qemu: fix and ignore several CVEs

backport fixes:
CVE-2020-13754, backport patches as debian security tracker notes
  https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2020-13754

CVE-2021-3713
CVE-2021-3748
CVE-2021-3930
CVE-2021-4206
CVE-2021-4207
CVE-2022-0216, does not include qtest in patches, the qtest code were not available in v4.2.

Ignore:
CVE-2020-27661, issue introduced in v5.1.0-rc0
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2020-27661

(From OE-Core rev: 16a6e8530c4820f070973a1b4d64764c20706087)

Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
Chee Yang Lee
2022-09-14 14:04:11 +08:00
committed by Richard Purdie
parent 20087e04b3
commit b44d209043
12 changed files with 748 additions and 0 deletions

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@@ -100,6 +100,17 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.qemu.org/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.xz \
file://CVE-2020-13791.patch \
file://CVE-2022-35414.patch \
file://CVE-2020-27821.patch \
file://CVE-2020-13754-1.patch \
file://CVE-2020-13754-2.patch \
file://CVE-2020-13754-3.patch \
file://CVE-2020-13754-4.patch \
file://CVE-2021-3713.patch \
file://CVE-2021-3748.patch \
file://CVE-2021-3930.patch \
file://CVE-2021-4206.patch \
file://CVE-2021-4207.patch \
file://CVE-2022-0216-1.patch \
file://CVE-2022-0216-2.patch \
"
UPSTREAM_CHECK_REGEX = "qemu-(?P<pver>\d+(\.\d+)+)\.tar"
@@ -117,6 +128,9 @@ CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2007-0998"
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1609015#c11
CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2018-18438"
# the issue introduced in v5.1.0-rc0
CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2020-27661"
COMPATIBLE_HOST_mipsarchn32 = "null"
COMPATIBLE_HOST_mipsarchn64 = "null"

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@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
From 5d971f9e672507210e77d020d89e0e89165c8fc9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Jun 2020 09:47:49 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] memory: Revert "memory: accept mismatching sizes in
memory_region_access_valid"
Memory API documentation documents valid .min_access_size and .max_access_size
fields and explains that any access outside these boundaries is blocked.
This is what devices seem to assume.
However this is not what the implementation does: it simply
ignores the boundaries unless there's an "accepts" callback.
Naturally, this breaks a bunch of devices.
Revert to the documented behaviour.
Devices that want to allow any access can just drop the valid field,
or add the impl field to have accesses converted to appropriate
length.
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Fixes: CVE-2020-13754
Fixes: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1842363
Fixes: a014ed07bd5a ("memory: accept mismatching sizes in memory_region_access_valid")
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200610134731.1514409-1-mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=patch;h=5d971f9e672507210e77d020d89e0e89165c8fc9
CVE: CVE-2020-13754
Upstream-Status: Backport
Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
---
memory.c | 29 +++++++++--------------------
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
diff --git a/memory.c b/memory.c
index 2f15a4b..9200b20 100644
--- a/memory.c
+++ b/memory.c
@@ -1352,35 +1352,24 @@ bool memory_region_access_valid(MemoryRegion *mr,
bool is_write,
MemTxAttrs attrs)
{
- int access_size_min, access_size_max;
- int access_size, i;
-
- if (!mr->ops->valid.unaligned && (addr & (size - 1))) {
+ if (mr->ops->valid.accepts
+ && !mr->ops->valid.accepts(mr->opaque, addr, size, is_write, attrs)) {
return false;
}
- if (!mr->ops->valid.accepts) {
- return true;
- }
-
- access_size_min = mr->ops->valid.min_access_size;
- if (!mr->ops->valid.min_access_size) {
- access_size_min = 1;
+ if (!mr->ops->valid.unaligned && (addr & (size - 1))) {
+ return false;
}
- access_size_max = mr->ops->valid.max_access_size;
+ /* Treat zero as compatibility all valid */
if (!mr->ops->valid.max_access_size) {
- access_size_max = 4;
+ return true;
}
- access_size = MAX(MIN(size, access_size_max), access_size_min);
- for (i = 0; i < size; i += access_size) {
- if (!mr->ops->valid.accepts(mr->opaque, addr + i, access_size,
- is_write, attrs)) {
- return false;
- }
+ if (size > mr->ops->valid.max_access_size
+ || size < mr->ops->valid.min_access_size) {
+ return false;
}
-
return true;
}
--
1.8.3.1

