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openssl: Upgrade 3.2.1 -> 3.2.2
CVE's Fixed by upgrade: CVE-2024-4741: Fixed potential use after free after SSL_free_buffers() is called CVE-2024-4603: Fixed an issue where checking excessively long DSA keys or parameters may be very slow CVE-2024-2511: Fixed unbounded memory growth with session handling in TLSv1.3 Bugs Fixed by upgrade: #23560: Fixed bug where SSL_export_keying_material() could not be used with QUIC connections Removed backports of CVE-2024-2511, CVE-2024-4603 and bti.patch as they are already fixed. Detailed Information: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/openssl-3.2/CHANGES.md#changes-between-321-and-322-4-jun-2024 (From OE-Core rev: f99c9346c225b862cc26923e823c35484beb797f) Signed-off-by: Siddharth Doshi <sdoshi@mvista.com> Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
This commit is contained in:
Siddharth
@@ -1,120 +0,0 @@
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From e9d7083e241670332e0443da0f0d4ffb52829f08 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Date: Tue, 5 Mar 2024 15:43:53 +0000
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Subject: [PATCH] Fix unconstrained session cache growth in TLSv1.3
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In TLSv1.3 we create a new session object for each ticket that we send.
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We do this by duplicating the original session. If SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is in
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use then the new session will be added to the session cache. However, if
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early data is not in use (and therefore anti-replay protection is being
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used), then multiple threads could be resuming from the same session
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simultaneously. If this happens and a problem occurs on one of the threads,
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then the original session object could be marked as not_resumable. When we
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duplicate the session object this not_resumable status gets copied into the
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new session object. The new session object is then added to the session
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cache even though it is not_resumable.
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Subsequently, another bug means that the session_id_length is set to 0 for
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sessions that are marked as not_resumable - even though that session is
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still in the cache. Once this happens the session can never be removed from
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the cache. When that object gets to be the session cache tail object the
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cache never shrinks again and grows indefinitely.
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CVE-2024-2511
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Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
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(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24043)
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CVE: CVE-2024-2511
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Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/e9d7083e241670332e0443da0f0d4ffb52829f08]
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Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
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---
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ssl/ssl_lib.c | 5 +++--
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ssl/ssl_sess.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++------
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ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c | 5 ++---
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3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
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index 4afb43bc86e54..c51529ddab5bb 100644
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--- a/ssl/ssl_lib.c
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+++ b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
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@@ -4457,9 +4457,10 @@ void ssl_update_cache(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int mode)
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/*
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* If the session_id_length is 0, we are not supposed to cache it, and it
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- * would be rather hard to do anyway :-)
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+ * would be rather hard to do anyway :-). Also if the session has already
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+ * been marked as not_resumable we should not cache it for later reuse.
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*/
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- if (s->session->session_id_length == 0)
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+ if (s->session->session_id_length == 0 || s->session->not_resumable)
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return;
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/*
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diff --git a/ssl/ssl_sess.c b/ssl/ssl_sess.c
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index 3dcc4d81e5bc6..1fa6d17c46863 100644
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--- a/ssl/ssl_sess.c
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+++ b/ssl/ssl_sess.c
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@@ -127,16 +127,11 @@ SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(void)
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return ss;
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}
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-SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_dup(const SSL_SESSION *src)
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-{
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- return ssl_session_dup(src, 1);
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-}
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-
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/*
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* Create a new SSL_SESSION and duplicate the contents of |src| into it. If
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* ticket == 0 then no ticket information is duplicated, otherwise it is.
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*/
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-SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(const SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket)
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+static SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup_intern(const SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket)
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{
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SSL_SESSION *dest;
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@@ -265,6 +260,27 @@ SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(const SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket)
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return NULL;
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}
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+SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_dup(const SSL_SESSION *src)
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+{
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+ return ssl_session_dup_intern(src, 1);
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+}
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+
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+/*
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+ * Used internally when duplicating a session which might be already shared.
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+ * We will have resumed the original session. Subsequently we might have marked
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+ * it as non-resumable (e.g. in another thread) - but this copy should be ok to
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+ * resume from.
