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git: Security fix CVE-2015-7545

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CVE-2015-7545 git: arbitrary code execution via crafted URLs

(From OE-Core rev: 1e0780427bad448c5b3644134b581ecf1d53af84)

Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
Armin Kuster
2016-01-31 14:27:05 -08:00
committed by Richard Purdie
parent 108ea6d05f
commit e8c96131d9
6 changed files with 897 additions and 0 deletions
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446
meta/recipes-devtools/git/git-2.5.0/0008-CVE-2015-7545-1.patch Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,446 @@
From a5adaced2e13c135d5d9cc65be9eb95aa3bacedf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2015 13:12:52 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] transport: add a protocol-whitelist environment variable
If we are cloning an untrusted remote repository into a
sandbox, we may also want to fetch remote submodules in
order to get the complete view as intended by the other
side. However, that opens us up to attacks where a malicious
user gets us to clone something they would not otherwise
have access to (this is not necessarily a problem by itself,
but we may then act on the cloned contents in a way that
exposes them to the attacker).
Ideally such a setup would sandbox git entirely away from
high-value items, but this is not always practical or easy
to set up (e.g., OS network controls may block multiple
protocols, and we would want to enable some but not others).
We can help this case by providing a way to restrict
particular protocols. We use a whitelist in the environment.
This is more annoying to set up than a blacklist, but
defaults to safety if the set of protocols git supports
grows). If no whitelist is specified, we continue to default
to allowing all protocols (this is an "unsafe" default, but
since the minority of users will want this sandboxing
effect, it is the only sensible one).
A note on the tests: ideally these would all be in a single
test file, but the git-daemon and httpd test infrastructure
is an all-or-nothing proposition rather than a test-by-test
prerequisite. By putting them all together, we would be
unable to test the file-local code on machines without
apache.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Upstream-Status: Backport
http://archive.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/pool/main/g/git/git_2.5.0-1ubuntu0.1.debian.tar.xz
CVE: CVE-2015-7545 #1
Singed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
---
Documentation/git.txt | 32 ++++++++++++++
connect.c | 5 +++
t/lib-proto-disable.sh | 96 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
t/t5810-proto-disable-local.sh | 14 ++++++
t/t5811-proto-disable-git.sh | 20 +++++++++
t/t5812-proto-disable-http.sh | 20 +++++++++
t/t5813-proto-disable-ssh.sh | 20 +++++++++
t/t5814-proto-disable-ext.sh | 18 ++++++++
transport-helper.c | 2 +
transport.c | 21 ++++++++-
transport.h | 7 +++
11 files changed, 254 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 t/lib-proto-disable.sh
create mode 100755 t/t5810-proto-disable-local.sh
create mode 100755 t/t5811-proto-disable-git.sh
create mode 100755 t/t5812-proto-disable-http.sh
create mode 100755 t/t5813-proto-disable-ssh.sh
create mode 100755 t/t5814-proto-disable-ext.sh
Index: git-2.5.0/Documentation/git.txt
===================================================================
--- git-2.5.0.orig/Documentation/git.txt 2015-12-11 12:46:48.975637719 -0500
+++ git-2.5.0/Documentation/git.txt 2015-12-11 12:46:48.967637661 -0500
@@ -1069,6 +1069,38 @@
an operation has touched every ref (e.g., because you are
cloning a repository to make a backup).
+`GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL`::
+ If set, provide a colon-separated list of protocols which are
+ allowed to be used with fetch/push/clone. This is useful to
+ restrict recursive submodule initialization from an untrusted
+ repository. Any protocol not mentioned will be disallowed (i.e.,
+ this is a whitelist, not a blacklist). If the variable is not
+ set at all, all protocols are enabled. The protocol names
+ currently used by git are:
+
+ - `file`: any local file-based path (including `file://` URLs,
+ or local paths)
+
+ - `git`: the anonymous git protocol over a direct TCP
+ connection (or proxy, if configured)
+
+ - `ssh`: git over ssh (including `host:path` syntax,
+ `git+ssh://`, etc).
+
+ - `rsync`: git over rsync
+
+ - `http`: git over http, both "smart http" and "dumb http".
