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vim: fix for CVE-2026-28421, CVE-2026-41411 & CVE-2026-44656

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Pick patch from [1], [2] & [3] also mentioned at NVD report in [4,5 & 6]

[1] 65c1a143c3
[2] c78194e41d
[3] 190cb3c2b9
[4] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-28421
[5] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41411
[6] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44656

More info :
CVE-2026-28421 - Validate block tree indices and readfile() line bounds.
CVE-2026-41411 - Disallow backticks before attempting to expand filenames.
CVE-2026-44656 - Prevent shell execution from 'path' backticks via modelines.

(From OE-Core rev: 3fe9e5132aab67f1ee3139c88a89d5c6c94313c1)

Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Yoann Congal <yoann.congal@smile.fr>
Signed-off-by: Paul Barker <paul@pbarker.dev>
This commit is contained in:
Hitendra Prajapati
2026-06-30 12:48:56 +05:30
committed by Paul Barker
parent 623f85f957
commit ba66043d77
4 changed files with 356 additions and 0 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

148
meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-28421.patch Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
From 65c1a143c331c886dc28888dd632708f953b4eb3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Christian Brabandt <cb@256bit.org>
Date: Mon, 23 Feb 2026 21:42:39 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] patch 9.2.0077: [security]: Crash when recovering a corrupted
swap file
Problem: memline: a crafted swap files with bogus pe_page_count/pe_bnum
values could cause a multi-GB allocation via mf_get(), and
invalid pe_old_lnum/pe_line_count values could cause a SEGV
when passed to readfile() (ehdgks0627, un3xploitable)
Solution: Add bounds checks on pe_page_count and pe_bnum against
mf_blocknr_max before descending into the block tree, and
validate pe_old_lnum >= 1 and pe_line_count > 0 before calling
readfile().
Github Advisory:
https://github.com/vim/vim/security/advisories/GHSA-r2gw-2x48-jj5p
Signed-off-by: Christian Brabandt <cb@256bit.org>
CVE: CVE-2026-28421
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/65c1a143c331c886dc28888dd632708f953b4eb3]
Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
---
src/memline.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
src/po/vim.pot | 5 ++++-
src/testdir/test_recover.vim | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/memline.c b/src/memline.c
index b93eb0a..15ac203 100644
--- a/src/memline.c
+++ b/src/memline.c
@@ -1597,8 +1597,12 @@ ml_recover(int checkext)
if (!cannot_open)
{
line_count = pp->pb_pointer[idx].pe_line_count;
- if (readfile(curbuf->b_ffname, NULL, lnum,
- pp->pb_pointer[idx].pe_old_lnum - 1,
+ linenr_T pe_old_lnum = pp->pb_pointer[idx].pe_old_lnum;
+ // Validate pe_line_count and pe_old_lnum from the
+ // untrusted swap file before passing to readfile().
+ if (line_count <= 0 || pe_old_lnum < 1 ||
+ readfile(curbuf->b_ffname, NULL, lnum,
+ pe_old_lnum - 1,
line_count, NULL, 0) != OK)
cannot_open = TRUE;
else
@@ -1629,6 +1633,27 @@ ml_recover(int checkext)
bnum = pp->pb_pointer[idx].pe_bnum;
line_count = pp->pb_pointer[idx].pe_line_count;
page_count = pp->pb_pointer[idx].pe_page_count;
+ // Validate pe_bnum and pe_page_count from the untrusted
+ // swap file before passing to mf_get(), which uses
+ // page_count to calculate allocation size. A bogus value
+ // (e.g. 0x40000000) would cause a multi-GB allocation.
+ // pe_page_count must be >= 1 and bnum + page_count must
+ // not exceed the number of pages in the swap file.
+ if (page_count < 1
+ || bnum + page_count > mfp->mf_blocknr_max + 1)
+ {
+ ++error;
+ ml_append(lnum++,
+ (char_u *)_("???ILLEGAL BLOCK NUMBER"),
+ (colnr_T)0, TRUE);
+ // Skip this entry and pop back up the stack to keep
+ // recovering whatever else we can.
+ idx = ip->ip_index + 1;
+ bnum = ip->ip_bnum;
+ page_count = 1;
+ --buf->b_ml.ml_stack_top;
+ continue;
+ }
idx = 0;
continue;
}
diff --git a/src/po/vim.pot b/src/po/vim.pot
index 9608271..be79cf0 100644
--- a/src/po/vim.pot
+++ b/src/po/vim.pot
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ msgid ""
msgstr ""
"Project-Id-Version: Vim\n"
"Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: vim-dev@vim.org\n"
-"POT-Creation-Date: 2026-04-30 12:40+0200\n"
+"POT-Creation-Date: 2026-02-27 21:04+0000\n"
"PO-Revision-Date: YEAR-MO-DA HO:MI+ZONE\n"
"Last-Translator: FULL NAME <EMAIL@ADDRESS>\n"
"Language-Team: LANGUAGE <LL@li.org>\n"
@@ -1960,6 +1960,9 @@ msgstr ""
msgid "???LINES MISSING"
msgstr ""
+msgid "???ILLEGAL BLOCK NUMBER"
+msgstr ""
+
msgid "???BLOCK MISSING"
msgstr ""
diff --git a/src/testdir/test_recover.vim b/src/testdir/test_recover.vim
index db59223..93425f1 100644
--- a/src/testdir/test_recover.vim
+++ b/src/testdir/test_recover.vim
@@ -471,4 +471,41 @@ func Test_noname_buffer()
call assert_equal(['one', 'two'], getline(1, '$'))
endfunc
+" Test for recovering a corrupted swap file, those caused a crash
+func Test_recover_corrupted_swap_file1()
+ CheckUnix
+ " only works correctly on 64bit Unix systems:
+ if v:sizeoflong != 8 || !has('unix')
+ throw 'Skipped: Corrupt Swap file sample requires a 64bit Unix build'
+ endif
+ " Test 1: Heap buffer-overflow
+ new
+ let sample = 'samples/recover-crash1.swp'
+ let target = 'Xpoc1.swp'
+ call filecopy(sample, target)
+ try
+ sil recover! Xpoc1
+ catch /^Vim\%((\S\+)\)\=:E1364:/
+ endtry
+ let content = getline(1, '$')->join()
+ call assert_match('???ILLEGAL BLOCK NUMBER', content)
+ call delete(target)
+ bw!
+"
+" " Test 2: Segfault
+ new
+ let sample = 'samples/recover-crash2.swp'
+ let target = 'Xpoc2.swp'
+ call filecopy(sample, target)
+ try
+ sil recover! Xpoc2
+ catch /^Vim\%((\S\+)\)\=:E1364:/
+ endtry
+ let content = getline(1, '$')->join()
+ call assert_match('???ILLEGAL BLOCK NUMBER', content)
+ call assert_match('???LINES MISSING', content)
+ call delete(target)
+ bw!
+endfunc
+
" vim: shiftwidth=2 sts=2 expandtab
--
2.34.1

