build-appliance-image: Update to dunfell head revision

(From OE-Core rev: efb1a73a13907bed3acac8e06053aef3e2ef57f5)

Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>

bitbake/lib/bb/cooker.py

@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@ import sys, os, glob, os.path, re, time
 import itertools
 import logging
 import multiprocessing
-import sre_constants
 import threading
 from io import StringIO, UnsupportedOperation
 from contextlib import closing
@@ -1795,7 +1794,7 @@ class CookerCollectFiles(object):
                 try:
                     re.compile(mask)
                     bbmasks.append(mask)
-                except sre_constants.error:
+                except re.error:
                     collectlog.critical("BBMASK contains an invalid regular expression, ignoring: %s" % mask)
 
             # Then validate the combined regular expressions. This should never
@@ -1803,7 +1802,7 @@ class CookerCollectFiles(object):
             bbmask = "|".join(bbmasks)
             try:
                 bbmask_compiled = re.compile(bbmask)
-            except sre_constants.error:
+            except re.error:
                 collectlog.critical("BBMASK is not a valid regular expression, ignoring: %s" % bbmask)
                 bbmask = None
 

bitbake/lib/bb/runqueue.py

@@ -1975,6 +1975,12 @@ class RunQueueExecute:
                 self.setbuildable(revdep)
                 logger.debug(1, "Marking task %s as buildable", revdep)
 
+        for t in self.sq_deferred.copy():
+            if self.sq_deferred[t] == task:
+                logger.debug(2, "Deferred task %s now buildable" % t)
+                del self.sq_deferred[t]
+                update_scenequeue_data([t], self.sqdata, self.rqdata, self.rq, self.cooker, self.stampcache, self, summary=False)
+
     def task_complete(self, task):
         self.stats.taskCompleted()
         bb.event.fire(runQueueTaskCompleted(task, self.stats, self.rq), self.cfgData)
@@ -2084,8 +2090,6 @@ class RunQueueExecute:
                             logger.debug(1, "%s didn't become valid, skipping setscene" % nexttask)
                             self.sq_task_failoutright(nexttask)
                             return True
-                        else:
-                            self.sqdata.outrightfail.remove(nexttask)
                     if nexttask in self.sqdata.outrightfail:
                         logger.debug(2, 'No package found, so skipping setscene task %s', nexttask)
                         self.sq_task_failoutright(nexttask)
@@ -2236,7 +2240,8 @@ class RunQueueExecute:
         if self.sq_deferred:
             tid = self.sq_deferred.pop(list(self.sq_deferred.keys())[0])
             logger.warning("Runqeueue deadlocked on deferred tasks, forcing task %s" % tid)
-            self.sq_task_failoutright(tid)
+            if tid not in self.runq_complete:
+                self.sq_task_failoutright(tid)
             return True
 
         if len(self.failed_tids) != 0:
@@ -2350,10 +2355,16 @@ class RunQueueExecute:
             self.updated_taskhash_queue.remove((tid, unihash))
 
             if unihash != self.rqdata.runtaskentries[tid].unihash:
-                hashequiv_logger.verbose("Task %s unihash changed to %s" % (tid, unihash))
-                self.rqdata.runtaskentries[tid].unihash = unihash
-                bb.parse.siggen.set_unihash(tid, unihash)
-                toprocess.add(tid)
+                # Make sure we rehash any other tasks with the same task hash that we're deferred against.
+                torehash = [tid]
+                for deftid in self.sq_deferred:
+                    if self.sq_deferred[deftid] == tid:
+                        torehash.append(deftid)
+                for hashtid in torehash:
+                    hashequiv_logger.verbose("Task %s unihash changed to %s" % (hashtid, unihash))
+                    self.rqdata.runtaskentries[hashtid].unihash = unihash
+                    bb.parse.siggen.set_unihash(hashtid, unihash)
+                    toprocess.add(hashtid)
 
         # Work out all tasks which depend upon these
         total = set()
@@ -2492,6 +2503,14 @@ class RunQueueExecute:
 
         if update_tasks:
             self.sqdone = False
+            for mc in sorted(self.sqdata.multiconfigs):
+                for tid in sorted([t[0] for t in update_tasks]):
+                    if mc_from_tid(tid) != mc:
+                        continue
+                    h = pending_hash_index(tid, self.rqdata)
+                    if h in self.sqdata.hashes and tid != self.sqdata.hashes[h]:
+                        self.sq_deferred[tid] = self.sqdata.hashes[h]
+                        bb.note("Deferring %s after %s" % (tid, self.sqdata.hashes[h]))
             update_scenequeue_data([t[0] for t in update_tasks], self.sqdata, self.rqdata, self.rq, self.cooker, self.stampcache, self, summary=False)
 
         for (tid, harddepfail, origvalid) in update_tasks:
@@ -2832,6 +2851,19 @@ def build_scenequeue_data(sqdata, rqdata, rq, cooker, stampcache, sqrq):
     sqdata.stamppresent = set()
     sqdata.valid = set()
 
+    sqdata.hashes = {}
+    sqrq.sq_deferred = {}
+    for mc in sorted(sqdata.multiconfigs):
+        for tid in sorted(sqdata.sq_revdeps):
+            if mc_from_tid(tid) != mc:
+                continue
+            h = pending_hash_index(tid, rqdata)
+            if h not in sqdata.hashes:
+                sqdata.hashes[h] = tid
+            else:
+                sqrq.sq_deferred[tid] = sqdata.hashes[h]
+                bb.note("Deferring %s after %s" % (tid, sqdata.hashes[h]))
+
     update_scenequeue_data(sqdata.sq_revdeps, sqdata, rqdata, rq, cooker, stampcache, sqrq, summary=True)
 
 def update_scenequeue_data(tids, sqdata, rqdata, rq, cooker, stampcache, sqrq, summary=True):
@@ -2843,6 +2875,8 @@ def update_scenequeue_data(tids, sqdata, rqdata, rq, cooker, stampcache, sqrq, s
             sqdata.stamppresent.remove(tid)
         if tid in sqdata.valid:
             sqdata.valid.remove(tid)
+        if tid in sqdata.outrightfail:
+            sqdata.outrightfail.remove(tid)
 
         (mc, fn, taskname, taskfn) = split_tid_mcfn(tid)
 
@@ -2870,32 +2904,20 @@ def update_scenequeue_data(tids, sqdata, rqdata, rq, cooker, stampcache, sqrq, s
 
     sqdata.valid |= rq.validate_hashes(tocheck, cooker.data, len(sqdata.stamppresent), False, summary=summary)
 
-    sqdata.hashes = {}
-    sqrq.sq_deferred = {}
-    for mc in sorted(sqdata.multiconfigs):
-        for tid in sorted(sqdata.sq_revdeps):
-            if mc_from_tid(tid) != mc:
-                continue
-            if tid in sqdata.stamppresent:
-                continue
-            if tid in sqdata.valid:
-                continue
-            if tid in sqdata.noexec:
-                continue
-            if tid in sqrq.scenequeue_notcovered:
-                continue
-            if tid in sqrq.scenequeue_covered:
-                continue
-
-            sqdata.outrightfail.add(tid)
-
-            h = pending_hash_index(tid, rqdata)
-            if h not in sqdata.hashes:
-                sqdata.hashes[h] = tid
-            else:
-                sqrq.sq_deferred[tid] = sqdata.hashes[h]
-                bb.note("Deferring %s after %s" % (tid, sqdata.hashes[h]))
-
+    for tid in tids:
+        if tid in sqdata.stamppresent:
+            continue
+        if tid in sqdata.valid:
+            continue
+        if tid in sqdata.noexec:
+            continue
+        if tid in sqrq.scenequeue_covered:
+            continue
+        if tid in sqrq.scenequeue_notcovered:
+            continue
+        if tid in sqrq.sq_deferred:
+            continue
+        sqdata.outrightfail.add(tid)
 
 class TaskFailure(Exception):
     """

documentation/conf.py

@@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ extlinks = {
     'yocto_git': ('https://git.yoctoproject.org%s', None),
     'oe_home': ('https://www.openembedded.org%s', None),
     'oe_lists': ('https://lists.openembedded.org%s', None),
+    'oe_git': ('https://git.openembedded.org%s', None),
 }
 
 # Intersphinx config to use cross reference with Bitbake user manual

documentation/overview-manual/overview-manual-yp-intro.rst

@@ -377,7 +377,7 @@ activities using the Yocto Project:
    Index <http://layers.openembedded.org/layerindex/layers/>`__, which
    is a website that indexes OpenEmbedded-Core layers.
 
--  *Patchwork:* `Patchwork <http://jk.ozlabs.org/projects/patchwork/>`__
+-  *Patchwork:* `Patchwork <https://patchwork.yoctoproject.org/>`__
    is a fork of a project originally started by
    `OzLabs <http://ozlabs.org/>`__. The project is a web-based tracking
    system designed to streamline the process of bringing contributions

documentation/poky.yaml

@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
-DISTRO : "3.1.23"
+DISTRO : "3.1.24"
 DISTRO_NAME_NO_CAP : "dunfell"
 DISTRO_NAME : "Dunfell"
 DISTRO_NAME_NO_CAP_MINUS_ONE : "zeus"
-YOCTO_DOC_VERSION : "3.1.23"
+YOCTO_DOC_VERSION : "3.1.24"
 YOCTO_DOC_VERSION_MINUS_ONE : "3.0.4"
-DISTRO_REL_TAG : "yocto-3.1.23"
-DOCCONF_VERSION : "3.1.23"
+DISTRO_REL_TAG : "yocto-3.1.24"
+DOCCONF_VERSION : "3.1.24"
 BITBAKE_SERIES : "1.46"
-POKYVERSION : "23.0.23"
+POKYVERSION : "23.0.24"
 YOCTO_POKY : "poky-&DISTRO_NAME_NO_CAP;-&POKYVERSION;"
 YOCTO_DL_URL : "https://downloads.yoctoproject.org"
 YOCTO_AB_URL : "https://autobuilder.yoctoproject.org"

documentation/profile-manual/profile-manual-usage.rst

@@ -1734,7 +1734,7 @@ events':
 
 The tool is pretty self-explanatory, but for more detailed information
 on navigating through the data, see the `kernelshark
-website <http://rostedt.homelinux.com/kernelshark/>`__.
+website <https://kernelshark.org/Documentation.html>`__.
 
 .. _ftrace-documentation:
 
@@ -1765,8 +1765,8 @@ There is a nice series of articles on using ftrace and trace-cmd at LWN:
 -  `trace-cmd: A front-end for
    Ftrace <https://lwn.net/Articles/410200/>`__
 
-There's more detailed documentation kernelshark usage here:
-`KernelShark <http://rostedt.homelinux.com/kernelshark/>`__
+See also `KernelShark's documentation <https://kernelshark.org/Documentation.html>`__
+for further usage details.
 
 An amusing yet useful README (a tracing mini-HOWTO) can be found in
 ``/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/README``.

documentation/ref-manual/ref-system-requirements.rst

@@ -45,6 +45,8 @@ distributions:
 
 -  Ubuntu 20.04
 
+-  Ubuntu 22.04
+
 -  Fedora 28
 
 -  Fedora 29
@@ -61,6 +63,8 @@ distributions:
 
 -  Fedora 35
 
+-  Fedora 36
+
 -  CentOS 7.x
 
 -  Debian GNU/Linux 8.x (Jessie)
@@ -79,6 +83,8 @@ distributions:
 
 -  AlmaLinux 8.5
 
+-  AlmaLinux 8.7
+
 .. note::
 
    -  While the Yocto Project Team attempts to ensure all Yocto Project

documentation/ref-manual/ref-variables.rst

@@ -7147,6 +7147,32 @@ system and gives an overview of their function and contents.
    :term:`SSTATE_DIR`
       The directory for the shared state cache.
 
+   :term:`SSTATE_EXCLUDEDEPS_SYSROOT`
+      This variable allows to specify indirect dependencies to exclude
+      from sysroots, for example to avoid the situations when a dependency on
+      any ``-native`` recipe will pull in all dependencies of that recipe
+      in the recipe sysroot. This behaviour might not always be wanted,
+      for example when that ``-native`` recipe depends on build tools
+      that are not relevant for the current recipe.
+
+      This way, irrelevant dependencies are ignored, which could have
+      prevented the reuse of prebuilt artifacts stored in the Shared
+      State Cache.
+
+      :term:`SSTATE_EXCLUDEDEPS_SYSROOT` is evaluated as two regular
+      expressions of recipe and dependency to ignore. An example
+      is the rule in :oe_git:`meta/conf/layer.conf </openembedded-core/tree/meta/conf/layer.conf>`::
+
+         # Nothing needs to depend on libc-initial
+         # base-passwd/shadow-sysroot don't need their dependencies
+         SSTATE_EXCLUDEDEPS_SYSROOT += "\
+             .*->.*-initial.* \
+             .*(base-passwd|shadow-sysroot)->.* \
+         "
+
+      The ``->`` substring represents the dependency between
+      the two regular expressions.
+
    :term:`SSTATE_MIRROR_ALLOW_NETWORK`
       If set to "1", allows fetches from mirrors that are specified in
       :term:`SSTATE_MIRRORS` to work even when

meta-poky/conf/distro/poky.conf

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 DISTRO = "poky"
 DISTRO_NAME = "Poky (Yocto Project Reference Distro)"
-DISTRO_VERSION = "3.1.23"
+DISTRO_VERSION = "3.1.24"
 DISTRO_CODENAME = "dunfell"
 SDK_VENDOR = "-pokysdk"
 SDK_VERSION = "${@d.getVar('DISTRO_VERSION').replace('snapshot-${DATE}', 'snapshot')}"
@@ -47,12 +47,14 @@ SANITY_TESTED_DISTROS ?= " \
             ubuntu-18.04 \n \
             ubuntu-19.04 \n \
             ubuntu-20.04 \n \
+            ubuntu-22.04 \n \
             fedora-30 \n \
             fedora-31 \n \
             fedora-32 \n \
             fedora-33 \n \
             fedora-34 \n \
             fedora-35 \n \
+            fedora-36 \n \
             centos-7 \n \
             centos-8 \n \
             debian-8 \n \
@@ -63,6 +65,7 @@ SANITY_TESTED_DISTROS ?= " \
             opensuseleap-15.2 \n \
             opensuseleap-15.3 \n \
             almalinux-8.5 \n \
+            almalinux-8.7 \n \
             "
 # add poky sanity bbclass
 INHERIT += "poky-sanity"

meta/classes/devshell.bbclass

@@ -2,8 +2,6 @@ inherit terminal
 
 DEVSHELL = "${SHELL}"
 
-PATH:prepend:task-devshell = "${COREBASE}/scripts/git-intercept:"
-
 python do_devshell () {
     if d.getVarFlag("do_devshell", "manualfakeroot"):
        d.prependVar("DEVSHELL", "pseudo ")

meta/classes/fs-uuid.bbclass

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 def get_rootfs_uuid(d):
     import subprocess
     rootfs = d.getVar('ROOTFS')
-    output = subprocess.check_output(['tune2fs', '-l', rootfs])
+    output = subprocess.check_output(['tune2fs', '-l', rootfs], text=True)
     for line in output.split('\n'):
         if line.startswith('Filesystem UUID:'):
             uuid = line.split()[-1]

meta/classes/image.bbclass

@@ -311,7 +311,7 @@ fakeroot python do_image_qa () {
         except oe.utils.ImageQAFailed as e:
             qamsg = qamsg + '\tImage QA function %s failed: %s\n' % (e.name, e.description)
         except Exception as e:
-            qamsg = qamsg + '\tImage QA function %s failed\n' % cmd
+            qamsg = qamsg + '\tImage QA function %s failed: %s\n' % (cmd, e)
 
     if qamsg:
         imgname = d.getVar('IMAGE_NAME')
@@ -437,7 +437,7 @@ python () {
         localdata.delVar('DATETIME')
         localdata.delVar('DATE')
         localdata.delVar('TMPDIR')
-        vardepsexclude = (d.getVarFlag('IMAGE_CMD_' + realt, 'vardepsexclude', True) or '').split()
+        vardepsexclude = (d.getVarFlag('IMAGE_CMD_' + realt, 'vardepsexclude') or '').split()
         for dep in vardepsexclude:
             localdata.delVar(dep)
 

meta/classes/kernel-yocto.bbclass

@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ do_kernel_metadata() {
 	# SRC_URI. If they were supplied, we convert them into include directives
 	# for the update part of the process
 	for f in ${feat_dirs}; do
-		if [ -d "${WORKDIR}/$f/meta" ]; then
+		if [ -d "${WORKDIR}/$f/kernel-meta" ]; then
 			includes="$includes -I${WORKDIR}/$f/kernel-meta"
 		elif [ -d "${WORKDIR}/../oe-local-files/$f" ]; then
 			includes="$includes -I${WORKDIR}/../oe-local-files/$f"

meta/classes/kernel.bbclass

@@ -595,7 +595,7 @@ do_savedefconfig() {
 do_savedefconfig[nostamp] = "1"
 addtask savedefconfig after do_configure
 
-inherit cml1
+inherit cml1 pkgconfig
 
 KCONFIG_CONFIG_COMMAND_append = " LD='${KERNEL_LD}' HOSTLDFLAGS='${BUILD_LDFLAGS}'"
 

meta/classes/libc-package.bbclass

@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ PACKAGE_NO_GCONV ?= "0"
 OVERRIDES_append = ":${TARGET_ARCH}-${TARGET_OS}"
 
 locale_base_postinst_ontarget() {
+mkdir ${libdir}/locale
 localedef --inputfile=${datadir}/i18n/locales/%s --charmap=%s %s
 }
 

meta/classes/license_image.bbclass

@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ def get_deployed_dependencies(d):
     deploy = {}
     # Get all the dependencies for the current task (rootfs).
     taskdata = d.getVar("BB_TASKDEPDATA", False)
-    pn = d.getVar("PN", True)
+    pn = d.getVar("PN")
     depends = list(set([dep[0] for dep
                     in list(taskdata.values())
                     if not dep[0].endswith("-native") and not dep[0] == pn]))

meta/classes/nativesdk.bbclass

@@ -113,3 +113,5 @@ do_packagedata[stamp-extra-info] = ""
 USE_NLS = "${SDKUSE_NLS}"
 
 OLDEST_KERNEL = "${SDK_OLDEST_KERNEL}"
+
+PATH_prepend = "${COREBASE}/scripts/nativesdk-intercept:"

meta/lib/oeqa/runtime/context.py

@@ -67,11 +67,11 @@ class OERuntimeTestContextExecutor(OETestContextExecutor):
                 % self.default_target_type)
         runtime_group.add_argument('--target-ip', action='store',
                 default=self.default_target_ip,
-                help="IP address of device under test, default: %s" \
+                help="IP address and optionally ssh port (default 22) of device under test, for example '192.168.0.7:22'. Default: %s" \
                 % self.default_target_ip)
         runtime_group.add_argument('--server-ip', action='store',
                 default=self.default_target_ip,
-                help="IP address of device under test, default: %s" \
+                help="IP address of the test host from test target machine, default: %s" \
                 % self.default_server_ip)
 
         runtime_group.add_argument('--host-dumper-dir', action='store',

meta/lib/oeqa/selftest/cases/prservice.py

@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ class BitbakePrTests(OESelftestTestCase):
         exported_db_path = os.path.join(self.builddir, 'export.inc')
         export_result = runCmd("bitbake-prserv-tool export %s" % exported_db_path, ignore_status=True)
         self.assertEqual(export_result.status, 0, msg="PR Service database export failed: %s" % export_result.output)
-        self.assertTrue(os.path.exists(exported_db_path))
+        self.assertTrue(os.path.exists(exported_db_path), msg="%s didn't exist, tool output %s" % (exported_db_path, export_result.output))
 
         if replace_current_db:
             current_db_path = os.path.join(get_bb_var('PERSISTENT_DIR'), 'prserv.sqlite3')

meta/lib/oeqa/selftest/cases/reproducible.py

@@ -39,7 +39,6 @@ exclude_packages = [
 	'gstreamer1.0-python',
 	'hwlatdetect',
         'kernel-devsrc',
-	'libaprutil',
 	'libcap-ng',
 	'libjson',
 	'libproxy',

meta/lib/oeqa/utils/qemurunner.py

@@ -432,10 +432,13 @@ class QemuRunner:
                 except OSError as e:
                     if e.errno != errno.ESRCH:
                         raise
-            endtime = time.time() + self.runqemutime
-            while self.runqemu.poll() is None and time.time() < endtime:
-                time.sleep(1)
-            if self.runqemu.poll() is None:
+            try:
+                outs, errs = self.runqemu.communicate(timeout = self.runqemutime)
+                if outs:
+                    self.logger.info("Output from runqemu:\n%s", outs.decode("utf-8"))
+                if errs:
+                    self.logger.info("Stderr from runqemu:\n%s", errs.decode("utf-8"))
+            except TimeoutExpired:
                 self.logger.debug("Sending SIGKILL to runqemu")
                 os.killpg(os.getpgid(self.runqemu.pid), signal.SIGKILL)
             if not self.runqemu.stdout.closed:

meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5_5.55.bb

@@ -6,6 +6,13 @@ SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "8863717113c4897e2ad3271fc808ea245319e6fd95eed2e934fae8e089
 # These issues have kernel fixes rather than bluez fixes so exclude here
 CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2020-12352 CVE-2020-24490"
 
+# Commit 7a80d2096f1b7125085e21448112aa02f49f5e9a, e2b0f0d8d63e1223bb714a9efb37e2257818268b 
+# and 0388794dc5fdb73a4ea88bcf148de0a12b4364d4 to fix CVE-2022-39177 
+# already backport in CVE-2022-39176.patch
+# https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/bluez/+bug/1977968
+
+CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2022-39177"
+
 # noinst programs in Makefile.tools that are conditional on READLINE
 # support
 NOINST_TOOLS_READLINE ?= " \

meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.1.1t.bb

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ SRC_URI_append_class-nativesdk = " \
            file://environment.d-openssl.sh \
            "
 
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "c5ac01e760ee6ff0dab61d6b2bbd30146724d063eb322180c6f18a6f74e4b6aa"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "8dee9b24bdb1dcbf0c3d1e9b02fb8f6bf22165e807f45adeb7c9677536859d3b"
 
 inherit lib_package multilib_header multilib_script ptest
 MULTILIB_SCRIPTS = "${PN}-bin:${bindir}/c_rehash"

meta/recipes-core/busybox/busybox.inc

@@ -139,6 +139,10 @@ do_configure () {
 	do_prepare_config
 	merge_config.sh -m .config ${@" ".join(find_cfgs(d))}
 	cml1_do_configure
+
+	# Save a copy of .config and autoconf.h.
+	cp .config .config.orig
+	cp include/autoconf.h include/autoconf.h.orig
 }
 
 do_compile() {
@@ -146,13 +150,17 @@ do_compile() {
 	if [ "${BUILD_REPRODUCIBLE_BINARIES}" = "1" ]; then
 		export KCONFIG_NOTIMESTAMP=1
 	fi
+
+	# Ensure we start do_compile with the original .config and autoconf.h.
+	# These files should always have matching timestamps.
+	cp .config.orig .config
+	cp include/autoconf.h.orig include/autoconf.h
+
 	if [ "${BUSYBOX_SPLIT_SUID}" = "1" -a x`grep "CONFIG_FEATURE_INDIVIDUAL=y" .config` = x ]; then
+		# Guard againt interrupted do_compile: clean temporary files.
+		rm -f .config.app.suid .config.app.nosuid .config.disable.apps .config.nonapps
+
 		# split the .config into two parts, and make two busybox binaries
-		if [ -e .config.orig ]; then
-			# Need to guard again an interrupted do_compile - restore any backup
-			cp .config.orig .config
-		fi
-		cp .config .config.orig
 		oe_runmake busybox.cfg.suid
 		oe_runmake busybox.cfg.nosuid
 
@@ -189,15 +197,18 @@ do_compile() {
 			bbfatal "busybox suid binary incorrectly provides /bin/sh"
 		fi
 
-		# copy .config.orig back to .config, because the install process may check this file
-		cp .config.orig .config
 		# cleanup
-		rm .config.orig .config.app.suid .config.app.nosuid .config.disable.apps .config.nonapps
+		rm .config.app.suid .config.app.nosuid .config.disable.apps .config.nonapps
 	else
 		oe_runmake busybox_unstripped
 		cp busybox_unstripped busybox
 		oe_runmake busybox.links
 	fi
+
+	# restore original .config and autoconf.h, because the install process
+	# may check these files
+	cp .config.orig .config
+	cp include/autoconf.h.orig include/autoconf.h
 }
 
 do_install () {

meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc/CVE-2023-0687.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+From 952aff5c00ad7c6b83c3f310f2643939538827f8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?=D0=9B=D0=B5=D0=BE=D0=BD=D0=B8=D0=B4=20=D0=AE=D1=80=D1=8C?=
+ =?UTF-8?q?=D0=B5=D0=B2=20=28Leonid=20Yuriev=29?= <leo@yuriev.ru>
+Date: Sat, 4 Feb 2023 14:41:38 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] gmon: Fix allocated buffer overflow (bug 29444)
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+The `__monstartup()` allocates a buffer used to store all the data
+accumulated by the monitor.
+
+The size of this buffer depends on the size of the internal structures
+used and the address range for which the monitor is activated, as well
+as on the maximum density of call instructions and/or callable functions
+that could be potentially on a segment of executable code.
+
+In particular a hash table of arcs is placed at the end of this buffer.
+The size of this hash table is calculated in bytes as
+   p->fromssize = p->textsize / HASHFRACTION;
+
+but actually should be
+   p->fromssize = ROUNDUP(p->textsize / HASHFRACTION, sizeof(*p->froms));
+
+This results in writing beyond the end of the allocated buffer when an
+added arc corresponds to a call near from the end of the monitored
+address range, since `_mcount()` check the incoming caller address for
+monitored range but not the intermediate result hash-like index that
+uses to write into the table.
+
+It should be noted that when the results are output to `gmon.out`, the
+table is read to the last element calculated from the allocated size in
+bytes, so the arcs stored outside the buffer boundary did not fall into
+`gprof` for analysis. Thus this "feature" help me to found this bug
+during working with https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=29438
+
+Just in case, I will explicitly note that the problem breaks the
+`make test t=gmon/tst-gmon-dso` added for Bug 29438.
+There, the arc of the `f3()` call disappears from the output, since in
+the DSO case, the call to `f3` is located close to the end of the
+monitored range.
+
+Signed-off-by: Леонид Юрьев (Leonid Yuriev) <leo@yuriev.ru>
+
+Another minor error seems a related typo in the calculation of
+`kcountsize`, but since kcounts are smaller than froms, this is
+actually to align the p->froms data.
+
+Co-authored-by: DJ Delorie <dj@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Carlos O'Donell <carlos@redhat.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=commit;h=801af9fafd4689337ebf27260aa115335a0cb2bc]
+CVE: CVE-2023-0687
+Signed-off-by: Shubham Kulkarni <skulkarni@mvista.com>
+---
+ gmon/gmon.c | 4 +++-
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/gmon/gmon.c b/gmon/gmon.c
+index dee6480..bf76358 100644
+--- a/gmon/gmon.c
++++ b/gmon/gmon.c
+@@ -132,6 +132,8 @@ __monstartup (u_long lowpc, u_long highpc)
+   p->lowpc = ROUNDDOWN(lowpc, HISTFRACTION * sizeof(HISTCOUNTER));
+   p->highpc = ROUNDUP(highpc, HISTFRACTION * sizeof(HISTCOUNTER));
+   p->textsize = p->highpc - p->lowpc;
++  /* This looks like a typo, but it's here to align the p->froms
++     section.  */
+   p->kcountsize = ROUNDUP(p->textsize / HISTFRACTION, sizeof(*p->froms));
+   p->hashfraction = HASHFRACTION;
+   p->log_hashfraction = -1;
+@@ -142,7 +144,7 @@ __monstartup (u_long lowpc, u_long highpc)
+	 instead of integer division.  Precompute shift amount. */
+       p->log_hashfraction = ffs(p->hashfraction * sizeof(*p->froms)) - 1;
+   }
+-  p->fromssize = p->textsize / HASHFRACTION;
++  p->fromssize = ROUNDUP(p->textsize / HASHFRACTION, sizeof(*p->froms));
+   p->tolimit = p->textsize * ARCDENSITY / 100;
+   if (p->tolimit < MINARCS)
+     p->tolimit = MINARCS;
+--
+2.7.4

meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc_2.31.bb

@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ SRC_URI =  "${GLIBC_GIT_URI};branch=${SRCBRANCH};name=glibc \
            file://0035-x86_64-Avoid-lazy-relocation-of-tlsdesc-BZ-27137.patch \
            file://0036-i386-Avoid-lazy-relocation-of-tlsdesc-BZ-27137.patch \
            file://0037-Avoid-deadlock-between-pthread_create-and-ctors.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-0687.patch \
            "
 S = "${WORKDIR}/git"
 B = "${WORKDIR}/build-${TARGET_SYS}"

meta/recipes-core/images/build-appliance-image_15.0.0.bb

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ IMAGE_FSTYPES = "wic.vmdk"
 
 inherit core-image setuptools3
 
-SRCREV ?= "f5e8301b203715404d18215d7d914499555b3425"
+SRCREV ?= "9fbfbf002e210dbdb2a4b9f3adf8012f245cf38f"
 SRC_URI = "git://git.yoctoproject.org/poky;branch=dunfell \
            file://Yocto_Build_Appliance.vmx \
            file://Yocto_Build_Appliance.vmxf \

meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/gcc-9.5.inc

@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ SRC_URI = "\
            file://0037-CVE-2019-14250-Check-zero-value-in-simple_object_elf.patch \
            file://0038-gentypes-genmodes-Do-not-use-__LINE__-for-maintainin.patch \
            file://0039-process_alt_operands-Don-t-match-user-defined-regs-o.patch \
+           file://0002-libstdc-Fix-inconsistent-noexcept-specific-for-valar.patch \
 "
 S = "${TMPDIR}/work-shared/gcc-${PV}-${PR}/gcc-${PV}"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "27769f64ef1d4cd5e2be8682c0c93f9887983e6cfd1a927ce5a0a2915a95cf8f"

meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/gcc-9.5/0002-libstdc-Fix-inconsistent-noexcept-specific-for-valar.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+From 60d966708d7cf105dccf128d2b7a38b0b2580a1a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jonathan Wakely <jwakely@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 5 Nov 2021 21:42:20 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] libstdc++: Fix inconsistent noexcept-specific for valarray
+ begin/end
+
+These declarations should be noexcept after I added it to the
+definitions in <valarray>.
+
+libstdc++-v3/ChangeLog:
+
+	* include/bits/range_access.h (begin(valarray), end(valarray)):
+	Add noexcept.
+
+(cherry picked from commit 2b2d97fc545635a0f6aa9c9ee3b017394bc494bf)
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/hkaelber/gcc/commit/2b2d97fc545635a0f6aa9c9ee3b017394bc494bf]
+Signed-off-by: Virendra Thakur <virendrak@kpit.com>
+
+---
+ libstdc++-v3/include/bits/range_access.h | 8 ++++----
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/libstdc++-v3/include/bits/range_access.h b/libstdc++-v3/include/bits/range_access.h
+index 3d99ea92027..4736e75fda1 100644
+--- a/libstdc++-v3/include/bits/range_access.h
++++ b/libstdc++-v3/include/bits/range_access.h
+@@ -101,10 +101,10 @@ _GLIBCXX_BEGIN_NAMESPACE_VERSION
+ 
+   template<typename _Tp> class valarray;
+   // These overloads must be declared for cbegin and cend to use them.
+-  template<typename _Tp> _Tp* begin(valarray<_Tp>&);
+-  template<typename _Tp> const _Tp* begin(const valarray<_Tp>&);
+-  template<typename _Tp> _Tp* end(valarray<_Tp>&);
+-  template<typename _Tp> const _Tp* end(const valarray<_Tp>&);
++  template<typename _Tp> _Tp* begin(valarray<_Tp>&) noexcept;
++  template<typename _Tp> const _Tp* begin(const valarray<_Tp>&) noexcept;
++  template<typename _Tp> _Tp* end(valarray<_Tp>&) noexcept;
++  template<typename _Tp> const _Tp* end(const valarray<_Tp>&) noexcept;
+ 
+   /**
+    *  @brief  Return an iterator pointing to the first element of
+-- 
+2.25.1

meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2022-23521.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,367 @@
+From eb22e7dfa23da6bd9aed9bd1dad69e1e8e167d24 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
+Date: Thu, 1 Dec 2022 15:45:15 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2022-23521
+
+attr: fix overflow when upserting attribute with overly long name
+
+The function `git_attr_internal()` is called to upsert attributes into
+the global map. And while all callers pass a `size_t`, the function
+itself accepts an `int` as the attribute name's length. This can lead to
+an integer overflow in case the attribute name is longer than `INT_MAX`.
+
+Now this overflow seems harmless as the first thing we do is to call
+`attr_name_valid()`, and that function only succeeds in case all chars
+in the range of `namelen` match a certain small set of chars. We thus
+can't do an out-of-bounds read as NUL is not part of that set and all
+strings passed to this function are NUL-terminated. And furthermore, we
+wouldn't ever read past the current attribute name anyway due to the
+same reason. And if validation fails we will return early.
+
+On the other hand it feels fragile to rely on this behaviour, even more
+so given that we pass `namelen` to `FLEX_ALLOC_MEM()`. So let's instead
+just do the correct thing here and accept a `size_t` as line length.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/git/git/commit/eb22e7dfa23da6bd9aed9bd1dad69e1e8e167d24 &https://github.com/git/git/commit/8d0d48cf2157cfb914db1f53b3fe40785b86f3aa & https://github.com/git/git/commit/24557209500e6ed618f04a8795a111a0c491a29c & https://github.com/git/git/commit/34ace8bad02bb14ecc5b631f7e3daaa7a9bba7d9 & https://github.com/git/git/commit/447ac906e189535e77dcb1f4bbe3f1bc917d4c12 & https://github.com/git/git/commit/e1e12e97ac73ded85f7d000da1063a774b3cc14f & https://github.com/git/git/commit/a60a66e409c265b2944f18bf43581c146812586d & https://github.com/git/git/commit/d74b1fd54fdbc45966d12ea907dece11e072fb2b & https://github.com/git/git/commit/dfa6b32b5e599d97448337ed4fc18dd50c90758f & https://github.com/git/git/commit/3c50032ff5289cc45659f21949c8d09e52164579
+
+CVE: CVE-2022-23521
+
+Reviewed-by: Sylvain Beucler <beuc@debian.org>
+Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
+Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+---
+ attr.c                | 97 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
+ attr.h                | 12 ++++++
+ t/t0003-attributes.sh | 59 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 3 files changed, 132 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/attr.c b/attr.c
+index 11f19b5..63484ab 100644
+--- a/attr.c
++++ b/attr.c
+@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ static const char git_attr__unknown[] = "(builtin)unknown";
+ #endif
+ 
+ struct git_attr {
+-	int attr_nr; /* unique attribute number */
++	unsigned int attr_nr; /* unique attribute number */
+ 	char name[FLEX_ARRAY]; /* attribute name */
+ };
+ 
+@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ static void report_invalid_attr(const char *name, size_t len,
+  * dictionary.  If no entry is found, create a new attribute and store it in
+  * the dictionary.
+  */
+-static const struct git_attr *git_attr_internal(const char *name, int namelen)
++static const struct git_attr *git_attr_internal(const char *name, size_t namelen)
+ {
+ 	struct git_attr *a;
+ 
+@@ -237,8 +237,8 @@ static const struct git_attr *git_attr_internal(const char *name, int namelen)
+ 		a->attr_nr = hashmap_get_size(&g_attr_hashmap.map);
+ 
+ 		attr_hashmap_add(&g_attr_hashmap, a->name, namelen, a);
+-		assert(a->attr_nr ==
+-		       (hashmap_get_size(&g_attr_hashmap.map) - 1));
++		if (a->attr_nr != hashmap_get_size(&g_attr_hashmap.map) - 1)
++			die(_("unable to add additional attribute"));
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	hashmap_unlock(&g_attr_hashmap);
+@@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ struct match_attr {
+ 		const struct git_attr *attr;
+ 	} u;
+ 	char is_macro;
+-	unsigned num_attr;
++	size_t num_attr;
+ 	struct attr_state state[FLEX_ARRAY];
+ };
+ 
+@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ static const char *parse_attr(const char *src, int lineno, const char *cp,
+ 			      struct attr_state *e)
+ {
+ 	const char *ep, *equals;
+-	int len;
++	size_t len;
+ 
+ 	ep = cp + strcspn(cp, blank);
+ 	equals = strchr(cp, '=');
+@@ -344,8 +344,7 @@ static const char *parse_attr(const char *src, int lineno, const char *cp,
+ static struct match_attr *parse_attr_line(const char *line, const char *src,
+ 					  int lineno, int macro_ok)
+ {
+-	int namelen;
+-	int num_attr, i;
++	size_t namelen, num_attr, i;
+ 	const char *cp, *name, *states;
+ 	struct match_attr *res = NULL;
+ 	int is_macro;
+@@ -356,6 +355,11 @@ static struct match_attr *parse_attr_line(const char *line, const char *src,
+ 		return NULL;
+ 	name = cp;
+ 
++	if (strlen(line) >= ATTR_MAX_LINE_LENGTH) {
++		warning(_("ignoring overly long attributes line %d"), lineno);
++		return NULL;
++	}
++
+ 	if (*cp == '"' && !unquote_c_style(&pattern, name, &states)) {
+ 		name = pattern.buf;
+ 		namelen = pattern.len;
+@@ -392,10 +396,9 @@ static struct match_attr *parse_attr_line(const char *line, const char *src,
+ 			goto fail_return;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	res = xcalloc(1,
+-		      sizeof(*res) +
+-		      sizeof(struct attr_state) * num_attr +
+-		      (is_macro ? 0 : namelen + 1));
++	res = xcalloc(1, st_add3(sizeof(*res),
++				 st_mult(sizeof(struct attr_state), num_attr),
++				 is_macro ? 0 : namelen + 1));
+ 	if (is_macro) {
+ 		res->u.attr = git_attr_internal(name, namelen);
+ 	} else {
+@@ -458,11 +461,12 @@ struct attr_stack {
+ 
+ static void attr_stack_free(struct attr_stack *e)
+ {
+-	int i;
++	unsigned i;
+ 	free(e->origin);
+ 	for (i = 0; i < e->num_matches; i++) {
+ 		struct match_attr *a = e->attrs[i];
+-		int j;
++		size_t j;
++
+ 		for (j = 0; j < a->num_attr; j++) {
+ 			const char *setto = a->state[j].setto;
+ 			if (setto == ATTR__TRUE ||
+@@ -671,8 +675,8 @@ static void handle_attr_line(struct attr_stack *res,
+ 	a = parse_attr_line(line, src, lineno, macro_ok);
+ 	if (!a)
+ 		return;
+-	ALLOC_GROW(res->attrs, res->num_matches + 1, res->alloc);
+-	res->attrs[res->num_matches++] = a;
++	ALLOC_GROW_BY(res->attrs, res->num_matches, 1, res->alloc);
++	res->attrs[res->num_matches - 1] = a;
+ }
+ 
+ static struct attr_stack *read_attr_from_array(const char **list)
+@@ -711,21 +715,37 @@ void git_attr_set_direction(enum git_attr_direction new_direction)
+ 
+ static struct attr_stack *read_attr_from_file(const char *path, int macro_ok)
+ {
++	struct strbuf buf = STRBUF_INIT;
+ 	FILE *fp = fopen_or_warn(path, "r");
+ 	struct attr_stack *res;
+-	char buf[2048];
+ 	int lineno = 0;
++	int fd;
++	struct stat st;
+ 
+ 	if (!fp)
+ 		return NULL;
+-	res = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*res));
+-	while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), fp)) {
+-		char *bufp = buf;
+-		if (!lineno)
+-			skip_utf8_bom(&bufp, strlen(bufp));
+-		handle_attr_line(res, bufp, path, ++lineno, macro_ok);
++
++	fd = fileno(fp);
++	if (fstat(fd, &st)) {
++		warning_errno(_("cannot fstat gitattributes file '%s'"), path);
++		fclose(fp);
++		return NULL;
+ 	}
++	if (st.st_size >= ATTR_MAX_FILE_SIZE) {
++		warning(_("ignoring overly large gitattributes file '%s'"), path);
++		fclose(fp);
++		return NULL;
++	}
++
++	CALLOC_ARRAY(res, 1);
++	while (strbuf_getline(&buf, fp) != EOF) {
++		if (!lineno && starts_with(buf.buf, utf8_bom))
++			strbuf_remove(&buf, 0, strlen(utf8_bom));
++		handle_attr_line(res, buf.buf, path, ++lineno, macro_ok);
++	}
++
+ 	fclose(fp);
++	strbuf_release(&buf);
+ 	return res;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -736,13 +756,18 @@ static struct attr_stack *read_attr_from_index(const struct index_state *istate,
+ 	struct attr_stack *res;
+ 	char *buf, *sp;
+ 	int lineno = 0;
++	size_t size;
+ 
+ 	if (!istate)
+ 		return NULL;
+ 
+-	buf = read_blob_data_from_index(istate, path, NULL);
++	buf = read_blob_data_from_index(istate, path, &size);
+ 	if (!buf)
+ 		return NULL;
++	if (size >= ATTR_MAX_FILE_SIZE) {
++		warning(_("ignoring overly large gitattributes blob '%s'"), path);
++		return NULL;
++	}
+ 
+ 	res = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*res));
+ 	for (sp = buf; *sp; ) {
+@@ -1012,12 +1037,12 @@ static int macroexpand_one(struct all_attrs_item *all_attrs, int nr, int rem);
+ static int fill_one(const char *what, struct all_attrs_item *all_attrs,
+ 		    const struct match_attr *a, int rem)
+ {
+-	int i;
++	size_t i;
+ 
+-	for (i = a->num_attr - 1; rem > 0 && i >= 0; i--) {
+-		const struct git_attr *attr = a->state[i].attr;
++	for (i = a->num_attr; rem > 0 && i > 0; i--) {
++		const struct git_attr *attr = a->state[i - 1].attr;
+ 		const char **n = &(all_attrs[attr->attr_nr].value);
+-		const char *v = a->state[i].setto;
++		const char *v = a->state[i - 1].setto;
+ 
+ 		if (*n == ATTR__UNKNOWN) {
+ 			debug_set(what,
+@@ -1036,11 +1061,11 @@ static int fill(const char *path, int pathlen, int basename_offset,
+ 		struct all_attrs_item *all_attrs, int rem)
+ {
+ 	for (; rem > 0 && stack; stack = stack->prev) {
+-		int i;
++		unsigned i;
+ 		const char *base = stack->origin ? stack->origin : "";
+ 
+-		for (i = stack->num_matches - 1; 0 < rem && 0 <= i; i--) {
+-			const struct match_attr *a = stack->attrs[i];
++		for (i = stack->num_matches; 0 < rem && 0 < i; i--) {
++			const struct match_attr *a = stack->attrs[i - 1];
+ 			if (a->is_macro)
+ 				continue;
+ 			if (path_matches(path, pathlen, basename_offset,
+@@ -1071,11 +1096,11 @@ static void determine_macros(struct all_attrs_item *all_attrs,
+ 			     const struct attr_stack *stack)
+ {
+ 	for (; stack; stack = stack->prev) {
+-		int i;
+-		for (i = stack->num_matches - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+-			const struct match_attr *ma = stack->attrs[i];
++		unsigned i;
++		for (i = stack->num_matches; i > 0; i--) {
++			const struct match_attr *ma = stack->attrs[i - 1];
+ 			if (ma->is_macro) {
+-				int n = ma->u.attr->attr_nr;
++				unsigned int n = ma->u.attr->attr_nr;
+ 				if (!all_attrs[n].macro) {
+ 					all_attrs[n].macro = ma;
+ 				}
+@@ -1127,7 +1152,7 @@ void git_check_attr(const struct index_state *istate,
+ 	collect_some_attrs(istate, path, check);
+ 
+ 	for (i = 0; i < check->nr; i++) {
+-		size_t n = check->items[i].attr->attr_nr;
++		unsigned int n = check->items[i].attr->attr_nr;
+ 		const char *value = check->all_attrs[n].value;
+ 		if (value == ATTR__UNKNOWN)
+ 			value = ATTR__UNSET;
+diff --git a/attr.h b/attr.h
+index b0378bf..f424285 100644
+--- a/attr.h
++++ b/attr.h
+@@ -1,6 +1,18 @@
+ #ifndef ATTR_H
+ #define ATTR_H
+ 
++/**
++ * The maximum line length for a gitattributes file. If the line exceeds this
++ * length we will ignore it.
++ */
++#define ATTR_MAX_LINE_LENGTH 2048
++
++ /**
++  * The maximum size of the giattributes file. If the file exceeds this size we
++  * will ignore it.
++  */
++#define ATTR_MAX_FILE_SIZE (100 * 1024 * 1024)
++
+ struct index_state;
+ 
+ /* An attribute is a pointer to this opaque structure */
+diff --git a/t/t0003-attributes.sh b/t/t0003-attributes.sh
+index 71e63d8..556245b 100755
+--- a/t/t0003-attributes.sh
++++ b/t/t0003-attributes.sh
+@@ -342,4 +342,63 @@ test_expect_success 'query binary macro directly' '
+ 	test_cmp expect actual
+ '
+ 
++test_expect_success 'large attributes line ignored in tree' '
++	test_when_finished "rm .gitattributes" &&
++	printf "path %02043d" 1 >.gitattributes &&
++	git check-attr --all path >actual 2>err &&
++	echo "warning: ignoring overly long attributes line 1" >expect &&
++	test_cmp expect err &&
++	test_must_be_empty actual
++'
++
++test_expect_success 'large attributes line ignores trailing content in tree' '
++	test_when_finished "rm .gitattributes" &&
++	# older versions of Git broke lines at 2048 bytes; the 2045 bytes
++	# of 0-padding here is accounting for the three bytes of "a 1", which
++	# would knock "trailing" to the "next" line, where it would be
++	# erroneously parsed.
++	printf "a %02045dtrailing attribute\n" 1 >.gitattributes &&
++	git check-attr --all trailing >actual 2>err &&
++	echo "warning: ignoring overly long attributes line 1" >expect &&
++	test_cmp expect err &&
++	test_must_be_empty actual
++'
++
++test_expect_success EXPENSIVE 'large attributes file ignored in tree' '
++	test_when_finished "rm .gitattributes" &&
++	dd if=/dev/zero of=.gitattributes bs=101M count=1 2>/dev/null &&
++	git check-attr --all path >/dev/null 2>err &&
++	echo "warning: ignoring overly large gitattributes file ${SQ}.gitattributes${SQ}" >expect &&
++	test_cmp expect err
++'
++
++test_expect_success 'large attributes line ignored in index' '
++	test_when_finished "git update-index --remove .gitattributes" &&
++	blob=$(printf "path %02043d" 1 | git hash-object -w --stdin) &&
++	git update-index --add --cacheinfo 100644,$blob,.gitattributes &&
++	git check-attr --cached --all path >actual 2>err &&
++	echo "warning: ignoring overly long attributes line 1" >expect &&
++	test_cmp expect err &&
++	test_must_be_empty actual
++'
++
++test_expect_success 'large attributes line ignores trailing content in index' '
++	test_when_finished "git update-index --remove .gitattributes" &&
++	blob=$(printf "a %02045dtrailing attribute\n" 1 | git hash-object -w --stdin) &&
++	git update-index --add --cacheinfo 100644,$blob,.gitattributes &&
++	git check-attr --cached --all trailing >actual 2>err &&
++	echo "warning: ignoring overly long attributes line 1" >expect &&
++	test_cmp expect err &&
++	test_must_be_empty actual
++'
++
++test_expect_success EXPENSIVE 'large attributes file ignored in index' '
++	test_when_finished "git update-index --remove .gitattributes" &&
++	blob=$(dd if=/dev/zero bs=101M count=1 2>/dev/null | git hash-object -w --stdin) &&
++	git update-index --add --cacheinfo 100644,$blob,.gitattributes &&
++	git check-attr --cached --all path >/dev/null 2>err &&
++	echo "warning: ignoring overly large gitattributes blob ${SQ}.gitattributes${SQ}" >expect &&
++	test_cmp expect err
++'
++
+ test_done
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2022-41903-01.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+From a244dc5b0a629290881641467c7a545de7508ab2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Carlo Marcelo Arenas Belón <carenas@gmail.com>
+Date: Tue, 2 Nov 2021 15:46:06 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 01/12] test-lib: add prerequisite for 64-bit platforms
+
+Allow tests that assume a 64-bit `size_t` to be skipped in 32-bit
+platforms and regardless of the size of `long`.
+
+This imitates the `LONG_IS_64BIT` prerequisite.
+
+Signed-off-by: Carlo Marcelo Arenas Belón <carenas@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
+Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/git/git/commit/a244dc5b0a629290881641467c7a545de7508ab2]
+CVE: CVE-2022-41903
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ t/test-lib.sh | 4 ++++
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/t/test-lib.sh b/t/test-lib.sh
+index e06fa02..db5ec2f 100644
+--- a/t/test-lib.sh
++++ b/t/test-lib.sh
+@@ -1613,6 +1613,10 @@ build_option () {
+ 	sed -ne "s/^$1: //p"
+ }
+ 
++test_lazy_prereq SIZE_T_IS_64BIT '
++	test 8 -eq "$(build_option sizeof-size_t)"
++'
++
+ test_lazy_prereq LONG_IS_64BIT '
+ 	test 8 -le "$(build_option sizeof-long)"
+ '
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2022-41903-02.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
+From 81dc898df9b4b4035534a927f3234a3839b698bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
+Date: Thu, 1 Dec 2022 15:46:25 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 02/12] pretty: fix out-of-bounds write caused by integer overflow
+
+When using a padding specifier in the pretty format passed to git-log(1)
+we need to calculate the string length in several places. These string
+lengths are stored in `int`s though, which means that these can easily
+overflow when the input lengths exceeds 2GB. This can ultimately lead to
+an out-of-bounds write when these are used in a call to memcpy(3P):
+
+        ==8340==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x7f1ec62f97fe at pc 0x7f2127e5f427 bp 0x7ffd3bd63de0 sp 0x7ffd3bd63588
+    WRITE of size 1 at 0x7f1ec62f97fe thread T0
+        #0 0x7f2127e5f426 in __interceptor_memcpy /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:827
+        #1 0x5628e96aa605 in format_and_pad_commit pretty.c:1762
+        #2 0x5628e96aa7f4 in format_commit_item pretty.c:1801
+        #3 0x5628e97cdb24 in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:429
+        #4 0x5628e96ab060 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869
+        #5 0x5628e96acd0f in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161
+        #6 0x5628e95a44c8 in show_log log-tree.c:781
+        #7 0x5628e95a76ba in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117
+        #8 0x5628e922bed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508
+        #9 0x5628e922c35b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549
+        #10 0x5628e922f1a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883
+        #11 0x5628e9106993 in run_builtin git.c:466
+        #12 0x5628e9107397 in handle_builtin git.c:721
+        #13 0x5628e9107b07 in run_argv git.c:788
+        #14 0x5628e91088a7 in cmd_main git.c:923
+        #15 0x5628e939d682 in main common-main.c:57
+        #16 0x7f2127c3c28f  (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f)
+        #17 0x7f2127c3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349)
+        #18 0x5628e91020e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115
+
+    0x7f1ec62f97fe is located 2 bytes to the left of 4831838265-byte region [0x7f1ec62f9800,0x7f1fe62f9839)
+    allocated by thread T0 here:
+        #0 0x7f2127ebe7ea in __interceptor_realloc /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:85
+        #1 0x5628e98774d4 in xrealloc wrapper.c:136
+        #2 0x5628e97cb01c in strbuf_grow strbuf.c:99
+        #3 0x5628e97ccd42 in strbuf_addchars strbuf.c:327
+        #4 0x5628e96aa55c in format_and_pad_commit pretty.c:1761
+        #5 0x5628e96aa7f4 in format_commit_item pretty.c:1801
+        #6 0x5628e97cdb24 in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:429
+        #7 0x5628e96ab060 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869
+        #8 0x5628e96acd0f in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161
+        #9 0x5628e95a44c8 in show_log log-tree.c:781
+        #10 0x5628e95a76ba in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117
+        #11 0x5628e922bed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508
+        #12 0x5628e922c35b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549
+        #13 0x5628e922f1a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883
+        #14 0x5628e9106993 in run_builtin git.c:466
+        #15 0x5628e9107397 in handle_builtin git.c:721
+        #16 0x5628e9107b07 in run_argv git.c:788
+        #17 0x5628e91088a7 in cmd_main git.c:923
+        #18 0x5628e939d682 in main common-main.c:57
+        #19 0x7f2127c3c28f  (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f)
+        #20 0x7f2127c3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349)
+        #21 0x5628e91020e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115
+
+    SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:827 in __interceptor_memcpy
+    Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
+      0x0fe458c572a0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
+      0x0fe458c572b0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
+      0x0fe458c572c0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
+      0x0fe458c572d0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
+      0x0fe458c572e0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
+    =>0x0fe458c572f0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa[fa]
+      0x0fe458c57300: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
+      0x0fe458c57310: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
+      0x0fe458c57320: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
+      0x0fe458c57330: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
+      0x0fe458c57340: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
+    Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
+      Addressable:           00
+      Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
+      Heap left redzone:       fa
+      Freed heap region:       fd
+      Stack left redzone:      f1
+      Stack mid redzone:       f2
+      Stack right redzone:     f3
+      Stack after return:      f5
+      Stack use after scope:   f8
+      Global redzone:          f9
+      Global init order:       f6
+      Poisoned by user:        f7
+      Container overflow:      fc
+      Array cookie:            ac
+      Intra object redzone:    bb
+      ASan internal:           fe
+      Left alloca redzone:     ca
+      Right alloca redzone:    cb
+    ==8340==ABORTING
+
+The pretty format can also be used in `git archive` operations via the
+`export-subst` attribute. So this is what in our opinion makes this a
+critical issue in the context of Git forges which allow to download an
+archive of user supplied Git repositories.
+
+Fix this vulnerability by using `size_t` instead of `int` to track the
+string lengths. Add tests which detect this vulnerability when Git is
+compiled with the address sanitizer.
+
+Reported-by: Joern Schneeweisz <jschneeweisz@gitlab.com>
+Original-patch-by: Joern Schneeweisz <jschneeweisz@gitlab.com>
+Modified-by: Taylor  Blau <me@ttalorr.com>
+Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
+Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/git/git/commit/81dc898df9b4b4035534a927f3234a3839b698bf]
+CVE: CVE-2022-41903
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ pretty.c                      | 11 ++++++-----
+ t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh | 17 +++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/pretty.c b/pretty.c
+index b32f036..637e344 100644
+--- a/pretty.c
++++ b/pretty.c
+@@ -1427,7 +1427,9 @@ static size_t format_and_pad_commit(struct strbuf *sb, /* in UTF-8 */
+ 				    struct format_commit_context *c)
+ {
+ 	struct strbuf local_sb = STRBUF_INIT;
+-	int total_consumed = 0, len, padding = c->padding;
++	size_t total_consumed = 0;
++	int len, padding = c->padding;
++
+ 	if (padding < 0) {
+ 		const char *start = strrchr(sb->buf, '\n');
+ 		int occupied;
+@@ -1439,7 +1441,7 @@ static size_t format_and_pad_commit(struct strbuf *sb, /* in UTF-8 */
+ 	}
+ 	while (1) {
+ 		int modifier = *placeholder == 'C';
+-		int consumed = format_commit_one(&local_sb, placeholder, c);
++		size_t consumed = format_commit_one(&local_sb, placeholder, c);
+ 		total_consumed += consumed;
+ 
+ 		if (!modifier)
+@@ -1505,7 +1507,7 @@ static size_t format_and_pad_commit(struct strbuf *sb, /* in UTF-8 */
+ 		}
+ 		strbuf_addbuf(sb, &local_sb);
+ 	} else {
+-		int sb_len = sb->len, offset = 0;
++		size_t sb_len = sb->len, offset = 0;
+ 		if (c->flush_type == flush_left)
+ 			offset = padding - len;
+ 		else if (c->flush_type == flush_both)
+@@ -1528,8 +1530,7 @@ static size_t format_commit_item(struct strbuf *sb, /* in UTF-8 */
+ 				 const char *placeholder,
+ 				 void *context)
+ {
+-	int consumed;
+-	size_t orig_len;
++	size_t consumed, orig_len;
+ 	enum {
+ 		NO_MAGIC,
+ 		ADD_LF_BEFORE_NON_EMPTY,
+diff --git a/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh b/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh
+index f42a69f..a2acee1 100755
+--- a/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh
++++ b/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh
+@@ -788,4 +788,21 @@ test_expect_success '%S in git log --format works with other placeholders (part
+ 	test_cmp expect actual
+ '
+ 
++test_expect_success EXPENSIVE,SIZE_T_IS_64BIT 'log --pretty with huge commit message' '
++	# We only assert that this command does not crash. This needs to be
++	# executed with the address sanitizer to demonstrate failure.
++	git log -1 --pretty="format:%>(2147483646)%x41%41%>(2147483646)%x41" >/dev/null
++'
++
++test_expect_success EXPENSIVE,SIZE_T_IS_64BIT 'set up huge commit' '
++	test-tool genzeros 2147483649 | tr "\000" "1" >expect &&
++	huge_commit=$(git commit-tree -F expect HEAD^{tree})
++'
++
++test_expect_success EXPENSIVE,SIZE_T_IS_64BIT 'log --pretty with huge commit message' '
++	git log -1 --format="%B%<(1)%x30" $huge_commit >actual &&
++	echo 0 >>expect &&
++	test_cmp expect actual
++'
++
+ test_done
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2022-41903-03.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+From b49f309aa16febeddb65e82526640a91bbba3be3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
+Date: Thu, 1 Dec 2022 15:46:30 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 03/12] pretty: fix out-of-bounds read when left-flushing with stealing
+
+With the `%>>(<N>)` pretty formatter, you can ask git-log(1) et al to
+steal spaces. To do so we need to look ahead of the next token to see
+whether there are spaces there. This loop takes into account ANSI
+sequences that end with an `m`, and if it finds any it will skip them
+until it finds the first space. While doing so it does not take into
+account the buffer's limits though and easily does an out-of-bounds
+read.
+
+Add a test that hits this behaviour. While we don't have an easy way to
+verify this, the test causes the following failure when run with
+`SANITIZE=address`:
+
+    ==37941==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x603000000baf at pc 0x55ba6f88e0d0 bp 0x7ffc84c50d20 sp 0x7ffc84c50d10
+    READ of size 1 at 0x603000000baf thread T0
+        #0 0x55ba6f88e0cf in format_and_pad_commit pretty.c:1712
+        #1 0x55ba6f88e7b4 in format_commit_item pretty.c:1801
+        #2 0x55ba6f9b1ae4 in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:429
+        #3 0x55ba6f88f020 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869
+        #4 0x55ba6f890ccf in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161
+        #5 0x55ba6f7884c8 in show_log log-tree.c:781
+        #6 0x55ba6f78b6ba in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117
+        #7 0x55ba6f40fed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508
+        #8 0x55ba6f41035b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549
+        #9 0x55ba6f4131a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883
+        #10 0x55ba6f2ea993 in run_builtin git.c:466
+        #11 0x55ba6f2eb397 in handle_builtin git.c:721
+        #12 0x55ba6f2ebb07 in run_argv git.c:788
+        #13 0x55ba6f2ec8a7 in cmd_main git.c:923
+        #14 0x55ba6f581682 in main common-main.c:57
+        #15 0x7f2d08c3c28f  (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f)
+        #16 0x7f2d08c3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349)
+        #17 0x55ba6f2e60e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115
+
+    0x603000000baf is located 1 bytes to the left of 24-byte region [0x603000000bb0,0x603000000bc8)
+    allocated by thread T0 here:
+        #0 0x7f2d08ebe7ea in __interceptor_realloc /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:85
+        #1 0x55ba6fa5b494 in xrealloc wrapper.c:136
+        #2 0x55ba6f9aefdc in strbuf_grow strbuf.c:99
+        #3 0x55ba6f9b0a06 in strbuf_add strbuf.c:298
+        #4 0x55ba6f9b1a25 in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:418
+        #5 0x55ba6f88f020 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869
+        #6 0x55ba6f890ccf in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161
+        #7 0x55ba6f7884c8 in show_log log-tree.c:781
+        #8 0x55ba6f78b6ba in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117
+        #9 0x55ba6f40fed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508
+        #10 0x55ba6f41035b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549
+        #11 0x55ba6f4131a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883
+        #12 0x55ba6f2ea993 in run_builtin git.c:466
+        #13 0x55ba6f2eb397 in handle_builtin git.c:721
+        #14 0x55ba6f2ebb07 in run_argv git.c:788
+        #15 0x55ba6f2ec8a7 in cmd_main git.c:923
+        #16 0x55ba6f581682 in main common-main.c:57
+        #17 0x7f2d08c3c28f  (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f)
+        #18 0x7f2d08c3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349)
+        #19 0x55ba6f2e60e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115
+
+    SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow pretty.c:1712 in format_and_pad_commit
+    Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
+      0x0c067fff8120: fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd
+      0x0c067fff8130: fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa
+      0x0c067fff8140: fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa
+      0x0c067fff8150: fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa 00 00 00 fa fa fa fd fd
+      0x0c067fff8160: fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa
+    =>0x0c067fff8170: fd fd fd fa fa[fa]00 00 00 fa fa fa 00 00 00 fa
+      0x0c067fff8180: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
+      0x0c067fff8190: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
+      0x0c067fff81a0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
+      0x0c067fff81b0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
+      0x0c067fff81c0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
+    Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
+      Addressable:           00
+      Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
+      Heap left redzone:       fa
+      Freed heap region:       fd
+      Stack left redzone:      f1
+      Stack mid redzone:       f2
+      Stack right redzone:     f3
+      Stack after return:      f5
+      Stack use after scope:   f8
+      Global redzone:          f9
+      Global init order:       f6
+      Poisoned by user:        f7
+      Container overflow:      fc
+      Array cookie:            ac
+      Intra object redzone:    bb
+      ASan internal:           fe
+      Left alloca redzone:     ca
+      Right alloca redzone:    cb
+
+Luckily enough, this would only cause us to copy the out-of-bounds data
+into the formatted commit in case we really had an ANSI sequence
+preceding our buffer. So this bug likely has no security consequences.
+
+Fix it regardless by not traversing past the buffer's start.
+
+Reported-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
+Reported-by: Eric Sesterhenn <eric.sesterhenn@x41-dsec.de>
+Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
+Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/git/git/commit/b49f309aa16febeddb65e82526640a91bbba3be3]
+CVE: CVE-2022-41903
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ pretty.c                      | 2 +-
+ t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh | 6 ++++++
+ 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/pretty.c b/pretty.c
+index 637e344..4348a82 100644
+--- a/pretty.c
++++ b/pretty.c
+@@ -1468,7 +1468,7 @@ static size_t format_and_pad_commit(struct strbuf *sb, /* in UTF-8 */
+ 			if (*ch != 'm')
+ 				break;
+ 			p = ch - 1;
+-			while (ch - p < 10 && *p != '\033')
++			while (p > sb->buf && ch - p < 10 && *p != '\033')
+ 				p--;
+ 			if (*p != '\033' ||
+ 			    ch + 1 - p != display_mode_esc_sequence_len(p))
+diff --git a/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh b/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh
+index a2acee1..e69caba 100755
+--- a/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh
++++ b/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh
+@@ -788,6 +788,12 @@ test_expect_success '%S in git log --format works with other placeholders (part
+ 	test_cmp expect actual
+ '
+ 
++test_expect_success 'log --pretty with space stealing' '
++	printf mm0 >expect &&
++	git log -1 --pretty="format:mm%>>|(1)%x30" >actual &&
++	test_cmp expect actual
++'
++
+ test_expect_success EXPENSIVE,SIZE_T_IS_64BIT 'log --pretty with huge commit message' '
+ 	# We only assert that this command does not crash. This needs to be
+ 	# executed with the address sanitizer to demonstrate failure.
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2022-41903-04.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
+From f6e0b9f38987ad5e47bab551f8760b70689a5905 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
+Date: Thu, 1 Dec 2022 15:46:34 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 04/12] pretty: fix out-of-bounds read when parsing invalid padding format
+
+An out-of-bounds read can be triggered when parsing an incomplete
+padding format string passed via `--pretty=format` or in Git archives
+when files are marked with the `export-subst` gitattribute.
+
+This bug exists since we have introduced support for truncating output
+via the `trunc` keyword a7f01c6 (pretty: support truncating in %>, %<
+and %><, 2013-04-19). Before this commit, we used to find the end of the
+formatting string by using strchr(3P). This function returns a `NULL`
+pointer in case the character in question wasn't found. The subsequent
+check whether any character was found thus simply checked the returned
+pointer. After the commit we switched to strcspn(3P) though, which only
+returns the offset to the first found character or to the trailing NUL
+byte. As the end pointer is now computed by adding the offset to the
+start pointer it won't be `NULL` anymore, and as a consequence the check
+doesn't do anything anymore.
+
+The out-of-bounds data that is being read can in fact end up in the
+formatted string. As a consequence, it is possible to leak memory
+contents either by calling git-log(1) or via git-archive(1) when any of
+the archived files is marked with the `export-subst` gitattribute.
+
+    ==10888==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x602000000398 at pc 0x7f0356047cb2 bp 0x7fff3ffb95d0 sp 0x7fff3ffb8d78
+    READ of size 1 at 0x602000000398 thread T0
+        #0 0x7f0356047cb1 in __interceptor_strchrnul /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:725
+        #1 0x563b7cec9a43 in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:417
+        #2 0x563b7cda7060 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869
+        #3 0x563b7cda8d0f in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161
+        #4 0x563b7cca04c8 in show_log log-tree.c:781
+        #5 0x563b7cca36ba in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117
+        #6 0x563b7c927ed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508
+        #7 0x563b7c92835b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549
+        #8 0x563b7c92b1a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883
+        #9 0x563b7c802993 in run_builtin git.c:466
+        #10 0x563b7c803397 in handle_builtin git.c:721
+        #11 0x563b7c803b07 in run_argv git.c:788
+        #12 0x563b7c8048a7 in cmd_main git.c:923
+        #13 0x563b7ca99682 in main common-main.c:57
+        #14 0x7f0355e3c28f  (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f)
+        #15 0x7f0355e3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349)
+        #16 0x563b7c7fe0e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115
+
+    0x602000000398 is located 0 bytes to the right of 8-byte region [0x602000000390,0x602000000398)
+    allocated by thread T0 here:
+        #0 0x7f0356072faa in __interceptor_strdup /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_interceptors.cpp:439
+        #1 0x563b7cf7317c in xstrdup wrapper.c:39
+        #2 0x563b7cd9a06a in save_user_format pretty.c:40
+        #3 0x563b7cd9b3e5 in get_commit_format pretty.c:173
+        #4 0x563b7ce54ea0 in handle_revision_opt revision.c:2456
+        #5 0x563b7ce597c9 in setup_revisions revision.c:2850
+        #6 0x563b7c9269e0 in cmd_log_init_finish builtin/log.c:269
+        #7 0x563b7c927362 in cmd_log_init builtin/log.c:348
+        #8 0x563b7c92b193 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:882
+        #9 0x563b7c802993 in run_builtin git.c:466
+        #10 0x563b7c803397 in handle_builtin git.c:721
+        #11 0x563b7c803b07 in run_argv git.c:788
+        #12 0x563b7c8048a7 in cmd_main git.c:923
+        #13 0x563b7ca99682 in main common-main.c:57
+        #14 0x7f0355e3c28f  (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f)
+        #15 0x7f0355e3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349)
+        #16 0x563b7c7fe0e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115
+
+    SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:725 in __interceptor_strchrnul
+    Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
+      0x0c047fff8020: fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 06 fa fa 05 fa fa fa fd fd
+      0x0c047fff8030: fa fa 00 02 fa fa 06 fa fa fa 05 fa fa fa fd fd
+      0x0c047fff8040: fa fa 00 07 fa fa 03 fa fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 00
+      0x0c047fff8050: fa fa 00 01 fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 01
+      0x0c047fff8060: fa fa 00 06 fa fa 00 06 fa fa 05 fa fa fa 05 fa
+    =>0x0c047fff8070: fa fa 00[fa]fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fd
+      0x0c047fff8080: fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 fa fa fa fd fa
+      0x0c047fff8090: fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 00 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
+      0x0c047fff80a0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
+      0x0c047fff80b0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
+      0x0c047fff80c0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
+    Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
+      Addressable:           00
+      Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
+      Heap left redzone:       fa
+      Freed heap region:       fd
+      Stack left redzone:      f1
+      Stack mid redzone:       f2
+      Stack right redzone:     f3
+      Stack after return:      f5
+      Stack use after scope:   f8
+      Global redzone:          f9
+      Global init order:       f6
+      Poisoned by user:        f7
+      Container overflow:      fc
+      Array cookie:            ac
+      Intra object redzone:    bb
+      ASan internal:           fe
+      Left alloca redzone:     ca
+      Right alloca redzone:    cb
+    ==10888==ABORTING
+
+Fix this bug by checking whether `end` points at the trailing NUL byte.
+Add a test which catches this out-of-bounds read and which demonstrates
+that we used to write out-of-bounds data into the formatted message.
+
+Reported-by: Markus Vervier <markus.vervier@x41-dsec.de>
+Original-patch-by: Markus Vervier <markus.vervier@x41-dsec.de>
+Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
+Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/git/git/commit/f6e0b9f38987ad5e47bab551f8760b70689a5905]
+CVE: CVE-2022-41903
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ pretty.c                      | 2 +-
+ t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh | 6 ++++++
+ 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/pretty.c b/pretty.c
+index 4348a82..c49e818 100644
+--- a/pretty.c
++++ b/pretty.c
+@@ -1024,7 +1024,7 @@ static size_t parse_padding_placeholder(const char *placeholder,
+ 		const char *end = start + strcspn(start, ",)");
+ 		char *next;
+ 		int width;
+-		if (!end || end == start)
++		if (!*end || end == start)
+ 			return 0;
+ 		width = strtol(start, &next, 10);
+ 		if (next == start || width == 0)
+diff --git a/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh b/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh
+index e69caba..8a349df 100755
+--- a/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh
++++ b/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh
+@@ -794,6 +794,12 @@ test_expect_success 'log --pretty with space stealing' '
+ 	test_cmp expect actual
+ '
+ 
++test_expect_success 'log --pretty with invalid padding format' '
++	printf "%s%%<(20" "$(git rev-parse HEAD)" >expect &&
++	git log -1 --pretty="format:%H%<(20" >actual &&
++	test_cmp expect actual
++'
++
+ test_expect_success EXPENSIVE,SIZE_T_IS_64BIT 'log --pretty with huge commit message' '
+ 	# We only assert that this command does not crash. This needs to be
+ 	# executed with the address sanitizer to demonstrate failure.
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2022-41903-05.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+From 1de69c0cdd388b0a5b7bdde0bfa0bda514a354b0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
+Date: Thu, 1 Dec 2022 15:46:39 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 05/12] pretty: fix adding linefeed when placeholder is not expanded
+
+When a formatting directive has a `+` or ` ` after the `%`, then we add
+either a line feed or space if the placeholder expands to a non-empty
+string. In specific cases though this logic doesn't work as expected,
+and we try to add the character even in the case where the formatting
+directive is empty.
+
+One such pattern is `%w(1)%+d%+w(2)`. `%+d` expands to reference names
+pointing to a certain commit, like in `git log --decorate`. For a tagged
+commit this would for example expand to `\n (tag: v1.0.0)`, which has a
+leading newline due to the `+` modifier and a space added by `%d`. Now
+the second wrapping directive will cause us to rewrap the text to
+`\n(tag:\nv1.0.0)`, which is one byte shorter due to the missing leading
+space. The code that handles the `+` magic now notices that the length
+has changed and will thus try to insert a leading line feed at the
+original posititon. But as the string was shortened, the original
+position is past the buffer's boundary and thus we die with an error.
+
+Now there are two issues here:
+
+    1. We check whether the buffer length has changed, not whether it
+       has been extended. This causes us to try and add the character
+       past the string boundary.
+
+    2. The current logic does not make any sense whatsoever. When the
+       string got expanded due to the rewrap, putting the separator into
+       the original position is likely to put it somewhere into the
+       middle of the rewrapped contents.
+
+It is debatable whether `%+w()` makes any sense in the first place.
+Strictly speaking, the placeholder never expands to a non-empty string,
+and consequentially we shouldn't ever accept this combination. We thus
+fix the bug by simply refusing `%+w()`.
+
+Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
+Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/git/git/commit/1de69c0cdd388b0a5b7bdde0bfa0bda514a354b0]
+CVE: CVE-2022-41903
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ pretty.c                      | 14 +++++++++++++-
+ t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh |  8 ++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/pretty.c b/pretty.c
+index c49e818..195d005 100644
+--- a/pretty.c
++++ b/pretty.c
+@@ -1551,9 +1551,21 @@ static size_t format_commit_item(struct strbuf *sb, /* in UTF-8 */
+ 	default:
+ 		break;
+ 	}
+-	if (magic != NO_MAGIC)
++	if (magic != NO_MAGIC) {
+ 		placeholder++;
+ 
++		switch (placeholder[0]) {
++		case 'w':
++			/*
++			 * `%+w()` cannot ever expand to a non-empty string,
++			 * and it potentially changes the layout of preceding
++			 * contents. We're thus not able to handle the magic in
++			 * this combination and refuse the pattern.
++			 */
++			return 0;
++		};
++	}
++
+ 	orig_len = sb->len;
+ 	if (((struct format_commit_context *)context)->flush_type != no_flush)
+ 		consumed = format_and_pad_commit(sb, placeholder, context);
+diff --git a/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh b/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh
+index 8a349df..fa1bc2b 100755
+--- a/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh
++++ b/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh
+@@ -800,6 +800,14 @@ test_expect_success 'log --pretty with invalid padding format' '
+ 	test_cmp expect actual
+ '
+ 
++test_expect_success 'log --pretty with magical wrapping directives' '
++	commit_id=$(git commit-tree HEAD^{tree} -m "describe me") &&
++	git tag describe-me $commit_id &&
++	printf "\n(tag:\ndescribe-me)%%+w(2)" >expect &&
++	git log -1 --pretty="format:%w(1)%+d%+w(2)" $commit_id >actual &&
++	test_cmp expect actual
++'
++
+ test_expect_success EXPENSIVE,SIZE_T_IS_64BIT 'log --pretty with huge commit message' '
+ 	# We only assert that this command does not crash. This needs to be
+ 	# executed with the address sanitizer to demonstrate failure.
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2022-41903-06.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+From 48050c42c73c28b0c001d63d11dffac7e116847b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
+Date: Thu, 1 Dec 2022 15:46:49 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 06/12] pretty: fix integer overflow in wrapping format
+
+The `%w(width,indent1,indent2)` formatting directive can be used to
+rewrap text to a specific width and is designed after git-shortlog(1)'s
+`-w` parameter. While the three parameters are all stored as `size_t`
+internally, `strbuf_add_wrapped_text()` accepts integers as input. As a
+result, the casted integers may overflow. As these now-negative integers
+are later on passed to `strbuf_addchars()`, we will ultimately run into
+implementation-defined behaviour due to casting a negative number back
+to `size_t` again. On my platform, this results in trying to allocate
+9000 petabyte of memory.
+
+Fix this overflow by using `cast_size_t_to_int()` so that we reject
+inputs that cannot be represented as an integer.
+
+Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
+Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/git/git/commit/48050c42c73c28b0c001d63d11dffac7e116847b]
+CVE: CVE-2022-41903
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ git-compat-util.h             |  8 ++++++++
+ pretty.c                      |  4 +++-
+ t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh | 12 ++++++++++++
+ 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/git-compat-util.h b/git-compat-util.h
+index a1ecfd3..b0f3890 100644
+--- a/git-compat-util.h
++++ b/git-compat-util.h
+@@ -854,6 +854,14 @@ static inline size_t st_sub(size_t a, size_t b)
+ 	return a - b;
+ }
+ 
++static inline int cast_size_t_to_int(size_t a)
++{
++	if (a > INT_MAX)
++		die("number too large to represent as int on this platform: %"PRIuMAX,
++		    (uintmax_t)a);
++	return (int)a;
++}
++
+ #ifdef HAVE_ALLOCA_H
+ # include <alloca.h>
+ # define xalloca(size)      (alloca(size))
+diff --git a/pretty.c b/pretty.c
+index 195d005..ff9fc97 100644
+--- a/pretty.c
++++ b/pretty.c
+@@ -898,7 +898,9 @@ static void strbuf_wrap(struct strbuf *sb, size_t pos,
+ 	if (pos)
+ 		strbuf_add(&tmp, sb->buf, pos);
+ 	strbuf_add_wrapped_text(&tmp, sb->buf + pos,
+-				(int) indent1, (int) indent2, (int) width);
++				cast_size_t_to_int(indent1),
++				cast_size_t_to_int(indent2),
++				cast_size_t_to_int(width));
+ 	strbuf_swap(&tmp, sb);
+ 	strbuf_release(&tmp);
+ }
+diff --git a/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh b/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh
+index fa1bc2b..23ac508 100755
+--- a/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh
++++ b/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh
+@@ -808,6 +808,18 @@ test_expect_success 'log --pretty with magical wrapping directives' '
+ 	test_cmp expect actual
+ '
+ 
++test_expect_success SIZE_T_IS_64BIT 'log --pretty with overflowing wrapping directive' '
++	cat >expect <<-EOF &&
++	fatal: number too large to represent as int on this platform: 2147483649
++	EOF
++	test_must_fail git log -1 --pretty="format:%w(2147483649,1,1)%d" 2>error &&
++	test_cmp expect error &&
++	test_must_fail git log -1 --pretty="format:%w(1,2147483649,1)%d" 2>error &&
++	test_cmp expect error &&
++	test_must_fail git log -1 --pretty="format:%w(1,1,2147483649)%d" 2>error &&
++	test_cmp expect error
++'
++
+ test_expect_success EXPENSIVE,SIZE_T_IS_64BIT 'log --pretty with huge commit message' '
+ 	# We only assert that this command does not crash. This needs to be
+ 	# executed with the address sanitizer to demonstrate failure.
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2022-41903-07.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+From 522cc87fdc25449222a5894a428eebf4b8d5eaa9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
+Date: Thu, 1 Dec 2022 15:46:53 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 07/12] utf8: fix truncated string lengths in utf8_strnwidth()
+
+The `utf8_strnwidth()` function accepts an optional string length as
+input parameter. This parameter can either be set to `-1`, in which case
+we call `strlen()` on the input. Or it can be set to a positive integer
+that indicates a precomputed length, which callers typically compute by
+calling `strlen()` at some point themselves.
+
+The input parameter is an `int` though, whereas `strlen()` returns a
+`size_t`. This can lead to implementation-defined behaviour though when
+the `size_t` cannot be represented by the `int`. In the general case
+though this leads to wrap-around and thus to negative string sizes,
+which is sure enough to not lead to well-defined behaviour.
+
+Fix this by accepting a `size_t` instead of an `int` as string length.
+While this takes away the ability of callers to simply pass in `-1` as
+string length, it really is trivial enough to convert them to instead
+pass in `strlen()` instead.
+
+Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
+Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/git/git/commit/522cc87fdc25449222a5894a428eebf4b8d5eaa9]
+CVE: CVE-2022-41903
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ column.c | 2 +-
+ pretty.c | 4 ++--
+ utf8.c   | 8 +++-----
+ utf8.h   | 2 +-
+ 4 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/column.c b/column.c
+index 4a38eed..0c79850 100644
+--- a/column.c
++++ b/column.c
+@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ struct column_data {
+ /* return length of 's' in letters, ANSI escapes stripped */
+ static int item_length(const char *s)
+ {
+-	return utf8_strnwidth(s, -1, 1);
++	return utf8_strnwidth(s, strlen(s), 1);
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+diff --git a/pretty.c b/pretty.c
+index ff9fc97..c3c1443 100644
+--- a/pretty.c
++++ b/pretty.c
+@@ -1437,7 +1437,7 @@ static size_t format_and_pad_commit(struct strbuf *sb, /* in UTF-8 */
+ 		int occupied;
+ 		if (!start)
+ 			start = sb->buf;
+-		occupied = utf8_strnwidth(start, -1, 1);
++		occupied = utf8_strnwidth(start, strlen(start), 1);
+ 		occupied += c->pretty_ctx->graph_width;
+ 		padding = (-padding) - occupied;
+ 	}
+@@ -1455,7 +1455,7 @@ static size_t format_and_pad_commit(struct strbuf *sb, /* in UTF-8 */
+ 		placeholder++;
+ 		total_consumed++;
+ 	}
+-	len = utf8_strnwidth(local_sb.buf, -1, 1);
++	len = utf8_strnwidth(local_sb.buf, local_sb.len, 1);
+ 
+ 	if (c->flush_type == flush_left_and_steal) {
+ 		const char *ch = sb->buf + sb->len - 1;
+diff --git a/utf8.c b/utf8.c
+index 5c8f151..a66984b 100644
+--- a/utf8.c
++++ b/utf8.c
+@@ -206,13 +206,11 @@ int utf8_width(const char **start, size_t *remainder_p)
+  * string, assuming that the string is utf8.  Returns strlen() instead
+  * if the string does not look like a valid utf8 string.
+  */
+-int utf8_strnwidth(const char *string, int len, int skip_ansi)
++int utf8_strnwidth(const char *string, size_t len, int skip_ansi)
+ {
+ 	int width = 0;
+ 	const char *orig = string;
+ 
+-	if (len == -1)
+-		len = strlen(string);
+ 	while (string && string < orig + len) {
+ 		int skip;
+ 		while (skip_ansi &&
+@@ -225,7 +223,7 @@ int utf8_strnwidth(const char *string, int len, int skip_ansi)
+ 
+ int utf8_strwidth(const char *string)
+ {
+-	return utf8_strnwidth(string, -1, 0);
++	return utf8_strnwidth(string, strlen(string), 0);
+ }
+ 
+ int is_utf8(const char *text)
+@@ -792,7 +790,7 @@ int skip_utf8_bom(char **text, size_t len)
+ void strbuf_utf8_align(struct strbuf *buf, align_type position, unsigned int width,
+ 		       const char *s)
+ {
+-	int slen = strlen(s);
++	size_t slen = strlen(s);
+ 	int display_len = utf8_strnwidth(s, slen, 0);
+ 	int utf8_compensation = slen - display_len;
+ 
+diff --git a/utf8.h b/utf8.h
+index fcd5167..6da1b6d 100644
+--- a/utf8.h
++++ b/utf8.h
+@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ typedef unsigned int ucs_char_t;  /* assuming 32bit int */
+ 
+ size_t display_mode_esc_sequence_len(const char *s);
+ int utf8_width(const char **start, size_t *remainder_p);
+-int utf8_strnwidth(const char *string, int len, int skip_ansi);
++int utf8_strnwidth(const char *string, size_t len, int skip_ansi);
+ int utf8_strwidth(const char *string);
+ int is_utf8(const char *text);
+ int is_encoding_utf8(const char *name);
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2022-41903-08.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+From 17d23e8a3812a5ca3dd6564e74d5250f22e5d76d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
+Date: Thu, 1 Dec 2022 15:47:00 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 08/12] utf8: fix returning negative string width
+
+The `utf8_strnwidth()` function calls `utf8_width()` in a loop and adds
+its returned width to the end result. `utf8_width()` can return `-1`
+though in case it reads a control character, which means that the
+computed string width is going to be wrong. In the worst case where
+there are more control characters than non-control characters, we may
+even return a negative string width.
+
+Fix this bug by treating control characters as having zero width.
+
+Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
+Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/git/git/commit/17d23e8a3812a5ca3dd6564e74d5250f22e5d76d]
+CVE: CVE-2022-41903
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh | 6 ++++++
+ utf8.c                        | 8 ++++++--
+ 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh b/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh
+index 23ac508..261a6f0 100755
+--- a/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh
++++ b/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh
+@@ -820,6 +820,12 @@ test_expect_success SIZE_T_IS_64BIT 'log --pretty with overflowing wrapping dire
+ 	test_cmp expect error
+ '
+ 
++test_expect_success 'log --pretty with padding and preceding control chars' '
++	printf "\20\20   0" >expect &&
++	git log -1 --pretty="format:%x10%x10%>|(4)%x30" >actual &&
++	test_cmp expect actual
++'
++
+ test_expect_success EXPENSIVE,SIZE_T_IS_64BIT 'log --pretty with huge commit message' '
+ 	# We only assert that this command does not crash. This needs to be
+ 	# executed with the address sanitizer to demonstrate failure.
+diff --git a/utf8.c b/utf8.c
+index a66984b..6632bd2 100644
+--- a/utf8.c
++++ b/utf8.c
+@@ -212,11 +212,15 @@ int utf8_strnwidth(const char *string, size_t len, int skip_ansi)
+ 	const char *orig = string;
+ 
+ 	while (string && string < orig + len) {
+-		int skip;
++		int glyph_width, skip;
++
+ 		while (skip_ansi &&
+ 		       (skip = display_mode_esc_sequence_len(string)) != 0)
+ 			string += skip;
+-		width += utf8_width(&string, NULL);
++
++		glyph_width = utf8_width(&string, NULL);
++		if (glyph_width > 0)
++			width += glyph_width;
+ 	}
+ 	return string ? width : len;
+ }
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2022-41903-09.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
+From 937b71cc8b5b998963a7f9a33312ba3549d55510 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
+Date: Thu, 1 Dec 2022 15:47:04 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 09/12] utf8: fix overflow when returning string width
+
+The return type of both `utf8_strwidth()` and `utf8_strnwidth()` is
+`int`, but we operate on string lengths which are typically of type
+`size_t`. This means that when the string is longer than `INT_MAX`, we
+will overflow and thus return a negative result.
+
+This can lead to an out-of-bounds write with `--pretty=format:%<1)%B`
+and a commit message that is 2^31+1 bytes long:
+
+    =================================================================
+    ==26009==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x603000001168 at pc 0x7f95c4e5f427 bp 0x7ffd8541c900 sp 0x7ffd8541c0a8
+    WRITE of size 2147483649 at 0x603000001168 thread T0
+        #0 0x7f95c4e5f426 in __interceptor_memcpy /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:827
+        #1 0x5612bbb1068c in format_and_pad_commit pretty.c:1763
+        #2 0x5612bbb1087a in format_commit_item pretty.c:1801
+        #3 0x5612bbc33bab in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:429
+        #4 0x5612bbb110e7 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869
+        #5 0x5612bbb12d96 in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161
+        #6 0x5612bba0a4d5 in show_log log-tree.c:781
+        #7 0x5612bba0d6c7 in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117
+        #8 0x5612bb691ed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508
+        #9 0x5612bb69235b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549
+        #10 0x5612bb6951a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883
+        #11 0x5612bb56c993 in run_builtin git.c:466
+        #12 0x5612bb56d397 in handle_builtin git.c:721
+        #13 0x5612bb56db07 in run_argv git.c:788
+        #14 0x5612bb56e8a7 in cmd_main git.c:923
+        #15 0x5612bb803682 in main common-main.c:57
+        #16 0x7f95c4c3c28f  (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f)
+        #17 0x7f95c4c3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349)
+        #18 0x5612bb5680e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115
+
+    0x603000001168 is located 0 bytes to the right of 24-byte region [0x603000001150,0x603000001168)
+    allocated by thread T0 here:
+        #0 0x7f95c4ebe7ea in __interceptor_realloc /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:85
+        #1 0x5612bbcdd556 in xrealloc wrapper.c:136
+        #2 0x5612bbc310a3 in strbuf_grow strbuf.c:99
+        #3 0x5612bbc32acd in strbuf_add strbuf.c:298
+        #4 0x5612bbc33aec in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:418
+        #5 0x5612bbb110e7 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869
+        #6 0x5612bbb12d96 in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161
+        #7 0x5612bba0a4d5 in show_log log-tree.c:781
+        #8 0x5612bba0d6c7 in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117
+        #9 0x5612bb691ed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508
+        #10 0x5612bb69235b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549
+        #11 0x5612bb6951a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883
+        #12 0x5612bb56c993 in run_builtin git.c:466
+        #13 0x5612bb56d397 in handle_builtin git.c:721
+        #14 0x5612bb56db07 in run_argv git.c:788
+        #15 0x5612bb56e8a7 in cmd_main git.c:923
+        #16 0x5612bb803682 in main common-main.c:57
+        #17 0x7f95c4c3c28f  (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f)
+
+    SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:827 in __interceptor_memcpy
+    Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
+      0x0c067fff81d0: fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa
+      0x0c067fff81e0: fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd
+      0x0c067fff81f0: fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa
+      0x0c067fff8200: fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa 00 00 00 fa
+      0x0c067fff8210: fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd
+    =>0x0c067fff8220: fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa 00 00 00[fa]fa fa
+      0x0c067fff8230: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
+      0x0c067fff8240: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
+      0x0c067fff8250: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
+      0x0c067fff8260: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
+      0x0c067fff8270: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
+    Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
+      Addressable:           00
+      Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
+      Heap left redzone:       fa
+      Freed heap region:       fd
+      Stack left redzone:      f1
+      Stack mid redzone:       f2
+      Stack right redzone:     f3
+      Stack after return:      f5
+      Stack use after scope:   f8
+      Global redzone:          f9
+      Global init order:       f6
+      Poisoned by user:        f7
+      Container overflow:      fc
+      Array cookie:            ac
+      Intra object redzone:    bb
+      ASan internal:           fe
+      Left alloca redzone:     ca
+      Right alloca redzone:    cb
+    ==26009==ABORTING
+
+Now the proper fix for this would be to convert both functions to return
+an `size_t` instead of an `int`. But given that this commit may be part
+of a security release, let's instead do the minimal viable fix and die
+in case we see an overflow.
+
+Add a test that would have previously caused us to crash.
+
+Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
+Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/git/git/commit/937b71cc8b5b998963a7f9a33312ba3549d55510]
+CVE: CVE-2022-41903
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh |  8 ++++++++
+ utf8.c                        | 12 +++++++++---
+ 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh b/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh
+index 261a6f0..de15007 100755
+--- a/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh
++++ b/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh
+@@ -843,4 +843,12 @@ test_expect_success EXPENSIVE,SIZE_T_IS_64BIT 'log --pretty with huge commit mes
+ 	test_cmp expect actual
+ '
+ 
++test_expect_success EXPENSIVE,SIZE_T_IS_64BIT 'log --pretty with huge commit message does not cause allocation failure' '
++	test_must_fail git log -1 --format="%<(1)%B" $huge_commit 2>error &&
++	cat >expect <<-EOF &&
++	fatal: number too large to represent as int on this platform: 2147483649
++	EOF
++	test_cmp expect error
++'
++
+ test_done
+diff --git a/utf8.c b/utf8.c
+index 6632bd2..03be475 100644
+--- a/utf8.c
++++ b/utf8.c
+@@ -208,11 +208,12 @@ int utf8_width(const char **start, size_t *remainder_p)
+  */
+ int utf8_strnwidth(const char *string, size_t len, int skip_ansi)
+ {
+-	int width = 0;
+ 	const char *orig = string;
++	size_t width = 0;
+ 
+ 	while (string && string < orig + len) {
+-		int glyph_width, skip;
++		int glyph_width;
++		size_t skip;
+ 
+ 		while (skip_ansi &&
+ 		       (skip = display_mode_esc_sequence_len(string)) != 0)
+@@ -222,7 +223,12 @@ int utf8_strnwidth(const char *string, size_t len, int skip_ansi)
+ 		if (glyph_width > 0)
+ 			width += glyph_width;
+ 	}
+-	return string ? width : len;
++
++	/*
++	 * TODO: fix the interface of this function and `utf8_strwidth()` to
++	 * return `size_t` instead of `int`.
++	 */
++	return cast_size_t_to_int(string ? width : len);
+ }
+ 
+ int utf8_strwidth(const char *string)
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2022-41903-10.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+From 81c2d4c3a5ba0e6ab8c348708441fed170e63a82 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
+Date: Thu, 1 Dec 2022 15:47:10 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 10/12] utf8: fix checking for glyph width in strbuf_utf8_replace()
+
+In `strbuf_utf8_replace()`, we call `utf8_width()` to compute the width
+of the current glyph. If the glyph is a control character though it can
+be that `utf8_width()` returns `-1`, but because we assign this value to
+a `size_t` the conversion will cause us to underflow. This bug can
+easily be triggered with the following command:
+
+    $ git log --pretty='format:xxx%<|(1,trunc)%x10'
+
+>From all I can see though this seems to be a benign underflow that has
+no security-related consequences.
+
+Fix the bug by using an `int` instead. When we see a control character,
+we now copy it into the target buffer but don't advance the current
+width of the string.
+
+Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
+Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/git/git/commit/81c2d4c3a5ba0e6ab8c348708441fed170e63a82]
+CVE: CVE-2022-41903
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh |  7 +++++++
+ utf8.c                        | 19 ++++++++++++++-----
+ 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh b/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh
+index de15007..52c8bc8 100755
+--- a/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh
++++ b/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh
+@@ -826,6 +826,13 @@ test_expect_success 'log --pretty with padding and preceding control chars' '
+ 	test_cmp expect actual
+ '
+ 
++test_expect_success 'log --pretty truncation with control chars' '
++	test_commit "$(printf "\20\20\20\20xxxx")" file contents commit-with-control-chars &&
++	printf "\20\20\20\20x.." >expect &&
++	git log -1 --pretty="format:%<(3,trunc)%s" commit-with-control-chars >actual &&
++	test_cmp expect actual
++'
++
+ test_expect_success EXPENSIVE,SIZE_T_IS_64BIT 'log --pretty with huge commit message' '
+ 	# We only assert that this command does not crash. This needs to be
+ 	# executed with the address sanitizer to demonstrate failure.
+diff --git a/utf8.c b/utf8.c
+index 03be475..ec03e69 100644
+--- a/utf8.c
++++ b/utf8.c
+@@ -377,6 +377,7 @@ void strbuf_utf8_replace(struct strbuf *sb_src, int pos, int width,
+ 	dst = sb_dst.buf;
+ 
+ 	while (src < end) {
++		int glyph_width;
+ 		char *old;
+ 		size_t n;
+ 
+@@ -390,21 +391,29 @@ void strbuf_utf8_replace(struct strbuf *sb_src, int pos, int width,
+ 			break;
+ 
+ 		old = src;
+-		n = utf8_width((const char**)&src, NULL);
+-		if (!src) 	/* broken utf-8, do nothing */
++		glyph_width = utf8_width((const char**)&src, NULL);
++		if (!src) /* broken utf-8, do nothing */
+ 			goto out;
+-		if (n && w >= pos && w < pos + width) {
++
++		/*
++		 * In case we see a control character we copy it into the
++		 * buffer, but don't add it to the width.
++		 */
++		if (glyph_width < 0)
++			glyph_width = 0;
++
++		if (glyph_width && w >= pos && w < pos + width) {
+ 			if (subst) {
+ 				memcpy(dst, subst, subst_len);
+ 				dst += subst_len;
+ 				subst = NULL;
+ 			}
+-			w += n;
++			w += glyph_width;
+ 			continue;
+ 		}
+ 		memcpy(dst, old, src - old);
+ 		dst += src - old;
+-		w += n;
++		w += glyph_width;
+ 	}
+ 	strbuf_setlen(&sb_dst, dst - sb_dst.buf);
+ 	strbuf_swap(sb_src, &sb_dst);
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2022-41903-11.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+From f930a2394303b902e2973f4308f96529f736b8bc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
+Date: Thu, 1 Dec 2022 15:47:15 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 11/12] utf8: refactor strbuf_utf8_replace to not rely on preallocated buffer
+
+In `strbuf_utf8_replace`, we preallocate the destination buffer and then
+use `memcpy` to copy bytes into it at computed offsets. This feels
+rather fragile and is hard to understand at times. Refactor the code to
+instead use `strbuf_add` and `strbuf_addstr` so that we can be sure that
+there is no possibility to perform an out-of-bounds write.
+
+Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
+Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/git/git/commit/f930a2394303b902e2973f4308f96529f736b8bc]
+CVE: CVE-2022-41903
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ utf8.c | 34 +++++++++++++---------------------
+ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/utf8.c b/utf8.c
+index ec03e69..a13f5e3 100644
+--- a/utf8.c
++++ b/utf8.c
+@@ -365,26 +365,20 @@ void strbuf_add_wrapped_bytes(struct strbuf *buf, const char *data, int len,
+ void strbuf_utf8_replace(struct strbuf *sb_src, int pos, int width,
+ 			 const char *subst)
+ {
+-	struct strbuf sb_dst = STRBUF_INIT;
+-	char *src = sb_src->buf;
+-	char *end = src + sb_src->len;
+-	char *dst;
+-	int w = 0, subst_len = 0;
++	const char *src = sb_src->buf, *end = sb_src->buf + sb_src->len;
++	struct strbuf dst;
++	int w = 0;
+ 
+-	if (subst)
+-		subst_len = strlen(subst);
+-	strbuf_grow(&sb_dst, sb_src->len + subst_len);
+-	dst = sb_dst.buf;
++	strbuf_init(&dst, sb_src->len);
+ 
+ 	while (src < end) {
++		const char *old;
+ 		int glyph_width;
+-		char *old;
+ 		size_t n;
+ 
+ 		while ((n = display_mode_esc_sequence_len(src))) {
+-			memcpy(dst, src, n);
++			strbuf_add(&dst, src, n);
+ 			src += n;
+-			dst += n;
+ 		}
+ 
+ 		if (src >= end)
+@@ -404,21 +398,19 @@ void strbuf_utf8_replace(struct strbuf *sb_src, int pos, int width,
+ 
+ 		if (glyph_width && w >= pos && w < pos + width) {
+ 			if (subst) {
+-				memcpy(dst, subst, subst_len);
+-				dst += subst_len;
++				strbuf_addstr(&dst, subst);
+ 				subst = NULL;
+ 			}
+-			w += glyph_width;
+-			continue;
++		} else {
++			strbuf_add(&dst, old, src - old);
+ 		}
+-		memcpy(dst, old, src - old);
+-		dst += src - old;
++
+ 		w += glyph_width;
+ 	}
+-	strbuf_setlen(&sb_dst, dst - sb_dst.buf);
+-	strbuf_swap(sb_src, &sb_dst);
++
++	strbuf_swap(sb_src, &dst);
+ out:
+-	strbuf_release(&sb_dst);
++	strbuf_release(&dst);
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2022-41903-12.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+From 304a50adff6480ede46b68f7545baab542cbfb46 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
+Date: Thu, 1 Dec 2022 15:47:23 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 12/12] pretty: restrict input lengths for padding and wrapping formats
+
+Both the padding and wrapping formatting directives allow the caller to
+specify an integer that ultimately leads to us adding this many chars to
+the result buffer. As a consequence, it is trivial to e.g. allocate 2GB
+of RAM via a single formatting directive and cause resource exhaustion
+on the machine executing this logic. Furthermore, it is debatable
+whether there are any sane usecases that require the user to pad data to
+2GB boundaries or to indent wrapped data by 2GB.
+
+Restrict the input sizes to 16 kilobytes at a maximum to limit the
+amount of bytes that can be requested by the user. This is not meant
+as a fix because there are ways to trivially amplify the amount of
+data we generate via formatting directives; the real protection is
+achieved by the changes in previous steps to catch and avoid integer
+wraparound that causes us to under-allocate and access beyond the
+end of allocated memory reagions. But having such a limit
+significantly helps fuzzing the pretty format, because the fuzzer is
+otherwise quite fast to run out-of-memory as it discovers these
+formatters.
+
+Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
+Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/git/git/commit/304a50adff6480ede46b68f7545baab542cbfb46]
+CVE: CVE-2022-41903
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ pretty.c                      | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh | 24 +++++++++++++++---------
+ 2 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/pretty.c b/pretty.c
+index c3c1443..e9687f0 100644
+--- a/pretty.c
++++ b/pretty.c
+@@ -13,6 +13,13 @@
+ #include "gpg-interface.h"
+ #include "trailer.h"
+ 
++/*
++ * The limit for formatting directives, which enable the caller to append
++ * arbitrarily many bytes to the formatted buffer. This includes padding
++ * and wrapping formatters.
++ */
++#define FORMATTING_LIMIT (16 * 1024)
++
+ static char *user_format;
+ static struct cmt_fmt_map {
+ 	const char *name;
+@@ -1029,6 +1036,15 @@ static size_t parse_padding_placeholder(const char *placeholder,
+ 		if (!*end || end == start)
+ 			return 0;
+ 		width = strtol(start, &next, 10);
++
++		/*
++		 * We need to limit the amount of padding, or otherwise this
++		 * would allow the user to pad the buffer by arbitrarily many
++		 * bytes and thus cause resource exhaustion.
++		 */
++		if (width < -FORMATTING_LIMIT || width > FORMATTING_LIMIT)
++			return 0;
++
+ 		if (next == start || width == 0)
+ 			return 0;
+ 		if (width < 0) {
+@@ -1188,6 +1204,16 @@ static size_t format_commit_one(struct strbuf *sb, /* in UTF-8 */
+ 				if (*next != ')')
+ 					return 0;
+ 			}
++
++			/*
++			 * We need to limit the format here as it allows the
++			 * user to prepend arbitrarily many bytes to the buffer
++			 * when rewrapping.
++			 */
++			if (width > FORMATTING_LIMIT ||
++			    indent1 > FORMATTING_LIMIT ||
++			    indent2 > FORMATTING_LIMIT)
++				return 0;
+ 			rewrap_message_tail(sb, c, width, indent1, indent2);
+ 			return end - placeholder + 1;
+ 		} else
+diff --git a/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh b/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh
+index 52c8bc8..572d02f 100755
+--- a/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh
++++ b/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh
+@@ -809,15 +809,21 @@ test_expect_success 'log --pretty with magical wrapping directives' '
+ '
+ 
+ test_expect_success SIZE_T_IS_64BIT 'log --pretty with overflowing wrapping directive' '
+-	cat >expect <<-EOF &&
+-	fatal: number too large to represent as int on this platform: 2147483649
+-	EOF
+-	test_must_fail git log -1 --pretty="format:%w(2147483649,1,1)%d" 2>error &&
+-	test_cmp expect error &&
+-	test_must_fail git log -1 --pretty="format:%w(1,2147483649,1)%d" 2>error &&
+-	test_cmp expect error &&
+-	test_must_fail git log -1 --pretty="format:%w(1,1,2147483649)%d" 2>error &&
+-	test_cmp expect error
++	printf "%%w(2147483649,1,1)0" >expect &&
++	git log -1 --pretty="format:%w(2147483649,1,1)%x30" >actual &&
++	test_cmp expect actual &&
++	printf "%%w(1,2147483649,1)0" >expect &&
++	git log -1 --pretty="format:%w(1,2147483649,1)%x30" >actual &&
++	test_cmp expect actual &&
++	printf "%%w(1,1,2147483649)0" >expect &&
++	git log -1 --pretty="format:%w(1,1,2147483649)%x30" >actual &&
++	test_cmp expect actual
++'
++
++test_expect_success SIZE_T_IS_64BIT 'log --pretty with overflowing padding directive' '
++	printf "%%<(2147483649)0" >expect &&
++	git log -1 --pretty="format:%<(2147483649)%x30" >actual &&
++	test_cmp expect actual
+ '
+ 
+ test_expect_success 'log --pretty with padding and preceding control chars' '
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-devtools/git/git.inc