+ Note that this does _not_ include `https`; if you want both,
+ you should specify both as `http:https`.
+
+ - any external helpers are named by their protocol (e.g., use
+ `hg` to allow the `git-remote-hg` helper)
++
+Note that this controls only git's internal protocol selection.
+If libcurl is used (e.g., by the `http` transport), it may
+redirect to other protocols. There is not currently any way to
+restrict this.
+
Discussion[[Discussion]]
------------------------
Index: git-2.5.0/connect.c
===================================================================
--- git-2.5.0.orig/connect.c 2015-12-11 12:46:48.975637719 -0500
+++ git-2.5.0/connect.c 2015-12-11 12:46:48.967637661 -0500
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
#include "url.h"
#include "string-list.h"
#include "sha1-array.h"
+#include "transport.h"
static char *server_capabilities;
static const char *parse_feature_value(const char *, const char *, int *);
@@ -694,6 +695,8 @@
else
target_host = xstrdup(hostandport);
+ transport_check_allowed("git");
+
/* These underlying connection commands die() if they
* cannot connect.
*/
@@ -727,6 +730,7 @@
int putty, tortoiseplink = 0;
char *ssh_host = hostandport;
const char *port = NULL;
+ transport_check_allowed("ssh");
get_host_and_port(&ssh_host, &port);
if (!port)
@@ -781,6 +785,7 @@
/* remove repo-local variables from the environment */
conn->env = local_repo_env;
conn->use_shell = 1;
+ transport_check_allowed("file");
}
argv_array_push(&conn->args, cmd.buf);
Index: git-2.5.0/t/lib-proto-disable.sh
===================================================================
--- /dev/null 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000
+++ git-2.5.0/t/lib-proto-disable.sh 2015-12-11 12:46:48.967637661 -0500
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+# Test routines for checking protocol disabling.
+
+# test cloning a particular protocol
+# $1 - description of the protocol
+# $2 - machine-readable name of the protocol
+# $3 - the URL to try cloning
+test_proto () {
+ desc=$1
+ proto=$2
+ url=$3
+
+ test_expect_success "clone $1 (enabled)" '
+ rm -rf tmp.git &&
+ (
+ GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL=$proto &&
+ export GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL &&
+ git clone --bare "$url" tmp.git
+ )
+ '
+
+ test_expect_success "fetch $1 (enabled)" '
+ (
+ cd tmp.git &&
+ GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL=$proto &&
+ export GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL &&
+ git fetch
+ )
+ '
+
+ test_expect_success "push $1 (enabled)" '
+ (
+ cd tmp.git &&
+ GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL=$proto &&
+ export GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL &&
+ git push origin HEAD:pushed
+ )
+ '
+
+ test_expect_success "push $1 (disabled)" '
+ (
+ cd tmp.git &&
+ GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL=none &&
+ export GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL &&
+ test_must_fail git push origin HEAD:pushed
+ )
+ '
+
+ test_expect_success "fetch $1 (disabled)" '
+ (
+ cd tmp.git &&
+ GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL=none &&
+ export GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL &&
+ test_must_fail git fetch
+ )
+ '
+
+ test_expect_success "clone $1 (disabled)" '
+ rm -rf tmp.git &&
+ (
+ GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL=none &&
+ export GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL &&
+ test_must_fail git clone --bare "$url" tmp.git
+ )
+ '
+}
+
+# set up an ssh wrapper that will access $host/$repo in the
+# trash directory, and enable it for subsequent tests.