75
meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-41411.patch Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
From c78194e41d5a0b05b0ddf383b6679b1503f977fb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Christian Brabandt <cb@256bit.org>
Date: Wed, 15 Apr 2026 20:17:17 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] patch 9.2.0357: [security]: command injection via backticks
in tag files
Problem: [security]: command injection via backticks in tag files
(Srinivas Piskala Ganesh Babu, Andy Ngo)
Solution: Disallow backticks before attempting to expand filenames.
Github Advisory:
https://github.com/vim/vim/security/advisories/GHSA-cwgx-gcj7-6qh8
Supported by AI
Signed-off-by: Christian Brabandt <cb@256bit.org>
CVE: CVE-2026-41411
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/c78194e41d5a0b05b0ddf383b6679b1503f977fb]
Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
---
src/tag.c | 4 +++-
src/testdir/test_tagjump.vim | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/tag.c b/src/tag.c
index d3a7399..0e203f0 100644
--- a/src/tag.c
+++ b/src/tag.c
@@ -4126,8 +4126,10 @@ expand_tag_fname(char_u *fname, char_u *tag_fname, int expand)
/*
* Expand file name (for environment variables) when needed.
+ * Disallow backticks, they could execute arbitrary shell
+ * commands. This is not needed for tag filenames.
*/
- if (expand && mch_has_wildcard(fname))
+ if (expand && mch_has_wildcard(fname) && vim_strchr(fname, '`') == NULL)
{
ExpandInit(&xpc);
xpc.xp_context = EXPAND_FILES;
diff --git a/src/testdir/test_tagjump.vim b/src/testdir/test_tagjump.vim
index 47618d0..a95b8b5 100644
--- a/src/testdir/test_tagjump.vim
+++ b/src/testdir/test_tagjump.vim
@@ -1670,4 +1670,26 @@ func Test_tag_excmd_with_number_vim9script()
bwipe!
endfunc
+" Test that backtick expressions in tag filenames are not expanded.
+" This prevents command injection via malicious tags files.
+func Test_tag_backtick_filename_not_expanded()
+ let pwned_file = 'Xtags_pwnd'
+ call assert_false(filereadable(pwned_file))
+
+ let tagline = "main\t`touch " .. pwned_file .. "`\t/^int main/;\"\tf"
+ call writefile([tagline], 'Xbt_tags', 'D')
+ call writefile(['int main(int argc, char **argv) {', '}'], 'Xbt_main.c', 'D')
+
+ set tags=Xbt_tags
+ sp Xbt_main.c
+
+ " The :tag command should fail to find the file, but must NOT execute
+ " the backtick shell command.
+ call assert_fails('tag main', 'E429:')
+ call assert_false(filereadable(pwned_file))
+
+ set tags&
+ bwipe!
+endfunc
+
" vim: shiftwidth=2 sts=2 expandtab
--
2.34.1

