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qemu: fix CVE-2020-10702/10761/13362/13659/13800
fix these CVE: CVE-2020-10702 CVE-2020-10761 CVE-2020-13362 CVE-2020-13659 CVE-2020-13800 (From OE-Core rev: 98c4642c526259fc664723145a1d6026b491032d) Signed-off-by: Lee Chee Yang <chee.yang.lee@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
Lee Chee Yang
committed by
Richard Purdie
Richard Purdie
parent
2a6fa8877d
commit
bf175f82ce
@@ -39,6 +39,11 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.qemu.org/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.xz \
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file://CVE-2020-11102.patch \
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file://CVE-2020-11869.patch \
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file://CVE-2020-13361.patch \
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file://CVE-2020-10761.patch \
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file://CVE-2020-10702.patch \
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file://CVE-2020-13659.patch \
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file://CVE-2020-13800.patch \
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file://CVE-2020-13362.patch \
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"
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UPSTREAM_CHECK_REGEX = "qemu-(?P<pver>\d+(\.\d+)+)\.tar"
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52
meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-10702.patch
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52
meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-10702.patch
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
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From de0b1bae6461f67243282555475f88b2384a1eb9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Vincent Dehors <vincent.dehors@smile.fr>
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Date: Thu, 23 Jan 2020 15:22:38 +0000
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Subject: [PATCH] target/arm: Fix PAuth sbox functions
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In the PAC computation, sbox was applied over wrong bits.
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As this is a 4-bit sbox, bit index should be incremented by 4 instead of 16.
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Test vector from QARMA paper (https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/444.pdf) was
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used to verify one computation of the pauth_computepac() function which
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uses sbox2.
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Launchpad: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1859713
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Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
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Signed-off-by: Vincent DEHORS <vincent.dehors@smile.fr>
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Signed-off-by: Adrien GRASSEIN <adrien.grassein@smile.fr>
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Message-id: 20200116230809.19078-2-richard.henderson@linaro.org
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Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
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Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
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Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=patch;h=de0b1bae6461f67243282555475f88b2384a1eb9]
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CVE: CVE-2020-10702
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Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
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---
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target/arm/pauth_helper.c | 4 ++--
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1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/target/arm/pauth_helper.c b/target/arm/pauth_helper.c
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index d3194f2..0a5f41e 100644
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--- a/target/arm/pauth_helper.c
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+++ b/target/arm/pauth_helper.c
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@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ static uint64_t pac_sub(uint64_t i)
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uint64_t o = 0;
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int b;
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- for (b = 0; b < 64; b += 16) {
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+ for (b = 0; b < 64; b += 4) {
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o |= (uint64_t)sub[(i >> b) & 0xf] << b;
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}
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return o;
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@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ static uint64_t pac_inv_sub(uint64_t i)
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uint64_t o = 0;
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int b;
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- for (b = 0; b < 64; b += 16) {
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+ for (b = 0; b < 64; b += 4) {
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o |= (uint64_t)inv_sub[(i >> b) & 0xf] << b;
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}
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return o;
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--
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1.8.3.1
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150
meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-10761.patch
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150
meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-10761.patch
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@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
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From 5c4fe018c025740fef4a0a4421e8162db0c3eefd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
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Date: Mon, 8 Jun 2020 13:26:37 -0500
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Subject: [PATCH] nbd/server: Avoid long error message assertions
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CVE-2020-10761
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Ever since commit 36683283 (v2.8), the server code asserts that error
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strings sent to the client are well-formed per the protocol by not
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exceeding the maximum string length of 4096. At the time the server
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first started sending error messages, the assertion could not be
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triggered, because messages were completely under our control.
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However, over the years, we have added latent scenarios where a client
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could trigger the server to attempt an error message that would
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include the client's information if it passed other checks first:
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- requesting NBD_OPT_INFO/GO on an export name that is not present
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(commit 0cfae925 in v2.12 echoes the name)
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- requesting NBD_OPT_LIST/SET_META_CONTEXT on an export name that is
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not present (commit e7b1948d in v2.12 echoes the name)
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At the time, those were still safe because we flagged names larger
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than 256 bytes with a different message; but that changed in commit
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93676c88 (v4.2) when we raised the name limit to 4096 to match the NBD
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string limit. (That commit also failed to change the magic number
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4096 in nbd_negotiate_send_rep_err to the just-introduced named
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constant.) So with that commit, long client names appended to server
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text can now trigger the assertion, and thus be used as a denial of
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service attack against a server. As a mitigating factor, if the
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server requires TLS, the client cannot trigger the problematic paths
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unless it first supplies TLS credentials, and such trusted clients are
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less likely to try to intentionally crash the server.
