mirrors/poky
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://git.yoctoproject.org/poky synced 2026-04-23 09:32:17 +02:00
Code Issues Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

busybox: fix CVE-2022-48174

Browse Source 
There is a stack overflow vulnerability in ash.c:6030 in busybox
vbefore 1.35. In the environment of Internet of Vehicles, this
vulnerability can be executed from command to arbitrary code execution.

(From OE-Core rev: 56b90b5f2da661bfac3f2d751fc09e918429ec87)

Signed-off-by: Meenali Gupta <meenali.gupta@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
This commit is contained in:
Meenali Gupta
2023-09-01 11:49:40 +00:00
committed by Steve Sakoman
parent 5bdd860ee5
commit 908738d644
2 changed files with 81 additions and 0 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

80
meta/recipes-core/busybox/busybox/CVE-2022-48174.patch Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
From cf5d0889262e1b04ec2aa4caff2f5da2d602c665 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com>
Date: Mon, 12 Jun 2023 17:48:47 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] busybox: shell: avoid segfault on ${0::0/0~09J}. Closes 15216
function old new delta evaluate_string 1011 1053 +42
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.busybox.net/busybox/commit/?id=d417193cf37ca1005830d7e16f5fa7e1d8a44209]
CVE: CVE-2022-48174
Signed-off-by: Meenali Gupta <meenali.gupta@windriver.com>
---
shell/math.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/shell/math.c b/shell/math.c
index 76d22c9..727c294 100644
--- a/shell/math.c
+++ b/shell/math.c
@@ -577,6 +577,28 @@ static arith_t strto_arith_t(const char *nptr, char **endptr)
# endif
#endif
+//TODO: much better estimation than expr_len/2? Such as:
+//static unsigned estimate_nums_and_names(const char *expr)
+//{
+// unsigned count = 0;
+// while (*(expr = skip_whitespace(expr)) != '\0') {
+// const char *p;
+// if (isdigit(*expr)) {
+// while (isdigit(*++expr))
+// continue;
+// count++;
+// continue;
+// }
+// p = endofname(expr);
+// if (p != expr) {
+// expr = p;
+// count++;
+// continue;
+// }
+// }
+// return count;
+//}
+
static arith_t
evaluate_string(arith_state_t *math_state, const char *expr)
{
@@ -584,10 +606,12 @@ evaluate_string(arith_state_t *math_state, const char *expr)
const char *errmsg;
const char *start_expr = expr = skip_whitespace(expr);
unsigned expr_len = strlen(expr) + 2;
- /* Stack of integers */
- /* The proof that there can be no more than strlen(startbuf)/2+1
- * integers in any given correct or incorrect expression
- * is left as an exercise to the reader. */
+ /* Stack of integers/names */
+ /* There can be no more than strlen(startbuf)/2+1
+ * integers/names in any given correct or incorrect expression.
+ * (modulo "09v09v09v09v09v" case,
+ * but we have code to detect that early)
+ */
var_or_num_t *const numstack = alloca((expr_len / 2) * sizeof(numstack[0]));
var_or_num_t *numstackptr = numstack;
/* Stack of operator tokens */
@@ -652,6 +676,13 @@ evaluate_string(arith_state_t *math_state, const char *expr)
numstackptr->var = NULL;
errno = 0;
numstackptr->val = strto_arith_t(expr, (char**) &expr);
+ /* A number can't be followed by another number, or a variable name.
+ * We'd catch this later anyway, but this would require numstack[]
+ * to be twice as deep to handle strings where _every_ char is
+ * a new number or name. Example: 09v09v09v09v09v09v09v09v09v
+ */
+ if (isalnum(*expr) || *expr == '_')
+ goto err;
//bb_error_msg("val:%lld", numstackptr->val);
if (errno)
numstackptr->val = 0; /* bash compat */
--
2.40.0

1
meta/recipes-core/busybox/busybox_1.35.0.bb
View File

@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://busybox.net/downloads/busybox-${PV}.tar.bz2;name=tarball \
file://0002-nslookup-sanitize-all-printed-strings-with-printable.patch \
file://CVE-2022-30065.patch \
file://0001-devmem-add-128-bit-width.patch \
file://CVE-2022-48174.patch \
"
SRC_URI:append:libc-musl = " file://musl.cfg "