130
meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-44656.patch Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
From 190cb3c2b9c769a3972bcfd991a7b5b6cb771ef0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Christian Brabandt <cb@256bit.org>
Date: Sun, 3 May 2026 16:10:03 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] patch 9.2.0435: [security]: backticks in 'path' may cause
shell execution on completion
Problem: [security]: Backticks enclosed shell commands in the 'path'
option value are executed during completion (q1uf3ng).
Solution: Skip path entries containing backticks, add P_SECURE to 'path'
option, so that it cannot be set from a modeline (for symmetry with
the 'cdpath' option)
Github Advisory:
https://github.com/vim/vim/security/advisories/GHSA-hwg5-3cxw-wvvg
Supported by AI.
Signed-off-by: Christian Brabandt <cb@256bit.org>
CVE: CVE-2026-44656
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/190cb3c2b9c769a3972bcfd991a7b5b6cb771ef0]
Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
---
runtime/doc/options.txt | 5 ++++-
src/findfile.c | 4 ++++
src/optiondefs.h | 2 +-
src/testdir/test_find_complete.vim | 17 +++++++++++++++++
src/testdir/test_modeline.vim | 14 ++++++++++++++
5 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/runtime/doc/options.txt b/runtime/doc/options.txt
index 8dba6f4..d06411f 100644
--- a/runtime/doc/options.txt
+++ b/runtime/doc/options.txt
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-*options.txt* For Vim version 9.1. Last change: 2025 Aug 23
+*options.txt* For Vim version 9.2. Last change: 2026 May 03
VIM REFERENCE MANUAL by Bram Moolenaar
@@ -6615,6 +6615,9 @@ A jump table for the options with a short description can be found at |Q_op|.
< Replace the ';' with a ':' or whatever separator is used. Note that
this doesn't work when $INCL contains a comma or white space.
+ This option cannot be set from a |modeline| or in the |sandbox|, for
+ security reasons.
+
*'perldll'*
'perldll' string (default depends on the build)
global
diff --git a/src/findfile.c b/src/findfile.c
index 008338c..f73a66b 100644
--- a/src/findfile.c
+++ b/src/findfile.c
@@ -2412,6 +2412,10 @@ expand_path_option(
{
buflen = copy_option_part(&path_option, buf, MAXPATHL, " ,");
+ // do not expand backticks, could have been set via a modeline
+ if (vim_strchr(buf, '`') != NULL)
+ continue;
+
if (buf[0] == '.' && (buf[1] == NUL || vim_ispathsep(buf[1])))
{
size_t plen;
diff --git a/src/optiondefs.h b/src/optiondefs.h
index bd02d04..72d3f36 100644
--- a/src/optiondefs.h
+++ b/src/optiondefs.h
@@ -1957,7 +1957,7 @@ static struct vimoption options[] =
(char_u *)&p_pm, PV_NONE,
did_set_backupext_or_patchmode, NULL,
{(char_u *)"", (char_u *)0L} SCTX_INIT},
- {"path", "pa", P_STRING|P_EXPAND|P_VI_DEF|P_COMMA|P_NODUP,
+ {"path", "pa", P_STRING|P_EXPAND|P_VI_DEF|P_SECURE|P_COMMA|P_NODUP,
(char_u *)&p_path, PV_PATH, NULL, NULL,
{
#if defined(AMIGA) || defined(MSWIN)
diff --git a/src/testdir/test_find_complete.vim b/src/testdir/test_find_complete.vim
index 079fb78..8b8b71c 100644
--- a/src/testdir/test_find_complete.vim
+++ b/src/testdir/test_find_complete.vim
@@ -161,4 +161,21 @@ func Test_find_complete()
set path&
endfunc
+" Verify that backticks in 'path' are not executed
+func Test_find_completion_backtick_in_path()
+ CheckUnix
+ CheckExecutable id
+
+ new Xpoc.c
+ setl path+=`id>Xrce_marker`
+ " Triggering completion must not execute the backtick command.
+ call getcompletion('', 'file_in_path')
+ call assert_false(filereadable('Xrce_marker'))
+ call feedkeys(":find \t\n", "xt")
+ call assert_false(filereadable('Xrce_marker'))
+
+ bwipe!
+ call delete('Xrce_marker')
+endfunc
+
" vim: shiftwidth=2 sts=2 expandtab
diff --git a/src/testdir/test_modeline.vim b/src/testdir/test_modeline.vim
index c00032b..fc11cc6 100644
--- a/src/testdir/test_modeline.vim
+++ b/src/testdir/test_modeline.vim
@@ -386,4 +386,18 @@ func Test_modeline_forbidden()
bw!
endfunc
+" Verify that backticks in 'path' set from a modeline are not executed
+func Test_path_modeline()
+ let lines =<< trim END
+ // vim: set path+=foobar :
+ END
+ call writefile(lines, 'Xpoc.c', 'D')
+
+ set nomodelinestrict modeline
+ call assert_fails('split Xpoc.c', 'E520:')
+
+ bwipe!
+ set modelinestrict& modeline&
+endfunc
+
" vim: shiftwidth=2 sts=2 expandtab
--
2.34.1

3
meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc
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@@ -25,6 +25,9 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/vim/vim.git;branch=master;protocol=https \
file://CVE-2026-34982.patch \
file://CVE-2026-34714.patch \
file://CVE-2026-35177.patch \
file://CVE-2026-44656.patch \
file://CVE-2026-41411.patch \
file://CVE-2026-28421.patch \
"
PV .= ".1683"