go: fix CVE-2022-2879 and CVE-2022-41720

Backport appropriate patches to fix CVE-2022-2879 and CVE-2022-41720.

Modified the original fix for CVE-2022-2879 to remove a testdata tarball
and any references to it since git binary diffs are not supported in
quilt.

(From OE-Core rev: a896cebe1ce2363b501723475154350acf0e0783)

Signed-off-by: Sakib Sajal <sakib.sajal@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
Sakib Sajal
2023-03-27 18:25:54 -04:00
committed by Richard Purdie
parent ce861f9dd0
commit 7a9f4f7a29
3 changed files with 693 additions and 0 deletions

View File

@@ -20,6 +20,8 @@ SRC_URI += "\
file://0001-net-http-httputil-avoid-query-parameter-smuggling.patch \
file://CVE-2022-41715.patch \
file://CVE-2022-41717.patch \
file://CVE-2022-2879.patch \
file://CVE-2022-41720.patch \
"
SRC_URI[main.sha256sum] = "a1a48b23afb206f95e7bbaa9b898d965f90826f6f1d1fc0c1d784ada0cd300fd"

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
From d064ed520a7cc6b480f9565e30751e695d394f4e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
Date: Fri, 2 Sep 2022 20:45:18 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] archive/tar: limit size of headers
Set a 1MiB limit on special file blocks (PAX headers, GNU long names,
GNU link names), to avoid reading arbitrarily large amounts of data
into memory.
Thanks to Adam Korczynski (ADA Logics) and OSS-Fuzz for reporting
this issue.
Fixes CVE-2022-2879
Updates #54853
Fixes #55925
Change-Id: I85136d6ff1e0af101a112190e027987ab4335680
Reviewed-on: https://team-review.git.corp.google.com/c/golang/go-private/+/1565555
Reviewed-by: Tatiana Bradley <tatianabradley@google.com>
Run-TryBot: Roland Shoemaker <bracewell@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <bracewell@google.com>
(cherry picked from commit 6ee768cef6b82adf7a90dcf367a1699ef694f3b2)
Reviewed-on: https://team-review.git.corp.google.com/c/golang/go-private/+/1590622
Reviewed-by: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Julie Qiu <julieqiu@google.com>
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/438500
Reviewed-by: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Carlos Amedee <carlos@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@google.com>
Run-TryBot: Carlos Amedee <carlos@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
CVE: CVE-2022-2879
Upstream-Status: Backport [0a723816cd205576945fa57fbdde7e6532d59d08]
Signed-off-by: Sakib Sajal <sakib.sajal@windriver.com>
---
src/archive/tar/format.go | 4 ++++
src/archive/tar/reader.go | 14 ++++++++++++--
src/archive/tar/reader_test.go | 8 +++++++-
src/archive/tar/writer.go | 3 +++
src/archive/tar/writer_test.go | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
5 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/archive/tar/format.go b/src/archive/tar/format.go
index cfe24a5..6642364 100644
--- a/src/archive/tar/format.go
+++ b/src/archive/tar/format.go
@@ -143,6 +143,10 @@ const (
blockSize = 512 // Size of each block in a tar stream
nameSize = 100 // Max length of the name field in USTAR format
prefixSize = 155 // Max length of the prefix field in USTAR format
+
+ // Max length of a special file (PAX header, GNU long name or link).
+ // This matches the limit used by libarchive.
+ maxSpecialFileSize = 1 << 20
)
// blockPadding computes the number of bytes needed to pad offset up to the
diff --git a/src/archive/tar/reader.go b/src/archive/tar/reader.go
index 1b1d5b4..f645af8 100644
--- a/src/archive/tar/reader.go
+++ b/src/archive/tar/reader.go
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ func (tr *Reader) next() (*Header, error) {
continue // This is a meta header affecting the next header
case TypeGNULongName, TypeGNULongLink:
format.mayOnlyBe(FormatGNU)
- realname, err := io.ReadAll(tr)
+ realname, err := readSpecialFile(tr)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ func mergePAX(hdr *Header, paxHdrs map[string]string) (err error) {
// parsePAX parses PAX headers.