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We may later want to further sanitize the user-supplied strings we
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place into our error messages, such as scrubbing out control
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characters, but that is less important to the CVE fix, so it can be a
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later patch to the new nbd_sanitize_name.
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Consideration was given to changing the assertion in
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nbd_negotiate_send_rep_verr to instead merely log a server error and
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truncate the message, to avoid leaving a latent path that could
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trigger a future CVE DoS on any new error message. However, this
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merely complicates the code for something that is already (correctly)
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flagging coding errors, and now that we are aware of the long message
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pitfall, we are less likely to introduce such errors in the future,
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which would make such error handling dead code.
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Reported-by: Xueqiang Wei <xuwei@redhat.com>
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CC: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
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Fixes: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/1843684 CVE-2020-10761
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Fixes: 93676c88d7
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Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
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Message-Id: <20200610163741.3745251-2-eblake@redhat.com>
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Reviewed-by: Vladimir Sementsov-Ogievskiy <vsementsov@virtuozzo.com>
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Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/qemu/qemu/commit/5c4fe018c025740fef4a0a4421e8162db0c3eefd]
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CVE: CVE-2020-10761
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Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
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---
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nbd/server.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++---
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tests/qemu-iotests/143 | 4 ++++
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tests/qemu-iotests/143.out | 2 ++
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3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/nbd/server.c b/nbd/server.c
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index 02b1ed08014..20754e9ebc3 100644
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--- a/nbd/server.c
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+++ b/nbd/server.c
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@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ nbd_negotiate_send_rep_verr(NBDClient *client, uint32_t type,
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msg = g_strdup_vprintf(fmt, va);
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len = strlen(msg);
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- assert(len < 4096);
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+ assert(len < NBD_MAX_STRING_SIZE);
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trace_nbd_negotiate_send_rep_err(msg);
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ret = nbd_negotiate_send_rep_len(client, type, len, errp);
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if (ret < 0) {
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@@ -231,6 +231,19 @@ nbd_negotiate_send_rep_verr(NBDClient *client, uint32_t type,
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return 0;
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}
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+/*
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+ * Return a malloc'd copy of @name suitable for use in an error reply.
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+ */
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+static char *
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+nbd_sanitize_name(const char *name)
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+{
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+ if (strnlen(name, 80) < 80) {
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+ return g_strdup(name);
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+ }
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+ /* XXX Should we also try to sanitize any control characters? */
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+ return g_strdup_printf("%.80s...", name);
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+}
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+
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/* Send an error reply.
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* Return -errno on error, 0 on success. */
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static int GCC_FMT_ATTR(4, 5)
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@@ -595,9 +608,11 @@ static int nbd_negotiate_handle_info(NBDClient *client, Error **errp)
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exp = nbd_export_find(name);
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if (!exp) {
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+ g_autofree char *sane_name = nbd_sanitize_name(name);
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+
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return nbd_negotiate_send_rep_err(client, NBD_REP_ERR_UNKNOWN,
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errp, "export '%s' not present",
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- name);
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+ sane_name);
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}
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/* Don't bother sending NBD_INFO_NAME unless client requested it */
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@@ -995,8 +1010,10 @@ static int nbd_negotiate_meta_queries(NBDClient *client,
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meta->exp = nbd_export_find(export_name);
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if (meta->exp == NULL) {
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+ g_autofree char *sane_name = nbd_sanitize_name(export_name);
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+
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return nbd_opt_drop(client, NBD_REP_ERR_UNKNOWN, errp,
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- "export '%s' not present", export_name);
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+ "export '%s' not present", sane_name);
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}
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ret = nbd_opt_read(client, &nb_queries, sizeof(nb_queries), errp);
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diff --git a/tests/qemu-iotests/143 b/tests/qemu-iotests/143
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index f649b361950..d2349903b1b 100755
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--- a/tests/qemu-iotests/143
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+++ b/tests/qemu-iotests/143
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@@ -58,6 +58,10 @@ _send_qemu_cmd $QEMU_HANDLE \
