cve-update: Avoid NFS caching issues

When moving the updated CVE database file to the downloads directory,
ensure that it has a different inode number to the previous version of
this file.

We have seen "sqlite3.DatabaseError: database disk image is malformed"
exceptions on our autobuilder when trying to read the CVE database in
do_cve_check tasks. The context here is that the downloads directory
(where the updated database file is copied to) is shared between workers
as an NFS mount. Different autobuilder workers were seeing different
checksums for the database file, which indicates that a mix of both new
and stale data was being read. Forcing each new version of the database
file to have a different inode number will prevent stale data from being
read from local caches.

This should fix [YOCTO #16086].

(From OE-Core rev: 1e668895f80725cb4102d000c879d57464757cc1)

Signed-off-by: Paul Barker <paul@pbarker.dev>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit f63622bbec1cfaca6d0b3e05e11466e4c10fa86e)
[YC: Fixing [YOCTO #15660] ]
Signed-off-by: Yoann Congal <yoann.congal@smile.fr>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>

bitbake/lib/bb/__init__.py

@@ -15,6 +15,13 @@ import sys
 if sys.version_info < (3, 5, 0):
     raise RuntimeError("Sorry, python 3.5.0 or later is required for this version of bitbake")
 
+if sys.version_info < (3, 10, 0):
+    # With python 3.8 and 3.9, we see errors of "libgcc_s.so.1 must be installed for pthread_cancel to work"
+    # https://stackoverflow.com/questions/64797838/libgcc-s-so-1-must-be-installed-for-pthread-cancel-to-work
+    # https://bugs.ams1.psf.io/issue42888
+    # so ensure libgcc_s is loaded early on
+    import ctypes
+    libgcc_s = ctypes.CDLL('libgcc_s.so.1')
 
 class BBHandledException(Exception):
     """

bitbake/lib/bb/data.py

@@ -301,6 +301,7 @@ def build_dependencies(key, keys, shelldeps, varflagsexcl, d):
                 value += "\n_remove of %s" % r
                 deps |= r2.references
                 deps = deps | (keys & r2.execs)
+                value = handle_contains(value, r2.contains, d)
             return value
 
         if "vardepvalue" in varflags:

bitbake/lib/bb/monitordisk.py

@@ -229,9 +229,10 @@ class diskMonitor:
                 freeInode = st.f_favail
 
                 if minInode and freeInode < minInode:
-                    # Some filesystems use dynamic inodes so can't run out
+                    # Some filesystems use dynamic inodes so can't run out.
-                    # (e.g. btrfs). This is reported by the inode count being 0.
+                    # This is reported by the inode count being 0 (btrfs) or the free
-                    if st.f_files == 0:
+                    # inode count being -1 (cephfs).
+                    if st.f_files == 0 or st.f_favail == -1:
                         self.devDict[k][2] = None
                         continue
                     # Always show warning, the self.checked would always be False if the action is WARN

bitbake/lib/bb/siggen.py

@@ -318,7 +318,8 @@ class SignatureGeneratorBasic(SignatureGenerator):
         else:
             sigfile = stampbase + "." + task + ".sigbasedata" + "." + self.basehash[tid]
 
-        bb.utils.mkdirhier(os.path.dirname(sigfile))
+        with bb.utils.umask(0o002):
+            bb.utils.mkdirhier(os.path.dirname(sigfile))
 
         data = {}
         data['task'] = task

bitbake/lib/bb/tests/codeparser.py

@@ -412,6 +412,32 @@ esac
         # Check final value
         self.assertEqual(self.d.getVar('ANOTHERVAR').split(), ['anothervalue', 'yetanothervalue', 'lastone'])
 
+    def test_contains_vardeps_override_operators(self):
+        # Check override operators handle dependencies correctly with the contains functionality
+        expr_plain = 'testval'
+        expr_prepend = '${@bb.utils.filter("TESTVAR1", "testval1", d)} '
+        expr_append = ' ${@bb.utils.filter("TESTVAR2", "testval2", d)}'
+        expr_remove = '${@bb.utils.contains("TESTVAR3", "no-testval", "testval", "", d)}'
+        # Check dependencies
+        self.d.setVar('ANOTHERVAR', expr_plain)
+        self.d.prependVar('ANOTHERVAR', expr_prepend)
+        self.d.appendVar('ANOTHERVAR', expr_append)
+        self.d.setVar('ANOTHERVAR:remove', expr_remove)
+        self.d.setVar('TESTVAR1', 'blah')
+        self.d.setVar('TESTVAR2', 'testval2')
+        self.d.setVar('TESTVAR3', 'no-testval')
+        deps, values = bb.data.build_dependencies("ANOTHERVAR", set(self.d.keys()), set(), set(), self.d)
+        self.assertEqual(sorted(values.splitlines()),
+                         sorted([
+                          expr_prepend + expr_plain + expr_append,
+                          '_remove of ' + expr_remove,
+                          'TESTVAR1{testval1} = Unset',
+                          'TESTVAR2{testval2} = Set',
+                          'TESTVAR3{no-testval} = Set',
+                          ]))
+        # Check final value
+        self.assertEqual(self.d.getVar('ANOTHERVAR').split(), ['testval2'])
+
     #Currently no wildcard support
     #def test_vardeps_wildcards(self):
     #    self.d.setVar("oe_libinstall", "echo test")

bitbake/lib/bb/utils.py

@@ -969,6 +969,17 @@ def which(path, item, direction = 0, history = False, executable=False):
         return "", hist
     return ""
 
+@contextmanager
+def umask(new_mask):
+    """
+    Context manager to set the umask to a specific mask, and restore it afterwards.
+    """
+    current_mask = os.umask(new_mask)
+    try:
+        yield
+    finally:
+        os.umask(current_mask)
+
 def to_boolean(string, default=None):
     if not string:
         return default

bitbake/lib/bblayers/layerindex.py

@@ -206,6 +206,7 @@ class LayerIndexPlugin(ActionPlugin):
 """
         args.show_only = True
         args.ignore = []
+        args.shallow = True
         self.do_layerindex_fetch(args)
 
     def register_commands(self, sp):

bitbake/lib/toaster/toastergui/api.py

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ import os
 import re
 import logging
 import json
-import subprocess
+import glob
 from collections import Counter
 
 from orm.models import Project, ProjectTarget, Build, Layer_Version
@@ -227,20 +227,18 @@ class XhrSetDefaultImageUrl(View):
 #    same logical name
 #  * Each project that uses a layer will have its own
 #    LayerVersion and Project Layer for it
-#  * During the Paroject delete process, when the last
+#  * During the Project delete process, when the last
 #    LayerVersion for a 'local_source_dir' layer is deleted
 #    then the Layer record is deleted to remove orphans
 #
 
 def scan_layer_content(layer,layer_version):
     # if this is a local layer directory, we can immediately scan its content
-    if layer.local_source_dir:
+    if os.path.isdir(layer.local_source_dir):
         try:
             # recipes-*/*/*.bb
-            cmd = '%s %s' % ('ls', os.path.join(layer.local_source_dir,'recipes-*/*/*.bb'))
+            recipes_list = glob.glob(os.path.join(layer.local_source_dir, 'recipes-*/*/*.bb'))
-            recipes_list = subprocess.Popen(cmd, shell=True, stdout=subprocess.PIPE,stderr=subprocess.STDOUT).stdout.read()
+            for recipe in recipes_list:
-            recipes_list = recipes_list.decode("utf-8").strip()
-            if recipes_list and 'No such' not in recipes_list:
                 for recipe in recipes_list.split('\n'):
                     recipe_path = recipe[recipe.rfind('recipes-'):]
                     recipe_name = recipe[recipe.rfind('/')+1:].replace('.bb','')
@@ -260,6 +258,9 @@ def scan_layer_content(layer,layer_version):
 
         except Exception as e:
             logger.warning("ERROR:scan_layer_content: %s" % e)
+    else:
+        logger.warning("ERROR: wrong path given")
+        raise KeyError("local_source_dir")
 
 class XhrLayer(View):
     """ Delete, Get, Add and Update Layer information
@@ -456,15 +457,18 @@ class XhrLayer(View):
                              'layerdetailurl':
                              layer_dep.get_detailspage_url(project.pk)})
 
-            # Scan the layer's content and update components
+            # Only scan_layer_content if layer is local
-            scan_layer_content(layer,layer_version)
+            if layer_data.get('local_source_dir', None):
+                # Scan the layer's content and update components
+                scan_layer_content(layer,layer_version)
 
         except Layer_Version.DoesNotExist:
             return error_response("layer-dep-not-found")
         except Project.DoesNotExist:
             return error_response("project-not-found")
-        except KeyError:
+        except KeyError as e:
-            return error_response("incorrect-parameters")
+            _log("KeyError: %s" % e)
+            return error_response(f"incorrect-parameters")
 
         return JsonResponse({'error': "ok",
                              'imported_layer': {

documentation/dev-manual/dev-manual-common-tasks.rst

@@ -8652,6 +8652,8 @@ In order to run tests, you need to do the following:
          -  Be sure to use an absolute path when calling this script
             with sudo.
 
+         -  Ensure that your host has the package ``iptables`` installed.
+
          -  The package recipe ``qemu-helper-native`` is required to run
             this script. Build the package using the following command:
             ::

documentation/dev-manual/dev-manual-start.rst

@@ -659,7 +659,7 @@ Follow these steps to locate and download a particular tarball:
 Using the Downloads Page
 ------------------------
 
-The :yocto_home:`Yocto Project Website <>` uses a "DOWNLOADS" page
+The :yocto_home:`Yocto Project Website <>` uses a "RELEASES" page
 from which you can locate and download tarballs of any Yocto Project
 release. Rather than Git repositories, these files represent snapshot
 tarballs similar to the tarballs located in the Index of Releases
@@ -676,12 +676,13 @@ Releases <#accessing-index-of-releases>`__" section.
 1. *Go to the Yocto Project Website:* Open The
    :yocto_home:`Yocto Project Website <>` in your browser.
 
-2. *Get to the Downloads Area:* Select the "DOWNLOADS" item from the
+#. *Get to the Downloads Area:* Select the "RELEASES" item from the
-   pull-down "SOFTWARE" tab menu near the top of the page.
+   pull-down "DEVELOPMENT" tab menu near the top of the page.
 
-3. *Select a Yocto Project Release:* Use the menu next to "RELEASE" to
+#. *Select a Yocto Project Release:* On the top of the "RELEASE" page currently
-   display and choose a recent or past supported Yocto Project release
+   supported releases are displayed, further down past supported Yocto Project
-   (e.g. &DISTRO_NAME_NO_CAP;, &DISTRO_NAME_NO_CAP_MINUS_ONE;, and so forth).
+   releases are visible. The "Download" links in the rows of the table there
+   will lead to the download tarballs for the release.
 
    .. note::
 
@@ -691,9 +692,9 @@ Releases <#accessing-index-of-releases>`__" section.
    You can use the "RELEASE ARCHIVE" link to reveal a menu of all Yocto
    Project releases.
 
-4. *Download Tools or Board Support Packages (BSPs):* From the
+#. *Download Tools or Board Support Packages (BSPs):* Next to the tarballs you
-   "DOWNLOADS" page, you can download tools or BSPs as well. Just scroll
+   will find download tools or BSPs as well. Just select a Yocto Project
-   down the page and look for what you need.
+   release and look for what you need.
 
 Accessing Nightly Builds
 ------------------------

documentation/poky.yaml

@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
-DISTRO : "3.1.29"
+DISTRO : "3.1.33"
 DISTRO_NAME_NO_CAP : "dunfell"
 DISTRO_NAME : "Dunfell"
 DISTRO_NAME_NO_CAP_MINUS_ONE : "zeus"
-YOCTO_DOC_VERSION : "3.1.29"
+YOCTO_DOC_VERSION : "3.1.33"
 YOCTO_DOC_VERSION_MINUS_ONE : "3.0.4"
-DISTRO_REL_TAG : "yocto-3.1.29"
+DISTRO_REL_TAG : "yocto-3.1.33"
-DOCCONF_VERSION : "3.1.29"
+DOCCONF_VERSION : "3.1.33"
 BITBAKE_SERIES : "1.46"
-POKYVERSION : "23.0.29"
+POKYVERSION : "23.0.33"
 YOCTO_POKY : "poky-&DISTRO_NAME_NO_CAP;-&POKYVERSION;"
 YOCTO_DL_URL : "https://downloads.yoctoproject.org"
 YOCTO_AB_URL : "https://autobuilder.yoctoproject.org"

documentation/ref-manual/ref-classes.rst

@@ -1315,16 +1315,6 @@ The following list shows the tests you can list with the ``WARN_QA`` and
    automatically get these versions. Consequently, you should only need
    to explicitly add dependencies to binary driver recipes.
 
-.. _ref-classes-insserv:
-
-``insserv.bbclass``
-===================
-
-The ``insserv`` class uses the ``insserv`` utility to update the order
-of symbolic links in ``/etc/rc?.d/`` within an image based on
-dependencies specified by LSB headers in the ``init.d`` scripts
-themselves.
-
 .. _ref-classes-kernel:
 
 ``kernel.bbclass``

documentation/ref-manual/ref-release-process.rst

@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ consists of the following pieces:
    piece of software. The test allows the packages to be be run within a
    target image.
 
--  ``oe-selftest``: Tests combination BitBake invocations. These tests
+-  ``oe-selftest``: Tests combinations of BitBake invocations. These tests
    operate outside the OpenEmbedded build system itself. The
    ``oe-selftest`` can run all tests by default or can run selected
    tests or test suites.

documentation/ref-manual/ref-system-requirements.rst

@@ -37,25 +37,21 @@ Supported Linux Distributions
 Currently, the &DISTRO; release ("&DISTRO_NAME;") of the Yocto Project is
 supported on the following distributions:
 
-
 -  Ubuntu 20.04 (LTS)
 
 -  Ubuntu 22.04 (LTS)
 
--  Fedora 37
+-  Fedora 38
 
 -  Debian GNU/Linux 11.x (Bullseye)
 
--  AlmaLinux 8.8
+-  AlmaLinux 8
 
-The following distribution versions are still tested (being listed
+The following distribution versions are still tested even though the
-in :term:`SANITY_TESTED_DISTROS`), even though the organizations
+organizations publishing them no longer make updates publicly available:
-publishing them no longer make updates publicly available:
 
 -  Ubuntu 18.04 (LTS)
 
--  OpenSUSE Leap 15.3
-
 Finally, here are the distribution versions which were previously
 tested on former revisions of "&DISTRO_NAME;", but no longer are:
 
@@ -81,6 +77,8 @@ tested on former revisions of "&DISTRO_NAME;", but no longer are:
 
 -  Fedora 36
 
+-  Fedora 37
+
 -  CentOS 7.x
 
 -  CentOS 8.x
@@ -95,9 +93,7 @@ tested on former revisions of "&DISTRO_NAME;", but no longer are:
 
 -  OpenSUSE Leap 15.2
 
--  AlmaLinux 8.5
+-  OpenSUSE Leap 15.3
-
--  AlmaLinux 8.7
 
 .. note::
 

meta-poky/conf/distro/poky.conf

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 DISTRO = "poky"
 DISTRO_NAME = "Poky (Yocto Project Reference Distro)"
-DISTRO_VERSION = "3.1.29"
+DISTRO_VERSION = "3.1.33"
 DISTRO_CODENAME = "dunfell"
 SDK_VENDOR = "-pokysdk"
 SDK_VERSION = "${@d.getVar('DISTRO_VERSION').replace('snapshot-${DATE}', 'snapshot')}"

meta/classes/cve-check.bbclass

@@ -25,8 +25,9 @@
 CVE_PRODUCT ??= "${BPN}"
 CVE_VERSION ??= "${PV}"
 
-CVE_CHECK_DB_DIR ?= "${DL_DIR}/CVE_CHECK"
+CVE_CHECK_DB_FILENAME ?= "nvdcve_2.db"
-CVE_CHECK_DB_FILE ?= "${CVE_CHECK_DB_DIR}/nvdcve_2.db"
+CVE_CHECK_DB_DIR ?= "${STAGING_DIR}/CVE_CHECK"
+CVE_CHECK_DB_FILE ?= "${CVE_CHECK_DB_DIR}/${CVE_CHECK_DB_FILENAME}"
 CVE_CHECK_DB_FILE_LOCK ?= "${CVE_CHECK_DB_FILE}.lock"
 
 CVE_CHECK_LOG ?= "${T}/cve.log"
@@ -97,6 +98,8 @@ def generate_json_report(d, out_path, link_path):
                     cve_check_merge_jsons(summary, data)
                 filename = f.readline()
 
+        summary["package"].sort(key=lambda d: d['name'])
+
         with open(out_path, "w") as f:
             json.dump(summary, f, indent=2)
 
@@ -154,7 +157,7 @@ python do_cve_check () {
 }
 
 addtask cve_check before do_build
-do_cve_check[depends] = "cve-update-nvd2-native:do_fetch"
+do_cve_check[depends] = "cve-update-nvd2-native:do_unpack"
 do_cve_check[nostamp] = "1"
 
 python cve_check_cleanup () {

meta/classes/testimage.bbclass

@@ -99,30 +99,9 @@ TESTIMAGE_DUMP_DIR ?= "${LOG_DIR}/runtime-hostdump/"
 TESTIMAGE_UPDATE_VARS ?= "DL_DIR WORKDIR DEPLOY_DIR"
 
 testimage_dump_target () {
-    top -bn1
-    ps
-    free
-    df
-    # The next command will export the default gateway IP
-    export DEFAULT_GATEWAY=$(ip route | awk '/default/ { print $3}')
-    ping -c3 $DEFAULT_GATEWAY
-    dmesg
-    netstat -an
-    ip address
-    # Next command will dump logs from /var/log/
-    find /var/log/ -type f 2>/dev/null -exec echo "====================" \; -exec echo {} \; -exec echo "====================" \; -exec cat {} \; -exec echo "" \;
 }
 
 testimage_dump_host () {
-    top -bn1
-    iostat -x -z -N -d -p ALL 20 2
-    ps -ef
-    free
-    df
-    memstat
-    dmesg
-    ip -s link
-    netstat -an
 }
 
 python do_testimage() {

meta/conf/distro/include/yocto-uninative.inc

@@ -6,10 +6,10 @@
 # to the distro running on the build machine.
 #
 
-UNINATIVE_MAXGLIBCVERSION = "2.38"
+UNINATIVE_MAXGLIBCVERSION = "2.39"
-UNINATIVE_VERSION = "4.3"
+UNINATIVE_VERSION = "4.4"
 
 UNINATIVE_URL ?= "http://downloads.yoctoproject.org/releases/uninative/${UNINATIVE_VERSION}/"
-UNINATIVE_CHECKSUM[aarch64] ?= "8df05f4a41455018b4303b2e0ea4eac5c960b5a13713f6dbb33dfdb3e32753ec"
+UNINATIVE_CHECKSUM[aarch64] ?= "b61876130f494f75092f21086b4a64ea5fb064045769bf1d32e9cb6af17ea8ec"
-UNINATIVE_CHECKSUM[i686] ?= "bea76b4a97c9ba0077c0dd1295f519cd599dbf71f0ca1c964471c4cdb043addd"
+UNINATIVE_CHECKSUM[i686] ?= "9f28627828f0082cc0344eede4d9a861a9a064bfa8f36e072e46212f0fe45fcc"
-UNINATIVE_CHECKSUM[x86_64] ?= "1c35f09a75c4096749bbe1e009df4e3968cde151424062cf4aa3ed89db22b030"
+UNINATIVE_CHECKSUM[x86_64] ?= "d81c54284be2bb886931fc87281d58177a2cd381cf99d1981f8923039a72a302"

meta/conf/licenses.conf

@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ SPDXLICENSEMAP[GPL-3.0-only] = "GPL-3.0"
 SPDXLICENSEMAP[LGPLv2] = "LGPL-2.0"
 SPDXLICENSEMAP[LGPLv2+] = "LGPL-2.0+"
 SPDXLICENSEMAP[LGPLv2.0] = "LGPL-2.0"
+SPDXLICENSEMAP[LGPLv2.0+] = "LGPL-2.0+"
 SPDXLICENSEMAP[LGPL-2.0-only] = "LGPL-2.0"
 SPDXLICENSEMAP[LGPL2.1] = "LGPL-2.1"
 SPDXLICENSEMAP[LGPLv2.1] = "LGPL-2.1"

meta/lib/oe/cve_check.py

@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ def cve_check_merge_jsons(output, data):
 
     for product in output["package"]:
         if product["name"] == data["package"][0]["name"]:
-            bb.error("Error adding the same package twice")
+            bb.error("Error adding the same package %s twice" % product["name"])
             return
 
     output["package"].append(data["package"][0])
@@ -114,11 +114,6 @@ def get_patched_cves(d):
     for url in oe.patch.src_patches(d):
         patch_file = bb.fetch.decodeurl(url)[2]
 
-        # Remote compressed patches may not be unpacked, so silently ignore them
-        if not os.path.isfile(patch_file):
-            bb.warn("%s does not exist, cannot extract CVE list" % patch_file)
-            continue
-
         # Check patch file name for CVE ID
         fname_match = cve_file_name_match.search(patch_file)
         if fname_match:
@@ -126,6 +121,12 @@ def get_patched_cves(d):
             patched_cves.add(cve)
             bb.debug(2, "Found CVE %s from patch file name %s" % (cve, patch_file))
 
+        # Remote patches won't be present and compressed patches won't be
+        # unpacked, so say we're not scanning them
+        if not os.path.isfile(patch_file):
+            bb.note("%s is remote or compressed, not scanning content" % patch_file)
+            continue
+
         with open(patch_file, "r", encoding="utf-8") as f:
             try:
                 patch_text = f.read()

meta/lib/oe/sstatesig.py

@@ -480,8 +480,10 @@ def OEOuthashBasic(path, sigfile, task, d):
     if "package_write_" in task or task == "package_qa":
         include_owners = False
     include_timestamps = False
+    include_root = True
     if task == "package":
         include_timestamps = d.getVar('BUILD_REPRODUCIBLE_BINARIES') == '1'
+        include_root = False
     extra_content = d.getVar('HASHEQUIV_HASH_VERSION')
 
     try:
@@ -592,7 +594,8 @@ def OEOuthashBasic(path, sigfile, task, d):
                 update_hash("\n")
 
             # Process this directory and all its child files
-            process(root)
+            if include_root or root != ".":
+                process(root)
             for f in files:
                 if f == 'fixmepath':
                     continue

meta/lib/oeqa/selftest/cases/runtime_test.py

@@ -185,14 +185,8 @@ class TestImage(OESelftestTestCase):
             self.skipTest('virgl isn\'t working with Centos 7')
         if distro and distro == 'centos-8':
             self.skipTest('virgl isn\'t working with Centos 8')
-        if distro and distro == 'fedora-34':
+        if distro and distro.startswith('fedora'):
-            self.skipTest('virgl isn\'t working with Fedora 34')
+            self.skipTest('virgl isn\'t working with Fedora')
-        if distro and distro == 'fedora-35':
-            self.skipTest('virgl isn\'t working with Fedora 35')
-        if distro and distro == 'fedora-36':
-            self.skipTest('virgl isn\'t working with Fedora 36')
-        if distro and distro == 'fedora-37':
-            self.skipTest('virgl isn\'t working with Fedora 37')
         if distro and distro == 'opensuseleap-15.0':
             self.skipTest('virgl isn\'t working with Opensuse 15.0')
         if distro and distro == 'ubuntu-22.04':

meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2023-4692.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+From 43651027d24e62a7a463254165e1e46e42aecdea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2023 16:31:57 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] fs/ntfs: Fix an OOB write when parsing the $ATTRIBUTE_LIST
+ attribute for the $MFT file
+
+When parsing an extremely fragmented $MFT file, i.e., the file described
+using the $ATTRIBUTE_LIST attribute, current NTFS code will reuse a buffer
+containing bytes read from the underlying drive to store sector numbers,
+which are consumed later to read data from these sectors into another buffer.
+
+These sectors numbers, two 32-bit integers, are always stored at predefined
+offsets, 0x10 and 0x14, relative to first byte of the selected entry within
+the $ATTRIBUTE_LIST attribute. Usually, this won't cause any problem.
+
+However, when parsing a specially-crafted file system image, this may cause
+the NTFS code to write these integers beyond the buffer boundary, likely
+causing the GRUB memory allocator to misbehave or fail. These integers contain
+values which are controlled by on-disk structures of the NTFS file system.
+
+Such modification and resulting misbehavior may touch a memory range not
+assigned to the GRUB and owned by firmware or another EFI application/driver.
+
+This fix introduces checks to ensure that these sector numbers are never
+written beyond the boundary.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2023-4692
+
+Reported-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=43651027d24e62a7a463254165e1e46e42aecdea]
+CVE: CVE-2023-4692
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+---
+ grub-core/fs/ntfs.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
+index 2f34f76..c8d3683 100644
+--- a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
++++ b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
+@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr)
+     }
+   if (at->attr_end)
+     {
+-      grub_uint8_t *pa;
++      grub_uint8_t *pa, *pa_end;
+ 
+       at->emft_buf = grub_malloc (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR);
+       if (at->emft_buf == NULL)
+@@ -209,11 +209,13 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr)
+ 	    }
+ 	  at->attr_nxt = at->edat_buf;
+ 	  at->attr_end = at->edat_buf + u32at (pa, 0x30);
++	  pa_end = at->edat_buf + n;
+ 	}
+       else
+ 	{
+ 	  at->attr_nxt = at->attr_end + u16at (pa, 0x14);
+ 	  at->attr_end = at->attr_end + u32at (pa, 4);
++	  pa_end = at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR);
+ 	}
+       at->flags |= GRUB_NTFS_AF_ALST;
+       while (at->attr_nxt < at->attr_end)
+@@ -230,6 +232,13 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr)
+ 	  at->flags |= GRUB_NTFS_AF_GPOS;
+ 	  at->attr_cur = at->attr_nxt;
+ 	  pa = at->attr_cur;
++
++	  if ((pa >= pa_end) || (pa_end - pa < 0x18))
++	    {
++	      grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "can\'t parse attribute list");
++	      return NULL;
++	    }
++
+ 	  grub_set_unaligned32 ((char *) pa + 0x10,
+ 				grub_cpu_to_le32 (at->mft->data->mft_start));
+ 	  grub_set_unaligned32 ((char *) pa + 0x14,
+@@ -240,6 +249,13 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr)
+ 	    {
+ 	      if (*pa != attr)
+ 		break;
++
++              if ((pa >= pa_end) || (pa_end - pa < 0x18))
++                {
++	          grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "can\'t parse attribute list");
++	          return NULL;
++	        }
++
+ 	      if (read_attr
+ 		  (at, pa + 0x10,
+ 		   u32at (pa, 0x10) * (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR),
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2023-4693.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+From 0ed2458cc4eff6d9a9199527e2a0b6d445802f94 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2023 16:32:33 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] fs/ntfs: Fix an OOB read when reading data from the resident
+ $DATA attribute
+
+When reading a file containing resident data, i.e., the file data is stored in
+the $DATA attribute within the NTFS file record, not in external clusters,
+there are no checks that this resident data actually fits the corresponding
+file record segment.
+
+When parsing a specially-crafted file system image, the current NTFS code will
+read the file data from an arbitrary, attacker-chosen memory offset and of
+arbitrary, attacker-chosen length.
+
+This allows an attacker to display arbitrary chunks of memory, which could
+contain sensitive information like password hashes or even plain-text,
+obfuscated passwords from BS EFI variables.
+
+This fix implements a check to ensure that resident data is read from the
+corresponding file record segment only.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2023-4693
+
+Reported-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=grub.git;a=commit;h=0ed2458cc4eff6d9a9199527e2a0b6d445802f94]
+CVE: CVE-2023-4693
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+---
+ grub-core/fs/ntfs.c | 13 ++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
+index c8d3683..4d1fe42 100644
+--- a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
++++ b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
+@@ -401,7 +401,18 @@ read_data (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t *pa, grub_uint8_t *dest,
+     {
+       if (ofs + len > u32at (pa, 0x10))
+ 	return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "read out of range");
+-      grub_memcpy (dest, pa + u32at (pa, 0x14) + ofs, len);
++
++      if (u32at (pa, 0x10) > (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR))
++	return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident attribute too large");
++
++      if (pa >= at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR))
++	return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident attribute out of range");
++
++      if (u16at (pa, 0x14) + u32at (pa, 0x10) >
++	  (grub_addr_t) at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR) - (grub_addr_t) pa)
++	return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident attribute out of range");
++
++      grub_memcpy (dest, pa + u16at (pa, 0x14) + ofs, len);
+       return 0;
+     }
+ 
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc

@@ -109,6 +109,8 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://CVE-2020-27749.patch \
            file://CVE-2021-20225.patch \
            file://CVE-2021-20233.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-4692.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-4693.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"

meta/recipes-connectivity/avahi/avahi.inc

@@ -22,6 +22,15 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE;md5=2d5025d4aa3495befef8f17206a5b0a1 \
 SRC_URI = "https://github.com/lathiat/avahi/releases/download/v${PV}/avahi-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://fix-CVE-2017-6519.patch \
            file://CVE-2021-3468.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-1981.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-38469-1.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-38469-2.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-38470-1.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-38470-2.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-38471-1.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-38471-2.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-38472.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-38473.patch \
            "
 
 UPSTREAM_CHECK_URI = "https://github.com/lathiat/avahi/releases/"

meta/recipes-connectivity/avahi/files/CVE-2023-1981.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+Backport of:
+
+From a2696da2f2c50ac43b6c4903f72290d5c3fa9f6f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Petr=20Men=C5=A1=C3=ADk?= <pemensik@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 17 Nov 2022 01:51:53 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Emit error if requested service is not found
+
+It currently just crashes instead of replying with error. Check return
+value and emit error instead of passing NULL pointer to reply.
+
+Fixes #375
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [import from ubuntu https://git.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/avahi/tree/debian/patches/CVE-2023-1981.patch?h=ubuntu/focal-security
+Upstream commit https://github.com/lathiat/avahi/commit/a2696da2f2c50ac43b6c4903f72290d5c3fa9f6f]
+CVE: CVE-2023-1981
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ avahi-daemon/dbus-protocol.c | 20 ++++++++++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/avahi-daemon/dbus-protocol.c
++++ b/avahi-daemon/dbus-protocol.c
+@@ -391,10 +391,14 @@ static DBusHandlerResult msg_server_impl
+         }
+ 
+         t = avahi_alternative_host_name(n);
+-        avahi_dbus_respond_string(c, m, t);
+-        avahi_free(t);
+-
+-        return DBUS_HANDLER_RESULT_HANDLED;
++        if (t) {
++            avahi_dbus_respond_string(c, m, t);
++            avahi_free(t);
++
++            return DBUS_HANDLER_RESULT_HANDLED;
++        } else {
++            return avahi_dbus_respond_error(c, m, AVAHI_ERR_NOT_FOUND, "Hostname not found");
++        }
+ 
+     } else if (dbus_message_is_method_call(m, AVAHI_DBUS_INTERFACE_SERVER, "GetAlternativeServiceName")) {
+         char *n, *t;
+@@ -405,10 +409,14 @@ static DBusHandlerResult msg_server_impl
+         }
+ 
+         t = avahi_alternative_service_name(n);
+-        avahi_dbus_respond_string(c, m, t);
+-        avahi_free(t);
+-
+-        return DBUS_HANDLER_RESULT_HANDLED;
++        if (t) {
++            avahi_dbus_respond_string(c, m, t);
++            avahi_free(t);
++
++            return DBUS_HANDLER_RESULT_HANDLED;
++        } else {
++            return avahi_dbus_respond_error(c, m, AVAHI_ERR_NOT_FOUND, "Service not found");
++        }
+ 
+     } else if (dbus_message_is_method_call(m, AVAHI_DBUS_INTERFACE_SERVER, "EntryGroupNew")) {
+         Client *client;

meta/recipes-connectivity/avahi/files/CVE-2023-38469-1.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+From a337a1ba7d15853fb56deef1f464529af6e3a1cf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Evgeny Vereshchagin <evvers@ya.ru>
+Date: Mon, 23 Oct 2023 20:29:31 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] core: reject overly long TXT resource records
+
+Closes https://github.com/lathiat/avahi/issues/455
+
+CVE-2023-38469
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [import from ubuntu https://git.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/avahi/tree/debian/patches/CVE-2023-38469-1.patch?h=ubuntu/focal-security
+Upstream commit https://github.com/lathiat/avahi/commit/a337a1ba7d15853fb56deef1f464529af6e3a1cf]
+CVE: CVE-2023-38469
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ avahi-core/rr.c | 9 ++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+Index: avahi-0.7/avahi-core/rr.c
+===================================================================
+--- avahi-0.7.orig/avahi-core/rr.c
++++ avahi-0.7/avahi-core/rr.c
+@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
+ #include <avahi-common/malloc.h>
+ #include <avahi-common/defs.h>
+ 
++#include "dns.h"
+ #include "rr.h"
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "util.h"
+@@ -688,11 +689,17 @@ int avahi_record_is_valid(AvahiRecord *r
+         case AVAHI_DNS_TYPE_TXT: {
+ 
+             AvahiStringList *strlst;
++            size_t used = 0;
+ 
+-            for (strlst = r->data.txt.string_list; strlst; strlst = strlst->next)
++            for (strlst = r->data.txt.string_list; strlst; strlst = strlst->next) {
+                 if (strlst->size > 255 || strlst->size <= 0)
+                     return 0;
+ 
++                used += 1+strlst->size;
++                if (used > AVAHI_DNS_RDATA_MAX)
++                    return 0;
++            }
++
+             return 1;
+         }
+     }

meta/recipes-connectivity/avahi/files/CVE-2023-38469-2.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+From c6cab87df290448a63323c8ca759baa516166237 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Evgeny Vereshchagin <evvers@ya.ru>
+Date: Wed, 25 Oct 2023 18:15:42 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] tests: pass overly long TXT resource records
+
+to make sure they don't crash avahi any more.
+It reproduces https://github.com/lathiat/avahi/issues/455
+
+Canonical notes:
+nickgalanis> removed first hunk since there is no .github dir in this release
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [import from ubuntu https://git.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/avahi/tree/debian/patches/CVE-2023-38469-2.patch?h=ubuntu/focal-security
+Upstream commit https://github.com/lathiat/avahi/commit/c6cab87df290448a63323c8ca759baa516166237]
+CVE: CVE-2023-38469
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ avahi-client/client-test.c       | 14 ++++++++++++++
+ 1 files changed, 14 insertions(+)
+
+Index: avahi-0.7/avahi-client/client-test.c
+===================================================================
+--- avahi-0.7.orig/avahi-client/client-test.c
++++ avahi-0.7/avahi-client/client-test.c
+@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
+ #endif
+ 
+ #include <stdio.h>
++#include <string.h>
+ #include <assert.h>
+ 
+ #include <avahi-client/client.h>
+@@ -33,6 +34,8 @@
+ #include <avahi-common/malloc.h>
+ #include <avahi-common/timeval.h>
+ 
++#include <avahi-core/dns.h>
++
+ static const AvahiPoll *poll_api = NULL;
+ static AvahiSimplePoll *simple_poll = NULL;
+ 
+@@ -222,6 +225,9 @@ int main (AVAHI_GCC_UNUSED int argc, AVA
+     uint32_t cookie;
+     struct timeval tv;
+     AvahiAddress a;
++    uint8_t rdata[AVAHI_DNS_RDATA_MAX+1];
++    AvahiStringList *txt = NULL;
++    int r;
+ 
+     simple_poll = avahi_simple_poll_new();
+     poll_api = avahi_simple_poll_get(simple_poll);
+@@ -258,6 +264,14 @@ int main (AVAHI_GCC_UNUSED int argc, AVA
+     printf("%s\n", avahi_strerror(avahi_entry_group_add_service (group, AVAHI_IF_UNSPEC, AVAHI_PROTO_UNSPEC, 0, "Lathiat's Site", "_http._tcp", NULL, NULL, 80, "foo=bar", NULL)));
+     printf("add_record: %d\n", avahi_entry_group_add_record (group, AVAHI_IF_UNSPEC, AVAHI_PROTO_UNSPEC, 0, "TestX", 0x01, 0x10, 120, "\5booya", 6));
+ 
++    memset(rdata, 1, sizeof(rdata));
++    r = avahi_string_list_parse(rdata, sizeof(rdata), &txt);
++    assert(r >= 0);
++    assert(avahi_string_list_serialize(txt, NULL, 0) == sizeof(rdata));
++    error = avahi_entry_group_add_service_strlst(group, AVAHI_IF_UNSPEC, AVAHI_PROTO_UNSPEC, 0, "TestX", "_qotd._tcp", NULL, NULL, 123, txt);
++    assert(error == AVAHI_ERR_INVALID_RECORD);
++    avahi_string_list_free(txt);
++
+     avahi_entry_group_commit (group);
+ 
+     domain = avahi_domain_browser_new (avahi, AVAHI_IF_UNSPEC, AVAHI_PROTO_UNSPEC, NULL, AVAHI_DOMAIN_BROWSER_BROWSE, 0, avahi_domain_browser_callback, (char*) "omghai3u");

