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u-boot: fix CVE-2022-2347 and CVE-2022-30790
Backport appropriate patches to fix CVE-2022-2347 and CVE-2022-30790. (From OE-Core rev: 7a5220a4877cd4d3766728e8a3525c157b6167fb) Signed-off-by: Sakib Sajal <sakib.sajal@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
This commit is contained in:
Sakib Sajal
committed by
Steve Sakoman
Steve Sakoman
parent
d552f85037
commit
83e5ad004a
129
meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/files/CVE-2022-2347_1.patch
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129
meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/files/CVE-2022-2347_1.patch
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@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
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From 9d2d2deabc49dbedf93a7192b25f55d9933fcede Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Venkatesh Yadav Abbarapu <venkatesh.abbarapu@amd.com>
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Date: Thu, 3 Nov 2022 09:37:48 +0530
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Subject: [PATCH 1/2] usb: gadget: dfu: Fix the unchecked length field
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DFU implementation does not bound the length field in USB
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DFU download setup packets, and it does not verify that
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the transfer direction. Fixing the length and transfer
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direction.
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CVE-2022-2347
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Signed-off-by: Venkatesh Yadav Abbarapu <venkatesh.abbarapu@amd.com>
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Reviewed-by: Marek Vasut <marex@denx.de>
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CVE: CVE-2022-2347
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Upstream-Status: Backport [fbce985e28eaca3af82afecc11961aadaf971a7e]
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Signed-off-by: Sakib Sajal <sakib.sajal@windriver.com>
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---
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drivers/usb/gadget/f_dfu.c | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
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1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/f_dfu.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/f_dfu.c
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index 4bedc7d3a1..33ef62f8ba 100644
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--- a/drivers/usb/gadget/f_dfu.c
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+++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/f_dfu.c
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@@ -321,21 +321,29 @@ static int state_dfu_idle(struct f_dfu *f_dfu,
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u16 len = le16_to_cpu(ctrl->wLength);
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int value = 0;
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+ len = len > DFU_USB_BUFSIZ ? DFU_USB_BUFSIZ : len;
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+
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switch (ctrl->bRequest) {
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case USB_REQ_DFU_DNLOAD:
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- if (len == 0) {
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- f_dfu->dfu_state = DFU_STATE_dfuERROR;
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- value = RET_STALL;
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- break;
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+ if (ctrl->bRequestType == USB_DIR_OUT) {
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+ if (len == 0) {
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+ f_dfu->dfu_state = DFU_STATE_dfuERROR;
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+ value = RET_STALL;
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+ break;
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+ }
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+ f_dfu->dfu_state = DFU_STATE_dfuDNLOAD_SYNC;
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+ f_dfu->blk_seq_num = w_value;
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+ value = handle_dnload(gadget, len);
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}
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- f_dfu->dfu_state = DFU_STATE_dfuDNLOAD_SYNC;
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- f_dfu->blk_seq_num = w_value;
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- value = handle_dnload(gadget, len);
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break;
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case USB_REQ_DFU_UPLOAD:
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- f_dfu->dfu_state = DFU_STATE_dfuUPLOAD_IDLE;
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- f_dfu->blk_seq_num = 0;
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- value = handle_upload(req, len);
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+ if (ctrl->bRequestType == USB_DIR_IN) {
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+ f_dfu->dfu_state = DFU_STATE_dfuUPLOAD_IDLE;
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+ f_dfu->blk_seq_num = 0;
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+ value = handle_upload(req, len);
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+ if (value >= 0 && value < len)
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+ f_dfu->dfu_state = DFU_STATE_dfuIDLE;
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+ }
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break;
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case USB_REQ_DFU_ABORT:
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/* no zlp? */
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@@ -424,11 +432,15 @@ static int state_dfu_dnload_idle(struct f_dfu *f_dfu,
