* Verify that the tree isn't too large. This mitigates CVE-2023-0464 */
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+ if (tree->node_maximum > 0 && tree->node_count >= tree->node_maximum)
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+ return NULL;
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+
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node = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*node));
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if (node == NULL) {
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X509V3err(X509V3_F_LEVEL_ADD_NODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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@@ -70,7 +75,7 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
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}
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node->data = data;
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node->parent = parent;
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- if (level) {
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+ if (level != NULL) {
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if (OBJ_obj2nid(data->valid_policy) == NID_any_policy) {
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if (level->anyPolicy)
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goto node_error;
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@@ -90,7 +95,7 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
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}
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}
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- if (tree) {
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+ if (extra_data) {
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if (tree->extra_data == NULL)
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tree->extra_data = sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_new_null();
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if (tree->extra_data == NULL){
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@@ -103,6 +108,7 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
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}
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}
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+ tree->node_count++;
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if (parent)
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parent->nchild++;
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diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c b/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c
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index 6e8322cbc5..6c7fd35405 100644
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--- a/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c
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+++ b/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c
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@@ -13,6 +13,18 @@
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#include "pcy_local.h"
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+/*
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+ * If the maximum number of nodes in the policy tree isn't defined, set it to
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+ * a generous default of 1000 nodes.
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+ *
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+ * Defining this to be zero means unlimited policy tree growth which opens the
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+ * door on CVE-2023-0464.
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+ */
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+
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+#ifndef OPENSSL_POLICY_TREE_NODES_MAX
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+# define OPENSSL_POLICY_TREE_NODES_MAX 1000
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+#endif
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+
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/*
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* Enable this to print out the complete policy tree at various point during
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* evaluation.
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@@ -168,6 +180,9 @@ static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
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return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL;
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}
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+ /* Limit the growth of the tree to mitigate CVE-2023-0464 */
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+ tree->node_maximum = OPENSSL_POLICY_TREE_NODES_MAX;
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+
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/*
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* http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-6.1.2, figure 3.
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*
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@@ -184,7 +199,7 @@ static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
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level = tree->levels;
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if ((data = policy_data_new(NULL, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_any_policy), 0)) == NULL)
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goto bad_tree;
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- if (level_add_node(level, data, NULL, tree) == NULL) {
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+ if (level_add_node(level, data, NULL, tree, 1) == NULL) {
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policy_data_free(data);
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goto bad_tree;
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}
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@@ -243,7 +258,8 @@ static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
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* Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise
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*/
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static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
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- X509_POLICY_DATA *data)
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+ X509_POLICY_DATA *data,
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+ X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
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{
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X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1;
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int i, matched = 0;
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@@ -253,13 +269,13 @@ static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
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X509_POLICY_NODE *node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(last->nodes, i);
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if (policy_node_match(last, node, data->valid_policy)) {
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- if (level_add_node(curr, data, node, NULL) == NULL)
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+ if (level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree, 0) == NULL)
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return 0;
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matched = 1;
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}
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}
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if (!matched && last->anyPolicy) {
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- if (level_add_node(curr, data, last->anyPolicy, NULL) == NULL)
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+ if (level_add_node(curr, data, last->anyPolicy, tree, 0) == NULL)
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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@@ -272,7 +288,8 @@ static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
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* Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
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*/
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static int tree_link_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
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- const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache)
