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sudo: fix CVE-2021-3156

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(From OE-Core rev: 2f6c7aae835c75a350686b058fba732005e4c923)

Signed-off-by: Anuj Mittal <anuj.mittal@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
Anuj Mittal
2021-02-06 15:57:55 +08:00
committed by Richard Purdie
parent 9df355c5f1
commit ac41e4a597
6 changed files with 301 additions and 0 deletions
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100
meta/recipes-extended/sudo/files/CVE-2021-3156-1.patch Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
Upstream-Status: Backport[https://www.sudo.ws/repos/sudo/rev/9b97f1787804]
Signed-off-by: Anuj Mittal <anuj.mittal@intel.com>
CVE: CVE-2021-3156
# HG changeset patch
# User Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@sudo.ws>
# Date 1611416639 25200
# Node ID 9b97f1787804aedccaec63c379053b1a91a0e409
# Parent 90aba6ba6e03f3bc33b4eabf16358396ed83642d
Reset valid_flags to MODE_NONINTERACTIVE for sudoedit.
This is consistent with how the -e option is handled.
Also reject -H and -P flags for sudoedit as was done in sudo 1.7.
Found by Qualys, this is part of the fix for CVE-2021-3156.
diff -r 90aba6ba6e03 -r 9b97f1787804 src/parse_args.c
--- a/src/parse_args.c Mon Jan 18 12:30:52 2021 +0100
+++ b/src/parse_args.c Sat Jan 23 08:43:59 2021 -0700
@@ -117,7 +117,10 @@
/*
* Default flags allowed when running a command.
*/
-#define DEFAULT_VALID_FLAGS (MODE_BACKGROUND|MODE_PRESERVE_ENV|MODE_RESET_HOME|MODE_LOGIN_SHELL|MODE_NONINTERACTIVE|MODE_SHELL)
+#define DEFAULT_VALID_FLAGS (MODE_BACKGROUND|MODE_PRESERVE_ENV|MODE_RESET_HOME|MODE_LOGIN_SHELL|MODE_NONINTERACTIVE|MODE_PRESERVE_GROUPS|MODE_SHELL)
+#define EDIT_VALID_FLAGS MODE_NONINTERACTIVE
+#define LIST_VALID_FLAGS (MODE_NONINTERACTIVE|MODE_LONG_LIST)
+#define VALIDATE_VALID_FLAGS MODE_NONINTERACTIVE
/* Option number for the --host long option due to ambiguity of the -h flag. */
#define OPT_HOSTNAME 256
@@ -262,6 +265,7 @@
progname = "sudoedit";
mode = MODE_EDIT;
sudo_settings[ARG_SUDOEDIT].value = "true";
+ valid_flags = EDIT_VALID_FLAGS;
}
/* Load local IP addresses and masks. */
@@ -365,7 +369,7 @@
usage_excl();
mode = MODE_EDIT;
sudo_settings[ARG_SUDOEDIT].value = "true";
- valid_flags = MODE_NONINTERACTIVE;
+ valid_flags = EDIT_VALID_FLAGS;
break;
case 'g':
assert(optarg != NULL);
@@ -377,6 +381,7 @@
break;
case 'H':
sudo_settings[ARG_SET_HOME].value = "true";
+ SET(flags, MODE_RESET_HOME);
break;
case 'h':
if (optarg == NULL) {
@@ -431,7 +436,7 @@
usage_excl();
}
mode = MODE_LIST;
- valid_flags = MODE_NONINTERACTIVE|MODE_LONG_LIST;
+ valid_flags = LIST_VALID_FLAGS;
break;
case 'n':
SET(flags, MODE_NONINTERACTIVE);
@@ -439,6 +444,7 @@
break;
case 'P':
sudo_settings[ARG_PRESERVE_GROUPS].value = "true";
+ SET(flags, MODE_PRESERVE_GROUPS);
break;
case 'p':
/* An empty prompt is allowed. */
@@ -505,7 +511,7 @@
if (mode && mode != MODE_VALIDATE)
usage_excl();
mode = MODE_VALIDATE;
- valid_flags = MODE_NONINTERACTIVE;
+ valid_flags = VALIDATE_VALID_FLAGS;
break;
case 'V':
if (mode && mode != MODE_VERSION)
@@ -533,7 +539,7 @@
if (!mode) {
/* Defer -k mode setting until we know whether it is a flag or not */
if (sudo_settings[ARG_IGNORE_TICKET].value != NULL) {
- if (argc == 0 && !(flags & (MODE_SHELL|MODE_LOGIN_SHELL))) {
+ if (argc == 0 && !ISSET(flags, MODE_SHELL|MODE_LOGIN_SHELL)) {
mode = MODE_INVALIDATE; /* -k by itself */
sudo_settings[ARG_IGNORE_TICKET].value = NULL;
valid_flags = 0;
@@ -601,7 +607,7 @@
/*
* For shell mode we need to rewrite argv
*/
- if (ISSET(mode, MODE_RUN) && ISSET(flags, MODE_SHELL)) {
+ if (ISSET(flags, MODE_SHELL|MODE_LOGIN_SHELL) && ISSET(mode, MODE_RUN)) {
char **av, *cmnd = NULL;
int ac = 1;