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u16 len = le16_to_cpu(ctrl->wLength);
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int value = 0;
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+ len = len > DFU_USB_BUFSIZ ? DFU_USB_BUFSIZ : len;
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+
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switch (ctrl->bRequest) {
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case USB_REQ_DFU_DNLOAD:
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- f_dfu->dfu_state = DFU_STATE_dfuDNLOAD_SYNC;
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- f_dfu->blk_seq_num = w_value;
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- value = handle_dnload(gadget, len);
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+ if (ctrl->bRequestType == USB_DIR_OUT) {
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+ f_dfu->dfu_state = DFU_STATE_dfuDNLOAD_SYNC;
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+ f_dfu->blk_seq_num = w_value;
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+ value = handle_dnload(gadget, len);
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+ }
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break;
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case USB_REQ_DFU_ABORT:
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f_dfu->dfu_state = DFU_STATE_dfuIDLE;
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@@ -511,13 +523,17 @@ static int state_dfu_upload_idle(struct f_dfu *f_dfu,
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u16 len = le16_to_cpu(ctrl->wLength);
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int value = 0;
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+ len = len > DFU_USB_BUFSIZ ? DFU_USB_BUFSIZ : len;
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+
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switch (ctrl->bRequest) {
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case USB_REQ_DFU_UPLOAD:
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- /* state transition if less data then requested */
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- f_dfu->blk_seq_num = w_value;
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- value = handle_upload(req, len);
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- if (value >= 0 && value < len)
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- f_dfu->dfu_state = DFU_STATE_dfuIDLE;
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+ if (ctrl->bRequestType == USB_DIR_IN) {
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+ /* state transition if less data then requested */
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+ f_dfu->blk_seq_num = w_value;
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+ value = handle_upload(req, len);
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+ if (value >= 0 && value < len)
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+ f_dfu->dfu_state = DFU_STATE_dfuIDLE;
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+ }
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break;
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case USB_REQ_DFU_ABORT:
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f_dfu->dfu_state = DFU_STATE_dfuIDLE;
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@@ -593,6 +609,8 @@ dfu_handle(struct usb_function *f, const struct usb_ctrlrequest *ctrl)
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int value = 0;
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u8 req_type = ctrl->bRequestType & USB_TYPE_MASK;
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+ len = len > DFU_USB_BUFSIZ ? DFU_USB_BUFSIZ : len;
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+
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debug("w_value: 0x%x len: 0x%x\n", w_value, len);
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debug("req_type: 0x%x ctrl->bRequest: 0x%x f_dfu->dfu_state: 0x%x\n",
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req_type, ctrl->bRequest, f_dfu->dfu_state);
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@@ -612,7 +630,7 @@ dfu_handle(struct usb_function *f, const struct usb_ctrlrequest *ctrl)
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value = dfu_state[f_dfu->dfu_state] (f_dfu, ctrl, gadget, req);
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if (value >= 0) {
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- req->length = value;
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+ req->length = value > DFU_USB_BUFSIZ ? DFU_USB_BUFSIZ : value;
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req->zero = value < len;
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value = usb_ep_queue(gadget->ep0, req, 0);
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if (value < 0) {
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--
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2.32.0
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66
meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/files/CVE-2022-2347_2.patch
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66
meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/files/CVE-2022-2347_2.patch
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@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
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From 0f465b3e81baa095b62a154a739c5378285526db Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Hugo SIMELIERE <hsimeliere.opensource@witekio.com>
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Date: Wed, 30 Nov 2022 09:29:16 +0100
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Subject: [PATCH 2/2] usb: gadget: dfu: Fix check of transfer direction
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Commit fbce985e28eaca3af82afecc11961aadaf971a7e to fix CVE-2022-2347
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blocks DFU usb requests.
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The verification of the transfer direction was done by an equality
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but it is a bit mask.