+setup_ssh_wrapper () {
+ test_expect_success 'setup ssh wrapper' '
+ write_script ssh-wrapper <<-\EOF &&
+ echo >&2 "ssh: $*"
+ host=$1; shift
+ cd "$TRASH_DIRECTORY/$host" &&
+ eval "$*"
+ EOF
+ GIT_SSH="$PWD/ssh-wrapper" &&
+ export GIT_SSH &&
+ export TRASH_DIRECTORY
+ '
+}
+
+# set up a wrapper that can be used with remote-ext to
+# access repositories in the "remote" directory of trash-dir,
+# like "ext::fake-remote %S repo.git"
+setup_ext_wrapper () {
+ test_expect_success 'setup ext wrapper' '
+ write_script fake-remote <<-\EOF &&
+ echo >&2 "fake-remote: $*"
+ cd "$TRASH_DIRECTORY/remote" &&
+ eval "$*"
+ EOF
+ PATH=$TRASH_DIRECTORY:$PATH &&
+ export TRASH_DIRECTORY
+ '
+}
Index: git-2.5.0/t/t5810-proto-disable-local.sh
===================================================================
--- /dev/null 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000
+++ git-2.5.0/t/t5810-proto-disable-local.sh 2015-12-11 12:46:48.967637661 -0500
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+test_description='test disabling of local paths in clone/fetch'
+. ./test-lib.sh
+. "$TEST_DIRECTORY/lib-proto-disable.sh"
+
+test_expect_success 'setup repository to clone' '
+ test_commit one
+'
+
+test_proto "file://" file "file://$PWD"
+test_proto "path" file .
+
+test_done
Index: git-2.5.0/t/t5811-proto-disable-git.sh
===================================================================
--- /dev/null 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000
+++ git-2.5.0/t/t5811-proto-disable-git.sh 2015-12-11 12:46:48.967637661 -0500
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+test_description='test disabling of git-over-tcp in clone/fetch'
+. ./test-lib.sh
+. "$TEST_DIRECTORY/lib-proto-disable.sh"
+. "$TEST_DIRECTORY/lib-git-daemon.sh"
+start_git_daemon
+
+test_expect_success 'create git-accessible repo' '
+ bare="$GIT_DAEMON_DOCUMENT_ROOT_PATH/repo.git" &&
+ test_commit one &&
+ git --bare init "$bare" &&
+ git push "$bare" HEAD &&
+ >"$bare/git-daemon-export-ok" &&
+ git -C "$bare" config daemon.receivepack true
+'
+
+test_proto "git://" git "$GIT_DAEMON_URL/repo.git"
+
+test_done
Index: git-2.5.0/t/t5812-proto-disable-http.sh
===================================================================
--- /dev/null 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000
+++ git-2.5.0/t/t5812-proto-disable-http.sh 2015-12-11 12:46:48.967637661 -0500
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+test_description='test disabling of git-over-http in clone/fetch'
+. ./test-lib.sh
+. "$TEST_DIRECTORY/lib-proto-disable.sh"
+. "$TEST_DIRECTORY/lib-httpd.sh"
+start_httpd
+
+test_expect_success 'create git-accessible repo' '
+ bare="$HTTPD_DOCUMENT_ROOT_PATH/repo.git" &&
+ test_commit one &&
+ git --bare init "$bare" &&
+ git push "$bare" HEAD &&
+ git -C "$bare" config http.receivepack true
+'
+
+test_proto "smart http" http "$HTTPD_URL/smart/repo.git"
+
+stop_httpd
+test_done
Index: git-2.5.0/t/t5813-proto-disable-ssh.sh
===================================================================
--- /dev/null 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000
+++ git-2.5.0/t/t5813-proto-disable-ssh.sh 2015-12-11 12:46:48.967637661 -0500
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+test_description='test disabling of git-over-ssh in clone/fetch'
+. ./test-lib.sh
+. "$TEST_DIRECTORY/lib-proto-disable.sh"
+
+setup_ssh_wrapper
+
+test_expect_success 'setup repository to clone' '
+ test_commit one &&
+ mkdir remote &&
+ git init --bare remote/repo.git &&
+ git push remote/repo.git HEAD
+'
+
+test_proto "host:path" ssh "remote:repo.git"
+test_proto "ssh://" ssh "ssh://remote/$PWD/remote/repo.git"
+test_proto "git+ssh://" ssh "git+ssh://remote/$PWD/remote/repo.git"
+
+test_done
Index: git-2.5.0/t/t5814-proto-disable-ext.sh
===================================================================
--- /dev/null 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000
+++ git-2.5.0/t/t5814-proto-disable-ext.sh 2015-12-11 12:46:48.967637661 -0500