@@ -11,8 +11,20 @@ SRC_URI = "${KERNELORG_MIRROR}/software/scm/git/git-${PV}.tar.gz;name=tarball \
            ${KERNELORG_MIRROR}/software/scm/git/git-manpages-${PV}.tar.gz;name=manpages \
            file://fixsort.patch \
            file://CVE-2021-40330.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-23521.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-41903-01.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-41903-02.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-41903-03.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-41903-04.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-41903-05.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-41903-06.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-41903-07.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-41903-08.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-41903-09.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-41903-10.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-41903-11.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-41903-12.patch \
            "
-
 S = "${WORKDIR}/git-${PV}"
 
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=7c0d7ef03a7eb04ce795b0f60e68e7e1"
@@ -23,6 +35,8 @@ CVE_PRODUCT = "git-scm:git"
 # in mirrored git repos. Most OE users wouldn't build the docs and
 # we don't see this as a major issue for our general users/usecases.
 CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2022-24975"
+# This is specific to Git-for-Windows
+CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2022-41953"
 
 PACKAGECONFIG ??= ""
 PACKAGECONFIG[cvsserver] = ""

meta/recipes-devtools/go/go_1.14.bb

@@ -7,8 +7,8 @@ export CGO_ENABLED_riscv64 = ""
 # windows/mips/riscv doesn't support -buildmode=pie, so skip the QA checking
 # for windows/mips/riscv and their variants.
 python() {
-    if 'mips' in d.getVar('TARGET_ARCH',True) or 'riscv' in d.getVar('TARGET_ARCH',True) or 'windows' in d.getVar('TARGET_GOOS', True):
-        d.appendVar('INSANE_SKIP_%s' % d.getVar('PN',True), " textrel")
+    if 'mips' in d.getVar('TARGET_ARCH') or 'riscv' in d.getVar('TARGET_ARCH') or 'windows' in d.getVar('TARGET_GOOS'):
+        d.appendVar('INSANE_SKIP_%s' % d.getVar('PN'), " textrel")
     else:
         d.setVar('GOBUILDMODE', 'pie')
 }

meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu-system-native_4.2.0.bb

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ DEPENDS = "glib-2.0-native zlib-native pixman-native qemu-native bison-native"
 
 EXTRA_OECONF_append = " --target-list=${@get_qemu_system_target_list(d)}"
 
-PACKAGECONFIG ??= "fdt alsa kvm"
+PACKAGECONFIG ??= "fdt alsa kvm slirp"
 
 # Handle distros such as CentOS 5 32-bit that do not have kvm support
 PACKAGECONFIG_remove = "${@'kvm' if not os.path.exists('/usr/include/linux/kvm.h') else ''}"

meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc

@@ -115,6 +115,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.qemu.org/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.xz \
 	   file://CVE-2021-3638.patch \
 	   file://CVE-2021-20196.patch \
 	   file://CVE-2021-3507.patch \
+	   file://CVE-2021-3929.patch \
            "
 UPSTREAM_CHECK_REGEX = "qemu-(?P<pver>\d+(\.\d+)+)\.tar"
 
@@ -279,6 +280,8 @@ PACKAGECONFIG[capstone] = "--enable-capstone,--disable-capstone"
 PACKAGECONFIG[libnfs] = "--enable-libnfs,--disable-libnfs,libnfs"
 PACKAGECONFIG[brlapi] = "--enable-brlapi,--disable-brlapi"
 PACKAGECONFIG[vde] = "--enable-vde,--disable-vde"
+# version 4.2.0 doesn't have an "internal" option for enable-slirp, so use "git" which uses the same configure code path
+PACKAGECONFIG[slirp] = "--enable-slirp=git,--disable-slirp"
 PACKAGECONFIG[rbd] = "--enable-rbd,--disable-rbd"
 PACKAGECONFIG[rdma] = "--enable-rdma,--disable-rdma"
 

meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3929.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+From 736b01642d85be832385063f278fe7cd4ffb5221 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Klaus Jensen <k.jensen@samsung.com>
+Date: Fri, 17 Dec 2021 10:44:01 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] hw/nvme: fix CVE-2021-3929
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+This fixes CVE-2021-3929 "locally" by denying DMA to the iomem of the
+device itself. This still allows DMA to MMIO regions of other devices
+(e.g. doing P2P DMA to the controller memory buffer of another NVMe
+device).
+
+Fixes: CVE-2021-3929
+Reported-by: Qiuhao Li <Qiuhao.Li@outlook.com>
+Reviewed-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
+Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
+Signed-off-by: Klaus Jensen <k.jensen@samsung.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/736b01642d85be832385]
+CVE: CVE-2021-3929
+Signed-off-by: Vivek Kumbhar <vkumbhar@mvista.com>
+---
+ hw/block/nvme.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
+ hw/block/nvme.h |  1 +
+ 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/block/nvme.c b/hw/block/nvme.c
+index 12d82542..e7d0750c 100644
+--- a/hw/block/nvme.c
++++ b/hw/block/nvme.c
+@@ -52,8 +52,31 @@
+ 
+ static void nvme_process_sq(void *opaque);
+ 
++static inline bool nvme_addr_is_iomem(NvmeCtrl *n, hwaddr addr)
++{
++    hwaddr hi, lo;
++
++    /*
++     * The purpose of this check is to guard against invalid "local" access to
++     * the iomem (i.e. controller registers). Thus, we check against the range
++     * covered by the 'bar0' MemoryRegion since that is currently composed of
++     * two subregions (the NVMe "MBAR" and the MSI-X table/pba). Note, however,
++     * that if the device model is ever changed to allow the CMB to be located
++     * in BAR0 as well, then this must be changed.
++     */
++    lo = n->bar0.addr;
++    hi = lo + int128_get64(n->bar0.size);
++
++    return addr >= lo && addr < hi;
++}
++
+ static void nvme_addr_read(NvmeCtrl *n, hwaddr addr, void *buf, int size)
+ {
++
++    if (nvme_addr_is_iomem(n, addr)) {
++    	return NVME_DATA_TRAS_ERROR;
++    }
++
+     if (n->cmbsz && addr >= n->ctrl_mem.addr &&
+                 addr < (n->ctrl_mem.addr + int128_get64(n->ctrl_mem.size))) {
+         memcpy(buf, (void *)&n->cmbuf[addr - n->ctrl_mem.addr], size);
+diff --git a/hw/block/nvme.h b/hw/block/nvme.h
+index 557194ee..5a2b119c 100644
+--- a/hw/block/nvme.h
++++ b/hw/block/nvme.h
+@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ typedef struct NvmeNamespace {
+ 
+ typedef struct NvmeCtrl {
+     PCIDevice    parent_obj;
++    MemoryRegion bar0;
+     MemoryRegion iomem;
+     MemoryRegion ctrl_mem;
+     NvmeBar      bar;
+-- 
+2.30.2
+

meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu_4.2.0.bb

@@ -24,8 +24,8 @@ do_install_append_class-nativesdk() {
 }
 
 PACKAGECONFIG ??= " \
-    fdt sdl kvm \
+    fdt sdl kvm slirp \
     ${@bb.utils.filter('DISTRO_FEATURES', 'alsa xen', d)} \
     ${@bb.utils.filter('DISTRO_FEATURES', 'seccomp', d)} \
 "
-PACKAGECONFIG_class-nativesdk ??= "fdt sdl kvm"
+PACKAGECONFIG:class-nativesdk ??= "fdt sdl kvm slirp"

meta/recipes-devtools/quilt/quilt.inc

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${SAVANNAH_GNU_MIRROR}/quilt/quilt-${PV}.tar.gz \
         file://Makefile \
         file://test.sh \
         file://0001-tests-Allow-different-output-from-mv.patch \
+        file://faildiff-order.patch \
 "
 
 SRC_URI_append_class-target = " file://gnu_patch_test_fix_target.patch"

meta/recipes-devtools/quilt/quilt/faildiff-order.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com>
+
+From 4dfe7f9e702c85243a71e4de267a13e434b6d6c2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de>
+Date: Fri, 20 Jan 2023 12:56:08 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] test: Fix a race condition
+
+The test suite does not differentiate between stdout and stderr. When
+messages are printed to both, the order in which they will reach us
+is apparently not guaranteed. Ideally this would be deterministic, but
+until then, explicitly test stdout and stderr separately in the test
+case itself. Otherwise the test suite fails randomly, which is a pain
+for distribution package maintainers.
+
+This fixes bug #63651 reported by Ross Burton:
+https://savannah.nongnu.org/bugs/index.php?63651
+
+Signed-off-by: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de>
+---
+ test/faildiff.test | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/test/faildiff.test b/test/faildiff.test
+index 5afb8e3..0444c15 100644
+--- a/test/faildiff.test
++++ b/test/faildiff.test
+@@ -27,8 +27,9 @@ What happens on binary files?
+ 	> File test.bin added to patch %{P}test.diff
+ 
+ 	$ printf "\\003\\000\\001" > test.bin
+-	$ quilt diff -pab --no-index
++	$ quilt diff -pab --no-index 2>/dev/null
+ 	>~ (Files|Binary files) a/test\.bin and b/test\.bin differ
++	$ quilt diff -pab --no-index >/dev/null
+ 	> Diff failed on file 'test.bin', aborting
+ 	$ echo %{?}
+ 	> 1
+-- 
+2.34.1
+

meta/recipes-extended/shadow/shadow_4.8.1.bb

@@ -9,3 +9,7 @@ BBCLASSEXTEND = "native nativesdk"
 # Severity is low and marked as closed and won't fix.
 # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=884658
 CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2013-4235"
+
+# This is an issue for a different shadow
+CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2016-15024"
+

meta/recipes-extended/sudo/files/CVE-2023-22809.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+Backport of:
+
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  7275148cad1f8cd3c350026460acc4d6ad349c3a
+sudoedit: do not permit editor arguments to include "--"
+We use "--" to separate the editor and arguments from the files to edit.
+If the editor arguments include "--", sudo can be tricked into allowing
+the user to edit a file not permitted by the security policy.
+Thanks to Matthieu Barjole and Victor Cutillas of Synacktiv
+(https://synacktiv.com) for finding this bug.
+
+CVE: CVE-2023-22809
+Upstream-Staus: Backport [http://archive.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/pool/main/s/sudo/sudo_1.8.31-1ubuntu1.4.debian.tar.xz]
+Signed-off-by: Omkar Patil <omkar.patil@kpit.com>
+
+--- a/plugins/sudoers/editor.c
++++ b/plugins/sudoers/editor.c
+@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ resolve_editor(const char *ed, size_t ed
+     const char *cp, *ep, *tmp;
+     const char *edend = ed + edlen;
+     struct stat user_editor_sb;
+-    int nargc;
++    int nargc = 0;
+     debug_decl(resolve_editor, SUDOERS_DEBUG_UTIL)
+ 
+     /*
+@@ -102,6 +102,21 @@ resolve_editor(const char *ed, size_t ed
+ 	    free(editor_path);
+ 	    while (nargc--)
+ 		free(nargv[nargc]);
++	    free(nargv);
++	    debug_return_str(NULL);
++	}
++
++	/*
++	 * We use "--" to separate the editor and arguments from the files
++	 * to edit.  The editor arguments themselves may not contain "--".
++	 */
++	if (strcmp(nargv[nargc], "--") == 0) {
++	    sudo_warnx(U_("ignoring editor: %.*s"), (int)edlen, ed);
++	    sudo_warnx("%s", U_("editor arguments may not contain \"--\""));
++	    errno = EINVAL;
++	    free(editor_path);
++	    while (nargc--)
++		free(nargv[nargc]);
+ 	    free(nargv);
+ 	    debug_return_str(NULL);
+ 	}
+--- a/plugins/sudoers/sudoers.c
++++ b/plugins/sudoers/sudoers.c
+@@ -616,20 +616,31 @@ sudoers_policy_main(int argc, char * con
+ 
+     /* Note: must call audit before uid change. */
+     if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_EDIT)) {
++	const char *env_editor = NULL;
+ 	int edit_argc;
+-	const char *env_editor;
+ 
+ 	free(safe_cmnd);
+ 	safe_cmnd = find_editor(NewArgc - 1, NewArgv + 1, &edit_argc,
+ 	    &edit_argv, NULL, &env_editor, false);
+ 	if (safe_cmnd == NULL) {
+-	    if (errno != ENOENT)
++	    switch (errno) {
++	    case ENOENT:
++		audit_failure(NewArgc, NewArgv, N_("%s: command not found"),
++		    env_editor ? env_editor : def_editor);
++		sudo_warnx(U_("%s: command not found"),
++		    env_editor ? env_editor : def_editor);
++		goto bad;
++	    case EINVAL:
++		if (def_env_editor && env_editor != NULL) {
++		    /* User tried to do something funny with the editor. */
++		    log_warningx(SLOG_NO_STDERR|SLOG_SEND_MAIL,
++			"invalid user-specified editor: %s", env_editor);
++		    goto bad;
++		}
++		/* FALLTHROUGH */
++	    default:
+ 		goto done;
+-	    audit_failure(NewArgc, NewArgv, N_("%s: command not found"),
+-		env_editor ? env_editor : def_editor);
+-	    sudo_warnx(U_("%s: command not found"),
+-		env_editor ? env_editor : def_editor);
+-	    goto bad;
++	    }
+ 	}
+ 	if (audit_success(edit_argc, edit_argv) != 0 && !def_ignore_audit_errors)
+ 	    goto done;
+--- a/plugins/sudoers/visudo.c
++++ b/plugins/sudoers/visudo.c
+@@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ static char *
+ get_editor(int *editor_argc, char ***editor_argv)
+ {
+     char *editor_path = NULL, **whitelist = NULL;
+-    const char *env_editor;
++    const char *env_editor = NULL;
+     static char *files[] = { "+1", "sudoers" };
+     unsigned int whitelist_len = 0;
+     debug_decl(get_editor, SUDOERS_DEBUG_UTIL)
+@@ -342,7 +342,11 @@ get_editor(int *editor_argc, char ***edi
+     if (editor_path == NULL) {
+ 	if (def_env_editor && env_editor != NULL) {
+ 	    /* We are honoring $EDITOR so this is a fatal error. */
+-	    sudo_fatalx(U_("specified editor (%s) doesn't exist"), env_editor);
++	    if (errno == ENOENT) {
++		sudo_warnx(U_("specified editor (%s) doesn't exist"),
++		    env_editor);
++	    }
++	    exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ 	}
+ 	sudo_fatalx(U_("no editor found (editor path = %s)"), def_editor);
+     }

meta/recipes-extended/sudo/sudo_1.8.32.bb

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://www.sudo.ws/dist/sudo-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://0001-Include-sys-types.h-for-id_t-definition.patch \
            file://0001-Fix-includes-when-building-with-musl.patch \
            file://CVE-2022-43995.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-22809.patch \
            "
 
 PAM_SRC_URI = "file://sudo.pam"

meta/recipes-extended/tar/tar/CVE-2022-48303.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+From 3da78400eafcccb97e2f2fd4b227ea40d794ede8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sergey Poznyakoff <gray@gnu.org>
+Date: Sat, 11 Feb 2023 11:57:39 +0200
+Subject: Fix boundary checking in base-256 decoder
+
+* src/list.c (from_header): Base-256 encoding is at least 2 bytes
+long.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [see reference below]
+CVE: CVE-2022-48303
+
+Reference to upstream patch:
+https://savannah.gnu.org/bugs/?62387
+https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/tar.git/patch/src/list.c?id=3da78400eafcccb97e2f2fd4b227ea40d794ede8
+
+Signed-off-by: Rodolfo Quesada Zumbado <rodolfo.zumbado@windriver.com>
+Signed-off-by: Joe Slater <joe.slater@windriver.com>
+---
+ src/list.c | 5 +++--
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)Signed-off-by: Rodolfo Quesada Zumbado <rodolfo.zumbado@windriver.com>
+
+
+(limited to 'src/list.c')
+
+diff --git a/src/list.c b/src/list.c
+index 9fafc42..86bcfdd 100644
+--- a/src/list.c
++++ b/src/list.c
+@@ -881,8 +881,9 @@ from_header (char const *where0, size_t digs, char const *type,
+ 	  where++;
+ 	}
+     }
+-  else if (*where == '\200' /* positive base-256 */
+-	   || *where == '\377' /* negative base-256 */)
++  else if (where <= lim - 2
++	   && (*where == '\200' /* positive base-256 */
++	       || *where == '\377' /* negative base-256 */))
+     {
+       /* Parse base-256 output.  A nonnegative number N is
+ 	 represented as (256**DIGS)/2 + N; a negative number -N is
+-- 
+cgit v1.1
+

meta/recipes-extended/tar/tar_1.32.bb

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=d32239bcb673463ab874e80d47fae504"
 SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/tar/tar-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
            file://musl_dirent.patch \
            file://CVE-2021-20193.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-48303.patch \
 "
 