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@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
From dba04c3488c4699f5afe96f66e448b1d447cf3fb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
Date: Mon, 20 Jul 2020 19:06:27 +0300
Subject: [PATCH] acpi: accept byte and word access to core ACPI registers
All ISA registers should be accessible as bytes, words or dwords
(if wide enough). Fix the access constraints for acpi-pm-evt,
acpi-pm-tmr & acpi-cnt registers.
Fixes: 5d971f9e67 (memory: Revert "memory: accept mismatching sizes in memory_region_access_valid")
Fixes: afafe4bbe0 (apci: switch cnt to memory api)
Fixes: 77d58b1e47 (apci: switch timer to memory api)
Fixes: b5a7c024d2 (apci: switch evt to memory api)
Buglink: https://lore.kernel.org/xen-devel/20200630170913.123646-1-anthony.perard@citrix.com/T/
Buglink: https://bugs.debian.org/964793
BugLink: https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=964247
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1886318
Reported-By: Simon John <git@the-jedi.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
Message-Id: <20200720160627.15491-1-mjt@msgid.tls.msk.ru>
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=patch;h=dba04c3488c4699f5afe96f66e448b1d447cf3fb
CVE: CVE-2020-13754
Upstream-Status: Backport
Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
---
hw/acpi/core.c | 9 ++++++---
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/hw/acpi/core.c b/hw/acpi/core.c
index f6d9ec4..ac06db3 100644
--- a/hw/acpi/core.c
+++ b/hw/acpi/core.c
@@ -458,7 +458,8 @@ static void acpi_pm_evt_write(void *opaque, hwaddr addr, uint64_t val,
static const MemoryRegionOps acpi_pm_evt_ops = {
.read = acpi_pm_evt_read,
.write = acpi_pm_evt_write,
- .valid.min_access_size = 2,
+ .impl.min_access_size = 2,
+ .valid.min_access_size = 1,
.valid.max_access_size = 2,
.endianness = DEVICE_LITTLE_ENDIAN,
};
@@ -527,7 +528,8 @@ static void acpi_pm_tmr_write(void *opaque, hwaddr addr, uint64_t val,
static const MemoryRegionOps acpi_pm_tmr_ops = {
.read = acpi_pm_tmr_read,
.write = acpi_pm_tmr_write,
- .valid.min_access_size = 4,
+ .impl.min_access_size = 4,
+ .valid.min_access_size = 1,
.valid.max_access_size = 4,
.endianness = DEVICE_LITTLE_ENDIAN,
};
@@ -599,7 +601,8 @@ static void acpi_pm_cnt_write(void *opaque, hwaddr addr, uint64_t val,
static const MemoryRegionOps acpi_pm_cnt_ops = {
.read = acpi_pm_cnt_read,
.write = acpi_pm_cnt_write,
- .valid.min_access_size = 2,
+ .impl.min_access_size = 2,
+ .valid.min_access_size = 1,
.valid.max_access_size = 2,
.endianness = DEVICE_LITTLE_ENDIAN,
};
--
1.8.3.1