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+test_description='test disabling of remote-helper paths in clone/fetch'
+. ./test-lib.sh
+. "$TEST_DIRECTORY/lib-proto-disable.sh"
+
+setup_ext_wrapper
+
+test_expect_success 'setup repository to clone' '
+ test_commit one &&
+ mkdir remote &&
+ git init --bare remote/repo.git &&
+ git push remote/repo.git HEAD
+'
+
+test_proto "remote-helper" ext "ext::fake-remote %S repo.git"
+
+test_done
Index: git-2.5.0/transport-helper.c
===================================================================
--- git-2.5.0.orig/transport-helper.c 2015-12-11 12:46:48.975637719 -0500
+++ git-2.5.0/transport-helper.c 2015-12-11 12:46:48.967637661 -0500
@@ -1039,6 +1039,8 @@
struct helper_data *data = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*data));
data->name = name;
+ transport_check_allowed(name);
+
if (getenv("GIT_TRANSPORT_HELPER_DEBUG"))
debug = 1;
Index: git-2.5.0/transport.c
===================================================================
--- git-2.5.0.orig/transport.c 2015-12-11 12:46:48.975637719 -0500
+++ git-2.5.0/transport.c 2015-12-11 12:46:48.967637661 -0500
@@ -912,6 +912,20 @@
return strchr(url, ':') - url;
}
+void transport_check_allowed(const char *type)
+{
+ struct string_list allowed = STRING_LIST_INIT_DUP;
+ const char *v = getenv("GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL");
+
+ if (!v)
+ return;
+
+ string_list_split(&allowed, v, ':', -1);
+ if (!unsorted_string_list_has_string(&allowed, type))
+ die("transport '%s' not allowed", type);
+ string_list_clear(&allowed, 0);
+}
+
struct transport *transport_get(struct remote *remote, const char *url)
{
const char *helper;
@@ -943,12 +957,14 @@
if (helper) {
transport_helper_init(ret, helper);
} else if (starts_with(url, "rsync:")) {
+ transport_check_allowed("rsync");
ret->get_refs_list = get_refs_via_rsync;
ret->fetch = fetch_objs_via_rsync;
ret->push = rsync_transport_push;
ret->smart_options = NULL;
} else if (url_is_local_not_ssh(url) && is_file(url) && is_bundle(url, 1)) {
struct bundle_transport_data *data = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*data));
+ transport_check_allowed("file");
ret->data = data;
ret->get_refs_list = get_refs_from_bundle;
ret->fetch = fetch_refs_from_bundle;
@@ -960,7 +976,10 @@
|| starts_with(url, "ssh://")
|| starts_with(url, "git+ssh://")
|| starts_with(url, "ssh+git://")) {
- /* These are builtin smart transports. */
+ /*
+ * These are builtin smart transports; "allowed" transports
+ * will be checked individually in git_connect.
+ */
struct git_transport_data *data = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*data));
ret->data = data;
ret->set_option = NULL;
Index: git-2.5.0/transport.h
===================================================================
--- git-2.5.0.orig/transport.h 2015-12-11 12:46:48.975637719 -0500
+++ git-2.5.0/transport.h 2015-12-11 12:46:48.971637690 -0500
@@ -133,6 +133,13 @@
/* Returns a transport suitable for the url */
struct transport *transport_get(struct remote *, const char *);
+/*
+ * Check whether a transport is allowed by the environment,
+ * and die otherwise. type should generally be the URL scheme,
+ * as described in Documentation/git.txt
+ */
+void transport_check_allowed(const char *type);
+
/* Transport options which apply to git:// and scp-style URLs */
/* The program to use on the remote side to send a pack */

112
meta/recipes-devtools/git/git-2.5.0/0009-CVE-2015-7545-2.patch Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
From 33cfccbbf35a56e190b79bdec5c85457c952a021 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2015 13:13:12 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] submodule: allow only certain protocols for submodule fetches
Some protocols (like git-remote-ext) can execute arbitrary
code found in the URL. The URLs that submodules use may come
from arbitrary sources (e.g., .gitmodules files in a remote
repository). Let's restrict submodules to fetching from a
known-good subset of protocols.
Note that we apply this restriction to all submodule
commands, whether the URL comes from .gitmodules or not.