meta/recipes-connectivity/avahi/files/CVE-2023-38470-1.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+From 94cb6489114636940ac683515417990b55b5d66c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Petr=20Men=C5=A1=C3=ADk?= <pemensik@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 11 Apr 2023 15:29:59 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Ensure each label is at least one byte long
+
+The only allowed exception is single dot, where it should return empty
+string.
+
+Fixes #454.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [import from ubuntu https://git.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/avahi/tree/debian/patches/CVE-2023-38470-1.patch?h=ubuntu/focal-security
+Upstream commit https://github.com/lathiat/avahi/commit/94cb6489114636940ac683515417990b55b5d66c]
+CVE: CVE-2023-38470
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ avahi-common/domain-test.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
+ avahi-common/domain.c      |  2 +-
+ 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+Index: avahi-0.7/avahi-common/domain-test.c
+===================================================================
+--- avahi-0.7.orig/avahi-common/domain-test.c
++++ avahi-0.7/avahi-common/domain-test.c
+@@ -45,6 +45,20 @@ int main(AVAHI_GCC_UNUSED int argc, AVAH
+     printf("%s\n", s = avahi_normalize_name_strdup("fo\\\\o\\..f oo."));
+     avahi_free(s);
+ 
++    printf("%s\n", s = avahi_normalize_name_strdup("."));
++    avahi_free(s);
++
++    s = avahi_normalize_name_strdup(",.=.}.=.?-.}.=.?.?.}.}.?.?.?.z.?.?.}.}."
++		    "}.?.?.?.r.=.=.}.=.?.}}.}.?.?.?.zM.=.=.?.?.}.}.?.?.}.}.}"
++		    ".?.?.?.r.=.=.}.=.?.}}.}.?.?.?.zM.=.=.?.?.}.}.?.?.?.zM.?`"
++		    "?.}.}.}.?.?.?.r.=.?.}.=.?.?.}.?.?.?.}.=.?.?.}??.}.}.?.?."
++		    "?.z.?.?.}.}.}.?.?.?.r.=.=.}.=.?.}}.}.?.?.?.zM.?`?.}.}.}."
++		    "??.?.zM.?`?.}.}.}.?.?.?.r.=.?.}.=.?.?.}.?.?.?.}.=.?.?.}?"
++		    "?.}.}.?.?.?.z.?.?.}.}.}.?.?.?.r.=.=.}.=.?.}}.}.?.?.?.zM."
++		    "?`?.}.}.}.?.?.?.r.=.=.?.?`.?.?}.}.}.?.?.?.r.=.?.}.=.?.?."
++		    "}.?.?.?.}.=.?.?.}");
++    assert(s == NULL);
++
+     printf("%i\n", avahi_domain_equal("\\065aa bbb\\.\\046cc.cc\\\\.dee.fff.", "Aaa BBB\\.\\.cc.cc\\\\.dee.fff"));
+     printf("%i\n", avahi_domain_equal("A", "a"));
+ 
+Index: avahi-0.7/avahi-common/domain.c
+===================================================================
+--- avahi-0.7.orig/avahi-common/domain.c
++++ avahi-0.7/avahi-common/domain.c
+@@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ char *avahi_normalize_name(const char *s
+         }
+ 
+         if (!empty) {
+-            if (size < 1)
++            if (size < 2)
+                 return NULL;
+ 
+             *(r++) = '.';

meta/recipes-connectivity/avahi/files/CVE-2023-38470-2.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+From 20dec84b2480821704258bc908e7b2bd2e883b24 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Evgeny Vereshchagin <evvers@ya.ru>
+Date: Tue, 19 Sep 2023 03:21:25 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] [common] bail out when escaped labels can't fit into ret
+
+Fixes:
+```
+==93410==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow on address 0x7f9e76f14c16 at pc 0x00000047208d bp 0x7ffee90a6a00 sp 0x7ffee90a61c8
+READ of size 1110 at 0x7f9e76f14c16 thread T0
+    #0 0x47208c in __interceptor_strlen (out/fuzz-domain+0x47208c) (BuildId: 731b20c1eef22c2104e75a6496a399b10cfc7cba)
+    #1 0x534eb0 in avahi_strdup avahi/avahi-common/malloc.c:167:12
+    #2 0x53862c in avahi_normalize_name_strdup avahi/avahi-common/domain.c:226:12
+```
+and
+```
+fuzz-domain: fuzz/fuzz-domain.c:38: int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t *, size_t): Assertion `avahi_domain_equal(s, t)' failed.
+==101571== ERROR: libFuzzer: deadly signal
+    #0 0x501175 in __sanitizer_print_stack_trace (/home/vagrant/avahi/out/fuzz-domain+0x501175) (BuildId: 682bf6400aff9d41b64b6e2cc3ef5ad600216ea8)
+    #1 0x45ad2c in fuzzer::PrintStackTrace() (/home/vagrant/avahi/out/fuzz-domain+0x45ad2c) (BuildId: 682bf6400aff9d41b64b6e2cc3ef5ad600216ea8)
+    #2 0x43fc07 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::CrashCallback() (/home/vagrant/avahi/out/fuzz-domain+0x43fc07) (BuildId: 682bf6400aff9d41b64b6e2cc3ef5ad600216ea8)
+    #3 0x7f1581d7ebaf  (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x3dbaf) (BuildId: c9f62793b9e886eb1b95077d4f26fe2b4aa1ac25)
+    #4 0x7f1581dcf883 in __pthread_kill_implementation (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x8e883) (BuildId: c9f62793b9e886eb1b95077d4f26fe2b4aa1ac25)
+    #5 0x7f1581d7eafd in gsignal (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x3dafd) (BuildId: c9f62793b9e886eb1b95077d4f26fe2b4aa1ac25)
+    #6 0x7f1581d6787e in abort (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x2687e) (BuildId: c9f62793b9e886eb1b95077d4f26fe2b4aa1ac25)
+    #7 0x7f1581d6779a in __assert_fail_base.cold (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x2679a) (BuildId: c9f62793b9e886eb1b95077d4f26fe2b4aa1ac25)
+    #8 0x7f1581d77186 in __assert_fail (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x36186) (BuildId: c9f62793b9e886eb1b95077d4f26fe2b4aa1ac25)
+    #9 0x5344a4 in LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput /home/vagrant/avahi/fuzz/fuzz-domain.c:38:9
+```
+
+It's a follow-up to 94cb6489114636940ac683515417990b55b5d66c
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [import from ubuntu https://git.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/avahi/tree/debian/patches/CVE-2023-38471-2.patch?h=ubuntu/focal-security
+Upstream commit https://github.com/lathiat/avahi/commit/20dec84b2480821704258bc908e7b2bd2e883b24]
+CVE: CVE-2023-38470 #Follow-up patch
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ avahi-common/domain.c | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+Index: avahi-0.7/avahi-common/domain.c
+===================================================================
+--- avahi-0.7.orig/avahi-common/domain.c
++++ avahi-0.7/avahi-common/domain.c
+@@ -210,7 +210,8 @@ char *avahi_normalize_name(const char *s
+         } else
+             empty = 0;
+ 
+-        avahi_escape_label(label, strlen(label), &r, &size);
++        if (!(avahi_escape_label(label, strlen(label), &r, &size)))
++            return NULL;
+     }
+ 
+     return ret_s;

meta/recipes-connectivity/avahi/files/CVE-2023-38471-1.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+From 894f085f402e023a98cbb6f5a3d117bd88d93b09 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Michal Sekletar <msekleta@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 23 Oct 2023 13:38:35 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] core: extract host name using avahi_unescape_label()
+
+Previously we could create invalid escape sequence when we split the
+string on dot. For example, from valid host name "foo\\.bar" we have
+created invalid name "foo\\" and tried to set that as the host name
+which crashed the daemon.
+
+Fixes #453
+
+CVE-2023-38471
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [import from ubuntu https://git.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/avahi/tree/debian/patches/CVE-2023-38471-1.patch?h=ubuntu/focal-security
+Upstream commit https://github.com/lathiat/avahi/commit/894f085f402e023a98cbb6f5a3d117bd88d93b09]
+CVE: CVE-2023-38471
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ avahi-core/server.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+Index: avahi-0.7/avahi-core/server.c
+===================================================================
+--- avahi-0.7.orig/avahi-core/server.c
++++ avahi-0.7/avahi-core/server.c
+@@ -1253,7 +1253,11 @@ static void update_fqdn(AvahiServer *s)
+ }
+ 
+ int avahi_server_set_host_name(AvahiServer *s, const char *host_name) {
+-    char *hn = NULL;
++    char label_escaped[AVAHI_LABEL_MAX*4+1];
++    char label[AVAHI_LABEL_MAX];
++    char *hn = NULL, *h;
++    size_t len;
++
+     assert(s);
+ 
+     AVAHI_CHECK_VALIDITY(s, !host_name || avahi_is_valid_host_name(host_name), AVAHI_ERR_INVALID_HOST_NAME);
+@@ -1263,17 +1267,28 @@ int avahi_server_set_host_name(AvahiServ
+     else
+         hn = avahi_normalize_name_strdup(host_name);
+ 
+-    hn[strcspn(hn, ".")] = 0;
++    h = hn;
++    if (!avahi_unescape_label((const char **)&hn, label, sizeof(label))) {
++        avahi_free(h);
++        return AVAHI_ERR_INVALID_HOST_NAME;
++    }
++
++    avahi_free(h);
+ 
+-    if (avahi_domain_equal(s->host_name, hn) && s->state != AVAHI_SERVER_COLLISION) {
+-        avahi_free(hn);
++    h = label_escaped;
++    len = sizeof(label_escaped);
++    if (!avahi_escape_label(label, strlen(label), &h, &len))
++        return AVAHI_ERR_INVALID_HOST_NAME;
++
++    if (avahi_domain_equal(s->host_name, label_escaped) && s->state != AVAHI_SERVER_COLLISION)
+         return avahi_server_set_errno(s, AVAHI_ERR_NO_CHANGE);
+-    }
+ 
+     withdraw_host_rrs(s);
+ 
+     avahi_free(s->host_name);
+-    s->host_name = hn;
++    s->host_name = avahi_strdup(label_escaped);
++    if (!s->host_name)
++        return AVAHI_ERR_NO_MEMORY;
+ 
+     update_fqdn(s);
+ 

meta/recipes-connectivity/avahi/files/CVE-2023-38471-2.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+From b675f70739f404342f7f78635d6e2dcd85a13460 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Evgeny Vereshchagin <evvers@ya.ru>
+Date: Tue, 24 Oct 2023 22:04:51 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] core: return errors from avahi_server_set_host_name properly
+
+It's a follow-up to 894f085f402e023a98cbb6f5a3d117bd88d93b09
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [import from ubuntu https://git.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/avahi/tree/debian/patches/CVE-2023-38471-2.patch?h=ubuntu/focal-security
+Upstream commit https://github.com/lathiat/avahi/commit/b675f70739f404342f7f78635d6e2dcd85a13460]
+CVE: CVE-2023-38471 #Follow-up Patch
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ avahi-core/server.c | 9 ++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+Index: avahi-0.7/avahi-core/server.c
+===================================================================
+--- avahi-0.7.orig/avahi-core/server.c
++++ avahi-0.7/avahi-core/server.c
+@@ -1267,10 +1267,13 @@ int avahi_server_set_host_name(AvahiServ
+     else
+         hn = avahi_normalize_name_strdup(host_name);
+ 
++    if (!hn)
++        return avahi_server_set_errno(s, AVAHI_ERR_NO_MEMORY);
++
+     h = hn;
+     if (!avahi_unescape_label((const char **)&hn, label, sizeof(label))) {
+         avahi_free(h);
+-        return AVAHI_ERR_INVALID_HOST_NAME;
++        return avahi_server_set_errno(s, AVAHI_ERR_INVALID_HOST_NAME);
+     }
+ 
+     avahi_free(h);
+@@ -1278,7 +1281,7 @@ int avahi_server_set_host_name(AvahiServ
+     h = label_escaped;
+     len = sizeof(label_escaped);
+     if (!avahi_escape_label(label, strlen(label), &h, &len))
+-        return AVAHI_ERR_INVALID_HOST_NAME;
++        return avahi_server_set_errno(s, AVAHI_ERR_INVALID_HOST_NAME);
+ 
+     if (avahi_domain_equal(s->host_name, label_escaped) && s->state != AVAHI_SERVER_COLLISION)
+         return avahi_server_set_errno(s, AVAHI_ERR_NO_CHANGE);
+@@ -1288,7 +1291,7 @@ int avahi_server_set_host_name(AvahiServ
+     avahi_free(s->host_name);
+     s->host_name = avahi_strdup(label_escaped);
+     if (!s->host_name)
+-        return AVAHI_ERR_NO_MEMORY;
++        return avahi_server_set_errno(s, AVAHI_ERR_NO_MEMORY);
+ 
+     update_fqdn(s);
+ 

meta/recipes-connectivity/avahi/files/CVE-2023-38472.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+From b024ae5749f4aeba03478e6391687c3c9c8dee40 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Michal Sekletar <msekleta@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 19 Oct 2023 17:36:44 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] core: make sure there is rdata to process before parsing it
+
+Fixes #452
+
+CVE-2023-38472
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [import from ubuntu https://git.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/avahi/tree/debian/patches/CVE-2023-38472.patch?h=ubuntu/focal-security
+Upstream commit https://github.com/lathiat/avahi/commit/b024ae5749f4aeba03478e6391687c3c9c8dee40]
+CVE: CVE-2023-38472
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ avahi-client/client-test.c      | 3 +++
+ avahi-daemon/dbus-entry-group.c | 2 +-
+ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+Index: avahi-0.7/avahi-client/client-test.c
+===================================================================
+--- avahi-0.7.orig/avahi-client/client-test.c
++++ avahi-0.7/avahi-client/client-test.c
+@@ -272,6 +272,9 @@ int main (AVAHI_GCC_UNUSED int argc, AVA
+     assert(error == AVAHI_ERR_INVALID_RECORD);
+     avahi_string_list_free(txt);
+ 
++    error = avahi_entry_group_add_record (group, AVAHI_IF_UNSPEC, AVAHI_PROTO_UNSPEC, 0, "TestX", 0x01, 0x10, 120, "", 0);
++    assert(error != AVAHI_OK);
++
+     avahi_entry_group_commit (group);
+ 
+     domain = avahi_domain_browser_new (avahi, AVAHI_IF_UNSPEC, AVAHI_PROTO_UNSPEC, NULL, AVAHI_DOMAIN_BROWSER_BROWSE, 0, avahi_domain_browser_callback, (char*) "omghai3u");
+Index: avahi-0.7/avahi-daemon/dbus-entry-group.c
+===================================================================
+--- avahi-0.7.orig/avahi-daemon/dbus-entry-group.c
++++ avahi-0.7/avahi-daemon/dbus-entry-group.c
+@@ -340,7 +340,7 @@ DBusHandlerResult avahi_dbus_msg_entry_g
+         if (!(r = avahi_record_new_full (name, clazz, type, ttl)))
+             return avahi_dbus_respond_error(c, m, AVAHI_ERR_NO_MEMORY, NULL);
+ 
+-        if (avahi_rdata_parse (r, rdata, size) < 0) {
++        if (!rdata || avahi_rdata_parse (r, rdata, size) < 0) {
+             avahi_record_unref (r);
+             return avahi_dbus_respond_error(c, m, AVAHI_ERR_INVALID_RDATA, NULL);
+         }

meta/recipes-connectivity/avahi/files/CVE-2023-38473.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+From b448c9f771bada14ae8de175695a9729f8646797 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Michal Sekletar <msekleta@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 11 Oct 2023 17:45:44 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] common: derive alternative host name from its unescaped
+ version
+
+Normalization of input makes sure we don't have to deal with special
+cases like unescaped dot at the end of label.
+
+Fixes #451 #487
+CVE-2023-38473
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [import from ubuntu https://git.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/avahi/tree/debian/patches/CVE-2023-38473.patch?h=ubuntu/focal-security
+Upstream commit https://github.com/lathiat/avahi/commit/b448c9f771bada14ae8de175695a9729f8646797]
+CVE: CVE-2023-38473
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ avahi-common/alternative-test.c |  3 +++
+ avahi-common/alternative.c      | 27 +++++++++++++++++++--------
+ 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+Index: avahi-0.7/avahi-common/alternative-test.c
+===================================================================
+--- avahi-0.7.orig/avahi-common/alternative-test.c
++++ avahi-0.7/avahi-common/alternative-test.c
+@@ -31,6 +31,9 @@ int main(AVAHI_GCC_UNUSED int argc, AVAH
+     const char* const test_strings[] = {
+         "XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX",
+         "XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXüüüüüüü",
++        ").",
++        "\\.",
++        "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA\\\\",
+         "gurke",
+         "-",
+         " #",
+Index: avahi-0.7/avahi-common/alternative.c
+===================================================================
+--- avahi-0.7.orig/avahi-common/alternative.c
++++ avahi-0.7/avahi-common/alternative.c
+@@ -49,15 +49,20 @@ static void drop_incomplete_utf8(char *c
+ }
+ 
+ char *avahi_alternative_host_name(const char *s) {
++    char label[AVAHI_LABEL_MAX], alternative[AVAHI_LABEL_MAX*4+1];
++    char *alt, *r, *ret;
+     const char *e;
+-    char *r;
++    size_t len;
+ 
+     assert(s);
+ 
+     if (!avahi_is_valid_host_name(s))
+         return NULL;
+ 
+-    if ((e = strrchr(s, '-'))) {
++    if (!avahi_unescape_label(&s, label, sizeof(label)))
++        return NULL;
++
++    if ((e = strrchr(label, '-'))) {
+         const char *p;
+ 
+         e++;
+@@ -74,19 +79,18 @@ char *avahi_alternative_host_name(const
+ 
+     if (e) {
+         char *c, *m;
+-        size_t l;
+         int n;
+ 
+         n = atoi(e)+1;
+         if (!(m = avahi_strdup_printf("%i", n)))
+             return NULL;
+ 
+-        l = e-s-1;
++        len = e-label-1;
+ 
+-        if (l >= AVAHI_LABEL_MAX-1-strlen(m)-1)
+-            l = AVAHI_LABEL_MAX-1-strlen(m)-1;
++        if (len >= AVAHI_LABEL_MAX-1-strlen(m)-1)
++            len = AVAHI_LABEL_MAX-1-strlen(m)-1;
+ 
+-        if (!(c = avahi_strndup(s, l))) {
++        if (!(c = avahi_strndup(label, len))) {
+             avahi_free(m);
+             return NULL;
+         }
+@@ -100,7 +104,7 @@ char *avahi_alternative_host_name(const
+     } else {
+         char *c;
+ 
+-        if (!(c = avahi_strndup(s, AVAHI_LABEL_MAX-1-2)))
++        if (!(c = avahi_strndup(label, AVAHI_LABEL_MAX-1-2)))
+             return NULL;
+ 
+         drop_incomplete_utf8(c);
+@@ -109,6 +113,13 @@ char *avahi_alternative_host_name(const
+         avahi_free(c);
+     }
+ 
++    alt = alternative;
++    len = sizeof(alternative);
++    ret = avahi_escape_label(r, strlen(r), &alt, &len);
++
++    avahi_free(r);
++    r = avahi_strdup(ret);
++
+     assert(avahi_is_valid_host_name(r));
+ 
+     return r;

meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2023-3341.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
+From c4fac5ca98efd02fbaef43601627c7a3a09f5a71 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org>
+Date: Tue, 20 Jun 2023 15:21:36 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] Limit isccc_cc_fromwire recursion depth
+
+Named and rndc do not need a lot of recursion so the depth is
+set to 10.
+
+Taken from BIND 9.16.44 change.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.isc.org/isc-projects/bind9/-/commit/c4fac5ca98efd02fbaef43601627c7a3a09f5a71]
+CVE: CVE-2023-3341
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ lib/isccc/cc.c                   | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++---------
+ lib/isccc/include/isccc/result.h |  4 +++-
+ lib/isccc/result.c               |  4 +++-
+ 3 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/isccc/cc.c b/lib/isccc/cc.c
+index e012685..8eac3d6 100644
+--- a/lib/isccc/cc.c
++++ b/lib/isccc/cc.c
+@@ -53,6 +53,10 @@
+ 
+ #define MAX_TAGS		256
+ #define DUP_LIFETIME		900
++#ifndef ISCCC_MAXDEPTH
++#define ISCCC_MAXDEPTH \
++	10 /* Big enough for rndc which just sends a string each way. */
++#endif
+ 
+ typedef isccc_sexpr_t *sexpr_ptr;
+ 
+@@ -561,19 +565,25 @@ verify(isccc_sexpr_t *alist, unsigned char *data, unsigned int length,
+ 
+ static isc_result_t
+ table_fromwire(isccc_region_t *source, isccc_region_t *secret,
+-	       uint32_t algorithm, isccc_sexpr_t **alistp);
++	       uint32_t algorithm, unsigned int depth, isccc_sexpr_t **alistp);
+ 
+ static isc_result_t
+-list_fromwire(isccc_region_t *source, isccc_sexpr_t **listp);
++list_fromwire(isccc_region_t *source, unsigned int depth,
++	      isccc_sexpr_t **listp);
+ 
+ static isc_result_t
+-value_fromwire(isccc_region_t *source, isccc_sexpr_t **valuep) {
++value_fromwire(isccc_region_t *source, unsigned int depth,
++	       isccc_sexpr_t **valuep) {
+ 	unsigned int msgtype;
+ 	uint32_t len;
+ 	isccc_sexpr_t *value;
+ 	isccc_region_t active;
+ 	isc_result_t result;
+ 
++	if (depth > ISCCC_MAXDEPTH) {
++		return (ISCCC_R_MAXDEPTH);
++	}
++
+ 	if (REGION_SIZE(*source) < 1 + 4)
+ 		return (ISC_R_UNEXPECTEDEND);
+ 	GET8(msgtype, source->rstart);
+@@ -591,9 +601,9 @@ value_fromwire(isccc_region_t *source, isccc_sexpr_t **valuep) {
+ 		} else
+ 			result = ISC_R_NOMEMORY;
+ 	} else if (msgtype == ISCCC_CCMSGTYPE_TABLE)
+-		result = table_fromwire(&active, NULL, 0, valuep);
++		result = table_fromwire(&active, NULL, 0, depth + 1, valuep);
+ 	else if (msgtype == ISCCC_CCMSGTYPE_LIST)
+-		result = list_fromwire(&active, valuep);
++		result = list_fromwire(&active, depth + 1, valuep);
+ 	else
+ 		result = ISCCC_R_SYNTAX;
+ 
+@@ -602,7 +612,7 @@ value_fromwire(isccc_region_t *source, isccc_sexpr_t **valuep) {
+ 
+ static isc_result_t
+ table_fromwire(isccc_region_t *source, isccc_region_t *secret,
+-	       uint32_t algorithm, isccc_sexpr_t **alistp)
++	       uint32_t algorithm, unsigned int depth, isccc_sexpr_t **alistp)
+ {
+ 	char key[256];
+ 	uint32_t len;
+@@ -613,6 +623,10 @@ table_fromwire(isccc_region_t *source, isccc_region_t *secret,
+ 
+ 	REQUIRE(alistp != NULL && *alistp == NULL);
+ 
++	if (depth > ISCCC_MAXDEPTH) {
++		return (ISCCC_R_MAXDEPTH);
++	}
++
+ 	checksum_rstart = NULL;
+ 	first_tag = true;
+ 	alist = isccc_alist_create();
+@@ -628,7 +642,7 @@ table_fromwire(isccc_region_t *source, isccc_region_t *secret,
+ 		GET_MEM(key, len, source->rstart);
+ 		key[len] = '\0';	/* Ensure NUL termination. */
+ 		value = NULL;
+-		result = value_fromwire(source, &value);
++		result = value_fromwire(source, depth + 1, &value);
+ 		if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS)
+ 			goto bad;
+ 		if (isccc_alist_define(alist, key, value) == NULL) {
+@@ -661,14 +675,18 @@ table_fromwire(isccc_region_t *source, isccc_region_t *secret,
+ }
+ 
+ static isc_result_t
+-list_fromwire(isccc_region_t *source, isccc_sexpr_t **listp) {
++list_fromwire(isccc_region_t *source, unsigned int depth, isccc_sexpr_t **listp) {
+ 	isccc_sexpr_t *list, *value;
+ 	isc_result_t result;
+ 
++	if (depth > ISCCC_MAXDEPTH) {
++		return (ISCCC_R_MAXDEPTH);
++	}
++
+ 	list = NULL;
+ 	while (!REGION_EMPTY(*source)) {
+ 		value = NULL;
+-		result = value_fromwire(source, &value);
++		result = value_fromwire(source, depth + 1, &value);
+ 		if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
+ 			isccc_sexpr_free(&list);
+ 			return (result);
+@@ -699,7 +717,7 @@ isccc_cc_fromwire(isccc_region_t *source, isccc_sexpr_t **alistp,
+ 	if (version != 1)
+ 		return (ISCCC_R_UNKNOWNVERSION);
+ 
+-	return (table_fromwire(source, secret, algorithm, alistp));
++	return (table_fromwire(source, secret, algorithm, 0, alistp));
+ }
+ 
+ static isc_result_t
+diff --git a/lib/isccc/include/isccc/result.h b/lib/isccc/include/isccc/result.h
+index 6c79dd7..a85861c 100644
+--- a/lib/isccc/include/isccc/result.h
++++ b/lib/isccc/include/isccc/result.h
+@@ -47,8 +47,10 @@
+ #define ISCCC_R_CLOCKSKEW		(ISC_RESULTCLASS_ISCCC + 4)
+ /*% Duplicate */
+ #define ISCCC_R_DUPLICATE		(ISC_RESULTCLASS_ISCCC + 5)
++/*% Maximum recursion depth */
++#define ISCCC_R_MAXDEPTH               (ISC_RESULTCLASS_ISCCC + 6)
+ 
+-#define ISCCC_R_NRESULTS 		6	/*%< Number of results */
++#define ISCCC_R_NRESULTS 		7	/*%< Number of results */
+ 
+ ISC_LANG_BEGINDECLS
+ 
+diff --git a/lib/isccc/result.c b/lib/isccc/result.c
+index 8419bbb..325200b 100644
+--- a/lib/isccc/result.c
++++ b/lib/isccc/result.c
+@@ -40,7 +40,8 @@ static const char *text[ISCCC_R_NRESULTS] = {
+ 	"bad auth",				/* 3 */
+ 	"expired",				/* 4 */
+ 	"clock skew",				/* 5 */
+-	"duplicate"				/* 6 */
++	"duplicate",				/* 6 */
++	"max depth",				/* 7 */
+ };
+ 
+ static const char *ids[ISCCC_R_NRESULTS] = {
+@@ -50,6 +51,7 @@ static const char *ids[ISCCC_R_NRESULTS] = {
+ 	"ISCCC_R_EXPIRED",
+ 	"ISCCC_R_CLOCKSKEW",
+ 	"ISCCC_R_DUPLICATE",
++	"ISCCC_R_MAXDEPTH",
+ };
+ 
+ #define ISCCC_RESULT_RESULTSET			2
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind_9.11.37.bb

@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://ftp.isc.org/isc/bind9/${PV}/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://CVE-2022-38177.patch \
            file://CVE-2022-38178.patch \
            file://CVE-2023-2828.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-3341.patch \
            "
 
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "0d8efbe7ec166ada90e46add4267b7e7c934790cba9bd5af6b8380a4fbfb5aff"

meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5.inc

@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${KERNELORG_MIRROR}/linux/bluetooth/bluez-${PV}.tar.xz \
            file://CVE-2022-0204.patch \
            file://CVE-2022-39176.patch \
            file://CVE-2022-3637.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-45866.patch \
            "
 S = "${WORKDIR}/bluez-${PV}"
 

meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5/CVE-2023-45866.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+From 25a471a83e02e1effb15d5a488b3f0085eaeb675 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
+Date: Tue, 10 Oct 2023 13:03:12 -0700
+Subject: input.conf: Change default of ClassicBondedOnly
+
+This changes the default of ClassicBondedOnly since defaulting to false
+is not inline with HID specification which mandates the of Security Mode
+4:
+
+BLUETOOTH SPECIFICATION Page 84 of 123
+Human Interface Device (HID) Profile:
+
+5.4.3.4.2 Security Modes
+Bluetooth HID Hosts shall use Security Mode 4 when interoperating with
+Bluetooth HID devices that are compliant to the Bluetooth Core
+Specification v2.1+EDR[6].
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/bluetooth/bluez.git/commit/?id=25a471a83e02e1effb15d5a488b3f0085eaeb675]
+CVE: CVE-2023-45866
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+---
+ profiles/input/device.c   | 2 +-
+ profiles/input/input.conf | 2 +-
+ 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/profiles/input/device.c b/profiles/input/device.c
+index 375314e..0236488 100644
+--- a/profiles/input/device.c
++++ b/profiles/input/device.c
+@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ struct input_device {
+ 
+ static int idle_timeout = 0;
+ static bool uhid_enabled = false;
+-static bool classic_bonded_only = false;
++static bool classic_bonded_only = true;
+ 
+ void input_set_idle_timeout(int timeout)
+ {
+diff --git a/profiles/input/input.conf b/profiles/input/input.conf
+index 4c70bc5..d8645f3 100644
+--- a/profiles/input/input.conf
++++ b/profiles/input/input.conf
+@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
+ # platforms may want to make sure that input connections only come from bonded
+ # device connections. Several older mice have been known for not supporting
+ # pairing/encryption.
+-# Defaults to false to maximize device compatibility.
++# Defaults to true for security.
+ #ClassicBondedOnly=true
+ 
+ # LE upgrade security
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-48795.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,468 @@
+(modified to not remove ssh_packet_read_expect(), to add to
+KexAlgorithms in sshd.c and sshconnect2.c as this version pre-dates
+kex_proposal_populate_entries(), replace debug*_f() with debug*(),
+error*_f() with error*(), and fatal_f() with fatal())
+
+Backport of:
+
+From 1edb00c58f8a6875fad6a497aa2bacf37f9e6cd5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2023 14:45:17 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] upstream: implement "strict key exchange" in ssh and sshd
+
+This adds a protocol extension to improve the integrity of the SSH
+transport protocol, particular in and around the initial key exchange
+(KEX) phase.
+
+Full details of the extension are in the PROTOCOL file.
+
+with markus@
+
+OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2a66ac962f0a630d7945fee54004ed9e9c439f14
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [import from ubuntu https://git.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/openssh/tree/debian/patches/CVE-2023-48795.patch?h=ubuntu/focal-security
+Upstream commit https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/1edb00c58f8a6875fad6a497aa2bacf37f9e6cd5]
+CVE: CVE-2023-48795
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ PROTOCOL      | 26 +++++++++++++++++
+ kex.c         | 68 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
+ kex.h         |  1 +
+ packet.c      | 78 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
+ sshconnect2.c | 14 +++------
+ sshd.c        |  7 +++--
+ 6 files changed, 146 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/PROTOCOL b/PROTOCOL
+index f75c1c0..89bddfe 100644
+--- a/PROTOCOL
++++ b/PROTOCOL
+@@ -102,6 +102,32 @@ OpenSSH supports the use of ECDH in Curve25519 for key exchange as
+ described at:
+ http://git.libssh.org/users/aris/libssh.git/plain/doc/curve25519-sha256@libssh.org.txt?h=curve25519
+ 
++1.9 transport: strict key exchange extension
++
++OpenSSH supports a number of transport-layer hardening measures under
++a "strict KEX" feature. This feature is signalled similarly to the
++RFC8308 ext-info feature: by including a additional algorithm in the
++initiial SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT kex_algorithms field. The client may append
++"kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com" to its kex_algorithms and the server
++may append "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com". These pseudo-algorithms
++are only valid in the initial SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT and MUST be ignored
++if they are present in subsequent SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT packets.
++
++When an endpoint that supports this extension observes this algorithm
++name in a peer's KEXINIT packet, it MUST make the following changes to
++the the protocol:
++
++a) During initial KEX, terminate the connection if any unexpected or
++   out-of-sequence packet is received. This includes terminating the
++   connection if the first packet received is not SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT.
++   Unexpected packets for the purpose of strict KEX include messages
++   that are otherwise valid at any time during the connection such as
++   SSH2_MSG_DEBUG and SSH2_MSG_IGNORE.
++b) After sending or receiving a SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS message, reset the
++   packet sequence number to zero. This behaviour persists for the
++   duration of the connection (i.e. not just the first
++   SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS).
++
+ 2. Connection protocol changes
+ 
+ 2.1. connection: Channel write close extension "eow@openssh.com"
+diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
+index ce85f04..3129a4e 100644
+--- a/kex.c
++++ b/kex.c
+@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@
+ #include "digest.h"
+ 
+ /* prototype */
+-static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *);
++static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *, uint32_t seq);
+ static int kex_input_newkeys(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+ 
+ static const char *proposal_names[PROPOSAL_MAX] = {
+@@ -173,6 +173,18 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
+ 	return 1;
+ }
+ 
++/* returns non-zero if proposal contains any algorithm from algs */
++static int
++has_any_alg(const char *proposal, const char *algs)
++{
++	char *cp;
++
++	if ((cp = match_list(proposal, algs, NULL)) == NULL)
++		return 0;
++	free(cp);
++	return 1;
++}
++
+ /*
+  * Concatenate algorithm names, avoiding duplicates in the process.
+  * Caller must free returned string.
+@@ -180,7 +192,7 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
+ char *
+ kex_names_cat(const char *a, const char *b)
+ {
+-	char *ret = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *cp, *p, *m;
++	char *ret = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *cp, *p;
+ 	size_t len;
+ 
+ 	if (a == NULL || *a == '\0')
+@@ -197,10 +209,8 @@ kex_names_cat(const char *a, const char *b)
+ 	}
+ 	strlcpy(ret, a, len);
+ 	for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0'; (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
+-		if ((m = match_list(ret, p, NULL)) != NULL) {
+-			free(m);
++		if (has_any_alg(ret, p))
+ 			continue; /* Algorithm already present */
+-		}
+ 		if (strlcat(ret, ",", len) >= len ||
+ 		    strlcat(ret, p, len) >= len) {
+ 			free(tmp);
+@@ -409,7 +419,12 @@ kex_protocol_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ {
+ 	int r;
+ 
+-	error("kex protocol error: type %d seq %u", type, seq);
++	/* If in strict mode, any unexpected message is an error */
++	if ((ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) && ssh->kex->kex_strict) {
++		ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "strict KEX violation: "
++		    "unexpected packet type %u (seqnr %u)", type, seq);
++	}
++	error("type %u seq %u", type, seq);
+ 	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, seq)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+@@ -481,6 +496,11 @@ kex_input_ext_info(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, &kex_protocol_error);
+ 	if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &ninfo)) != 0)
+ 		return r;
++	if (ninfo >= 1024) {
++		error("SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO with too many entries, expected "
++		    "<=1024, received %u", ninfo);
++		return dispatch_protocol_error(type, seq, ssh);
++	}
+ 	for (i = 0; i < ninfo; i++) {
+ 		if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &name, NULL)) != 0)
+ 			return r;
+@@ -581,7 +601,7 @@ kex_input_kexinit(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 		error("%s: no hex", __func__);
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ 	}
+-	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, NULL);
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_protocol_error);
+ 	ptr = sshpkt_ptr(ssh, &dlen);
+ 	if ((r = sshbuf_put(kex->peer, ptr, dlen)) != 0)
+ 		return r;
+@@ -617,7 +637,7 @@ kex_input_kexinit(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	if (!(kex->flags & KEX_INIT_SENT))
+ 		if ((r = kex_send_kexinit(ssh)) != 0)
+ 			return r;
+-	if ((r = kex_choose_conf(ssh)) != 0)
++	if ((r = kex_choose_conf(ssh, seq)) != 0)
+ 		return r;
+ 
+ 	if (kex->kex_type < KEX_MAX && kex->kex[kex->kex_type] != NULL)
+@@ -880,7 +900,13 @@ proposals_match(char *my[PROPOSAL_MAX], char *peer[PROPOSAL_MAX])
+ }
+ 
+ static int
+-kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
++kexalgs_contains(char **peer, const char *ext)
++{
++	return has_any_alg(peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], ext);
++}
++
++static int
++kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh, uint32_t seq)
+ {
+ 	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+ 	struct newkeys *newkeys;
+@@ -905,13 +931,23 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 		sprop=peer;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	/* Check whether client supports ext_info_c */
+-	if (kex->server && (kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL)) {
+-		char *ext;
+-
+-		ext = match_list("ext-info-c", peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], NULL);
+-		kex->ext_info_c = (ext != NULL);
+-		free(ext);
++	/* Check whether peer supports ext_info/kex_strict */
++	if ((kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) != 0) {
++		if (kex->server) {
++			kex->ext_info_c = kexalgs_contains(peer, "ext-info-c");
++			kex->kex_strict = kexalgs_contains(peer,
++			    "kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com");
++		} else {
++			kex->kex_strict = kexalgs_contains(peer,
++			    "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com");
++		}
++		if (kex->kex_strict) {
++			debug3("will use strict KEX ordering");
++			if (seq != 0)
++				ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh,
++				    "strict KEX violation: "
++				    "KEXINIT was not the first packet");
++		}
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* Algorithm Negotiation */
+diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h
+index a5ae6ac..cae38f7 100644
+--- a/kex.h
++++ b/kex.h
+@@ -145,6 +145,7 @@ struct kex {
+ 	u_int	kex_type;
+ 	char	*server_sig_algs;
+ 	int	ext_info_c;
++	int	kex_strict;
+ 	struct sshbuf *my;
+ 	struct sshbuf *peer;
+ 	struct sshbuf *client_version;
+diff --git a/packet.c b/packet.c
+index 6d3e917..43139f9 100644
+--- a/packet.c
++++ b/packet.c
+@@ -1203,8 +1203,13 @@ ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	sshbuf_dump(state->output, stderr);
+ #endif
+ 	/* increment sequence number for outgoing packets */
+-	if (++state->p_send.seqnr == 0)
++	if (++state->p_send.seqnr == 0) {
++		if ((ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) != 0) {
++			ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "outgoing sequence number "
++			    "wrapped during initial key exchange");
++		}
+ 		logit("outgoing seqnr wraps around");
++	}
+ 	if (++state->p_send.packets == 0)
+ 		if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY))
+ 			return SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY;
+@@ -1212,6 +1217,11 @@ ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	state->p_send.bytes += len;
+ 	sshbuf_reset(state->outgoing_packet);
+ 
++	if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS && ssh->kex->kex_strict) {
++		debug("resetting send seqnr %u", state->p_send.seqnr);
++		state->p_send.seqnr = 0;
++	}
++
+ 	if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS)
+ 		r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_OUT);
+ 	else if (type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS && state->server_side)
+@@ -1345,8 +1355,7 @@ ssh_packet_read_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
+ 	/* Stay in the loop until we have received a complete packet. */
+ 	for (;;) {
+ 		/* Try to read a packet from the buffer. */
+-		r = ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(ssh, typep, seqnr_p);
+-		if (r != 0)
++		if ((r = ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(ssh, typep, seqnr_p)) != 0)
+ 			break;
+ 		/* If we got a packet, return it. */
+ 		if (*typep != SSH_MSG_NONE)
+@@ -1633,10 +1642,16 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll2(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
+ 		if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, mac->mac_len)) != 0)
+ 			goto out;
+ 	}
++
+ 	if (seqnr_p != NULL)
+ 		*seqnr_p = state->p_read.seqnr;
+-	if (++state->p_read.seqnr == 0)
++	if (++state->p_read.seqnr == 0) {
++		if ((ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) != 0) {
++			ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "incoming sequence number "
++			    "wrapped during initial key exchange");
++		}
+ 		logit("incoming seqnr wraps around");
++	}
+ 	if (++state->p_read.packets == 0)
+ 		if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY))
+ 			return SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY;
+@@ -1702,6 +1717,10 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll2(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
+ #endif
+ 	/* reset for next packet */
+ 	state->packlen = 0;
++	if (*typep == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS && ssh->kex->kex_strict) {
++		debug("resetting read seqnr %u", state->p_read.seqnr);
++		state->p_read.seqnr = 0;
++	}
+ 
+ 	/* do we need to rekey? */
+ 	if (ssh_packet_need_rekeying(ssh, 0)) {
+@@ -1726,10 +1745,39 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
+ 		r = ssh_packet_read_poll2(ssh, typep, seqnr_p);
+ 		if (r != 0)
+ 			return r;
+-		if (*typep) {
+-			state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0;
+-			DBG(debug("received packet type %d", *typep));
++		if (*typep == 0) {
++			/* no message ready */
++			return 0;
++		}
++		state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0;
++		DBG(debug("received packet type %d", *typep));
++
++		/* Always process disconnect messages */
++		if (*typep == SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT) {
++			if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &reason)) != 0 ||
++			    (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0)
++				return r;
++			/* Ignore normal client exit notifications */
++			do_log2(ssh->state->server_side &&
++			    reason == SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION ?
++			    SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
++			    "Received disconnect from %s port %d:"
++			    "%u: %.400s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
++			    ssh_remote_port(ssh), reason, msg);
++			free(msg);
++			return SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED;
+ 		}
++
++		/*
++		 * Do not implicitly handle any messages here during initial
++		 * KEX when in strict mode. They will be need to be allowed
++		 * explicitly by the KEX dispatch table or they will generate
++		 * protocol errors.
++		 */
++		if (ssh->kex != NULL &&
++		    (ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) && ssh->kex->kex_strict)
++			return 0;
++		/* Implicitly handle transport-level messages */
+ 		switch (*typep) {
+ 		case SSH2_MSG_IGNORE:
+ 			debug3("Received SSH2_MSG_IGNORE");
+@@ -1744,19 +1792,6 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
+ 			debug("Remote: %.900s", msg);
+ 			free(msg);
+ 			break;
+-		case SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT:
+-			if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &reason)) != 0 ||
+-			    (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0)
+-				return r;
+-			/* Ignore normal client exit notifications */
+-			do_log2(ssh->state->server_side &&
+-			    reason == SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION ?
+-			    SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
+-			    "Received disconnect from %s port %d:"
+-			    "%u: %.400s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+-			    ssh_remote_port(ssh), reason, msg);
+-			free(msg);
+-			return SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED;
+ 		case SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED:
+ 			if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &seqnr)) != 0)
+ 				return r;
+@@ -2235,6 +2270,7 @@ kex_to_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct kex *kex)
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->hostkey_type)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->hostkey_nid)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->kex_type)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->kex_strict)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->my)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->peer)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->client_version)) != 0 ||
+@@ -2397,6 +2433,7 @@ kex_from_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct kex **kexp)
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, (u_int *)&kex->hostkey_type)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, (u_int *)&kex->hostkey_nid)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->kex_type)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->kex_strict)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->my)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->peer)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->client_version)) != 0 ||
+@@ -2724,6 +2761,7 @@ sshpkt_disconnect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt,...)
+ 	vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
+ 	va_end(args);
+ 
++	debug2("sending SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT: %s", buf);
+ 	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, buf)) != 0 ||
+diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
+index 5df9477..617ed9f 100644
+--- a/sshconnect2.c
++++ b/sshconnect2.c
+@@ -218,7 +218,8 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
+ 		fatal("%s: kex_assemble_namelist", __func__);
+ 	free(all_key);
+ 
+-	if ((s = kex_names_cat(options.kex_algorithms, "ext-info-c")) == NULL)
++	if ((s = kex_names_cat(options.kex_algorithms,
++	    "ext-info-c,kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com")) == NULL)
+ 		fatal("%s: kex_names_cat", __func__);
+ 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(s);
+ 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
+@@ -343,7 +344,6 @@ struct cauthmethod {
+ };
+ 
+ static int input_userauth_service_accept(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+-static int input_userauth_ext_info(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+ static int input_userauth_success(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+ static int input_userauth_failure(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+ static int input_userauth_banner(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+@@ -460,7 +460,7 @@ ssh_userauth2(struct ssh *ssh, const char *local_user,
+ 
+ 	ssh->authctxt = &authctxt;
+ 	ssh_dispatch_init(ssh, &input_userauth_error);
+-	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, &input_userauth_ext_info);
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, kex_input_ext_info);
+ 	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT, &input_userauth_service_accept);
+ 	ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &authctxt.success);	/* loop until success */
+ 	pubkey_cleanup(ssh);
+@@ -505,13 +505,6 @@ input_userauth_service_accept(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	return r;
+ }
+ 
+-/* ARGSUSED */
+-static int
+-input_userauth_ext_info(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, struct ssh *ssh)
+-{
+-	return kex_input_ext_info(type, seqnr, ssh);
+-}
+-
+ void
+ userauth(struct ssh *ssh, char *authlist)
+ {
+@@ -593,6 +586,7 @@ input_userauth_success(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	free(authctxt->methoddata);
+ 	authctxt->methoddata = NULL;
+ 	authctxt->success = 1;			/* break out */
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, dispatch_protocol_error);
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
+index 60b2aaf..ffea38c 100644
+--- a/sshd.c
++++ b/sshd.c
+@@ -2323,11 +2323,13 @@ static void
+ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
+ {
+ 	char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_SERVER };
++	char *s;
+ 	struct kex *kex;
+ 	int r;
+ 
+-	myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(
+-	    options.kex_algorithms);
++	if ((s = kex_names_cat(options.kex_algorithms, "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com")) == NULL)
++		fatal("kex_names_cat");
++	myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(s);
+ 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = compat_cipher_proposal(
+ 	    options.ciphers);
+ 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = compat_cipher_proposal(
+@@ -2382,6 +2384,7 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	packet_send();
+ 	packet_write_wait();
+ #endif
++	free(s);
+ 	debug("KEX done");
+ }
+ 
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-51385.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+From 7ef3787c84b6b524501211b11a26c742f829af1a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2023 14:47:44 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] upstream: ban user/hostnames with most shell metacharacters
+
+This makes ssh(1) refuse user or host names provided on the
+commandline that contain most shell metacharacters.
+
+Some programs that invoke ssh(1) using untrusted data do not filter
+metacharacters in arguments they supply. This could create
+interactions with user-specified ProxyCommand and other directives
+that allow shell injection attacks to occur.
+
+It's a mistake to invoke ssh(1) with arbitrary untrusted arguments,
+but getting this stuff right can be tricky, so this should prevent
+most obvious ways of creating risky situations. It however is not
+and cannot be perfect: ssh(1) has no practical way of interpreting
+what shell quoting rules are in use and how they interact with the
+user's specified ProxyCommand.
+
+To allow configurations that use strange user or hostnames to
+continue to work, this strictness is applied only to names coming
+from the commandline. Names specified using User or Hostname
+directives in ssh_config(5) are not affected.
+
+feedback/ok millert@ markus@ dtucker@ deraadt@
+
+OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3b487348b5964f3e77b6b4d3da4c3b439e94b2d9
+
+CVE: CVE-2023-51385
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/7ef3787c84b6b524501211b11a26c742f829af1a]
+Signed-off-by: Ranjitsinh Rathod <ranjitsinh.rathod@kpit.com>
+Comment: Hunks refreshed to apply cleanly
+
+---
+ ssh.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
+index 35c48e62d18..48d93ddf2a9 100644
+--- a/ssh.c
++++ b/ssh.c
+@@ -583,6 +583,41 @@ set_addrinfo_port(struct addrinfo *addrs
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
++static int
++valid_hostname(const char *s)
++{
++	size_t i;
++
++	if (*s == '-')
++		return 0;
++	for (i = 0; s[i] != 0; i++) {
++		if (strchr("'`\"$\\;&<>|(){}", s[i]) != NULL ||
++		    isspace((u_char)s[i]) || iscntrl((u_char)s[i]))
++			return 0;
++	}
++	return 1;
++}
++
++static int
++valid_ruser(const char *s)
++{
++	size_t i;
++
++	if (*s == '-')
++		return 0;
++	for (i = 0; s[i] != 0; i++) {
++		if (strchr("'`\";&<>|(){}", s[i]) != NULL)
++			return 0;
++		/* Disallow '-' after whitespace */
++		if (isspace((u_char)s[i]) && s[i + 1] == '-')
++			return 0;
++		/* Disallow \ in last position */
++		if (s[i] == '\\' && s[i + 1] == '\0')
++			return 0;
++	}
++	return 1;
++}
++
+ /*
+  * Main program for the ssh client.
+  */
+@@ -1069,6 +1104,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	if (!host)
+ 		usage();
+ 
++	if (!valid_hostname(host))
++		fatal("hostname contains invalid characters");
++	if (options.user != NULL && !valid_ruser(options.user))
++		fatal("remote username contains invalid characters");
+ 	host_arg = xstrdup(host);
+ 
+ 	/* Initialize the command to execute on remote host. */

meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_8.2p1.bb

@@ -39,6 +39,8 @@ SRC_URI = "http://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-${PV}.tar
            file://CVE-2023-38408-10.patch \
            file://CVE-2023-38408-11.patch \
            file://CVE-2023-38408-12.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-48795.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-51385.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "3076e6413e8dbe56d33848c1054ac091"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "43925151e6cf6cee1450190c0e9af4dc36b41c12737619edff8bcebdff64e671"

meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2024-0727.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+Backport of:
+
+From 09df4395b5071217b76dc7d3d2e630eb8c5a79c2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Date: Fri, 19 Jan 2024 11:28:58 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Add NULL checks where ContentInfo data can be NULL
+
+PKCS12 structures contain PKCS7 ContentInfo fields. These fields are
+optional and can be NULL even if the "type" is a valid value. OpenSSL
+was not properly accounting for this and a NULL dereference can occur
+causing a crash.
+
+CVE-2024-0727
+
+Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23362)
+
+(cherry picked from commit d135eeab8a5dbf72b3da5240bab9ddb7678dbd2c)
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/d135eeab8a5dbf72b3da5240bab9ddb7678dbd2c]
+
+CVE: CVE-2024-0727
+
+Signed-off-by: virendra thakur <virendrak@kpit.com>
+---
+ crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c  | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
+ crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c |  5 +++++
+ crypto/pkcs12/p12_npas.c |  5 +++--
+ crypto/pkcs7/pk7_mime.c  |  7 +++++--
+ 4 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c
++++ b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c
+@@ -76,6 +76,13 @@ STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *PKCS12_unpack_
+                   PKCS12_R_CONTENT_TYPE_NOT_DATA);
+         return NULL;
+     }
++
++    if (p7->d.data == NULL) {
++        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_UNPACK_P7DATA,
++                  PKCS12_R_DECODE_ERROR);
++        return NULL;
++    }
++
+     return ASN1_item_unpack(p7->d.data, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12_SAFEBAGS));
+ }
+ 
+@@ -132,6 +139,12 @@ STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *PKCS12_unpack_
+ {
+     if (!PKCS7_type_is_encrypted(p7))
+         return NULL;
++
++    if (p7->d.encrypted == NULL) {
++        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_UNPACK_P7DATA, PKCS12_R_DECODE_ERROR);
++        return NULL;
++    }
++
+     return PKCS12_item_decrypt_d2i(p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->algorithm,
+                                    ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12_SAFEBAGS),
+                                    pass, passlen,
+@@ -159,6 +172,13 @@ STACK_OF(PKCS7) *PKCS12_unpack_authsafes
+                   PKCS12_R_CONTENT_TYPE_NOT_DATA);
+         return NULL;
+     }
++
++    if (p12->authsafes->d.data == NULL) {
++        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_UNPACK_AUTHSAFES,
++                  PKCS12_R_DECODE_ERROR);
++        return NULL;
++    }
++
+     return ASN1_item_unpack(p12->authsafes->d.data,
+                             ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12_AUTHSAFES));
+ }
+--- a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c
++++ b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c
+@@ -93,6 +93,11 @@ static int pkcs12_gen_mac(PKCS12 *p12, c
+         return 0;
+     }
+ 
++    if (p12->authsafes->d.data == NULL) {
++        PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_GEN_MAC, PKCS12_R_DECODE_ERROR);
++        return 0;
++    }
++
+     salt = p12->mac->salt->data;
+     saltlen = p12->mac->salt->length;
+     if (!p12->mac->iter)
+--- a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_npas.c
++++ b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_npas.c
+@@ -78,8 +78,9 @@ static int newpass_p12(PKCS12 *p12, cons
+             bags = PKCS12_unpack_p7data(p7);
+         } else if (bagnid == NID_pkcs7_encrypted) {
+             bags = PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata(p7, oldpass, -1);
+-            if (!alg_get(p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->algorithm,
+-                         &pbe_nid, &pbe_iter, &pbe_saltlen))
++            if (p7->d.encrypted == NULL
++                    || !alg_get(p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->algorithm,
++                                &pbe_nid, &pbe_iter, &pbe_saltlen))
+                 goto err;
+         } else {
+             continue;
+--- a/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_mime.c
++++ b/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_mime.c
+@@ -30,10 +30,13 @@ int SMIME_write_PKCS7(BIO *bio, PKCS7 *p
+ {
+     STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) *mdalgs;
+     int ctype_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
+-    if (ctype_nid == NID_pkcs7_signed)
++    if (ctype_nid == NID_pkcs7_signed) {
++        if (p7->d.sign == NULL)
++            return 0;
+         mdalgs = p7->d.sign->md_algs;
+-    else
++    } else {
+         mdalgs = NULL;
++    }
+ 
+     flags ^= SMIME_OLDMIME;
+ 

meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.1.1w.bb

@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://reproducibility.patch \
            file://0001-Configure-add-2-missing-key-sorts.patch \
            file://0001-Configure-do-not-tweak-mips-cflags.patch \
+           file://CVE-2024-0727.patch \
            "
 
 SRC_URI_append_class-nativesdk = " \

meta/recipes-connectivity/resolvconf/resolvconf_1.82.bb

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ AUTHOR = "Thomas Hood"
 HOMEPAGE = "http://packages.debian.org/resolvconf"
 RDEPENDS_${PN} = "bash"
 
-SRC_URI = "git://salsa.debian.org/debian/resolvconf.git;protocol=https;branch=master \
+SRC_URI = "git://salsa.debian.org/debian/resolvconf.git;protocol=https;branch=unstable \
            file://fix-path-for-busybox.patch \
            file://99_resolvconf \
           "

meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc/CVE-2023-4813.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,986 @@
+From 1c37b8022e8763fedbb3f79c02e05c6acfe5a215 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Siddhesh Poyarekar <siddhesh@sourceware.org>
+Date: Thu, 17 Mar 2022 11:44:34 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] Simplify allocations and fix merge and continue actions [BZ
+ #28931]
+
+Allocations for address tuples is currently a bit confusing because of
+the pointer chasing through PAT, making it hard to observe the sequence
+in which allocations have been made.  Narrow scope of the pointer
+chasing through PAT so that it is only used where necessary.
+
+This also tightens actions behaviour with the hosts database in
+getaddrinfo to comply with the manual text.  The "continue" action
+discards previous results and the "merge" action results in an immedate
+lookup failure.  Consequently, chaining of allocations across modules is
+no longer necessary, thus opening up cleanup opportunities.
+
+A test has been added that checks some combinations to ensure that they
+work correctly.
+
+Resolves: BZ #28931
+
+CVE: CVE-2023-4813
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=commitdiff;h=1c37b8022e8763fedbb3f79c02e05c6acfe5a215]
+Comments: Hunks refreshed
+
+Signed-off-by: Siddhesh Poyarekar <siddhesh@sourceware.org>
+Reviewed-by: DJ Delorie <dj@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Bhabu Bindu <bhabu.bindu@kpit.com>
+---
+ nss/Makefile                               |   1 +
+ nss/tst-nss-gai-actions.c                  | 149 ++++++
+ nss/tst-nss-gai-actions.root/etc/host.conf |   1 +
+ nss/tst-nss-gai-actions.root/etc/hosts     | 508 +++++++++++++++++++++
+ sysdeps/posix/getaddrinfo.c                | 143 +++---
+ 5 files changed, 750 insertions(+), 52 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 nss/tst-nss-gai-actions.c
+ create mode 100644 nss/tst-nss-gai-actions.root/etc/host.conf
+ create mode 100644 nss/tst-nss-gai-actions.root/etc/hosts
+
+diff --git a/nss/Makefile b/nss/Makefile
+index 42a59535cb..d8b06b44fb 100644
+--- a/nss/Makefile
++++ b/nss/Makefile
+@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@
+ 
+ tests-container = \
+ 			  tst-nss-test3 \
++			  tst-nss-gai-actions \
+ 			  tst-nss-files-hosts-long \
+ 			  tst-nss-db-endpwent \
+ 			  tst-nss-db-endgrent
+diff --git a/nss/tst-nss-gai-actions.c b/nss/tst-nss-gai-actions.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000..efca6cd183
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/nss/tst-nss-gai-actions.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
++/* Test continue and merge NSS actions for getaddrinfo.
++   Copyright The GNU Toolchain Authors.
++   This file is part of the GNU C Library.
++
++   The GNU C Library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
++   modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
++   License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
++   version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
++
++   The GNU C Library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
++   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
++   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
++   Lesser General Public License for more details.
++
++   You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
++   License along with the GNU C Library; if not, see
++   <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.  */
++
++#include <dlfcn.h>
++#include <gnu/lib-names.h>
++#include <nss.h>
++#include <stdio.h>
++#include <stdlib.h>
++#include <string.h>
++
++#include <support/check.h>
++#include <support/format_nss.h>
++#include <support/support.h>
++#include <support/xstdio.h>
++#include <support/xunistd.h>
++
++enum
++{
++  ACTION_MERGE = 0,
++  ACTION_CONTINUE,
++};
++
++static const char *
++family_str (int family)
++{
++  switch (family)
++    {
++    case AF_UNSPEC:
++      return "AF_UNSPEC";
++    case AF_INET:
++      return "AF_INET";
++    default:
++      __builtin_unreachable ();
++    }
++}
++
++static const char *
++action_str (int action)
++{
++  switch (action)
++    {
++    case ACTION_MERGE:
++      return "merge";
++    case ACTION_CONTINUE:
++      return "continue";
++    default:
++      __builtin_unreachable ();
++    }
++}
++
++static void
++do_one_test (int action, int family, bool canon)
++{
++  struct addrinfo hints =
++    {
++      .ai_family = family,
++    };
++
++  struct addrinfo *ai;
++
++  if (canon)
++    hints.ai_flags = AI_CANONNAME;
++
++  printf ("***** Testing \"files [SUCCESS=%s] files\" for family %s, %s\n",
++	  action_str (action), family_str (family),
++	  canon ? "AI_CANONNAME" : "");
++
++  int ret = getaddrinfo ("example.org", "80", &hints, &ai);
++
++  switch (action)
++    {
++    case ACTION_MERGE:
++      if (ret == 0)
++	{
++	  char *formatted = support_format_addrinfo (ai, ret);
++
++	  printf ("merge unexpectedly succeeded:\n %s\n", formatted);
++	  support_record_failure ();
++	  free (formatted);
++	}
++      else
++	return;
++    case ACTION_CONTINUE:
++	{
++	  char *formatted = support_format_addrinfo (ai, ret);
++
++	  /* Verify that the result appears exactly once.  */
++	  const char *expected = "address: STREAM/TCP 192.0.0.1 80\n"
++	    "address: DGRAM/UDP 192.0.0.1 80\n"
++	    "address: RAW/IP 192.0.0.1 80\n";
++
++	  const char *contains = strstr (formatted, expected);
++	  const char *contains2 = NULL;
++
++	  if (contains != NULL)
++	    contains2 = strstr (contains + strlen (expected), expected);
++
++	  if (contains == NULL || contains2 != NULL)
++	    {
++	      printf ("continue failed:\n%s\n", formatted);
++	      support_record_failure ();
++	    }
++
++	  free (formatted);
++	  break;
++	}
++    default:
++      __builtin_unreachable ();
++    }
++}
++
++static void
++do_one_test_set (int action)
++{
++  char buf[32];
++
++  snprintf (buf, sizeof (buf), "files [SUCCESS=%s] files",
++	    action_str (action));
++  __nss_configure_lookup ("hosts", buf);
++
++  do_one_test (action, AF_UNSPEC, false);
++  do_one_test (action, AF_INET, false);
++  do_one_test (action, AF_INET, true);
++}
++
++static int
++do_test (void)
++{
++  do_one_test_set (ACTION_CONTINUE);
++  do_one_test_set (ACTION_MERGE);
++  return 0;
++}
++
++#include <support/test-driver.c>
+diff --git a/nss/tst-nss-gai-actions.root/etc/host.conf b/nss/tst-nss-gai-actions.root/etc/host.conf
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000..d1a59f73a9
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/nss/tst-nss-gai-actions.root/etc/host.conf
+@@ -0,0 +1 @@
++multi on
+diff --git a/nss/tst-nss-gai-actions.root/etc/hosts b/nss/tst-nss-gai-actions.root/etc/hosts
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000..50ce9774dc
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/nss/tst-nss-gai-actions.root/etc/hosts
+@@ -0,0 +1,508 @@
++192.0.0.1	example.org
++192.0.0.2	example.org
++192.0.0.3	example.org
++192.0.0.4	example.org
++192.0.0.5	example.org
++192.0.0.6	example.org
++192.0.0.7	example.org
++192.0.0.8	example.org
++192.0.0.9	example.org
++192.0.0.10	example.org
++192.0.0.11	example.org
++192.0.0.12	example.org
++192.0.0.13	example.org
++192.0.0.14	example.org
++192.0.0.15	example.org
++192.0.0.16	example.org
++192.0.0.17	example.org
++192.0.0.18	example.org
++192.0.0.19	example.org
++192.0.0.20	example.org
++192.0.0.21	example.org
++192.0.0.22	example.org
++192.0.0.23	example.org
++192.0.0.24	example.org
++192.0.0.25	example.org
++192.0.0.26	example.org
++192.0.0.27	example.org
++192.0.0.28	example.org
++192.0.0.29	example.org
++192.0.0.30	example.org
++192.0.0.31	example.org
++192.0.0.32	example.org
++192.0.0.33	example.org
++192.0.0.34	example.org
++192.0.0.35	example.org
++192.0.0.36	example.org
++192.0.0.37	example.org
++192.0.0.38	example.org
++192.0.0.39	example.org
++192.0.0.40	example.org
++192.0.0.41	example.org
++192.0.0.42	example.org
++192.0.0.43	example.org
++192.0.0.44	example.org
++192.0.0.45	example.org
++192.0.0.46	example.org
++192.0.0.47	example.org
++192.0.0.48	example.org
++192.0.0.49	example.org
++192.0.0.50	example.org
++192.0.0.51	example.org
++192.0.0.52	example.org
++192.0.0.53	example.org
++192.0.0.54	example.org
++192.0.0.55	example.org
++192.0.0.56	example.org
++192.0.0.57	example.org
++192.0.0.58	example.org
++192.0.0.59	example.org
++192.0.0.60	example.org
++192.0.0.61	example.org
++192.0.0.62	example.org
++192.0.0.63	example.org
++192.0.0.64	example.org
++192.0.0.65	example.org
++192.0.0.66	example.org
++192.0.0.67	example.org
++192.0.0.68	example.org
++192.0.0.69	example.org
++192.0.0.70	example.org
++192.0.0.71	example.org
++192.0.0.72	example.org
++192.0.0.73	example.org
++192.0.0.74	example.org
++192.0.0.75	example.org
++192.0.0.76	example.org
++192.0.0.77	example.org
++192.0.0.78	example.org
++192.0.0.79	example.org
++192.0.0.80	example.org
++192.0.0.81	example.org
++192.0.0.82	example.org
++192.0.0.83	example.org
++192.0.0.84	example.org
++192.0.0.85	example.org
++192.0.0.86	example.org
++192.0.0.87	example.org
++192.0.0.88	example.org
++192.0.0.89	example.org
++192.0.0.90	example.org
++192.0.0.91	example.org
++192.0.0.92	example.org
++192.0.0.93	example.org
++192.0.0.94	example.org
++192.0.0.95	example.org
++192.0.0.96	example.org
++192.0.0.97	example.org
++192.0.0.98	example.org
++192.0.0.99	example.org
++192.0.0.100	example.org
++192.0.0.101	example.org
++192.0.0.102	example.org
++192.0.0.103	example.org
++192.0.0.104	example.org
++192.0.0.105	example.org
++192.0.0.106	example.org
++192.0.0.107	example.org
++192.0.0.108	example.org
++192.0.0.109	example.org
++192.0.0.110	example.org
++192.0.0.111	example.org
++192.0.0.112	example.org
++192.0.0.113	example.org
++192.0.0.114	example.org
++192.0.0.115	example.org
++192.0.0.116	example.org
++192.0.0.117	example.org
++192.0.0.118	example.org
++192.0.0.119	example.org
++192.0.0.120	example.org
++192.0.0.121	example.org
++192.0.0.122	example.org
++192.0.0.123	example.org
++192.0.0.124	example.org
++192.0.0.125	example.org
++192.0.0.126	example.org
++192.0.0.127	example.org
++192.0.0.128	example.org
++192.0.0.129	example.org
++192.0.0.130	example.org
++192.0.0.131	example.org
++192.0.0.132	example.org
++192.0.0.133	example.org
++192.0.0.134	example.org
++192.0.0.135	example.org
++192.0.0.136	example.org
++192.0.0.137	example.org
++192.0.0.138	example.org
++192.0.0.139	example.org
++192.0.0.140	example.org
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++192.0.1.209	example.org
++192.0.1.210	example.org
++192.0.1.211	example.org
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++192.0.1.219	example.org
++192.0.1.220	example.org
++192.0.1.221	example.org
++192.0.1.222	example.org
++192.0.1.223	example.org
++192.0.1.224	example.org
++192.0.1.225	example.org
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++192.0.1.227	example.org
++192.0.1.228	example.org
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++192.0.1.232	example.org
++192.0.1.233	example.org
++192.0.1.234	example.org
++192.0.1.235	example.org
++192.0.1.236	example.org
++192.0.1.237	example.org
++192.0.1.238	example.org
++192.0.1.239	example.org
++192.0.1.240	example.org
++192.0.1.241	example.org
++192.0.1.242	example.org
++192.0.1.243	example.org
++192.0.1.244	example.org
++192.0.1.245	example.org
++192.0.1.246	example.org
++192.0.1.247	example.org
++192.0.1.248	example.org
++192.0.1.249	example.org
++192.0.1.250	example.org
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++192.0.1.253	example.org
++192.0.1.254	example.org
+diff --git a/sysdeps/posix/getaddrinfo.c b/sysdeps/posix/getaddrinfo.c
+index 18dccd5924..3d9bea60c6 100644
+--- a/sysdeps/posix/getaddrinfo.c
++++ b/sysdeps/posix/getaddrinfo.c
+@@ -458,11 +458,6 @@ gaih_inet (const char *name, const struct gaih_service *service,
+ 
+   if (name != NULL)
+     {
+-      at = alloca_account (sizeof (struct gaih_addrtuple), alloca_used);
+-      at->family = AF_UNSPEC;
+-      at->scopeid = 0;
+-      at->next = NULL;
+-
+       if (req->ai_flags & AI_IDN)
+ 	{
+ 	  char *out;
+@@ -473,13 +468,21 @@ gaih_inet (const char *name, const struct gaih_service *service,
+ 	  malloc_name = true;
+ 	}
+ 
+-      if (__inet_aton_exact (name, (struct in_addr *) at->addr) != 0)
++      uint32_t addr[4];
++      if (__inet_aton_exact (name, (struct in_addr *) addr) != 0)
+ 	{
++	  at = alloca_account (sizeof (struct gaih_addrtuple), alloca_used);
++	  at->scopeid = 0;
++	  at->next = NULL;
++
+ 	  if (req->ai_family == AF_UNSPEC || req->ai_family == AF_INET)
+-	    at->family = AF_INET;
++	    {
++	      memcpy (at->addr, addr, sizeof (at->addr));
++	      at->family = AF_INET;
++	    }
+ 	  else if (req->ai_family == AF_INET6 && (req->ai_flags & AI_V4MAPPED))
+ 	    {
+-	      at->addr[3] = at->addr[0];
++	      at->addr[3] = addr[0];
+ 	      at->addr[2] = htonl (0xffff);
+ 	      at->addr[1] = 0;
+ 	      at->addr[0] = 0;
+@@ -505,49 +505,62 @@
+ 
+ 	  if (req->ai_flags & AI_CANONNAME)
+ 	    canon = name;
++
++	  goto process_list;
+ 	}
+-      else if (at->family == AF_UNSPEC)
++
++      char *scope_delim = strchr (name, SCOPE_DELIMITER);
++      int e;
++
++      if (scope_delim == NULL)
++	e = inet_pton (AF_INET6, name, addr);
++      else
++	e = __inet_pton_length (AF_INET6, name, scope_delim - name, addr);
++
++      if (e > 0)
+ 	{
+-	  char *scope_delim = strchr (name, SCOPE_DELIMITER);
+-	  int e;
+-	  if (scope_delim == NULL)
+-	    e = inet_pton (AF_INET6, name, at->addr);
++	  at = alloca_account (sizeof (struct gaih_addrtuple),
++			       alloca_used);
++	  at->scopeid = 0;
++	  at->next = NULL;
++
++	  if (req->ai_family == AF_UNSPEC || req->ai_family == AF_INET6)
++	    {
++	      memcpy (at->addr, addr, sizeof (at->addr));
++	      at->family = AF_INET6;
++	    }
++	  else if (req->ai_family == AF_INET
++		   && IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED (addr))
++	    {
++	      at->addr[0] = addr[3];
++	      at->addr[1] = addr[1];
++	      at->addr[2] = addr[2];
++	      at->addr[3] = addr[3];
++	      at->family = AF_INET;
++	    }
+ 	  else
+-	    e = __inet_pton_length (AF_INET6, name, scope_delim - name,
+-				    at->addr);
+-	  if (e > 0)
+ 	    {
+-	      if (req->ai_family == AF_UNSPEC || req->ai_family == AF_INET6)
+-		at->family = AF_INET6;
+-	      else if (req->ai_family == AF_INET
+-		       && IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED (at->addr))
+-		{
+-		  at->addr[0] = at->addr[3];
+-		  at->family = AF_INET;
+-		}
+-	      else
+-		{
+-		  result = -EAI_ADDRFAMILY;
+-		  goto free_and_return;
+-		}
+-
+-	      if (scope_delim != NULL
+-		  && __inet6_scopeid_pton ((struct in6_addr *) at->addr,
+-					   scope_delim + 1,
+-					   &at->scopeid) != 0)
+-		{
+-		  result = -EAI_NONAME;
+-		  goto free_and_return;
+-		}
++	      result = -EAI_ADDRFAMILY;
++	      goto free_and_return;
++	    }
+ 
+-	      if (req->ai_flags & AI_CANONNAME)
+-		canon = name;
++	  if (scope_delim != NULL
++	      && __inet6_scopeid_pton ((struct in6_addr *) at->addr,
++				       scope_delim + 1,
++				       &at->scopeid) != 0)
++	    {
++	      result = -EAI_NONAME;
++	      goto free_and_return;
+ 	    }
++
++	  if (req->ai_flags & AI_CANONNAME)
++	    canon = name;
++
++	  goto process_list;
+ 	}
+ 
+-      if (at->family == AF_UNSPEC && (req->ai_flags & AI_NUMERICHOST) == 0)
++      if ((req->ai_flags & AI_NUMERICHOST) == 0)
+ 	{
+-	  struct gaih_addrtuple **pat = &at;
+ 	  int no_data = 0;
+ 	  int no_inet6_data = 0;
+ 	  service_user *nip;
+@@ -543,6 +559,7 @@ gaih_inet (const char *name, const struct gaih_service *service,
+ 	  enum nss_status status = NSS_STATUS_UNAVAIL;
+ 	  int no_more;
+ 	  struct resolv_context *res_ctx = NULL;
++	  bool do_merge = false;
+ 
+ 	  /* If we do not have to look for IPv6 addresses or the canonical
+ 	     name, use the simple, old functions, which do not support
+@@ -579,7 +596,7 @@ gaih_inet (const char *name, const struct gaih_service *service,
+ 			  result = -EAI_MEMORY;
+ 			  goto free_and_return;
+ 			}
+-		      *pat = addrmem;
++		      at = addrmem;
+ 		    }
+ 		  else
+ 		    {
+@@ -632,6 +649,8 @@ gaih_inet (const char *name, const struct gaih_service *service,
+ 		    }
+ 
+ 		  struct gaih_addrtuple *addrfree = addrmem;
++		  struct gaih_addrtuple **pat = &at;
++
+ 		  for (int i = 0; i < air->naddrs; ++i)
+ 		    {
+ 		      socklen_t size = (air->family[i] == AF_INET
+@@ -695,12 +714,6 @@ gaih_inet (const char *name, const struct gaih_service *service,
+ 
+ 		  free (air);
+ 
+-		  if (at->family == AF_UNSPEC)
+-		    {
+-		      result = -EAI_NONAME;
+-		      goto free_and_return;
+-		    }
+-
+ 		  goto process_list;
+ 		}
+ 	      else if (err == 0)
+@@ -750,6 +763,22 @@
+ 
+ 	  while (!no_more)
+ 	    {
++	      /* Always start afresh; continue should discard previous results
++		 and the hosts database does not support merge.  */
++	      at = NULL;
++	      free (canonbuf);
++	      free (addrmem);
++	      canon = canonbuf = NULL;
++	      addrmem = NULL;
++	      got_ipv6 = false;
++
++	      if (do_merge)
++		{
++		  __set_h_errno (NETDB_INTERNAL);
++		  __set_errno (EBUSY);
++		  break;
++		}
++
+ 	      no_data = 0;
+ 	      nss_gethostbyname4_r fct4 = NULL;
+ 
+@@ -744,12 +773,14 @@ gaih_inet (const char *name, const struct gaih_service *service,
+ 		{
+ 		  while (1)
+ 		    {
+-		      status = DL_CALL_FCT (fct4, (name, pat,
++		      status = DL_CALL_FCT (fct4, (name, &at,
+ 						   tmpbuf->data, tmpbuf->length,
+ 						   &errno, &h_errno,
+ 						   NULL));
+ 		      if (status == NSS_STATUS_SUCCESS)
+ 			break;
++		      /* gethostbyname4_r may write into AT, so reset it.  */
++		      at = NULL;
+ 		      if (status != NSS_STATUS_TRYAGAIN
+ 			  || errno != ERANGE || h_errno != NETDB_INTERNAL)
+ 			{
+@@ -774,7 +805,9 @@ gaih_inet (const char *name, const struct gaih_service *service,
+ 		      no_data = 1;
+ 
+ 		      if ((req->ai_flags & AI_CANONNAME) != 0 && canon == NULL)
+-			canon = (*pat)->name;
++			canon = at->name;
++
++		      struct gaih_addrtuple **pat = &at;
+ 
+ 		      while (*pat != NULL)
+ 			{
+@@ -826,6 +859,8 @@ gaih_inet (const char *name, const struct gaih_service *service,
+ 
+ 		  if (fct != NULL)
+ 		    {
++		      struct gaih_addrtuple **pat = &at;
++
+ 		      if (req->ai_family == AF_INET6
+ 			  || req->ai_family == AF_UNSPEC)
+ 			{
+@@ -917,6 +946,10 @@
+ 	      if (nss_next_action (nip, status) == NSS_ACTION_RETURN)
+ 		break;
+ 
++	      /* The hosts database does not support MERGE.  */
++	      if (nss_next_action (nip, status) == NSS_ACTION_MERGE)
++		do_merge = true;
++
+ 	      if (nip->next == NULL)
+ 		no_more = -1;
+ 	      else
+@@ -930,7 +969,7 @@ gaih_inet (const char *name, const struct gaih_service *service,
+ 	}
+ 
+     process_list:
+-      if (at->family == AF_UNSPEC)
++      if (at == NULL)
+ 	{
+ 	  result = -EAI_NONAME;
+ 	  goto free_and_return;
+-- 
+2.39.3

meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc_2.31.bb

@@ -29,6 +29,13 @@ CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2019-1010025"
 # https://git.yoctoproject.org/cgit/cgit.cgi/poky/commit/?h=dunfell&id=e1e89ff7d75c3d2223f9e3bd875b9b0c5e15836b
 CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2021-35942"
 