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+ const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache,
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+ X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
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{
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int i;
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@@ -280,7 +297,7 @@ static int tree_link_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
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X509_POLICY_DATA *data = sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_value(cache->data, i);
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/* Look for matching nodes in previous level */
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- if (!tree_link_matching_nodes(curr, data))
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+ if (!tree_link_matching_nodes(curr, data, tree))
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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@@ -311,7 +328,7 @@ static int tree_add_unmatched(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
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/* Curr may not have anyPolicy */
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data->qualifier_set = cache->anyPolicy->qualifier_set;
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data->flags |= POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS;
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- if (level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree) == NULL) {
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+ if (level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree, 1) == NULL) {
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policy_data_free(data);
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return 0;
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}
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@@ -373,7 +390,7 @@ static int tree_link_any(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
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}
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/* Finally add link to anyPolicy */
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if (last->anyPolicy &&
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- level_add_node(curr, cache->anyPolicy, last->anyPolicy, NULL) == NULL)
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+ level_add_node(curr, cache->anyPolicy, last->anyPolicy, tree, 0) == NULL)
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return 0;
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return 1;
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}
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@@ -555,7 +572,7 @@ static int tree_calculate_user_set(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
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extra->qualifier_set = anyPolicy->data->qualifier_set;
|
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extra->flags = POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS
|
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| POLICY_DATA_FLAG_EXTRA_NODE;
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- node = level_add_node(NULL, extra, anyPolicy->parent, tree);
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+ node = level_add_node(NULL, extra, anyPolicy->parent, tree, 1);
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}
|
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if (!tree->user_policies) {
|
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tree->user_policies = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_new_null();
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@@ -582,7 +599,7 @@ static int tree_evaluate(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
|
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|
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for (i = 1; i < tree->nlevel; i++, curr++) {
|
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cache = policy_cache_set(curr->cert);
|
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- if (!tree_link_nodes(curr, cache))
|
||||
+ if (!tree_link_nodes(curr, cache, tree))
|
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return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL;
|
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|
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if (!(curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY)
|
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--
|
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2.34.1
|
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@@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
|
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From b013765abfa80036dc779dd0e50602c57bb3bf95 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 7 Mar 2023 16:52:55 +0000
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH] Ensure that EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY is checked even in leaf
|
||||
certs
|
||||
|
||||
Even though we check the leaf cert to confirm it is valid, we
|
||||
later ignored the invalid flag and did not notice that the leaf
|
||||
cert was bad.
|
||||
|
||||
Fixes: CVE-2023-0465
|
||||
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
|
||||
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20588)
|
||||
|
||||
CVE: CVE-2023-0465
|
||||
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commitdiff;h=b013765abfa80036dc779dd0e50602c57bb3bf95]
|
||||
Comment: Refreshed first hunk
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Omkar Patil <omkar.patil@kpit.com>
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c | 11 +++++++++--
|
||||
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
|
||||
index 925fbb5412..1dfe4f9f31 100644
|
||||
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
|
||||
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
|
||||
@@ -1649,18 +1649,25 @@
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
|
||||
if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_INVALID) {
|
||||
- int i;
|
||||
+ int i, cbcalled = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback. */
|
||||
- for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
|
||||
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
|
||||
X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
|
||||
|
||||
if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
+ cbcalled = 1;
|
||||
if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i,
|
||||
X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
+ if (!cbcalled) {
|
||||
+ /* Should not be able to get here */
|
||||
+ X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
||||
+ return 0;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ /* The callback ignored the error so we return success */
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE) {
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.34.1
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,82 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 0d16b7e99aafc0b4a6d729eec65a411a7e025f0a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 21 Mar 2023 16:15:47 +0100
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH] Fix documentation of X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy()
|
||||
|
||||
The function was incorrectly documented as enabling policy checking.
|
||||
|
||||
Fixes: CVE-2023-0466
|
||||
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
|
||||
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20564)
|
||||
|
||||
CVE: CVE-2023-0466
|
||||
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commitdiff;h=0d16b7e99aafc0b4a6d729eec65a411a7e025f0a]
|
||||
Comment: Refreshed first hunk from CHANGE and NEWS
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Omkar Patil <omkar.patil@kpit.com>
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
CHANGES | 5 +++++
|
||||
NEWS | 1 +
|
||||
doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod | 9 +++++++--
|
||||
3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
|
||||
index efccf7838e..b19f1429bb 100644
|
||||
--- a/CHANGES
|
||||
+++ b/CHANGES
|
||||
@@ -9,6 +9,11 @@
|
||||
|
||||
Changes between 1.1.1s and 1.1.1t [7 Feb 2023]
|
||||
|
||||
+ *) Corrected documentation of X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() to mention
|
||||
+ that it does not enable policy checking. Thanks to
|
||||
+ David Benjamin for discovering this issue. (CVE-2023-0466)
|
||||
+ [Tomas Mraz]
|
||||
+
|
||||
*) Fixed X.400 address type confusion in X.509 GeneralName.