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@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
From 8e67fda2dd6202ccec093fda561107ba14830a17 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Laurent Vivier <lvivier@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 21 Jul 2020 10:33:22 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] xhci: fix valid.max_access_size to access address registers
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
QEMU XHCI advertises AC64 (64-bit addressing) but doesn't allow
64-bit mode access in "runtime" and "operational" MemoryRegionOps.
Set the max_access_size based on sizeof(dma_addr_t) as AC64 is set.
XHCI specs:
"If the xHC supports 64-bit addressing (AC64 = â1â), then software
should write 64-bit registers using only Qword accesses. If a
system is incapable of issuing Qword accesses, then writes to the
64-bit address fields shall be performed using 2 Dword accesses;
low Dword-first, high-Dword second. If the xHC supports 32-bit
addressing (AC64 = â0â), then the high Dword of registers containing
64-bit address fields are unused and software should write addresses
using only Dword accesses"
The problem has been detected with SLOF, as linux kernel always accesses
registers using 32-bit access even if AC64 is set and revealed by
5d971f9e6725 ("memory: Revert "memory: accept mismatching sizes in memory_region_access_valid"")
Suggested-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@au1.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <lvivier@redhat.com>
Message-id: 20200721083322.90651-1-lvivier@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=patch;h=8e67fda2dd6202ccec093fda561107ba14830a17
CVE: CVE-2020-13754
Upstream-Status: Backport
Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
---
hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c b/hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c
index b330e36..67a18fe 100644
--- a/hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c
+++ b/hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c
@@ -3184,7 +3184,7 @@ static const MemoryRegionOps xhci_oper_ops = {
.read = xhci_oper_read,
.write = xhci_oper_write,
.valid.min_access_size = 4,
- .valid.max_access_size = 4,
+ .valid.max_access_size = sizeof(dma_addr_t),
.endianness = DEVICE_LITTLE_ENDIAN,
};
@@ -3200,7 +3200,7 @@ static const MemoryRegionOps xhci_runtime_ops = {
.read = xhci_runtime_read,
.write = xhci_runtime_write,
.valid.min_access_size = 4,
- .valid.max_access_size = 4,
+ .valid.max_access_size = sizeof(dma_addr_t),
.endianness = DEVICE_LITTLE_ENDIAN,
};
--
1.8.3.1

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@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
From 70b78d4e71494c90d2ccb40381336bc9b9a22f79 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
Date: Tue, 30 Jun 2020 13:12:11 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] hw/riscv: Allow 64 bit access to SiFive CLINT
Commit 5d971f9e672507210e77d020d89e0e89165c8fc9
"memory: Revert "memory: accept mismatching sizes in
memory_region_access_valid"" broke most RISC-V boards as they do 64 bit
accesses to the CLINT and QEMU would trigger a fault. Fix this failure
by allowing 8 byte accesses.
Signed-off-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: LIU Zhiwei<zhiwei_liu@c-sky.com>
Message-Id: <122b78825b077e4dfd39b444d3a46fe894a7804c.1593547870.git.alistair.francis@wdc.com>
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=patch;h=70b78d4e71494c90d2ccb40381336bc9b9a22f79
CVE: CVE-2020-13754
Upstream-Status: Backport
Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
---
hw/riscv/sifive_clint.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/hw/riscv/sifive_clint.c b/hw/riscv/sifive_clint.c
index b11ffa0..669c21a 100644
--- a/hw/riscv/sifive_clint.c
+++ b/hw/riscv/sifive_clint.c
@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ static const MemoryRegionOps sifive_clint_ops = {
.endianness = DEVICE_LITTLE_ENDIAN,
.valid = {
.min_access_size = 4,
- .max_access_size = 4
+ .max_access_size = 8
}
};
--
1.8.3.1