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+ */
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+SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(const SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket)
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+{
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+ SSL_SESSION *sess = ssl_session_dup_intern(src, ticket);
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+
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+ if (sess != NULL)
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+ sess->not_resumable = 0;
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+
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+ return sess;
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+}
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+
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const unsigned char *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *s, unsigned int *len)
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{
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if (len)
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diff --git a/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c b/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c
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index 853af8c0aa9f9..d5f0ab091dacc 100644
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--- a/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c
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+++ b/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c
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@@ -2445,9 +2445,8 @@ CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_server_hello(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
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* so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
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* to send back.
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*/
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- if (s->session->not_resumable ||
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- (!(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
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- && !s->hit))
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+ if (!(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
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+ && !s->hit)
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s->session->session_id_length = 0;
|
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|
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if (usetls13) {
|
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@@ -1,179 +0,0 @@
|
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From da343d0605c826ef197aceedc67e8e04f065f740 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
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From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
|
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Date: Wed, 8 May 2024 15:23:45 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH] Check DSA parameters for excessive sizes before validating
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This avoids overly long computation of various validation
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checks.
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Fixes CVE-2024-4603
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Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
|
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Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
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(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24346)
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|
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(cherry picked from commit 85ccbab216da245cf9a6503dd327072f21950d9b)
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|
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<dropped CHANGES.md modifications as it would need backport of all previous changes>
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|
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CVE: CVE-2024-4603
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Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/da343d0605c826ef197aceedc67e8e04f065f740]
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Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
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---
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crypto/dsa/dsa_check.c | 44 ++++++++++++--
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.../invalid/p10240_q256_too_big.pem | 57 +++++++++++++++++++
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2 files changed, 97 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa_check.c b/crypto/dsa/dsa_check.c
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index fb0e9129a2..122449a7bf 100644
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--- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_check.c
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+++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_check.c
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@@ -19,8 +19,34 @@
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#include "dsa_local.h"
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#include "crypto/dsa.h"
|
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|
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+static int dsa_precheck_params(const DSA *dsa, int *ret)
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+{
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+ if (dsa->params.p == NULL || dsa->params.q == NULL) {
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+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DSA, DSA_R_BAD_FFC_PARAMETERS);
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+ *ret = FFC_CHECK_INVALID_PQ;
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+ return 0;
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+ }
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+
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+ if (BN_num_bits(dsa->params.p) > OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
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+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DSA, DSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
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+ *ret = FFC_CHECK_INVALID_PQ;
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+ return 0;
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+ }
|
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+
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+ if (BN_num_bits(dsa->params.q) >= BN_num_bits(dsa->params.p)) {
|
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+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DSA, DSA_R_BAD_Q_VALUE);
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+ *ret = FFC_CHECK_INVALID_PQ;
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+ return 0;
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+ }
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+
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+ return 1;
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+}
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+
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int ossl_dsa_check_params(const DSA *dsa, int checktype, int *ret)
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{
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+ if (!dsa_precheck_params(dsa, ret))