// If an extended header (type 'x') is invalid, ErrHeader is returned
func parsePAX(r io.Reader) (map[string]string, error) {
- buf, err := io.ReadAll(r)
+ buf, err := readSpecialFile(r)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@@ -826,6 +826,16 @@ func tryReadFull(r io.Reader, b []byte) (n int, err error) {
return n, err
}
+// readSpecialFile is like io.ReadAll except it returns
+// ErrFieldTooLong if more than maxSpecialFileSize is read.
+func readSpecialFile(r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) {
+ buf, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(r, maxSpecialFileSize+1))
+ if len(buf) > maxSpecialFileSize {
+ return nil, ErrFieldTooLong
+ }
+ return buf, err
+}
+
// discard skips n bytes in r, reporting an error if unable to do so.
func discard(r io.Reader, n int64) error {
// If possible, Seek to the last byte before the end of the data section.
diff --git a/src/archive/tar/reader_test.go b/src/archive/tar/reader_test.go
index 789ddc1..926dc3d 100644
--- a/src/archive/tar/reader_test.go
+++ b/src/archive/tar/reader_test.go
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ package tar
import (
"bytes"
+ "compress/bzip2"
"crypto/md5"
"errors"
"fmt"
@@ -625,9 +626,14 @@ func TestReader(t *testing.T) {
}
defer f.Close()
+ var fr io.Reader = f
+ if strings.HasSuffix(v.file, ".bz2") {
+ fr = bzip2.NewReader(fr)
+ }
+
// Capture all headers and checksums.
var (
- tr = NewReader(f)
+ tr = NewReader(fr)
hdrs []*Header
chksums []string
rdbuf = make([]byte, 8)
diff --git a/src/archive/tar/writer.go b/src/archive/tar/writer.go
index e80498d..893eac0 100644
--- a/src/archive/tar/writer.go
+++ b/src/archive/tar/writer.go
@@ -199,6 +199,9 @@ func (tw *Writer) writePAXHeader(hdr *Header, paxHdrs map[string]string) error {
flag = TypeXHeader
}
data := buf.String()
+ if len(data) > maxSpecialFileSize {
+ return ErrFieldTooLong
+ }
if err := tw.writeRawFile(name, data, flag, FormatPAX); err != nil || isGlobal {
return err // Global headers return here
}
diff --git a/src/archive/tar/writer_test.go b/src/archive/tar/writer_test.go
index a00f02d..4e709e5 100644
--- a/src/archive/tar/writer_test.go
+++ b/src/archive/tar/writer_test.go
@@ -1006,6 +1006,33 @@ func TestIssue12594(t *testing.T) {
}
}
+func TestWriteLongHeader(t *testing.T) {
+ for _, test := range []struct {
+ name string
+ h *Header
+ }{{
+ name: "name too long",
+ h: &Header{Name: strings.Repeat("a", maxSpecialFileSize)},
+ }, {
+ name: "linkname too long",
+ h: &Header{Linkname: strings.Repeat("a", maxSpecialFileSize)},
+ }, {
+ name: "uname too long",
+ h: &Header{Uname: strings.Repeat("a", maxSpecialFileSize)},
+ }, {
+ name: "gname too long",
+ h: &Header{Gname: strings.Repeat("a", maxSpecialFileSize)},
+ }, {
+ name: "PAX header too long",
+ h: &Header{PAXRecords: map[string]string{"GOLANG.x": strings.Repeat("a", maxSpecialFileSize)}},
+ }} {
+ w := NewWriter(io.Discard)
+ if err := w.WriteHeader(test.h); err != ErrFieldTooLong {
+ t.Errorf("%v: w.WriteHeader() = %v, want ErrFieldTooLong", test.name, err)
+ }
+ }
+}
+
// testNonEmptyWriter wraps an io.Writer and ensures that
// Write is never called with an empty buffer.
type testNonEmptyWriter struct{ io.Writer }

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,514 @@
From f8896a97a0630b0f2f8c488310147f7f20b3ec7d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
Date: Thu, 10 Nov 2022 12:16:27 -0800
Subject: [PATCH] os, net/http: avoid escapes from os.DirFS and http.Dir on
Windows
Do not permit access to Windows reserved device names (NUL, COM1, etc.)
via os.DirFS and http.Dir filesystems.