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$QEMU_IO_PROG -f raw -c quit \
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"nbd+unix:///no_such_export?socket=$SOCK_DIR/nbd" 2>&1 \
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| _filter_qemu_io | _filter_nbd
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+# Likewise, with longest possible name permitted in NBD protocol
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+$QEMU_IO_PROG -f raw -c quit \
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+ "nbd+unix:///$(printf %4096d 1 | tr ' ' a)?socket=$SOCK_DIR/nbd" 2>&1 \
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+ | _filter_qemu_io | _filter_nbd | sed 's/aaaa*aa/aa--aa/'
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_send_qemu_cmd $QEMU_HANDLE \
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"{ 'execute': 'quit' }" \
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diff --git a/tests/qemu-iotests/143.out b/tests/qemu-iotests/143.out
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index 1f4001c6013..fc9c0a761fa 100644
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--- a/tests/qemu-iotests/143.out
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+++ b/tests/qemu-iotests/143.out
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@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@ QA output created by 143
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{"return": {}}
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qemu-io: can't open device nbd+unix:///no_such_export?socket=SOCK_DIR/nbd: Requested export not available
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server reported: export 'no_such_export' not present
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+qemu-io: can't open device nbd+unix:///aa--aa1?socket=SOCK_DIR/nbd: Requested export not available
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+server reported: export 'aa--aa...' not present
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{ 'execute': 'quit' }
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{"return": {}}
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{"timestamp": {"seconds": TIMESTAMP, "microseconds": TIMESTAMP}, "event": "SHUTDOWN", "data": {"guest": false, "reason": "host-qmp-quit"}}
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52
meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-13362.patch
Normal file
52
meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-13362.patch
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
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From f50ab86a2620bd7e8507af865b164655ee921661 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
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Date: Thu, 14 May 2020 00:55:38 +0530
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Subject: [PATCH] megasas: use unsigned type for reply_queue_head and check
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index
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A guest user may set 'reply_queue_head' field of MegasasState to
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a negative value. Later in 'megasas_lookup_frame' it is used to
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index into s->frames[] array. Use unsigned type to avoid OOB
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access issue.
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Also check that 'index' value stays within s->frames[] bounds
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through the while() loop in 'megasas_lookup_frame' to avoid OOB
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access.
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Reported-by: Ren Ding <rding@gatech.edu>
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Reported-by: Hanqing Zhao <hanqing@gatech.edu>
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Reported-by: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu>
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Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
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Acked-by: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu>
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Message-Id: <20200513192540.1583887-2-ppandit@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=f50ab86a2620bd7e8507af865b164655ee921661]
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CVE: CVE-2020-13362
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Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
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---
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hw/scsi/megasas.c | 4 ++--
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1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/hw/scsi/megasas.c b/hw/scsi/megasas.c
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index af18c88b656..6ce598cd690 100644
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--- a/hw/scsi/megasas.c
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+++ b/hw/scsi/megasas.c
|
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@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ typedef struct MegasasState {
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uint64_t reply_queue_pa;
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void *reply_queue;
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int reply_queue_len;
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- int reply_queue_head;
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+ uint16_t reply_queue_head;
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int reply_queue_tail;
|
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uint64_t consumer_pa;
|
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uint64_t producer_pa;
|
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@@ -445,7 +445,7 @@ static MegasasCmd *megasas_lookup_frame(MegasasState *s,
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index = s->reply_queue_head;
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- while (num < s->fw_cmds) {
|
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+ while (num < s->fw_cmds && index < MEGASAS_MAX_FRAMES) {
|
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if (s->frames[index].pa && s->frames[index].pa == frame) {
|
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cmd = &s->frames[index];
|
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break;
|
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55
meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-13659.patch
Normal file
55
meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-13659.patch
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
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From 77f55eac6c433e23e82a1b88b2d74f385c4c7d82 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
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From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
|
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Date: Tue, 26 May 2020 16:47:43 +0530
|
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Subject: [PATCH] exec: set map length to zero when returning NULL
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MIME-Version: 1.0
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Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
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When mapping physical memory into host's virtual address space,
|
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'address_space_map' may return NULL if BounceBuffer is in_use.
|
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Set and return '*plen = 0' to avoid later NULL pointer dereference.
