openssh: Add fixes for CVEs reported for openssh

Applied patch for CVE-2020-14145
Link: https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git/patch/?id=b3855ff053f5078ec3d3c653cdaedefaa5fc362d

Also, whitelisted below CVEs:

1.CVE-2020-15778:
As per upstream, because of the way scp is based on a historical
protocol called rcp which relies on that style of argument passing
and therefore encounters expansion problems. Making changes to how
the scp command line works breaks the pattern used by scp consumers.
Upstream therefore recommends the use of rsync in the place of
scp for better security. https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1860487

2.CVE-2008-3844: It was reported in OpenSSH on Red Hat Enterprise Linux
and certain packages may have been compromised. This CVE is not
applicable as our source is OpenBSD.
Links:
https://securitytracker.com/id?1020730
https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/30794

Also, for CVE-2007-2768 no fix is available yet as it's unavoidable
drawback of using one time passwords as per
https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2007-2768
Also it is marked as unimportant on debian
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2007-2768

Mailed to CPE to update database for CVE-2020-15778, CVE-2008-3844
and CVE-2007-2768. We can upstream CVE-2020-14145 till we recieve
response from CPE.

(From OE-Core rev: 302a6828b380ba20bb244f11f22a5bc273f0e5e7)

Signed-off-by: Sana Kazi <Sana.Kazi@kpit.com>
Signed-off-by: Nisha Parrakat <nishaparrakat@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
Sana Kazi
2021-05-28 18:24:15 +00:00
committed by Richard Purdie
parent a59a11eb56
commit f5882b194b
2 changed files with 109 additions and 1 deletions

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
From b3855ff053f5078ec3d3c653cdaedefaa5fc362d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
Date: Fri, 18 Sep 2020 05:23:03 +0000
Subject: upstream: tweak the client hostkey preference ordering algorithm to
prefer the default ordering if the user has a key that matches the
best-preference default algorithm.
feedback and ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a92dd7d7520ddd95c0a16786a7519e6d0167d35f
Signed-off-by: Sana Kazi <Sana.Kazi@kpit.com>
---
sshconnect2.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
CVE: CVE-2020-14145
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git/patch/?id=b3855ff053f5078ec3d3c653cdaedefaa5fc362d]
Comment: Refreshed first hunk
diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
index 347e348c..f64aae66 100644
--- a/sshconnect2.c
+++ b/sshconnect2.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.320 2020/02/06 22:48:23 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.326 2020/09/18 05:23:03 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
@@ -102,12 +102,25 @@ verify_host_key_callback(struct sshkey *hostkey, struct ssh *ssh)
return 0;
}
+/* Returns the first item from a comma-separated algorithm list */
+static char *
+first_alg(const char *algs)
+{
+ char *ret, *cp;
+
+ ret = xstrdup(algs);
+ if ((cp = strchr(ret, ',')) != NULL)
+ *cp = '\0';
+ return ret;
+}
+
static char *
order_hostkeyalgs(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
{
- char *oavail, *avail, *first, *last, *alg, *hostname, *ret;
+ char *oavail = NULL, *avail = NULL, *first = NULL, *last = NULL;
+ char *alg = NULL, *hostname = NULL, *ret = NULL, *best = NULL;
size_t maxlen;
- struct hostkeys *hostkeys;
+ struct hostkeys *hostkeys = NULL;
int ktype;
u_int i;
@@ -119,6 +132,26 @@ order_hostkeyalgs(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
for (i = 0; i < options.num_system_hostfiles; i++)
load_hostkeys(hostkeys, hostname, options.system_hostfiles[i]);
+ /*
+ * If a plain public key exists that matches the type of the best
+ * preference HostkeyAlgorithms, then use the whole list as is.
+ * Note that we ignore whether the best preference algorithm is a
+ * certificate type, as sshconnect.c will downgrade certs to
+ * plain keys if necessary.
+ */
+ best = first_alg(options.hostkeyalgorithms);
+ if (lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(hostkeys,
+ sshkey_type_plain(sshkey_type_from_name(best)), NULL)) {
+ debug3("%s: have matching best-preference key type %s, "
+ "using HostkeyAlgorithms verbatim", __func__, best);
+ ret = xstrdup(options.hostkeyalgorithms);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Otherwise, prefer the host key algorithms that match known keys
+ * while keeping the ordering of HostkeyAlgorithms as much as possible.
+ */
oavail = avail = xstrdup(options.hostkeyalgorithms);
maxlen = strlen(avail) + 1;
first = xmalloc(maxlen);
@@ -159,6 +192,8 @@ order_hostkeyalgs(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
if (*first != '\0')
debug3("%s: prefer hostkeyalgs: %s", __func__, first);
+ out:
+ free(best);
free(first);
free(last);
free(hostname);
--
cgit v1.2.3

View File

@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-${PV}.tar
file://fix-potential-signed-overflow-in-pointer-arithmatic.patch \
file://sshd_check_keys \
file://add-test-support-for-busybox.patch \
file://CVE-2020-14145.patch \
"
SRC_URI[md5sum] = "3076e6413e8dbe56d33848c1054ac091"
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "43925151e6cf6cee1450190c0e9af4dc36b41c12737619edff8bcebdff64e671"
@@ -35,7 +36,17 @@ CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2007-2768"
# and when running in a Kerberos environment. As such it is not relevant to OpenEmbedded
CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2014-9278"
# CVE only applies to some distributed RHEL binaries
# As per upstream, because of the way scp is based on a historical protocol called rcp
# which relies on that style of argument passing and therefore encounters expansion
# problems. Making changes to how the scp command line works breaks the pattern used
# by scp consumers. Upstream therefore recommends the use of rsync in the place of
# scp for better security. https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1860487
CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2020-15778"
# CVE-2008-3844 was reported in OpenSSH on Red Hat Enterprise Linux and
# certain packages may have been compromised. This CVE is not applicable
# as our source is OpenBSD. https://securitytracker.com/id?1020730
# https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/30794
CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2008-3844"
PAM_SRC_URI = "file://sshd"