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "17917356fff5cb4bd3cd5a6c3e727b05"

meta/recipes-graphics/harfbuzz/harfbuzz/CVE-2023-25193-pre0.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,335 @@
+From 3122c2cdc45a964efedad8953a2df67205c3e3a8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Behdad Esfahbod <behdad@behdad.org>
+Date: Sat, 4 Dec 2021 19:50:33 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH] [buffer] Add HB_GLYPH_FLAG_UNSAFE_TO_CONCAT
+
+Fixes https://github.com/harfbuzz/harfbuzz/issues/1463
+Upstream-Status: Backport from [https://github.com/harfbuzz/harfbuzz/commit/3122c2cdc45a964efedad8953a2df67205c3e3a8]
+Comment1: To backport the fix for CVE-2023-25193, add defination for HB_GLYPH_FLAG_UNSAFE_TO_CONCAT. This patch is needed along with CVE-2023-25193-pre1.patch for sucessfull porting.
+Signed-off-by: Siddharth Doshi <sdoshi@mvista.com>
+---
+ src/hb-buffer.cc             | 10 ++---
+ src/hb-buffer.h              | 76 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
+ src/hb-buffer.hh             | 33 ++++++++++------
+ src/hb-ot-layout-gsubgpos.hh | 39 +++++++++++++++---
+ src/hb-ot-shape.cc           |  8 +---
+ 5 files changed, 124 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/hb-buffer.cc b/src/hb-buffer.cc
+index 6131c86..bba5eae 100644
+--- a/src/hb-buffer.cc
++++ b/src/hb-buffer.cc
+@@ -610,14 +610,14 @@ done:
+ }
+ 
+ void
+-hb_buffer_t::unsafe_to_break_impl (unsigned int start, unsigned int end)
++hb_buffer_t::unsafe_to_break_impl (unsigned int start, unsigned int end, hb_mask_t mask)
+ {
+   unsigned int cluster = (unsigned int) -1;
+   cluster = _unsafe_to_break_find_min_cluster (info, start, end, cluster);
+-  _unsafe_to_break_set_mask (info, start, end, cluster);
++  _unsafe_to_break_set_mask (info, start, end, cluster, mask);
+ }
+ void
+-hb_buffer_t::unsafe_to_break_from_outbuffer (unsigned int start, unsigned int end)
++hb_buffer_t::unsafe_to_break_from_outbuffer (unsigned int start, unsigned int end, hb_mask_t mask)
+ {
+   if (!have_output)
+   {
+@@ -631,8 +631,8 @@ hb_buffer_t::unsafe_to_break_from_outbuffer (unsigned int start, unsigned int en
+   unsigned int cluster = (unsigned int) -1;
+   cluster = _unsafe_to_break_find_min_cluster (out_info, start, out_len, cluster);
+   cluster = _unsafe_to_break_find_min_cluster (info, idx, end, cluster);
+-  _unsafe_to_break_set_mask (out_info, start, out_len, cluster);
+-  _unsafe_to_break_set_mask (info, idx, end, cluster);
++  _unsafe_to_break_set_mask (out_info, start, out_len, cluster, mask);
++  _unsafe_to_break_set_mask (info, idx, end, cluster, mask);
+ }
+ 
+ void
+diff --git a/src/hb-buffer.h b/src/hb-buffer.h
+index d5cb746..42dc92a 100644
+--- a/src/hb-buffer.h
++++ b/src/hb-buffer.h
+@@ -77,26 +77,76 @@ typedef struct hb_glyph_info_t
+  * @HB_GLYPH_FLAG_UNSAFE_TO_BREAK: Indicates that if input text is broken at the
+  * 				   beginning of the cluster this glyph is part of,
+  * 				   then both sides need to be re-shaped, as the
+- * 				   result might be different.  On the flip side,
+- * 				   it means that when this flag is not present,
+- * 				   then it's safe to break the glyph-run at the
+- * 				   beginning of this cluster, and the two sides
+- * 				   represent the exact same result one would get
+- * 				   if breaking input text at the beginning of
+- * 				   this cluster and shaping the two sides
+- * 				   separately.  This can be used to optimize
+- * 				   paragraph layout, by avoiding re-shaping
+- * 				   of each line after line-breaking, or limiting
+- * 				   the reshaping to a small piece around the
+- * 				   breaking point only.
++ * 				   result might be different.
++ *
++ * 				   On the flip side, it means that when this
++ * 				   flag is not present, then it is safe to break
++ * 				   the glyph-run at the beginning of this
++ * 				   cluster, and the two sides will represent the
++ * 				   exact same result one would get if breaking
++ * 				   input text at the beginning of this cluster
++ * 				   and shaping the two sides separately.
++ *
++ * 				   This can be used to optimize paragraph
++ * 				   layout, by avoiding re-shaping of each line
++ * 				   after line-breaking.
++ *
++ * @HB_GLYPH_FLAG_UNSAFE_TO_CONCAT: Indicates that if input text is changed on one
++ * 				   side of the beginning of the cluster this glyph
++ * 				   is part of, then the shaping results for the
++ * 				   other side might change.
++ *
++ * 				   Note that the absence of this flag will NOT by
++ * 				   itself mean that it IS safe to concat text.
++ * 				   Only two pieces of text both of which clear of
++ * 				   this flag can be concatenated safely.
++ *
++ * 				   This can be used to optimize paragraph
++ * 				   layout, by avoiding re-shaping of each line
++ * 				   after line-breaking, by limiting the
++ * 				   reshaping to a small piece around the
++ * 				   breaking positin only, even if the breaking
++ * 				   position carries the
++ * 				   #HB_GLYPH_FLAG_UNSAFE_TO_BREAK or when
++ * 				   hyphenation or other text transformation
++ * 				   happens at line-break position, in the following
++ * 				   way:
++ *
++ * 				   1. Iterate back from the line-break position till
++ * 				   the the first cluster start position that is
++ * 				   NOT unsafe-to-concat, 2. shape the segment from
++ * 				   there till the end of line, 3. check whether the
++ * 				   resulting glyph-run also is clear of the
++ * 				   unsafe-to-concat at its start-of-text position;
++ * 				   if it is, just splice it into place and the line
++ * 				   is shaped; If not, move on to a position further
++ * 				   back that is clear of unsafe-to-concat and retry
++ * 				   from there, and repeat.
++ *
++ * 				   At the start of next line a similar algorithm can
++ * 				   be implemented. A slight complication will arise,
++ * 				   because while our buffer API has a way to
++ * 				   return flags for position corresponding to
++ * 				   start-of-text, there is currently no position
++ * 				   corresponding to end-of-text.  This limitation
++ * 				   can be alleviated by shaping more text than needed
++ * 				   and looking for unsafe-to-concat flag within text
++ * 				   clusters.
++ *
++ * 				   The #HB_GLYPH_FLAG_UNSAFE_TO_BREAK flag will
++ * 				   always imply this flag.
++ *
++ * 				   Since: REPLACEME
++ *
+  * @HB_GLYPH_FLAG_DEFINED: All the currently defined flags.
+  *
+  * Since: 1.5.0
+  */
+ typedef enum { /*< flags >*/
+   HB_GLYPH_FLAG_UNSAFE_TO_BREAK		= 0x00000001,
++  HB_GLYPH_FLAG_UNSAFE_TO_CONCAT	= 0x00000002,
+ 
+-  HB_GLYPH_FLAG_DEFINED			= 0x00000001 /* OR of all defined flags */
++  HB_GLYPH_FLAG_DEFINED			= 0x00000003 /* OR of all defined flags */
+ } hb_glyph_flags_t;
+ 
+ HB_EXTERN hb_glyph_flags_t
+diff --git a/src/hb-buffer.hh b/src/hb-buffer.hh
+index b5596d9..beac7b6 100644
+--- a/src/hb-buffer.hh
++++ b/src/hb-buffer.hh
+@@ -67,8 +67,8 @@ enum hb_buffer_scratch_flags_t {
+   HB_BUFFER_SCRATCH_FLAG_HAS_DEFAULT_IGNORABLES		= 0x00000002u,
+   HB_BUFFER_SCRATCH_FLAG_HAS_SPACE_FALLBACK		= 0x00000004u,
+   HB_BUFFER_SCRATCH_FLAG_HAS_GPOS_ATTACHMENT		= 0x00000008u,
+-  HB_BUFFER_SCRATCH_FLAG_HAS_UNSAFE_TO_BREAK		= 0x00000010u,
+-  HB_BUFFER_SCRATCH_FLAG_HAS_CGJ			= 0x00000020u,
++  HB_BUFFER_SCRATCH_FLAG_HAS_CGJ			= 0x00000010u,
++  HB_BUFFER_SCRATCH_FLAG_HAS_GLYPH_FLAGS		= 0x00000020u,
+ 
+   /* Reserved for complex shapers' internal use. */
+   HB_BUFFER_SCRATCH_FLAG_COMPLEX0			= 0x01000000u,
+@@ -324,8 +324,19 @@ struct hb_buffer_t
+       return;
+     unsafe_to_break_impl (start, end);
+   }
+-  HB_INTERNAL void unsafe_to_break_impl (unsigned int start, unsigned int end);
+-  HB_INTERNAL void unsafe_to_break_from_outbuffer (unsigned int start, unsigned int end);
++  void unsafe_to_concat (unsigned int start,
++			 unsigned int end)
++  {
++    if (end - start < 2)
++      return;
++    unsafe_to_break_impl (start, end, HB_GLYPH_FLAG_UNSAFE_TO_CONCAT);
++  }
++  HB_INTERNAL void unsafe_to_break_impl (unsigned int start, unsigned int end,
++					 hb_mask_t mask = HB_GLYPH_FLAG_UNSAFE_TO_BREAK | HB_GLYPH_FLAG_UNSAFE_TO_CONCAT);
++  HB_INTERNAL void unsafe_to_break_from_outbuffer (unsigned int start, unsigned int end,
++						   hb_mask_t mask = HB_GLYPH_FLAG_UNSAFE_TO_BREAK | HB_GLYPH_FLAG_UNSAFE_TO_CONCAT);
++  void unsafe_to_concat_from_outbuffer (unsigned int start, unsigned int end)
++  { unsafe_to_break_from_outbuffer (start, end, HB_GLYPH_FLAG_UNSAFE_TO_CONCAT); }
+ 
+ 
+   /* Internal methods */
+@@ -377,12 +388,7 @@ struct hb_buffer_t
+   set_cluster (hb_glyph_info_t &inf, unsigned int cluster, unsigned int mask = 0)
+   {
+     if (inf.cluster != cluster)
+-    {
+-      if (mask & HB_GLYPH_FLAG_UNSAFE_TO_BREAK)
+-	inf.mask |= HB_GLYPH_FLAG_UNSAFE_TO_BREAK;
+-      else
+-	inf.mask &= ~HB_GLYPH_FLAG_UNSAFE_TO_BREAK;
+-    }
++      inf.mask = (inf.mask & ~HB_GLYPH_FLAG_DEFINED) | (mask & HB_GLYPH_FLAG_DEFINED);
+     inf.cluster = cluster;
+   }
+ 
+@@ -398,13 +404,14 @@ struct hb_buffer_t
+   void
+   _unsafe_to_break_set_mask (hb_glyph_info_t *infos,
+ 			     unsigned int start, unsigned int end,
+-			     unsigned int cluster)
++			     unsigned int cluster,
++			     hb_mask_t mask)
+   {
+     for (unsigned int i = start; i < end; i++)
+       if (cluster != infos[i].cluster)
+       {
+-	scratch_flags |= HB_BUFFER_SCRATCH_FLAG_HAS_UNSAFE_TO_BREAK;
+-	infos[i].mask |= HB_GLYPH_FLAG_UNSAFE_TO_BREAK;
++	scratch_flags |= HB_BUFFER_SCRATCH_FLAG_HAS_GLYPH_FLAGS;
++	infos[i].mask |= mask;
+       }
+   }
+ 
+diff --git a/src/hb-ot-layout-gsubgpos.hh b/src/hb-ot-layout-gsubgpos.hh
+index 579d178..a6ca456 100644
+--- a/src/hb-ot-layout-gsubgpos.hh
++++ b/src/hb-ot-layout-gsubgpos.hh
+@@ -369,7 +369,7 @@ struct hb_ot_apply_context_t :
+     may_skip (const hb_glyph_info_t &info) const
+     { return matcher.may_skip (c, info); }
+ 
+-    bool next ()
++    bool next (unsigned *unsafe_to = nullptr)
+     {
+       assert (num_items > 0);
+       while (idx + num_items < end)
+@@ -392,11 +392,17 @@ struct hb_ot_apply_context_t :
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if (skip == matcher_t::SKIP_NO)
++	{
++	  if (unsafe_to)
++	    *unsafe_to = idx + 1;
+ 	  return false;
++	}
+       }
++      if (unsafe_to)
++        *unsafe_to = end;
+       return false;
+     }
+-    bool prev ()
++    bool prev (unsigned *unsafe_from = nullptr)
+     {
+       assert (num_items > 0);
+       while (idx > num_items - 1)
+@@ -419,8 +425,14 @@ struct hb_ot_apply_context_t :
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if (skip == matcher_t::SKIP_NO)
++	{
++	  if (unsafe_from)
++	    *unsafe_from = hb_max (1u, idx) - 1u;
+ 	  return false;
++	}
+       }
++      if (unsafe_from)
++        *unsafe_from = 0;
+       return false;
+     }
+ 
+@@ -834,7 +846,12 @@ static inline bool match_input (hb_ot_apply_context_t *c,
+   match_positions[0] = buffer->idx;
+   for (unsigned int i = 1; i < count; i++)
+   {
+-    if (!skippy_iter.next ()) return_trace (false);
++    unsigned unsafe_to;
++    if (!skippy_iter.next (&unsafe_to))
++    {
++      c->buffer->unsafe_to_concat (c->buffer->idx, unsafe_to);
++      return_trace (false);
++    }
+ 
+     match_positions[i] = skippy_iter.idx;
+ 
+@@ -1022,8 +1039,14 @@ static inline bool match_backtrack (hb_ot_apply_context_t *c,
+   skippy_iter.set_match_func (match_func, match_data, backtrack);
+ 
+   for (unsigned int i = 0; i < count; i++)
+-    if (!skippy_iter.prev ())
++  {
++    unsigned unsafe_from;
++    if (!skippy_iter.prev (&unsafe_from))
++    {
++      c->buffer->unsafe_to_concat_from_outbuffer (unsafe_from, c->buffer->idx);
+       return_trace (false);
++    }
++  }
+ 
+   *match_start = skippy_iter.idx;
+ 
+@@ -1045,8 +1068,14 @@ static inline bool match_lookahead (hb_ot_apply_context_t *c,
+   skippy_iter.set_match_func (match_func, match_data, lookahead);
+ 
+   for (unsigned int i = 0; i < count; i++)
+-    if (!skippy_iter.next ())
++  {
++    unsigned unsafe_to;
++    if (!skippy_iter.next (&unsafe_to))
++    {
++      c->buffer->unsafe_to_concat (c->buffer->idx + offset, unsafe_to);
+       return_trace (false);
++    }
++  }
+ 
+   *end_index = skippy_iter.idx + 1;
+ 
+diff --git a/src/hb-ot-shape.cc b/src/hb-ot-shape.cc
+index 5d9a70c..5d10b30 100644
+--- a/src/hb-ot-shape.cc
++++ b/src/hb-ot-shape.cc
+@@ -1008,7 +1008,7 @@ hb_propagate_flags (hb_buffer_t *buffer)
+   /* Propagate cluster-level glyph flags to be the same on all cluster glyphs.
+    * Simplifies using them. */
+ 
+-  if (!(buffer->scratch_flags & HB_BUFFER_SCRATCH_FLAG_HAS_UNSAFE_TO_BREAK))
++  if (!(buffer->scratch_flags & HB_BUFFER_SCRATCH_FLAG_HAS_GLYPH_FLAGS))
+     return;
+ 
+   hb_glyph_info_t *info = buffer->info;
+@@ -1017,11 +1017,7 @@ hb_propagate_flags (hb_buffer_t *buffer)
+   {
+     unsigned int mask = 0;
+     for (unsigned int i = start; i < end; i++)
+-      if (info[i].mask & HB_GLYPH_FLAG_UNSAFE_TO_BREAK)
+-      {
+-	 mask = HB_GLYPH_FLAG_UNSAFE_TO_BREAK;
+-	 break;
+-      }
++      mask |= info[i].mask & HB_GLYPH_FLAG_DEFINED;
+     if (mask)
+       for (unsigned int i = start; i < end; i++)
+ 	info[i].mask |= mask;
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-graphics/harfbuzz/harfbuzz/CVE-2023-25193-pre1.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+From b29fbd16fa82b82bdf0dcb2f13a63f7dc23cf324 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Behdad Esfahbod <behdad@behdad.org>
+Date: Mon, 6 Feb 2023 13:08:52 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] [gsubgpos] Refactor skippy_iter.match()
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport from [https://github.com/harfbuzz/harfbuzz/commit/b29fbd16fa82b82bdf0dcb2f13a63f7dc23cf324]
+Comment1: To backport the fix for CVE-2023-25193, add defination for MATCH, NOT_MATCH and SKIP.
+Signed-off-by: Siddharth Doshi <sdoshi@mvista.com>
+---
+ src/hb-ot-layout-gsubgpos.hh | 94 +++++++++++++++++++++---------------
+ 1 file changed, 54 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/hb-ot-layout-gsubgpos.hh b/src/hb-ot-layout-gsubgpos.hh
+index a6ca456..5a7e564 100644
+--- a/src/hb-ot-layout-gsubgpos.hh
++++ b/src/hb-ot-layout-gsubgpos.hh
+@@ -369,33 +369,52 @@ struct hb_ot_apply_context_t :
+     may_skip (const hb_glyph_info_t &info) const
+     { return matcher.may_skip (c, info); }
+ 
++    enum match_t {
++      MATCH,
++      NOT_MATCH,
++      SKIP
++    };
++
++    match_t match (hb_glyph_info_t &info)
++    {
++      matcher_t::may_skip_t skip = matcher.may_skip (c, info);
++      if (unlikely (skip == matcher_t::SKIP_YES))
++	return SKIP;
++
++      matcher_t::may_match_t match = matcher.may_match (info, match_glyph_data);
++      if (match == matcher_t::MATCH_YES ||
++	  (match == matcher_t::MATCH_MAYBE &&
++	   skip == matcher_t::SKIP_NO))
++	return MATCH;
++
++      if (skip == matcher_t::SKIP_NO)
++        return NOT_MATCH;
++
++      return SKIP;
++  }
++
+     bool next (unsigned *unsafe_to = nullptr)
+     {
+       assert (num_items > 0);
+       while (idx + num_items < end)
+       {
+ 	idx++;
+-	const hb_glyph_info_t &info = c->buffer->info[idx];
+-
+-	matcher_t::may_skip_t skip = matcher.may_skip (c, info);
+-	if (unlikely (skip == matcher_t::SKIP_YES))
+-	  continue;
+-
+-	matcher_t::may_match_t match = matcher.may_match (info, match_glyph_data);
+-	if (match == matcher_t::MATCH_YES ||
+-	    (match == matcher_t::MATCH_MAYBE &&
+-	     skip == matcher_t::SKIP_NO))
+-	{
+-	  num_items--;
+-	  if (match_glyph_data) match_glyph_data++;
+-	  return true;
+-	}
+-
+-	if (skip == matcher_t::SKIP_NO)
++	switch (match (c->buffer->info[idx]))
+ 	{
+-	  if (unsafe_to)
+-	    *unsafe_to = idx + 1;
+-	  return false;
++	  case MATCH:
++	  {
++	    num_items--;
++	    if (match_glyph_data) match_glyph_data++;
++	    return true;
++	  }
++	  case NOT_MATCH:
++	  {
++	    if (unsafe_to)
++	      *unsafe_to = idx + 1;
++	    return false;
++	  }
++	  case SKIP:
++	    continue;
+ 	}
+       }
+       if (unsafe_to)
+@@ -408,27 +427,22 @@ struct hb_ot_apply_context_t :
+       while (idx > num_items - 1)
+       {
+ 	idx--;
+-	const hb_glyph_info_t &info = c->buffer->out_info[idx];
+-
+-	matcher_t::may_skip_t skip = matcher.may_skip (c, info);
+-	if (unlikely (skip == matcher_t::SKIP_YES))
+-	  continue;
+-
+-	matcher_t::may_match_t match = matcher.may_match (info, match_glyph_data);
+-	if (match == matcher_t::MATCH_YES ||
+-	    (match == matcher_t::MATCH_MAYBE &&
+-	     skip == matcher_t::SKIP_NO))
++	switch (match (c->buffer->out_info[idx]))
+ 	{
+-	  num_items--;
+-	  if (match_glyph_data) match_glyph_data++;
+-	  return true;
+-	}
+-
+-	if (skip == matcher_t::SKIP_NO)
+-	{
+-	  if (unsafe_from)
+-	    *unsafe_from = hb_max (1u, idx) - 1u;
+-	  return false;
++	  case MATCH:
++	  {
++	    num_items--;
++	    if (match_glyph_data) match_glyph_data++;
++	    return true;
++	  }
++	  case NOT_MATCH:
++	  {
++	    if (unsafe_from)
++	      *unsafe_from = hb_max (1u, idx) - 1u;
++	    return false;
++	  }
++	  case SKIP:
++	    continue;
+ 	}
+       }
+       if (unsafe_from)
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-graphics/harfbuzz/harfbuzz/CVE-2023-25193.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
+From 8708b9e081192786c027bb7f5f23d76dbe5c19e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Behdad Esfahbod <behdad@behdad.org>
+Date: Mon, 6 Feb 2023 14:51:25 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] [GPOS] Avoid O(n^2) behavior in mark-attachment
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport from [https://github.com/harfbuzz/harfbuzz/commit/8708b9e081192786c027bb7f5f23d76dbe5c19e8]
+Comment1: The Original Patch [https://github.com/harfbuzz/harfbuzz/commit/85be877925ddbf34f74a1229f3ca1716bb6170dc] causes regression and was reverted. This Patch completes the fix.
+Comment2: The Patch contained files MarkBasePosFormat1.hh and MarkLigPosFormat1.hh which were moved from hb-ot-layout-gpos-table.hh as per https://github.com/harfbuzz/harfbuzz/commit/197d9a5c994eb41c8c89b7b958b26b1eacfeeb00
+CVE: CVE-2023-25193
+Signed-off-by: Siddharth Doshi <sdoshi@mvista.com>
+---
+ src/hb-ot-layout-gpos-table.hh | 101 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
+ src/hb-ot-layout-gsubgpos.hh   |   5 +-
+ 2 files changed, 77 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/hb-ot-layout-gpos-table.hh b/src/hb-ot-layout-gpos-table.hh
+index 024312d..88df13d 100644
+--- a/src/hb-ot-layout-gpos-table.hh
++++ b/src/hb-ot-layout-gpos-table.hh
+@@ -1458,6 +1458,25 @@ struct MarkBasePosFormat1
+ 
+   const Coverage &get_coverage () const { return this+markCoverage; }
+ 
++  static inline bool accept (hb_buffer_t *buffer, unsigned idx)
++  {
++    /* We only want to attach to the first of a MultipleSubst sequence.
++     * https://github.com/harfbuzz/harfbuzz/issues/740
++     * Reject others...
++     * ...but stop if we find a mark in the MultipleSubst sequence:
++     * https://github.com/harfbuzz/harfbuzz/issues/1020 */
++    return !_hb_glyph_info_multiplied (&buffer->info[idx]) ||
++          0 == _hb_glyph_info_get_lig_comp (&buffer->info[idx]) ||
++          (idx == 0 ||
++           _hb_glyph_info_is_mark (&buffer->info[idx - 1]) ||
++           !_hb_glyph_info_multiplied (&buffer->info[idx - 1]) ||
++           _hb_glyph_info_get_lig_id (&buffer->info[idx]) !=
++           _hb_glyph_info_get_lig_id (&buffer->info[idx - 1]) ||
++           _hb_glyph_info_get_lig_comp (&buffer->info[idx]) !=
++           _hb_glyph_info_get_lig_comp (&buffer->info[idx - 1]) + 1
++           );
++  }
++
+   bool apply (hb_ot_apply_context_t *c) const
+   {
+     TRACE_APPLY (this);
+@@ -1465,37 +1484,46 @@ struct MarkBasePosFormat1
+     unsigned int mark_index = (this+markCoverage).get_coverage  (buffer->cur().codepoint);
+     if (likely (mark_index == NOT_COVERED)) return_trace (false);
+ 
+-    /* Now we search backwards for a non-mark glyph */
++    /* Now we search backwards for a non-mark glyph.
++     * We don't use skippy_iter.prev() to avoid O(n^2) behavior. */
++
+     hb_ot_apply_context_t::skipping_iterator_t &skippy_iter = c->iter_input;
+-    skippy_iter.reset (buffer->idx, 1);
+     skippy_iter.set_lookup_props (LookupFlag::IgnoreMarks);
+-    do {
+-      if (!skippy_iter.prev ()) return_trace (false);
+-      /* We only want to attach to the first of a MultipleSubst sequence.
+-       * https://github.com/harfbuzz/harfbuzz/issues/740
+-       * Reject others...
+-       * ...but stop if we find a mark in the MultipleSubst sequence:
+-       * https://github.com/harfbuzz/harfbuzz/issues/1020 */
+-      if (!_hb_glyph_info_multiplied (&buffer->info[skippy_iter.idx]) ||
+-	  0 == _hb_glyph_info_get_lig_comp (&buffer->info[skippy_iter.idx]) ||
+-	  (skippy_iter.idx == 0 ||
+-	   _hb_glyph_info_is_mark (&buffer->info[skippy_iter.idx - 1]) ||
+-	   _hb_glyph_info_get_lig_id (&buffer->info[skippy_iter.idx]) !=
+-	   _hb_glyph_info_get_lig_id (&buffer->info[skippy_iter.idx - 1]) ||
+-	   _hb_glyph_info_get_lig_comp (&buffer->info[skippy_iter.idx]) !=
+-	   _hb_glyph_info_get_lig_comp (&buffer->info[skippy_iter.idx - 1]) + 1
+-	   ))
+-	break;
+-      skippy_iter.reject ();
+-    } while (true);
++    unsigned j;
++    for (j = buffer->idx; j > c->last_base_until; j--)
++    {
++      auto match = skippy_iter.match (buffer->info[j - 1]);
++      if (match == skippy_iter.MATCH)
++      {
++       if (!accept (buffer, j - 1))
++         match = skippy_iter.SKIP;
++      }
++      if (match == skippy_iter.MATCH)
++      {
++       c->last_base = (signed) j - 1;
++       break;
++      }
++    }
++    c->last_base_until = buffer->idx;
++    if (c->last_base == -1)
++    {
++      buffer->unsafe_to_concat_from_outbuffer (0, buffer->idx + 1);
++      return_trace (false);
++    }
++
++    unsigned idx = (unsigned) c->last_base;
+ 
+     /* Checking that matched glyph is actually a base glyph by GDEF is too strong; disabled */
+-    //if (!_hb_glyph_info_is_base_glyph (&buffer->info[skippy_iter.idx])) { return_trace (false); }
++    //if (!_hb_glyph_info_is_base_glyph (&buffer->info[idx])) { return_trace (false); }
+ 
+-    unsigned int base_index = (this+baseCoverage).get_coverage  (buffer->info[skippy_iter.idx].codepoint);
++    unsigned int base_index = (this+baseCoverage).get_coverage  (buffer->info[idx].codepoint);
+     if (base_index == NOT_COVERED) return_trace (false);
++    {
++      buffer->unsafe_to_concat_from_outbuffer (idx, buffer->idx + 1);
++      return_trace (false);
++    }
+ 
+-    return_trace ((this+markArray).apply (c, mark_index, base_index, this+baseArray, classCount, skippy_iter.idx));
++    return_trace ((this+markArray).apply (c, mark_index, base_index, this+baseArray, classCount, idx));
+   }
+ 
+   bool subset (hb_subset_context_t *c) const
+@@ -1587,15 +1615,32 @@ struct MarkLigPosFormat1
+     if (likely (mark_index == NOT_COVERED)) return_trace (false);
+ 
+     /* Now we search backwards for a non-mark glyph */
++
+     hb_ot_apply_context_t::skipping_iterator_t &skippy_iter = c->iter_input;
+-    skippy_iter.reset (buffer->idx, 1);
+     skippy_iter.set_lookup_props (LookupFlag::IgnoreMarks);
+-    if (!skippy_iter.prev ()) return_trace (false);
++
++    unsigned j;
++    for (j = buffer->idx; j > c->last_base_until; j--)
++    {
++      auto match = skippy_iter.match (buffer->info[j - 1]);
++      if (match == skippy_iter.MATCH)
++      {
++       c->last_base = (signed) j - 1;
++       break;
++      }
++    }
++    c->last_base_until = buffer->idx;
++    if (c->last_base == -1)
++    {
++      buffer->unsafe_to_concat_from_outbuffer (0, buffer->idx + 1);
++      return_trace (false);
++    }
++
++    j = (unsigned) c->last_base;
+ 
+     /* Checking that matched glyph is actually a ligature by GDEF is too strong; disabled */
+-    //if (!_hb_glyph_info_is_ligature (&buffer->info[skippy_iter.idx])) { return_trace (false); }
++    //if (!_hb_glyph_info_is_ligature (&buffer->info[idx])) { return_trace (false); }
+ 
+-    unsigned int j = skippy_iter.idx;
+     unsigned int lig_index = (this+ligatureCoverage).get_coverage  (buffer->info[j].codepoint);
+     if (lig_index == NOT_COVERED) return_trace (false);
+ 
+diff --git a/src/hb-ot-layout-gsubgpos.hh b/src/hb-ot-layout-gsubgpos.hh
+index 5a7e564..437123c 100644
+--- a/src/hb-ot-layout-gsubgpos.hh
++++ b/src/hb-ot-layout-gsubgpos.hh
+@@ -503,6 +503,9 @@ struct hb_ot_apply_context_t :
+   uint32_t random_state;
+ 
+ 
++  signed last_base = -1; // GPOS uses
++  unsigned last_base_until = 0; // GPOS uses
++
+   hb_ot_apply_context_t (unsigned int table_index_,
+ 		      hb_font_t *font_,
+ 		      hb_buffer_t *buffer_) :
+@@ -536,7 +539,7 @@ struct hb_ot_apply_context_t :
+     iter_context.init (this, true);
+   }
+ 
+-  void set_lookup_mask (hb_mask_t mask) { lookup_mask = mask; init_iters (); }
++  void set_lookup_mask (hb_mask_t mask) { lookup_mask = mask; last_base = -1; last_base_until = 0; init_iters (); }
+   void set_auto_zwj (bool auto_zwj_) { auto_zwj = auto_zwj_; init_iters (); }
+   void set_auto_zwnj (bool auto_zwnj_) { auto_zwnj = auto_zwnj_; init_iters (); }
+   void set_random (bool random_) { random = random_; }
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-graphics/harfbuzz/harfbuzz_2.6.4.bb

@@ -7,7 +7,10 @@ LICENSE = "MIT"
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=e11f5c3149cdec4bb309babb020b32b9 \
                     file://src/hb-ucd.cc;beginline=1;endline=15;md5=29d4dcb6410429195df67efe3382d8bc"
 
-SRC_URI = "http://www.freedesktop.org/software/harfbuzz/release/${BP}.tar.xz"
+SRC_URI = "http://www.freedesktop.org/software/harfbuzz/release/${BP}.tar.xz \
+           file://CVE-2023-25193-pre0.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-25193-pre1.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-25193.patch"
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "2b3a4dfdb3e5e50055f941978944da9f"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "9413b8d96132d699687ef914ebb8c50440efc87b3f775d25856d7ec347c03c12"
 

meta/recipes-kernel/linux-firmware/linux-firmware_20230210.bb

@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ LICENSE = "\
     & Firmware-phanfw \
     & Firmware-qat \
     & Firmware-qcom \
+    & Firmware-qcom-yamato \
     & Firmware-qla1280 \
     & Firmware-qla2xxx \
     & Firmware-qualcommAthos_ar3k \
@@ -70,7 +71,7 @@ LICENSE = "\
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENCE.Abilis;md5=b5ee3f410780e56711ad48eadc22b8bc \
                     file://LICENCE.adsp_sst;md5=615c45b91a5a4a9fe046d6ab9a2df728 \
                     file://LICENCE.agere;md5=af0133de6b4a9b2522defd5f188afd31 \
-                    file://LICENSE.amdgpu;md5=44c1166d052226cb2d6c8d7400090203 \
+                    file://LICENSE.amdgpu;md5=a2589a05ea5b6bd2b7f4f623c7e7a649 \
                     file://LICENSE.amd-ucode;md5=6ca90c57f7b248de1e25c7f68ffc4698 \
                     file://LICENSE.amlogic_vdec;md5=dc44f59bf64a81643e500ad3f39a468a \
                     file://LICENCE.atheros_firmware;md5=30a14c7823beedac9fa39c64fdd01a13 \
@@ -109,6 +110,7 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENCE.Abilis;md5=b5ee3f410780e56711ad48eadc22b8bc \
                     file://LICENCE.phanfw;md5=954dcec0e051f9409812b561ea743bfa \
                     file://LICENCE.qat_firmware;md5=9e7d8bea77612d7cc7d9e9b54b623062 \
                     file://LICENSE.qcom;md5=164e3362a538eb11d3ac51e8e134294b \
+                    file://LICENSE.qcom_yamato;md5=d0de0eeccaf1843a850bf7a6777eec5c \
                     file://LICENCE.qla1280;md5=d6895732e622d950609093223a2c4f5d \
                     file://LICENCE.qla2xxx;md5=505855e921b75f1be4a437ad9b79dff0 \
                     file://LICENSE.QualcommAtheros_ar3k;md5=b5fe244fb2b532311de1472a3bc06da5 \
@@ -132,7 +134,7 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENCE.Abilis;md5=b5ee3f410780e56711ad48eadc22b8bc \
                     "
 # WHENCE checksum is defined separately to ease overriding it if
 # class-devupstream is selected.
-WHENCE_CHKSUM  = "bf7c716d16e48fe118c6209f99b13253"
+WHENCE_CHKSUM  = "aadb3cccbde1e53fc244a409e9bd5a22"
 
