openssl: update to 1.0.2i (CVE-2016-6304 and more)

This update fixes several CVEs:
* OCSP Status Request extension unbounded memory growth (CVE-2016-6304)
* SWEET32 Mitigation (CVE-2016-2183)
* OOB write in MDC2_Update() (CVE-2016-6303)
* Malformed SHA512 ticket DoS (CVE-2016-6302)
* OOB write in BN_bn2dec() (CVE-2016-2182)
* OOB read in TS_OBJ_print_bio() (CVE-2016-2180)
* DTLS buffered message DoS (CVE-2016-2179)
* DTLS replay protection DoS (CVE-2016-2181)
* Certificate message OOB reads (CVE-2016-6306)

Of these, only CVE-2016-6304 is considered of high
severity. Everything else is low. CVE-2016-2177 and CVE-2016-2178 were
already fixed via local patches, which can be removed now.

See https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20160922.txt for details.

Some patches had to be refreshed and one compile error fix from
upstream's OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable was required. The server.pem
file is needed for test_dtls.

(From OE-Core rev: d6b69279b5d1370d9c4982d5b1842a471cfd2b0e)

Signed-off-by: Patrick Ohly <patrick.ohly@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
Patrick Ohly
2016-09-23 15:26:05 +02:00
committed by Richard Purdie
parent 2f4b80b306
commit d9e1bb679e
7 changed files with 48 additions and 345 deletions

View File

@@ -211,6 +211,7 @@ do_install_ptest () {
ln -sf ${libdir}/ssl/misc/CA.sh ${D}${PTEST_PATH}/apps
ln -sf ${sysconfdir}/ssl/openssl.cnf ${D}${PTEST_PATH}/apps
ln -sf ${bindir}/openssl ${D}${PTEST_PATH}/apps
cp apps/server.pem ${D}${PTEST_PATH}/apps
cp apps/server2.pem ${D}${PTEST_PATH}/apps
mkdir -p ${D}${PTEST_PATH}/util
install util/opensslwrap.sh ${D}${PTEST_PATH}/util