|
||||
|
||||
There is a type confusion vulnerability relating to X.400 address processing
|
||||
diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS
|
||||
index 36a9bb6890..62615693fa 100644
|
||||
--- a/NEWS
|
||||
+++ b/NEWS
|
||||
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.1s and OpenSSL 1.1.1t [7 Feb 2023]
|
||||
|
||||
+ o Fixed documentation of X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() (CVE-2023-0466)
|
||||
o Fixed X.400 address type confusion in X.509 GeneralName (CVE-2023-0286)
|
||||
o Fixed Use-after-free following BIO_new_NDEF (CVE-2023-0215)
|
||||
o Fixed Double free after calling PEM_read_bio_ex (CVE-2022-4450)
|
||||
diff --git a/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod b/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod
|
||||
index f6f304bf7b..aa292f9336 100644
|
||||
--- a/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod
|
||||
+++ b/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod
|
||||
@@ -92,8 +92,9 @@ B<trust>.
|
||||
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time() sets the verification time in B<param> to
|
||||
B<t>. Normally the current time is used.
|
||||
|
||||
-X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() enables policy checking (it is disabled
|
||||
-by default) and adds B<policy> to the acceptable policy set.
|
||||
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() adds B<policy> to the acceptable policy set.
|
||||
+Contrary to preexisting documentation of this function it does not enable
|
||||
+policy checking.
|
||||
|
||||
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies() enables policy checking (it is disabled
|
||||
by default) and sets the acceptable policy set to B<policies>. Any existing
|
||||
@@ -377,6 +378,10 @@ and has no effect.
|
||||
|
||||
The X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_hostflags() function was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0i.
|
||||
|
||||
+The function X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() was historically documented as
|
||||
+enabling policy checking however the implementation has never done this.
|
||||
+The documentation was changed to align with the implementation.
|
||||
+
|
||||
=head1 COPYRIGHT
|
||||
|
||||
Copyright 2009-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.34.1
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,122 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 9e209944b35cf82368071f160a744b6178f9b098 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
|
||||
Date: Fri, 12 May 2023 10:00:13 +0200
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH] Restrict the size of OBJECT IDENTIFIERs that OBJ_obj2txt will
|
||||
translate
|
||||
|
||||
OBJ_obj2txt() would translate any size OBJECT IDENTIFIER to canonical
|
||||
numeric text form. For gigantic sub-identifiers, this would take a very
|
||||
long time, the time complexity being O(n^2) where n is the size of that
|
||||
sub-identifier.
|
||||
|
||||
To mitigate this, a restriction on the size that OBJ_obj2txt() will
|
||||
translate to canonical numeric text form is added, based on RFC 2578
|
||||
(STD 58), which says this:
|
||||
|
||||
> 3.5. OBJECT IDENTIFIER values
|
||||
>
|
||||
> An OBJECT IDENTIFIER value is an ordered list of non-negative numbers.
|
||||
> For the SMIv2, each number in the list is referred to as a sub-identifier,
|
||||
> there are at most 128 sub-identifiers in a value, and each sub-identifier
|
||||
> has a maximum value of 2^32-1 (4294967295 decimal).
|
||||
|
||||
Fixes otc/security#96
|
||||
Fixes CVE-2023-2650
|
||||
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
|
||||
|
||||
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/9e209944b35cf82368071f160a744b6178f9b098]
|
||||
CVE: CVE-2023-2650
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
CHANGES | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
|
||||
NEWS | 2 ++
|
||||
crypto/objects/obj_dat.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
|
||||
3 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
|
||||
index 1eaaf4e..f2cf38f 100644
|
||||
--- a/CHANGES
|
||||
+++ b/CHANGES
|
||||
@@ -7,7 +7,33 @@
|
||||
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commits/ and pick the appropriate
|
||||
release branch.
|
||||
|
||||
- Changes between 1.1.1s and 1.1.1t [7 Feb 2023]
|
||||
+ Changes between 1.1.1t and 1.1.1u [xx XXX xxxx]
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ *) Mitigate for the time it takes for `OBJ_obj2txt` to translate gigantic
|
||||
+ OBJECT IDENTIFIER sub-identifiers to canonical numeric text form.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ OBJ_obj2txt() would translate any size OBJECT IDENTIFIER to canonical
|
||||
+ numeric text form. For gigantic sub-identifiers, this would take a very
|
||||
+ long time, the time complexity being O(n^2) where n is the size of that
|
||||
+ sub-identifier. (CVE-2023-2650)
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ To mitigitate this, `OBJ_obj2txt()` will only translate an OBJECT
|
||||
+ IDENTIFIER to canonical numeric text form if the size of that OBJECT
|
||||
+ IDENTIFIER is 586 bytes or less, and fail otherwise.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ The basis for this restriction is RFC 2578 (STD 58), section 3.5. OBJECT
|
||||
+ IDENTIFIER values, which stipulates that OBJECT IDENTIFIERS may have at
|
||||
+ most 128 sub-identifiers, and that the maximum value that each sub-
|
||||
+ identifier may have is 2^32-1 (4294967295 decimal).