53
meta/recipes-extended/sudo/files/CVE-2021-3156-2.patch Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
From 03d04069468d6633be0d6ef6c4adff07620488da Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Anuj Mittal <anuj.mittal@intel.com>
Date: Sat, 6 Feb 2021 15:57:55 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] sudo: fix CVE-2021-3156
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://www.sudo.ws/repos/sudo/rev/a97dc92eae6b]
Signed-off-by: Anuj Mittal <anuj.mittal@intel.com>
CVE: CVE-2021-3156
# HG changeset patch
# User Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@sudo.ws>
# Date 1611416639 25200
# Node ID a97dc92eae6b60ae285055441341d493c17262ff
# Parent 9b97f1787804aedccaec63c379053b1a91a0e409
Add sudoedit flag checks in plugin that are consistent with front-end.
Don't assume the sudo front-end is sending reasonable mode flags.
These checks need to be kept consistent between the sudo front-end
and the sudoers plugin.
---
plugins/sudoers/policy.c | 9 ++++++++-
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/plugins/sudoers/policy.c b/plugins/sudoers/policy.c
index c4749a6..2f18fe1 100644
--- a/plugins/sudoers/policy.c
+++ b/plugins/sudoers/policy.c
@@ -88,10 +88,11 @@ parse_bool(const char *line, int varlen, int *flags, int fval)
int
sudoers_policy_deserialize_info(void *v, char **runas_user, char **runas_group)
{
+ const int edit_mask = MODE_EDIT|MODE_IGNORE_TICKET|MODE_NONINTERACTIVE;
struct sudoers_open_info *info = v;
- char * const *cur;
const char *p, *errstr, *groups = NULL;
const char *remhost = NULL;
+ char * const *cur;
int flags = 0;
debug_decl(sudoers_policy_deserialize_info, SUDOERS_DEBUG_PLUGIN);
@@ -343,6 +344,12 @@ sudoers_policy_deserialize_info(void *v, char **runas_user, char **runas_group)
#endif
}
+ /* Sudo front-end should restrict mode flags for sudoedit. */
+ if (ISSET(flags, MODE_EDIT) && (flags & edit_mask) != flags) {
+ sudo_warnx(U_("invalid mode flags from sudo front end: 0x%x"), flags);
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
user_gid = (gid_t)-1;
user_sid = (pid_t)-1;
user_uid = (gid_t)-1;

73
meta/recipes-extended/sudo/files/CVE-2021-3156-3.patch Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
Upstream-Status: Backport[https://www.sudo.ws/repos/sudo/rev/049ad90590be]
Signed-off-by: Anuj Mittal <anuj.mittal@intel.com>
CVE: CVE-2021-3156
# HG changeset patch
# User Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@sudo.ws>
# Date 1611416639 25200
# Node ID 049ad90590be1e5dfb7df2675d2eb3e37c96ab86
# Parent a97dc92eae6b60ae285055441341d493c17262ff
Fix potential buffer overflow when unescaping backslashes in user_args.
Also, do not try to unescaping backslashes unless in run mode *and*
we are running the command via a shell.
Found by Qualys, this fixes CVE-2021-3156.
diff -r a97dc92eae6b -r 049ad90590be plugins/sudoers/sudoers.c
--- a/plugins/sudoers/sudoers.c Sat Jan 23 08:43:59 2021 -0700
+++ b/plugins/sudoers/sudoers.c Sat Jan 23 08:43:59 2021 -0700
@@ -547,7 +547,7 @@
/* If run as root with SUDO_USER set, set sudo_user.pw to that user. */
/* XXX - causes confusion when root is not listed in sudoers */
- if (sudo_mode & (MODE_RUN | MODE_EDIT) && prev_user != NULL) {
+ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN|MODE_EDIT) && prev_user != NULL) {
if (user_uid == 0 && strcmp(prev_user, "root") != 0) {
struct passwd *pw;
@@ -932,8 +932,8 @@
if (user_cmnd == NULL)
user_cmnd = NewArgv[0];
- if (sudo_mode & (MODE_RUN | MODE_EDIT | MODE_CHECK)) {
- if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN | MODE_CHECK)) {
+ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN|MODE_EDIT|MODE_CHECK)) {
+ if (!ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_EDIT)) {
const char *runchroot = user_runchroot;
if (runchroot == NULL && def_runchroot != NULL &&
strcmp(def_runchroot, "*") != 0)
@@ -961,7 +961,8 @@
sudo_warnx(U_("%s: %s"), __func__, U_("unable to allocate memory"));
debug_return_int(NOT_FOUND_ERROR);
}
- if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_SHELL|MODE_LOGIN_SHELL)) {
+ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_SHELL|MODE_LOGIN_SHELL) &&
+ ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN)) {
/*
* When running a command via a shell, the sudo front-end
* escapes potential meta chars. We unescape non-spaces
@@ -969,10 +970,22 @@
*/
for (to = user_args, av = NewArgv + 1; (from = *av); av++) {
while (*from) {
- if (from[0] == '\\' && !isspace((unsigned char)from[1]))
+ if (from[0] == '\\' && from[1] != '\0' &&
+ !isspace((unsigned char)from[1])) {
from++;
+ }
+ if (size - (to - user_args) < 1) {
+ sudo_warnx(U_("internal error, %s overflow"),
+ __func__);
+ debug_return_int(NOT_FOUND_ERROR);
+ }
*to++ = *from++;
}
+ if (size - (to - user_args) < 1) {
+ sudo_warnx(U_("internal error, %s overflow"),
+ __func__);
+ debug_return_int(NOT_FOUND_ERROR);
+ }
*to++ = ' ';
}
*--to = '\0';