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@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
From a114d6baedf2cccb454a46d36e399fec1bc3e1c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 2021 14:05:05 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] uas: add stream number sanity checks.
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
The device uses the guest-supplied stream number unchecked, which can
lead to guest-triggered out-of-band access to the UASDevice->data3 and
UASDevice->status3 fields. Add the missing checks.
Fixes: CVE-2021-3713
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Chen Zhe <chenzhe@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Tan Jingguo <tanjingguo@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210818120505.1258262-2-kraxel@redhat.com>
https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/13b250b12ad3c59114a6a17d59caf073ce45b33a
CVE: CVE-2021-3713
Upstream-Status: Backport
Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
---
hw/usb/dev-uas.c | 11 +++++++++++
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
diff --git a/hw/usb/dev-uas.c b/hw/usb/dev-uas.c
index 6d6d1073..0b8cd4dd 100644
--- a/hw/usb/dev-uas.c
+++ b/hw/usb/dev-uas.c
@@ -830,6 +830,9 @@ static void usb_uas_handle_data(USBDevice *dev, USBPacket *p)
}
break;
case UAS_PIPE_ID_STATUS:
+ if (p->stream > UAS_MAX_STREAMS) {
+ goto err_stream;
+ }
if (p->stream) {
QTAILQ_FOREACH(st, &uas->results, next) {
if (st->stream == p->stream) {
@@ -857,6 +860,9 @@ static void usb_uas_handle_data(USBDevice *dev, USBPacket *p)
break;
case UAS_PIPE_ID_DATA_IN:
case UAS_PIPE_ID_DATA_OUT:
+ if (p->stream > UAS_MAX_STREAMS) {
+ goto err_stream;
+ }
if (p->stream) {
req = usb_uas_find_request(uas, p->stream);
} else {
@@ -892,6 +898,11 @@ static void usb_uas_handle_data(USBDevice *dev, USBPacket *p)
p->status = USB_RET_STALL;
break;
}
+
+err_stream:
+ error_report("%s: invalid stream %d", __func__, p->stream);
+ p->status = USB_RET_STALL;
+ return;
}
static void usb_uas_unrealize(USBDevice *dev, Error **errp)

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@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
From bedd7e93d01961fcb16a97ae45d93acf357e11f6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 2 Sep 2021 13:44:12 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] virtio-net: fix use after unmap/free for sg
When mergeable buffer is enabled, we try to set the num_buffers after
the virtqueue elem has been unmapped. This will lead several issues,
E.g a use after free when the descriptor has an address which belongs
to the non direct access region. In this case we use bounce buffer
that is allocated during address_space_map() and freed during
address_space_unmap().
Fixing this by storing the elems temporarily in an array and delay the
unmap after we set the the num_buffers.
This addresses CVE-2021-3748.
Reported-by: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu>
Fixes: fbe78f4f55c6 ("virtio-net support")
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
https://github.com/qemu/qemu/commit/bedd7e93d01961fcb16a97ae45d93acf357e11f6
CVE: CVE-2021-3748
Upstream-Status: Backport
Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
---
hw/net/virtio-net.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/hw/net/virtio-net.c b/hw/net/virtio-net.c
index 16d20cdee52a..f205331dcf8c 100644
--- a/hw/net/virtio-net.c
+++ b/hw/net/virtio-net.c
@@ -1746,10 +1746,13 @@ static ssize_t virtio_net_receive_rcu(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf,
VirtIONet *n = qemu_get_nic_opaque(nc);
VirtIONetQueue *q = virtio_net_get_subqueue(nc);
VirtIODevice *vdev = VIRTIO_DEVICE(n);
+ VirtQueueElement *elems[VIRTQUEUE_MAX_SIZE];
+ size_t lens[VIRTQUEUE_MAX_SIZE];
struct iovec mhdr_sg[VIRTQUEUE_MAX_SIZE];
struct virtio_net_hdr_mrg_rxbuf mhdr;
unsigned mhdr_cnt = 0;
- size_t offset, i, guest_offset;
+ size_t offset, i, guest_offset, j;
+ ssize_t err;
if (!virtio_net_can_receive(nc)) {
return -1;
@@ -1780,6 +1783,12 @@ static ssize_t virtio_net_receive_rcu(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf,
total = 0;
+ if (i == VIRTQUEUE_MAX_SIZE) {
+ virtio_error(vdev, "virtio-net unexpected long buffer chain");
+ err = size;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
elem = virtqueue_pop(q->rx_vq, sizeof(VirtQueueElement));
if (!elem) {
if (i) {
@@ -1791,7 +1800,8 @@ static ssize_t virtio_net_receive_rcu(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf,
n->guest_hdr_len, n->host_hdr_len,
vdev->guest_features);
}
- return -1;
+ err = -1;
+ goto err;
}
if (elem->in_num < 1) {
@@ -1799,7 +1809,8 @@ static ssize_t virtio_net_receive_rcu(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf,
"virtio-net receive queue contains no in buffers");
virtqueue_detach_element(q->rx_vq, elem, 0);
g_free(elem);
- return -1;
+ err = -1;
+ goto err;
}
sg = elem->in_sg;
@@ -1836,12 +1847,13 @@ static ssize_t virtio_net_receive_rcu(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf,
if (!n->mergeable_rx_bufs && offset < size) {
virtqueue_unpop(q->rx_vq, elem, total);
g_free(elem);
- return size;
+ err = size;
+ goto err;
}
- /* signal other side */
- virtqueue_fill(q->rx_vq, elem, total, i++);
- g_free(elem);
+ elems[i] = elem;
+ lens[i] = total;
+ i++;
}
if (mhdr_cnt) {
@@ -1851,10 +1863,23 @@ static ssize_t virtio_net_receive_rcu(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf,
&mhdr.num_buffers, sizeof mhdr.num_buffers);
}
+ for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
+ /* signal other side */
+ virtqueue_fill(q->rx_vq, elems[j], lens[j], j);
+ g_free(elems[j]);
+ }
+
virtqueue_flush(q->rx_vq, i);
virtio_notify(vdev, q->rx_vq);
return size;
+
+err:
+ for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
+ g_free(elems[j]);
+ }
+
+ return err;
}
static ssize_t virtio_net_do_receive(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf,