View File

@@ -1,286 +0,0 @@
From a004e72b95835136d3f1ea90517f706c24c03da7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Date: Thu, 5 May 2016 11:10:26 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Avoid some undefined pointer arithmetic
A common idiom in the codebase is:
if (p + len > limit)
{
return; /* Too long */
}
Where "p" points to some malloc'd data of SIZE bytes and
limit == p + SIZE
"len" here could be from some externally supplied data (e.g. from a TLS
message).
The rules of C pointer arithmetic are such that "p + len" is only well
defined where len <= SIZE. Therefore the above idiom is actually
undefined behaviour.
For example this could cause problems if some malloc implementation
provides an address for "p" such that "p + len" actually overflows for
values of len that are too big and therefore p + len < limit!
Issue reported by Guido Vranken.
CVE-2016-2177
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Upstream-Status: Backport
CVE: CVE-2016-2177
Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
---
ssl/s3_srvr.c | 14 +++++++-------
ssl/ssl_sess.c | 2 +-
ssl/t1_lib.c | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------
3 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)
diff --git a/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
index ab28702..ab7f690 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
@@ -980,7 +980,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- if (p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= d + n) {
+ if (SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= (d + n) - p) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
@@ -998,7 +998,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
/* get the session-id */
j = *(p++);
- if (p + j > d + n) {
+ if ((d + n) - p < j) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
@@ -1054,14 +1054,14 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/* cookie stuff */
- if (p + 1 > d + n) {
+ if ((d + n) - p < 1) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
cookie_len = *(p++);
- if (p + cookie_len > d + n) {
+ if ((d + n ) - p < cookie_len) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
@@ -1131,7 +1131,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
}
}
- if (p + 2 > d + n) {
+ if ((d + n ) - p < 2) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
@@ -1145,7 +1145,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
}
/* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */
- if ((p + i + 1) > (d + n)) {
+ if ((d + n) - p < i + 1) {
/* not enough data */
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
@@ -1211,7 +1211,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
/* compression */
i = *(p++);
- if ((p + i) > (d + n)) {
+ if ((d + n) - p < i) {
/* not enough data */
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_sess.c b/ssl/ssl_sess.c
index b182998..54ee783 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_sess.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_sess.c
@@ -573,7 +573,7 @@ int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
int r;
#endif
- if (session_id + len > limit) {
+ if (limit - session_id < len) {
fatal = 1;
goto err;
}
diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
index fb64607..cdac011 100644
--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -1867,11 +1867,11 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
};
- if (data >= (limit - 2))
+ if (limit - data <= 2)
return;
data += 2;
- if (data > (limit - 4))
+ if (limit - data < 4)
return;
n2s(data, type);
n2s(data, size);
@@ -1879,7 +1879,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
return;
- if (data + size > limit)
+ if (limit - data < size)
return;
data += size;
@@ -1887,7 +1887,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
- if (data + len1 + len2 != limit)
+ if (limit - data != (int)(len1 + len2))
return;
if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
return;
@@ -1896,7 +1896,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
} else {
const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
- if (data + len != limit)
+ if (limit - data != (int)(len))
return;
if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
return;
@@ -2053,19 +2053,19 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
if (data == limit)
goto ri_check;
- if (data > (limit - 2))
+ if (limit - data < 2)
goto err;
n2s(data, len);
- if (data + len != limit)
+ if (limit - data != len)
goto err;
- while (data <= (limit - 4)) {
+ while (limit - data >= 4) {
n2s(data, type);
n2s(data, size);
- if (data + size > (limit))
+ if (limit - data < size)
goto err;
# if 0
fprintf(stderr, "Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size);
@@ -2472,18 +2472,18 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(SSL *s,
if (s->hit || s->cert->srv_ext.meths_count == 0)
return 1;
- if (data >= limit - 2)
+ if (limit - data <= 2)
return 1;
n2s(data, len);
- if (data > limit - len)
+ if (limit - data < len)
return 1;
- while (data <= limit - 4) {
+ while (limit - data >= 4) {
n2s(data, type);
n2s(data, size);
- if (data + size > limit)
+ if (limit - data < size)
return 1;
if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1 /* server */ , type, data, size, al) <= 0)
return 0;
@@ -2569,20 +2569,20 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
# endif
- if (data >= (d + n - 2))
+ if ((d + n) - data <= 2)
goto ri_check;
n2s(data, length);
- if (data + length != d + n) {
+ if ((d + n) - data != length) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
- while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
+ while ((d + n) - data >= 4) {
n2s(data, type);
n2s(data, size);
- if (data + size > (d + n))
+ if ((d + n) - data < size)
goto ri_check;
if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
@@ -3307,29 +3307,33 @@ int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
/* Skip past DTLS cookie */
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
i = *(p++);
- p += i;
- if (p >= limit)
+
+ if (limit - p <= i)
return -1;
+
+ p += i;
}
/* Skip past cipher list */
n2s(p, i);
- p += i;
- if (p >= limit)
+ if (limit - p <= i)
return -1;
+ p += i;
+
/* Skip past compression algorithm list */
i = *(p++);
- p += i;
- if (p > limit)
+ if (limit - p < i)
return -1;
+ p += i;
+
/* Now at start of extensions */
- if ((p + 2) >= limit)
+ if (limit - p <= 2)
return 0;
n2s(p, i);
- while ((p + 4) <= limit) {
+ while (limit - p >= 4) {
unsigned short type, size;
n2s(p, type);
n2s(p, size);
- if (p + size > limit)
+ if (limit - p < size)
return 0;
if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
int r;
--
2.3.5

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@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
From 399944622df7bd81af62e67ea967c470534090e2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Cesar Pereida <cesar.pereida@aalto.fi>
Date: Mon, 23 May 2016 12:45:25 +0300
Subject: [PATCH] Fix DSA, preserve BN_FLG_CONSTTIME
Operations in the DSA signing algorithm should run in constant time in
order to avoid side channel attacks. A flaw in the OpenSSL DSA
implementation means that a non-constant time codepath is followed for
certain operations. This has been demonstrated through a cache-timing
attack to be sufficient for an attacker to recover the private DSA key.
CVE-2016-2178
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Upstream-Status: Backport
CVE: CVE-2016-2178
Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
---
crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c | 9 +++++----
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
Index: openssl-1.0.2h/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-1.0.2h.orig/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
+++ openssl-1.0.2h/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
@@ -248,9 +248,6 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_C
if (!BN_rand_range(&k, dsa->q))
goto err;
while (BN_is_zero(&k)) ;
- if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) {
- BN_set_flags(&k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- }
if (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) {
if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dsa->method_mont_p,
@@ -282,6 +279,11 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_C
} else {
K = &k;
}
+
+ if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) {
+ BN_set_flags(K, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ }
+
DSA_BN_MOD_EXP(goto err, dsa, r, dsa->g, K, dsa->p, ctx,
dsa->method_mont_p);
if (!BN_mod(r, r, dsa->q, ctx))