Avoid escapes from os.DirFS(`\`) on Windows. DirFS would join the
the root to the relative path with a path separator, making
os.DirFS(`\`).Open(`/foo/bar`) open the path `\\foo\bar`, which is
a UNC name. Not only does this not open the intended file, but permits
reference to any file on the system rather than only files on the
current drive.
Make os.DirFS("") invalid, with all file access failing. Previously,
a root of "" was interpreted as "/", which is surprising and probably
unintentional.
Fixes CVE-2022-41720.
Fixes #56694.
Change-Id: I275b5fa391e6ad7404309ea98ccc97405942e0f0
Reviewed-on: https://team-review.git.corp.google.com/c/golang/go-private/+/1663832
Reviewed-by: Julie Qiu <julieqiu@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Tatiana Bradley <tatianabradley@google.com>
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/455360
Reviewed-by: Michael Pratt <mpratt@google.com>
TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Jenny Rakoczy <jenny@golang.org>
CVE: CVE-2022-41720
Upstream-Status: Backport [7013a4f5f816af62033ad63dd06b77c30d7a62a7]
Signed-off-by: Sakib Sajal <sakib.sajal@windriver.com>
---
src/go/build/deps_test.go | 1 +
src/internal/safefilepath/path.go | 21 +++++
src/internal/safefilepath/path_other.go | 23 ++++++
src/internal/safefilepath/path_test.go | 88 +++++++++++++++++++++
src/internal/safefilepath/path_windows.go | 95 +++++++++++++++++++++++
src/net/http/fs.go | 8 +-
src/net/http/fs_test.go | 28 +++++++
src/os/file.go | 36 +++++++--
src/os/os_test.go | 38 +++++++++
9 files changed, 328 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 src/internal/safefilepath/path.go
create mode 100644 src/internal/safefilepath/path_other.go
create mode 100644 src/internal/safefilepath/path_test.go
create mode 100644 src/internal/safefilepath/path_windows.go
diff --git a/src/go/build/deps_test.go b/src/go/build/deps_test.go
index 45e2f25..dc3bb8c 100644
--- a/src/go/build/deps_test.go
+++ b/src/go/build/deps_test.go
@@ -165,6 +165,7 @@ var depsRules = `
io/fs
< internal/testlog
< internal/poll
+ < internal/safefilepath
< os
< os/signal;
diff --git a/src/internal/safefilepath/path.go b/src/internal/safefilepath/path.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0f0a270
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/internal/safefilepath/path.go
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+// Copyright 2022 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+// Package safefilepath manipulates operating-system file paths.
+package safefilepath
+
+import (
+ "errors"
+)
+
+var errInvalidPath = errors.New("invalid path")
+
+// FromFS converts a slash-separated path into an operating-system path.
+//
+// FromFS returns an error if the path cannot be represented by the operating
+// system. For example, paths containing '\' and ':' characters are rejected
+// on Windows.
+func FromFS(path string) (string, error) {
+ return fromFS(path)
+}
diff --git a/src/internal/safefilepath/path_other.go b/src/internal/safefilepath/path_other.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f93da18
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/internal/safefilepath/path_other.go
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+// Copyright 2022 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+//go:build !windows
+
+package safefilepath
+
+import "runtime"
+
+func fromFS(path string) (string, error) {
+ if runtime.GOOS == "plan9" {
+ if len(path) > 0 && path[0] == '#' {
+ return path, errInvalidPath
+ }
+ }
+ for i := range path {
+ if path[i] == 0 {
+ return "", errInvalidPath
+ }
+ }
+ return path, nil
+}
diff --git a/src/internal/safefilepath/path_test.go b/src/internal/safefilepath/path_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dc662c1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/internal/safefilepath/path_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+// Copyright 2022 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package safefilepath_test
+
+import (
+ "internal/safefilepath"
+ "os"
+ "path/filepath"
+ "runtime"
+ "testing"
+)
+
+type PathTest struct {
+ path, result string
+}
+
+const invalid = ""
+
+var fspathtests = []PathTest{
+ {".", "."},
+ {"/a/b/c", "/a/b/c"},
+ {"a\x00b", invalid},
+}
+
+var winreservedpathtests = []PathTest{
+ {`a\b`, `a\b`},
+ {`a:b`, `a:b`},
+ {`a/b:c`, `a/b:c`},
+ {`NUL`, `NUL`},
+ {`./com1`, `./com1`},
+ {`a/nul/b`, `a/nul/b`},
+}
+
+// Whether a reserved name with an extension is reserved or not varies by
+// Windows version.