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@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
From b3af7fdf9cc537f8f0dd3e2423d83f5c99a457e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mauro Matteo Cascella <mcascell@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 4 Nov 2021 17:31:38 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] hw/scsi/scsi-disk: MODE_PAGE_ALLS not allowed in MODE SELECT
commands
This avoids an off-by-one read of 'mode_sense_valid' buffer in
hw/scsi/scsi-disk.c:mode_sense_page().
Fixes: CVE-2021-3930
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Reported-by: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu>
Fixes: a8f4bbe2900 ("scsi-disk: store valid mode pages in a table")
Fixes: #546
Reported-by: Qiuhao Li <Qiuhao.Li@outlook.com>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Matteo Cascella <mcascell@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/b3af7fdf9cc537f8f0dd3e2423d83f5c99a457e8
CVE: CVE-2021-3930
Upstream-Status: Backport
Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
---
hw/scsi/scsi-disk.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/hw/scsi/scsi-disk.c b/hw/scsi/scsi-disk.c
index e8a547dbb7..d4914178ea 100644
--- a/hw/scsi/scsi-disk.c
+++ b/hw/scsi/scsi-disk.c
@@ -1087,6 +1087,7 @@ static int mode_sense_page(SCSIDiskState *s, int page, uint8_t **p_outbuf,
uint8_t *p = *p_outbuf + 2;
int length;
+ assert(page < ARRAY_SIZE(mode_sense_valid));
if ((mode_sense_valid[page] & (1 << s->qdev.type)) == 0) {
return -1;
}
@@ -1428,6 +1429,11 @@ static int scsi_disk_check_mode_select(SCSIDiskState *s, int page,
return -1;
}
+ /* MODE_PAGE_ALLS is only valid for MODE SENSE commands */
+ if (page == MODE_PAGE_ALLS) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
p = mode_current;
memset(mode_current, 0, inlen + 2);
len = mode_sense_page(s, page, &p, 0);
--
GitLab