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Signed-off-by: Hugo SIMELIERE <hsimeliere.opensource@witekio.com>
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Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <festevam@denx.de>
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Reviewed-by: Sultan Qasim Khan <sultan.qasimkhan@nccgroup.com>
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Reviewed-by: Marek Vasut <marex@denx.de>
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Tested-by: Marek Vasut <marex@denx.de>
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CVE: CVE-2022-2347
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Upstream-Status: Backport [14dc0ab138988a8e45ffa086444ec8db48b3f103]
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Signed-off-by: Sakib Sajal <sakib.sajal@windriver.com>
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---
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drivers/usb/gadget/f_dfu.c | 8 ++++----
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1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/f_dfu.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/f_dfu.c
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index 33ef62f8ba..44877df4ec 100644
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--- a/drivers/usb/gadget/f_dfu.c
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+++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/f_dfu.c
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@@ -325,7 +325,7 @@ static int state_dfu_idle(struct f_dfu *f_dfu,
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switch (ctrl->bRequest) {
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case USB_REQ_DFU_DNLOAD:
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- if (ctrl->bRequestType == USB_DIR_OUT) {
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+ if (!(ctrl->bRequestType & USB_DIR_IN)) {
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if (len == 0) {
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f_dfu->dfu_state = DFU_STATE_dfuERROR;
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value = RET_STALL;
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@@ -337,7 +337,7 @@ static int state_dfu_idle(struct f_dfu *f_dfu,
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}
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break;
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case USB_REQ_DFU_UPLOAD:
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- if (ctrl->bRequestType == USB_DIR_IN) {
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+ if (ctrl->bRequestType & USB_DIR_IN) {
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f_dfu->dfu_state = DFU_STATE_dfuUPLOAD_IDLE;
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f_dfu->blk_seq_num = 0;
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value = handle_upload(req, len);
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@@ -436,7 +436,7 @@ static int state_dfu_dnload_idle(struct f_dfu *f_dfu,
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switch (ctrl->bRequest) {
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case USB_REQ_DFU_DNLOAD:
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- if (ctrl->bRequestType == USB_DIR_OUT) {
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+ if (!(ctrl->bRequestType & USB_DIR_IN)) {
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f_dfu->dfu_state = DFU_STATE_dfuDNLOAD_SYNC;
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f_dfu->blk_seq_num = w_value;
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value = handle_dnload(gadget, len);
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@@ -527,7 +527,7 @@ static int state_dfu_upload_idle(struct f_dfu *f_dfu,
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switch (ctrl->bRequest) {
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case USB_REQ_DFU_UPLOAD:
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- if (ctrl->bRequestType == USB_DIR_IN) {
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+ if (ctrl->bRequestType & USB_DIR_IN) {
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/* state transition if less data then requested */
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f_dfu->blk_seq_num = w_value;
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value = handle_upload(req, len);
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--
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2.32.0
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149
meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/files/CVE-2022-30790.patch
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149
meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/files/CVE-2022-30790.patch
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@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
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From 1817c3824a08bbad7fd2fbae1a6e73be896e8e5e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Rasmus Villemoes <rasmus.villemoes@prevas.dk>
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Date: Fri, 14 Oct 2022 19:43:39 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH] net: (actually/better) deal with CVE-2022-{30790,30552}
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I hit a strange problem with v2022.10: Sometimes my tftp transfer
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would seemingly just hang. It only happened for some files. Moreover,
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changing tftpblocksize from 65464 to 65460 or 65000 made it work again
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for all the files I tried. So I started suspecting it had something to
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do with the file sizes and in particular the way the tftp blocks get
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fragmented and reassembled.
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v2022.01 showed no problems with any of the files or any value of
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tftpblocksize.
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Looking at what had changed in net.c or tftp.c since January showed
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only one remotely interesting thing, b85d130ea0ca.
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So I fired up wireshark on my host to see if somehow one of the
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packets would be too small. But no, with both v2022.01 and v2022.10,
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the exact same sequence of packets were sent, all but the last of size
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1500, and the last being 1280 bytes.
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But then it struck me that 1280 is 5*256, so one of the two bytes
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on-the-wire is 0 and the other is 5, and when then looking at the code
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again the lack of endianness conversion becomes obvious. [ntohs is
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both applied to ip->ip_off just above, as well as to ip->ip_len just a
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little further down when the "len" is actually computed].
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IOWs the current code would falsely reject any packet which happens to
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be a multiple of 256 bytes in size, breaking tftp transfers somewhat
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randomly, and if it did get one of those "malicious" packets with
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ip_len set to, say, 27, it would be seen by this check as being 6912
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and hence not rejected.
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====
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Now, just adding the missing ntohs() would make my initial problem go
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away, in that I can now download the file where the last fragment ends
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up being 1280 bytes. But there's another bug in the code and/or
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analysis: The right-hand side is too strict, in that it is ok for the
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last fragment not to have a multiple of 8 bytes as payload - it really
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must be ok, because nothing in the IP spec says that IP datagrams must
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have a multiple of 8 bytes as payload. And comments in the code also
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mention this.
