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go: fix CVE-2023-2453
Backport a security fix, can be removed once we have 1.20.2 onwards. (From OE-Core rev: 06df8350c3bc6f56013a0bff20b64cfdbb81cfca) Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
committed by
Richard Purdie
parent
13d4b2a455
commit
985f1b883f
@@ -15,5 +15,6 @@ SRC_URI += "\
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file://0008-src-cmd-dist-buildgo.go-do-not-hardcode-host-compile.patch \
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file://0009-go-Filter-build-paths-on-staticly-linked-arches.patch \
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file://0010-cmd-compile-re-compile-instantiated-generic-methods-.patch \
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file://CVE-2023-24532.patch \
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"
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SRC_URI[main.sha256sum] = "b5c1a3af52c385a6d1c76aed5361cf26459023980d0320de7658bae3915831a2"
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208
meta/recipes-devtools/go/go/CVE-2023-24532.patch
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208
meta/recipes-devtools/go/go/CVE-2023-24532.patch
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@@ -0,0 +1,208 @@
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From 602eeaab387f24a4b28c5eccbb50fa934f3bc3c4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
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Date: Mon, 13 Feb 2023 15:16:27 +0100
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Subject: [PATCH] [release-branch.go1.20] crypto/internal/nistec: reduce P-256
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scalar
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Unlike the rest of nistec, the P-256 assembly doesn't use complete
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addition formulas, meaning that p256PointAdd[Affine]Asm won't return the
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correct value if the two inputs are equal.
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This was (undocumentedly) ignored in the scalar multiplication loops
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because as long as the input point is not the identity and the scalar is
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lower than the order of the group, the addition inputs can't be the same.
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As part of the math/big rewrite, we went however from always reducing
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the scalar to only checking its length, under the incorrect assumption
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that the scalar multiplication loop didn't require reduction.
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Added a reduction, and while at it added it in P256OrdInverse, too, to
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enforce a universal reduction invariant on p256OrdElement values.
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Note that if the input point is the infinity, the code currently still
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relies on undefined behavior, but that's easily tested to behave
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acceptably, and will be addressed in a future CL.
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Updates #58647
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Fixes #58720
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Fixes CVE-2023-24532
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(Filed with the "safe APIs like complete addition formulas are good" dept.)
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Change-Id: I7b2c75238440e6852be2710fad66ff1fdc4e2b24
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Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/471255
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TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
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Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
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Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
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Auto-Submit: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
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Reviewed-by: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
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(cherry picked from commit 203e59ad41bd288e1d92b6f617c2f55e70d3c8e3)
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Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/471695
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Reviewed-by: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@google.com>
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Auto-Submit: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
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Run-TryBot: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
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CVE: CVE-2023-24532
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Upstream-Status: Backport [602eeaab387f24a4b28c5eccbb50fa934f3bc3c4]
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Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com>
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---
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src/crypto/internal/nistec/nistec_test.go | 81 +++++++++++++++++++++++
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src/crypto/internal/nistec/p256_asm.go | 17 +++++
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src/crypto/internal/nistec/p256_ordinv.go | 1 +
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3 files changed, 99 insertions(+)
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diff --git a/src/crypto/internal/nistec/nistec_test.go b/src/crypto/internal/nistec/nistec_test.go
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index 309f68be16a9f..9103608c18a0f 100644
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--- a/src/crypto/internal/nistec/nistec_test.go
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+++ b/src/crypto/internal/nistec/nistec_test.go
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@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import (
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"bytes"
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"crypto/elliptic"
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"crypto/internal/nistec"
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+ "fmt"
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"internal/testenv"
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"math/big"
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"math/rand"
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@@ -165,6 +166,86 @@ func testEquivalents[P nistPoint[P]](t *testing.T, newPoint func() P, c elliptic
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}
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}
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+func TestScalarMult(t *testing.T) {
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+ t.Run("P224", func(t *testing.T) {
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+ testScalarMult(t, nistec.NewP224Point, elliptic.P224())
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+ })
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+ t.Run("P256", func(t *testing.T) {
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+ testScalarMult(t, nistec.NewP256Point, elliptic.P256())
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+ })
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+ t.Run("P384", func(t *testing.T) {
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+ testScalarMult(t, nistec.NewP384Point, elliptic.P384())
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+ })
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+ t.Run("P521", func(t *testing.T) {
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+ testScalarMult(t, nistec.NewP521Point, elliptic.P521())
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+ })
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+}
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+
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+func testScalarMult[P nistPoint[P]](t *testing.T, newPoint func() P, c elliptic.Curve) {
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+ G := newPoint().SetGenerator()
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+ checkScalar := func(t *testing.T, scalar []byte) {
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+ p1, err := newPoint().ScalarBaseMult(scalar)
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+ fatalIfErr(t, err)
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+ p2, err := newPoint().ScalarMult(G, scalar)
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+ fatalIfErr(t, err)
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+ if !bytes.Equal(p1.Bytes(), p2.Bytes()) {
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+ t.Error("[k]G != ScalarBaseMult(k)")
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+ }
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+
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+ d := new(big.Int).SetBytes(scalar)
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+ d.Sub(c.Params().N, d)
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+ d.Mod(d, c.Params().N)
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+ g1, err := newPoint().ScalarBaseMult(d.FillBytes(make([]byte, len(scalar))))
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+ fatalIfErr(t, err)
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+ g1.Add(g1, p1)
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+ if !bytes.Equal(g1.Bytes(), newPoint().Bytes()) {
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+ t.Error("[N - k]G + [k]G != ∞")
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+ }
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+ }
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+
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+ byteLen := len(c.Params().N.Bytes())
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+ bitLen := c.Params().N.BitLen()
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+ t.Run("0", func(t *testing.T) { checkScalar(t, make([]byte, byteLen)) })
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+ t.Run("1", func(t *testing.T) {
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+ checkScalar(t, big.NewInt(1).FillBytes(make([]byte, byteLen)))
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+ })
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+ t.Run("N-1", func(t *testing.T) {
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+ checkScalar(t, new(big.Int).Sub(c.Params().N, big.NewInt(1)).Bytes())
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+ })
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+ t.Run("N", func(t *testing.T) { checkScalar(t, c.Params().N.Bytes()) })
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+ t.Run("N+1", func(t *testing.T) {
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+ checkScalar(t, new(big.Int).Add(c.Params().N, big.NewInt(1)).Bytes())
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+ })
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+ t.Run("all1s", func(t *testing.T) {
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+ s := new(big.Int).Lsh(big.NewInt(1), uint(bitLen))
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+ s.Sub(s, big.NewInt(1))
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+ checkScalar(t, s.Bytes())
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+ })
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+ if testing.Short() {
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+ return
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+ }
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+ for i := 0; i < bitLen; i++ {
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+ t.Run(fmt.Sprintf("1<<%d", i), func(t *testing.T) {
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+ s := new(big.Int).Lsh(big.NewInt(1), uint(i))
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+ checkScalar(t, s.FillBytes(make([]byte, byteLen)))
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+ })
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+ }
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+ // Test N+1...N+32 since they risk overlapping with precomputed table values
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+ // in the final additions.