This is more restrictive than we need to be; for example, in
the tests we run:
git submodule add ext::...
which should be trusted, as the URL comes directly from the
command line provided by the user. But doing it this way is
simpler, and makes it much less likely that we would miss a
case. And since such protocols should be an exception
(especially because nobody who clones from them will be able
to update the submodules!), it's not likely to inconvenience
anyone in practice.
Reported-by: Blake Burkhart <bburky@bburky.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Upstream-Status: Backport
http://archive.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/pool/main/g/git/git_2.5.0-1ubuntu0.1.debian.tar.xz
CVE: CVE-2015-7545 #2
Singed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
---
git-submodule.sh | 9 +++++++++
t/t5815-submodule-protos.sh | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 52 insertions(+)
create mode 100755 t/t5815-submodule-protos.sh
diff --git a/git-submodule.sh b/git-submodule.sh
index 36797c3..78c2740 100755
--- a/git-submodule.sh
+++ b/git-submodule.sh
@@ -22,6 +22,15 @@ require_work_tree
wt_prefix=$(git rev-parse --show-prefix)
cd_to_toplevel
+# Restrict ourselves to a vanilla subset of protocols; the URLs
+# we get are under control of a remote repository, and we do not
+# want them kicking off arbitrary git-remote-* programs.
+#
+# If the user has already specified a set of allowed protocols,
+# we assume they know what they're doing and use that instead.
+: ${GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL=file:git:http:https:ssh}
+export GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL
+
command=
branch=
force=
diff --git a/t/t5815-submodule-protos.sh b/t/t5815-submodule-protos.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..06f55a1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/t/t5815-submodule-protos.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+test_description='test protocol whitelisting with submodules'
+. ./test-lib.sh
+. "$TEST_DIRECTORY"/lib-proto-disable.sh
+
+setup_ext_wrapper
+setup_ssh_wrapper
+
+test_expect_success 'setup repository with submodules' '
+ mkdir remote &&
+ git init remote/repo.git &&
+ (cd remote/repo.git && test_commit one) &&
+ # submodule-add should probably trust what we feed it on the cmdline,
+ # but its implementation is overly conservative.
+ GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL=ssh git submodule add remote:repo.git ssh-module &&
+ GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL=ext git submodule add "ext::fake-remote %S repo.git" ext-module &&
+ git commit -m "add submodules"
+'
+
+test_expect_success 'clone with recurse-submodules fails' '
+ test_must_fail git clone --recurse-submodules . dst
+'
+
+test_expect_success 'setup individual updates' '
+ rm -rf dst &&
+ git clone . dst &&
+ git -C dst submodule init
+'
+
+test_expect_success 'update of ssh allowed' '
+ git -C dst submodule update ssh-module
+'
+
+test_expect_success 'update of ext not allowed' '
+ test_must_fail git -C dst submodule update ext-module
+'
+
+test_expect_success 'user can override whitelist' '
+ GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL=ext git -C dst submodule update ext-module
+'
+
+test_done

112
meta/recipes-devtools/git/git-2.5.0/0010-CVE-2015-7545-3.patch Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
From 5088d3b38775f8ac12d7f77636775b16059b67ef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Date: Tue, 22 Sep 2015 18:03:49 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] transport: refactor protocol whitelist code
The current callers only want to die when their transport is
prohibited. But future callers want to query the mechanism
without dying.
Let's break out a few query functions, and also save the
results in a static list so we don't have to re-parse for
each query.