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@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
From fa892e9abb728e76afcf27323ab29c57fb0fe7aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mauro Matteo Cascella <mcascell@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 7 Apr 2022 10:17:12 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] ui/cursor: fix integer overflow in cursor_alloc
(CVE-2021-4206)
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Prevent potential integer overflow by limiting 'width' and 'height' to
512x512. Also change 'datasize' type to size_t. Refer to security
advisory https://starlabs.sg/advisories/22-4206/ for more information.
Fixes: CVE-2021-4206
Signed-off-by: Mauro Matteo Cascella <mcascell@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220407081712.345609-1-mcascell@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/fa892e9a
CVE: CVE-2021-4206
Upstream-Status: Backport
Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
---
hw/display/qxl-render.c | 7 +++++++
hw/display/vmware_vga.c | 2 ++
ui/cursor.c | 8 +++++++-
3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/hw/display/qxl-render.c b/hw/display/qxl-render.c
index 237ed293ba..ca217004bf 100644
--- a/hw/display/qxl-render.c
+++ b/hw/display/qxl-render.c
@@ -247,6 +247,13 @@ static QEMUCursor *qxl_cursor(PCIQXLDevice *qxl, QXLCursor *cursor,
size_t size;
c = cursor_alloc(cursor->header.width, cursor->header.height);
+
+ if (!c) {
+ qxl_set_guest_bug(qxl, "%s: cursor %ux%u alloc error", __func__,
+ cursor->header.width, cursor->header.height);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
c->hot_x = cursor->header.hot_spot_x;
c->hot_y = cursor->header.hot_spot_y;
switch (cursor->header.type) {
diff --git a/hw/display/vmware_vga.c b/hw/display/vmware_vga.c
index 98c83474ad..45d06cbe25 100644
--- a/hw/display/vmware_vga.c
+++ b/hw/display/vmware_vga.c
@@ -515,6 +515,8 @@ static inline void vmsvga_cursor_define(struct vmsvga_state_s *s,
int i, pixels;
qc = cursor_alloc(c->width, c->height);
+ assert(qc != NULL);
+
qc->hot_x = c->hot_x;
qc->hot_y = c->hot_y;
switch (c->bpp) {
diff --git a/ui/cursor.c b/ui/cursor.c
index 1d62ddd4d0..835f0802f9 100644
--- a/ui/cursor.c
+++ b/ui/cursor.c
@@ -46,6 +46,8 @@ static QEMUCursor *cursor_parse_xpm(const char *xpm[])
/* parse pixel data */
c = cursor_alloc(width, height);
+ assert(c != NULL);
+
for (pixel = 0, y = 0; y < height; y++, line++) {
for (x = 0; x < height; x++, pixel++) {
idx = xpm[line][x];
@@ -91,7 +93,11 @@ QEMUCursor *cursor_builtin_left_ptr(void)
QEMUCursor *cursor_alloc(int width, int height)
{
QEMUCursor *c;
- int datasize = width * height * sizeof(uint32_t);
+ size_t datasize = width * height * sizeof(uint32_t);
+
+ if (width > 512 || height > 512) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
c = g_malloc0(sizeof(QEMUCursor) + datasize);
c->width = width;
--
GitLab

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@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
From 9569f5cb5b4bffa9d3ebc8ba7da1e03830a9a895 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mauro Matteo Cascella <mcascell@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 7 Apr 2022 10:11:06 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] display/qxl-render: fix race condition in qxl_cursor
(CVE-2021-4207)
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Avoid fetching 'width' and 'height' a second time to prevent possible
race condition. Refer to security advisory
https://starlabs.sg/advisories/22-4207/ for more information.
Fixes: CVE-2021-4207
Signed-off-by: Mauro Matteo Cascella <mcascell@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220407081106.343235-1-mcascell@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/9569f5cb
CVE: CVE-2021-4207
Upstream-Status: Backport
Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
---
hw/display/qxl-render.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/hw/display/qxl-render.c b/hw/display/qxl-render.c
index d28849b121..237ed293ba 100644
--- a/hw/display/qxl-render.c
+++ b/hw/display/qxl-render.c
@@ -266,7 +266,7 @@ static QEMUCursor *qxl_cursor(PCIQXLDevice *qxl, QXLCursor *cursor,
}
break;
case SPICE_CURSOR_TYPE_ALPHA:
- size = sizeof(uint32_t) * cursor->header.width * cursor->header.height;
+ size = sizeof(uint32_t) * c->width * c->height;
qxl_unpack_chunks(c->data, size, qxl, &cursor->chunk, group_id);
if (qxl->debug > 2) {
cursor_print_ascii_art(c, "qxl/alpha");
--
GitLab