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+ for i := int64(2); i <= 32; i++ {
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+ t.Run(fmt.Sprintf("N+%d", i), func(t *testing.T) {
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+ checkScalar(t, new(big.Int).Add(c.Params().N, big.NewInt(i)).Bytes())
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+ })
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+ }
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+}
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+
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+func fatalIfErr(t *testing.T, err error) {
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+ t.Helper()
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+ if err != nil {
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+ t.Fatal(err)
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+ }
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+}
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+
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func BenchmarkScalarMult(b *testing.B) {
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b.Run("P224", func(b *testing.B) {
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benchmarkScalarMult(b, nistec.NewP224Point().SetGenerator(), 28)
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diff --git a/src/crypto/internal/nistec/p256_asm.go b/src/crypto/internal/nistec/p256_asm.go
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index 6ea161eb49953..99a22b833f028 100644
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--- a/src/crypto/internal/nistec/p256_asm.go
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+++ b/src/crypto/internal/nistec/p256_asm.go
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@@ -364,6 +364,21 @@ func p256PointDoubleAsm(res, in *P256Point)
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// Montgomery domain (with R 2²⁵⁶) as four uint64 limbs in little-endian order.
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type p256OrdElement [4]uint64
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+// p256OrdReduce ensures s is in the range [0, ord(G)-1].
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+func p256OrdReduce(s *p256OrdElement) {
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+ // Since 2 * ord(G) > 2²⁵⁶, we can just conditionally subtract ord(G),
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+ // keeping the result if it doesn't underflow.
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+ t0, b := bits.Sub64(s[0], 0xf3b9cac2fc632551, 0)
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+ t1, b := bits.Sub64(s[1], 0xbce6faada7179e84, b)
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+ t2, b := bits.Sub64(s[2], 0xffffffffffffffff, b)
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+ t3, b := bits.Sub64(s[3], 0xffffffff00000000, b)
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+ tMask := b - 1 // zero if subtraction underflowed
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+ s[0] ^= (t0 ^ s[0]) & tMask
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+ s[1] ^= (t1 ^ s[1]) & tMask
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+ s[2] ^= (t2 ^ s[2]) & tMask
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+ s[3] ^= (t3 ^ s[3]) & tMask
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+}
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+
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// Add sets q = p1 + p2, and returns q. The points may overlap.
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func (q *P256Point) Add(r1, r2 *P256Point) *P256Point {
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var sum, double P256Point
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@@ -393,6 +408,7 @@ func (r *P256Point) ScalarBaseMult(scalar []byte) (*P256Point, error) {
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}
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scalarReversed := new(p256OrdElement)
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p256OrdBigToLittle(scalarReversed, (*[32]byte)(scalar))
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+ p256OrdReduce(scalarReversed)
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r.p256BaseMult(scalarReversed)
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return r, nil
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@@ -407,6 +423,7 @@ func (r *P256Point) ScalarMult(q *P256Point, scalar []byte) (*P256Point, error)
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}
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scalarReversed := new(p256OrdElement)
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p256OrdBigToLittle(scalarReversed, (*[32]byte)(scalar))
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+ p256OrdReduce(scalarReversed)
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r.Set(q).p256ScalarMult(scalarReversed)
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return r, nil
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diff --git a/src/crypto/internal/nistec/p256_ordinv.go b/src/crypto/internal/nistec/p256_ordinv.go
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index 86a7a230bdce8..1274fb7fd3f5c 100644
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--- a/src/crypto/internal/nistec/p256_ordinv.go
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+++ b/src/crypto/internal/nistec/p256_ordinv.go
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@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ func P256OrdInverse(k []byte) ([]byte, error) {
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x := new(p256OrdElement)
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p256OrdBigToLittle(x, (*[32]byte)(k))
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+ p256OrdReduce(x)
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// Inversion is implemented as exponentiation by n - 2, per Fermat's little theorem.
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//
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