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@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
From 581215a519c66db7255ea360ed25bb00033ccd52 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Date: Thu, 22 Sep 2016 08:47:45 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] Fix typo introduced by a03f81f4
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/581215a519c66db7255ea360ed25bb00033ccd52]
Signed-off-by: Patrick Ohly <patrick.ohly@intel.com>
---
crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c b/crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c
index 65a74df..2a2b95c 100644
--- a/crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c
+++ b/crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c
@@ -939,7 +939,7 @@ static int cryptodev_digest_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from)
if (fstate->mac_len != 0) {
if (fstate->mac_data != NULL) {
dstate->mac_data = OPENSSL_malloc(fstate->mac_len);
- if (dstate->ac_data == NULL) {
+ if (dstate->mac_data == NULL) {
printf("cryptodev_digest_init: malloc failed\n");
return 0;
}
--
2.1.4

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@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ Index: openssl-0.9.8m/apps/CA.pl.in
@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@
foreach (@ARGV) {
if ( /^(-\?|-h|-help)$/ ) {
print STDERR "usage: CA -newcert|-newreq|-newreq-nodes|-newca|-sign|-verify\n";
print STDERR "usage: CA -newcert|-newreq|-newreq-nodes|-newca|-sign|-signcert|-verify\n";
+ print STDERR "usage: CA -signcert certfile keyfile|-newcert|-newreq|-newca|-sign|-verify\n";
exit 0;
} elsif (/^-newcert$/) {

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@@ -6,6 +6,9 @@ https://gitweb.gentoo.org/repo/gentoo.git/plain/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-1
Upstream-Status: Pending
Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com>
Refreshed for 1.0.2i
Signed-off-by: Patrick Ohly <patrick.ohly@intel.com>
--- openssl-1.0.2g/crypto/Makefile
+++ openssl-1.0.2g/crypto/Makefile
@@ -85,11 +85,11 @@
@@ -133,7 +136,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com>
fi; \
--- openssl-1.0.2g/test/Makefile
+++ openssl-1.0.2g/test/Makefile
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@
@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@
tags:
ctags $(SRC)
@@ -142,7 +145,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com>
apps:
@(cd ..; $(MAKE) DIRS=apps all)
@@ -421,130 +421,130 @@
@@ -438,136 +438,136 @@
link_app.$${shlib_target}
$(RSATEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(RSATEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
@@ -309,13 +312,21 @@ Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com>
- @target=$(CLIENTHELLOTEST) $(BUILD_CMD)
+ +@target=$(CLIENTHELLOTEST) $(BUILD_CMD)
$(BADDTLSTEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(BADDTLSTEST).o
- @target=$(BADDTLSTEST) $(BUILD_CMD)
+ +@target=$(BADDTLSTEST) $(BUILD_CMD)
$(SSLV2CONFTEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(SSLV2CONFTEST).o
- @target=$(SSLV2CONFTEST) $(BUILD_CMD)
+ +@target=$(SSLV2CONFTEST) $(BUILD_CMD)
$(DTLSTEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(DTLSTEST).o ssltestlib.o $(DLIBSSL) $(DLIBCRYPTO)
- @target=$(DTLSTEST); exobj=ssltestlib.o; $(BUILD_CMD)
+ +@target=$(DTLSTEST); exobj=ssltestlib.o; $(BUILD_CMD)
#$(AESTEST).o: $(AESTEST).c
# $(CC) -c $(CFLAGS) -DINTERMEDIATE_VALUE_KAT -DTRACE_KAT_MCT $(AESTEST).c
@@ -557,7 +557,7 @@
@@ -580,6 +580,6 @@
# fi
dummytest$(EXE_EXT): dummytest.o $(DLIBCRYPTO)

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@@ -39,12 +39,11 @@ SRC_URI += "file://find.pl;subdir=${BP}/util/ \
file://ptest_makefile_deps.patch \
file://configure-musl-target.patch \
file://parallel.patch \
file://CVE-2016-2177.patch \
file://CVE-2016-2178.patch \
file://openssl-util-perlpath.pl-cwd.patch \
file://Fix-typo-introduced-by-a03f81f4.patch \
"
SRC_URI[md5sum] = "9392e65072ce4b614c1392eefc1f23d0"
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "1d4007e53aad94a5b2002fe045ee7bb0b3d98f1a47f8b2bc851dcd1c74332919"
SRC_URI[md5sum] = "678374e63f8df456a697d3e5e5a931fb"
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "9287487d11c9545b6efb287cdb70535d4e9b284dd10d51441d9b9963d000de6f"
PACKAGES =+ "${PN}-engines"
FILES_${PN}-engines = "${libdir}/ssl/engines/*.so ${libdir}/engines"