+var winreservedextpathtests = []PathTest{
+ {"nul.txt", "nul.txt"},
+ {"a/nul.txt/b", "a/nul.txt/b"},
+}
+
+var plan9reservedpathtests = []PathTest{
+ {`#c`, `#c`},
+}
+
+func TestFromFS(t *testing.T) {
+ switch runtime.GOOS {
+ case "windows":
+ if canWriteFile(t, "NUL") {
+ t.Errorf("can unexpectedly write a file named NUL on Windows")
+ }
+ if canWriteFile(t, "nul.txt") {
+ fspathtests = append(fspathtests, winreservedextpathtests...)
+ } else {
+ winreservedpathtests = append(winreservedpathtests, winreservedextpathtests...)
+ }
+ for i := range winreservedpathtests {
+ winreservedpathtests[i].result = invalid
+ }
+ for i := range fspathtests {
+ fspathtests[i].result = filepath.FromSlash(fspathtests[i].result)
+ }
+ case "plan9":
+ for i := range plan9reservedpathtests {
+ plan9reservedpathtests[i].result = invalid
+ }
+ }
+ tests := fspathtests
+ tests = append(tests, winreservedpathtests...)
+ tests = append(tests, plan9reservedpathtests...)
+ for _, test := range tests {
+ got, err := safefilepath.FromFS(test.path)
+ if (got == "") != (err != nil) {
+ t.Errorf(`FromFS(%q) = %q, %v; want "" only if err != nil`, test.path, got, err)
+ }
+ if got != test.result {
+ t.Errorf("FromFS(%q) = %q, %v; want %q", test.path, got, err, test.result)
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+func canWriteFile(t *testing.T, name string) bool {
+ path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), name)
+ os.WriteFile(path, []byte("ok"), 0666)
+ b, _ := os.ReadFile(path)
+ return string(b) == "ok"
+}
diff --git a/src/internal/safefilepath/path_windows.go b/src/internal/safefilepath/path_windows.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..909c150
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/internal/safefilepath/path_windows.go
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+// Copyright 2022 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package safefilepath
+
+import (
+ "syscall"
+ "unicode/utf8"
+)
+
+func fromFS(path string) (string, error) {
+ if !utf8.ValidString(path) {
+ return "", errInvalidPath
+ }
+ for len(path) > 1 && path[0] == '/' && path[1] == '/' {
+ path = path[1:]
+ }
+ containsSlash := false
+ for p := path; p != ""; {
+ // Find the next path element.
+ i := 0
+ dot := -1
+ for i < len(p) && p[i] != '/' {
+ switch p[i] {
+ case 0, '\\', ':':
+ return "", errInvalidPath
+ case '.':
+ if dot < 0 {
+ dot = i
+ }
+ }
+ i++
+ }
+ part := p[:i]
+ if i < len(p) {
+ containsSlash = true
+ p = p[i+1:]
+ } else {
+ p = ""
+ }
+ // Trim the extension and look for a reserved name.
+ base := part
+ if dot >= 0 {
+ base = part[:dot]
+ }
+ if isReservedName(base) {
+ if dot < 0 {
+ return "", errInvalidPath
+ }
+ // The path element is a reserved name with an extension.
+ // Some Windows versions consider this a reserved name,
+ // while others do not. Use FullPath to see if the name is
+ // reserved.
+ if p, _ := syscall.FullPath(part); len(p) >= 4 && p[:4] == `\\.\` {
+ return "", errInvalidPath
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if containsSlash {
+ // We can't depend on strings, so substitute \ for / manually.