 # These are not common licenses, set NO_GENERIC_LICENSE for them
 # so that the license files will be copied from fetched source
@@ -177,6 +179,7 @@ NO_GENERIC_LICENSE[Firmware-ath9k-htc] = "LICENCE.open-ath9k-htc-firmware"
 NO_GENERIC_LICENSE[Firmware-phanfw] = "LICENCE.phanfw"
 NO_GENERIC_LICENSE[Firmware-qat] = "LICENCE.qat_firmware"
 NO_GENERIC_LICENSE[Firmware-qcom] = "LICENSE.qcom"
+NO_GENERIC_LICENSE[Firmware-qcom-yamato] = "LICENSE.qcom_yamato"
 NO_GENERIC_LICENSE[Firmware-qla1280] = "LICENCE.qla1280"
 NO_GENERIC_LICENSE[Firmware-qla2xxx] = "LICENCE.qla2xxx"
 NO_GENERIC_LICENSE[Firmware-qualcommAthos_ar3k] = "LICENSE.QualcommAtheros_ar3k"
@@ -209,7 +212,7 @@ SRC_URI:class-devupstream = "git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/firmw
 # Pin this to the 20220509 release, override this in local.conf
 SRCREV:class-devupstream ?= "b19cbdca78ab2adfd210c91be15a22568e8b8cae"
 
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "e793783e92acbde549965521462d1d1327827360664cf242dbda08f075654331"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "6e3d9e8d52cffc4ec0dbe8533a8445328e0524a20f159a5b61c2706f983ce38a"
 
 inherit allarch
 
@@ -305,7 +308,7 @@ PACKAGES =+ "${PN}-ralink-license ${PN}-ralink \
              ${PN}-nvidia-gpu \
              ${PN}-netronome-license ${PN}-netronome \
              ${PN}-qat ${PN}-qat-license \
-             ${PN}-qcom-license \
+             ${PN}-qcom-license ${PN}-qcom-yamato-license \
              ${PN}-qcom-venus-1.8 ${PN}-qcom-venus-4.2 ${PN}-qcom-venus-5.2 ${PN}-qcom-venus-5.4 \
              ${PN}-qcom-vpu-1.0 ${PN}-qcom-vpu-2.0 \
              ${PN}-qcom-adreno-a2xx ${PN}-qcom-adreno-a3xx ${PN}-qcom-adreno-a4xx ${PN}-qcom-adreno-a530 \
@@ -961,14 +964,41 @@ RDEPENDS_${PN}-qat        = "${PN}-qat-license"
 
 # For QCOM VPU/GPU and SDM845
 LICENSE_${PN}-qcom-license = "Firmware-qcom"
+LICENSE_${PN}-qcom-yamato-license = "Firmware-qcom-yamato"
+LICENSE_${PN}-qcom-venus-1.8 = "Firmware-qcom"
+LICENSE_${PN}-qcom-venus-4.2 = "Firmware-qcom"
+LICENSE_${PN}-qcom-venus-5.2 = "Firmware-qcom"
+LICENSE_${PN}-qcom-venus-5.4 = "Firmware-qcom"
+LICENSE_${PN}-qcom-vpu-1.0 = "Firmware-qcom"
+LICENSE_${PN}-qcom-vpu-2.0 = "Firmware-qcom"
+LICENSE_${PN}-qcom-adreno-a2xx = "Firmware-qcom Firmware-qcom-yamato"
+LICENSE_${PN}-qcom-adreno-a3xx = "Firmware-qcom"
+LICENSE_${PN}-qcom-adreno-a4xx = "Firmware-qcom"
+LICENSE_${PN}-qcom-adreno-a530 = "Firmware-qcom"
+LICENSE_${PN}-qcom-adreno-a630 = "Firmware-qcom"
+LICENSE_${PN}-qcom-adreno-a650 = "Firmware-qcom"
+LICENSE_${PN}-qcom-adreno-a660 = "Firmware-qcom"
+LICENSE_${PN}-qcom-apq8096-audio = "Firmware-qcom"
+LICENSE_${PN}-qcom-apq8096-modem = "Firmware-qcom"
+LICENSE_${PN}-qcom-sc8280xp-lenovo-x13s-audio = "Firmware-qcom"
+LICENSE_${PN}-qcom-sc8280xp-lenovo-x13s-adreno = "Firmware-qcom"
+LICENSE_${PN}-qcom-sc8280xp-lenovo-x13s-compute = "Firmware-qcom"
+LICENSE_${PN}-qcom-sc8280xp-lenovo-x13s-sensors = "Firmware-qcom"
+LICENSE_${PN}-qcom-sdm845-audio = "Firmware-qcom"
+LICENSE_${PN}-qcom-sdm845-compute = "Firmware-qcom"
+LICENSE_${PN}-qcom-sdm845-modem = "Firmware-qcom"
+LICENSE_${PN}-qcom-sm8250-audio = "Firmware-qcom"
+LICENSE_${PN}-qcom-sm8250-compute = "Firmware-qcom"
+
 FILES_${PN}-qcom-license   = "${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/LICENSE.qcom ${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/qcom/NOTICE.txt"
+FILES_${PN}-qcom-yamato-license = "${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/LICENSE.qcom_yamato"
 FILES_${PN}-qcom-venus-1.8 = "${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/qcom/venus-1.8/*"
 FILES_${PN}-qcom-venus-4.2 = "${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/qcom/venus-4.2/*"
 FILES_${PN}-qcom-venus-5.2 = "${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/qcom/venus-5.2/*"
 FILES_${PN}-qcom-venus-5.4 = "${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/qcom/venus-5.4/*"
 FILES_${PN}-qcom-vpu-1.0 = "${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/qcom/vpu-1.0/*"
 FILES_${PN}-qcom-vpu-2.0 = "${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/qcom/vpu-2.0/*"
-FILES_${PN}-qcom-adreno-a2xx = "${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/qcom/leia_*.fw"
+FILES_${PN}-qcom-adreno-a2xx = "${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/qcom/leia_*.fw ${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/qcom/yamato_*.fw"
 FILES_${PN}-qcom-adreno-a3xx = "${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/qcom/a3*_*.fw ${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/a300_*.fw"
 FILES_${PN}-qcom-adreno-a4xx = "${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/qcom/a4*_*.fw"
 FILES_${PN}-qcom-adreno-a530 = "${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/qcom/a530*.*"
@@ -994,7 +1024,7 @@ RDEPENDS_${PN}-qcom-venus-5.4 = "${PN}-qcom-license"
 RDEPENDS_${PN}-qcom-vpu-1.0 = "${PN}-qcom-license"
 RDEPENDS_${PN}-qcom-vpu-2.0 = "${PN}-qcom-license"
 RDEPENDS_${PN}-qcom-adreno-a2xx = "${PN}-qcom-license"
-RDEPENDS_${PN}-qcom-adreno-a3xx = "${PN}-qcom-license"
+RDEPENDS_${PN}-qcom-adreno-a2xx = "${PN}-qcom-license ${PN}-qcom-yamato-license"
 RDEPENDS_${PN}-qcom-adreno-a4xx = "${PN}-qcom-license"
 RDEPENDS_${PN}-qcom-adreno-a530 = "${PN}-qcom-license"
 RDEPENDS_${PN}-qcom-adreno-a630 = "${PN}-qcom-license"

meta/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto-dev.bb

@@ -10,8 +10,6 @@
 
 inherit kernel
 require recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto.inc
-# for ncurses tests
-inherit pkgconfig
 
 # provide this .inc to set specific revisions
 include recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto-dev-revisions.inc

meta/recipes-kernel/make-mod-scripts/make-mod-scripts_1.0.bb

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ HOMEPAGE = "https://www.yoctoproject.org/"
 LICENSE = "GPLv2"
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://${COREBASE}/meta/files/common-licenses/GPL-2.0;md5=801f80980d171dd6425610833a22dbe6"
 
-inherit kernel-arch
+inherit kernel-arch linux-kernel-base
 inherit pkgconfig
 
 PACKAGE_ARCH = "${MACHINE_ARCH}"

meta/recipes-kernel/wireless-regdb/wireless-regdb_2023.02.13.bb

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ LICENSE = "ISC"
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE;md5=07c4f6dea3845b02a18dc00c8c87699c"
 
 SRC_URI = "https://www.kernel.org/pub/software/network/${BPN}/${BP}.tar.xz"
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "59c8f7d17966db71b27f90e735ee8f5b42ca3527694a8c5e6e9b56bd379c3b84"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "fe81e8a8694dc4753a45087a1c4c7e1b48dee5a59f5f796ce374ea550f0b2e73"
 
 inherit bin_package allarch
 

meta/recipes-multimedia/libtiff/files/CVE-2022-3570_3598.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,659 @@
+From 226e336cdceec933da2e9f72b6578c7a1bea450b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Su Laus <sulau@freenet.de>
+Date: Thu, 13 Oct 2022 14:33:27 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] tiffcrop subroutines require a larger buffer (fixes #271,
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [import from debian http://security.debian.org/debian-security/pool/updates/main/t/tiff/tiff_4.1.0+git191117-2~deb10u7.debian.tar.xz ]
+CVE: CVE-2022-3570 CVE-2022-3598
+Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
+
+Origin: https://gitlab.com/libtiff/libtiff/-/commit/cfbb883bf6ea7bedcb04177cc4e52d304522fdff
+Origin: https://gitlab.com/libtiff/libtiff/-/commit/24d3b2425af24432e0e4e2fd58b33f3b04c4bfa4
+Reviewed-by: Sylvain Beucler <beuc@debian.org>
+Last-Update: 2023-01-17
+
+ #381, #386, #388, #389, #435)
+
+---
+ tools/tiffcrop.c | 209 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
+ 1 file changed, 117 insertions(+), 92 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/tools/tiffcrop.c b/tools/tiffcrop.c
+index c7877aa..c923920 100644
+--- a/tools/tiffcrop.c
++++ b/tools/tiffcrop.c
+@@ -126,6 +126,7 @@ static   char tiffcrop_rev_date[] = "03-03-2010";
+ 
+ #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+ # include <stdint.h>
++# include <inttypes.h>
+ #endif
+ 
+ #ifndef HAVE_GETOPT
+@@ -212,6 +213,10 @@ extern int getopt(int argc, char * const argv[], const char *optstring);
+ 
+ #define TIFF_DIR_MAX  65534
+ 
++/* Some conversion subroutines require image buffers, which are at least 3 bytes
++ * larger than the necessary size for the image itself. */
++#define NUM_BUFF_OVERSIZE_BYTES   3
++
+ /* Offsets into buffer for margins and fixed width and length segments */
+ struct offset {
+   uint32  tmargin;
+@@ -233,7 +238,7 @@ struct offset {
+  */
+ 
+ struct  buffinfo {
+-  uint32 size;           /* size of this buffer */
++  size_t size;           /* size of this buffer */
+   unsigned char *buffer; /* address of the allocated buffer */
+ };
+ 
+@@ -771,8 +776,8 @@ static int readContigTilesIntoBuffer (TIFF* in, uint8* buf,
+   uint32 dst_rowsize, shift_width;
+   uint32 bytes_per_sample, bytes_per_pixel;
+   uint32 trailing_bits, prev_trailing_bits;
+-  uint32 tile_rowsize  = TIFFTileRowSize(in);
+-  uint32 src_offset, dst_offset;
++  tmsize_t tile_rowsize  = TIFFTileRowSize(in);
++  tmsize_t src_offset, dst_offset;
+   uint32 row_offset, col_offset;
+   uint8 *bufp = (uint8*) buf;
+   unsigned char *src = NULL;
+@@ -822,7 +827,7 @@ static int readContigTilesIntoBuffer (TIFF* in, uint8* buf,
+       TIFFError("readContigTilesIntoBuffer", "Integer overflow when calculating buffer size.");
+       exit(-1);
+   }
+-  tilebuf = _TIFFmalloc(tile_buffsize + 3);
++  tilebuf = _TIFFmalloc(tile_buffsize + NUM_BUFF_OVERSIZE_BYTES);
+   if (tilebuf == 0)
+     return 0;
+   tilebuf[tile_buffsize] = 0;
+@@ -986,7 +991,7 @@ static int  readSeparateTilesIntoBuffer (TIFF* in, uint8 *obuf,
+   for (sample = 0; (sample < spp) && (sample < MAX_SAMPLES); sample++)
+     {
+     srcbuffs[sample] = NULL;
+-    tbuff = (unsigned char *)_TIFFmalloc(tilesize + 8);
++    tbuff = (unsigned char *)_TIFFmalloc(tilesize + NUM_BUFF_OVERSIZE_BYTES);
+     if (!tbuff)
+       {
+       TIFFError ("readSeparateTilesIntoBuffer", 
+@@ -1181,7 +1186,8 @@ writeBufferToSeparateStrips (TIFF* out, uint8* buf,
+   }
+   rowstripsize = rowsperstrip * bytes_per_sample * (width + 1); 
+ 
+-  obuf = _TIFFmalloc (rowstripsize);
++  /* Add 3 padding bytes for extractContigSamples32bits */
++  obuf = _TIFFmalloc (rowstripsize + NUM_BUFF_OVERSIZE_BYTES);
+   if (obuf == NULL)
+     return 1;
+   
+@@ -1194,7 +1200,7 @@ writeBufferToSeparateStrips (TIFF* out, uint8* buf,
+       stripsize = TIFFVStripSize(out, nrows);
+       src = buf + (row * rowsize);
+       total_bytes += stripsize;
+-      memset (obuf, '\0', rowstripsize);
++      memset (obuf, '\0',rowstripsize + NUM_BUFF_OVERSIZE_BYTES);
+       if (extractContigSamplesToBuffer(obuf, src, nrows, width, s, spp, bps, dump))
+         {
+         _TIFFfree(obuf);
+@@ -1202,10 +1208,15 @@ writeBufferToSeparateStrips (TIFF* out, uint8* buf,
+ 	}
+       if ((dump->outfile != NULL) && (dump->level == 1))
+         {
+-        dump_info(dump->outfile, dump->format,"", 
++          if ((uint64_t)scanlinesize > 0x0ffffffffULL) {
++              dump_info(dump->infile, dump->format, "loadImage",
++                  "Attention: scanlinesize %"PRIu64" is larger than UINT32_MAX.\nFollowing dump might be wrong.",
++                  (uint64_t)scanlinesize);
++          }
++          dump_info(dump->outfile, dump->format,"",
+                   "Sample %2d, Strip: %2d, bytes: %4d, Row %4d, bytes: %4d, Input offset: %6d", 
+-                  s + 1, strip + 1, stripsize, row + 1, scanlinesize, src - buf);
+-        dump_buffer(dump->outfile, dump->format, nrows, scanlinesize, row, obuf);
++                  s + 1, strip + 1, stripsize, row + 1, (uint32)scanlinesize, src - buf);
++        dump_buffer(dump->outfile, dump->format, nrows, (uint32)scanlinesize, row, obuf);
+ 	}
+ 
+       if (TIFFWriteEncodedStrip(out, strip++, obuf, stripsize) < 0)
+@@ -1232,7 +1243,7 @@ static int writeBufferToContigTiles (TIFF* out, uint8* buf, uint32 imagelength,
+   uint32 tl, tw;
+   uint32 row, col, nrow, ncol;
+   uint32 src_rowsize, col_offset;
+-  uint32 tile_rowsize  = TIFFTileRowSize(out);
++  tmsize_t tile_rowsize  = TIFFTileRowSize(out);
+   uint8* bufp = (uint8*) buf;
+   tsize_t tile_buffsize = 0;
+   tsize_t tilesize = TIFFTileSize(out);
+@@ -1275,9 +1286,11 @@ static int writeBufferToContigTiles (TIFF* out, uint8* buf, uint32 imagelength,
+   }
+   src_rowsize = ((imagewidth * spp * bps) + 7U) / 8;
+ 
+-  tilebuf = _TIFFmalloc(tile_buffsize);
++  /* Add 3 padding bytes for extractContigSamples32bits */
++  tilebuf = _TIFFmalloc(tile_buffsize + NUM_BUFF_OVERSIZE_BYTES);
+   if (tilebuf == 0)
+     return 1;
++  memset(tilebuf, 0, tile_buffsize + NUM_BUFF_OVERSIZE_BYTES);
+   for (row = 0; row < imagelength; row += tl)
+     {
+     nrow = (row + tl > imagelength) ? imagelength - row : tl;
+@@ -1323,7 +1336,8 @@ static int writeBufferToSeparateTiles (TIFF* out, uint8* buf, uint32 imagelength
+ 				       uint32 imagewidth, tsample_t spp, 
+                                        struct dump_opts * dump)
+   {
+-  tdata_t obuf = _TIFFmalloc(TIFFTileSize(out));
++  /* Add 3 padding bytes for extractContigSamples32bits */
++  tdata_t obuf = _TIFFmalloc(TIFFTileSize(out) + NUM_BUFF_OVERSIZE_BYTES);
+   uint32 tl, tw;
+   uint32 row, col, nrow, ncol;
+   uint32 src_rowsize, col_offset;
+@@ -1333,6 +1347,7 @@ static int writeBufferToSeparateTiles (TIFF* out, uint8* buf, uint32 imagelength
+ 
+   if (obuf == NULL)
+     return 1;
++  memset(obuf, 0, TIFFTileSize(out) + NUM_BUFF_OVERSIZE_BYTES);
+ 
+   TIFFGetField(out, TIFFTAG_TILELENGTH, &tl);
+   TIFFGetField(out, TIFFTAG_TILEWIDTH, &tw);
+@@ -1754,14 +1769,14 @@ void  process_command_opts (int argc, char *argv[], char *mp, char *mode, uint32
+                       
+                     *opt_offset = '\0';
+                     /* convert option to lowercase */
+-                    end = strlen (opt_ptr);
++                    end = (unsigned int)strlen (opt_ptr);
+                     for (i = 0; i < end; i++)
+                       *(opt_ptr + i) = tolower((int) *(opt_ptr + i));
+                     /* Look for dump format specification */
+                     if (strncmp(opt_ptr, "for", 3) == 0)
+                       {
+ 		      /* convert value to lowercase */
+-                      end = strlen (opt_offset + 1);
++                      end = (unsigned int)strlen (opt_offset + 1);
+                       for (i = 1; i <= end; i++)
+                         *(opt_offset + i) = tolower((int) *(opt_offset + i));
+                       /* check dump format value */
+@@ -2213,6 +2228,8 @@ main(int argc, char* argv[])
+   size_t length;
+   char   temp_filename[PATH_MAX + 16]; /* Extra space keeps the compiler from complaining */
+ 
++  assert(NUM_BUFF_OVERSIZE_BYTES >= 3);
++
+   little_endian = *((unsigned char *)&little_endian) & '1';
+ 
+   initImageData(&image);
+@@ -3114,13 +3131,13 @@ extractContigSamples32bits (uint8 *in, uint8 *out, uint32 cols,
+       /* If we have a full buffer's worth, write it out */
+       if (ready_bits >= 32)
+         {
+-        bytebuff1 = (buff2 >> 56);
++        bytebuff1 = (uint8)(buff2 >> 56);
+         *dst++ = bytebuff1;
+-        bytebuff2 = (buff2 >> 48);
++        bytebuff2 = (uint8)(buff2 >> 48);
+         *dst++ = bytebuff2;
+-        bytebuff3 = (buff2 >> 40);
++        bytebuff3 = (uint8)(buff2 >> 40);
+         *dst++ = bytebuff3;
+-        bytebuff4 = (buff2 >> 32);
++        bytebuff4 = (uint8)(buff2 >> 32);
+         *dst++ = bytebuff4;
+         ready_bits -= 32;
+                     
+@@ -3495,13 +3512,13 @@ extractContigSamplesShifted32bits (uint8 *in, uint8 *out, uint32 cols,
+         }
+       else  /* If we have a full buffer's worth, write it out */
+         {
+-        bytebuff1 = (buff2 >> 56);
++        bytebuff1 = (uint8)(buff2 >> 56);
+         *dst++ = bytebuff1;
+-        bytebuff2 = (buff2 >> 48);
++        bytebuff2 = (uint8)(buff2 >> 48);
+         *dst++ = bytebuff2;
+-        bytebuff3 = (buff2 >> 40);
++        bytebuff3 = (uint8)(buff2 >> 40);
+         *dst++ = bytebuff3;
+-        bytebuff4 = (buff2 >> 32);
++        bytebuff4 = (uint8)(buff2 >> 32);
+         *dst++ = bytebuff4;
+         ready_bits -= 32;
+                     
+@@ -3678,10 +3695,10 @@ extractContigSamplesToTileBuffer(uint8 *out, uint8 *in, uint32 rows, uint32 cols
+ static int readContigStripsIntoBuffer (TIFF* in, uint8* buf)
+ {
+         uint8* bufp = buf;
+-        int32  bytes_read = 0;
++        tmsize_t  bytes_read = 0;
+         uint32 strip, nstrips   = TIFFNumberOfStrips(in);
+-        uint32 stripsize = TIFFStripSize(in);
+-        uint32 rows = 0;
++        tmsize_t stripsize = TIFFStripSize(in);
++        tmsize_t rows = 0;
+         uint32 rps = TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(in, TIFFTAG_ROWSPERSTRIP, &rps);
+         tsize_t scanline_size = TIFFScanlineSize(in);
+ 
+@@ -3694,13 +3711,12 @@ static int readContigStripsIntoBuffer (TIFF* in, uint8* buf)
+                 bytes_read = TIFFReadEncodedStrip (in, strip, bufp, -1);
+                 rows = bytes_read / scanline_size;
+                 if ((strip < (nstrips - 1)) && (bytes_read != (int32)stripsize))
+-                        TIFFError("", "Strip %d: read %lu bytes, strip size %lu",
+-                                  (int)strip + 1, (unsigned long) bytes_read,
+-                                  (unsigned long)stripsize);
++                        TIFFError("", "Strip %"PRIu32": read %"PRId64" bytes, strip size %"PRIu64,
++                                  strip + 1, bytes_read, stripsize);
+ 
+                 if (bytes_read < 0 && !ignore) {
+-                        TIFFError("", "Error reading strip %lu after %lu rows",
+-                                  (unsigned long) strip, (unsigned long)rows);
++                        TIFFError("", "Error reading strip %"PRIu32" after %"PRIu64" rows",
++                                  strip, rows);
+                         return 0;
+                 }
+                 bufp += stripsize;
+@@ -4164,13 +4180,13 @@ combineSeparateSamples32bits (uint8 *in[], uint8 *out, uint32 cols,
+ 	/* If we have a full buffer's worth, write it out */
+ 	if (ready_bits >= 32)
+ 	  {
+-	  bytebuff1 = (buff2 >> 56);
++	  bytebuff1 = (uint8)(buff2 >> 56);
+ 	  *dst++ = bytebuff1;
+-	  bytebuff2 = (buff2 >> 48);
++	  bytebuff2 = (uint8)(buff2 >> 48);
+ 	  *dst++ = bytebuff2;
+-	  bytebuff3 = (buff2 >> 40);
++	  bytebuff3 = (uint8)(buff2 >> 40);
+ 	  *dst++ = bytebuff3;
+-	  bytebuff4 = (buff2 >> 32);
++	  bytebuff4 = (uint8)(buff2 >> 32);
+ 	  *dst++ = bytebuff4;
+ 	  ready_bits -= 32;
+                     
+@@ -4213,10 +4229,10 @@ combineSeparateSamples32bits (uint8 *in[], uint8 *out, uint32 cols,
+ 	         "Row %3d, Col %3d, Src byte offset %3d  bit offset %2d  Dst offset %3d",
+ 		 row + 1, col + 1, src_byte, src_bit, dst - out);
+ 
+-      dump_long (dumpfile, format, "Match bits ", matchbits);
++      dump_wide (dumpfile, format, "Match bits ", matchbits);
+       dump_data (dumpfile, format, "Src   bits ", src, 4);
+-      dump_long (dumpfile, format, "Buff1 bits ", buff1);
+-      dump_long (dumpfile, format, "Buff2 bits ", buff2);
++      dump_wide (dumpfile, format, "Buff1 bits ", buff1);
++      dump_wide (dumpfile, format, "Buff2 bits ", buff2);
+       dump_byte (dumpfile, format, "Write bits1", bytebuff1);
+       dump_byte (dumpfile, format, "Write bits2", bytebuff2);
+       dump_info (dumpfile, format, "", "Ready bits:  %2d", ready_bits); 
+@@ -4689,13 +4705,13 @@ combineSeparateTileSamples32bits (uint8 *in[], uint8 *out, uint32 cols,
+ 	/* If we have a full buffer's worth, write it out */
+ 	if (ready_bits >= 32)
+ 	  {
+-	  bytebuff1 = (buff2 >> 56);
++	  bytebuff1 = (uint8)(buff2 >> 56);
+ 	  *dst++ = bytebuff1;
+-	  bytebuff2 = (buff2 >> 48);
++	  bytebuff2 = (uint8)(buff2 >> 48);
+ 	  *dst++ = bytebuff2;
+-	  bytebuff3 = (buff2 >> 40);
++	  bytebuff3 = (uint8)(buff2 >> 40);
+ 	  *dst++ = bytebuff3;
+-	  bytebuff4 = (buff2 >> 32);
++	  bytebuff4 = (uint8)(buff2 >> 32);
+ 	  *dst++ = bytebuff4;
+ 	  ready_bits -= 32;
+                     
+@@ -4738,10 +4754,10 @@ combineSeparateTileSamples32bits (uint8 *in[], uint8 *out, uint32 cols,
+ 	         "Row %3d, Col %3d, Src byte offset %3d  bit offset %2d  Dst offset %3d",
+ 		 row + 1, col + 1, src_byte, src_bit, dst - out);
+ 
+-      dump_long (dumpfile, format, "Match bits ", matchbits);
++      dump_wide (dumpfile, format, "Match bits ", matchbits);
+       dump_data (dumpfile, format, "Src   bits ", src, 4);
+-      dump_long (dumpfile, format, "Buff1 bits ", buff1);
+-      dump_long (dumpfile, format, "Buff2 bits ", buff2);
++      dump_wide (dumpfile, format, "Buff1 bits ", buff1);
++      dump_wide (dumpfile, format, "Buff2 bits ", buff2);
+       dump_byte (dumpfile, format, "Write bits1", bytebuff1);
+       dump_byte (dumpfile, format, "Write bits2", bytebuff2);
+       dump_info (dumpfile, format, "", "Ready bits:  %2d", ready_bits); 
+@@ -4764,7 +4780,7 @@ static int readSeparateStripsIntoBuffer (TIFF *in, uint8 *obuf, uint32 length,
+   {
+   int i, bytes_per_sample, bytes_per_pixel, shift_width, result = 1;
+   uint32 j;
+-  int32  bytes_read = 0;
++  tmsize_t  bytes_read = 0;
+   uint16 bps = 0, planar;
+   uint32 nstrips;
+   uint32 strips_per_sample;
+@@ -4830,7 +4846,7 @@ static int readSeparateStripsIntoBuffer (TIFF *in, uint8 *obuf, uint32 length,
+   for (s = 0; (s < spp) && (s < MAX_SAMPLES); s++)
+     {
+     srcbuffs[s] = NULL;
+-    buff = _TIFFmalloc(stripsize + 3);
++    buff = _TIFFmalloc(stripsize + NUM_BUFF_OVERSIZE_BYTES);
+     if (!buff)
+       {
+       TIFFError ("readSeparateStripsIntoBuffer", 
+@@ -4853,7 +4869,7 @@ static int readSeparateStripsIntoBuffer (TIFF *in, uint8 *obuf, uint32 length,
+       buff = srcbuffs[s];
+       strip = (s * strips_per_sample) + j; 
+       bytes_read = TIFFReadEncodedStrip (in, strip, buff, stripsize);
+-      rows_this_strip = bytes_read / src_rowsize;
++      rows_this_strip = (uint32)(bytes_read / src_rowsize);
+       if (bytes_read < 0 && !ignore)
+         {
+         TIFFError(TIFFFileName(in),
+@@ -5860,13 +5876,14 @@ loadImage(TIFF* in, struct image_data *image, struct dump_opts *dump, unsigned c
+   uint16   input_compression = 0, input_photometric = 0;
+   uint16   subsampling_horiz, subsampling_vert;
+   uint32   width = 0, length = 0;
+-  uint32   stsize = 0, tlsize = 0, buffsize = 0, scanlinesize = 0;
++  tmsize_t   stsize = 0, tlsize = 0, buffsize = 0;
++  tmsize_t   scanlinesize = 0;
+   uint32   tw = 0, tl = 0;       /* Tile width and length */
+-  uint32   tile_rowsize = 0;
++  tmsize_t   tile_rowsize = 0;
+   unsigned char *read_buff = NULL;
+   unsigned char *new_buff  = NULL;
+   int      readunit = 0;
+-  static   uint32  prev_readsize = 0;
++  static   tmsize_t  prev_readsize = 0;
+ 
+   TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(in, TIFFTAG_BITSPERSAMPLE, &bps);
+   TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(in, TIFFTAG_SAMPLESPERPIXEL, &spp);
+@@ -6168,7 +6185,7 @@ loadImage(TIFF* in, struct image_data *image, struct dump_opts *dump, unsigned c
+         TIFFError("loadImage", "Unable to allocate/reallocate read buffer");
+         return (-1);
+     }
+-    read_buff = (unsigned char *)_TIFFmalloc(buffsize+3);
++    read_buff = (unsigned char *)_TIFFmalloc(buffsize + NUM_BUFF_OVERSIZE_BYTES);
+   }
+   else
+     {
+@@ -6179,11 +6196,11 @@ loadImage(TIFF* in, struct image_data *image, struct dump_opts *dump, unsigned c
+           TIFFError("loadImage", "Unable to allocate/reallocate read buffer");
+           return (-1);
+       }
+-      new_buff = _TIFFrealloc(read_buff, buffsize+3);
++      new_buff = _TIFFrealloc(read_buff, buffsize + NUM_BUFF_OVERSIZE_BYTES);
+       if (!new_buff)
+         {
+ 	free (read_buff);
+-        read_buff = (unsigned char *)_TIFFmalloc(buffsize+3);
++        read_buff = (unsigned char *)_TIFFmalloc(buffsize + NUM_BUFF_OVERSIZE_BYTES);
+         }
+       else
+         read_buff = new_buff;
+@@ -6256,8 +6273,13 @@ loadImage(TIFF* in, struct image_data *image, struct dump_opts *dump, unsigned c
+     dump_info  (dump->infile, dump->format, "", 
+                 "Bits per sample %d, Samples per pixel %d", bps, spp);
+ 
++    if ((uint64_t)scanlinesize > 0x0ffffffffULL) {
++        dump_info(dump->infile, dump->format, "loadImage",
++            "Attention: scanlinesize %"PRIu64" is larger than UINT32_MAX.\nFollowing dump might be wrong.",
++            (uint64_t)scanlinesize);
++    }
+     for (i = 0; i < length; i++)
+-      dump_buffer(dump->infile, dump->format, 1, scanlinesize, 
++      dump_buffer(dump->infile, dump->format, 1, (uint32)scanlinesize, 
+                   i, read_buff + (i * scanlinesize));
+     }
+   return (0);
+@@ -7277,13 +7299,13 @@ writeSingleSection(TIFF *in, TIFF *out, struct image_data *image,
+      if (TIFFGetField(in, TIFFTAG_NUMBEROFINKS, &ninks)) {
+        TIFFSetField(out, TIFFTAG_NUMBEROFINKS, ninks);
+        if (TIFFGetField(in, TIFFTAG_INKNAMES, &inknames)) {
+-	 int inknameslen = strlen(inknames) + 1;
++	 int inknameslen = (int)strlen(inknames) + 1;
+ 	 const char* cp = inknames;
+ 	 while (ninks > 1) {
+ 	   cp = strchr(cp, '\0');
+ 	   if (cp) {
+ 	     cp++;
+-	     inknameslen += (strlen(cp) + 1);
++	     inknameslen += ((int)strlen(cp) + 1);
+ 	   }
+ 	   ninks--;
+          }
+@@ -7346,23 +7368,23 @@ createImageSection(uint32 sectsize, unsigned char **sect_buff_ptr)
+ 
+   if (!sect_buff)
+     {
+-    sect_buff = (unsigned char *)_TIFFmalloc(sectsize);
++    sect_buff = (unsigned char *)_TIFFmalloc(sectsize + NUM_BUFF_OVERSIZE_BYTES);
+     if (!sect_buff)
+     {
+         TIFFError("createImageSection", "Unable to allocate/reallocate section buffer");
+         return (-1);
+     }
+-    _TIFFmemset(sect_buff, 0, sectsize);
++    _TIFFmemset(sect_buff, 0, sectsize + NUM_BUFF_OVERSIZE_BYTES);
+     }
+   else
+     {
+     if (prev_sectsize < sectsize)
+       {
+-      new_buff = _TIFFrealloc(sect_buff, sectsize);
++      new_buff = _TIFFrealloc(sect_buff, sectsize + NUM_BUFF_OVERSIZE_BYTES);
+       if (!new_buff)
+         {
+ 	free (sect_buff);
+-        sect_buff = (unsigned char *)_TIFFmalloc(sectsize);
++        sect_buff = (unsigned char *)_TIFFmalloc(sectsize + NUM_BUFF_OVERSIZE_BYTES);
+         }
+       else
+         sect_buff = new_buff;
+@@ -7372,7 +7394,7 @@ createImageSection(uint32 sectsize, unsigned char **sect_buff_ptr)
+           TIFFError("createImageSection", "Unable to allocate/reallocate section buffer");
+           return (-1);
+       }
+-      _TIFFmemset(sect_buff, 0, sectsize);
++      _TIFFmemset(sect_buff, 0, sectsize + NUM_BUFF_OVERSIZE_BYTES);
+       }
+     }
+ 
+@@ -7403,17 +7425,17 @@ processCropSelections(struct image_data *image, struct crop_mask *crop,
+     cropsize = crop->bufftotal;
+     crop_buff = seg_buffs[0].buffer; 
+     if (!crop_buff)
+-      crop_buff = (unsigned char *)_TIFFmalloc(cropsize);
++      crop_buff = (unsigned char *)_TIFFmalloc(cropsize + NUM_BUFF_OVERSIZE_BYTES);
+     else
+       {
+       prev_cropsize = seg_buffs[0].size;
+       if (prev_cropsize < cropsize)
+         {
+-        next_buff = _TIFFrealloc(crop_buff, cropsize);
++        next_buff = _TIFFrealloc(crop_buff, cropsize + NUM_BUFF_OVERSIZE_BYTES);
+         if (! next_buff)
+           {
+           _TIFFfree (crop_buff);
+-          crop_buff = (unsigned char *)_TIFFmalloc(cropsize);
++          crop_buff = (unsigned char *)_TIFFmalloc(cropsize + NUM_BUFF_OVERSIZE_BYTES);
+           }
+         else
+           crop_buff = next_buff;
+@@ -7426,7 +7448,7 @@ processCropSelections(struct image_data *image, struct crop_mask *crop,
+       return (-1);
+       }
+  
+-    _TIFFmemset(crop_buff, 0, cropsize);
++    _TIFFmemset(crop_buff, 0, cropsize + NUM_BUFF_OVERSIZE_BYTES);
+     seg_buffs[0].buffer = crop_buff;
+     seg_buffs[0].size = cropsize;
+ 
+@@ -7505,17 +7527,17 @@ processCropSelections(struct image_data *image, struct crop_mask *crop,
+       cropsize = crop->bufftotal;
+       crop_buff = seg_buffs[i].buffer; 
+       if (!crop_buff)
+-        crop_buff = (unsigned char *)_TIFFmalloc(cropsize);
++        crop_buff = (unsigned char *)_TIFFmalloc(cropsize + NUM_BUFF_OVERSIZE_BYTES);
+       else
+         {
+         prev_cropsize = seg_buffs[0].size;
+         if (prev_cropsize < cropsize)
+           {
+-          next_buff = _TIFFrealloc(crop_buff, cropsize);
++          next_buff = _TIFFrealloc(crop_buff, cropsize + NUM_BUFF_OVERSIZE_BYTES);
+           if (! next_buff)
+             {
+             _TIFFfree (crop_buff);
+-            crop_buff = (unsigned char *)_TIFFmalloc(cropsize);
++            crop_buff = (unsigned char *)_TIFFmalloc(cropsize + NUM_BUFF_OVERSIZE_BYTES);
+             }
+           else
+             crop_buff = next_buff;
+@@ -7528,7 +7550,7 @@ processCropSelections(struct image_data *image, struct crop_mask *crop,
+         return (-1);
+         }
+  
+-      _TIFFmemset(crop_buff, 0, cropsize);
++      _TIFFmemset(crop_buff, 0, cropsize + NUM_BUFF_OVERSIZE_BYTES);
+       seg_buffs[i].buffer = crop_buff;
+       seg_buffs[i].size = cropsize;
+ 
+@@ -7641,24 +7663,24 @@ createCroppedImage(struct image_data *image, struct crop_mask *crop,
+   crop_buff = *crop_buff_ptr;
+   if (!crop_buff)
+     {
+-    crop_buff = (unsigned char *)_TIFFmalloc(cropsize);
++    crop_buff = (unsigned char *)_TIFFmalloc(cropsize + NUM_BUFF_OVERSIZE_BYTES);
+     if (!crop_buff)
+     {
+         TIFFError("createCroppedImage", "Unable to allocate/reallocate crop buffer");
+         return (-1);
+     }
+-    _TIFFmemset(crop_buff, 0, cropsize);
++    _TIFFmemset(crop_buff, 0, cropsize + NUM_BUFF_OVERSIZE_BYTES);
+     prev_cropsize = cropsize;
+     }
+   else
+     {
+     if (prev_cropsize < cropsize)
+       {
+-      new_buff = _TIFFrealloc(crop_buff, cropsize);
++      new_buff = _TIFFrealloc(crop_buff, cropsize + NUM_BUFF_OVERSIZE_BYTES);
+       if (!new_buff)
+         {
+ 	free (crop_buff);
+-        crop_buff = (unsigned char *)_TIFFmalloc(cropsize);
++        crop_buff = (unsigned char *)_TIFFmalloc(cropsize + NUM_BUFF_OVERSIZE_BYTES);
+         }
+       else
+         crop_buff = new_buff;
+@@ -7667,7 +7689,7 @@ createCroppedImage(struct image_data *image, struct crop_mask *crop,
+           TIFFError("createCroppedImage", "Unable to allocate/reallocate crop buffer");
+           return (-1);
+       }
+-      _TIFFmemset(crop_buff, 0, cropsize);
++      _TIFFmemset(crop_buff, 0, cropsize + NUM_BUFF_OVERSIZE_BYTES);
+       }
+     }
+ 
+@@ -7965,13 +7987,13 @@ writeCroppedImage(TIFF *in, TIFF *out, struct image_data *image,
+      if (TIFFGetField(in, TIFFTAG_NUMBEROFINKS, &ninks)) {
+        TIFFSetField(out, TIFFTAG_NUMBEROFINKS, ninks);
+        if (TIFFGetField(in, TIFFTAG_INKNAMES, &inknames)) {
+-	 int inknameslen = strlen(inknames) + 1;
++	 int inknameslen = (int)strlen(inknames) + 1;
+ 	 const char* cp = inknames;
+ 	 while (ninks > 1) {
+ 	   cp = strchr(cp, '\0');
+ 	   if (cp) {
+ 	     cp++;
+-	     inknameslen += (strlen(cp) + 1);
++	     inknameslen += ((int)strlen(cp) + 1);
+ 	   }
+ 	   ninks--;
+          }
+@@ -8356,13 +8378,13 @@ rotateContigSamples32bits(uint16 rotation, uint16 spp, uint16 bps, uint32 width,
+         }
+       else /* If we have a full buffer's worth, write it out */
+         {
+-        bytebuff1 = (buff2 >> 56);
++        bytebuff1 = (uint8)(buff2 >> 56);
+         *dst++ = bytebuff1;
+-        bytebuff2 = (buff2 >> 48);
++        bytebuff2 = (uint8)(buff2 >> 48);
+         *dst++ = bytebuff2;
+-        bytebuff3 = (buff2 >> 40);
++        bytebuff3 = (uint8)(buff2 >> 40);
+         *dst++ = bytebuff3;
+-        bytebuff4 = (buff2 >> 32);
++        bytebuff4 = (uint8)(buff2 >> 32);
+         *dst++ = bytebuff4;
+         ready_bits -= 32;
+                     
+@@ -8431,12 +8453,13 @@ rotateImage(uint16 rotation, struct image_data *image, uint32 *img_width,
+               return (-1);
+     }
+ 
+-  if (!(rbuff = (unsigned char *)_TIFFmalloc(buffsize)))
++  /* Add 3 padding bytes for extractContigSamplesShifted32bits */
++  if (!(rbuff = (unsigned char *)_TIFFmalloc(buffsize + NUM_BUFF_OVERSIZE_BYTES)))
+     {
+-    TIFFError("rotateImage", "Unable to allocate rotation buffer of %1u bytes", buffsize);
++    TIFFError("rotateImage", "Unable to allocate rotation buffer of %1u bytes", buffsize + NUM_BUFF_OVERSIZE_BYTES);
+     return (-1);
+     }
+-  _TIFFmemset(rbuff, '\0', buffsize);
++  _TIFFmemset(rbuff, '\0', buffsize + NUM_BUFF_OVERSIZE_BYTES);
+ 
+   ibuff = *ibuff_ptr;
+   switch (rotation)
+@@ -8964,13 +8987,13 @@ reverseSamples32bits (uint16 spp, uint16 bps, uint32 width,
+         }
+       else /* If we have a full buffer's worth, write it out */
+         {
+-        bytebuff1 = (buff2 >> 56);
++        bytebuff1 = (uint8)(buff2 >> 56);
+         *dst++ = bytebuff1;
+-        bytebuff2 = (buff2 >> 48);
++        bytebuff2 = (uint8)(buff2 >> 48);
+         *dst++ = bytebuff2;
+-        bytebuff3 = (buff2 >> 40);
++        bytebuff3 = (uint8)(buff2 >> 40);
+         *dst++ = bytebuff3;
+-        bytebuff4 = (buff2 >> 32);
++        bytebuff4 = (uint8)(buff2 >> 32);
+         *dst++ = bytebuff4;
+         ready_bits -= 32;
+                     
+@@ -9061,12 +9084,13 @@ mirrorImage(uint16 spp, uint16 bps, uint16 mirror, uint32 width, uint32 length,
+     {
+     case MIRROR_BOTH:
+     case MIRROR_VERT: 
+-             line_buff = (unsigned char *)_TIFFmalloc(rowsize);
++             line_buff = (unsigned char *)_TIFFmalloc(rowsize + NUM_BUFF_OVERSIZE_BYTES);
+              if (line_buff == NULL)
+                {
+-	       TIFFError ("mirrorImage", "Unable to allocate mirror line buffer of %1u bytes", rowsize);
++	       TIFFError ("mirrorImage", "Unable to allocate mirror line buffer of %1u bytes", rowsize + NUM_BUFF_OVERSIZE_BYTES);
+                return (-1);
+                }
++             _TIFFmemset(line_buff, '\0', rowsize + NUM_BUFF_OVERSIZE_BYTES);
+ 
+              dst = ibuff + (rowsize * (length - 1));
+              for (row = 0; row < length / 2; row++)
+@@ -9098,11 +9122,12 @@ mirrorImage(uint16 spp, uint16 bps, uint16 mirror, uint32 width, uint32 length,
+ 		}
+ 	      else
+                 { /* non 8 bit per sample  data */
+-                if (!(line_buff = (unsigned char *)_TIFFmalloc(rowsize + 1)))
++                if (!(line_buff = (unsigned char *)_TIFFmalloc(rowsize + NUM_BUFF_OVERSIZE_BYTES)))
+                   {
+                   TIFFError("mirrorImage", "Unable to allocate mirror line buffer");
+                   return (-1);
+                   }
++                _TIFFmemset(line_buff, '\0', rowsize + NUM_BUFF_OVERSIZE_BYTES);
+                 bytes_per_sample = (bps + 7) / 8;
+                 bytes_per_pixel  = ((bps * spp) + 7) / 8;
+                 if (bytes_per_pixel < (bytes_per_sample + 1))
+@@ -9114,7 +9139,7 @@ mirrorImage(uint16 spp, uint16 bps, uint16 mirror, uint32 width, uint32 length,
+                   {
+ 		  row_offset = row * rowsize;
+                   src = ibuff + row_offset;
+-                  _TIFFmemset (line_buff, '\0', rowsize);
++                  _TIFFmemset (line_buff, '\0', rowsize + NUM_BUFF_OVERSIZE_BYTES);
+                   switch (shift_width)
+                     {
+                     case 1: if (reverseSamples16bits(spp, bps, width, src, line_buff))

