xwayland: Fix CVE-2026-34002

Pick patch according to [2]

[1] https://lists.x.org/archives/xorg-announce/2026-April/003679.html
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-34002

(From OE-Core rev: 0df72cf8effda9d82088062aa57159df2b197945)

Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Yoann Congal <yoann.congal@smile.fr>
Signed-off-by: Paul Barker <paul@pbarker.dev>
This commit is contained in:
Vijay Anusuri
2026-06-19 19:37:49 +05:30
committed by Paul Barker
parent f54d73ee0d
commit e28bf42780
2 changed files with 94 additions and 0 deletions

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@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
From f056ce1cc96ed9261052c31524162c78e458f98c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 18 Feb 2026 17:02:09 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] xkb: Fix out-of-bounds read in CheckModifierMap()
As reported by valgrind:
== Conditional jump or move depends on uninitialised value(s)
== at 0x547E5B: CheckModifierMap (xkb.c:1972)
== by 0x54A086: _XkbSetMapChecks (xkb.c:2574)
== by 0x54A845: ProcXkbSetMap (xkb.c:2741)
== by 0x556EF4: ProcXkbDispatch (xkb.c:7048)
== by 0x454A8C: Dispatch (dispatch.c:553)
== by 0x462CEB: dix_main (main.c:274)
== by 0x405EA7: main (stubmain.c:34)
== Uninitialised value was created by a heap allocation
== at 0x4840B26: malloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:447)
== by 0x592D5A: AllocateInputBuffer (io.c:981)
== by 0x591F77: InsertFakeRequest (io.c:516)
== by 0x45CA27: NextAvailableClient (dispatch.c:3629)
== by 0x58FA81: AllocNewConnection (connection.c:628)
== by 0x58FC70: EstablishNewConnections (connection.c:692)
== by 0x58FFAA: HandleNotifyFd (connection.c:809)
== by 0x593F42: ospoll_wait (ospoll.c:660)
== by 0x58B9B6: WaitForSomething (WaitFor.c:208)
== by 0x4548AC: Dispatch (dispatch.c:493)
== by 0x462CEB: dix_main (main.c:274)
== by 0x405EA7: main (stubmain.c:34)
The issue is that the loop in CheckModifierMap() reads from wire without
verifying that the data is within the request bounds.
The req->totalModMapKeys value could exceed the actual data provided,
causing reads of uninitialized memory.
To fix that issue, we add a bounds check using _XkbCheckRequestBounds,
but for that, we need to also pass a ClientPtr parameter, which is not
a problem since CheckModifierMap() is a private, static function.
CVE-2026-34002, ZDI-CAN-28737
This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/2176>
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/commit/f056ce1cc96ed9261052c31524162c78e458f98c]
CVE: CVE-2026-34002
Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
---
xkb/xkb.c | 10 +++++++---
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xkb/xkb.c b/xkb/xkb.c
index 1ba638b..3fcc6c4 100644
--- a/xkb/xkb.c
+++ b/xkb/xkb.c
@@ -1940,8 +1940,8 @@ CheckKeyExplicit(XkbDescPtr xkb,
}
static int
-CheckModifierMap(XkbDescPtr xkb, xkbSetMapReq * req, CARD8 **wireRtrn,
- int *errRtrn)
+CheckModifierMap(ClientPtr client, XkbDescPtr xkb, xkbSetMapReq * req,
+ CARD8 **wireRtrn, int *errRtrn)
{
register CARD8 *wire = *wireRtrn;
CARD8 *start;
@@ -1965,6 +1965,10 @@ CheckModifierMap(XkbDescPtr xkb, xkbSetMapReq * req, CARD8 **wireRtrn,
}
start = wire;
for (i = 0; i < req->totalModMapKeys; i++, wire += 2) {
+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, req, wire, wire + 2)) {
+ *errRtrn = _XkbErrCode3(0x64, req->totalModMapKeys, i);
+ return 0;
+ }
if ((wire[0] < first) || (wire[0] > last)) {
*errRtrn = _XkbErrCode4(0x63, first, last, wire[0]);
return 0;
@@ -2568,7 +2572,7 @@ _XkbSetMapChecks(ClientPtr client, DeviceIntPtr dev, xkbSetMapReq * req,
return BadValue;
}
if ((req->present & XkbModifierMapMask) &&
- (!CheckModifierMap(xkb, req, (CARD8 **) &values, &error))) {
+ (!CheckModifierMap(client, xkb, req, (CARD8 **) &values, &error))) {
client->errorValue = error;
return BadValue;
}
--
2.43.0

View File

@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://www.x.org/archive/individual/xserver/xwayland-${PV}.tar.xz \
file://CVE-2026-33999.patch \
file://CVE-2026-34000.patch \
file://CVE-2026-34001.patch \
file://CVE-2026-34002.patch \
"
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "33ec7ff2687a59faaa52b9b09aa8caf118e7ecb6aed8953f526a625ff9f4bd90"