d08e8d726d
CVE-2024-32002: Git is a revision control system. Prior to versions 2.45.1, 2.44.1, 2.43.4, 2.42.2, 2.41.1, 2.40.2, and 2.39.4, repositories with submodules can be crafted in a way that exploits a bug in Git whereby it can be fooled into writing files not into the submodule's worktree but into a `.git/` directory. This allows writing a hook that will be executed while the clone operation is still running, giving the user no opportunity to inspect the code that is being executed. The problem has been patched in versions 2.45.1, 2.44.1, 2.43.4, 2.42.2, 2.41.1, 2.40.2, and 2.39.4. If symbolic link support is disabled in Git (e.g. via `git config --global core.symlinks false`), the described attack won't work. As always, it is best to avoid cloning repositories from untrusted sources. CVE-2024-32004: Git is a revision control system. Prior to versions 2.45.1, 2.44.1, 2.43.4, 2.42.2, 2.41.1, 2.40.2, and 2.39.4, an attacker can prepare a local repository in such a way that, when cloned, will execute arbitrary code during the operation. The problem has been patched in versions 2.45.1, 2.44.1, 2.43.4, 2.42.2, 2.41.1, 2.40.2, and 2.39.4. As a workaround, avoid cloning repositories from untrusted sources. CVE-2024-32020: Git is a revision control system. Prior to versions 2.45.1, 2.44.1, 2.43.4, 2.42.2, 2.41.1, 2.40.2, and 2.39.4, local clones may end up hardlinking files into the target repository's object database when source and target repository reside on the same disk. If the source repository is owned by a different user, then those hardlinked files may be rewritten at any point in time by the untrusted user. Cloning local repositories will cause Git to either copy or hardlink files of the source repository into the target repository. This significantly speeds up such local clones compared to doing a "proper" clone and saves both disk space and compute time. When cloning a repository located on the same disk that is owned by a different user than the current user we also end up creating such hardlinks. These files will continue to be owned and controlled by the potentially-untrusted user and can be rewritten by them at will in the future. The problem has been patched in versions 2.45.1, 2.44.1, 2.43.4, 2.42.2, 2.41.1, 2.40.2, and 2.39.4. CVE-2024-32021: Git is a revision control system. Prior to versions 2.45.1, 2.44.1, 2.43.4, 2.42.2, 2.41.1, 2.40.2, and 2.39.4, when cloning a local source repository that contains symlinks via the filesystem, Git may create hardlinks to arbitrary user-readable files on the same filesystem as the target repository in the `objects/` directory. Cloning a local repository over the filesystem may creating hardlinks to arbitrary user-owned files on the same filesystem in the target Git repository's `objects/` directory. When cloning a repository over the filesystem (without explicitly specifying the `file://` protocol or `--no-local`), the optimizations for local cloning will be used, which include attempting to hard link the object files instead of copying them. While the code includes checks against symbolic links in the source repository, which were added during the fix for CVE-2022-39253, these checks can still be raced because the hard link operation ultimately follows symlinks. If the object on the filesystem appears as a file during the check, and then a symlink during the operation, this will allow the adversary to bypass the check and create hardlinks in the destination objects directory to arbitrary, user-readable files. The problem has been patched in versions 2.45.1, 2.44.1, 2.43.4, 2.42.2, 2.41.1, 2.40.2, and 2.39.4. CVE-2024-32465: Git is a revision control system. The Git project recommends to avoid working in untrusted repositories, and instead to clone it first with `git clone --no-local` to obtain a clean copy. Git has specific protections to make that a safe operation even with an untrusted source repository, but vulnerabilities allow those protections to be bypassed. In the context of cloning local repositories owned by other users, this vulnerability has been covered in CVE-2024-32004. But there are circumstances where the fixes for CVE-2024-32004 are not enough: For example, when obtaining a `.zip` file containing a full copy of a Git repository, it should not be trusted by default to be safe, as e.g. hooks could be configured to run within the context of that repository. The problem has been patched in versions 2.45.1, 2.44.1, 2.43.4, 2.42.2, 2.41.1, 2.40.2, and 2.39.4. As a workaround, avoid using Git in repositories that have been obtained via archives from untrusted sources. References: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-32002 https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-32004 https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-32020 https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-32021 https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-32465 (From OE-Core rev: 209c41377abf6853455b00af3923f1b244a3766b) Signed-off-by: Soumya Sambu <soumya.sambu@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
Poky
Poky is an integration of various components to form a pre-packaged build system and development environment which is used as a development and validation tool by the Yocto Project. It features support for building customised embedded style device images and custom containers. There are reference demo images ranging from X11/GTK+ to Weston, commandline and more. The system supports cross-architecture application development using QEMU emulation and a standalone toolchain and SDK suitable for IDE integration.
Additional information on the specifics of hardware that Poky supports is available in README.hardware. Further hardware support can easily be added in the form of BSP layers which extend the systems capabilities in a modular way. Many layers are available and can be found through the layer index.
As an integration layer Poky consists of several upstream projects such as BitBake, OpenEmbedded-Core, Yocto documentation, the 'meta-yocto' layer which has configuration and hardware support components. These components are all part of the Yocto Project and OpenEmbedded ecosystems.
The Yocto Project has extensive documentation about the system including a reference manual which can be found at https://docs.yoctoproject.org/
OpenEmbedded is the build architecture used by Poky and the Yocto project. For information about OpenEmbedded, see the OpenEmbedded website.
Contribution Guidelines
The project works using a mailing list patch submission process. Patches should be sent to the mailing list for the repository the components originate from (see below). Throughout the Yocto Project, the README files in the component in question should detail where to send patches, who the maintainers are and where bugs should be reported.
A guide to submitting patches to OpenEmbedded is available at:
https://www.openembedded.org/wiki/How_to_submit_a_patch_to_OpenEmbedded
There is good documentation on how to write/format patches at:
https://www.openembedded.org/wiki/Commit_Patch_Message_Guidelines
Where to Send Patches
As Poky is an integration repository (built using a tool called combo-layer), patches against the various components should be sent to their respective upstreams:
OpenEmbedded-Core (files in meta/, meta-selftest/, meta-skeleton/, scripts/):
- Git repository: https://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core/
- Mailing list: openembedded-core@lists.openembedded.org
BitBake (files in bitbake/):
- Git repository: https://git.openembedded.org/bitbake/
- Mailing list: bitbake-devel@lists.openembedded.org
Documentation (files in documentation/):
- Git repository: https://git.yoctoproject.org/cgit/cgit.cgi/yocto-docs/
- Mailing list: docs@lists.yoctoproject.org
meta-yocto (files in meta-poky/, meta-yocto-bsp/):
- Git repository: https://git.yoctoproject.org/cgit/cgit.cgi/meta-yocto
- Mailing list: poky@lists.yoctoproject.org
If in doubt, check the openembedded-core git repository for the content you intend to modify as most files are from there unless clearly one of the above categories. Before sending, be sure the patches apply cleanly to the current git repository branch in question.