29
meta/recipes-extended/sudo/files/CVE-2021-3156-4.patch Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://www.sudo.ws/repos/sudo/rev/09f98816fc89]
Signed-off-by: Anuj Mittal <anuj.mittal@intel.com>
CVE: CVE-2021-3156
# HG changeset patch
# User Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@sudo.ws>
# Date 1611416640 25200
# Node ID 09f98816fc8978f1d8623a857073d2d5746f0379
# Parent 049ad90590be1e5dfb7df2675d2eb3e37c96ab86
Fix the memset offset when converting a v1 timestamp to TS_LOCKEXCL.
We want to zero the struct starting at flags, not type (which was just set).
Found by Qualys.
diff -r 049ad90590be -r 09f98816fc89 plugins/sudoers/timestamp.c
--- a/plugins/sudoers/timestamp.c Sat Jan 23 08:43:59 2021 -0700
+++ b/plugins/sudoers/timestamp.c Sat Jan 23 08:44:00 2021 -0700
@@ -643,8 +643,8 @@
if (entry.size == sizeof(struct timestamp_entry_v1)) {
/* Old sudo record, convert it to TS_LOCKEXCL. */
entry.type = TS_LOCKEXCL;
- memset((char *)&entry + offsetof(struct timestamp_entry, type), 0,
- nread - offsetof(struct timestamp_entry, type));
+ memset((char *)&entry + offsetof(struct timestamp_entry, flags), 0,
+ nread - offsetof(struct timestamp_entry, flags));
if (ts_write(cookie->fd, cookie->fname, &entry, 0) == -1)
debug_return_bool(false);
} else {

41
meta/recipes-extended/sudo/files/CVE-2021-3156-5.patch Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://www.sudo.ws/repos/sudo/rev/c125fbe68783]
Signed-off-by: Anuj Mittal <anuj.mittal@intel.com>
CVE: CVE-2021-3156
# HG changeset patch
# User Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@sudo.ws>
# Date 1611416640 25200
# Node ID c125fbe6878395d10f01d891d3c09b1229ada404
# Parent 09f98816fc8978f1d8623a857073d2d5746f0379
Don't assume that argv is allocated as a single flat buffer.
While this is how the kernel behaves it is not a portable assumption.
The assumption may also be violated if getopt_long(3) permutes arguments.
Found by Qualys.
diff -r 09f98816fc89 -r c125fbe68783 src/parse_args.c
--- a/src/parse_args.c Sat Jan 23 08:44:00 2021 -0700
+++ b/src/parse_args.c Sat Jan 23 08:44:00 2021 -0700
@@ -614,16 +614,16 @@
if (argc != 0) {
/* shell -c "command" */
char *src, *dst;
- size_t cmnd_size = (size_t) (argv[argc - 1] - argv[0]) +
- strlen(argv[argc - 1]) + 1;
+ size_t size = 0;
- cmnd = dst = reallocarray(NULL, cmnd_size, 2);
- if (cmnd == NULL)
+ for (av = argv; *av != NULL; av++)
+ size += strlen(*av) + 1;
+ if (size == 0 || (cmnd = reallocarray(NULL, size, 2)) == NULL)
sudo_fatalx(U_("%s: %s"), __func__, U_("unable to allocate memory"));
if (!gc_add(GC_PTR, cmnd))
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
- for (av = argv; *av != NULL; av++) {
+ for (dst = cmnd, av = argv; *av != NULL; av++) {
for (src = *av; *src != '\0'; src++) {
/* quote potential meta characters */
if (!isalnum((unsigned char)*src) && *src != '_' && *src != '-' && *src != '$')

5
meta/recipes-extended/sudo/sudo_1.9.3.bb
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@@ -5,6 +5,11 @@ SRC_URI = "https://www.sudo.ws/dist/sudo-${PV}.tar.gz \
file://0001-sudo.conf.in-fix-conflict-with-multilib.patch \
file://CVE-2021-23239.patch \
file://CVE-2021-23240.patch \
file://CVE-2021-3156-1.patch \
file://CVE-2021-3156-2.patch \
file://CVE-2021-3156-3.patch \
file://CVE-2021-3156-4.patch \
file://CVE-2021-3156-5.patch \
"
PAM_SRC_URI = "file://sudo.pam"