Based-on-a-patch-by: Blake Burkhart <bburky@bburky.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Upstream-Status: Backport
http://archive.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/pool/main/g/git/git_2.5.0-1ubuntu0.1.debian.tar.xz
CVE: CVE-2015-7545 #3
Singed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
---
transport.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
transport.h | 15 +++++++++++++--
2 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
Index: git-2.5.0/transport.c
===================================================================
--- git-2.5.0.orig/transport.c 2015-12-11 12:47:09.547784038 -0500
+++ git-2.5.0/transport.c 2015-12-11 12:47:09.543784009 -0500
@@ -912,18 +912,40 @@
return strchr(url, ':') - url;
}
-void transport_check_allowed(const char *type)
+static const struct string_list *protocol_whitelist(void)
{
- struct string_list allowed = STRING_LIST_INIT_DUP;
- const char *v = getenv("GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL");
+ static int enabled = -1;
+ static struct string_list allowed = STRING_LIST_INIT_DUP;
+
+ if (enabled < 0) {
+ const char *v = getenv("GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL");
+ if (v) {
+ string_list_split(&allowed, v, ':', -1);
+ string_list_sort(&allowed);
+ enabled = 1;
+ } else {
+ enabled = 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return enabled ? &allowed : NULL;
+}
- if (!v)
- return;
+int is_transport_allowed(const char *type)
+{
+ const struct string_list *allowed = protocol_whitelist();
+ return !allowed || string_list_has_string(allowed, type);
+}
- string_list_split(&allowed, v, ':', -1);
- if (!unsorted_string_list_has_string(&allowed, type))
+void transport_check_allowed(const char *type)
+{
+ if (!is_transport_allowed(type))
die("transport '%s' not allowed", type);
- string_list_clear(&allowed, 0);
+}
+
+int transport_restrict_protocols(void)
+{
+ return !!protocol_whitelist();
}
struct transport *transport_get(struct remote *remote, const char *url)
Index: git-2.5.0/transport.h
===================================================================
--- git-2.5.0.orig/transport.h 2015-12-11 12:47:09.547784038 -0500
+++ git-2.5.0/transport.h 2015-12-11 12:47:09.543784009 -0500
@@ -134,12 +134,23 @@
struct transport *transport_get(struct remote *, const char *);
/*
+ * Check whether a transport is allowed by the environment. Type should
+ * generally be the URL scheme, as described in Documentation/git.txt
+ */
+int is_transport_allowed(const char *type);
+
+/*
* Check whether a transport is allowed by the environment,
- * and die otherwise. type should generally be the URL scheme,
- * as described in Documentation/git.txt
+ * and die otherwise.
*/
void transport_check_allowed(const char *type);
+/*
+ * Returns true if the user has attempted to turn on protocol
+ * restrictions at all.
+ */
+int transport_restrict_protocols(void);
+
/* Transport options which apply to git:// and scp-style URLs */
/* The program to use on the remote side to send a pack */

150
meta/recipes-devtools/git/git-2.5.0/0011-CVE-2015-7545-4.patch Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
Backport of:
From f4113cac0c88b4f36ee6f3abf3218034440a68e3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Blake Burkhart <bburky@bburky.com>
Date: Tue, 22 Sep 2015 18:06:04 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] http: limit redirection to protocol-whitelist
Previously, libcurl would follow redirection to any protocol
it was compiled for support with. This is desirable to allow
redirection from HTTP to HTTPS. However, it would even
successfully allow redirection from HTTP to SFTP, a protocol
that git does not otherwise support at all. Furthermore
git's new protocol-whitelisting could be bypassed by
following a redirect within the remote helper, as it was
only enforced at transport selection time.
This patch limits redirects within libcurl to HTTP, HTTPS,
FTP and FTPS. If there is a protocol-whitelist present, this
list is limited to those also allowed by the whitelist. As
redirection happens from within libcurl, it is impossible
for an HTTP redirect to a protocol implemented within
another remote helper.
When the curl version git was compiled with is too old to
support restrictions on protocol redirection, we warn the
user if GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL restrictions were requested. This
is a little inaccurate, as even without that variable in the
environment, we would still restrict SFTP, etc, and we do
not warn in that case. But anything else means we would
literally warn every time git accesses an http remote.
This commit includes a test, but it is not as robust as we
would hope. It redirects an http request to ftp, and checks
that curl complained about the protocol, which means that we
are relying on curl's specific error message to know what
happened. Ideally we would redirect to a working ftp server
and confirm that we can clone without protocol restrictions,
and not with them. But we do not have a portable way of
providing an ftp server, nor any other protocol that curl
supports (https is the closest, but we would have to deal
with certificates).