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@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
From 6c8fa961da5e60f574bb52fd3ad44b1e9e8ad4b8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mauro Matteo Cascella <mcascell@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 5 Jul 2022 22:05:43 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] scsi/lsi53c895a: fix use-after-free in lsi_do_msgout
(CVE-2022-0216)
Set current_req->req to NULL to prevent reusing a free'd buffer in case of
repeated SCSI cancel requests. Thanks to Thomas Huth for suggesting the patch.
Fixes: CVE-2022-0216
Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/972
Signed-off-by: Mauro Matteo Cascella <mcascell@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220705200543.2366809-1-mcascell@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/6c8fa961da5e60f574bb52fd3ad44b1e9e8ad4b8
CVE: CVE-2022-0216
Upstream-Status: Backport
Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
---
hw/scsi/lsi53c895a.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/hw/scsi/lsi53c895a.c b/hw/scsi/lsi53c895a.c
index c8773f73f7..99ea42d49b 100644
--- a/hw/scsi/lsi53c895a.c
+++ b/hw/scsi/lsi53c895a.c
@@ -1028,8 +1028,9 @@ static void lsi_do_msgout(LSIState *s)
case 0x0d:
/* The ABORT TAG message clears the current I/O process only. */
trace_lsi_do_msgout_abort(current_tag);
- if (current_req) {
+ if (current_req && current_req->req) {
scsi_req_cancel(current_req->req);
+ current_req->req = NULL;
}
lsi_disconnect(s);
break;
--
GitLab

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@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
From 4367a20cc442c56b05611b4224de9a61908f9eac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mauro Matteo Cascella <mcascell@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 11 Jul 2022 14:33:16 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] scsi/lsi53c895a: really fix use-after-free in lsi_do_msgout
(CVE-2022-0216)
Set current_req to NULL, not current_req->req, to prevent reusing a free'd
buffer in case of repeated SCSI cancel requests. Also apply the fix to
CLEAR QUEUE and BUS DEVICE RESET messages as well, since they also cancel
the request.
Thanks to Alexander Bulekov for providing a reproducer.
Fixes: CVE-2022-0216
Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/972
Signed-off-by: Mauro Matteo Cascella <mcascell@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu>
Message-Id: <20220711123316.421279-1-mcascell@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/4367a20cc4
CVE: CVE-2022-0216
Upstream-Status: Backport
Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
---
hw/scsi/lsi53c895a.c | 3 +-
1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/hw/scsi/lsi53c895a.c b/hw/scsi/lsi53c895a.c
index 99ea42d49b..ad5f5e5f39 100644
--- a/hw/scsi/lsi53c895a.c
+++ b/hw/scsi/lsi53c895a.c
@@ -1030,7 +1030,7 @@ static void lsi_do_msgout(LSIState *s)
trace_lsi_do_msgout_abort(current_tag);
if (current_req && current_req->req) {
scsi_req_cancel(current_req->req);
- current_req->req = NULL;
+ current_req = NULL;
}
lsi_disconnect(s);
break;
@@ -1056,6 +1056,7 @@ static void lsi_do_msgout(LSIState *s)
/* clear the current I/O process */
if (s->current) {
scsi_req_cancel(s->current->req);
+ current_req = NULL;
}
/* As the current implemented devices scsi_disk and scsi_generic
--
GitLab