+ buf := []byte(path)
+ for i, b := range buf {
+ if b == '/' {
+ buf[i] = '\\'
+ }
+ }
+ path = string(buf)
+ }
+ return path, nil
+}
+
+// isReservedName reports if name is a Windows reserved device name.
+// It does not detect names with an extension, which are also reserved on some Windows versions.
+//
+// For details, search for PRN in
+// https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/fileio/naming-a-file.
+func isReservedName(name string) bool {
+ if 3 <= len(name) && len(name) <= 4 {
+ switch string([]byte{toUpper(name[0]), toUpper(name[1]), toUpper(name[2])}) {
+ case "CON", "PRN", "AUX", "NUL":
+ return len(name) == 3
+ case "COM", "LPT":
+ return len(name) == 4 && '1' <= name[3] && name[3] <= '9'
+ }
+ }
+ return false
+}
+
+func toUpper(c byte) byte {
+ if 'a' <= c && c <= 'z' {
+ return c - ('a' - 'A')
+ }
+ return c
+}
diff --git a/src/net/http/fs.go b/src/net/http/fs.go
index 57e731e..43ee4b5 100644
--- a/src/net/http/fs.go
+++ b/src/net/http/fs.go
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ package http
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
+ "internal/safefilepath"
"io"
"io/fs"
"mime"
@@ -69,14 +70,15 @@ func mapDirOpenError(originalErr error, name string) error {
// Open implements FileSystem using os.Open, opening files for reading rooted
// and relative to the directory d.
func (d Dir) Open(name string) (File, error) {
- if filepath.Separator != '/' && strings.ContainsRune(name, filepath.Separator) {
- return nil, errors.New("http: invalid character in file path")
+ path, err := safefilepath.FromFS(path.Clean("/" + name))
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, errors.New("http: invalid or unsafe file path")
}
dir := string(d)
if dir == "" {
dir = "."
}
- fullName := filepath.Join(dir, filepath.FromSlash(path.Clean("/"+name)))
+ fullName := filepath.Join(dir, path)
f, err := os.Open(fullName)
if err != nil {
return nil, mapDirOpenError(err, fullName)
diff --git a/src/net/http/fs_test.go b/src/net/http/fs_test.go
index b42ade1..941448a 100644
--- a/src/net/http/fs_test.go
+++ b/src/net/http/fs_test.go
@@ -648,6 +648,34 @@ func TestFileServerZeroByte(t *testing.T) {
}
}
+func TestFileServerNamesEscape(t *testing.T) {
+ t.Run("h1", func(t *testing.T) {
+ testFileServerNamesEscape(t, h1Mode)
+ })
+ t.Run("h2", func(t *testing.T) {
+ testFileServerNamesEscape(t, h2Mode)
+ })
+}
+func testFileServerNamesEscape(t *testing.T, h2 bool) {
+ defer afterTest(t)
+ ts := newClientServerTest(t, h2, FileServer(Dir("testdata"))).ts
+ defer ts.Close()
+ for _, path := range []string{
+ "/../testdata/file",
+ "/NUL", // don't read from device files on Windows
+ } {
+ res, err := ts.Client().Get(ts.URL + path)
+ if err != nil {
+ t.Fatal(err)
+ }
+ res.Body.Close()
+ if res.StatusCode < 400 || res.StatusCode > 599 {
+ t.Errorf("Get(%q): got status %v, want 4xx or 5xx", path, res.StatusCode)
+ }
+
+ }
+}
+
type fakeFileInfo struct {
dir bool
basename string
diff --git a/src/os/file.go b/src/os/file.go
index e717f17..cb87158 100644
--- a/src/os/file.go
+++ b/src/os/file.go
@@ -37,12 +37,12 @@
// Note: The maximum number of concurrent operations on a File may be limited by
// the OS or the system. The number should be high, but exceeding it may degrade
// performance or cause other issues.