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ For each byte of every sub-identifier, only the 7 lower bits are part of
|
||||
+ the value, so the maximum amount of bytes that an OBJECT IDENTIFIER with
|
||||
+ these restrictions may occupy is 32 * 128 / 7, which is approximately 586
|
||||
+ bytes.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Ref: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2578#section-3.5
|
||||
+
|
||||
+Changes between 1.1.1s and 1.1.1t [7 Feb 2023]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Corrected documentation of X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() to mention
|
||||
that it does not enable policy checking. Thanks to
|
||||
diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS
|
||||
index a86220a..41922c4 100644
|
||||
--- a/NEWS
|
||||
+++ b/NEWS
|
||||
@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@
|
||||
|
||||
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.1s and OpenSSL 1.1.1t [7 Feb 2023]
|
||||
|
||||
+ o Mitigate for very slow `OBJ_obj2txt()` performance with gigantic
|
||||
+ OBJECT IDENTIFIER sub-identities. (CVE-2023-2650)
|
||||
o Fixed documentation of X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() (CVE-2023-0466)
|
||||
o Fixed X.400 address type confusion in X.509 GeneralName (CVE-2023-0286)
|
||||
o Fixed Use-after-free following BIO_new_NDEF (CVE-2023-0215)
|
||||
diff --git a/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c b/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c
|
||||
index 7e8de72..d699915 100644
|
||||
--- a/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c
|
||||
+++ b/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c
|
||||
@@ -428,6 +428,25 @@ int OBJ_obj2txt(char *buf, int buf_len, const ASN1_OBJECT *a, int no_name)
|
||||
first = 1;
|
||||
bl = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
+ /*
|
||||
+ * RFC 2578 (STD 58) says this about OBJECT IDENTIFIERs:
|
||||
+ *
|
||||
+ * > 3.5. OBJECT IDENTIFIER values
|
||||
+ * >
|
||||
+ * > An OBJECT IDENTIFIER value is an ordered list of non-negative
|
||||
+ * > numbers. For the SMIv2, each number in the list is referred to as a
|
||||
+ * > sub-identifier, there are at most 128 sub-identifiers in a value,
|
||||
+ * > and each sub-identifier has a maximum value of 2^32-1 (4294967295
|
||||
+ * > decimal).
|
||||
+ *
|
||||
+ * So a legitimate OID according to this RFC is at most (32 * 128 / 7),
|
||||
+ * i.e. 586 bytes long.
|
||||
+ *
|
||||
+ * Ref: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2578#section-3.5
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+ if (len > 586)
|
||||
+ goto err;
|
||||
+
|
||||
while (len > 0) {
|
||||
l = 0;
|
||||
use_bn = 0;
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.25.1
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -19,17 +19,14 @@ SRC_URI = "http://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-${PV}.tar.gz \
|
||||
file://reproducible.patch \
|
||||
file://reproducibility.patch \
|
||||
file://0001-Configure-add-2-missing-key-sorts.patch \
|
||||
file://CVE-2023-0464.patch \
|
||||
file://CVE-2023-0465.patch \
|
||||
file://CVE-2023-0466.patch \
|
||||
file://CVE-2023-2650.patch \
|
||||
file://0001-Configure-do-not-tweak-mips-cflags.patch \
|
||||
"
|
||||
|
||||
SRC_URI_append_class-nativesdk = " \
|
||||
file://environment.d-openssl.sh \
|
||||
"
|
||||
|
||||
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "8dee9b24bdb1dcbf0c3d1e9b02fb8f6bf22165e807f45adeb7c9677536859d3b"
|
||||
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "d6697e2871e77238460402e9362d47d18382b15ef9f246aba6c7bd780d38a6b0"
|
||||
|
||||
inherit lib_package multilib_header multilib_script ptest
|
||||
MULTILIB_SCRIPTS = "${PN}-bin:${bindir}/c_rehash"
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user