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To fix that, replace the comparison with <= IP_HDR_SIZE and add
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another check that len is actually a multiple of 8 when the "more
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fragments" bit is set - which it necessarily is for the case where
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offset8 ends up being 0, since we're only called when
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(ip_off & (IP_OFFS | IP_FLAGS_MFRAG)).
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====
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So, does this fix CVE-2022-30790 for real? It certainly correctly
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rejects the POC code which relies on sending a packet of size 27 with
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the MFRAG flag set. Can the attack be carried out with a size 27
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packet that doesn't set MFRAG (hence must set a non-zero fragment
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offset)? I dunno. If we get a packet without MFRAG, we update
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h->last_byte in the hole we've found to be start+len, hence we'd enter
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one of
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if ((h >= thisfrag) && (h->last_byte <= start + len)) {
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or
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} else if (h->last_byte <= start + len) {
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and thus won't reach any of the
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/* overlaps with initial part of the hole: move this hole */
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newh = thisfrag + (len / 8);
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/* fragment sits in the middle: split the hole */
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newh = thisfrag + (len / 8);
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IOW these division are now guaranteed to be exact, and thus I think
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the scenario in CVE-2022-30790 cannot happen anymore.
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====
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However, there's a big elephant in the room, which has always been
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spelled out in the comments, and which makes me believe that one can
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still cause mayhem even with packets whose payloads are all 8-byte
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aligned:
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This code doesn't deal with a fragment that overlaps with two
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different holes (thus being a superset of a previously-received
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fragment).
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Suppose each character below represents 8 bytes, with D being already
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received data, H being a hole descriptor (struct hole), h being
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non-populated chunks, and P representing where the payload of a just
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received packet should go:
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DDDHhhhhDDDDHhhhDDDD
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PPPPPPPPP
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I'm pretty sure in this case we'd end up with h being the first hole,
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enter the simple
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} else if (h->last_byte <= start + len) {
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/* overlaps with final part of the hole: shorten this hole */
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h->last_byte = start;
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case, and thus in the memcpy happily overwrite the second H with our
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chosen payload. This is probably worth fixing...
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Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <rasmus.villemoes@prevas.dk>
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CVE: CVE-2022-30790
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Upstream-Status: Backport [1817c3824a08bbad7fd2fbae1a6e73be896e8e5e]
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Signed-off-by: Sakib Sajal <sakib.sajal@windriver.com>
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---
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net/net.c | 10 +++++++++-
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1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
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diff --git a/net/net.c b/net/net.c
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index 434c3b411e..987c25931e 100644
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--- a/net/net.c
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+++ b/net/net.c
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@@ -924,7 +924,11 @@ static struct ip_udp_hdr *__net_defragment(struct ip_udp_hdr *ip, int *lenp)
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int offset8, start, len, done = 0;
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u16 ip_off = ntohs(ip->ip_off);
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- if (ip->ip_len < IP_MIN_FRAG_DATAGRAM_SIZE)
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+ /*
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+ * Calling code already rejected <, but we don't have to deal
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+ * with an IP fragment with no payload.
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+ */
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+ if (ntohs(ip->ip_len) <= IP_HDR_SIZE)
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return NULL;
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/* payload starts after IP header, this fragment is in there */
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@@ -934,6 +938,10 @@ static struct ip_udp_hdr *__net_defragment(struct ip_udp_hdr *ip, int *lenp)
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start = offset8 * 8;
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len = ntohs(ip->ip_len) - IP_HDR_SIZE;
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+ /* All but last fragment must have a multiple-of-8 payload. */
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+ if ((len & 7) && (ip_off & IP_FLAGS_MFRAG))
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+ return NULL;
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+
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if (start + len > IP_MAXUDP) /* fragment extends too far */
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return NULL;
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--
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2.25.1
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@@ -8,6 +8,9 @@ SRC_URI += " file://0001-riscv32-Use-double-float-ABI-for-rv32.patch \
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file://0001-net-Check-for-the-minimum-IP-fragmented-datagram-siz.patch \
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file://0001-fs-squashfs-Use-kcalloc-when-relevant.patch \
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file://0001-CVE-2022-30767.patch \
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file://CVE-2022-30790.patch \
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file://CVE-2022-2347_1.patch \
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file://CVE-2022-2347_2.patch \
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"
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DEPENDS += "bc-native dtc-native python3-setuptools-native"
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