|
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|
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Reported-by: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu>
|
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Fixes: https://bugs.launchpad.net/qemu/+bug/1878259
|
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Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
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Suggested-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
|
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Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
|
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Message-Id: <20200526111743.428367-1-ppandit@redhat.com>
|
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Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
|
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Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
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|
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Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/qemu/qemu/commit/77f55eac6c433e23e82a1b88b2d74f385c4c7d82]
|
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CVE: CVE-2020-13659
|
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Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
|
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---
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exec.c | 1 +
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include/exec/memory.h | 3 ++-
|
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2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
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|
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diff --git a/exec.c b/exec.c
|
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index 9cbde85d8c1..778263f1c6a 100644
|
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--- a/exec.c
|
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+++ b/exec.c
|
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@@ -3540,6 +3540,7 @@ void *address_space_map(AddressSpace *as,
|
||||
|
||||
if (!memory_access_is_direct(mr, is_write)) {
|
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if (atomic_xchg(&bounce.in_use, true)) {
|
||||
+ *plen = 0;
|
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return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* Avoid unbounded allocations */
|
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diff --git a/include/exec/memory.h b/include/exec/memory.h
|
||||
index bd7fdd60810..af8ca7824e0 100644
|
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--- a/include/exec/memory.h
|
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+++ b/include/exec/memory.h
|
||||
@@ -2314,7 +2314,8 @@ bool address_space_access_valid(AddressSpace *as, hwaddr addr, hwaddr len,
|
||||
/* address_space_map: map a physical memory region into a host virtual address
|
||||
*
|
||||
* May map a subset of the requested range, given by and returned in @plen.
|
||||
- * May return %NULL if resources needed to perform the mapping are exhausted.
|
||||
+ * May return %NULL and set *@plen to zero(0), if resources needed to perform
|
||||
+ * the mapping are exhausted.
|
||||
* Use only for reads OR writes - not for read-modify-write operations.
|
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* Use cpu_register_map_client() to know when retrying the map operation is
|
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* likely to succeed.
|
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60
meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-13800.patch
Normal file
60
meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-13800.patch
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
|
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From a98610c429d52db0937c1e48659428929835c455 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
|
||||
Date: Thu, 4 Jun 2020 14:38:30 +0530
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH] ati-vga: check mm_index before recursive call
|
||||
(CVE-2020-13800)
|
||||
MIME-Version: 1.0
|
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Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
|
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
|
||||
|
||||
While accessing VGA registers via ati_mm_read/write routines,
|
||||
a guest may set 's->regs.mm_index' such that it leads to infinite
|
||||
recursion. Check mm_index value to avoid such recursion. Log an
|
||||
error message for wrong values.
|
||||
|
||||
Reported-by: Ren Ding <rding@gatech.edu>
|
||||
Reported-by: Hanqing Zhao <hanqing@gatech.edu>
|
||||
Reported-by: Yi Ren <c4tren@gmail.com>
|
||||
Message-id: 20200604090830.33885-1-ppandit@redhat.com
|
||||
Suggested-by: BALATON Zoltan <balaton@eik.bme.hu>
|
||||
Suggested-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
|
||||
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/qemu/qemu/commit/a98610c429d52db0937c1e48659428929835c455]
|
||||
CVE: CVE-2020-13800
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
hw/display/ati.c | 10 ++++++++--
|
||||
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/hw/display/ati.c b/hw/display/ati.c
|
||||
index 065f197678e..67604e68deb 100644
|
||||
--- a/hw/display/ati.c
|
||||
+++ b/hw/display/ati.c
|
||||
@@ -285,8 +285,11 @@ static uint64_t ati_mm_read(void *opaque, hwaddr addr, unsigned int size)
|
||||
if (idx <= s->vga.vram_size - size) {
|
||||
val = ldn_le_p(s->vga.vram_ptr + idx, size);
|
||||
}
|
||||
- } else {
|
||||
+ } else if (s->regs.mm_index > MM_DATA + 3) {
|
||||
val = ati_mm_read(s, s->regs.mm_index + addr - MM_DATA, size);
|
||||
+ } else {
|
||||
+ qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR,
|
||||
+ "ati_mm_read: mm_index too small: %u\n", s->regs.mm_index);
|
||||
}
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case BIOS_0_SCRATCH ... BUS_CNTL - 1:
|
||||
@@ -520,8 +523,11 @@ static void ati_mm_write(void *opaque, hwaddr addr,
|
||||
if (idx <= s->vga.vram_size - size) {
|
||||
stn_le_p(s->vga.vram_ptr + idx, size, data);
|
||||
}
|
||||
- } else {
|
||||
+ } else if (s->regs.mm_index > MM_DATA + 3) {
|
||||
ati_mm_write(s, s->regs.mm_index + addr - MM_DATA, data, size);
|
||||
+ } else {
|
||||
+ qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR,
|
||||
+ "ati_mm_write: mm_index too small: %u\n", s->regs.mm_index);
|
||||
}
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case BIOS_0_SCRATCH ... BUS_CNTL - 1:
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user