+# glibc https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2023-4527
+# This vulnerability was introduced in 2.36 by commit
+# f282cdbe7f436c75864e5640a409a10485e9abb2 resolv: Implement no-aaaa stub resolver option
+# so our version is not yet vulnerable
+# See https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=30842
+CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2023-4527"
+
 DEPENDS += "gperf-native bison-native make-native"
 
 NATIVESDKFIXES ?= ""
@@ -81,6 +88,7 @@ SRC_URI =  "${GLIBC_GIT_URI};branch=${SRCBRANCH};name=glibc \
            file://0037-Avoid-deadlock-between-pthread_create-and-ctors.patch \
            file://CVE-2023-0687.patch \
            file://CVE-2023-4911.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-4813.patch \
            "
 S = "${WORKDIR}/git"
 B = "${WORKDIR}/build-${TARGET_SYS}"

meta/recipes-core/images/build-appliance-image_15.0.0.bb

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ IMAGE_FSTYPES = "wic.vmdk"
 
 inherit core-image setuptools3
 
-SRCREV ?= "9a045bde41e8edf3b17c73526d8b3c151e0bb242"
+SRCREV ?= "77442211926cbe93d60108f6df4abda3bc06b735"
 SRC_URI = "git://git.yoctoproject.org/poky;branch=dunfell \
            file://Yocto_Build_Appliance.vmx \
            file://Yocto_Build_Appliance.vmxf \

meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2021-3516.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+From 1358d157d0bd83be1dfe356a69213df9fac0b539 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Nick Wellnhofer <wellnhofer@aevum.de>
+Date: Wed, 21 Apr 2021 13:23:27 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix use-after-free with `xmllint --html --push`
+
+Call htmlCtxtUseOptions to make sure that names aren't stored in
+dictionaries.
+
+Note that this issue only affects xmllint using the HTML push parser.
+
+Fixes #230.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libxml2/-/commit/1358d157d0bd83be1dfe356a69213df9fac0b539]
+CVE: CVE-2021-3516
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ xmllint.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/xmllint.c b/xmllint.c
+index 6ca1bf54d..dbef273a8 100644
+--- a/xmllint.c
++++ b/xmllint.c
+@@ -2213,7 +2213,7 @@ static void parseAndPrintFile(char *filename, xmlParserCtxtPtr rectxt) {
+             if (res > 0) {
+                 ctxt = htmlCreatePushParserCtxt(NULL, NULL,
+                             chars, res, filename, XML_CHAR_ENCODING_NONE);
+-                xmlCtxtUseOptions(ctxt, options);
++                htmlCtxtUseOptions(ctxt, options);
+                 while ((res = fread(chars, 1, pushsize, f)) > 0) {
+                     htmlParseChunk(ctxt, chars, res, 0);
+                 }
+-- 
+GitLab
+

meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2023-45322-1.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+From a22bd982bf10291deea8ba0c61bf75b898c604ce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Nick Wellnhofer <wellnhofer@aevum.de>
+Date: Wed, 2 Nov 2022 15:44:42 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] malloc-fail: Fix memory leak in xmlStaticCopyNodeList
+
+Found with libFuzzer, see #344.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libxml2/-/commit/a22bd982bf10291deea8ba0c61bf75b898c604ce]
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ tree.c | 7 +++++--
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/tree.c b/tree.c
+index 507869efe..647288ce3 100644
+--- a/tree.c
++++ b/tree.c
+@@ -4461,7 +4461,7 @@ xmlStaticCopyNodeList(xmlNodePtr node, xmlDocPtr doc, xmlNodePtr parent) {
+ 	    }
+ 	    if (doc->intSubset == NULL) {
+ 		q = (xmlNodePtr) xmlCopyDtd( (xmlDtdPtr) node );
+-		if (q == NULL) return(NULL);
++		if (q == NULL) goto error;
+ 		q->doc = doc;
+ 		q->parent = parent;
+ 		doc->intSubset = (xmlDtdPtr) q;
+@@ -4473,7 +4473,7 @@ xmlStaticCopyNodeList(xmlNodePtr node, xmlDocPtr doc, xmlNodePtr parent) {
+ 	} else
+ #endif /* LIBXML_TREE_ENABLED */
+ 	    q = xmlStaticCopyNode(node, doc, parent, 1);
+-	if (q == NULL) return(NULL);
++	if (q == NULL) goto error;
+ 	if (ret == NULL) {
+ 	    q->prev = NULL;
+ 	    ret = p = q;
+@@ -4486,6 +4486,9 @@ xmlStaticCopyNodeList(xmlNodePtr node, xmlDocPtr doc, xmlNodePtr parent) {
+ 	node = node->next;
+     }
+     return(ret);
++error:
++    xmlFreeNodeList(ret);
++    return(NULL);
+ }
+ 
+ /**
+-- 
+GitLab
+

meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2023-45322-2.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+From d39f78069dff496ec865c73aa44d7110e429bce9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Nick Wellnhofer <wellnhofer@aevum.de>
+Date: Wed, 23 Aug 2023 20:24:24 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] tree: Fix copying of DTDs
+
+- Don't create multiple DTD nodes.
+- Fix UAF if malloc fails.
+- Skip DTD nodes if tree module is disabled.
+
+Fixes #583.
+
+CVE: CVE-2023-45322
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libxml2/-/commit/d39f78069dff496ec865c73aa44d7110e429bce9]
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ tree.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++---------------
+ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/tree.c b/tree.c
+index 6c8a875b9..02c1b5791 100644
+--- a/tree.c
++++ b/tree.c
+@@ -4471,29 +4471,28 @@ xmlNodePtr
+ xmlStaticCopyNodeList(xmlNodePtr node, xmlDocPtr doc, xmlNodePtr parent) {
+     xmlNodePtr ret = NULL;
+     xmlNodePtr p = NULL,q;
++    xmlDtdPtr newSubset = NULL;
+ 
+     while (node != NULL) {
+-#ifdef LIBXML_TREE_ENABLED
+ 	if (node->type == XML_DTD_NODE ) {
+-	    if (doc == NULL) {
++#ifdef LIBXML_TREE_ENABLED
++	    if ((doc == NULL) || (doc->intSubset != NULL)) {
+ 		node = node->next;
+ 		continue;
+ 	    }
+-	    if (doc->intSubset == NULL) {
+-		q = (xmlNodePtr) xmlCopyDtd( (xmlDtdPtr) node );
+-		if (q == NULL) goto error;
+-		q->doc = doc;
+-		q->parent = parent;
+-		doc->intSubset = (xmlDtdPtr) q;
+-		xmlAddChild(parent, q);
+-	    } else {
+-		q = (xmlNodePtr) doc->intSubset;
+-		xmlAddChild(parent, q);
+-	    }
+-	} else
++            q = (xmlNodePtr) xmlCopyDtd( (xmlDtdPtr) node );
++            if (q == NULL) goto error;
++            q->doc = doc;
++            q->parent = parent;
++            newSubset = (xmlDtdPtr) q;
++#else
++            node = node->next;
++            continue;
+ #endif /* LIBXML_TREE_ENABLED */
++	} else {
+ 	    q = xmlStaticCopyNode(node, doc, parent, 1);
+-	if (q == NULL) goto error;
++	    if (q == NULL) goto error;
++        }
+ 	if (ret == NULL) {
+ 	    q->prev = NULL;
+ 	    ret = p = q;
+@@ -4505,6 +4504,8 @@ xmlStaticCopyNodeList(xmlNodePtr node, xmlDocPtr doc, xmlNodePtr parent) {
+ 	}
+ 	node = node->next;
+     }
++    if (newSubset != NULL)
++        doc->intSubset = newSubset;
+     return(ret);
+ error:
+     xmlFreeNodeList(ret);
+-- 
+GitLab
+

meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2024-25062-pre1.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+From 31c6ce3b63f8a494ad9e31ca65187a73d8ad3508 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Nick Wellnhofer <wellnhofer@aevum.de>
+Date: Mon, 9 Nov 2020 17:55:44 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Avoid call stack overflow with XML reader and recursive
+ XIncludes
+
+Don't process XIncludes in the result of another inclusion to avoid
+infinite recursion resulting in a call stack overflow.
+
+This is something the XInclude engine shouldn't allow but correct
+handling of intra-document includes would require major changes.
+
+Found by OSS-Fuzz.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libxml2/-/commit/31c6ce3b63f8a494ad9e31ca65187a73d8ad3508]
+CVE: CVE-2024-25062 #Dependency Patch
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ xmlreader.c | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/xmlreader.c b/xmlreader.c
+index 01adf74f4..72e40b032 100644
+--- a/xmlreader.c
++++ b/xmlreader.c
+@@ -1585,7 +1585,8 @@ node_found:
+     /*
+      * Handle XInclude if asked for
+      */
+-    if ((reader->xinclude) && (reader->node != NULL) &&
++    if ((reader->xinclude) && (reader->in_xinclude == 0) &&
++        (reader->node != NULL) &&
+ 	(reader->node->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE) &&
+ 	(reader->node->ns != NULL) &&
+ 	((xmlStrEqual(reader->node->ns->href, XINCLUDE_NS)) ||
+-- 
+GitLab
+

meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2024-25062.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+From 2b0aac140d739905c7848a42efc60bfe783a39b7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Nick Wellnhofer <wellnhofer@aevum.de>
+Date: Sat, 14 Oct 2023 22:45:54 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] [CVE-2024-25062] xmlreader: Don't expand XIncludes when
+ backtracking
+
+Fixes a use-after-free if XML Reader if used with DTD validation and
+XInclude expansion.
+
+Fixes #604.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libxml2/-/commit/2b0aac140d739905c7848a42efc60bfe783a39b7]
+CVE: CVE-2024-25062
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ xmlreader.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/xmlreader.c b/xmlreader.c
+index 979385a13..fefd68e0b 100644
+--- a/xmlreader.c
++++ b/xmlreader.c
+@@ -1443,6 +1443,7 @@ node_found:
+      * Handle XInclude if asked for
+      */
+     if ((reader->xinclude) && (reader->in_xinclude == 0) &&
++        (reader->state != XML_TEXTREADER_BACKTRACK) &&
+         (reader->node != NULL) &&
+ 	(reader->node->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE) &&
+ 	(reader->node->ns != NULL) &&
+-- 
+GitLab
+

meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2_2.9.10.bb

@@ -41,6 +41,11 @@ SRC_URI += "http://www.w3.org/XML/Test/xmlts20080827.tar.gz;subdir=${BP};name=te
            file://CVE-2023-39615-pre.patch \
            file://CVE-2023-39615-0001.patch \
            file://CVE-2023-39615-0002.patch \
+           file://CVE-2021-3516.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-45322-1.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-45322-2.patch \
+           file://CVE-2024-25062-pre1.patch \
+           file://CVE-2024-25062.patch \
            "
 
 SRC_URI[archive.sha256sum] = "593b7b751dd18c2d6abcd0c4bcb29efc203d0b4373a6df98e3a455ea74ae2813"

meta/recipes-core/meta/cve-update-db-native.bb

@@ -63,8 +63,13 @@ python do_fetch() {
         shutil.copy2(db_file, db_tmp_file)
 
     if update_db_file(db_tmp_file, d) == True:
-        # Update downloaded correctly, can swap files
+        # Update downloaded correctly, we can swap files. To avoid potential
-        shutil.move(db_tmp_file, db_file)
+        # NFS caching issues, ensure that the destination file has a new inode
+        # number. We do this in two steps as the downloads directory may be on
+        # a different filesystem to tmpdir we're working in.
+        new_file = "%s.new" % (db_file)
+        shutil.move(db_tmp_file, new_file)
+        os.rename(new_file, db_file)
     else:
         # Update failed, do not modify the database
         bb.note("CVE database update failed")

meta/recipes-core/meta/cve-update-nvd2-native.bb

@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ INHIBIT_DEFAULT_DEPS = "1"
 
 inherit native
 
-deltask do_unpack
 deltask do_patch
 deltask do_configure
 deltask do_compile
@@ -26,12 +25,18 @@ NVDCVE_API_KEY ?= ""
 # Use a negative value to skip the update
 CVE_DB_UPDATE_INTERVAL ?= "86400"
 
-# Timeout for blocking socket operations, such as the connection attempt.
+# CVE database incremental update age threshold, in seconds. If the database is
-CVE_SOCKET_TIMEOUT ?= "60"
+# older than this threshold, do a full re-download, else, do an incremental
+# update. By default: the maximum allowed value from NVD: 120 days (120*24*60*60)
+# Use 0 to force a full download.
+CVE_DB_INCR_UPDATE_AGE_THRES ?= "10368000"
 
-CVE_DB_TEMP_FILE ?= "${CVE_CHECK_DB_DIR}/temp_nvdcve_2.db"
+# Number of attempts for each http query to nvd server before giving up
+CVE_DB_UPDATE_ATTEMPTS ?= "5"
 
-CVE_CHECK_DB_FILE ?= "${CVE_CHECK_DB_DIR}/nvdcve_2.db"
+CVE_CHECK_DB_DLDIR_FILE ?= "${DL_DIR}/CVE_CHECK/${CVE_CHECK_DB_FILENAME}"
+CVE_CHECK_DB_DLDIR_LOCK ?= "${CVE_CHECK_DB_DLDIR_FILE}.lock"
+CVE_CHECK_DB_TEMP_FILE ?= "${CVE_CHECK_DB_FILE}.tmp"
 
 python () {
     if not bb.data.inherits_class("cve-check", d):
@@ -48,9 +53,9 @@ python do_fetch() {
 
     bb.utils.export_proxies(d)
 
-    db_file = d.getVar("CVE_CHECK_DB_FILE")
+    db_file = d.getVar("CVE_CHECK_DB_DLDIR_FILE")
     db_dir = os.path.dirname(db_file)
-    db_tmp_file = d.getVar("CVE_DB_TEMP_FILE")
+    db_tmp_file = d.getVar("CVE_CHECK_DB_TEMP_FILE")
 
     cleanup_db_download(db_file, db_tmp_file)
     # By default let's update the whole database (since time 0)
@@ -73,22 +78,34 @@ python do_fetch() {
         pass
 
     bb.utils.mkdirhier(db_dir)
+    bb.utils.mkdirhier(os.path.dirname(db_tmp_file))
     if os.path.exists(db_file):
         shutil.copy2(db_file, db_tmp_file)
 
     if update_db_file(db_tmp_file, d, database_time) == True:
-        # Update downloaded correctly, can swap files
+        # Update downloaded correctly, we can swap files. To avoid potential
-        shutil.move(db_tmp_file, db_file)
+        # NFS caching issues, ensure that the destination file has a new inode
+        # number. We do this in two steps as the downloads directory may be on
+        # a different filesystem to tmpdir we're working in.
+        new_file = "%s.new" % (db_file)
+        shutil.move(db_tmp_file, new_file)
+        os.rename(new_file, db_file)
     else:
         # Update failed, do not modify the database
         bb.warn("CVE database update failed")
         os.remove(db_tmp_file)
 }
 
-do_fetch[lockfiles] += "${CVE_CHECK_DB_FILE_LOCK}"
+do_fetch[lockfiles] += "${CVE_CHECK_DB_DLDIR_LOCK}"
 do_fetch[file-checksums] = ""
 do_fetch[vardeps] = ""
 
+python do_unpack() {
+    import shutil
+    shutil.copyfile(d.getVar("CVE_CHECK_DB_DLDIR_FILE"), d.getVar("CVE_CHECK_DB_FILE"))
+}
+do_unpack[lockfiles] += "${CVE_CHECK_DB_DLDIR_LOCK} ${CVE_CHECK_DB_FILE_LOCK}"
+
 def cleanup_db_download(db_file, db_tmp_file):
     """
     Cleanup the download space from possible failed downloads
@@ -114,9 +131,13 @@ def cleanup_db_download(db_file, db_tmp_file):
     if os.path.exists(db_tmp_file):
         os.remove(db_tmp_file)
 
-def nvd_request_next(url, api_key, args):
+def nvd_request_wait(attempt, min_wait):
+    return min ( ( (2 * attempt) + min_wait ) , 30)
+
+def nvd_request_next(url, attempts, api_key, args, min_wait):
     """
-    Request next part of the NVD dabase
+    Request next part of the NVD database
+    NVD API documentation: https://nvd.nist.gov/developers/vulnerabilities
     """
 
     import urllib.request
@@ -130,7 +151,7 @@ def nvd_request_next(url, api_key, args):
         request.add_header("apiKey", api_key)
     bb.note("Requesting %s" % request.full_url)
 
-    for attempt in range(5):
+    for attempt in range(attempts):
         try:
             r = urllib.request.urlopen(request)
 
@@ -143,8 +164,10 @@ def nvd_request_next(url, api_key, args):
             r.close()
 
         except Exception as e:
-            bb.note("CVE database: received error (%s), retrying" % (e))
+            wait_time = nvd_request_wait(attempt, min_wait)
-            time.sleep(6)
+            bb.note("CVE database: received error (%s)" % (e))
+            bb.note("CVE database: retrying download after %d seconds. attempted (%d/%d)" % (wait_time, attempt+1, attempts))
+            time.sleep(wait_time)
             pass
         else:
             return raw_data
@@ -167,18 +190,24 @@ def update_db_file(db_tmp_file, d, database_time):
 
     req_args = {'startIndex' : 0}
 
-    # The maximum range for time is 120 days
+    incr_update_threshold = int(d.getVar("CVE_DB_INCR_UPDATE_AGE_THRES"))
-    # Force a complete update if our range is longer
+    if database_time != 0:
-    if (database_time != 0):
         database_date = datetime.datetime.fromtimestamp(database_time, tz=datetime.timezone.utc)
         today_date = datetime.datetime.now(tz=datetime.timezone.utc)
         delta = today_date - database_date
-        if delta.days < 120:
+        if incr_update_threshold == 0:
+            bb.note("CVE database: forced full update")
+        elif delta < datetime.timedelta(seconds=incr_update_threshold):
             bb.note("CVE database: performing partial update")
+            # The maximum range for time is 120 days
+            if delta > datetime.timedelta(days=120):
+                bb.error("CVE database: Trying to do an incremental update on a larger than supported range")
             req_args['lastModStartDate'] = database_date.isoformat()
             req_args['lastModEndDate'] = today_date.isoformat()
         else:
             bb.note("CVE database: file too old, forcing a full update")
+    else:
+        bb.note("CVE database: no preexisting database, do a full download")
 
     with bb.progress.ProgressHandler(d) as ph, open(os.path.join(d.getVar("TMPDIR"), 'cve_check'), 'a') as cve_f:
 
@@ -186,10 +215,16 @@ def update_db_file(db_tmp_file, d, database_time):
         index = 0
         url = d.getVar("NVDCVE_URL")
         api_key = d.getVar("NVDCVE_API_KEY") or None
+        attempts = int(d.getVar("CVE_DB_UPDATE_ATTEMPTS"))
+
+        # Recommended by NVD
+        wait_time = 6
+        if api_key:
+            wait_time = 2
 
         while True:
             req_args['startIndex'] = index
-            raw_data = nvd_request_next(url, api_key, req_args)
+            raw_data = nvd_request_next(url, attempts, api_key, req_args, wait_time)
             if raw_data is None:
                 # We haven't managed to download data
                 return False
@@ -209,7 +244,7 @@ def update_db_file(db_tmp_file, d, database_time):
                break
 
             # Recommended by NVD
-            time.sleep(6)
+            time.sleep(wait_time)
 
         # Update success, set the date to cve_check file.
         cve_f.write('CVE database update : %s\n\n' % datetime.date.today())
@@ -301,6 +336,10 @@ def update_db(conn, elt):
     accessVector = None
     cveId = elt['cve']['id']
     if elt['cve']['vulnStatus'] ==  "Rejected":
+        c = conn.cursor()
+        c.execute("delete from PRODUCTS where ID = ?;", [cveId])
+        c.execute("delete from NVD where ID = ?;", [cveId])
+        c.close()
         return
     cveDesc = ""
     for desc in elt['cve']['descriptions']:
@@ -330,6 +369,10 @@ def update_db(conn, elt):
                 [cveId, cveDesc, cvssv2, cvssv3, date, accessVector]).close()
 
     try:
+        # Remove any pre-existing CVE configuration. Even for partial database
+        # update, those will be repopulated. This ensures that old
+        # configuration is not kept for an updated CVE.
+        conn.execute("delete from PRODUCTS where ID = ?", [cveId]).close()
         for config in elt['cve']['configurations']:
             # This is suboptimal as it doesn't handle AND/OR and negate, but is better than nothing
             for node in config["nodes"]:

meta/recipes-core/ncurses/files/CVE-2023-29491.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+Backport of:
+
+Author: Sven Joachim <svenjoac@gmx.de>
+Description: Change the --disable-root-environ configure option behavior
+ By default, the --disable-root-environ option forbids program run by
+ the superuser to load custom terminfo entries.  This patch changes
+ that to only restrict programs running with elevated privileges,
+ matching the behavior of the --disable-setuid-environ option
+ introduced in the 20230423 upstream patchlevel.
+Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=1034372#29
+Bug: https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/bug-ncurses/2023-04/msg00018.html
+Forwarded: not-needed
+Last-Update: 2023-05-01
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://launchpad.net/ubuntu/+archive/primary/+sourcefiles/ncurses/6.2-0ubuntu2.1/ncurses_6.2-0ubuntu2.1.debian.tar.xz]
+CVE: CVE-2023-29491
+Signed-off-by: Virendra Thakur <virendrak@kpit.com>
+
+---
+ ncurses/tinfo/access.c |    2 --
+ 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/ncurses/tinfo/access.c
++++ b/ncurses/tinfo/access.c
+@@ -178,15 +178,16 @@ _nc_is_file_path(const char *path)
+ NCURSES_EXPORT(int)
+ _nc_env_access(void)
+ {
++    int result = TRUE;
++
+ #if HAVE_ISSETUGID
+     if (issetugid())
+-	return FALSE;
++	result = FALSE;
+ #elif HAVE_GETEUID && HAVE_GETEGID
+     if (getuid() != geteuid()
+ 	|| getgid() != getegid())
+-	return FALSE;
++	result = FALSE;
+ #endif
+-    /* ...finally, disallow root */
+-    return (getuid() != ROOT_UID) && (geteuid() != ROOT_UID);
++    return result;
+ }
+ #endif

meta/recipes-core/ncurses/files/CVE-2023-50495.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+Fix for CVE-2023-50495 from upstream:
+https://github.com/ThomasDickey/ncurses-snapshots/commit/efe9674ee14b14b788f9618941f97d31742f0adc
+
+Reference:
+https://invisible-island.net/archives/ncurses/6.4/ncurses-6.4-20230424.patch.gz
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [import from suse ftp.pbone.net/mirror/ftp.opensuse.org/update/leap-micro/5.3/sle/src/ncurses-6.1-150000.5.20.1.src.rpm
+Upstream commit https://github.com/ThomasDickey/ncurses-snapshots/commit/efe9674ee14b14b788f9618941f97d31742f0adc]
+CVE: CVE-2023-50495
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ ncurses/tinfo/parse_entry.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++-------
+ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ncurses/tinfo/parse_entry.c b/ncurses/tinfo/parse_entry.c
+index 23574b66..56ba9ae6 100644
+--- a/ncurses/tinfo/parse_entry.c
++++ b/ncurses/tinfo/parse_entry.c
+@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ _nc_extend_names(ENTRY * entryp, const char *name, int token_type)
+ 	/* Well, we are given a cancel for a name that we don't recognize */
+ 	return _nc_extend_names(entryp, name, STRING);
+     default:
+-	return 0;
++	return NULL;
+     }
+ 
+     /* Adjust the 'offset' (insertion-point) to keep the lists of extended
+@@ -142,6 +142,11 @@ _nc_extend_names(ENTRY * entryp, const char *name, int token_type)
+ 	for (last = (unsigned) (max - 1); last > tindex; last--)
+ 
+     if (!found) {
++	char *saved;
++
++	if ((saved = _nc_save_str(name)) == NULL)
++	    return NULL;
++
+ 	switch (token_type) {
+ 	case BOOLEAN:
+ 	    tp->ext_Booleans++;
+@@ -169,7 +174,7 @@ _nc_extend_names(ENTRY * entryp, const char *name, int token_type)
+ 	TYPE_REALLOC(char *, actual, tp->ext_Names);
+ 	while (--actual > offset)
+ 	    tp->ext_Names[actual] = tp->ext_Names[actual - 1];
+-	tp->ext_Names[offset] = _nc_save_str(name);
++	tp->ext_Names[offset] = saved;
+     }
+ 
+     temp.nte_name = tp->ext_Names[offset];
+@@ -337,6 +342,8 @@ _nc_parse_entry(ENTRY * entryp, int literal, bool silent)
+ 	bool is_use = (strcmp(_nc_curr_token.tk_name, "use") == 0);
+ 	bool is_tc = !is_use && (strcmp(_nc_curr_token.tk_name, "tc") == 0);
+ 	if (is_use || is_tc) {
++	    char *saved;
++
+ 	    if (!VALID_STRING(_nc_curr_token.tk_valstring)
+ 		|| _nc_curr_token.tk_valstring[0] == '\0') {
+ 		_nc_warning("missing name for use-clause");
+@@ -350,11 +357,13 @@ _nc_parse_entry(ENTRY * entryp, int literal, bool silent)
+ 			    _nc_curr_token.tk_valstring);
+ 		continue;
+ 	    }
+-	    entryp->uses[entryp->nuses].name = _nc_save_str(_nc_curr_token.tk_valstring);
+-	    entryp->uses[entryp->nuses].line = _nc_curr_line;
+-	    entryp->nuses++;
+-	    if (entryp->nuses > 1 && is_tc) {
+-		BAD_TC_USAGE
++	    if ((saved = _nc_save_str(_nc_curr_token.tk_valstring)) != NULL) {
++		entryp->uses[entryp->nuses].name = saved;
++		entryp->uses[entryp->nuses].line = _nc_curr_line;
++		entryp->nuses++;
++		if (entryp->nuses > 1 && is_tc) {
++		    BAD_TC_USAGE
++		}
+ 	    }
+ 	} else {
+ 	    /* normal token lookup */
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-core/ncurses/ncurses_6.2.bb

@@ -5,11 +5,13 @@ SRC_URI += "file://0001-tic-hang.patch \
            file://0003-gen-pkgconfig.in-Do-not-include-LDFLAGS-in-generated.patch \
            file://CVE-2021-39537.patch \
            file://CVE-2022-29458.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-29491.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-50495.patch \
            "
 # commit id corresponds to the revision in package version
 SRCREV = "a669013cd5e9d6434e5301348ea51baf306c93c4"
 S = "${WORKDIR}/git"
-EXTRA_OECONF += "--with-abi-version=5"
+EXTRA_OECONF += "--with-abi-version=5 --disable-root-environ"
 UPSTREAM_CHECK_GITTAGREGEX = "(?P<pver>\d+(\.\d+)+(\+\d+)*)"
 
 # This is needed when using patchlevel versions like 6.1+20181013

meta/recipes-core/zlib/zlib/CVE-2023-45853.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+From 73331a6a0481067628f065ffe87bb1d8f787d10c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Hans Wennborg <hans@chromium.org>
+Date: Fri, 18 Aug 2023 11:05:33 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Reject overflows of zip header fields in minizip.
+
+This checks the lengths of the file name, extra field, and comment
+that would be put in the zip headers, and rejects them if they are
+too long. They are each limited to 65535 bytes in length by the zip
+format. This also avoids possible buffer overflows if the provided
+fields are too long.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport from [https://github.com/madler/zlib/commit/73331a6a0481067628f065ffe87bb1d8f787d10c]
+CVE: CVE-2023-45853
+Signed-off-by: Ashish Sharma <asharma@mvista.com>
+---
+ contrib/minizip/zip.c | 11 +++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/contrib/minizip/zip.c b/contrib/minizip/zip.c
+index 3d3d4cadd..0446109b2 100644
+--- a/contrib/minizip/zip.c
++++ b/contrib/minizip/zip.c
+@@ -1043,6 +1043,17 @@ extern int ZEXPORT zipOpenNewFileInZip4_64(zipFile file, const char* filename, c
+       return ZIP_PARAMERROR;
+ #endif
+ 
++    // The filename and comment length must fit in 16 bits.
++    if ((filename!=NULL) && (strlen(filename)>0xffff))
++        return ZIP_PARAMERROR;
++    if ((comment!=NULL) && (strlen(comment)>0xffff))
++        return ZIP_PARAMERROR;
++    // The extra field length must fit in 16 bits. If the member also requires
++    // a Zip64 extra block, that will also need to fit within that 16-bit
++    // length, but that will be checked for later.
++    if ((size_extrafield_local>0xffff) || (size_extrafield_global>0xffff))
++        return ZIP_PARAMERROR;
++
+     zi = (zip64_internal*)file;
+ 
+     if (zi->in_opened_file_inzip == 1)

meta/recipes-core/zlib/zlib_1.2.11.bb

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${SOURCEFORGE_MIRROR}/libpng/${BPN}/${PV}/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.xz \
            file://CVE-2018-25032.patch \
            file://run-ptest \
 	    file://CVE-2022-37434.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-45853.patch \
            "
 UPSTREAM_CHECK_URI = "http://zlib.net/"
 
@@ -52,3 +53,6 @@ do_install_append_class-target() {
 }
 
 BBCLASSEXTEND = "native nativesdk"
+
+# this CVE is for cloudflare zlib
+CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2023-6992"

meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils-2.34.inc

@@ -54,5 +54,13 @@ SRC_URI = "\
      file://0001-CVE-2021-45078.patch \
      file://CVE-2022-38533.patch \
      file://CVE-2023-25588.patch \
+     file://CVE-2021-46174.patch \
+     file://CVE-2023-25584.patch \
+     file://CVE-2022-47007.patch \
+     file://CVE-2022-47008.patch \
+     file://CVE-2022-47010.patch \
+     file://CVE-2022-47011.patch \
+     file://CVE-2022-48063.patch \
+     file://CVE-2022-47695.patch \
 "
 S  = "${WORKDIR}/git"

meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/CVE-2021-46174.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+From 46322722ad40ac1a75672ae0f62f4969195f1368 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alan Modra <amodra@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 20 Jan 2022 13:58:38 +1030
+Subject: [PATCH] PR28753, buffer overflow in read_section_stabs_debugging_info
+
+	PR 28753
+	* rddbg.c (read_section_stabs_debugging_info): Don't read past
+	end of section when concatentating stab strings.
+
+CVE: CVE-2021-46174
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://sourceware.org/git/gitweb.cgi?p=binutils-gdb.git;h=cad4d6b91e97]
+
+(cherry picked from commit 085b299b71721e15f5c5c5344dc3e4e4536dadba)
+(cherry picked from commit cad4d6b91e97b6962807d33c04ed7e7797788438)
+Signed-off-by: poojitha adireddy <pooadire@cisco.com>
+---
+ binutils/rddbg.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/binutils/rddbg.c b/binutils/rddbg.c
+index 72e934055b5..5e76d94a3c4 100644
+--- a/binutils/rddbg.c
++++ b/binutils/rddbg.c
+@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ read_section_stabs_debugging_info (bfd *abfd, asymbol **syms, long symcount,
+ 		     an attempt to read the byte before 'strings' would occur.  */
+ 		  while ((len = strlen (s)) > 0
+ 			 && s[len  - 1] == '\\'
+-			 && stab + 12 < stabs + stabsize)
++			 && stab + 16 <= stabs + stabsize)
+ 		    {
+ 		      char *p;
+ 
+-- 
+2.23.1
+

meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/CVE-2022-47007.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+From 0ebc886149c22aceaf8ed74267821a59ca9d03eb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alan Modra <amodra@gmail.com>
+Date: Fri, 17 Jun 2022 09:00:41 +0930
+Subject: [PATCH] PR29254, memory leak in stab_demangle_v3_arg
+
+	PR 29254
+	* stabs.c (stab_demangle_v3_arg): Free dt on failure path.
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://sourceware.org/git/?p=binutils-gdb.git;a=commitdiff_plain;h=0ebc886149c22aceaf8ed74267821a59ca9d03eb]
+CVE: CVE-2022-47007
+Signed-off-by: Virendra Thakur <virendrak@kpit.com>
+Comment: Patch refreshed based on codebase.
+---
+ binutils/stabs.c | 5 ++++-
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/binutils/stabs.c b/binutils/stabs.c
+index 2b5241637c1..796ff85b86a 100644
+--- a/binutils/stabs.c
++++ b/binutils/stabs.c
+@@ -5476,7 +5476,10 @@
+ 					  dc->u.s_binary.right,
+ 					  &varargs);
+ 	if (pargs == NULL)
+-	  return NULL;
++         {
++           free (dt);
++           return NULL;
++         }
+ 
+ 	return debug_make_function_type (dhandle, dt, pargs, varargs);
+       }
+

meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/CVE-2022-47008.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+From d6e1d48c83b165c129cb0aa78905f7ca80a1f682 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alan Modra <amodra@gmail.com>
+Date: Fri, 17 Jun 2022 09:13:38 +0930
+Subject: [PATCH] PR29255, memory leak in make_tempdir
+
+	PR 29255
+	* bucomm.c (make_tempdir, make_tempname): Free template on all
+	failure paths.
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://sourceware.org/git/?p=binutils-gdb.git;a=commitdiff_plain;h=d6e1d48c83b165c129cb0aa78905f7ca80a1f682]
+CVE: CVE-2022-47008
+Signed-off-by: Virendra Thakur <virendrak@kpit.com>
+Comment: Patch refreshed based on codebase.
+---
+ binutils/bucomm.c | 20 +++++++++++---------
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/binutils/bucomm.c b/binutils/bucomm.c
+index fdc2209df9c..4395cb9f7f5 100644
+--- a/binutils/bucomm.c
++++ b/binutils/bucomm.c
+@@ -542,8 +542,9 @@
+ #else
+   tmpname = mktemp (tmpname);
+   if (tmpname == NULL)
+-    return NULL;
+-  fd = open (tmpname, O_RDWR | O_CREAT | O_EXCL, 0600);
++    fd = -1;
++  else
++    fd = open (tmpname, O_RDWR | O_CREAT | O_EXCL, 0600);
+ #endif
+   if (fd == -1)
+     {
+@@ -561,22 +562,23 @@
+ make_tempdir (const char *filename)
+ {
+   char *tmpname = template_in_dir (filename);
++  char *ret;
+ 
+ #ifdef HAVE_MKDTEMP
+-  return mkdtemp (tmpname);
++  ret = mkdtemp (tmpname);
+ #else
+-  tmpname = mktemp (tmpname);
+-  if (tmpname == NULL)
+-    return NULL;
++  ret = mktemp (tmpname);
+ #if defined (_WIN32) && !defined (__CYGWIN32__)
+   if (mkdir (tmpname) != 0)
+-    return NULL;
++    ret = NULL;
+ #else
+   if (mkdir (tmpname, 0700) != 0)
+-    return NULL;
++    ret = NULL;
+ #endif
+-  return tmpname;
+ #endif
++  if (ret == NULL)
++    free (tmpname);
++  return ret;
+ }
+ 
+ /* Parse a string into a VMA, with a fatal error if it can't be
+

meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/CVE-2022-47010.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+From 0d02e70b197c786f26175b9a73f94e01d14abdab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alan Modra <amodra@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 20 Jun 2022 10:39:31 +0930
+Subject: [PATCH] PR29262, memory leak in pr_function_type
+
+	PR 29262
+	* prdbg.c (pr_function_type): Free "s" on failure path.
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://sourceware.org/git/?p=binutils-gdb.git;a=commitdiff_plain;h=0d02e70b197c786f26175b9a73f94e01d14abdab]
+CVE: CVE-2022-47010
+Signed-off-by: Virendra Thakur <virendrak@kpit.com>
+Comment: Patch refreshed based on codebase.
+---
+ binutils/prdbg.c | 7 ++-----
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/binutils/prdbg.c b/binutils/prdbg.c
+index c1e41628d26..bb42a5b6c2d 100644
+--- a/binutils/prdbg.c
++++ b/binutils/prdbg.c
+@@ -778,12 +778,9 @@
+ 
+   strcat (s, ")");
+ 
+-  if (! substitute_type (info, s))
+-    return FALSE;
+-
++  bfd_boolean ret = substitute_type (info, s);
+   free (s);
+-
+-  return TRUE;
++  return ret;
+ }
+ 
+ /* Turn the top type on the stack into a reference to that type.  */

meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/CVE-2022-47011.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+From 8a24927bc8dbf6beac2000593b21235c3796dc35 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alan Modra <amodra@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 20 Jun 2022 10:39:13 +0930
+Subject: [PATCH] PR29261, memory leak in parse_stab_struct_fields
+
+	PR 29261
+	* stabs.c (parse_stab_struct_fields): Free "fields" on failure path.
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://sourceware.org/git/?p=binutils-gdb.git;a=commitdiff_plain;h=8a24927bc8dbf6beac2000593b21235c3796dc35]
+CVE: CVE-2022-47011
+Signed-off-by: Virendra Thakur <virendrak@kpit.com>
+Comment: Patch refreshed based on codebase.
+---
+ binutils/stabs.c | 5 ++++-
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/binutils/stabs.c b/binutils/stabs.c
+index 796ff85b86a..bf3f578cbcc 100644
+--- a/binutils/stabs.c
++++ b/binutils/stabs.c
+@@ -2368,7 +2368,10 @@
+ 
+       if (! parse_stab_one_struct_field (dhandle, info, pp, p, fields + c,
+ 					 staticsp, p_end))
+-	return FALSE;
++       {
++         free (fields);
++         return FALSE;
++       }
+ 
+       ++c;
+     }

meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/CVE-2022-47695.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+From 3d3af4ba39e892b1c544d667ca241846bc3df386 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alan Modra <amodra@gmail.com>
+Date: Sun, 4 Dec 2022 22:15:40 +1030
+Subject: [PATCH] PR29846, segmentation fault in objdump.c compare_symbols
+
+Fixes a fuzzed object file problem where plt relocs were manipulated
+in such a way that two synthetic symbols were generated at the same
+plt location.  Won't occur in real object files.
+
+	PR 29846
+	PR 20337
+	* objdump.c (compare_symbols): Test symbol flags to exclude
+	section and synthetic symbols before attempting to check flavour.
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://sourceware.org/git/?p=binutils-gdb.git;a=commitdiff;h=3d3af4ba39e892b1c544d667ca241846bc3df386]
+CVE: CVE-2022-47695
+Signed-off-by: Virendra Thakur <virendrak@kpit.com>
+Comment: Patch refreshed based on codebase.
+---
+ binutils/objdump.c | 23 ++++++++++-------------
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/binutils/objdump.c b/binutils/objdump.c
+index e8481b2d928..d95c8b68bf0 100644
+--- a/binutils/objdump.c
++++ b/binutils/objdump.c
+@@ -935,20 +935,17 @@
+ 	return 1;
+     }
+ 
+-  if (bfd_get_flavour (bfd_asymbol_bfd (a)) == bfd_target_elf_flavour
++  /* Sort larger size ELF symbols before smaller.  See PR20337.  */
++  bfd_vma asz = 0;
++  if ((a->flags & (BSF_SECTION_SYM | BSF_SYNTHETIC)) == 0
++      && bfd_get_flavour (bfd_asymbol_bfd (a)) == bfd_target_elf_flavour)
++    asz = ((elf_symbol_type *) a)->internal_elf_sym.st_size;
++  bfd_vma bsz = 0;
++  if ((b->flags & (BSF_SECTION_SYM | BSF_SYNTHETIC)) == 0
+       && bfd_get_flavour (bfd_asymbol_bfd (b)) == bfd_target_elf_flavour)
+-    {
+-      bfd_vma asz, bsz;
+-
+-      asz = 0;
+-      if ((a->flags & (BSF_SECTION_SYM | BSF_SYNTHETIC)) == 0)
+-	asz = ((elf_symbol_type *) a)->internal_elf_sym.st_size;
+-      bsz = 0;
+-      if ((b->flags & (BSF_SECTION_SYM | BSF_SYNTHETIC)) == 0)
+-	bsz = ((elf_symbol_type *) b)->internal_elf_sym.st_size;
+-      if (asz != bsz)
+-	return asz > bsz ? -1 : 1;
+-    }
++    bsz = ((elf_symbol_type *) b)->internal_elf_sym.st_size;
++  if (asz != bsz)
++    return asz > bsz ? -1 : 1;
+ 
+   /* Symbols that start with '.' might be section names, so sort them
+      after symbols that don't start with '.'.  */
+

meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/CVE-2022-48063.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+From 75393a2d54bcc40053e5262a3de9d70c5ebfbbfd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Nick Clifton <nickc@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 21 Dec 2022 11:51:23 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix an attempt to allocate an unreasonably large amount of
+ memory when parsing a corrupt ELF file.
+
+	PR  29924
+	* objdump.c (load_specific_debug_section): Check for excessively
+	large sections.
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://sourceware.org/git/gitweb.cgi?p=binutils-gdb.git;h=75393a2d54bcc40053e5262a3de9d70c5ebfbbfd]
+CVE: CVE-2022-48063
+Signed-off-by: Virendra Thakur <virendrak@kpit.com>
+Comment: Patch refreshed based on codebase.
+---
+ binutils/ChangeLog | 6 ++++++
+ binutils/objdump.c | 4 +++-
+ 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/binutils/ChangeLog b/binutils/ChangeLog
+index e7f918d3f65..020e09f3700 100644
+--- a/binutils/ChangeLog
++++ b/binutils/ChangeLog
+@@ -1,3 +1,9 @@
++2022-12-21  Nick Clifton  <nickc@redhat.com>
++
++	PR  29924
++	* objdump.c (load_specific_debug_section): Check for excessively
++	large sections.
++
+ 2021-02-11  Alan Modra  <amodra@gmail.com>
+ 
+ 	   PR 27290
+
+diff --git a/binutils/objdump.c b/binutils/objdump.c
+index d51abbe3858..2eb02de0e76 100644
+--- a/binutils/objdump.c
++++ b/binutils/objdump.c
+@@ -3479,7 +3479,9 @@
+   section->size = bfd_section_size (sec);
+   /* PR 24360: On 32-bit hosts sizeof (size_t) < sizeof (bfd_size_type). */
+   alloced = amt = section->size + 1;
+-  if (alloced != amt || alloced == 0)
++  if (alloced != amt
++      || alloced == 0
++      || (bfd_get_size (abfd) != 0 && alloced >= bfd_get_size (abfd)))
+     {
+       section->start = NULL;
+       free_debug_section (debug);
+

meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/CVE-2023-25584.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,530 @@
+CVE: CVE-2023-25584
+Upstream-Status: Backport [ import from ubuntu http://archive.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/pool/main/b/binutils/binutils_2.34-6ubuntu1.7.debian.tar.xz  upstream  https://sourceware.org/git/gitweb.cgi?p=binutils-gdb.git;h=77c225bdeb410cf60da804879ad41622f5f1aa44 ]
+Signed-off-by: Lee Chee Yang <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
+
+[Ubuntu note: this is backport of the original patch, no major changes just
+ fix this patch for this release]
+From 77c225bdeb410cf60da804879ad41622f5f1aa44 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alan Modra <amodra@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 12 Dec 2022 18:28:49 +1030
+Subject: [PATCH] Lack of bounds checking in vms-alpha.c parse_module
+
+	PR 29873
+	PR 29874
+	PR 29875
+	PR 29876
+	PR 29877
+	PR 29878
+	PR 29879
+	PR 29880
+	PR 29881
+	PR 29882
+	PR 29883
+	PR 29884
+	PR 29885
+	PR 29886
+	PR 29887
+	PR 29888
+	PR 29889
+	PR 29890
+	PR 29891
+	* vms-alpha.c (parse_module): Make length param bfd_size_type.
+	Delete length == -1 checks.  Sanity check record_length.
+	Sanity check DST__K_MODBEG, DST__K_RTNBEG, DST__K_RTNEND lengths.
+	Sanity check DST__K_SOURCE and DST__K_LINE_NUM elements
+	before accessing.
+	(build_module_list): Pass dst_section size to parse_module.
+---
+ bfd/vms-alpha.c | 213 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
+ 1 file changed, 168 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-)
+
+--- binutils-2.34.orig/bfd/vms-alpha.c
++++ binutils-2.34/bfd/vms-alpha.c
+@@ -4267,7 +4267,7 @@ new_module (bfd *abfd)
+ 
+ static void
+ parse_module (bfd *abfd, struct module *module, unsigned char *ptr,
+-	      int length)
++	      bfd_size_type length)
+ {
+   unsigned char *maxptr = ptr + length;
+   unsigned char *src_ptr, *pcl_ptr;
+@@ -4284,7 +4284,7 @@ parse_module (bfd *abfd, struct module *
+   curr_line = (struct lineinfo *) bfd_zalloc (abfd, sizeof (struct lineinfo));
+   module->line_table = curr_line;
+ 
+-  while (length == -1 || ptr < maxptr)
++  while (ptr < maxptr)
+     {
+       /* The first byte is not counted in the recorded length.  */
+       int rec_length = bfd_getl16 (ptr) + 1;
+@@ -4292,15 +4292,19 @@ parse_module (bfd *abfd, struct module *
+ 
+       vms_debug2 ((2, "DST record: leng %d, type %d\n", rec_length, rec_type));
+ 
+-      if (length == -1 && rec_type == DST__K_MODEND)
++      if (rec_length > maxptr - ptr)
++	break;
++      if (rec_type == DST__K_MODEND)
+ 	break;
+ 
+       switch (rec_type)
+ 	{
+ 	case DST__K_MODBEG:
++	  if (rec_length <= DST_S_B_MODBEG_NAME)
++	    break;
+ 	  module->name
+ 	    = _bfd_vms_save_counted_string (abfd, ptr + DST_S_B_MODBEG_NAME,
+-					    maxptr - (ptr + DST_S_B_MODBEG_NAME));
++					    rec_length - DST_S_B_MODBEG_NAME);
+ 
+ 	  curr_pc = 0;
+ 	  prev_pc = 0;
+@@ -4314,11 +4318,13 @@ parse_module (bfd *abfd, struct module *
+ 	  break;
+ 
+ 	case DST__K_RTNBEG:
++	  if (rec_length <= DST_S_B_RTNBEG_NAME)
++	    break;
+ 	  funcinfo = (struct funcinfo *)
+ 	    bfd_zalloc (abfd, sizeof (struct funcinfo));
+ 	  funcinfo->name
+ 	    = _bfd_vms_save_counted_string (abfd, ptr + DST_S_B_RTNBEG_NAME,
+-					    maxptr - (ptr + DST_S_B_RTNBEG_NAME));
++					    rec_length - DST_S_B_RTNBEG_NAME);
+ 	  funcinfo->low = bfd_getl32 (ptr + DST_S_L_RTNBEG_ADDRESS);
+ 	  funcinfo->next = module->func_table;
+ 	  module->func_table = funcinfo;
+@@ -4328,6 +4334,8 @@ parse_module (bfd *abfd, struct module *
+ 	  break;
+ 
+ 	case DST__K_RTNEND:
++	  if (rec_length < DST_S_L_RTNEND_SIZE + 4)
++	    break;
+ 	  module->func_table->high = module->func_table->low
+ 	    + bfd_getl32 (ptr + DST_S_L_RTNEND_SIZE) - 1;
+ 
+@@ -4358,13 +4366,66 @@ parse_module (bfd *abfd, struct module *
+ 
+ 	  vms_debug2 ((3, "source info\n"));
+ 
+-	  while (src_ptr < ptr + rec_length)
++	  while (src_ptr - ptr < rec_length)
+ 	    {
+ 	      int cmd = src_ptr[0], cmd_length, data;
+ 
+ 	      switch (cmd)
+ 		{
+ 		case DST__K_SRC_DECLFILE:
++		  if (src_ptr - ptr + DST_S_B_SRC_DF_LENGTH >= rec_length)
++		    cmd_length = 0x10000;
++		  else
++		    cmd_length = src_ptr[DST_S_B_SRC_DF_LENGTH] + 2;
++		  break;
++
++		case DST__K_SRC_DEFLINES_B:
++		  cmd_length = 2;
++		  break;
++
++		case DST__K_SRC_DEFLINES_W:
++		  cmd_length = 3;
++		  break;
++
++		case DST__K_SRC_INCRLNUM_B:
++		  cmd_length = 2;
++		  break;
++
++		case DST__K_SRC_SETFILE:
++		  cmd_length = 3;
++		  break;
++
++		case DST__K_SRC_SETLNUM_L:
++		  cmd_length = 5;
++		  break;
++
++		case DST__K_SRC_SETLNUM_W:
++		  cmd_length = 3;
++		  break;
++
++		case DST__K_SRC_SETREC_L:
++		  cmd_length = 5;
++		  break;
++
++		case DST__K_SRC_SETREC_W:
++		  cmd_length = 3;
++		  break;
++
++		case DST__K_SRC_FORMFEED:
++		  cmd_length = 1;
++		  break;
++
++		default:
++		  cmd_length = 2;
++		  break;
++		}
++
++	      if (src_ptr - ptr + cmd_length > rec_length)
++		break;
++
++	      switch (cmd)
++		{
++		case DST__K_SRC_DECLFILE:
+ 		  {
+ 		    unsigned int fileid
+ 		      = bfd_getl16 (src_ptr + DST_S_W_SRC_DF_FILEID);
+@@ -4384,7 +4445,6 @@ parse_module (bfd *abfd, struct module *
+ 
+ 		    module->file_table [fileid].name = filename;
+ 		    module->file_table [fileid].srec = 1;
+-		    cmd_length = src_ptr[DST_S_B_SRC_DF_LENGTH] + 2;
+ 		    vms_debug2 ((4, "DST_S_C_SRC_DECLFILE: %d, %s\n",
+ 				 fileid, module->file_table [fileid].name));
+ 		  }
+@@ -4401,7 +4461,6 @@ parse_module (bfd *abfd, struct module *
+ 		  srec->sfile = curr_srec->sfile;
+ 		  curr_srec->next = srec;
+ 		  curr_srec = srec;
+-		  cmd_length = 2;
+ 		  vms_debug2 ((4, "DST_S_C_SRC_DEFLINES_B: %d\n", data));
+ 		  break;
+ 
+@@ -4416,14 +4475,12 @@ parse_module (bfd *abfd, struct module *
+ 		  srec->sfile = curr_srec->sfile;
+ 		  curr_srec->next = srec;
+ 		  curr_srec = srec;
+-		  cmd_length = 3;
+ 		  vms_debug2 ((4, "DST_S_C_SRC_DEFLINES_W: %d\n", data));
+ 		  break;
+ 
+ 		case DST__K_SRC_INCRLNUM_B:
+ 		  data = src_ptr[DST_S_B_SRC_UNSBYTE];
+ 		  curr_srec->line += data;
+-		  cmd_length = 2;
+ 		  vms_debug2 ((4, "DST_S_C_SRC_INCRLNUM_B: %d\n", data));
+ 		  break;
+ 
+@@ -4431,21 +4488,18 @@ parse_module (bfd *abfd, struct module *
+ 		  data = bfd_getl16 (src_ptr + DST_S_W_SRC_UNSWORD);
+ 		  curr_srec->sfile = data;
+ 		  curr_srec->srec = module->file_table[data].srec;
+-		  cmd_length = 3;
+ 		  vms_debug2 ((4, "DST_S_C_SRC_SETFILE: %d\n", data));
+ 		  break;
+ 
+ 		case DST__K_SRC_SETLNUM_L:
+ 		  data = bfd_getl32 (src_ptr + DST_S_L_SRC_UNSLONG);
+ 		  curr_srec->line = data;
+-		  cmd_length = 5;
+ 		  vms_debug2 ((4, "DST_S_C_SRC_SETLNUM_L: %d\n", data));
+ 		  break;
+ 
+ 		case DST__K_SRC_SETLNUM_W:
+ 		  data = bfd_getl16 (src_ptr + DST_S_W_SRC_UNSWORD);
+ 		  curr_srec->line = data;
+-		  cmd_length = 3;
+ 		  vms_debug2 ((4, "DST_S_C_SRC_SETLNUM_W: %d\n", data));
+ 		  break;
+ 
+@@ -4453,7 +4507,6 @@ parse_module (bfd *abfd, struct module *
+ 		  data = bfd_getl32 (src_ptr + DST_S_L_SRC_UNSLONG);
+ 		  curr_srec->srec = data;
+ 		  module->file_table[curr_srec->sfile].srec = data;
+-		  cmd_length = 5;
+ 		  vms_debug2 ((4, "DST_S_C_SRC_SETREC_L: %d\n", data));
+ 		  break;
+ 
+@@ -4461,19 +4514,16 @@ parse_module (bfd *abfd, struct module *
+ 		  data = bfd_getl16 (src_ptr + DST_S_W_SRC_UNSWORD);
+ 		  curr_srec->srec = data;
+ 		  module->file_table[curr_srec->sfile].srec = data;
+-		  cmd_length = 3;
+ 		  vms_debug2 ((4, "DST_S_C_SRC_SETREC_W: %d\n", data));
+ 		  break;
+ 
+ 		case DST__K_SRC_FORMFEED:
+-		  cmd_length = 1;
+ 		  vms_debug2 ((4, "DST_S_C_SRC_FORMFEED\n"));
+ 		  break;
+ 
+ 		default:
+ 		  _bfd_error_handler (_("unknown source command %d"),
+ 				      cmd);
+-		  cmd_length = 2;
+ 		  break;
+ 		}
+ 
+@@ -4486,7 +4536,7 @@ parse_module (bfd *abfd, struct module *
+ 
+ 	  vms_debug2 ((3, "line info\n"));
+ 
+-	  while (pcl_ptr < ptr + rec_length)
++	  while (pcl_ptr - ptr < rec_length)
+ 	    {
+ 	      /* The command byte is signed so we must sign-extend it.  */
+ 	      int cmd = ((signed char *)pcl_ptr)[0], cmd_length, data;
+@@ -4494,10 +4544,106 @@ parse_module (bfd *abfd, struct module *
+ 	      switch (cmd)
+ 		{
+ 		case DST__K_DELTA_PC_W:
++		  cmd_length = 3;
++		  break;
++
++		case DST__K_DELTA_PC_L:
++		  cmd_length = 5;
++		  break;
++
++		case DST__K_INCR_LINUM:
++		  cmd_length = 2;
++		  break;
++
++		case DST__K_INCR_LINUM_W:
++		  cmd_length = 3;
++		  break;
++
++		case DST__K_INCR_LINUM_L:
++		  cmd_length = 5;
++		  break;
++
++		case DST__K_SET_LINUM_INCR:
++		  cmd_length = 2;
++		  break;
++
++		case DST__K_SET_LINUM_INCR_W:
++		  cmd_length = 3;
++		  break;
++
++		case DST__K_RESET_LINUM_INCR:
++		  cmd_length = 1;
++		  break;
++
++		case DST__K_BEG_STMT_MODE:
++		  cmd_length = 1;
++		  break;
++
++		case DST__K_END_STMT_MODE:
++		  cmd_length = 1;
++		  break;
++
++		case DST__K_SET_LINUM_B:
++		  cmd_length = 2;
++		  break;
++
++		case DST__K_SET_LINUM:
++		  cmd_length = 3;
++		  break;
++
++		case DST__K_SET_LINUM_L:
++		  cmd_length = 5;
++		  break;
++
++		case DST__K_SET_PC:
++		  cmd_length = 2;
++		  break;
++
++		case DST__K_SET_PC_W:
++		  cmd_length = 3;
++		  break;
++
++		case DST__K_SET_PC_L:
++		  cmd_length = 5;
++		  break;
++
++		case DST__K_SET_STMTNUM:
++		  cmd_length = 2;
++		  break;
++
++		case DST__K_TERM:
++		  cmd_length = 2;
++		  break;
++
++		case DST__K_TERM_W:
++		  cmd_length = 3;
++		  break;
++
++		case DST__K_TERM_L:
++		  cmd_length = 5;
++		  break;
++
++		case DST__K_SET_ABS_PC:
++		  cmd_length = 5;
++		  break;
++
++		default:
++		  if (cmd <= 0)
++		    cmd_length = 1;
++		  else
++		    cmd_length = 2;
++		  break;
++		}
++
++	      if (pcl_ptr - ptr + cmd_length > rec_length)
++		break;
++
++	      switch (cmd)
++		{
++		case DST__K_DELTA_PC_W:
+ 		  data = bfd_getl16 (pcl_ptr + DST_S_W_PCLINE_UNSWORD);
+ 		  curr_pc += data;
+ 		  curr_linenum += 1;
+-		  cmd_length = 3;
+ 		  vms_debug2 ((4, "DST__K_DELTA_PC_W: %d\n", data));
+ 		  break;
+ 
+@@ -4505,131 +4651,111 @@ parse_module (bfd *abfd, struct module *
+ 		  data = bfd_getl32 (pcl_ptr + DST_S_L_PCLINE_UNSLONG);
+ 		  curr_pc += data;
+ 		  curr_linenum += 1;
+-		  cmd_length = 5;
+ 		  vms_debug2 ((4, "DST__K_DELTA_PC_L: %d\n", data));
+ 		  break;
+ 
+ 		case DST__K_INCR_LINUM:
+ 		  data = pcl_ptr[DST_S_B_PCLINE_UNSBYTE];
+ 		  curr_linenum += data;
+-		  cmd_length = 2;
+ 		  vms_debug2 ((4, "DST__K_INCR_LINUM: %d\n", data));
+ 		  break;
+ 
+ 		case DST__K_INCR_LINUM_W:
+ 		  data = bfd_getl16 (pcl_ptr + DST_S_W_PCLINE_UNSWORD);
+ 		  curr_linenum += data;
+-		  cmd_length = 3;
+ 		  vms_debug2 ((4, "DST__K_INCR_LINUM_W: %d\n", data));
+ 		  break;
+ 
+ 		case DST__K_INCR_LINUM_L:
+ 		  data = bfd_getl32 (pcl_ptr + DST_S_L_PCLINE_UNSLONG);
+ 		  curr_linenum += data;
+-		  cmd_length = 5;
+ 		  vms_debug2 ((4, "DST__K_INCR_LINUM_L: %d\n", data));
+ 		  break;
+ 
+ 		case DST__K_SET_LINUM_INCR:
+ 		  _bfd_error_handler
+ 		    (_("%s not implemented"), "DST__K_SET_LINUM_INCR");
+-		  cmd_length = 2;
+ 		  break;
+ 
+ 		case DST__K_SET_LINUM_INCR_W:
+ 		  _bfd_error_handler
+ 		    (_("%s not implemented"), "DST__K_SET_LINUM_INCR_W");
+-		  cmd_length = 3;
+ 		  break;
+ 
+ 		case DST__K_RESET_LINUM_INCR:
+ 		  _bfd_error_handler
+ 		    (_("%s not implemented"), "DST__K_RESET_LINUM_INCR");
+-		  cmd_length = 1;
+ 		  break;
+ 
+ 		case DST__K_BEG_STMT_MODE:
+ 		  _bfd_error_handler
+ 		    (_("%s not implemented"), "DST__K_BEG_STMT_MODE");
+-		  cmd_length = 1;
+ 		  break;
+ 
+ 		case DST__K_END_STMT_MODE:
+ 		  _bfd_error_handler
+ 		    (_("%s not implemented"), "DST__K_END_STMT_MODE");
+-		  cmd_length = 1;
+ 		  break;
+ 
+ 		case DST__K_SET_LINUM_B:
+ 		  data = pcl_ptr[DST_S_B_PCLINE_UNSBYTE];
+ 		  curr_linenum = data;
+-		  cmd_length = 2;
+ 		  vms_debug2 ((4, "DST__K_SET_LINUM_B: %d\n", data));
+ 		  break;
+ 
+ 		case DST__K_SET_LINUM:
+ 		  data = bfd_getl16 (pcl_ptr + DST_S_W_PCLINE_UNSWORD);
+ 		  curr_linenum = data;
+-		  cmd_length = 3;
+ 		  vms_debug2 ((4, "DST__K_SET_LINE_NUM: %d\n", data));
+ 		  break;
+ 
+ 		case DST__K_SET_LINUM_L:
+ 		  data = bfd_getl32 (pcl_ptr + DST_S_L_PCLINE_UNSLONG);
+ 		  curr_linenum = data;
+-		  cmd_length = 5;
+ 		  vms_debug2 ((4, "DST__K_SET_LINUM_L: %d\n", data));
+ 		  break;
+ 
+ 		case DST__K_SET_PC:
+ 		  _bfd_error_handler
+ 		    (_("%s not implemented"), "DST__K_SET_PC");
+-		  cmd_length = 2;
+ 		  break;
+ 
+ 		case DST__K_SET_PC_W:
+ 		  _bfd_error_handler
+ 		    (_("%s not implemented"), "DST__K_SET_PC_W");
+-		  cmd_length = 3;
+ 		  break;
+ 
+ 		case DST__K_SET_PC_L:
+ 		  _bfd_error_handler
+ 		    (_("%s not implemented"), "DST__K_SET_PC_L");
+-		  cmd_length = 5;
+ 		  break;
+ 
+ 		case DST__K_SET_STMTNUM:
+ 		  _bfd_error_handler
+ 		    (_("%s not implemented"), "DST__K_SET_STMTNUM");
+-		  cmd_length = 2;
+ 		  break;
+ 
+ 		case DST__K_TERM:
+ 		  data = pcl_ptr[DST_S_B_PCLINE_UNSBYTE];
+ 		  curr_pc += data;
+-		  cmd_length = 2;
+ 		  vms_debug2 ((4, "DST__K_TERM: %d\n", data));
+ 		  break;
+ 
+ 		case DST__K_TERM_W:
+ 		  data = bfd_getl16 (pcl_ptr + DST_S_W_PCLINE_UNSWORD);
+ 		  curr_pc += data;
+-		  cmd_length = 3;
+ 		  vms_debug2 ((4, "DST__K_TERM_W: %d\n", data));
+ 		  break;
+ 
+ 		case DST__K_TERM_L:
+ 		  data = bfd_getl32 (pcl_ptr + DST_S_L_PCLINE_UNSLONG);
+ 		  curr_pc += data;
+-		  cmd_length = 5;
+ 		  vms_debug2 ((4, "DST__K_TERM_L: %d\n", data));
+ 		  break;
+ 
+ 		case DST__K_SET_ABS_PC:
+ 		  data = bfd_getl32 (pcl_ptr + DST_S_L_PCLINE_UNSLONG);
+ 		  curr_pc = data;
+-		  cmd_length = 5;
+ 		  vms_debug2 ((4, "DST__K_SET_ABS_PC: 0x%x\n", data));
+ 		  break;
+ 
+@@ -4638,15 +4764,11 @@ parse_module (bfd *abfd, struct module *
+ 		    {
+ 		      curr_pc -= cmd;
+ 		      curr_linenum += 1;
+-		      cmd_length = 1;
+ 		      vms_debug2 ((4, "bump pc to 0x%lx and line to %d\n",
+ 				   (unsigned long)curr_pc, curr_linenum));
+ 		    }
+ 		  else
+-		    {
+-		      _bfd_error_handler (_("unknown line command %d"), cmd);
+-		      cmd_length = 2;
+-		    }
++		    _bfd_error_handler (_("unknown line command %d"), cmd);
+ 		  break;
+ 		}
+ 
+@@ -4778,7 +4900,7 @@ build_module_list (bfd *abfd)
+ 	return NULL;
+ 
+       module = new_module (abfd);
+-      parse_module (abfd, module, PRIV (dst_section)->contents, -1);
++      parse_module (abfd, module, PRIV (dst_section)->contents, PRIV (dst_section)->size);
+       list = module;
+     }
+ 

meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/CVE-2023-25588.patch

@@ -13,7 +13,10 @@ anyway, so get rid of them.  Also, simplify and correct sanity checks.
 ---
 Upstream-Status: Backport from [https://sourceware.org/git/?p=binutils-gdb.git;a=patch;h=d12f8998d2d086f0a6606589e5aedb7147e6f2f1]
 CVE: CVE-2023-25588
+CVE: CVE-2022-47696
+
 Signed-off-by: Ashish Sharma <asharma@mvista.com>
+Signed-off-by: poojitha adireddy <pooadire@cisco.com>
 
  bfd/mach-o.c | 72 ++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------------
  1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-)

meta/recipes-devtools/cmake/cmake/OEToolchainConfig.cmake

@@ -19,3 +19,6 @@ file( GLOB toolchain_config_files "${CMAKE_TOOLCHAIN_FILE}.d/*.cmake" )
 foreach(config ${toolchain_config_files})
     include(${config})
 endforeach()
+
+unset(CMAKE_C_IMPLICIT_INCLUDE_DIRECTORIES)
+unset(CMAKE_CXX_IMPLICIT_INCLUDE_DIRECTORIES)

meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/gcc-shared-source.inc

@@ -9,3 +9,6 @@ SRC_URI = ""
 
 do_configure[depends] += "gcc-source-${PV}:do_preconfigure"
 do_populate_lic[depends] += "gcc-source-${PV}:do_unpack"
+
+# patch is available via gcc-source recipe
+CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2023-4039"

meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.14.inc

@@ -71,7 +71,8 @@ SRC_URI += "\
     file://CVE-2023-29402.patch \
     file://CVE-2023-29404.patch \
     file://CVE-2023-29400.patch \
-    file://CVE-2023-29406.patch \
+    file://CVE-2023-29406-1.patch \
+    file://CVE-2023-29406-2.patch \
     file://CVE-2023-29409.patch \
     file://CVE-2022-41725-pre1.patch \
     file://CVE-2022-41725-pre2.patch \
@@ -82,6 +83,15 @@ SRC_URI += "\
     file://CVE-2023-24536_3.patch \
     file://CVE-2023-39318.patch \
     file://CVE-2023-39319.patch \
+    file://CVE-2023-39326.patch \
+    file://CVE-2023-45287-pre1.patch \
+    file://CVE-2023-45287-pre2.patch \
+    file://CVE-2023-45287-pre3.patch \
+    file://CVE-2023-45287.patch \
+    file://CVE-2023-45289.patch \
+    file://CVE-2023-45290.patch \
+    file://CVE-2024-24785.patch \
+    file://CVE-2024-24784.patch \
 "
 
 SRC_URI_append_libc-musl = " file://0009-ld-replace-glibc-dynamic-linker-with-musl.patch"

meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.14/CVE-2023-29406-2.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+From c08a5fa413a34111c9a37fd9e545de27ab0978b1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
+Date: Wed, 19 Jul 2023 10:30:46 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] [release-branch.go1.19] net/http: permit requests with
+ invalid Host headers
+
+Historically, the Transport has silently truncated invalid
+Host headers at the first '/' or ' ' character. CL 506996 changed
+this behavior to reject invalid Host headers entirely.
+Unfortunately, Docker appears to rely on the previous behavior.
+
+When sending a HTTP/1 request with an invalid Host, send an empty
+Host header. This is safer than truncation: If you care about the
+Host, then you should get the one you set; if you don't care,
+then an empty Host should be fine.
+
+Continue to fully validate Host headers sent to a proxy,
+since proxies generally can't productively forward requests
+without a Host.
+
+For #60374
+Fixes #61431
+Fixes #61825
+
+Change-Id: If170c7dd860aa20eb58fe32990fc93af832742b6
+Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/511155
+TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
+Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
+Run-TryBot: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
+(cherry picked from commit b9153f6ef338baee5fe02a867c8fbc83a8b29dd1)
+Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/518855
+Auto-Submit: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@google.com>
+Run-TryBot: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
+Reviewed-by: Russ Cox <rsc@golang.org>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/golang/go/commit/c08a5fa413a34111c9a37fd9e545de27ab0978b1]
+CVE: CVE-2023-29406
+Signed-off-by: Ming Liu <liu.ming50@gmail.com>
+---
+ src/net/http/request.go      | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ src/net/http/request_test.go | 17 ++++++++++++-----
+ 2 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/net/http/request.go b/src/net/http/request.go
+index 3100037386..91cb8a66b9 100644
+--- a/src/net/http/request.go
++++ b/src/net/http/request.go
+@@ -582,8 +582,29 @@ func (r *Request) write(w io.Writer, usingProxy bool, extraHeaders Header, waitF
+ 	if err != nil {
+ 		return err
+ 	}
++	// Validate that the Host header is a valid header in general,
++	// but don't validate the host itself. This is sufficient to avoid
++	// header or request smuggling via the Host field.
++	// The server can (and will, if it's a net/http server) reject
++	// the request if it doesn't consider the host valid.
+ 	if !httpguts.ValidHostHeader(host) {
+-		return errors.New("http: invalid Host header")
++		// Historically, we would truncate the Host header after '/' or ' '.
++		// Some users have relied on this truncation to convert a network
++		// address such as Unix domain socket path into a valid, ignored
++		// Host header (see https://go.dev/issue/61431).
++		//
++		// We don't preserve the truncation, because sending an altered
++		// header field opens a smuggling vector. Instead, zero out the
++		// Host header entirely if it isn't valid. (An empty Host is valid;
++		// see RFC 9112 Section 3.2.)
++		//
++		// Return an error if we're sending to a proxy, since the proxy
++		// probably can't do anything useful with an empty Host header.
++		if !usingProxy {
++			host = ""
++		} else {
++			return errors.New("http: invalid Host header")
++		}
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	// According to RFC 6874, an HTTP client, proxy, or other
+diff --git a/src/net/http/request_test.go b/src/net/http/request_test.go
+index fddc85d6a9..dd1e2dc2a1 100644
+--- a/src/net/http/request_test.go
++++ b/src/net/http/request_test.go
+@@ -770,16 +770,23 @@ func TestRequestWriteBufferedWriter(t *testing.T) {
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
+-func TestRequestBadHost(t *testing.T) {
++func TestRequestBadHostHeader(t *testing.T) {
+ 	got := []string{}
+ 	req, err := NewRequest("GET", "http://foo/after", nil)
+ 	if err != nil {
+ 		t.Fatal(err)
+ 	}
+-	req.Host = "foo.com with spaces"
+-	req.URL.Host = "foo.com with spaces"
+-	if err := req.Write(logWrites{t, &got}); err == nil {
+-		t.Errorf("Writing request with invalid Host: succeded, want error")
++	req.Host = "foo.com\nnewline"
++	req.URL.Host = "foo.com\nnewline"
++	req.Write(logWrites{t, &got})
++	want := []string{
++		"GET /after HTTP/1.1\r\n",
++		"Host: \r\n",
++		"User-Agent: " + DefaultUserAgent + "\r\n",
++		"\r\n",
++	}
++	if !reflect.DeepEqual(got, want) {
++		t.Errorf("Writes = %q\n  Want = %q", got, want)
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
+-- 
+2.34.1
+

meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.14/CVE-2023-39326.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
+From 6446af942e2e2b161c4ec1b60d9703a2b55dc4dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
+Date: Tue, 7 Nov 2023 10:47:56 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH] [release-branch.go1.20] net/http: limit chunked data overhead
+
+The chunked transfer encoding adds some overhead to
+the content transferred. When writing one byte per
+chunk, for example, there are five bytes of overhead
+per byte of data transferred: "1\r\nX\r\n" to send "X".
+
+Chunks may include "chunk extensions",
+which we skip over and do not use.
+For example: "1;chunk extension here\r\nX\r\n".
+
+A malicious sender can use chunk extensions to add
+about 4k of overhead per byte of data.
+(The maximum chunk header line size we will accept.)
+
+Track the amount of overhead read in chunked data,
+and produce an error if it seems excessive.
+
+Updates #64433
+Fixes #64434
+Fixes CVE-2023-39326
+
+Change-Id: I40f8d70eb6f9575fb43f506eb19132ccedafcf39
+Reviewed-on: https://team-review.git.corp.google.com/c/golang/go-private/+/2076135
+Reviewed-by: Tatiana Bradley <tatianabradley@google.com>
+Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <bracewell@google.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 3473ae72ee66c60744665a24b2fde143e8964d4f)
+Reviewed-on: https://team-review.git.corp.google.com/c/golang/go-private/+/2095407
+Run-TryBot: Roland Shoemaker <bracewell@google.com>
+TryBot-Result: Security TryBots <security-trybots@go-security-trybots.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
+Reviewed-by: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
+Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/547355
+Reviewed-by: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@google.com>
+LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/golang/go/commit/6446af942e2e2b161c4ec1b60d9703a2b55dc4dd]
+CVE: CVE-2023-39326
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ src/net/http/internal/chunked.go      | 36 +++++++++++++---
+ src/net/http/internal/chunked_test.go | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 89 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/net/http/internal/chunked.go b/src/net/http/internal/chunked.go
+index f06e572..ddbaacb 100644
+--- a/src/net/http/internal/chunked.go
++++ b/src/net/http/internal/chunked.go
+@@ -39,7 +39,8 @@ type chunkedReader struct {
+ 	n        uint64 // unread bytes in chunk
+ 	err      error
+ 	buf      [2]byte
+-	checkEnd bool // whether need to check for \r\n chunk footer
++	checkEnd bool  // whether need to check for \r\n chunk footer
++	excess   int64 // "excessive" chunk overhead, for malicious sender detection
+ }
+ 
+ func (cr *chunkedReader) beginChunk() {
+@@ -49,10 +50,38 @@ func (cr *chunkedReader) beginChunk() {
+ 	if cr.err != nil {
+ 		return
+ 	}
++	cr.excess += int64(len(line)) + 2 // header, plus \r\n after the chunk data
++	line = trimTrailingWhitespace(line)
++	line, cr.err = removeChunkExtension(line)
++	if cr.err != nil {
++		return
++	}
+ 	cr.n, cr.err = parseHexUint(line)
+ 	if cr.err != nil {
+ 		return
+ 	}
++	// A sender who sends one byte per chunk will send 5 bytes of overhead
++	// for every byte of data. ("1\r\nX\r\n" to send "X".)
++	// We want to allow this, since streaming a byte at a time can be legitimate.
++	//
++	// A sender can use chunk extensions to add arbitrary amounts of additional
++	// data per byte read. ("1;very long extension\r\nX\r\n" to send "X".)
++	// We don't want to disallow extensions (although we discard them),
++	// but we also don't want to allow a sender to reduce the signal/noise ratio
++	// arbitrarily.
++	//
++	// We track the amount of excess overhead read,
++	// and produce an error if it grows too large.
++	//
++	// Currently, we say that we're willing to accept 16 bytes of overhead per chunk,
++	// plus twice the amount of real data in the chunk.
++	cr.excess -= 16 + (2 * int64(cr.n))
++	if cr.excess < 0 {
++		cr.excess = 0
++	}
++	if cr.excess > 16*1024 {
++		cr.err = errors.New("chunked encoding contains too much non-data")
++	}
+ 	if cr.n == 0 {
+ 		cr.err = io.EOF
+ 	}
+@@ -133,11 +162,6 @@ func readChunkLine(b *bufio.Reader) ([]byte, error) {
+ 	if len(p) >= maxLineLength {
+ 		return nil, ErrLineTooLong
+ 	}
+-	p = trimTrailingWhitespace(p)
+-	p, err = removeChunkExtension(p)
+-	if err != nil {
+-		return nil, err
+-	}
+ 	return p, nil
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/src/net/http/internal/chunked_test.go b/src/net/http/internal/chunked_test.go
+index d067165..b20747d 100644
+--- a/src/net/http/internal/chunked_test.go
++++ b/src/net/http/internal/chunked_test.go
+@@ -212,3 +212,62 @@ func TestChunkReadPartial(t *testing.T) {
+ 	}
+ 
+ }
++
++func TestChunkReaderTooMuchOverhead(t *testing.T) {
++	// If the sender is sending 100x as many chunk header bytes as chunk data,
++	// we should reject the stream at some point.
++	chunk := []byte("1;")
++	for i := 0; i < 100; i++ {
++		chunk = append(chunk, 'a') // chunk extension
++	}
++	chunk = append(chunk, "\r\nX\r\n"...)
++	const bodylen = 1 << 20
++	r := NewChunkedReader(&funcReader{f: func(i int) ([]byte, error) {
++		if i < bodylen {
++			return chunk, nil
++		}
++		return []byte("0\r\n"), nil
++	}})
++	_, err := io.ReadAll(r)
++	if err == nil {
++		t.Fatalf("successfully read body with excessive overhead; want error")
++	}
++}
++
++func TestChunkReaderByteAtATime(t *testing.T) {
++	// Sending one byte per chunk should not trip the excess-overhead detection.
++	const bodylen = 1 << 20
++	r := NewChunkedReader(&funcReader{f: func(i int) ([]byte, error) {
++		if i < bodylen {
++			return []byte("1\r\nX\r\n"), nil
++		}
++		return []byte("0\r\n"), nil
++	}})
++	got, err := io.ReadAll(r)
++	if err != nil {
++		t.Errorf("unexpected error: %v", err)
++	}
++	if len(got) != bodylen {
++		t.Errorf("read %v bytes, want %v", len(got), bodylen)
++	}
++}
++
++type funcReader struct {
++	f   func(iteration int) ([]byte, error)
++	i   int
++	b   []byte
++	err error
++}
++
++func (r *funcReader) Read(p []byte) (n int, err error) {
++	if len(r.b) == 0 && r.err == nil {
++		r.b, r.err = r.f(r.i)
++		r.i++
++	}
++	n = copy(p, r.b)
++	r.b = r.b[n:]
++	if len(r.b) > 0 {
++		return n, nil
++	}
++	return n, r.err
++}
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.14/CVE-2023-45287-pre1.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,393 @@
+From 9baafabac9a84813a336f068862207d2bb06d255 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
+Date: Wed, 1 Apr 2020 17:25:40 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] crypto/rsa: refactor RSA-PSS signing and verification
+
+Cleaned up for readability and consistency.
+
+There is one tiny behavioral change: when PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash is
+used and both hash and opts.Hash were set, hash.Size() was used for the
+salt length instead of opts.Hash.Size(). That's clearly wrong because
+opts.Hash is documented to override hash.
+
+Change-Id: I3e25dad933961eac827c6d2e3bbfe45fc5a6fb0e
+Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/226937
+Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
+TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
+Reviewed-by: Katie Hockman <katie@golang.org>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/golang/go/commit/9baafabac9a84813a336f068862207d2bb06d255]
+CVE: CVE-2023-45287 #Dependency Patch1
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ src/crypto/rsa/pss.go | 173 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
+ src/crypto/rsa/rsa.go |   9 ++-
+ 2 files changed, 96 insertions(+), 86 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/crypto/rsa/pss.go b/src/crypto/rsa/pss.go
+index 3ff0c2f4d0076..f9844d87329a8 100644
+--- a/src/crypto/rsa/pss.go
++++ b/src/crypto/rsa/pss.go
+@@ -4,9 +4,7 @@
+ 
+ package rsa
+ 
+-// This file implements the PSS signature scheme [1].
+-//
+-// [1] https://www.emc.com/collateral/white-papers/h11300-pkcs-1v2-2-rsa-cryptography-standard-wp.pdf
++// This file implements the RSASSA-PSS signature scheme according to RFC 8017.
+ 
+ import (
+ 	"bytes"
+@@ -17,8 +15,22 @@ import (
+ 	"math/big"
+ )
+ 
++// Per RFC 8017, Section 9.1
++//
++//     EM = MGF1 xor DB || H( 8*0x00 || mHash || salt ) || 0xbc
++//
++// where
++//
++//     DB = PS || 0x01 || salt
++//
++// and PS can be empty so
++//
++//     emLen = dbLen + hLen + 1 = psLen + sLen + hLen + 2
++//
++
+ func emsaPSSEncode(mHash []byte, emBits int, salt []byte, hash hash.Hash) ([]byte, error) {
+-	// See [1], section 9.1.1
++	// See RFC 8017, Section 9.1.1.
++
+ 	hLen := hash.Size()
+ 	sLen := len(salt)
+ 	emLen := (emBits + 7) / 8
+@@ -30,7 +42,7 @@ func emsaPSSEncode(mHash []byte, emBits int, salt []byte, hash hash.Hash) ([]byt
+ 	// 2.  Let mHash = Hash(M), an octet string of length hLen.
+ 
+ 	if len(mHash) != hLen {
+-		return nil, errors.New("crypto/rsa: input must be hashed message")
++		return nil, errors.New("crypto/rsa: input must be hashed with given hash")
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	// 3.  If emLen < hLen + sLen + 2, output "encoding error" and stop.
+@@ -40,8 +52,9 @@ func emsaPSSEncode(mHash []byte, emBits int, salt []byte, hash hash.Hash) ([]byt
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	em := make([]byte, emLen)
+-	db := em[:emLen-sLen-hLen-2+1+sLen]
+-	h := em[emLen-sLen-hLen-2+1+sLen : emLen-1]
++	psLen := emLen - sLen - hLen - 2
++	db := em[:psLen+1+sLen]
++	h := em[psLen+1+sLen : emLen-1]
+ 
+ 	// 4.  Generate a random octet string salt of length sLen; if sLen = 0,
+ 	//     then salt is the empty string.
+@@ -69,8 +82,8 @@ func emsaPSSEncode(mHash []byte, emBits int, salt []byte, hash hash.Hash) ([]byt
+ 	// 8.  Let DB = PS || 0x01 || salt; DB is an octet string of length
+ 	//     emLen - hLen - 1.
+ 
+-	db[emLen-sLen-hLen-2] = 0x01
+-	copy(db[emLen-sLen-hLen-1:], salt)
++	db[psLen] = 0x01
++	copy(db[psLen+1:], salt)
+ 
+ 	// 9.  Let dbMask = MGF(H, emLen - hLen - 1).
+ 	//
+@@ -81,47 +94,57 @@ func emsaPSSEncode(mHash []byte, emBits int, salt []byte, hash hash.Hash) ([]byt
+ 	// 11. Set the leftmost 8 * emLen - emBits bits of the leftmost octet in
+ 	//     maskedDB to zero.
+ 
+-	db[0] &= (0xFF >> uint(8*emLen-emBits))
++	db[0] &= 0xff >> (8*emLen - emBits)
+ 
+ 	// 12. Let EM = maskedDB || H || 0xbc.
+-	em[emLen-1] = 0xBC
++	em[emLen-1] = 0xbc
+ 
+ 	// 13. Output EM.
+ 	return em, nil
+ }
+ 
+ func emsaPSSVerify(mHash, em []byte, emBits, sLen int, hash hash.Hash) error {
++	// See RFC 8017, Section 9.1.2.
++
++	hLen := hash.Size()
++	if sLen == PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash {
++		sLen = hLen
++	}
++	emLen := (emBits + 7) / 8
++	if emLen != len(em) {
++		return errors.New("rsa: internal error: inconsistent length")
++	}
++
+ 	// 1.  If the length of M is greater than the input limitation for the
+ 	//     hash function (2^61 - 1 octets for SHA-1), output "inconsistent"
+ 	//     and stop.
+ 	//
+ 	// 2.  Let mHash = Hash(M), an octet string of length hLen.
+-	hLen := hash.Size()
+ 	if hLen != len(mHash) {
+ 		return ErrVerification
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	// 3.  If emLen < hLen + sLen + 2, output "inconsistent" and stop.
+-	emLen := (emBits + 7) / 8
+ 	if emLen < hLen+sLen+2 {
+ 		return ErrVerification
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	// 4.  If the rightmost octet of EM does not have hexadecimal value
+ 	//     0xbc, output "inconsistent" and stop.
+-	if em[len(em)-1] != 0xBC {
++	if em[emLen-1] != 0xbc {
+ 		return ErrVerification
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	// 5.  Let maskedDB be the leftmost emLen - hLen - 1 octets of EM, and
+ 	//     let H be the next hLen octets.
+ 	db := em[:emLen-hLen-1]
+-	h := em[emLen-hLen-1 : len(em)-1]
++	h := em[emLen-hLen-1 : emLen-1]
+ 
+ 	// 6.  If the leftmost 8 * emLen - emBits bits of the leftmost octet in
+ 	//     maskedDB are not all equal to zero, output "inconsistent" and
+ 	//     stop.
+-	if em[0]&(0xFF<<uint(8-(8*emLen-emBits))) != 0 {
++	var bitMask byte = 0xff >> (8*emLen - emBits)
++	if em[0] & ^bitMask != 0 {
+ 		return ErrVerification
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -132,37 +155,30 @@ func emsaPSSVerify(mHash, em []byte, emBits, sLen int, hash hash.Hash) error {
+ 
+ 	// 9.  Set the leftmost 8 * emLen - emBits bits of the leftmost octet in DB
+ 	//     to zero.
+-	db[0] &= (0xFF >> uint(8*emLen-emBits))
++	db[0] &= bitMask
+ 
++	// If we don't know the salt length, look for the 0x01 delimiter.
+ 	if sLen == PSSSaltLengthAuto {
+-	FindSaltLength:
+-		for sLen = emLen - (hLen + 2); sLen >= 0; sLen-- {
+-			switch db[emLen-hLen-sLen-2] {
+-			case 1:
+-				break FindSaltLength
+-			case 0:
+-				continue
+-			default:
+-				return ErrVerification
+-			}
+-		}
+-		if sLen < 0 {
++		psLen := bytes.IndexByte(db, 0x01)
++		if psLen < 0 {
+ 			return ErrVerification
+ 		}
+-	} else {
+-		// 10. If the emLen - hLen - sLen - 2 leftmost octets of DB are not zero
+-		//     or if the octet at position emLen - hLen - sLen - 1 (the leftmost
+-		//     position is "position 1") does not have hexadecimal value 0x01,
+-		//     output "inconsistent" and stop.
+-		for _, e := range db[:emLen-hLen-sLen-2] {
+-			if e != 0x00 {
+-				return ErrVerification
+-			}
+-		}
+-		if db[emLen-hLen-sLen-2] != 0x01 {
++		sLen = len(db) - psLen - 1
++	}
++
++	// 10. If the emLen - hLen - sLen - 2 leftmost octets of DB are not zero
++	//     or if the octet at position emLen - hLen - sLen - 1 (the leftmost
++	//     position is "position 1") does not have hexadecimal value 0x01,
++	//     output "inconsistent" and stop.
++	psLen := emLen - hLen - sLen - 2
++	for _, e := range db[:psLen] {
++		if e != 0x00 {
+ 			return ErrVerification
+ 		}
+ 	}
++	if db[psLen] != 0x01 {
++		return ErrVerification
++	}
+ 
+ 	// 11.  Let salt be the last sLen octets of DB.
+ 	salt := db[len(db)-sLen:]
+@@ -181,19 +197,19 @@ func emsaPSSVerify(mHash, em []byte, emBits, sLen int, hash hash.Hash) error {
+ 	h0 := hash.Sum(nil)
+ 
+ 	// 14. If H = H', output "consistent." Otherwise, output "inconsistent."
+-	if !bytes.Equal(h0, h) {
++	if !bytes.Equal(h0, h) { // TODO: constant time?
+ 		return ErrVerification
+ 	}
+ 	return nil
+ }
+ 
+-// signPSSWithSalt calculates the signature of hashed using PSS [1] with specified salt.
++// signPSSWithSalt calculates the signature of hashed using PSS with specified salt.
+ // Note that hashed must be the result of hashing the input message using the
+ // given hash function. salt is a random sequence of bytes whose length will be
+ // later used to verify the signature.
+ func signPSSWithSalt(rand io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, hash crypto.Hash, hashed, salt []byte) (s []byte, err error) {
+-	nBits := priv.N.BitLen()
+-	em, err := emsaPSSEncode(hashed, nBits-1, salt, hash.New())
++	emBits := priv.N.BitLen() - 1
++	em, err := emsaPSSEncode(hashed, emBits, salt, hash.New())
+ 	if err != nil {
+ 		return
+ 	}
+@@ -202,7 +218,7 @@ func signPSSWithSalt(rand io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, hash crypto.Hash, hashed,
+ 	if err != nil {
+ 		return
+ 	}
+-	s = make([]byte, (nBits+7)/8)
++	s = make([]byte, priv.Size())
+ 	copyWithLeftPad(s, c.Bytes())
+ 	return
+ }
+@@ -223,16 +239,15 @@ type PSSOptions struct {
+ 	// PSSSaltLength constants.
+ 	SaltLength int
+ 
+-	// Hash, if not zero, overrides the hash function passed to SignPSS.
+-	// This is the only way to specify the hash function when using the
+-	// crypto.Signer interface.
++	// Hash is the hash function used to generate the message digest. If not
++	// zero, it overrides the hash function passed to SignPSS. It's required
++	// when using PrivateKey.Sign.
+ 	Hash crypto.Hash
+ }
+ 
+-// HashFunc returns pssOpts.Hash so that PSSOptions implements
+-// crypto.SignerOpts.
+-func (pssOpts *PSSOptions) HashFunc() crypto.Hash {
+-	return pssOpts.Hash
++// HashFunc returns opts.Hash so that PSSOptions implements crypto.SignerOpts.
++func (opts *PSSOptions) HashFunc() crypto.Hash {
++	return opts.Hash
+ }
+ 
+ func (opts *PSSOptions) saltLength() int {
+@@ -242,56 +257,50 @@ func (opts *PSSOptions) saltLength() int {
+ 	return opts.SaltLength
+ }
+ 
+-// SignPSS calculates the signature of hashed using RSASSA-PSS [1].
+-// Note that hashed must be the result of hashing the input message using the
+-// given hash function. The opts argument may be nil, in which case sensible
+-// defaults are used.
+-func SignPSS(rand io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, hash crypto.Hash, hashed []byte, opts *PSSOptions) ([]byte, error) {
++// SignPSS calculates the signature of digest using PSS.
++//
++// digest must be the result of hashing the input message using the given hash
++// function. The opts argument may be nil, in which case sensible defaults are
++// used. If opts.Hash is set, it overrides hash.
++func SignPSS(rand io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, hash crypto.Hash, digest []byte, opts *PSSOptions) ([]byte, error) {
++	if opts != nil && opts.Hash != 0 {
++		hash = opts.Hash
++	}
++
+ 	saltLength := opts.saltLength()
+ 	switch saltLength {
+ 	case PSSSaltLengthAuto:
+-		saltLength = (priv.N.BitLen()+7)/8 - 2 - hash.Size()
++		saltLength = priv.Size() - 2 - hash.Size()
+ 	case PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash:
+ 		saltLength = hash.Size()
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if opts != nil && opts.Hash != 0 {
+-		hash = opts.Hash
+-	}
+-
+ 	salt := make([]byte, saltLength)
+ 	if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand, salt); err != nil {
+ 		return nil, err
+ 	}
+-	return signPSSWithSalt(rand, priv, hash, hashed, salt)
++	return signPSSWithSalt(rand, priv, hash, digest, salt)
+ }
+ 
+ // VerifyPSS verifies a PSS signature.
+-// hashed is the result of hashing the input message using the given hash
+-// function and sig is the signature. A valid signature is indicated by
+-// returning a nil error. The opts argument may be nil, in which case sensible
+-// defaults are used.
+-func VerifyPSS(pub *PublicKey, hash crypto.Hash, hashed []byte, sig []byte, opts *PSSOptions) error {
+-	return verifyPSS(pub, hash, hashed, sig, opts.saltLength())
+-}
+-
+-// verifyPSS verifies a PSS signature with the given salt length.
+-func verifyPSS(pub *PublicKey, hash crypto.Hash, hashed []byte, sig []byte, saltLen int) error {
+-	nBits := pub.N.BitLen()
+-	if len(sig) != (nBits+7)/8 {
++//
++// A valid signature is indicated by returning a nil error. digest must be the
++// result of hashing the input message using the given hash function. The opts
++// argument may be nil, in which case sensible defaults are used. opts.Hash is
++// ignored.
++func VerifyPSS(pub *PublicKey, hash crypto.Hash, digest []byte, sig []byte, opts *PSSOptions) error {
++	if len(sig) != pub.Size() {
+ 		return ErrVerification
+ 	}
+ 	s := new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig)
+ 	m := encrypt(new(big.Int), pub, s)
+-	emBits := nBits - 1
++	emBits := pub.N.BitLen() - 1
+ 	emLen := (emBits + 7) / 8
+-	if emLen < len(m.Bytes()) {
++	emBytes := m.Bytes()
++	if emLen < len(emBytes) {
+ 		return ErrVerification
+ 	}
+ 	em := make([]byte, emLen)
+-	copyWithLeftPad(em, m.Bytes())
+-	if saltLen == PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash {
+-		saltLen = hash.Size()
+-	}
+-	return emsaPSSVerify(hashed, em, emBits, saltLen, hash.New())
++	copyWithLeftPad(em, emBytes)
++	return emsaPSSVerify(digest, em, emBits, opts.saltLength(), hash.New())
+ }
+diff --git a/src/crypto/rsa/rsa.go b/src/crypto/rsa/rsa.go
+index 5a42990640164..b4bfa13defbdf 100644
+--- a/src/crypto/rsa/rsa.go
++++ b/src/crypto/rsa/rsa.go
+@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
+ // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+ // license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+ 
+-// Package rsa implements RSA encryption as specified in PKCS#1.
++// Package rsa implements RSA encryption as specified in PKCS#1 and RFC 8017.
+ //
+ // RSA is a single, fundamental operation that is used in this package to
+ // implement either public-key encryption or public-key signatures.
+@@ -10,13 +10,13 @@
+ // The original specification for encryption and signatures with RSA is PKCS#1
+ // and the terms "RSA encryption" and "RSA signatures" by default refer to
+ // PKCS#1 version 1.5. However, that specification has flaws and new designs
+-// should use version two, usually called by just OAEP and PSS, where
++// should use version 2, usually called by just OAEP and PSS, where
+ // possible.
+ //
+ // Two sets of interfaces are included in this package. When a more abstract
+ // interface isn't necessary, there are functions for encrypting/decrypting
+ // with v1.5/OAEP and signing/verifying with v1.5/PSS. If one needs to abstract
+-// over the public-key primitive, the PrivateKey struct implements the
++// over the public key primitive, the PrivateKey type implements the
+ // Decrypter and Signer interfaces from the crypto package.
+ //
+ // The RSA operations in this package are not implemented using constant-time algorithms.
+@@ -111,7 +111,8 @@ func (priv *PrivateKey) Public() crypto.PublicKey {
+ 
+ // Sign signs digest with priv, reading randomness from rand. If opts is a
+ // *PSSOptions then the PSS algorithm will be used, otherwise PKCS#1 v1.5 will
+-// be used.
++// be used. digest must be the result of hashing the input message using
++// opts.HashFunc().
+ //
+ // This method implements crypto.Signer, which is an interface to support keys
+ // where the private part is kept in, for example, a hardware module. Common

meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.14/CVE-2023-45287-pre2.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,401 @@
+From c9d5f60eaa4450ccf1ce878d55b4c6a12843f2f3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
+Date: Mon, 27 Apr 2020 21:52:38 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] math/big: add (*Int).FillBytes
+
+Replaced almost every use of Bytes with FillBytes.
+
+Note that the approved proposal was for
+
+    func (*Int) FillBytes(buf []byte)
+
+while this implements
+
+    func (*Int) FillBytes(buf []byte) []byte
+
+because the latter was far nicer to use in all callsites.
+
+Fixes #35833
+
+Change-Id: Ia912df123e5d79b763845312ea3d9a8051343c0a
+Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/230397
+Reviewed-by: Robert Griesemer <gri@golang.org>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/golang/go/commit/c9d5f60eaa4450ccf1ce878d55b4c6a12843f2f3]
+CVE: CVE-2023-45287 #Dependency Patch2
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ src/crypto/elliptic/elliptic.go | 13 ++++----
+ src/crypto/rsa/pkcs1v15.go      | 20 +++---------
+ src/crypto/rsa/pss.go           | 17 +++++------
+ src/crypto/rsa/rsa.go           | 32 +++----------------
+ src/crypto/tls/key_schedule.go  |  7 ++---
+ src/crypto/x509/sec1.go         |  7 ++---
+ src/math/big/int.go             | 15 +++++++++
+ src/math/big/int_test.go        | 54 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ src/math/big/nat.go             | 15 ++++++---
+ 9 files changed, 106 insertions(+), 74 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/crypto/elliptic/elliptic.go b/src/crypto/elliptic/elliptic.go
+index e2f71cdb63bab..bd5168c5fd842 100644
+--- a/src/crypto/elliptic/elliptic.go
++++ b/src/crypto/elliptic/elliptic.go
+@@ -277,7 +277,7 @@ var mask = []byte{0xff, 0x1, 0x3, 0x7, 0xf, 0x1f, 0x3f, 0x7f}
+ func GenerateKey(curve Curve, rand io.Reader) (priv []byte, x, y *big.Int, err error) {
+ 	N := curve.Params().N
+ 	bitSize := N.BitLen()
+-	byteLen := (bitSize + 7) >> 3
++	byteLen := (bitSize + 7) / 8
+ 	priv = make([]byte, byteLen)
+ 
+ 	for x == nil {
+@@ -304,15 +304,14 @@ func GenerateKey(curve Curve, rand io.Reader) (priv []byte, x, y *big.Int, err e
+ 
+ // Marshal converts a point into the uncompressed form specified in section 4.3.6 of ANSI X9.62.
+ func Marshal(curve Curve, x, y *big.Int) []byte {
+-	byteLen := (curve.Params().BitSize + 7) >> 3
++	byteLen := (curve.Params().BitSize + 7) / 8
+ 
+ 	ret := make([]byte, 1+2*byteLen)
+ 	ret[0] = 4 // uncompressed point
+ 
+-	xBytes := x.Bytes()
+-	copy(ret[1+byteLen-len(xBytes):], xBytes)
+-	yBytes := y.Bytes()
+-	copy(ret[1+2*byteLen-len(yBytes):], yBytes)
++	x.FillBytes(ret[1 : 1+byteLen])
++	y.FillBytes(ret[1+byteLen : 1+2*byteLen])
++
+ 	return ret
+ }
+ 
+@@ -320,7 +319,7 @@ func Marshal(curve Curve, x, y *big.Int) []byte {
+ // It is an error if the point is not in uncompressed form or is not on the curve.
+ // On error, x = nil.
+ func Unmarshal(curve Curve, data []byte) (x, y *big.Int) {
+-	byteLen := (curve.Params().BitSize + 7) >> 3
++	byteLen := (curve.Params().BitSize + 7) / 8
+ 	if len(data) != 1+2*byteLen {
+ 		return
+ 	}
+diff --git a/src/crypto/rsa/pkcs1v15.go b/src/crypto/rsa/pkcs1v15.go
+index 499242ffc5b57..3208119ae1ff4 100644
+--- a/src/crypto/rsa/pkcs1v15.go
++++ b/src/crypto/rsa/pkcs1v15.go
+@@ -61,8 +61,7 @@ func EncryptPKCS1v15(rand io.Reader, pub *PublicKey, msg []byte) ([]byte, error)
+ 	m := new(big.Int).SetBytes(em)
+ 	c := encrypt(new(big.Int), pub, m)
+ 
+-	copyWithLeftPad(em, c.Bytes())
+-	return em, nil
++	return c.FillBytes(em), nil
+ }
+ 
+ // DecryptPKCS1v15 decrypts a plaintext using RSA and the padding scheme from PKCS#1 v1.5.
+@@ -150,7 +149,7 @@ func decryptPKCS1v15(rand io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, ciphertext []byte) (valid
+ 		return
+ 	}
+ 
+-	em = leftPad(m.Bytes(), k)
++	em = m.FillBytes(make([]byte, k))
+ 	firstByteIsZero := subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(em[0], 0)
+ 	secondByteIsTwo := subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(em[1], 2)
+ 
+@@ -256,8 +255,7 @@ func SignPKCS1v15(rand io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, hash crypto.Hash, hashed []b
+ 		return nil, err
+ 	}
+ 
+-	copyWithLeftPad(em, c.Bytes())
+-	return em, nil
++	return c.FillBytes(em), nil
+ }
+ 
+ // VerifyPKCS1v15 verifies an RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature.
+@@ -286,7 +284,7 @@ func VerifyPKCS1v15(pub *PublicKey, hash crypto.Hash, hashed []byte, sig []byte)
+ 
+ 	c := new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig)
+ 	m := encrypt(new(big.Int), pub, c)
+-	em := leftPad(m.Bytes(), k)
++	em := m.FillBytes(make([]byte, k))
+ 	// EM = 0x00 || 0x01 || PS || 0x00 || T
+ 
+ 	ok := subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(em[0], 0)
+@@ -323,13 +321,3 @@ func pkcs1v15HashInfo(hash crypto.Hash, inLen int) (hashLen int, prefix []byte,
+ 	}
+ 	return
+ }
+-
+-// copyWithLeftPad copies src to the end of dest, padding with zero bytes as
+-// needed.
+-func copyWithLeftPad(dest, src []byte) {
+-	numPaddingBytes := len(dest) - len(src)
+-	for i := 0; i < numPaddingBytes; i++ {
+-		dest[i] = 0
+-	}
+-	copy(dest[numPaddingBytes:], src)
+-}
+diff --git a/src/crypto/rsa/pss.go b/src/crypto/rsa/pss.go
+index f9844d87329a8..b2adbedb28fa8 100644
+--- a/src/crypto/rsa/pss.go
++++ b/src/crypto/rsa/pss.go
+@@ -207,20 +207,19 @@ func emsaPSSVerify(mHash, em []byte, emBits, sLen int, hash hash.Hash) error {
+ // Note that hashed must be the result of hashing the input message using the
+ // given hash function. salt is a random sequence of bytes whose length will be
+ // later used to verify the signature.
+-func signPSSWithSalt(rand io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, hash crypto.Hash, hashed, salt []byte) (s []byte, err error) {
++func signPSSWithSalt(rand io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, hash crypto.Hash, hashed, salt []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+ 	emBits := priv.N.BitLen() - 1
+ 	em, err := emsaPSSEncode(hashed, emBits, salt, hash.New())
+ 	if err != nil {
+-		return
++		return nil, err
+ 	}
+ 	m := new(big.Int).SetBytes(em)
+ 	c, err := decryptAndCheck(rand, priv, m)
+ 	if err != nil {
+-		return
++		return nil, err
+ 	}
+-	s = make([]byte, priv.Size())
+-	copyWithLeftPad(s, c.Bytes())
+-	return
++	s := make([]byte, priv.Size())
++	return c.FillBytes(s), nil
+ }
+ 
+ const (
+@@ -296,11 +295,9 @@ func VerifyPSS(pub *PublicKey, hash crypto.Hash, digest []byte, sig []byte, opts
+ 	m := encrypt(new(big.Int), pub, s)
+ 	emBits := pub.N.BitLen() - 1
+ 	emLen := (emBits + 7) / 8
+-	emBytes := m.Bytes()
+-	if emLen < len(emBytes) {
++	if m.BitLen() > emLen*8 {
+ 		return ErrVerification
+ 	}
+-	em := make([]byte, emLen)
+-	copyWithLeftPad(em, emBytes)
++	em := m.FillBytes(make([]byte, emLen))
+ 	return emsaPSSVerify(digest, em, emBits, opts.saltLength(), hash.New())
+ }
+diff --git a/src/crypto/rsa/rsa.go b/src/crypto/rsa/rsa.go
+index b4bfa13defbdf..28eb5926c1a54 100644
+--- a/src/crypto/rsa/rsa.go
++++ b/src/crypto/rsa/rsa.go
+@@ -416,16 +416,9 @@ func EncryptOAEP(hash hash.Hash, random io.Reader, pub *PublicKey, msg []byte, l
+ 	m := new(big.Int)
+ 	m.SetBytes(em)
+ 	c := encrypt(new(big.Int), pub, m)
+-	out := c.Bytes()
+ 
+-	if len(out) < k {
+-		// If the output is too small, we need to left-pad with zeros.
+-		t := make([]byte, k)
+-		copy(t[k-len(out):], out)
+-		out = t
+-	}
+-
+-	return out, nil
++	out := make([]byte, k)
++	return c.FillBytes(out), nil
+ }
+ 
+ // ErrDecryption represents a failure to decrypt a message.
+@@ -597,12 +590,9 @@ func DecryptOAEP(hash hash.Hash, random io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, ciphertext
+ 	lHash := hash.Sum(nil)
+ 	hash.Reset()
+ 
+-	// Converting the plaintext number to bytes will strip any
+-	// leading zeros so we may have to left pad. We do this unconditionally
+-	// to avoid leaking timing information. (Although we still probably
+-	// leak the number of leading zeros. It's not clear that we can do
+-	// anything about this.)
+-	em := leftPad(m.Bytes(), k)
++	// We probably leak the number of leading zeros.
++	// It's not clear that we can do anything about this.
++	em := m.FillBytes(make([]byte, k))
+ 
+ 	firstByteIsZero := subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(em[0], 0)
+ 
+@@ -643,15 +633,3 @@ func DecryptOAEP(hash hash.Hash, random io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, ciphertext
+ 
+ 	return rest[index+1:], nil
+ }
+-
+-// leftPad returns a new slice of length size. The contents of input are right
+-// aligned in the new slice.
+-func leftPad(input []byte, size int) (out []byte) {
+-	n := len(input)
+-	if n > size {
+-		n = size
+-	}
+-	out = make([]byte, size)
+-	copy(out[len(out)-n:], input)
+-	return
+-}
+diff --git a/src/crypto/tls/key_schedule.go b/src/crypto/tls/key_schedule.go
+index 2aab323202f7d..314016979afb8 100644
+--- a/src/crypto/tls/key_schedule.go
++++ b/src/crypto/tls/key_schedule.go
+@@ -173,11 +173,8 @@ func (p *nistParameters) SharedKey(peerPublicKey []byte) []byte {
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	xShared, _ := curve.ScalarMult(x, y, p.privateKey)
+-	sharedKey := make([]byte, (curve.Params().BitSize+7)>>3)
+-	xBytes := xShared.Bytes()
+-	copy(sharedKey[len(sharedKey)-len(xBytes):], xBytes)
+-
+-	return sharedKey
++	sharedKey := make([]byte, (curve.Params().BitSize+7)/8)
++	return xShared.FillBytes(sharedKey)
+ }
+ 
+ type x25519Parameters struct {
+diff --git a/src/crypto/x509/sec1.go b/src/crypto/x509/sec1.go
+index 0bfb90cd5464a..52c108ff1d624 100644
+--- a/src/crypto/x509/sec1.go
++++ b/src/crypto/x509/sec1.go
+@@ -52,13 +52,10 @@ func MarshalECPrivateKey(key *ecdsa.PrivateKey) ([]byte, error) {
+ // marshalECPrivateKey marshals an EC private key into ASN.1, DER format and
+ // sets the curve ID to the given OID, or omits it if OID is nil.
+ func marshalECPrivateKeyWithOID(key *ecdsa.PrivateKey, oid asn1.ObjectIdentifier) ([]byte, error) {
+-	privateKeyBytes := key.D.Bytes()
+-	paddedPrivateKey := make([]byte, (key.Curve.Params().N.BitLen()+7)/8)
+-	copy(paddedPrivateKey[len(paddedPrivateKey)-len(privateKeyBytes):], privateKeyBytes)
+-
++	privateKey := make([]byte, (key.Curve.Params().N.BitLen()+7)/8)
+ 	return asn1.Marshal(ecPrivateKey{
+ 		Version:       1,
+-		PrivateKey:    paddedPrivateKey,
++		PrivateKey:    key.D.FillBytes(privateKey),
+ 		NamedCurveOID: oid,
+ 		PublicKey:     asn1.BitString{Bytes: elliptic.Marshal(key.Curve, key.X, key.Y)},
+ 	})
+diff --git a/src/math/big/int.go b/src/math/big/int.go
+index 8816cf5266cc4..65f32487b58c0 100644
+--- a/src/math/big/int.go
++++ b/src/math/big/int.go
+@@ -447,11 +447,26 @@ func (z *Int) SetBytes(buf []byte) *Int {
+ }
+ 
+ // Bytes returns the absolute value of x as a big-endian byte slice.
++//
++// To use a fixed length slice, or a preallocated one, use FillBytes.
+ func (x *Int) Bytes() []byte {
+ 	buf := make([]byte, len(x.abs)*_S)
+ 	return buf[x.abs.bytes(buf):]
+ }
+ 
++// FillBytes sets buf to the absolute value of x, storing it as a zero-extended
++// big-endian byte slice, and returns buf.
++//
++// If the absolute value of x doesn't fit in buf, FillBytes will panic.
++func (x *Int) FillBytes(buf []byte) []byte {
++	// Clear whole buffer. (This gets optimized into a memclr.)
++	for i := range buf {
++		buf[i] = 0
++	}
++	x.abs.bytes(buf)
++	return buf
++}
++
+ // BitLen returns the length of the absolute value of x in bits.
+ // The bit length of 0 is 0.
+ func (x *Int) BitLen() int {
+diff --git a/src/math/big/int_test.go b/src/math/big/int_test.go
+index e3a1587b3f0ad..3c8557323a032 100644
+--- a/src/math/big/int_test.go
++++ b/src/math/big/int_test.go
+@@ -1840,3 +1840,57 @@ func BenchmarkDiv(b *testing.B) {
+ 		})
+ 	}
+ }
++
++func TestFillBytes(t *testing.T) {
++	checkResult := func(t *testing.T, buf []byte, want *Int) {
++		t.Helper()
++		got := new(Int).SetBytes(buf)
++		if got.CmpAbs(want) != 0 {
++			t.Errorf("got 0x%x, want 0x%x: %x", got, want, buf)
++		}
++	}
++	panics := func(f func()) (panic bool) {
++		defer func() { panic = recover() != nil }()
++		f()
++		return
++	}
++
++	for _, n := range []string{
++		"0",
++		"1000",
++		"0xffffffff",
++		"-0xffffffff",
++		"0xffffffffffffffff",
++		"0x10000000000000000",
++		"0xabababababababababababababababababababababababababa",
++		"0xffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff",
++	} {
++		t.Run(n, func(t *testing.T) {
++			t.Logf(n)
++			x, ok := new(Int).SetString(n, 0)
++			if !ok {
++				panic("invalid test entry")
++			}
++
++			// Perfectly sized buffer.
++			byteLen := (x.BitLen() + 7) / 8
++			buf := make([]byte, byteLen)
++			checkResult(t, x.FillBytes(buf), x)
++
++			// Way larger, checking all bytes get zeroed.
++			buf = make([]byte, 100)
++			for i := range buf {
++				buf[i] = 0xff
++			}
++			checkResult(t, x.FillBytes(buf), x)
++
++			// Too small.
++			if byteLen > 0 {
++				buf = make([]byte, byteLen-1)
++				if !panics(func() { x.FillBytes(buf) }) {
++					t.Errorf("expected panic for small buffer and value %x", x)
++				}
++			}
++		})
++	}
++}
+diff --git a/src/math/big/nat.go b/src/math/big/nat.go
+index c31ec5156b81d..6a3989bf9d82b 100644
+--- a/src/math/big/nat.go
++++ b/src/math/big/nat.go
+@@ -1476,19 +1476,26 @@ func (z nat) expNNMontgomery(x, y, m nat) nat {
+ }
+ 
+ // bytes writes the value of z into buf using big-endian encoding.
+-// len(buf) must be >= len(z)*_S. The value of z is encoded in the
+-// slice buf[i:]. The number i of unused bytes at the beginning of
+-// buf is returned as result.
++// The value of z is encoded in the slice buf[i:]. If the value of z
++// cannot be represented in buf, bytes panics. The number i of unused
++// bytes at the beginning of buf is returned as result.
+ func (z nat) bytes(buf []byte) (i int) {
+ 	i = len(buf)
+ 	for _, d := range z {
+ 		for j := 0; j < _S; j++ {
+ 			i--
+-			buf[i] = byte(d)
++			if i >= 0 {
++				buf[i] = byte(d)
++			} else if byte(d) != 0 {
++				panic("math/big: buffer too small to fit value")
++			}
+ 			d >>= 8
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 
++	if i < 0 {
++		i = 0
++	}
+ 	for i < len(buf) && buf[i] == 0 {
+ 		i++
+ 	}

meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.14/CVE-2023-45287-pre3.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+From 8f676144ad7b7c91adb0c6e1ec89aaa6283c6807 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Himanshu Kishna Srivastava <28himanshu@gmail.com>
+Date: Tue, 16 Mar 2021 22:37:46 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] crypto/rsa: fix salt length calculation with
+ PSSSaltLengthAuto
+
+When PSSSaltLength is set, the maximum salt length must equal:
+
+    (modulus_key_size - 1 + 7)/8 - hash_length - 2
+and for example, with a 4096 bit modulus key, and a SHA-1 hash,
+it should be:
+
+     (4096 -1 + 7)/8 - 20 - 2 = 490
+Previously we'd encounter this error:
+
+     crypto/rsa: key size too small for PSS signature
+
+Fixes #42741
+
+Change-Id: I18bb82c41c511d564b3f4c443f4b3a38ab010ac5
+Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/302230
+Reviewed-by: Emmanuel Odeke <emmanuel@orijtech.com>
+Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
+Trust: Emmanuel Odeke <emmanuel@orijtech.com>
+Run-TryBot: Emmanuel Odeke <emmanuel@orijtech.com>
+TryBot-Result: Go Bot <gobot@golang.org>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/golang/go/commit/8f676144ad7b7c91adb0c6e1ec89aaa6283c6807]
+CVE: CVE-2023-45287 #Dependency Patch3
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ src/crypto/rsa/pss.go      |  2 +-
+ src/crypto/rsa/pss_test.go | 20 +++++++++++++++++++-
+ 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/crypto/rsa/pss.go b/src/crypto/rsa/pss.go
+index b2adbedb28fa8..814522de8181f 100644
+--- a/src/crypto/rsa/pss.go
++++ b/src/crypto/rsa/pss.go
+@@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ func SignPSS(rand io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, hash crypto.Hash, digest []byte,
+ 	saltLength := opts.saltLength()
+ 	switch saltLength {
+ 	case PSSSaltLengthAuto:
+-		saltLength = priv.Size() - 2 - hash.Size()
++		saltLength = (priv.N.BitLen()-1+7)/8 - 2 - hash.Size()
+ 	case PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash:
+ 		saltLength = hash.Size()
+ 	}
+diff --git a/src/crypto/rsa/pss_test.go b/src/crypto/rsa/pss_test.go
+index dfa8d8bb5ad02..c3a6d468497cd 100644
+--- a/src/crypto/rsa/pss_test.go
++++ b/src/crypto/rsa/pss_test.go
+@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ import (
+ 	_ "crypto/md5"
+ 	"crypto/rand"
+ 	"crypto/sha1"
+-	_ "crypto/sha256"
++	"crypto/sha256"
+ 	"encoding/hex"
+ 	"math/big"
+ 	"os"
+@@ -233,6 +233,24 @@ func TestPSSSigning(t *testing.T) {
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
++func TestSignWithPSSSaltLengthAuto(t *testing.T) {
++	key, err := GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 513)
++	if err != nil {
++		t.Fatal(err)
++	}
++	digest := sha256.Sum256([]byte("message"))
++	signature, err := key.Sign(rand.Reader, digest[:], &PSSOptions{
++		SaltLength: PSSSaltLengthAuto,
++		Hash:       crypto.SHA256,
++	})
++	if err != nil {
++		t.Fatal(err)
++	}
++	if len(signature) == 0 {
++		t.Fatal("empty signature returned")
++	}
++}
++
+ func bigFromHex(hex string) *big.Int {
+ 	n, ok := new(big.Int).SetString(hex, 16)
+ 	if !ok {

meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.14/CVE-2023-45289.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+From 20586c0dbe03d144f914155f879fa5ee287591a1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
+Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2024 11:31:57 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH] [release-branch.go1.21] net/http, net/http/cookiejar: avoid
+ subdomain matches on IPv6 zones
+
+When deciding whether to forward cookies or sensitive headers
+across a redirect, do not attempt to interpret an IPv6 address
+as a domain name.
+
+Avoids a case where a maliciously-crafted redirect to an
+IPv6 address with a scoped addressing zone could be
+misinterpreted as a within-domain redirect. For example,
+we could interpret "::1%.www.example.com" as a subdomain
+of "www.example.com".
+
+Thanks to Juho Nurminen of Mattermost for reporting this issue.
+
+Fixes CVE-2023-45289
+Fixes #65385
+For #65065
+
+Change-Id: I8f463f59f0e700c8a18733d2b264a8bcb3a19599
+Reviewed-on: https://team-review.git.corp.google.com/c/golang/go-private/+/2131938
+Reviewed-by: Tatiana Bradley <tatianabradley@google.com>
+Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <bracewell@google.com>
+Reviewed-on: https://team-review.git.corp.google.com/c/golang/go-private/+/2173775
+Reviewed-by: Carlos Amedee <amedee@google.com>
+Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/569239
+Reviewed-by: Carlos Amedee <carlos@golang.org>
+Auto-Submit: Michael Knyszek <mknyszek@google.com>
+TryBot-Bypass: Michael Knyszek <mknyszek@google.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/golang/go/commit/20586c0dbe03d144f914155f879fa5ee287591a1]
+CVE: CVE-2023-45289
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ src/net/http/client.go             |  6 ++++++
+ src/net/http/client_test.go        |  1 +
+ src/net/http/cookiejar/jar.go      |  7 +++++++
+ src/net/http/cookiejar/jar_test.go | 10 ++++++++++
+ 4 files changed, 24 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/net/http/client.go b/src/net/http/client.go
+index a496f1c..2031834 100644
+--- a/src/net/http/client.go
++++ b/src/net/http/client.go
+@@ -973,6 +973,12 @@ func isDomainOrSubdomain(sub, parent string) bool {
+ 	if sub == parent {
+ 		return true
+ 	}
++	// If sub contains a :, it's probably an IPv6 address (and is definitely not a hostname).
++	// Don't check the suffix in this case, to avoid matching the contents of a IPv6 zone.
++	// For example, "::1%.www.example.com" is not a subdomain of "www.example.com".
++	if strings.ContainsAny(sub, ":%") {
++		return false
++	}
+ 	// If sub is "foo.example.com" and parent is "example.com",
+ 	// that means sub must end in "."+parent.
+ 	// Do it without allocating.
+diff --git a/src/net/http/client_test.go b/src/net/http/client_test.go
+index 2b4f53f..442fe35 100644
+--- a/src/net/http/client_test.go
++++ b/src/net/http/client_test.go
+@@ -1703,6 +1703,7 @@ func TestShouldCopyHeaderOnRedirect(t *testing.T) {
+ 		{"cookie2", "http://foo.com/", "http://bar.com/", false},
+ 		{"authorization", "http://foo.com/", "http://bar.com/", false},
+ 		{"www-authenticate", "http://foo.com/", "http://bar.com/", false},
++		{"authorization", "http://foo.com/", "http://[::1%25.foo.com]/", false},
+ 
+ 		// But subdomains should work:
+ 		{"www-authenticate", "http://foo.com/", "http://foo.com/", true},
+diff --git a/src/net/http/cookiejar/jar.go b/src/net/http/cookiejar/jar.go
+index 9f19917..18cbfc2 100644
+--- a/src/net/http/cookiejar/jar.go
++++ b/src/net/http/cookiejar/jar.go
+@@ -356,6 +356,13 @@ func jarKey(host string, psl PublicSuffixList) string {
+ 
+ // isIP reports whether host is an IP address.
+ func isIP(host string) bool {
++	if strings.ContainsAny(host, ":%") {
++		// Probable IPv6 address.
++		// Hostnames can't contain : or %, so this is definitely not a valid host.
++		// Treating it as an IP is the more conservative option, and avoids the risk
++		// of interpeting ::1%.www.example.com as a subtomain of www.example.com.
++		return true
++	}
+ 	return net.ParseIP(host) != nil
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/src/net/http/cookiejar/jar_test.go b/src/net/http/cookiejar/jar_test.go
+index 47fb1ab..fd8d40e 100644
+--- a/src/net/http/cookiejar/jar_test.go
++++ b/src/net/http/cookiejar/jar_test.go
+@@ -251,6 +251,7 @@ var isIPTests = map[string]bool{
+ 	"127.0.0.1":            true,
+ 	"1.2.3.4":              true,
+ 	"2001:4860:0:2001::68": true,
++	"::1%zone":             true,
+ 	"example.com":          false,
+ 	"1.1.1.300":            false,
+ 	"www.foo.bar.net":      false,
+@@ -613,6 +614,15 @@ var basicsTests = [...]jarTest{
+ 			{"http://www.host.test:1234/", "a=1"},
+ 		},
+ 	},
++	{
++		"IPv6 zone is not treated as a host.",
++		"https://example.com/",
++		[]string{"a=1"},
++		"a=1",
++		[]query{
++			{"https://[::1%25.example.com]:80/", ""},
++		},
++	},
+ }
+ 
+ func TestBasics(t *testing.T) {
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.14/CVE-2023-45290.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,271 @@
+From bf80213b121074f4ad9b449410a4d13bae5e9be0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
+Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2024 15:37:52 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH] [release-branch.go1.21] net/textproto, mime/multipart: avoid
+ unbounded read in MIME header
+
+mime/multipart.Reader.ReadForm allows specifying the maximum amount
+of memory that will be consumed by the form. While this limit is
+correctly applied to the parsed form data structure, it was not
+being applied to individual header lines in a form.
+
+For example, when presented with a form containing a header line
+that never ends, ReadForm will continue to read the line until it
+runs out of memory.
+
+Limit the amount of data consumed when reading a header.
+
+Fixes CVE-2023-45290
+Fixes #65389
+For #65383
+
+Change-Id: I7f9264d25752009e95f6b2c80e3d76aaf321d658
+Reviewed-on: https://team-review.git.corp.google.com/c/golang/go-private/+/2134435
+Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <bracewell@google.com>
+Reviewed-by: Tatiana Bradley <tatianabradley@google.com>
+Reviewed-on: https://team-review.git.corp.google.com/c/golang/go-private/+/2173776
+Reviewed-by: Carlos Amedee <amedee@google.com>
+Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/569240
+Auto-Submit: Michael Knyszek <mknyszek@google.com>
+LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
+Reviewed-by: Carlos Amedee <carlos@golang.org>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/golang/go/commit/bf80213b121074f4ad9b449410a4d13bae5e9be0]
+CVE: CVE-2023-45290
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ src/mime/multipart/formdata_test.go | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ src/net/textproto/reader.go         | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++---------
+ src/net/textproto/reader_test.go    | 12 ++++++++
+ 3 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/mime/multipart/formdata_test.go b/src/mime/multipart/formdata_test.go
+index c78eeb7..f729da6 100644
+--- a/src/mime/multipart/formdata_test.go
++++ b/src/mime/multipart/formdata_test.go
+@@ -421,6 +421,48 @@ func TestReadFormLimits(t *testing.T) {
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
++func TestReadFormEndlessHeaderLine(t *testing.T) {
++	for _, test := range []struct {
++		name   string
++		prefix string
++	}{{
++		name:   "name",
++		prefix: "X-",
++	}, {
++		name:   "value",
++		prefix: "X-Header: ",
++	}, {
++		name:   "continuation",
++		prefix: "X-Header: foo\r\n  ",
++	}} {
++		t.Run(test.name, func(t *testing.T) {
++			const eol = "\r\n"
++			s := `--boundary` + eol
++			s += `Content-Disposition: form-data; name="a"` + eol
++			s += `Content-Type: text/plain` + eol
++			s += test.prefix
++			fr := io.MultiReader(
++				strings.NewReader(s),
++				neverendingReader('X'),
++			)
++			r := NewReader(fr, "boundary")
++			_, err := r.ReadForm(1 << 20)
++			if err != ErrMessageTooLarge {
++				t.Fatalf("ReadForm(1 << 20): %v, want ErrMessageTooLarge", err)
++			}
++		})
++	}
++}
++
++type neverendingReader byte
++
++func (r neverendingReader) Read(p []byte) (n int, err error) {
++	for i := range p {
++		p[i] = byte(r)
++	}
++	return len(p), nil
++}
++
+ func BenchmarkReadForm(b *testing.B) {
+ 	for _, test := range []struct {
+ 		name string
+diff --git a/src/net/textproto/reader.go b/src/net/textproto/reader.go
+index ad2d777..cea6613 100644
+--- a/src/net/textproto/reader.go
++++ b/src/net/textproto/reader.go
+@@ -17,6 +17,10 @@ import (
+ 	"sync"
+ )
+ 
++// TODO: This should be a distinguishable error (ErrMessageTooLarge)
++// to allow mime/multipart to detect it.
++var errMessageTooLarge = errors.New("message too large")
++
+ // A Reader implements convenience methods for reading requests
+ // or responses from a text protocol network connection.
+ type Reader struct {
+@@ -38,13 +42,13 @@ func NewReader(r *bufio.Reader) *Reader {
+ // ReadLine reads a single line from r,
+ // eliding the final \n or \r\n from the returned string.
+ func (r *Reader) ReadLine() (string, error) {
+-	line, err := r.readLineSlice()
++	line, err := r.readLineSlice(-1)
+ 	return string(line), err
+ }
+ 
+ // ReadLineBytes is like ReadLine but returns a []byte instead of a string.
+ func (r *Reader) ReadLineBytes() ([]byte, error) {
+-	line, err := r.readLineSlice()
++	line, err := r.readLineSlice(-1)
+ 	if line != nil {
+ 		buf := make([]byte, len(line))
+ 		copy(buf, line)
+@@ -53,7 +57,10 @@ func (r *Reader) ReadLineBytes() ([]byte, error) {
+ 	return line, err
+ }
+ 
+-func (r *Reader) readLineSlice() ([]byte, error) {
++// readLineSlice reads a single line from r,
++// up to lim bytes long (or unlimited if lim is less than 0),
++// eliding the final \r or \r\n from the returned string.
++func (r *Reader) readLineSlice(lim int64) ([]byte, error) {
+ 	r.closeDot()
+ 	var line []byte
+ 	for {
+@@ -61,6 +68,9 @@ func (r *Reader) readLineSlice() ([]byte, error) {
+ 		if err != nil {
+ 			return nil, err
+ 		}
++		if lim >= 0 && int64(len(line))+int64(len(l)) > lim {
++			return nil, errMessageTooLarge
++		}
+ 		// Avoid the copy if the first call produced a full line.
+ 		if line == nil && !more {
+ 			return l, nil
+@@ -93,7 +103,7 @@ func (r *Reader) readLineSlice() ([]byte, error) {
+ // A line consisting of only white space is never continued.
+ //
+ func (r *Reader) ReadContinuedLine() (string, error) {
+-	line, err := r.readContinuedLineSlice(noValidation)
++	line, err := r.readContinuedLineSlice(-1, noValidation)
+ 	return string(line), err
+ }
+ 
+@@ -114,7 +124,7 @@ func trim(s []byte) []byte {
+ // ReadContinuedLineBytes is like ReadContinuedLine but
+ // returns a []byte instead of a string.
+ func (r *Reader) ReadContinuedLineBytes() ([]byte, error) {
+-	line, err := r.readContinuedLineSlice(noValidation)
++	line, err := r.readContinuedLineSlice(-1, noValidation)
+ 	if line != nil {
+ 		buf := make([]byte, len(line))
+ 		copy(buf, line)
+@@ -127,13 +137,14 @@ func (r *Reader) ReadContinuedLineBytes() ([]byte, error) {
+ // returning a byte slice with all lines. The validateFirstLine function
+ // is run on the first read line, and if it returns an error then this
+ // error is returned from readContinuedLineSlice.
+-func (r *Reader) readContinuedLineSlice(validateFirstLine func([]byte) error) ([]byte, error) {
++// It reads up to lim bytes of data (or unlimited if lim is less than 0).
++func (r *Reader) readContinuedLineSlice(lim int64, validateFirstLine func([]byte) error) ([]byte, error) {
+ 	if validateFirstLine == nil {
+ 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing validateFirstLine func")
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	// Read the first line.
+-	line, err := r.readLineSlice()
++	line, err := r.readLineSlice(lim)
+ 	if err != nil {
+ 		return nil, err
+ 	}
+@@ -161,13 +172,21 @@ func (r *Reader) readContinuedLineSlice(validateFirstLine func([]byte) error) ([
+ 	// copy the slice into buf.
+ 	r.buf = append(r.buf[:0], trim(line)...)
+ 
++	if lim < 0 {
++		lim = math.MaxInt64
++	}
++	lim -= int64(len(r.buf))
++
+ 	// Read continuation lines.
+ 	for r.skipSpace() > 0 {
+-		line, err := r.readLineSlice()
++		r.buf = append(r.buf, ' ')
++		if int64(len(r.buf)) >= lim {
++			return nil, errMessageTooLarge
++		}
++		line, err := r.readLineSlice(lim - int64(len(r.buf)))
+ 		if err != nil {
+ 			break
+ 		}
+-		r.buf = append(r.buf, ' ')
+ 		r.buf = append(r.buf, trim(line)...)
+ 	}
+ 	return r.buf, nil
+@@ -512,7 +531,8 @@ func readMIMEHeader(r *Reader, maxMemory, maxHeaders int64) (MIMEHeader, error)
+ 
+ 	// The first line cannot start with a leading space.
+ 	if buf, err := r.R.Peek(1); err == nil && (buf[0] == ' ' || buf[0] == '\t') {
+-		line, err := r.readLineSlice()
++		const errorLimit = 80 // arbitrary limit on how much of the line we'll quote
++		line, err := r.readLineSlice(errorLimit)
+ 		if err != nil {
+ 			return m, err
+ 		}
+@@ -520,7 +540,7 @@ func readMIMEHeader(r *Reader, maxMemory, maxHeaders int64) (MIMEHeader, error)
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	for {
+-		kv, err := r.readContinuedLineSlice(mustHaveFieldNameColon)
++		kv, err := r.readContinuedLineSlice(maxMemory, mustHaveFieldNameColon)
+ 		if len(kv) == 0 {
+ 			return m, err
+ 		}
+@@ -541,7 +561,7 @@ func readMIMEHeader(r *Reader, maxMemory, maxHeaders int64) (MIMEHeader, error)
+ 
+ 		maxHeaders--
+ 		if maxHeaders < 0 {
+-			return nil, errors.New("message too large")
++			return nil, errMessageTooLarge
+ 		}
+ 
+ 		// backport 5c55ac9bf1e5f779220294c843526536605f42ab
+@@ -567,9 +587,7 @@ func readMIMEHeader(r *Reader, maxMemory, maxHeaders int64) (MIMEHeader, error)
+ 		}
+ 		maxMemory -= int64(len(value))
+ 		if maxMemory < 0 {
+-			// TODO: This should be a distinguishable error (ErrMessageTooLarge)
+-			// to allow mime/multipart to detect it.
+-			return m, errors.New("message too large")
++			return m, errMessageTooLarge
+ 		}
+ 		if vv == nil && len(strs) > 0 {
+ 			// More than likely this will be a single-element key.
+diff --git a/src/net/textproto/reader_test.go b/src/net/textproto/reader_test.go
+index 3ae0de1..db1ed91 100644
+--- a/src/net/textproto/reader_test.go
++++ b/src/net/textproto/reader_test.go
+@@ -34,6 +34,18 @@ func TestReadLine(t *testing.T) {
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
++func TestReadLineLongLine(t *testing.T) {
++	line := strings.Repeat("12345", 10000)
++	r := reader(line + "\r\n")
++	s, err := r.ReadLine()
++	if err != nil {
++		t.Fatalf("Line 1: %v", err)
++	}
++	if s != line {
++		t.Fatalf("%v-byte line does not match expected %v-byte line", len(s), len(line))
++	}
++}
++
+ func TestReadContinuedLine(t *testing.T) {
+ 	r := reader("line1\nline\n 2\nline3\n")
+ 	s, err := r.ReadContinuedLine()
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.14/CVE-2024-24784.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,205 @@
+From 5330cd225ba54c7dc78c1b46dcdf61a4671a632c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Roland Shoemaker <bracewell@google.com>
+Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2024 11:02:14 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH] [release-branch.go1.22] net/mail: properly handle special
+ characters in phrase and obs-phrase
+
+Fixes a couple of misalignments with RFC 5322 which introduce
+significant diffs between (mostly) conformant parsers.
+
+This change reverts the changes made in CL50911, which allowed certain
+special RFC 5322 characters to appear unquoted in the "phrase" syntax.
+It is unclear why this change was made in the first place, and created
+a divergence from comformant parsers. In particular this resulted in
+treating comments in display names incorrectly.
+
+Additionally properly handle trailing malformed comments in the group
+syntax.
+
+For #65083
+Fixed #65849
+
+Change-Id: I00dddc044c6ae3381154e43236632604c390f672
+Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/555596
+Reviewed-by: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
+LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
+Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/566215
+Reviewed-by: Carlos Amedee <carlos@golang.org>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/golang/go/commit/5330cd225ba54c7dc78c1b46dcdf61a4671a632c]
+CVE: CVE-2024-24784
+Signed-off-by: Ashish Sharma <asharma@mvista.com>
+
+ src/net/mail/message.go      | 30 +++++++++++++++------------
+ src/net/mail/message_test.go | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
+ 2 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/net/mail/message.go b/src/net/mail/message.go
+index af516fc30f470..fc2a9e46f811b 100644
+--- a/src/net/mail/message.go
++++ b/src/net/mail/message.go
+@@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ func (a *Address) String() string {
+ 	// Add quotes if needed
+ 	quoteLocal := false
+ 	for i, r := range local {
+-		if isAtext(r, false, false) {
++		if isAtext(r, false) {
+ 			continue
+ 		}
+ 		if r == '.' {
+@@ -444,7 +444,7 @@ func (p *addrParser) parseAddress(handleGroup bool) ([]*Address, error) {
+ 	if !p.consume('<') {
+ 		atext := true
+ 		for _, r := range displayName {
+-			if !isAtext(r, true, false) {
++			if !isAtext(r, true) {
+ 				atext = false
+ 				break
+ 			}
+@@ -479,7 +479,9 @@ func (p *addrParser) consumeGroupList() ([]*Address, error) {
+ 	// handle empty group.
+ 	p.skipSpace()
+ 	if p.consume(';') {
+-		p.skipCFWS()
++		if !p.skipCFWS() {
++			return nil, errors.New("mail: misformatted parenthetical comment")
++		}
+ 		return group, nil
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -496,7 +498,9 @@ func (p *addrParser) consumeGroupList() ([]*Address, error) {
+ 			return nil, errors.New("mail: misformatted parenthetical comment")
+ 		}
+ 		if p.consume(';') {
+-			p.skipCFWS()
++			if !p.skipCFWS() {
++				return nil, errors.New("mail: misformatted parenthetical comment")
++			}
+ 			break
+ 		}
+ 		if !p.consume(',') {
+@@ -566,6 +570,12 @@ func (p *addrParser) consumePhrase() (phrase string, err error) {
+ 	var words []string
+ 	var isPrevEncoded bool
+ 	for {
++		// obs-phrase allows CFWS after one word
++		if len(words) > 0 {
++			if !p.skipCFWS() {
++				return "", errors.New("mail: misformatted parenthetical comment")
++			}
++		}
+ 		// word = atom / quoted-string
+ 		var word string
+ 		p.skipSpace()
+@@ -661,7 +671,6 @@ Loop:
+ // If dot is true, consumeAtom parses an RFC 5322 dot-atom instead.
+ // If permissive is true, consumeAtom will not fail on:
+ // - leading/trailing/double dots in the atom (see golang.org/issue/4938)
+-// - special characters (RFC 5322 3.2.3) except '<', '>', ':' and '"' (see golang.org/issue/21018)
+ func (p *addrParser) consumeAtom(dot bool, permissive bool) (atom string, err error) {
+ 	i := 0
+ 
+@@ -672,7 +681,7 @@ Loop:
+ 		case size == 1 && r == utf8.RuneError:
+ 			return "", fmt.Errorf("mail: invalid utf-8 in address: %q", p.s)
+ 
+-		case size == 0 || !isAtext(r, dot, permissive):
++		case size == 0 || !isAtext(r, dot):
+ 			break Loop
+ 
+ 		default:
+@@ -850,18 +859,13 @@ func (e charsetError) Error() string {
+ 
+ // isAtext reports whether r is an RFC 5322 atext character.
+ // If dot is true, period is included.
+-// If permissive is true, RFC 5322 3.2.3 specials is included,
+-// except '<', '>', ':' and '"'.
+-func isAtext(r rune, dot, permissive bool) bool {
++func isAtext(r rune, dot bool) bool {
+ 	switch r {
+ 	case '.':
+ 		return dot
+ 
+ 	// RFC 5322 3.2.3. specials
+-	case '(', ')', '[', ']', ';', '@', '\\', ',':
+-		return permissive
+-
+-	case '<', '>', '"', ':':
++	case '(', ')', '<', '>', '[', ']', ':', ';', '@', '\\', ',', '"': // RFC 5322 3.2.3. specials
+ 		return false
+ 	}
+ 	return isVchar(r)
+diff --git a/src/net/mail/message_test.go b/src/net/mail/message_test.go
+index 1e1bb4092f659..1f2f62afbf406 100644
+--- a/src/net/mail/message_test.go
++++ b/src/net/mail/message_test.go
+@@ -385,8 +385,11 @@ func TestAddressParsingError(t *testing.T) {
+ 		13: {"group not closed: null@example.com", "expected comma"},
+ 		14: {"group: first@example.com, second@example.com;", "group with multiple addresses"},
+ 		15: {"john.doe", "missing '@' or angle-addr"},
+-		16: {"john.doe@", "no angle-addr"},
++		16: {"john.doe@", "missing '@' or angle-addr"},
+ 		17: {"John Doe@foo.bar", "no angle-addr"},
++		18: {" group: null@example.com; (asd", "misformatted parenthetical comment"},
++		19: {" group: ; (asd", "misformatted parenthetical comment"},
++		20: {`(John) Doe <jdoe@machine.example>`, "missing word in phrase:"},
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	for i, tc := range mustErrTestCases {
+@@ -436,24 +439,19 @@ func TestAddressParsing(t *testing.T) {
+ 				Address: "john.q.public@example.com",
+ 			}},
+ 		},
+-		{
+-			`"John (middle) Doe" <jdoe@machine.example>`,
+-			[]*Address{{
+-				Name:    "John (middle) Doe",
+-				Address: "jdoe@machine.example",
+-			}},
+-		},
++		// Comment in display name
+ 		{
+ 			`John (middle) Doe <jdoe@machine.example>`,
+ 			[]*Address{{
+-				Name:    "John (middle) Doe",
++				Name:    "John Doe",
+ 				Address: "jdoe@machine.example",
+ 			}},
+ 		},
++		// Display name is quoted string, so comment is not a comment
+ 		{
+-			`John !@M@! Doe <jdoe@machine.example>`,
++			`"John (middle) Doe" <jdoe@machine.example>`,
+ 			[]*Address{{
+-				Name:    "John !@M@! Doe",
++				Name:    "John (middle) Doe",
+ 				Address: "jdoe@machine.example",
+ 			}},
+ 		},
+@@ -788,6 +786,26 @@ func TestAddressParsing(t *testing.T) {
+ 				},
+ 			},
+ 		},
++		// Comment in group display name
++		{
++			`group (comment:): a@example.com, b@example.com;`,
++			[]*Address{
++				{
++					Address: "a@example.com",
++				},
++				{
++					Address: "b@example.com",
++				},
++			},
++		},
++		{
++			`x(:"):"@a.example;("@b.example;`,
++			[]*Address{
++				{
++					Address: `@a.example;(@b.example`,
++				},
++			},
++		},
+ 	}
+ 	for _, test := range tests {
+ 		if len(test.exp) == 1 {

meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.14/CVE-2024-24785.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
+From 3643147a29352ca2894fd5d0d2069bc4b4335a7e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
+Date: Wed, 14 Feb 2024 17:18:36 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH] [release-branch.go1.21] html/template: escape additional
+ tokens in MarshalJSON errors
+
+Escape "</script" and "<!--" in errors returned from MarshalJSON errors
+when attempting to marshal types in script blocks. This prevents any
+user controlled content from prematurely terminating the script block.
+
+Updates #65697
+Fixes #65968
+
+Change-Id: Icf0e26c54ea7d9c1deed0bff11b6506c99ddef1b
+Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/564196
+LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
+Reviewed-by: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
+(cherry picked from commit ccbc725f2d678255df1bd326fa511a492aa3a0aa)
+Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/567515
+Reviewed-by: Carlos Amedee <carlos@golang.org>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/golang/go/commit/3643147a29352ca2894fd5d0d2069bc4b4335a7e]
+CVE: CVE-2024-24785
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ src/html/template/js.go      | 22 ++++++++-
+ src/html/template/js_test.go | 96 ++++++++++++++++++++----------------
+ 2 files changed, 74 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/html/template/js.go b/src/html/template/js.go
+index 35994f0..4d3b25d 100644
+--- a/src/html/template/js.go
++++ b/src/html/template/js.go
+@@ -171,13 +171,31 @@ func jsValEscaper(args ...interface{}) string {
+ 	// cyclic data. This may be an unacceptable DoS risk.
+ 	b, err := json.Marshal(a)
+ 	if err != nil {
+-		// Put a space before comment so that if it is flush against
++		// While the standard JSON marshaller does not include user controlled
++		// information in the error message, if a type has a MarshalJSON method,
++		// the content of the error message is not guaranteed. Since we insert
++		// the error into the template, as part of a comment, we attempt to
++		// prevent the error from either terminating the comment, or the script
++		// block itself.
++		//
++		// In particular we:
++		//   * replace "*/" comment end tokens with "* /", which does not
++		//     terminate the comment
++		//   * replace "</script" with "\x3C/script", and "<!--" with
++		//     "\x3C!--", which prevents confusing script block termination
++		//     semantics
++		//
++		// We also put a space before the comment so that if it is flush against
+ 		// a division operator it is not turned into a line comment:
+ 		//     x/{{y}}
+ 		// turning into
+ 		//     x//* error marshaling y:
+ 		//          second line of error message */null
+-		return fmt.Sprintf(" /* %s */null ", strings.ReplaceAll(err.Error(), "*/", "* /"))
++		errStr := err.Error()
++		errStr = strings.ReplaceAll(errStr, "*/", "* /")
++		errStr = strings.ReplaceAll(errStr, "</script", `\x3C/script`)
++		errStr = strings.ReplaceAll(errStr, "<!--", `\x3C!--`)
++		return fmt.Sprintf(" /* %s */null ", errStr)
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	// TODO: maybe post-process output to prevent it from containing
+diff --git a/src/html/template/js_test.go b/src/html/template/js_test.go
+index de9ef28..3fc3baf 100644
+--- a/src/html/template/js_test.go
++++ b/src/html/template/js_test.go
+@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
+ package template
+ 
+ import (
++	"errors"
+ 	"bytes"
+ 	"math"
+ 	"strings"
+@@ -104,61 +105,72 @@ func TestNextJsCtx(t *testing.T) {
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
++type jsonErrType struct{}
++
++func (e *jsonErrType) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error) {
++	return nil, errors.New("beep */ boop </script blip <!--")
++}
++
+ func TestJSValEscaper(t *testing.T) {
+ 	tests := []struct {
+-		x  interface{}
+-		js string
++		x        interface{}
++		js       string
++		skipNest bool
+ 	}{
+-		{int(42), " 42 "},
+-		{uint(42), " 42 "},
+-		{int16(42), " 42 "},
+-		{uint16(42), " 42 "},
+-		{int32(-42), " -42 "},
+-		{uint32(42), " 42 "},
+-		{int16(-42), " -42 "},
+-		{uint16(42), " 42 "},
+-		{int64(-42), " -42 "},
+-		{uint64(42), " 42 "},
+-		{uint64(1) << 53, " 9007199254740992 "},
++		{int(42), " 42 ", false},
++		{uint(42), " 42 ", false},
++		{int16(42), " 42 ", false},
++		{uint16(42), " 42 ", false},
++		{int32(-42), " -42 ", false},
++		{uint32(42), " 42 ", false},
++		{int16(-42), " -42 ", false},
++		{uint16(42), " 42 ", false},
++		{int64(-42), " -42 ", false},
++		{uint64(42), " 42 ", false},
++		{uint64(1) << 53, " 9007199254740992 ", false},
+ 		// ulp(1 << 53) > 1 so this loses precision in JS
+ 		// but it is still a representable integer literal.
+-		{uint64(1)<<53 + 1, " 9007199254740993 "},
+-		{float32(1.0), " 1 "},
+-		{float32(-1.0), " -1 "},
+-		{float32(0.5), " 0.5 "},
+-		{float32(-0.5), " -0.5 "},
+-		{float32(1.0) / float32(256), " 0.00390625 "},
+-		{float32(0), " 0 "},
+-		{math.Copysign(0, -1), " -0 "},
+-		{float64(1.0), " 1 "},
+-		{float64(-1.0), " -1 "},
+-		{float64(0.5), " 0.5 "},
+-		{float64(-0.5), " -0.5 "},
+-		{float64(0), " 0 "},
+-		{math.Copysign(0, -1), " -0 "},
+-		{"", `""`},
+-		{"foo", `"foo"`},
++		{uint64(1)<<53 + 1, " 9007199254740993 ", false},
++		{float32(1.0), " 1 ", false},
++		{float32(-1.0), " -1 ", false},
++		{float32(0.5), " 0.5 ", false},
++		{float32(-0.5), " -0.5 ", false},
++		{float32(1.0) / float32(256), " 0.00390625 ", false},
++		{float32(0), " 0 ", false},
++		{math.Copysign(0, -1), " -0 ", false},
++		{float64(1.0), " 1 ", false},
++		{float64(-1.0), " -1 ", false},
++		{float64(0.5), " 0.5 ", false},
++		{float64(-0.5), " -0.5 ", false},
++		{float64(0), " 0 ", false},
++		{math.Copysign(0, -1), " -0 ", false},
++		{"", `""`, false},
++		{"foo", `"foo"`, false},
+ 		// Newlines.
+-		{"\r\n\u2028\u2029", `"\r\n\u2028\u2029"`},
++		{"\r\n\u2028\u2029", `"\r\n\u2028\u2029"`, false},
+ 		// "\v" == "v" on IE 6 so use "\u000b" instead.
+-		{"\t\x0b", `"\t\u000b"`},
+-		{struct{ X, Y int }{1, 2}, `{"X":1,"Y":2}`},
+-		{[]interface{}{}, "[]"},
+-		{[]interface{}{42, "foo", nil}, `[42,"foo",null]`},
+-		{[]string{"<!--", "</script>", "-->"}, `["\u003c!--","\u003c/script\u003e","--\u003e"]`},
+-		{"<!--", `"\u003c!--"`},
+-		{"-->", `"--\u003e"`},
+-		{"<![CDATA[", `"\u003c![CDATA["`},
+-		{"]]>", `"]]\u003e"`},
+-		{"</script", `"\u003c/script"`},
+-		{"\U0001D11E", "\"\U0001D11E\""}, // or "\uD834\uDD1E"
+-		{nil, " null "},
++		{"\t\x0b", `"\t\u000b"`, false},
++		{struct{ X, Y int }{1, 2}, `{"X":1,"Y":2}`, false},
++		{[]interface{}{}, "[]", false},
++		{[]interface{}{42, "foo", nil}, `[42,"foo",null]`, false},
++		{[]string{"<!--", "</script>", "-->"}, `["\u003c!--","\u003c/script\u003e","--\u003e"]`, false},
++		{"<!--", `"\u003c!--"`, false},
++		{"-->", `"--\u003e"`, false},
++		{"<![CDATA[", `"\u003c![CDATA["`, false},
++		{"]]>", `"]]\u003e"`, false},
++		{"</script", `"\u003c/script"`, false},
++		{"\U0001D11E", "\"\U0001D11E\"", false}, // or "\uD834\uDD1E"
++		{nil, " null ", false},
++		{&jsonErrType{}, " /* json: error calling MarshalJSON for type *template.jsonErrType: beep * / boop \\x3C/script blip \\x3C!-- */null ", true},
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	for _, test := range tests {
+ 		if js := jsValEscaper(test.x); js != test.js {
+ 			t.Errorf("%+v: want\n\t%q\ngot\n\t%q", test.x, test.js, js)
+ 		}
++		if test.skipNest {
++			continue
++		}
+ 		// Make sure that escaping corner cases are not broken
+ 		// by nesting.
+ 		a := []interface{}{test.x}
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-devtools/opkg/opkg/0001-file_util.c-fix-possible-bad-memory-access-in-file_r.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+From 8b45a3c4cab95382beea1ecdddeb2e4a9ed14aba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
+Date: Wed, 1 Apr 2020 21:47:40 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 001/104] file_util.c: fix possible bad memory access in
+ file_read_line_alloc()
+
+In the case of a zero length string being returned by fgets(), the condition
+checking for a trailing new line would perform a bad memory access outside
+of `buf`. This might happen when line with a leading null byte is read.
+
+Avoid this case by checking that the string has a length of at least one
+byte. Also change the unsigned int types to size_t to store length values
+while we're at it.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/ndmsystems/opkg/commit/8b45a3c4cab95382beea1ecdddeb2e4a9ed14aba]
+
+Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
+Signed-off-by: Alejandro del Castillo <alejandro.delcastillo@ni.com>
+Signed-off-by: virendra thakur <virendrak@kpit.com>
+---
+ libopkg/file_util.c | 7 ++-----
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/libopkg/file_util.c b/libopkg/file_util.c
+index fbed7b4..ee9f59d 100644
+--- a/libopkg/file_util.c
++++ b/libopkg/file_util.c
+@@ -127,17 +127,14 @@ char *file_readlink_alloc(const char *file_name)
+ */
+ char *file_read_line_alloc(FILE * fp)
+ {
++    size_t buf_len, line_size;
+     char buf[BUFSIZ];
+-    unsigned int buf_len;
+     char *line = NULL;
+-    unsigned int line_size = 0;
+     int got_nl = 0;
+ 
+-    buf[0] = '\0';
+-
+     while (fgets(buf, BUFSIZ, fp)) {
+         buf_len = strlen(buf);
+-        if (buf[buf_len - 1] == '\n') {
++        if (buf_len > 0 && buf[buf_len - 1] == '\n') {
+             buf_len--;
+             buf[buf_len] = '\0';
+             got_nl = 1;
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-devtools/opkg/opkg_0.4.2.bb