meta/recipes-multimedia/libtiff/files/CVE-2022-3597_3626_3627.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+From f7c06c395daf1b2c52ab431e00db2d9fc2ac993e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Su Laus <sulau@freenet.de>
+Date: Tue, 10 May 2022 20:03:17 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] tiffcrop: Fix issue #330 and some more from 320 to 349
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [import from debian http://security.debian.org/debian-security/pool/updates/main/t/tiff/tiff_4.1.0+git191117-2~deb10u7.debian.tar.xz ]
+CVE: CVE-2022-3597 CVE-2022-3626 CVE-2022-3627
+Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
+
+Origin: https://gitlab.com/libtiff/libtiff/-/commit/e319508023580e2f70e6e626f745b5b2a1707313
+Origin: https://gitlab.com/libtiff/libtiff/-/commit/8fe3735942ea1d90d8cef843b55b3efe8ab6feaf
+Origin: https://gitlab.com/libtiff/libtiff/-/commit/bad48e90b410df32172006c7876da449ba62cdba
+Origin: https://gitlab.com/libtiff/libtiff/-/commit/236b7191f04c60d09ee836ae13b50f812c841047
+Reviewed-by: Sylvain Beucler <beuc@debian.org>
+Last-Update: 2023-01-17
+
+---
+ tools/tiffcrop.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
+ 1 file changed, 42 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/tools/tiffcrop.c b/tools/tiffcrop.c
+index c923920..a0789a3 100644
+--- a/tools/tiffcrop.c
++++ b/tools/tiffcrop.c
+@@ -103,7 +103,12 @@
+  *                selects which functions dump data, with higher numbers selecting
+  *                lower level, scanline level routines. Debug reports a limited set
+  *                of messages to monitor progess without enabling dump logs.
+- */
++ *
++ * Note 1:  The (-X|-Y), -Z, -z and -S options are mutually exclusive.
++ *          In no case should the options be applied to a given selection successively.
++ * Note 2:  Any of the -X, -Y, -Z and -z options together with other PAGE_MODE_x options
++ *          such as -H, -V, -P, -J or -K are not supported and may cause buffer overflows.
++  */
+ 
+ static   char tiffcrop_version_id[] = "2.4.1";
+ static   char tiffcrop_rev_date[] = "03-03-2010";
+@@ -176,12 +181,12 @@ extern int getopt(int argc, char * const argv[], const char *optstring);
+ #define ROTATECW_270 32
+ #define ROTATE_ANY (ROTATECW_90 | ROTATECW_180 | ROTATECW_270)
+ 
+-#define CROP_NONE     0
+-#define CROP_MARGINS  1
+-#define CROP_WIDTH    2
+-#define CROP_LENGTH   4
+-#define CROP_ZONES    8
+-#define CROP_REGIONS 16
++#define CROP_NONE     0     /* "-S" -> Page_MODE_ROWSCOLS and page->rows/->cols != 0 */
++#define CROP_MARGINS  1     /* "-m" */
++#define CROP_WIDTH    2     /* "-X" */
++#define CROP_LENGTH   4     /* "-Y" */
++#define CROP_ZONES    8     /* "-Z" */
++#define CROP_REGIONS 16     /* "-z" */
+ #define CROP_ROTATE  32
+ #define CROP_MIRROR  64
+ #define CROP_INVERT 128
+@@ -323,7 +328,7 @@ struct crop_mask {
+ #define PAGE_MODE_RESOLUTION   1
+ #define PAGE_MODE_PAPERSIZE    2
+ #define PAGE_MODE_MARGINS      4
+-#define PAGE_MODE_ROWSCOLS     8
++#define PAGE_MODE_ROWSCOLS     8    /* for -S option */
+ 
+ #define INVERT_DATA_ONLY      10
+ #define INVERT_DATA_AND_TAG   11
+@@ -754,6 +759,12 @@ static   char* usage_info[] = {
+ "             The four debug/dump options are independent, though it makes little sense to",
+ "             specify a dump file without specifying a detail level.",
+ " ",
++"Note 1:      The (-X|-Y), -Z, -z and -S options are mutually exclusive.",
++"             In no case should the options be applied to a given selection successively.",
++" ",
++"Note 2:      Any of the -X, -Y, -Z and -z options together with other PAGE_MODE_x options",
++"             such as - H, -V, -P, -J or -K are not supported and may cause buffer overflows.",
++" ",
+ NULL
+ };
+ 
+@@ -2112,6 +2123,27 @@ void  process_command_opts (int argc, char *argv[], char *mp, char *mode, uint32
+ 		/*NOTREACHED*/
+       }
+     }
++    /*-- Check for not allowed combinations (e.g. -X, -Y and -Z, -z and -S are mutually exclusive) --*/
++    char XY, Z, R, S;
++    XY = ((crop_data->crop_mode & CROP_WIDTH) || (crop_data->crop_mode & CROP_LENGTH)) ? 1 : 0;
++    Z = (crop_data->crop_mode & CROP_ZONES) ? 1 : 0;
++    R = (crop_data->crop_mode & CROP_REGIONS) ? 1 : 0;
++    S = (page->mode & PAGE_MODE_ROWSCOLS) ? 1 : 0;
++    if (XY + Z + R + S > 1) {
++        TIFFError("tiffcrop input error", "The crop options(-X|-Y), -Z, -z and -S are mutually exclusive.->exit");
++        exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
++    }
++
++    /* Check for not allowed combination:
++     * Any of the -X, -Y, -Z and -z options together with other PAGE_MODE_x options
++     * such as -H, -V, -P, -J or -K are not supported and may cause buffer overflows.
++.    */
++    if ((XY + Z + R > 0) && page->mode != PAGE_MODE_NONE) {
++        TIFFError("tiffcrop input error",
++            "Any of the crop options -X, -Y, -Z and -z together with other PAGE_MODE_x options such as - H, -V, -P, -J or -K is not supported and may cause buffer overflows..->exit");
++        exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
++    }
++
+   }  /* end process_command_opts */
+ 
+ /* Start a new output file if one has not been previously opened or
+@@ -2384,6 +2416,7 @@ main(int argc, char* argv[])
+         exit (-1);
+ 	}
+ 
++      /* Crop input image and copy zones and regions from input image into seg_buffs or crop_buff. */
+       if (crop.selections > 0)
+         {
+         if (processCropSelections(&image, &crop, &read_buff, seg_buffs))
+@@ -2400,6 +2433,7 @@ main(int argc, char* argv[])
+           exit (-1);
+ 	  }
+ 	}
++      /* Format and write selected image parts to output file(s). */
+       if (page.mode == PAGE_MODE_NONE)
+         {  /* Whole image or sections not based on output page size */
+         if (crop.selections > 0)

meta/recipes-multimedia/libtiff/files/CVE-2022-3599.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,277 @@
+From 01bca7e6f608da7696949fca6acda78b9935ba19 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Su_Laus <sulau@freenet.de>
+Date: Tue, 30 Aug 2022 16:56:48 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Revised handling of TIFFTAG_INKNAMES and related
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [import from debian http://security.debian.org/debian-security/pool/updates/main/t/tiff/tiff_4.1.0+git191117-2~deb10u7.debian.tar.xz ]
+CVE: CVE-2022-3599
+Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
+
+Origin: https://gitlab.com/libtiff/libtiff/-/commit/e813112545942107551433d61afd16ac094ff246
+Reviewed-by: Sylvain Beucler <beuc@debian.org>
+Last-Update: 2023-01-17
+
+ TIFFTAG_NUMBEROFINKS value
+
+In order to solve the buffer overflow issues related to TIFFTAG_INKNAMES and related TIFFTAG_NUMBEROFINKS value, a revised handling of those tags within LibTiff is proposed:
+
+Behaviour for writing:
+    `NumberOfInks`  MUST fit to the number of inks in the `InkNames` string.
+    `NumberOfInks` is automatically set when `InkNames` is set.
+    If `NumberOfInks` is different to the number of inks within `InkNames` string, that will be corrected and a warning is issued.
+    If `NumberOfInks` is not equal to samplesperpixel only a warning will be issued.
+
+Behaviour for reading:
+    When reading `InkNames` from a TIFF file, the `NumberOfInks` will be set automatically to the number of inks in `InkNames` string.
+    If `NumberOfInks` is different to the number of inks within `InkNames` string, that will be corrected and a warning is issued.
+    If  `NumberOfInks` is not equal to samplesperpixel only a warning will be issued.
+
+This allows the safe use of the NumberOfInks value to read out the InkNames without buffer overflow
+
+This MR will close the following issues:  #149, #150, #152, #168 (to be checked), #250, #269, #398 and #456.
+
+It also fixes the old bug at http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2599, for which the limitation of `NumberOfInks = SPP` was introduced, which is in my opinion not necessary and does not solve the general issue.
+
+---
+ libtiff/tif_dir.c      | 120 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
+ libtiff/tif_dir.h      |   2 +
+ libtiff/tif_dirinfo.c  |   2 +-
+ libtiff/tif_dirwrite.c |   5 ++
+ libtiff/tif_print.c    |   4 ++
+ 5 files changed, 83 insertions(+), 50 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/libtiff/tif_dir.c b/libtiff/tif_dir.c
+index 39aeeb4..9d8267a 100644
+--- a/libtiff/tif_dir.c
++++ b/libtiff/tif_dir.c
+@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
+  * (and also some miscellaneous stuff)
+  */
+ #include "tiffiop.h"
++# include <inttypes.h>
+ 
+ /*
+  * These are used in the backwards compatibility code...
+@@ -137,32 +138,30 @@ setExtraSamples(TIFF* tif, va_list ap, uint32* v)
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+- * Confirm we have "samplesperpixel" ink names separated by \0.  Returns 
++ * Count ink names separated by \0.  Returns
+  * zero if the ink names are not as expected.
+  */
+-static uint32
+-checkInkNamesString(TIFF* tif, uint32 slen, const char* s)
++static uint16
++countInkNamesString(TIFF *tif, uint32 slen, const char *s)
+ {
+-	TIFFDirectory* td = &tif->tif_dir;
+-	uint16 i = td->td_samplesperpixel;
++	uint16 i = 0;
++	const char *ep = s + slen;
++	const char *cp = s;
+ 
+ 	if (slen > 0) {
+-		const char* ep = s+slen;
+-		const char* cp = s;
+-		for (; i > 0; i--) {
++		do {
+ 			for (; cp < ep && *cp != '\0'; cp++) {}
+ 			if (cp >= ep)
+ 				goto bad;
+ 			cp++;				/* skip \0 */
+-		}
+-		return ((uint32)(cp-s));
++			i++;
++		} while (cp < ep);
++		return (i);
+ 	}
+ bad:
+ 	TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, "TIFFSetField",
+-	    "%s: Invalid InkNames value; expecting %d names, found %d",
+-	    tif->tif_name,
+-	    td->td_samplesperpixel,
+-	    td->td_samplesperpixel-i);
++		"%s: Invalid InkNames value; no NUL at given buffer end location %"PRIu32", after %"PRIu16" ink",
++		tif->tif_name, slen, i);
+ 	return (0);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -476,13 +475,61 @@ _TIFFVSetField(TIFF* tif, uint32 tag, va_list ap)
+ 		_TIFFsetFloatArray(&td->td_refblackwhite, va_arg(ap, float*), 6);
+ 		break;
+ 	case TIFFTAG_INKNAMES:
+-		v = (uint16) va_arg(ap, uint16_vap);
+-		s = va_arg(ap, char*);
+-		v = checkInkNamesString(tif, v, s);
+-		status = v > 0;
+-		if( v > 0 ) {
+-			_TIFFsetNString(&td->td_inknames, s, v);
+-			td->td_inknameslen = v;
++		{
++			v = (uint16) va_arg(ap, uint16_vap);
++			s = va_arg(ap, char*);
++			uint16 ninksinstring;
++			ninksinstring = countInkNamesString(tif, v, s);
++			status = ninksinstring > 0;
++			if(ninksinstring > 0 ) {
++				_TIFFsetNString(&td->td_inknames, s, v);
++				td->td_inknameslen = v;
++				/* Set NumberOfInks to the value ninksinstring */
++				if (TIFFFieldSet(tif, FIELD_NUMBEROFINKS))
++				{
++					if (td->td_numberofinks != ninksinstring) {
++						TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module,
++							"Warning %s; Tag %s:\n  Value %"PRIu16" of NumberOfInks is different from the number of inks %"PRIu16".\n  -> NumberOfInks value adapted to %"PRIu16"",
++							tif->tif_name, fip->field_name, td->td_numberofinks, ninksinstring, ninksinstring);
++						td->td_numberofinks = ninksinstring;
++					}
++				} else {
++					td->td_numberofinks = ninksinstring;
++					TIFFSetFieldBit(tif, FIELD_NUMBEROFINKS);
++				}
++				if (TIFFFieldSet(tif, FIELD_SAMPLESPERPIXEL))
++				{
++					if (td->td_numberofinks != td->td_samplesperpixel) {
++						TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module,
++							"Warning %s; Tag %s:\n  Value %"PRIu16" of NumberOfInks is different from the SamplesPerPixel value %"PRIu16"",
++							tif->tif_name, fip->field_name, td->td_numberofinks, td->td_samplesperpixel);
++					}
++				}
++			}
++		}
++		break;
++	case TIFFTAG_NUMBEROFINKS:
++		v = (uint16)va_arg(ap, uint16_vap);
++		/* If InkNames already set also NumberOfInks is set accordingly and should be equal */
++		if (TIFFFieldSet(tif, FIELD_INKNAMES))
++		{
++			if (v != td->td_numberofinks) {
++				TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module,
++					"Error %s; Tag %s:\n  It is not possible to set the value %"PRIu32" for NumberOfInks\n  which is different from the number of inks in the InkNames tag (%"PRIu16")",
++					tif->tif_name, fip->field_name, v, td->td_numberofinks);
++				/* Do not set / overwrite number of inks already set by InkNames case accordingly. */
++				status = 0;
++			}
++		} else {
++			td->td_numberofinks = (uint16)v;
++			if (TIFFFieldSet(tif, FIELD_SAMPLESPERPIXEL))
++			{
++				if (td->td_numberofinks != td->td_samplesperpixel) {
++					TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module,
++						"Warning %s; Tag %s:\n  Value %"PRIu32" of NumberOfInks is different from the SamplesPerPixel value %"PRIu16"",
++						tif->tif_name, fip->field_name, v, td->td_samplesperpixel);
++				}
++			}
+ 		}
+ 		break;
+ 	case TIFFTAG_PERSAMPLE:
+@@ -887,34 +934,6 @@ _TIFFVGetField(TIFF* tif, uint32 tag, va_list ap)
+ 	if (fip->field_bit == FIELD_CUSTOM) {
+ 		standard_tag = 0;
+ 	}
+-	
+-        if( standard_tag == TIFFTAG_NUMBEROFINKS )
+-        {
+-            int i;
+-            for (i = 0; i < td->td_customValueCount; i++) {
+-                uint16 val;
+-                TIFFTagValue *tv = td->td_customValues + i;
+-                if (tv->info->field_tag != standard_tag)
+-                    continue;
+-                if( tv->value == NULL )
+-                    return 0;
+-                val = *(uint16 *)tv->value;
+-                /* Truncate to SamplesPerPixel, since the */
+-                /* setting code for INKNAMES assume that there are SamplesPerPixel */
+-                /* inknames. */
+-                /* Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2599 */
+-                if( val > td->td_samplesperpixel )
+-                {
+-                    TIFFWarningExt(tif->tif_clientdata,"_TIFFVGetField",
+-                                   "Truncating NumberOfInks from %u to %u",
+-                                   val, td->td_samplesperpixel);
+-                    val = td->td_samplesperpixel;
+-                }
+-                *va_arg(ap, uint16*) = val;
+-                return 1;
+-            }
+-            return 0;
+-        }
+ 
+ 	switch (standard_tag) {
+ 		case TIFFTAG_SUBFILETYPE:
+@@ -1092,6 +1111,9 @@ _TIFFVGetField(TIFF* tif, uint32 tag, va_list ap)
+ 		case TIFFTAG_INKNAMES:
+ 			*va_arg(ap, char**) = td->td_inknames;
+ 			break;
++		case TIFFTAG_NUMBEROFINKS:
++			*va_arg(ap, uint16 *) = td->td_numberofinks;
++			break;
+ 		default:
+ 			{
+ 				int i;
+diff --git a/libtiff/tif_dir.h b/libtiff/tif_dir.h
+index e7f0667..7cad679 100644
+--- a/libtiff/tif_dir.h
++++ b/libtiff/tif_dir.h
+@@ -117,6 +117,7 @@ typedef struct {
+ 	/* CMYK parameters */
+ 	int     td_inknameslen;
+ 	char*   td_inknames;
++	uint16 td_numberofinks;                 /* number of inks in InkNames string */
+ 
+ 	int     td_customValueCount;
+         TIFFTagValue *td_customValues;
+@@ -174,6 +175,7 @@ typedef struct {
+ #define FIELD_TRANSFERFUNCTION         44
+ #define FIELD_INKNAMES                 46
+ #define FIELD_SUBIFD                   49
++#define FIELD_NUMBEROFINKS             50
+ /*      FIELD_CUSTOM (see tiffio.h)    65 */
+ /* end of support for well-known tags; codec-private tags follow */
+ #define FIELD_CODEC                    66  /* base of codec-private tags */
+diff --git a/libtiff/tif_dirinfo.c b/libtiff/tif_dirinfo.c
+index fbfaaf0..bf7de70 100644
+--- a/libtiff/tif_dirinfo.c
++++ b/libtiff/tif_dirinfo.c
+@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ tiffFields[] = {
+ 	{ TIFFTAG_SUBIFD, -1, -1, TIFF_IFD8, 0, TIFF_SETGET_C16_IFD8, TIFF_SETGET_UNDEFINED, FIELD_SUBIFD, 1, 1, "SubIFD", (TIFFFieldArray*) &tiffFieldArray },
+ 	{ TIFFTAG_INKSET, 1, 1, TIFF_SHORT, 0, TIFF_SETGET_UINT16, TIFF_SETGET_UNDEFINED, FIELD_CUSTOM, 0, 0, "InkSet", NULL },
+ 	{ TIFFTAG_INKNAMES, -1, -1, TIFF_ASCII, 0, TIFF_SETGET_C16_ASCII, TIFF_SETGET_UNDEFINED, FIELD_INKNAMES, 1, 1, "InkNames", NULL },
+-	{ TIFFTAG_NUMBEROFINKS, 1, 1, TIFF_SHORT, 0, TIFF_SETGET_UINT16, TIFF_SETGET_UNDEFINED, FIELD_CUSTOM, 1, 0, "NumberOfInks", NULL },
++	{ TIFFTAG_NUMBEROFINKS, 1, 1, TIFF_SHORT, 0, TIFF_SETGET_UINT16, TIFF_SETGET_UNDEFINED, FIELD_NUMBEROFINKS, 1, 0, "NumberOfInks", NULL },
+ 	{ TIFFTAG_DOTRANGE, 2, 2, TIFF_SHORT, 0, TIFF_SETGET_UINT16_PAIR, TIFF_SETGET_UNDEFINED, FIELD_CUSTOM, 0, 0, "DotRange", NULL },
+ 	{ TIFFTAG_TARGETPRINTER, -1, -1, TIFF_ASCII, 0, TIFF_SETGET_ASCII, TIFF_SETGET_UNDEFINED, FIELD_CUSTOM, 1, 0, "TargetPrinter", NULL },
+ 	{ TIFFTAG_EXTRASAMPLES, -1, -1, TIFF_SHORT, 0, TIFF_SETGET_C16_UINT16, TIFF_SETGET_UNDEFINED, FIELD_EXTRASAMPLES, 0, 1, "ExtraSamples", NULL },
+diff --git a/libtiff/tif_dirwrite.c b/libtiff/tif_dirwrite.c
+index 9e4d306..a2dbc3b 100644
+--- a/libtiff/tif_dirwrite.c
++++ b/libtiff/tif_dirwrite.c
+@@ -677,6 +677,11 @@ TIFFWriteDirectorySec(TIFF* tif, int isimage, int imagedone, uint64* pdiroff)
+ 				if (!TIFFWriteDirectoryTagAscii(tif,&ndir,dir,TIFFTAG_INKNAMES,tif->tif_dir.td_inknameslen,tif->tif_dir.td_inknames))
+ 					goto bad;
+ 			}
++			if (TIFFFieldSet(tif, FIELD_NUMBEROFINKS))
++			{
++				if (!TIFFWriteDirectoryTagShort(tif, &ndir, dir, TIFFTAG_NUMBEROFINKS, tif->tif_dir.td_numberofinks))
++					goto bad;
++			}
+ 			if (TIFFFieldSet(tif,FIELD_SUBIFD))
+ 			{
+ 				if (!TIFFWriteDirectoryTagSubifd(tif,&ndir,dir))
+diff --git a/libtiff/tif_print.c b/libtiff/tif_print.c
+index a073794..a9f05a7 100644
+--- a/libtiff/tif_print.c
++++ b/libtiff/tif_print.c
+@@ -402,6 +402,10 @@ TIFFPrintDirectory(TIFF* tif, FILE* fd, long flags)
+ 		}
+                 fputs("\n", fd);
+ 	}
++	if (TIFFFieldSet(tif, FIELD_NUMBEROFINKS)) {
++		fprintf(fd, "  NumberOfInks: %d\n",
++			td->td_numberofinks);
++	}
+ 	if (TIFFFieldSet(tif,FIELD_THRESHHOLDING)) {
+ 		fprintf(fd, "  Thresholding: ");
+ 		switch (td->td_threshholding) {