[jk: added test and version warning]
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Upstream-Status: Backport
http://archive.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/pool/main/g/git/git_2.5.0-1ubuntu0.1.debian.tar.xz
CVE: CVE-2015-7545 #4
Singed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
---
Documentation/git.txt | 5 -----
http.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
t/lib-httpd/apache.conf | 1 +
t/t5812-proto-disable-http.sh | 9 +++++++++
4 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
Index: git-2.5.0/Documentation/git.txt
===================================================================
--- git-2.5.0.orig/Documentation/git.txt 2015-12-11 12:47:18.707849212 -0500
+++ git-2.5.0/Documentation/git.txt 2015-12-11 12:47:18.703849183 -0500
@@ -1095,11 +1095,6 @@
- any external helpers are named by their protocol (e.g., use
`hg` to allow the `git-remote-hg` helper)
-+
-Note that this controls only git's internal protocol selection.
-If libcurl is used (e.g., by the `http` transport), it may
-redirect to other protocols. There is not currently any way to
-restrict this.
Discussion[[Discussion]]
Index: git-2.5.0/http.c
===================================================================
--- git-2.5.0.orig/http.c 2015-12-11 12:47:18.707849212 -0500
+++ git-2.5.0/http.c 2015-12-11 12:47:34.171959268 -0500
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
#include "credential.h"
#include "version.h"
#include "pkt-line.h"
+#include "transport.h"
#include "gettext.h"
int active_requests;
@@ -340,6 +341,7 @@
static CURL *get_curl_handle(void)
{
CURL *result = curl_easy_init();
+ long allowed_protocols = 0;
if (!result)
die("curl_easy_init failed");
@@ -399,6 +401,21 @@
#elif LIBCURL_VERSION_NUM >= 0x071101
curl_easy_setopt(result, CURLOPT_POST301, 1);
#endif
+#if LIBCURL_VERSION_NUM >= 0x071304
+ if (is_transport_allowed("http"))
+ allowed_protocols |= CURLPROTO_HTTP;
+ if (is_transport_allowed("https"))
+ allowed_protocols |= CURLPROTO_HTTPS;
+ if (is_transport_allowed("ftp"))
+ allowed_protocols |= CURLPROTO_FTP;
+ if (is_transport_allowed("ftps"))
+ allowed_protocols |= CURLPROTO_FTPS;
+ curl_easy_setopt(result, CURLOPT_REDIR_PROTOCOLS, allowed_protocols);
+#else
+ if (transport_restrict_protocols())
+ warning("protocol restrictions not applied to curl redirects because\n"
+ "your curl version is too old (>= 7.19.4)");
+#endif
if (getenv("GIT_CURL_VERBOSE"))
curl_easy_setopt(result, CURLOPT_VERBOSE, 1);
Index: git-2.5.0/t/lib-httpd/apache.conf
===================================================================
--- git-2.5.0.orig/t/lib-httpd/apache.conf 2015-12-11 12:47:18.707849212 -0500
+++ git-2.5.0/t/lib-httpd/apache.conf 2015-12-11 12:47:18.703849183 -0500
@@ -119,6 +119,7 @@
RewriteRule ^/smart-redir-temp/(.*)$ /smart/$1 [R=302]
RewriteRule ^/smart-redir-auth/(.*)$ /auth/smart/$1 [R=301]
RewriteRule ^/smart-redir-limited/(.*)/info/refs$ /smart/$1/info/refs [R=301]
+RewriteRule ^/ftp-redir/(.*)$ ftp://localhost:1000/$1 [R=302]
<IfDefine SSL>
LoadModule ssl_module modules/mod_ssl.so
Index: git-2.5.0/t/t5812-proto-disable-http.sh
===================================================================
--- git-2.5.0.orig/t/t5812-proto-disable-http.sh 2015-12-11 12:47:18.707849212 -0500
+++ git-2.5.0/t/t5812-proto-disable-http.sh 2015-12-11 12:47:18.703849183 -0500
@@ -16,5 +16,14 @@
test_proto "smart http" http "$HTTPD_URL/smart/repo.git"
+test_expect_success 'curl redirects respect whitelist' '
+ test_must_fail env GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL=http:https \
+ git clone "$HTTPD_URL/ftp-redir/repo.git" 2>stderr &&
+ {
+ test_i18ngrep "ftp.*disabled" stderr ||
+ test_i18ngrep "your curl version is too old"
+ }
+'
+
stop_httpd
test_done

69
meta/recipes-devtools/git/git-2.5.0/0012-CVE-2015-7545-5.patch Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
From b258116462399b318c86165c61a5c7123043cfd4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Blake Burkhart <bburky@bburky.com>
Date: Tue, 22 Sep 2015 18:06:20 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] http: limit redirection depth
By default, libcurl will follow circular http redirects
forever. Let's put a cap on this so that somebody who can
trigger an automated fetch of an arbitrary repository (e.g.,
for CI) cannot convince git to loop infinitely.