@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://downloads.yoctoproject.org/releases/${BPN}/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.gz
            file://opkg.conf \
            file://0001-opkg_conf-create-opkg.lock-in-run-instead-of-var-run.patch \
            file://sourcedateepoch.patch \
+           file://0001-file_util.c-fix-possible-bad-memory-access-in-file_r.patch \
            file://run-ptest \
 "
 

meta/recipes-devtools/perl/files/CVE-2023-31484.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+CVE: CVE-2023-31484
+Upstream-Status: Backport [  import from Ubuntu  perl_5.30.0-9ubuntu0.5
+upstream  https://github.com/andk/cpanpm/commit/9c98370287f4e709924aee7c58ef21c85289a7f0 ]
+Signed-off-by: Lee Chee Yang <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
+
+From 9c98370287f4e709924aee7c58ef21c85289a7f0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stig Palmquist <git@stig.io>
+Date: Tue, 28 Feb 2023 11:54:06 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Add verify_SSL=>1 to HTTP::Tiny to verify https server
+ identity
+
+---
+ lib/CPAN/HTTP/Client.pm | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/cpan/CPAN/lib/CPAN/HTTP/Client.pm b/cpan/CPAN/lib/CPAN/HTTP/Client.pm
+index 4fc792c26..a616fee20 100644
+--- a/cpan/CPAN/lib/CPAN/HTTP/Client.pm
++++ b/cpan/CPAN/lib/CPAN/HTTP/Client.pm
+@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ sub mirror {
+ 
+     my $want_proxy = $self->_want_proxy($uri);
+     my $http = HTTP::Tiny->new(
++        verify_SSL => 1,
+         $want_proxy ? (proxy => $self->{proxy}) : ()
+     );
+ 

meta/recipes-devtools/perl/files/CVE-2023-47038.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+as per https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2023-47100 , CVE-2023-47100 is duplicate of CVE-2023-47038
+CVE: CVE-2023-47038 CVE-2023-47100
+Upstream-Status: Backport [ import from ubuntu perl_5.30.0-9ubuntu0.5 
+upstream https://github.com/Perl/perl5/commit/12c313ce49b36160a7ca2e9b07ad5bd92ee4a010 ]
+Signed-off-by: Lee Chee Yang <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
+
+Backport of:
+
+From 12c313ce49b36160a7ca2e9b07ad5bd92ee4a010 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Karl Williamson <khw@cpan.org>
+Date: Sat, 9 Sep 2023 11:59:09 -0600
+Subject: [PATCH 1/2] Fix read/write past buffer end: perl-security#140
+
+A package name may be specified in a \p{...} regular expression
+construct.  If unspecified, "utf8::" is assumed, which is the package
+all official Unicode properties are in.  By specifying a different
+package, one can create a user-defined property with the same
+unqualified name as a Unicode one.  Such a property is defined by a sub
+whose name begins with "Is" or "In", and if the sub wishes to refer to
+an official Unicode property, it must explicitly specify the "utf8::".
+S_parse_uniprop_string() is used to parse the interior of both \p{} and
+the user-defined sub lines.
+
+In S_parse_uniprop_string(), it parses the input "name" parameter,
+creating a modified copy, "lookup_name", malloc'ed with the same size as
+"name".  The modifications are essentially to create a canonicalized
+version of the input, with such things as extraneous white-space
+stripped off.  I found it convenient to strip off the package specifier
+"utf8::".  To to so, the code simply pretends "lookup_name" begins just
+after the "utf8::", and adjusts various other values to compensate.
+However, it missed the adjustment of one required one.
+
+This is only a problem when the property name begins with "perl" and
+isn't "perlspace" nor "perlword".  All such ones are undocumented
+internal properties.
+
+What happens in this case is that the input is reparsed with slightly
+different rules in effect as to what is legal versus illegal.  The
+problem is that "lookup_name" no longer is pointing to its initial
+value, but "name" is.  Thus the space allocated for filling "lookup_name"
+is now shorter than "name", and as this shortened "lookup_name" is
+filled by copying suitable portions of "name", the write can be to
+unallocated space.
+
+The solution is to skip the "utf8::" when reparsing "name".  Then both
+"lookup_name" and "name" are effectively shortened by the same amount,
+and there is no going off the end.
+
+This commit also does white-space adjustment so that things align
+vertically for readability.
+
+This can be easily backported to earlier Perl releases.
+---
+ regcomp.c           | 17 +++++++++++------
+ t/re/pat_advanced.t |  8 ++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/regcomp.c
++++ b/regcomp.c
+@@ -22606,7 +22606,7 @@ Perl_parse_uniprop_string(pTHX_
+      * compile perl to know about them) */
+     bool is_nv_type = FALSE;
+ 
+-    unsigned int i, j = 0;
++    unsigned int i = 0, i_zero = 0, j = 0;
+     int equals_pos = -1;    /* Where the '=' is found, or negative if none */
+     int slash_pos  = -1;    /* Where the '/' is found, or negative if none */
+     int table_index = 0;    /* The entry number for this property in the table
+@@ -22717,9 +22717,13 @@ Perl_parse_uniprop_string(pTHX_
+      * all of them are considered to be for that package.  For the purposes of
+      * parsing the rest of the property, strip it off */
+     if (non_pkg_begin == STRLENs("utf8::") && memBEGINPs(name, name_len, "utf8::")) {
+-        lookup_name +=  STRLENs("utf8::");
+-        j -=  STRLENs("utf8::");
+-        equals_pos -=  STRLENs("utf8::");
++        lookup_name += STRLENs("utf8::");
++        j           -= STRLENs("utf8::");
++        equals_pos  -= STRLENs("utf8::");
++        i_zero       = STRLENs("utf8::");   /* When resetting 'i' to reparse
++                                               from the beginning, it has to be
++                                               set past what we're stripping
++                                               off */
+     }
+ 
+     /* Here, we are either done with the whole property name, if it was simple;
+@@ -22997,7 +23001,8 @@ Perl_parse_uniprop_string(pTHX_
+ 
+             /* We set the inputs back to 0 and the code below will reparse,
+              * using strict */
+-            i = j = 0;
++            i = i_zero;
++            j = 0;
+         }
+     }
+ 
+@@ -23018,7 +23023,7 @@ Perl_parse_uniprop_string(pTHX_
+          * separates two digits */
+         if (cur == '_') {
+             if (    stricter
+-                && (     i == 0 || (int) i == equals_pos || i == name_len- 1
++                && (   i == i_zero || (int) i == equals_pos || i == name_len- 1
+                     || ! isDIGIT_A(name[i-1]) || ! isDIGIT_A(name[i+1])))
+             {
+                 lookup_name[j++] = '_';
+--- a/t/re/pat_advanced.t
++++ b/t/re/pat_advanced.t
+@@ -2524,6 +2524,14 @@ EOF
+                       "", {}, "*COMMIT caused positioning beyond EOS");
+     }
+ 
++    {   # perl-security#140, read/write past buffer end
++        fresh_perl_like('qr/\p{utf8::perl x}/',
++                        qr/Illegal user-defined property name "utf8::perl x" in regex/,
++                        {}, "perl-security#140");
++        fresh_perl_is('qr/\p{utf8::_perl_surrogate}/', "",
++                        {}, "perl-security#140");
++    }
++
+ 
+     # !!! NOTE that tests that aren't at all likely to crash perl should go
+     # a ways above, above these last ones.  There's a comment there that, like

meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl_5.30.1.bb

@@ -29,6 +29,8 @@ SRC_URI = "https://www.cpan.org/src/5.0/perl-${PV}.tar.gz;name=perl \
            file://CVE-2020-10878_1.patch \
            file://CVE-2020-10878_2.patch \
            file://CVE-2020-12723.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-31484.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-47038.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI_append_class-native = " \
            file://perl-configpm-switch.patch \
@@ -44,6 +46,10 @@ SRC_URI[perl-cross.sha256sum] = "edce0b0c2f725e2db3f203d6d8e9f3f7161256f5d159055
 
 S = "${WORKDIR}/perl-${PV}"
 
+# This is windows only issue.
+# https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2023-47039
+CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2023-47039"
+
 inherit upstream-version-is-even update-alternatives
 
 DEPENDS += "zlib virtual/crypt"

meta/recipes-devtools/python/python-setuptools.inc

@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ PYPI_PACKAGE_EXT = "zip"
 
 inherit pypi
 
+SRC_URI += " file://CVE-2022-40897.patch "
+
 SRC_URI_append_class-native = " file://0001-conditionally-do-not-fetch-code-by-easy_install.patch"
 
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "0c956eea142af9c2b02d72e3c042af30"

meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-setuptools/CVE-2022-40897.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+From 43a9c9bfa6aa626ec2a22540bea28d2ca77964be Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Jason R. Coombs" <jaraco@jaraco.com>
+Date: Fri, 4 Nov 2022 13:47:53 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] Limit the amount of whitespace to search/backtrack. Fixes
+ #3659.
+
+CVE: CVE-2022-40897
+Upstream-Status: Backport [
+Upstream :  https://github.com/pypa/setuptools/commit/43a9c9bfa6aa626ec2a22540bea28d2ca77964be
+Import from Ubuntu: http://archive.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/pool/main/s/setuptools/setuptools_45.2.0-1ubuntu0.1.debian.tar.xz
+]
+Signed-off-by: Lee Chee Yang <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
+
+---
+ setuptools/package_index.py           | 2 +-
+ setuptools/tests/test_packageindex.py | 1 -
+ 2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- setuptools-45.2.0.orig/setuptools/package_index.py
++++ setuptools-45.2.0/setuptools/package_index.py
+@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ def unique_values(func):
+     return wrapper
+ 
+ 
+-REL = re.compile(r"""<([^>]*\srel\s*=\s*['"]?([^'">]+)[^>]*)>""", re.I)
++REL = re.compile(r"""<([^>]*\srel\s{0,10}=\s{0,10}['"]?([^'" >]+)[^>]*)>""", re.I)
+ # this line is here to fix emacs' cruddy broken syntax highlighting
+ 
+ 

meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc

@@ -137,11 +137,13 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.qemu.org/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.xz \
            file://CVE-2021-3409-4.patch \
            file://CVE-2021-3409-5.patch \
            file://hw-display-qxl-Pass-requested-buffer-size-to-qxl_phy.patch \
-           file://CVE-2023-0330_1.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-0330.patch \
-           file://CVE-2023-0330_2.patch \
            file://CVE-2023-3354.patch \
 	   file://CVE-2023-3180.patch \
            file://CVE-2020-24165.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-5088.patch \
+           file://9pfs-local-ignore-O_NOATIME-if-we-don-t-have-permiss.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-2861.patch \
            "
 UPSTREAM_CHECK_REGEX = "qemu-(?P<pver>\d+(\.\d+)+)\.tar"
 
@@ -167,6 +169,13 @@ CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2020-27661"
 # this bug related to windows specific.
 CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2023-0664"
 
+# As per https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2203387
+# RHEL specific issue
+CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2023-2680"
+
+# Affected only `qemu-kvm` shipped with Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.3 release.
+CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2021-20295"
+
 COMPATIBLE_HOST_mipsarchn32 = "null"
 COMPATIBLE_HOST_mipsarchn64 = "null"
 

meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/0012-fix-libcap-header-issue-on-some-distro.patch

@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com>
  1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
 
 diff --git a/fsdev/virtfs-proxy-helper.c b/fsdev/virtfs-proxy-helper.c
-index 6f132c5f..8329950c 100644
+index 300c9765..2823db7d 100644
 --- a/fsdev/virtfs-proxy-helper.c
 +++ b/fsdev/virtfs-proxy-helper.c
 @@ -13,7 +13,6 @@
@@ -71,9 +71,9 @@ index 6f132c5f..8329950c 100644
  #include <sys/fsuid.h>
  #include <sys/vfs.h>
  #include <sys/ioctl.h>
-@@ -27,7 +26,11 @@
+@@ -28,7 +27,11 @@
- #include "9p-iov-marshal.h"
  #include "hw/9pfs/9p-proxy.h"
+ #include "hw/9pfs/9p-util.h"
  #include "fsdev/9p-iov-marshal.h"
 -
 +/*
@@ -84,3 +84,6 @@ index 6f132c5f..8329950c 100644
  #define PROGNAME "virtfs-proxy-helper"
  
  #ifndef XFS_SUPER_MAGIC
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/9pfs-local-ignore-O_NOATIME-if-we-don-t-have-permiss.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+From a5804fcf7b22fc7d1f9ec794dd284c7d504bd16b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
+Date: Thu, 14 May 2020 08:06:43 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] 9pfs: local: ignore O_NOATIME if we don't have permissions
+
+QEMU's local 9pfs server passes through O_NOATIME from the client. If
+the QEMU process doesn't have permissions to use O_NOATIME (namely, it
+does not own the file nor have the CAP_FOWNER capability), the open will
+fail. This causes issues when from the client's point of view, it
+believes it has permissions to use O_NOATIME (e.g., a process running as
+root in the virtual machine). Additionally, overlayfs on Linux opens
+files on the lower layer using O_NOATIME, so in this case a 9pfs mount
+can't be used as a lower layer for overlayfs (cf.
+https://github.com/osandov/drgn/blob/dabfe1971951701da13863dbe6d8a1d172ad9650/vmtest/onoatimehack.c
+and https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs/issues/54509).
+
+Luckily, O_NOATIME is effectively a hint, and is often ignored by, e.g.,
+network filesystems. open(2) notes that O_NOATIME "may not be effective
+on all filesystems. One example is NFS, where the server maintains the
+access time." This means that we can honor it when possible but fall
+back to ignoring it.
+
+Acked-by: Christian Schoenebeck <qemu_oss@crudebyte.com>
+Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
+Message-Id: <e9bee604e8df528584693a4ec474ded6295ce8ad.1587149256.git.osandov@fb.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/a5804fcf7b22fc7d1f9ec794dd284c7d504bd16b]
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ hw/9pfs/9p-util.h | 13 +++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p-util.h b/hw/9pfs/9p-util.h
+index 79ed6b233e5..546f46dc7dc 100644
+--- a/hw/9pfs/9p-util.h
++++ b/hw/9pfs/9p-util.h
+@@ -37,9 +37,22 @@ static inline int openat_file(int dirfd, const char *name, int flags,
+ {
+     int fd, serrno, ret;
+ 
++again:
+     fd = openat(dirfd, name, flags | O_NOFOLLOW | O_NOCTTY | O_NONBLOCK,
+                 mode);
+     if (fd == -1) {
++        if (errno == EPERM && (flags & O_NOATIME)) {
++            /*
++             * The client passed O_NOATIME but we lack permissions to honor it.
++             * Rather than failing the open, fall back without O_NOATIME. This
++             * doesn't break the semantics on the client side, as the Linux
++             * open(2) man page notes that O_NOATIME "may not be effective on
++             * all filesystems". In particular, NFS and other network
++             * filesystems ignore it entirely.
++             */
++            flags &= ~O_NOATIME;
++            goto again;
++        }
+         return -1;
+     }
+ 
+-- 
+GitLab
+

meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2023-0330_2.patch

@@ -1,135 +0,0 @@
-From a2e1753b8054344f32cf94f31c6399a58794a380 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu>
-Date: Thu, 27 Apr 2023 17:10:06 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH] memory: prevent dma-reentracy issues
-
-Add a flag to the DeviceState, when a device is engaged in PIO/MMIO/DMA.
-This flag is set/checked prior to calling a device's MemoryRegion
-handlers, and set when device code initiates DMA.  The purpose of this
-flag is to prevent two types of DMA-based reentrancy issues:
-
-1.) mmio -> dma -> mmio case
-2.) bh -> dma write -> mmio case
-
-These issues have led to problems such as stack-exhaustion and
-use-after-frees.
-
-Summary of the problem from Peter Maydell:
-https://lore.kernel.org/qemu-devel/CAFEAcA_23vc7hE3iaM-JVA6W38LK4hJoWae5KcknhPRD5fPBZA@mail.gmail.com
-
-Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/62
-Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/540
-Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/541
-Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/556
-Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/557
-Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/827
-Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/1282
-Resolves: CVE-2023-0330
-
-Signed-off-by: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu>
-Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
-Message-Id: <20230427211013.2994127-2-alxndr@bu.edu>
-[thuth: Replace warn_report() with warn_report_once()]
-Signed-off-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/a2e1753b8054344f32cf94f31c6399a58794a380]
-CVE: CVE-2023-0330
-Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
----
- include/exec/memory.h  |  5 +++++
- include/hw/qdev-core.h |  7 +++++++
- memory.c               | 16 ++++++++++++++++
- 3 files changed, 28 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/include/exec/memory.h b/include/exec/memory.h
-index 2b8bccdd..0c8cdb8e 100644
---- a/include/exec/memory.h
-+++ b/include/exec/memory.h
-@@ -378,6 +378,8 @@ struct MemoryRegion {
-     bool is_iommu;
-     RAMBlock *ram_block;
-     Object *owner;
-+    /* owner as TYPE_DEVICE. Used for re-entrancy checks in MR access hotpath */
-+    DeviceState *dev;
- 
-     const MemoryRegionOps *ops;
-     void *opaque;
-@@ -400,6 +402,9 @@ struct MemoryRegion {
-     const char *name;
-     unsigned ioeventfd_nb;
-     MemoryRegionIoeventfd *ioeventfds;
-+
-+    /* For devices designed to perform re-entrant IO into their own IO MRs */
-+    bool disable_reentrancy_guard;
- };
- 
- struct IOMMUMemoryRegion {
-diff --git a/include/hw/qdev-core.h b/include/hw/qdev-core.h
-index 1518495b..206f0a70 100644
---- a/include/hw/qdev-core.h
-+++ b/include/hw/qdev-core.h
-@@ -138,6 +138,10 @@ struct NamedGPIOList {
-     QLIST_ENTRY(NamedGPIOList) node;
- };
- 
-+typedef struct {
-+    bool engaged_in_io;
-+} MemReentrancyGuard;
-+
- /**
-  * DeviceState:
-  * @realized: Indicates whether the device has been fully constructed.
-@@ -163,6 +167,9 @@ struct DeviceState {
-     int num_child_bus;
-     int instance_id_alias;
-     int alias_required_for_version;
-+
-+    /* Is the device currently in mmio/pio/dma? Used to prevent re-entrancy */
-+    MemReentrancyGuard mem_reentrancy_guard;
- };
- 
- struct DeviceListener {
-diff --git a/memory.c b/memory.c
-index 8cafb86a..94ebcaf9 100644
---- a/memory.c
-+++ b/memory.c
-@@ -531,6 +531,18 @@ static MemTxResult access_with_adjusted_size(hwaddr addr,
-         access_size_max = 4;
-     }
- 
-+    /* Do not allow more than one simultaneous access to a device's IO Regions */
-+    if (mr->dev && !mr->disable_reentrancy_guard &&
-+	!mr->ram_device && !mr->ram && !mr->rom_device && !mr->readonly) {
-+	if (mr->dev->mem_reentrancy_guard.engaged_in_io) {
-+	    warn_report_once("Blocked re-entrant IO on MemoryRegion: "
-+			     "%s at addr: 0x%" HWADDR_PRIX,
-+			     memory_region_name(mr), addr);
-+	    return MEMTX_ACCESS_ERROR;
-+	}
-+	mr->dev->mem_reentrancy_guard.engaged_in_io = true;
-+    }
-+
-     /* FIXME: support unaligned access? */
-     access_size = MAX(MIN(size, access_size_max), access_size_min);
-     access_mask = MAKE_64BIT_MASK(0, access_size * 8);
-@@ -545,6 +557,9 @@ static MemTxResult access_with_adjusted_size(hwaddr addr,
-                         access_mask, attrs);
-         }
-     }
-+    if (mr->dev) {
-+	mr->dev->mem_reentrancy_guard.engaged_in_io = false;
-+    }
-     return r;
- }
- 
-@@ -1132,6 +1147,7 @@ static void memory_region_do_init(MemoryRegion *mr,
-     }
-     mr->name = g_strdup(name);
-     mr->owner = owner;
-+    mr->dev = (DeviceState *) object_dynamic_cast(mr->owner, TYPE_DEVICE);
-     mr->ram_block = NULL;
- 
-     if (name) {
--- 
-2.25.1
-

meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2023-2861.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
+From f6b0de53fb87ddefed348a39284c8e2f28dc4eda Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Christian Schoenebeck <qemu_oss@crudebyte.com>
+Date: Wed, 7 Jun 2023 18:29:33 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] 9pfs: prevent opening special files (CVE-2023-2861)
+
+The 9p protocol does not specifically define how server shall behave when
+client tries to open a special file, however from security POV it does
+make sense for 9p server to prohibit opening any special file on host side
+in general. A sane Linux 9p client for instance would never attempt to
+open a special file on host side, it would always handle those exclusively
+on its guest side. A malicious client however could potentially escape
+from the exported 9p tree by creating and opening a device file on host
+side.
+
+With QEMU this could only be exploited in the following unsafe setups:
+
+  - Running QEMU binary as root AND 9p 'local' fs driver AND 'passthrough'
+    security model.
+
+or
+
+  - Using 9p 'proxy' fs driver (which is running its helper daemon as
+    root).
+
+These setups were already discouraged for safety reasons before,
+however for obvious reasons we are now tightening behaviour on this.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2023-2861
+Reported-by: Yanwu Shen <ywsPlz@gmail.com>
+Reported-by: Jietao Xiao <shawtao1125@gmail.com>
+Reported-by: Jinku Li <jkli@xidian.edu.cn>
+Reported-by: Wenbo Shen <shenwenbo@zju.edu.cn>
+Signed-off-by: Christian Schoenebeck <qemu_oss@crudebyte.com>
+Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+Reviewed-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
+Message-Id: <E1q6w7r-0000Q0-NM@lizzy.crudebyte.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/f6b0de53fb87ddefed348a39284c8e2f28dc4eda]
+CVE: CVE-2023-2861
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ fsdev/virtfs-proxy-helper.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++--
+ hw/9pfs/9p-util.h           | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/fsdev/virtfs-proxy-helper.c b/fsdev/virtfs-proxy-helper.c
+index 6f132c5f..300c9765 100644
+--- a/fsdev/virtfs-proxy-helper.c
++++ b/fsdev/virtfs-proxy-helper.c
+@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
+ #include "qemu/xattr.h"
+ #include "9p-iov-marshal.h"
+ #include "hw/9pfs/9p-proxy.h"
++#include "hw/9pfs/9p-util.h"
+ #include "fsdev/9p-iov-marshal.h"
+ 
+ #define PROGNAME "virtfs-proxy-helper"
+@@ -350,6 +351,28 @@ static void resetugid(int suid, int sgid)
+     }
+ }
+ 
++/*
++ * Open regular file or directory. Attempts to open any special file are
++ * rejected.
++ *
++ * returns file descriptor or -1 on error
++ */
++static int open_regular(const char *pathname, int flags, mode_t mode)
++{
++    int fd;
++
++    fd = open(pathname, flags, mode);
++    if (fd < 0) {
++	return fd;
++    }
++
++    if (close_if_special_file(fd) < 0) {
++	return -1;
++    }
++
++    return fd;
++}
++
+ /*
+  * send response in two parts
+  * 1) ProxyHeader
+@@ -694,7 +717,7 @@ static int do_create(struct iovec *iovec)
+     if (ret < 0) {
+         goto unmarshal_err_out;
+     }
+-    ret = open(path.data, flags, mode);
++    ret = open_regular(path.data, flags, mode);
+     if (ret < 0) {
+         ret = -errno;
+     }
+@@ -719,7 +742,7 @@ static int do_open(struct iovec *iovec)
+     if (ret < 0) {
+         goto err_out;
+     }
+-    ret = open(path.data, flags);
++    ret = open_regular(path.data, flags, 0);
+     if (ret < 0) {
+         ret = -errno;
+     }
+diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p-util.h b/hw/9pfs/9p-util.h
+index 546f46dc..79fdd2a3 100644
+--- a/hw/9pfs/9p-util.h
++++ b/hw/9pfs/9p-util.h
+@@ -13,12 +13,16 @@
+ #ifndef QEMU_9P_UTIL_H
+ #define QEMU_9P_UTIL_H
+ 
++#include "qemu/error-report.h"
++
+ #ifdef O_PATH
+ #define O_PATH_9P_UTIL O_PATH
+ #else
+ #define O_PATH_9P_UTIL 0
+ #endif
+ 
++#define qemu_fstat      fstat
++
+ static inline void close_preserve_errno(int fd)
+ {
+     int serrno = errno;
+@@ -26,6 +30,38 @@ static inline void close_preserve_errno(int fd)
+     errno = serrno;
+ }
+ 
++/**
++ * close_if_special_file() - Close @fd if neither regular file nor directory.
++ *
++ * @fd: file descriptor of open file
++ * Return: 0 on regular file or directory, -1 otherwise
++ *
++ * CVE-2023-2861: Prohibit opening any special file directly on host
++ * (especially device files), as a compromised client could potentially gain
++ * access outside exported tree under certain, unsafe setups. We expect
++ * client to handle I/O on special files exclusively on guest side.
++ */
++static inline int close_if_special_file(int fd)
++{
++    struct stat stbuf;
++
++    if (qemu_fstat(fd, &stbuf) < 0) {
++	close_preserve_errno(fd);
++	return -1;
++    }
++    if (!S_ISREG(stbuf.st_mode) && !S_ISDIR(stbuf.st_mode)) {
++	error_report_once(
++	    "9p: broken or compromised client detected; attempt to open "
++	    "special file (i.e. neither regular file, nor directory)"
++	);
++	close(fd);
++	errno = ENXIO;
++	return -1;
++    }
++
++    return 0;
++}
++
+ static inline int openat_dir(int dirfd, const char *name)
+ {
+     return openat(dirfd, name,
+@@ -56,6 +92,10 @@ again:
+         return -1;
+     }
+ 
++    if (close_if_special_file(fd) < 0) {
++	return -1;
++    }
++
+     serrno = errno;
+     /* O_NONBLOCK was only needed to open the file. Let's drop it. We don't
+      * do that with O_PATH since fcntl(F_SETFL) isn't supported, and openat()
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2023-5088.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+From 7d7512019fc40c577e2bdd61f114f31a9eb84a8e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Fiona Ebner <f.ebner@proxmox.com>
+Date: Wed, 6 Sep 2023 15:09:21 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] hw/ide: reset: cancel async DMA operation before resetting
+ state
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+If there is a pending DMA operation during ide_bus_reset(), the fact
+that the IDEState is already reset before the operation is canceled
+can be problematic. In particular, ide_dma_cb() might be called and
+then use the reset IDEState which contains the signature after the
+reset. When used to construct the IO operation this leads to
+ide_get_sector() returning 0 and nsector being 1. This is particularly
+bad, because a write command will thus destroy the first sector which
+often contains a partition table or similar.
+
+Traces showing the unsolicited write happening with IDEState
+0x5595af6949d0 being used after reset:
+
+> ahci_port_write ahci(0x5595af6923f0)[0]: port write [reg:PxSCTL] @ 0x2c: 0x00000300
+> ahci_reset_port ahci(0x5595af6923f0)[0]: reset port
+> ide_reset IDEstate 0x5595af6949d0
+> ide_reset IDEstate 0x5595af694da8
+> ide_bus_reset_aio aio_cancel
+> dma_aio_cancel dbs=0x7f64600089a0
+> dma_blk_cb dbs=0x7f64600089a0 ret=0
+> dma_complete dbs=0x7f64600089a0 ret=0 cb=0x5595acd40b30
+> ahci_populate_sglist ahci(0x5595af6923f0)[0]
+> ahci_dma_prepare_buf ahci(0x5595af6923f0)[0]: prepare buf limit=512 prepared=512
+> ide_dma_cb IDEState 0x5595af6949d0; sector_num=0 n=1 cmd=DMA WRITE
+> dma_blk_io dbs=0x7f6420802010 bs=0x5595ae2c6c30 offset=0 to_dev=1
+> dma_blk_cb dbs=0x7f6420802010 ret=0
+
+> (gdb) p *qiov
+> $11 = {iov = 0x7f647c76d840, niov = 1, {{nalloc = 1, local_iov = {iov_base = 0x0,
+>       iov_len = 512}}, {__pad = "\001\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000",
+>       size = 512}}}
+> (gdb) bt
+> #0  blk_aio_pwritev (blk=0x5595ae2c6c30, offset=0, qiov=0x7f6420802070, flags=0,
+>     cb=0x5595ace6f0b0 <dma_blk_cb>, opaque=0x7f6420802010)
+>     at ../block/block-backend.c:1682
+> #1  0x00005595ace6f185 in dma_blk_cb (opaque=0x7f6420802010, ret=<optimized out>)
+>     at ../softmmu/dma-helpers.c:179
+> #2  0x00005595ace6f778 in dma_blk_io (ctx=0x5595ae0609f0,
+>     sg=sg@entry=0x5595af694d00, offset=offset@entry=0, align=align@entry=512,
+>     io_func=io_func@entry=0x5595ace6ee30 <dma_blk_write_io_func>,
+>     io_func_opaque=io_func_opaque@entry=0x5595ae2c6c30,
+>     cb=0x5595acd40b30 <ide_dma_cb>, opaque=0x5595af6949d0,
+>     dir=DMA_DIRECTION_TO_DEVICE) at ../softmmu/dma-helpers.c:244
+> #3  0x00005595ace6f90a in dma_blk_write (blk=0x5595ae2c6c30,
+>     sg=sg@entry=0x5595af694d00, offset=offset@entry=0, align=align@entry=512,
+>     cb=cb@entry=0x5595acd40b30 <ide_dma_cb>, opaque=opaque@entry=0x5595af6949d0)
+>     at ../softmmu/dma-helpers.c:280
+> #4  0x00005595acd40e18 in ide_dma_cb (opaque=0x5595af6949d0, ret=<optimized out>)
+>     at ../hw/ide/core.c:953
+> #5  0x00005595ace6f319 in dma_complete (ret=0, dbs=0x7f64600089a0)
+>     at ../softmmu/dma-helpers.c:107
+> #6  dma_blk_cb (opaque=0x7f64600089a0, ret=0) at ../softmmu/dma-helpers.c:127
+> #7  0x00005595ad12227d in blk_aio_complete (acb=0x7f6460005b10)
+>     at ../block/block-backend.c:1527
+> #8  blk_aio_complete (acb=0x7f6460005b10) at ../block/block-backend.c:1524
+> #9  blk_aio_write_entry (opaque=0x7f6460005b10) at ../block/block-backend.c:1594
+> #10 0x00005595ad258cfb in coroutine_trampoline (i0=<optimized out>,
+>     i1=<optimized out>) at ../util/coroutine-ucontext.c:177
+
+Signed-off-by: Fiona Ebner <f.ebner@proxmox.com>
+Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org>
+Tested-by: simon.rowe@nutanix.com
+Message-ID: <20230906130922.142845-1-f.ebner@proxmox.com>
+Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/7d7512019fc40c577e2bdd61f114f31a9eb84a8e]
+CVE: CVE-2023-5088
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ hw/ide/core.c | 14 +++++++-------
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/ide/core.c b/hw/ide/core.c
+index b5e0dcd29b2..63ba665f3d2 100644
+--- a/hw/ide/core.c
++++ b/hw/ide/core.c
+@@ -2515,19 +2515,19 @@ static void ide_dummy_transfer_stop(IDEState *s)
+ 
+ void ide_bus_reset(IDEBus *bus)
+ {
+-    bus->unit = 0;
+-    bus->cmd = 0;
+-    ide_reset(&bus->ifs[0]);
+-    ide_reset(&bus->ifs[1]);
+-    ide_clear_hob(bus);
+-
+-    /* pending async DMA */
++    /* pending async DMA - needs the IDEState before it is reset */
+     if (bus->dma->aiocb) {
+         trace_ide_bus_reset_aio();
+         blk_aio_cancel(bus->dma->aiocb);
+         bus->dma->aiocb = NULL;
+     }
+ 
++    bus->unit = 0;
++    bus->cmd = 0;
++    ide_reset(&bus->ifs[0]);
++    ide_reset(&bus->ifs[1]);
++    ide_clear_hob(bus);
++
+     /* reset dma provider too */
+     if (bus->dma->ops->reset) {
+         bus->dma->ops->reset(bus->dma);
+-- 
+GitLab
+

meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/0001-Fix-relative-when-copying-an-absolute-path.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+From fabef23bea6e9963c06e218586fda1a823e3c6bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Wayne Davison <wayne@opencoder.net>
+Date: Mon, 8 Aug 2022 21:30:21 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix --relative when copying an absolute path.
+
+CVE: CVE-2022-29154
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/WayneD/rsync/commit/fabef23bea6e9963c06e218586fda1a823e3c6bf]
+Signed-off-by: Matthias Schmitz <matthias.schmitz@port4949.net>
+---
+ exclude.c | 4 +++-
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/exclude.c b/exclude.c
+index 2394023f..ba5ca5a3 100644
+--- a/exclude.c
++++ b/exclude.c
+@@ -434,8 +434,10 @@ void add_implied_include(const char *arg)
+ 				*p++ = *cp++;
+ 				break;
+ 			  case '/':
+-				if (p[-1] == '/') /* This is safe because of the initial slash. */
++				if (p[-1] == '/') { /* This is safe because of the initial slash. */
++					cp++;
+ 					break;
++				}
+ 				if (relative_paths) {
+ 					filter_rule const *ent;
+ 					int found = 0;
+-- 
+2.39.2
+