|
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+ return 0;
|
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+
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if (checktype == OSSL_KEYMGMT_VALIDATE_QUICK_CHECK)
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return ossl_ffc_params_simple_validate(dsa->libctx, &dsa->params,
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FFC_PARAM_TYPE_DSA, ret);
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@@ -39,6 +65,9 @@ int ossl_dsa_check_params(const DSA *dsa, int checktype, int *ret)
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*/
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int ossl_dsa_check_pub_key(const DSA *dsa, const BIGNUM *pub_key, int *ret)
|
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{
|
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+ if (!dsa_precheck_params(dsa, ret))
|
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+ return 0;
|
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+
|
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return ossl_ffc_validate_public_key(&dsa->params, pub_key, ret)
|
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&& *ret == 0;
|
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}
|
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@@ -50,6 +79,9 @@ int ossl_dsa_check_pub_key(const DSA *dsa, const BIGNUM *pub_key, int *ret)
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*/
|
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int ossl_dsa_check_pub_key_partial(const DSA *dsa, const BIGNUM *pub_key, int *ret)
|
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{
|
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+ if (!dsa_precheck_params(dsa, ret))
|
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+ return 0;
|
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+
|
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return ossl_ffc_validate_public_key_partial(&dsa->params, pub_key, ret)
|
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&& *ret == 0;
|
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}
|
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@@ -58,8 +90,10 @@ int ossl_dsa_check_priv_key(const DSA *dsa, const BIGNUM *priv_key, int *ret)
|
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{
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*ret = 0;
|
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|
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- return (dsa->params.q != NULL
|
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- && ossl_ffc_validate_private_key(dsa->params.q, priv_key, ret));
|
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+ if (!dsa_precheck_params(dsa, ret))
|
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+ return 0;
|
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+
|
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+ return ossl_ffc_validate_private_key(dsa->params.q, priv_key, ret);
|
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}
|
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|
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/*
|
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@@ -72,8 +106,10 @@ int ossl_dsa_check_pairwise(const DSA *dsa)
|
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BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
|
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BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL;
|
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|
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- if (dsa->params.p == NULL
|
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- || dsa->params.g == NULL
|
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+ if (!dsa_precheck_params(dsa, &ret))
|
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+ return 0;
|
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+
|
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+ if (dsa->params.g == NULL
|
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|| dsa->priv_key == NULL
|
||||
|| dsa->pub_key == NULL)
|
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return 0;
|
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diff --git a/test/recipes/15-test_dsaparam_data/invalid/p10240_q256_too_big.pem b/test/recipes/15-test_dsaparam_data/invalid/p10240_q256_too_big.pem
|
||||
new file mode 100644
|
||||
index 0000000000..e85e2953b7
|
||||
--- /dev/null
|
||||
+++ b/test/recipes/15-test_dsaparam_data/invalid/p10240_q256_too_big.pem
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
|
||||
+-----BEGIN DSA PARAMETERS-----
|
||||
+MIIKLAKCBQEAym47LzPFZdbz16WvjczLKuzLtsP8yRk/exxL4bBthJhP1qOwctja
|
||||
+p1586SF7gDxCMn7yWVEYdfRbFefGoq0gj1XOE917XqlbnkmZhMgxut2KbNJo/xil
|
||||
+XNFUjGvKs3F413U9rAodC8f07cWHP1iTcWL+vPe6u2yilKWYYfnLWHQH+Z6aPrrF
|
||||
+x/R08LI6DZ6nEsIo+hxaQnEtx+iqNTJC6Q1RIjWDqxQkFVTkJ0Y7miRDXmRdneWk
|
||||
+oLrMZRpaXr5l5tSjEghh1pBgJcdyOv0lh4dlDy/alAiqE2Qlb667yHl6A9dDPlpW
|
||||
+dAntpffy4LwOxfbuEhISvKjjQoBwIvYE4TBPqL0Q6bC6HgQ4+tqd9b44pQjdIQjb
|
||||
+Xcjc6azheITSnPEex3OdKtKoQeRq01qCeLBpMXu1c+CTf4ApKArZvT3vZSg0hM1O
|
||||
+pR71bRZrEEegDj0LH2HCgI5W6H3blOS9A0kUTddCoQXr2lsVdiPtRbPKH1gcd9FQ
|
||||
+P8cGrvbakpTiC0dCczOMDaCteM1QNILlkM7ZoV6VghsKvDnFPxFsiIr5GgjasXP5
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||||
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||||
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|
||||
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||||
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||||
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||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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||||
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||||
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||||
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||||
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||||
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||||
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|
||||
++3ga3ZUpRlSigzx0kb1+KjTSWeQ8vE/psdWjvBukVEbzdUauMLyRLo/6znSVvvPX
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||||
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|
||||
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||||
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||||
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||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
+KKlAOwlywVn5jUlwHkTmDiTM9w5AqVVGHZ2b+4ZgQW8jnPKN0SrKf6U555D+zp7E
|
||||
+x4uXoE8ojN9y8m8UKf0cTLnujH2XgZorjPfuMOt5VZEhQFMS2QaljSeni5CJJ8gk
|
||||
+XtztNqfBlAtWR4V5iAHeQOfIB2YaOy8GESda89tyKraKeaez41VblpTVHTeq9IIF
|
||||
+YB4cQA2PfuNaGVRGLMAgT3Dvl+mxxxeJyxnGAiUcETU/jJJt9QombiuszBlYGQ5d
|
||||
+ELOSm/eQSRARV9zNSt5jaQlMSjMBqenIEM09BzYqa7jDwqoztFxNdO8bcuQPuKwa
|
||||
+4z3bBZ1yYm63WFdNbQqqGEwc0OYmqg1raJ0zltgHyjFyw8IGu4g/wETs+nVQcH7D
|
||||
+vKuje86bePD6kD/LH3wmkA==
|
||||
+-----END DSA PARAMETERS-----
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.30.2
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,58 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From ba8a599395f8b770c76316b5f5b0f3838567014f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2024 13:18:00 +0000
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH] aarch64: fix BTI in bsaes assembly code
|
||||
|
||||
In Arm systems where BTI is enabled but the Crypto extensions are not (more
|
||||
likely in FVPs than in real hardware), the bit-sliced assembler code will
|
||||
be used. However, this wasn't annotated with BTI instructions when BTI was
|
||||
enabled, so the moment libssl jumps into this code it (correctly) aborts.