-//
package os
import (
"errors"
"internal/poll"
+ "internal/safefilepath"
"internal/testlog"
"internal/unsafeheader"
"io"
@@ -623,6 +623,8 @@ func isWindowsNulName(name string) bool {
// the /prefix tree, then using DirFS does not stop the access any more than using
// os.Open does. DirFS is therefore not a general substitute for a chroot-style security
// mechanism when the directory tree contains arbitrary content.
+//
+// The directory dir must not be "".
func DirFS(dir string) fs.FS {
return dirFS(dir)
}
@@ -641,10 +643,11 @@ func containsAny(s, chars string) bool {
type dirFS string
func (dir dirFS) Open(name string) (fs.File, error) {
- if !fs.ValidPath(name) || runtime.GOOS == "windows" && containsAny(name, `\:`) {
- return nil, &PathError{Op: "open", Path: name, Err: ErrInvalid}
+ fullname, err := dir.join(name)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, &PathError{Op: "stat", Path: name, Err: err}
}
- f, err := Open(string(dir) + "/" + name)
+ f, err := Open(fullname)
if err != nil {
return nil, err // nil fs.File
}
@@ -652,16 +655,35 @@ func (dir dirFS) Open(name string) (fs.File, error) {
}
func (dir dirFS) Stat(name string) (fs.FileInfo, error) {
- if !fs.ValidPath(name) || runtime.GOOS == "windows" && containsAny(name, `\:`) {
- return nil, &PathError{Op: "stat", Path: name, Err: ErrInvalid}
+ fullname, err := dir.join(name)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, &PathError{Op: "stat", Path: name, Err: err}
}
- f, err := Stat(string(dir) + "/" + name)
+ f, err := Stat(fullname)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return f, nil
}
+// join returns the path for name in dir.
+func (dir dirFS) join(name string) (string, error) {
+ if dir == "" {
+ return "", errors.New("os: DirFS with empty root")
+ }
+ if !fs.ValidPath(name) {
+ return "", ErrInvalid
+ }
+ name, err := safefilepath.FromFS(name)
+ if err != nil {
+ return "", ErrInvalid
+ }
+ if IsPathSeparator(dir[len(dir)-1]) {
+ return string(dir) + name, nil
+ }
+ return string(dir) + string(PathSeparator) + name, nil
+}
+
// ReadFile reads the named file and returns the contents.
// A successful call returns err == nil, not err == EOF.
// Because ReadFile reads the whole file, it does not treat an EOF from Read
diff --git a/src/os/os_test.go b/src/os/os_test.go
index 506f1fb..be269bb 100644
--- a/src/os/os_test.go
+++ b/src/os/os_test.go
@@ -2702,6 +2702,44 @@ func TestDirFS(t *testing.T) {
if err == nil {
t.Fatalf(`Open testdata\dirfs succeeded`)
}
+
+ // Test that Open does not open Windows device files.
+ _, err = d.Open(`NUL`)
+ if err == nil {
+ t.Errorf(`Open NUL succeeded`)
+ }
+}
+
+func TestDirFSRootDir(t *testing.T) {
+ cwd, err := os.Getwd()
+ if err != nil {
+ t.Fatal(err)
+ }
+ cwd = cwd[len(filepath.VolumeName(cwd)):] // trim volume prefix (C:) on Windows
+ cwd = filepath.ToSlash(cwd) // convert \ to /
+ cwd = strings.TrimPrefix(cwd, "/") // trim leading /
+
+ // Test that Open can open a path starting at /.
+ d := DirFS("/")
+ f, err := d.Open(cwd + "/testdata/dirfs/a")
+ if err != nil {
+ t.Fatal(err)
+ }
+ f.Close()
+}
+
+func TestDirFSEmptyDir(t *testing.T) {
+ d := DirFS("")
+ cwd, _ := os.Getwd()
+ for _, path := range []string{
+ "testdata/dirfs/a", // not DirFS(".")
+ filepath.ToSlash(cwd) + "/testdata/dirfs/a", // not DirFS("/")
+ } {
+ _, err := d.Open(path)
+ if err == nil {
+ t.Fatalf(`DirFS("").Open(%q) succeeded`, path)
+ }
+ }
}
func TestDirFSPathsValid(t *testing.T) {