The value chosen is 20, which is the same default that
Firefox uses.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Upstream-Status: Backport
http://archive.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/pool/main/g/git/git_2.5.0-1ubuntu0.1.debian.tar.xz
CVE: CVE-2015-7545 #5
Singed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
---
http.c | 1 +
t/lib-httpd/apache.conf | 3 +++
t/t5812-proto-disable-http.sh | 4 ++++
3 files changed, 8 insertions(+)
Index: git-2.5.0/http.c
===================================================================
--- git-2.5.0.orig/http.c 2015-12-11 12:48:02.900163824 -0500
+++ git-2.5.0/http.c 2015-12-11 12:48:02.896163796 -0500
@@ -396,6 +396,7 @@
}
curl_easy_setopt(result, CURLOPT_FOLLOWLOCATION, 1);
+ curl_easy_setopt(result, CURLOPT_MAXREDIRS, 20);
#if LIBCURL_VERSION_NUM >= 0x071301
curl_easy_setopt(result, CURLOPT_POSTREDIR, CURL_REDIR_POST_ALL);
#elif LIBCURL_VERSION_NUM >= 0x071101
Index: git-2.5.0/t/lib-httpd/apache.conf
===================================================================
--- git-2.5.0.orig/t/lib-httpd/apache.conf 2015-12-11 12:48:02.900163824 -0500
+++ git-2.5.0/t/lib-httpd/apache.conf 2015-12-11 12:48:02.896163796 -0500
@@ -121,6 +121,9 @@
RewriteRule ^/smart-redir-limited/(.*)/info/refs$ /smart/$1/info/refs [R=301]
RewriteRule ^/ftp-redir/(.*)$ ftp://localhost:1000/$1 [R=302]
+RewriteRule ^/loop-redir/x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-(.*) /$1 [R=302]
+RewriteRule ^/loop-redir/(.*)$ /loop-redir/x-$1 [R=302]
+
<IfDefine SSL>
LoadModule ssl_module modules/mod_ssl.so
Index: git-2.5.0/t/t5812-proto-disable-http.sh
===================================================================
--- git-2.5.0.orig/t/t5812-proto-disable-http.sh 2015-12-11 12:48:02.900163824 -0500
+++ git-2.5.0/t/t5812-proto-disable-http.sh 2015-12-11 12:48:02.896163796 -0500
@@ -25,5 +25,9 @@
}
'
+test_expect_success 'curl limits redirects' '
+ test_must_fail git clone "$HTTPD_URL/loop-redir/smart/repo.git"
+'
+
stop_httpd
test_done

8
meta/recipes-devtools/git/git_2.5.0.bb
View File

@@ -9,3 +9,11 @@ SRC_URI[tarball.md5sum] = "3bc9b0a803ae8ec6c5316cc64f0b7f78"
SRC_URI[tarball.sha256sum] = "8fa13ba8434ff83d24f57f831d55dbb9046434c266641180a37744facfce72ac"
SRC_URI[manpages.md5sum] = "134b049e51420a336049aac21c88a75a"
SRC_URI[manpages.sha256sum] = "745e4e797fe5061e781c880d370b1beb480199127da5acaf4e376e0b09d4d685"
SRC_URI += "\
file://0008-CVE-2015-7545-1.patch \
file://0009-CVE-2015-7545-2.patch \
file://0010-CVE-2015-7545-3.patch \
file://0011-CVE-2015-7545-4.patch \
file://0012-CVE-2015-7545-5.patch \
"