|
||||
|
||||
Solve this by adding the missing BTI landing pads.
|
||||
|
||||
Upstream-Status: Submitted [https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23982]
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
crypto/aes/asm/bsaes-armv8.pl | 5 ++++-
|
||||
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/crypto/aes/asm/bsaes-armv8.pl b/crypto/aes/asm/bsaes-armv8.pl
|
||||
index b3c97e439f..c3c5ff3e05 100644
|
||||
--- a/crypto/aes/asm/bsaes-armv8.pl
|
||||
+++ b/crypto/aes/asm/bsaes-armv8.pl
|
||||
@@ -1018,6 +1018,7 @@ _bsaes_key_convert:
|
||||
// Initialisation vector overwritten with last quadword of ciphertext
|
||||
// No output registers, usual AAPCS64 register preservation
|
||||
ossl_bsaes_cbc_encrypt:
|
||||
+ AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
|
||||
cmp x2, #128
|
||||
bhs .Lcbc_do_bsaes
|
||||
b AES_cbc_encrypt
|
||||
@@ -1270,7 +1271,7 @@ ossl_bsaes_cbc_encrypt:
|
||||
// Output text filled in
|
||||
// No output registers, usual AAPCS64 register preservation
|
||||
ossl_bsaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks:
|
||||
-
|
||||
+ AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
|
||||
cmp x2, #8 // use plain AES for
|
||||
blo .Lctr_enc_short // small sizes
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1476,6 +1477,7 @@ ossl_bsaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks:
|
||||
// Output ciphertext filled in
|
||||
// No output registers, usual AAPCS64 register preservation
|
||||
ossl_bsaes_xts_encrypt:
|
||||
+ AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
|
||||
// Stack layout:
|
||||
// sp ->
|
||||
// nrounds*128-96 bytes: key schedule
|
||||
@@ -1921,6 +1923,7 @@ ossl_bsaes_xts_encrypt:
|
||||
// Output plaintext filled in
|
||||
// No output registers, usual AAPCS64 register preservation
|
||||
ossl_bsaes_xts_decrypt:
|
||||
+ AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
|
||||
// Stack layout:
|
||||
// sp ->
|
||||
// nrounds*128-96 bytes: key schedule
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.34.1
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -12,16 +12,13 @@ SRC_URI = "http://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-${PV}.tar.gz \
|
||||
file://0001-buildinfo-strip-sysroot-and-debug-prefix-map-from-co.patch \
|
||||
file://0001-Configure-do-not-tweak-mips-cflags.patch \
|
||||
file://0001-Added-handshake-history-reporting-when-test-fails.patch \
|
||||
file://bti.patch \
|
||||
file://CVE-2024-2511.patch \
|
||||
file://CVE-2024-4603.patch \
|
||||
"
|
||||
|
||||
SRC_URI:append:class-nativesdk = " \
|
||||
file://environment.d-openssl.sh \
|
||||
"
|
||||
|
||||
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "83c7329fe52c850677d75e5d0b0ca245309b97e8ecbcfdc1dfdc4ab9fac35b39"
|
||||
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "197149c18d9e9f292c43f0400acaba12e5f52cacfe050f3d199277ea738ec2e7"
|
||||
|
||||
inherit lib_package multilib_header multilib_script ptest perlnative manpages
|
||||
MULTILIB_SCRIPTS = "${PN}-bin:${bindir}/c_rehash"
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user