meta/recipes-multimedia/libtiff/files/CVE-2022-3970.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+From 7e87352217d1f0c77eee7033ac59e3aab08532bb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Even Rouault <even.rouault@spatialys.com>
+Date: Tue, 8 Nov 2022 15:16:58 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] TIFFReadRGBATileExt(): fix (unsigned) integer overflow on
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [import from debian http://security.debian.org/debian-security/pool/updates/main/t/tiff/tiff_4.1.0+git191117-2~deb10u7.debian.tar.xz ]
+CVE: CVE-2022-3970
+Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
+
+Origin: https://gitlab.com/libtiff/libtiff/-/commit/227500897dfb07fb7d27f7aa570050e62617e3be
+Reviewed-by: Sylvain Beucler <beuc@debian.org>
+Last-Update: 2023-01-17
+
+ strips/tiles > 2 GB
+
+Fixes https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=53137
+
+---
+ libtiff/tif_getimage.c | 8 ++++----
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/libtiff/tif_getimage.c b/libtiff/tif_getimage.c
+index 96ab146..0b90dcc 100644
+--- a/libtiff/tif_getimage.c
++++ b/libtiff/tif_getimage.c
+@@ -3042,15 +3042,15 @@ TIFFReadRGBATileExt(TIFF* tif, uint32 col, uint32 row, uint32 * raster, int stop
+         return( ok );
+ 
+     for( i_row = 0; i_row < read_ysize; i_row++ ) {
+-        memmove( raster + (tile_ysize - i_row - 1) * tile_xsize,
+-                 raster + (read_ysize - i_row - 1) * read_xsize,
++        memmove( raster + (size_t)(tile_ysize - i_row - 1) * tile_xsize,
++                 raster + (size_t)(read_ysize - i_row - 1) * read_xsize,
+                  read_xsize * sizeof(uint32) );
+-        _TIFFmemset( raster + (tile_ysize - i_row - 1) * tile_xsize+read_xsize,
++        _TIFFmemset( raster + (size_t)(tile_ysize - i_row - 1) * tile_xsize+read_xsize,
+                      0, sizeof(uint32) * (tile_xsize - read_xsize) );
+     }
+ 
+     for( i_row = read_ysize; i_row < tile_ysize; i_row++ ) {
+-        _TIFFmemset( raster + (tile_ysize - i_row - 1) * tile_xsize,
++        _TIFFmemset( raster + (size_t)(tile_ysize - i_row - 1) * tile_xsize,
+                      0, sizeof(uint32) * tile_xsize );
+     }
+ 

meta/recipes-multimedia/libtiff/files/CVE-2022-48281.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+From 424c82b5b33256e7f03faace51dc8010f3ded9ff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Su Laus <sulau@freenet.de>
+Date: Sat, 21 Jan 2023 15:58:10 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] tiffcrop: Correct simple copy paste error. Fix #488.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [import from debian http://security.debian.org/debian-security/pool/updates/main/t/tiff/tiff_4.1.0+git191117-2~deb10u7.debian.tar.xz]
+CVE: CVE-2022-48281
+Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
+
+---
+ tools/tiffcrop.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/tools/tiffcrop.c b/tools/tiffcrop.c
+index a0789a3..8aed9cd 100644
+--- a/tools/tiffcrop.c
++++ b/tools/tiffcrop.c
+@@ -7564,7 +7564,7 @@ processCropSelections(struct image_data *image, struct crop_mask *crop,
+         crop_buff = (unsigned char *)_TIFFmalloc(cropsize + NUM_BUFF_OVERSIZE_BYTES);
+       else
+         {
+-        prev_cropsize = seg_buffs[0].size;
++        prev_cropsize = seg_buffs[i].size;
+         if (prev_cropsize < cropsize)
+           {
+           next_buff = _TIFFrealloc(crop_buff, cropsize + NUM_BUFF_OVERSIZE_BYTES);

meta/recipes-multimedia/libtiff/files/CVE-2023-0795_0796_0797_0798_0799.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
+From 7808740e100ba30ffb791044f3b14dec3e85ed6f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Markus Koschany <apo@debian.org>
+Date: Tue, 21 Feb 2023 14:26:43 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2023-0795
+
+This is also the fix for CVE-2023-0796, CVE-2023-0797, CVE-2023-0798,
+CVE-2023-0799.
+
+Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/1031632
+Origin: https://gitlab.com/libtiff/libtiff/-/commit/afaabc3e50d4e5d80a94143f7e3c997e7e410f68
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [import from debian http://security.debian.org/debian-security/pool/updates/main/t/tiff/tiff_4.1.0+git191117-2~deb10u7.debian.tar.xz ]
+CVE: CVE-2023-0795 CVE-2023-0796 CVE-2023-0797 CVE-2023-0798 CVE-2023-0799
+Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
+---
+ tools/tiffcrop.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
+ 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/tools/tiffcrop.c b/tools/tiffcrop.c
+index 8aed9cd..f21a7d7 100644
+--- a/tools/tiffcrop.c
++++ b/tools/tiffcrop.c
+@@ -277,7 +277,6 @@ struct  region {
+   uint32 width;     /* width in pixels */
+   uint32 length;    /* length in pixels */
+   uint32 buffsize;  /* size of buffer needed to hold the cropped region */
+-  unsigned char *buffptr; /* address of start of the region */
+ };
+ 
+ /* Cropping parameters from command line and image data 
+@@ -532,7 +531,7 @@ static int rotateContigSamples24bits(uint16, uint16, uint16, uint32,
+ static int rotateContigSamples32bits(uint16, uint16, uint16, uint32, 
+                                      uint32,   uint32, uint8 *, uint8 *);
+ static int rotateImage(uint16, struct image_data *, uint32 *, uint32 *,
+- 		       unsigned char **);
++ 		       unsigned char **, int);
+ static int mirrorImage(uint16, uint16, uint16, uint32, uint32,
+ 		       unsigned char *);
+ static int invertImage(uint16, uint16, uint16, uint32, uint32,
+@@ -5112,7 +5111,6 @@ initCropMasks (struct crop_mask *cps)
+      cps->regionlist[i].width = 0;
+      cps->regionlist[i].length = 0;
+      cps->regionlist[i].buffsize = 0;
+-     cps->regionlist[i].buffptr = NULL;
+      cps->zonelist[i].position = 0;
+      cps->zonelist[i].total = 0;
+      }
+@@ -6358,8 +6356,13 @@ static int  correct_orientation(struct image_data *image, unsigned char **work_b
+                   image->adjustments & ROTATE_ANY);
+       return (-1);
+       }
+- 
+-    if (rotateImage(rotation, image, &image->width, &image->length, work_buff_ptr))
++
++      /* Dummy variable in order not to switch two times the
++       * image->width,->length within rotateImage(),
++       * but switch xres, yres there. */
++      uint32_t width = image->width;
++      uint32_t length = image->length;
++      if (rotateImage(rotation, image, &width, &length, work_buff_ptr, TRUE))
+       {
+       TIFFError ("correct_orientation", "Unable to rotate image");
+       return (-1);
+@@ -6427,7 +6430,6 @@ extractCompositeRegions(struct image_data *image,  struct crop_mask *crop,
+     /* These should not be needed for composite images */
+     crop->regionlist[i].width = crop_width;
+     crop->regionlist[i].length = crop_length;
+-    crop->regionlist[i].buffptr = crop_buff;
+ 
+     src_rowsize = ((img_width * bps * spp) + 7) / 8;
+     dst_rowsize = (((crop_width * bps * count) + 7) / 8);
+@@ -6664,7 +6666,6 @@ extractSeparateRegion(struct image_data *image,  struct crop_mask *crop,
+ 
+   crop->regionlist[region].width = crop_width;
+   crop->regionlist[region].length = crop_length;
+-  crop->regionlist[region].buffptr = crop_buff;
+ 
+   src = read_buff;
+   dst = crop_buff;
+@@ -7542,7 +7543,7 @@ processCropSelections(struct image_data *image, struct crop_mask *crop,
+     if (crop->crop_mode & CROP_ROTATE) /* rotate should be last as it can reallocate the buffer */
+       {
+       if (rotateImage(crop->rotation, image, &crop->combined_width, 
+-                      &crop->combined_length, &crop_buff))
++                      &crop->combined_length, &crop_buff, FALSE))
+         {
+         TIFFError("processCropSelections", 
+                   "Failed to rotate composite regions by %d degrees", crop->rotation);
+@@ -7648,7 +7649,7 @@ processCropSelections(struct image_data *image, struct crop_mask *crop,
+       if (crop->crop_mode & CROP_ROTATE) /* rotate should be last as it can reallocate the buffer */
+         {
+ 	if (rotateImage(crop->rotation, image, &crop->regionlist[i].width, 
+-			&crop->regionlist[i].length, &crop_buff))
++			&crop->regionlist[i].length, &crop_buff, FALSE))
+           {
+           TIFFError("processCropSelections", 
+                     "Failed to rotate crop region by %d degrees", crop->rotation);
+@@ -7780,7 +7781,7 @@ createCroppedImage(struct image_data *image, struct crop_mask *crop,
+   if (crop->crop_mode & CROP_ROTATE) /* rotate should be last as it can reallocate the buffer */
+     {
+     if (rotateImage(crop->rotation, image, &crop->combined_width, 
+-                    &crop->combined_length, crop_buff_ptr))
++                    &crop->combined_length, crop_buff_ptr, TRUE))
+       {
+       TIFFError("createCroppedImage", 
+                 "Failed to rotate image or cropped selection by %d degrees", crop->rotation);
+@@ -8443,7 +8444,7 @@ rotateContigSamples32bits(uint16 rotation, uint16 spp, uint16 bps, uint32 width,
+ /* Rotate an image by a multiple of 90 degrees clockwise */
+ static int
+ rotateImage(uint16 rotation, struct image_data *image, uint32 *img_width, 
+-            uint32 *img_length, unsigned char **ibuff_ptr)
++            uint32 *img_length, unsigned char **ibuff_ptr, int rot_image_params)
+   {
+   int      shift_width;
+   uint32   bytes_per_pixel, bytes_per_sample;
+@@ -8634,11 +8635,15 @@ rotateImage(uint16 rotation, struct image_data *image, uint32 *img_width,
+ 
+               *img_width = length;
+               *img_length = width;
+-              image->width = length;
+-              image->length = width;
+-              res_temp = image->xres;
+-              image->xres = image->yres;
+-              image->yres = res_temp;
++            /* Only toggle image parameters if whole input image is rotated. */
++            if (rot_image_params)
++            {
++                image->width = length;
++                image->length = width;
++                res_temp = image->xres;
++                image->xres = image->yres;
++                image->yres = res_temp;
++            }
+ 	      break;
+ 
+     case 270: if ((bps % 8) == 0) /* byte aligned data */
+@@ -8711,11 +8716,15 @@ rotateImage(uint16 rotation, struct image_data *image, uint32 *img_width,
+ 
+               *img_width = length;
+               *img_length = width;
+-              image->width = length;
+-              image->length = width;
+-              res_temp = image->xres;
+-              image->xres = image->yres;
+-              image->yres = res_temp;
++            /* Only toggle image parameters if whole input image is rotated. */
++            if (rot_image_params)
++            {
++                image->width = length;
++                image->length = width;
++                res_temp = image->xres;
++                image->xres = image->yres;
++                image->yres = res_temp;
++            }
+               break;
+     default:
+               break;

meta/recipes-multimedia/libtiff/files/CVE-2023-0800_0801_0802_0803_0804.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+From e18be834497e0ebf68d443abb9e18187f36cd3bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Markus Koschany <apo@debian.org>
+Date: Tue, 21 Feb 2023 14:39:52 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2023-0800
+
+This is also the fix for CVE-2023-0801, CVE-2023-0802, CVE-2023-0803,
+CVE-2023-0804.
+
+Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/1031632
+Origin: https://gitlab.com/libtiff/libtiff/-/commit/33aee1275d9d1384791d2206776eb8152d397f00
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [import from debian http://security.debian.org/debian-security/pool/updates/main/t/tiff/tiff_4.1.0+git191117-2~deb10u7.debian.tar.xz ]
+CVE: CVE-2023-0800 CVE-2023-0801 CVE-2023-0802 CVE-2023-0803 CVE-2023-0804 
+Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
+---
+ tools/tiffcrop.c | 73 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 69 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/tools/tiffcrop.c b/tools/tiffcrop.c
+index f21a7d7..742615a 100644
+--- a/tools/tiffcrop.c
++++ b/tools/tiffcrop.c
+@@ -5250,18 +5250,40 @@ computeInputPixelOffsets(struct crop_mask *crop, struct image_data *image,
+ 
+       crop->regionlist[i].buffsize = buffsize;
+       crop->bufftotal += buffsize;
++
++      /* For composite images with more than one region, the
++       * combined_length or combined_width always needs to be equal,
++       * respectively.
++       * Otherwise, even the first section/region copy
++       * action might cause buffer overrun. */
+       if (crop->img_mode == COMPOSITE_IMAGES)
+         {
+         switch (crop->edge_ref)
+           {
+           case EDGE_LEFT:
+           case EDGE_RIGHT:
++               if (i > 0 && zlength != crop->combined_length)
++               {
++                   TIFFError(
++                       "computeInputPixelOffsets",
++                       "Only equal length regions can be combined for "
++                       "-E left or right");
++                   return (-1);
++               }
+                crop->combined_length = zlength;
+                crop->combined_width += zwidth;
+                break;
+           case EDGE_BOTTOM:
+           case EDGE_TOP:  /* width from left, length from top */
+           default:
++               if (i > 0 && zwidth != crop->combined_width)
++                {
++                    TIFFError("computeInputPixelOffsets",
++                              "Only equal width regions can be "
++                              "combined for -E "
++                              "top or bottom");
++                    return (-1);
++                }
+                crop->combined_width = zwidth;
+                crop->combined_length += zlength;
+ 	       break;
+@@ -6416,6 +6438,47 @@ extractCompositeRegions(struct image_data *image,  struct crop_mask *crop,
+   crop->combined_width = 0;
+   crop->combined_length = 0;
+ 
++    /* If there is more than one region, check beforehand whether all the width
++     * and length values of the regions are the same, respectively. */
++    switch (crop->edge_ref)
++    {
++        default:
++        case EDGE_TOP:
++        case EDGE_BOTTOM:
++            for (i = 1; i < crop->selections; i++)
++            {
++                uint32_t crop_width0 =
++                    crop->regionlist[i - 1].x2 - crop->regionlist[i - 1].x1 + 1;
++                uint32_t crop_width1 =
++                    crop->regionlist[i].x2 - crop->regionlist[i].x1 + 1;
++                if (crop_width0 != crop_width1)
++                {
++                    TIFFError("extractCompositeRegions",
++                              "Only equal width regions can be combined for -E "
++                              "top or bottom");
++                    return (1);
++                }
++            }
++            break;
++        case EDGE_LEFT:
++        case EDGE_RIGHT:
++            for (i = 1; i < crop->selections; i++)
++            {
++                uint32_t crop_length0 =
++                    crop->regionlist[i - 1].y2 - crop->regionlist[i - 1].y1 + 1;
++                uint32_t crop_length1 =
++                    crop->regionlist[i].y2 - crop->regionlist[i].y1 + 1;
++                if (crop_length0 != crop_length1)
++                {
++                    TIFFError("extractCompositeRegions",
++                              "Only equal length regions can be combined for "
++                              "-E left or right");
++                    return (1);
++                }
++            }
++   }
++
++
+   for (i = 0; i < crop->selections; i++)
+     {
+     /* rows, columns, width, length are expressed in pixels */
+@@ -6439,8 +6502,9 @@ extractCompositeRegions(struct image_data *image,  struct crop_mask *crop,
+       default:
+       case EDGE_TOP:
+       case EDGE_BOTTOM:
+-	   if ((i > 0) && (crop_width != crop->regionlist[i - 1].width))
+-             {
++         if ((crop->selections > i + 1) &&
++                    (crop_width != crop->regionlist[i + 1].width))
++         {
+ 	     TIFFError ("extractCompositeRegions", 
+                           "Only equal width regions can be combined for -E top or bottom");
+ 	     return (1);
+@@ -6520,8 +6584,9 @@ extractCompositeRegions(struct image_data *image,  struct crop_mask *crop,
+ 	   break;
+       case EDGE_LEFT:  /* splice the pieces of each row together, side by side */
+       case EDGE_RIGHT:
+-	   if ((i > 0) && (crop_length != crop->regionlist[i - 1].length))
+-             {
++         if ((crop->selections > i + 1) &&
++                    (crop_length != crop->regionlist[i + 1].length))
++         {
+ 	     TIFFError ("extractCompositeRegions", 
+                           "Only equal length regions can be combined for -E left or right");
+ 	     return (1);

meta/recipes-multimedia/libtiff/tiff_4.1.0.bb

@@ -29,6 +29,13 @@ SRC_URI = "http://download.osgeo.org/libtiff/tiff-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://CVE-2022-2867-CVE-2022-2868-CVE-2022-2869.patch \
            file://CVE-2022-1354.patch \
            file://CVE-2022-1355.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-3570_3598.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-3597_3626_3627.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-3599.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-3970.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-48281.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-0795_0796_0797_0798_0799.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-0800_0801_0802_0803_0804.patch \
           "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "2165e7aba557463acc0664e71a3ed424"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "5d29f32517dadb6dbcd1255ea5bbc93a2b54b94fbf83653b4d65c7d6775b8634"

meta/recipes-support/apr/apr-util/0001-Fix-error-handling-in-gdbm.patch

@@ -1,135 +0,0 @@
-From 6b638fa9afbeb54dfa19378e391465a5284ce1ad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Changqing Li <changqing.li@windriver.com>
-Date: Wed, 12 Sep 2018 17:16:36 +0800
-Subject: [PATCH] Fix error handling in gdbm
-
-Only check for gdbm_errno if the return value of the called gdbm_*
-function says so. This fixes apr-util with gdbm 1.14, which does not
-seem to always reset gdbm_errno.
-
-Also make the gdbm driver return error codes starting with
-APR_OS_START_USEERR instead of always returning APR_EGENERAL. This is
-what the berkleydb driver already does.
-
-Also ensure that dsize is 0 if dptr == NULL.
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport[https://svn.apache.org/viewvc?
-view=revision&amp;revision=1825311]
-
-Signed-off-by: Changqing Li <changqing.li@windriver.com>
----
- dbm/apr_dbm_gdbm.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
- 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/dbm/apr_dbm_gdbm.c b/dbm/apr_dbm_gdbm.c
-index 749447a..1c86327 100644
---- a/dbm/apr_dbm_gdbm.c
-+++ b/dbm/apr_dbm_gdbm.c
-@@ -36,13 +36,25 @@
- static apr_status_t g2s(int gerr)
- {
-     if (gerr == -1) {
--        /* ### need to fix this */
--        return APR_EGENERAL;
-+        if (gdbm_errno == GDBM_NO_ERROR)
-+           return APR_SUCCESS;
-+        return APR_OS_START_USEERR + gdbm_errno;
-     }
- 
-     return APR_SUCCESS;
- }
- 
-+static apr_status_t gdat2s(datum d)
-+{
-+    if (d.dptr == NULL) {
-+        if (gdbm_errno == GDBM_NO_ERROR || gdbm_errno == GDBM_ITEM_NOT_FOUND)
-+           return APR_SUCCESS;
-+        return APR_OS_START_USEERR + gdbm_errno;
-+   }
-+
-+    return APR_SUCCESS;
-+}
-+
- static apr_status_t datum_cleanup(void *dptr)
- {
-     if (dptr)
-@@ -53,22 +65,15 @@ static apr_status_t datum_cleanup(void *dptr)
- 
- static apr_status_t set_error(apr_dbm_t *dbm, apr_status_t dbm_said)
- {
--    apr_status_t rv = APR_SUCCESS;
- 
--    /* ### ignore whatever the DBM said (dbm_said); ask it explicitly */
-+    dbm->errcode = dbm_said;  
- 
--    if ((dbm->errcode = gdbm_errno) == GDBM_NO_ERROR) {
-+    if (dbm_said == APR_SUCCESS)
-         dbm->errmsg = NULL;
--    }
--    else {
--        dbm->errmsg = gdbm_strerror(gdbm_errno);
--        rv = APR_EGENERAL;        /* ### need something better */
--    }
--
--    /* captured it. clear it now. */
--    gdbm_errno = GDBM_NO_ERROR;
-+    else
-+        dbm->errmsg = gdbm_strerror(dbm_said - APR_OS_START_USEERR);
- 
--    return rv;
-+    return dbm_said;
- }
- 
- /* --------------------------------------------------------------------------
-@@ -107,7 +112,7 @@ static apr_status_t vt_gdbm_open(apr_dbm_t **pdb, const char *pathname,
-                      NULL);
- 
-     if (file == NULL)
--        return APR_EGENERAL;      /* ### need a better error */
-+        return APR_OS_START_USEERR + gdbm_errno;   /* ### need a better error */
- 
-     /* we have an open database... return it */
-     *pdb = apr_pcalloc(pool, sizeof(**pdb));
-@@ -141,10 +146,12 @@ static apr_status_t vt_gdbm_fetch(apr_dbm_t *dbm, apr_datum_t key,
-     if (pvalue->dptr)
-         apr_pool_cleanup_register(dbm->pool, pvalue->dptr, datum_cleanup,
-                                   apr_pool_cleanup_null);
-+    else
-+       pvalue->dsize = 0;
- 
-     /* store the error info into DBM, and return a status code. Also, note
-        that *pvalue should have been cleared on error. */
--    return set_error(dbm, APR_SUCCESS);
-+    return set_error(dbm, gdat2s(rd));
- }
- 
- static apr_status_t vt_gdbm_store(apr_dbm_t *dbm, apr_datum_t key,
-@@ -201,9 +208,11 @@ static apr_status_t vt_gdbm_firstkey(apr_dbm_t *dbm, apr_datum_t *pkey)
-     if (pkey->dptr)
-         apr_pool_cleanup_register(dbm->pool, pkey->dptr, datum_cleanup,
-                                   apr_pool_cleanup_null);
-+    else
-+        pkey->dsize = 0;
- 
-     /* store any error info into DBM, and return a status code. */
--    return set_error(dbm, APR_SUCCESS);
-+    return set_error(dbm, gdat2s(rd));
- }
- 
- static apr_status_t vt_gdbm_nextkey(apr_dbm_t *dbm, apr_datum_t *pkey)
-@@ -221,9 +230,11 @@ static apr_status_t vt_gdbm_nextkey(apr_dbm_t *dbm, apr_datum_t *pkey)
-     if (pkey->dptr)
-         apr_pool_cleanup_register(dbm->pool, pkey->dptr, datum_cleanup,
-                                   apr_pool_cleanup_null);
-+    else
-+       pkey->dsize = 0;
- 
-     /* store any error info into DBM, and return a status code. */
--    return set_error(dbm, APR_SUCCESS);
-+    return set_error(dbm, gdat2s(rd));
- }
- 
- static void vt_gdbm_freedatum(apr_dbm_t *dbm, apr_datum_t data)
--- 
-2.7.4
-

meta/recipes-support/apr/apr-util_1.6.3.bb

@@ -13,11 +13,9 @@ SRC_URI = "${APACHE_MIRROR}/apr/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://configfix.patch \
            file://configure_fixes.patch \
            file://run-ptest \
-           file://0001-Fix-error-handling-in-gdbm.patch \
-"
+           "
 
-SRC_URI[md5sum] = "bd502b9a8670a8012c4d90c31a84955f"
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "b65e40713da57d004123b6319828be7f1273fbc6490e145874ee1177e112c459"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "2b74d8932703826862ca305b094eef2983c27b39d5c9414442e9976a9acf1983"
 
 EXTRA_OECONF = "--with-apr=${STAGING_BINDIR_CROSS}/apr-1-config \
 		--without-odbc \
@@ -35,6 +33,7 @@ OE_BINCONFIG_EXTRA_MANGLE = " -e 's:location=source:location=installed:'"
 do_configure_append() {
 	if [ "${CLASSOVERRIDE}" = "class-target" ]; then
 		cp ${STAGING_DATADIR}/apr/apr_rules.mk ${B}/build/rules.mk
+		sed -i -e 's#^CFLAGS=.*#CFLAGS=${TARGET_CFLAGS}#g' ${B}/build/rules.mk
 	fi
 }
 do_configure_prepend_class-native() {
@@ -49,6 +48,7 @@ do_configure_append_class-native() {
 
 do_configure_prepend_class-nativesdk() {
 	cp ${STAGING_DATADIR}/apr/apr_rules.mk ${S}/build/rules.mk
+	sed -i -e 's#^CFLAGS=.*#CFLAGS=${TARGET_CFLAGS}#g' ${S}/build/rules.mk
 }
 
 do_configure_append_class-nativesdk() {

meta/recipes-support/apr/apr/0001-Add-option-to-disable-timed-dependant-tests.patch

@@ -1,14 +1,15 @@
-From 2bbe20b4f69e84e7a18bc79d382486953f479328 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 225abf37cd0b49960664b59f08e515a4c4ea5ad0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Jeremy Puhlman <jpuhlman@mvista.com>
 Date: Thu, 26 Mar 2020 18:30:36 +0000
 Subject: [PATCH] Add option to disable timed dependant tests
 
-The disabled tests rely on timing to pass correctly. On a virtualized 
+The disabled tests rely on timing to pass correctly. On a virtualized
 system under heavy load, these tests randomly fail because they miss
 a timer or other timing related issues.
 
 Upstream-Status: Pending
 Signed-off-by: Jeremy Puhlman <jpuhlman@mvista.com>
+
 ---
  configure.in     | 6 ++++++
  include/apr.h.in | 1 +
@@ -16,10 +17,10 @@ Signed-off-by: Jeremy Puhlman <jpuhlman@mvista.com>
  3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
 
 diff --git a/configure.in b/configure.in
-index d9f32d6..f0c5661 100644
+index bfd488b..3663220 100644
 --- a/configure.in
 +++ b/configure.in
-@@ -2886,6 +2886,12 @@ AC_ARG_ENABLE(timedlocks,
+@@ -3023,6 +3023,12 @@ AC_ARG_ENABLE(timedlocks,
  )
  AC_SUBST(apr_has_timedlocks)
  
@@ -45,10 +46,10 @@ index ee99def..c46a5f4 100644
  #define APR_PROCATTR_USER_SET_REQUIRES_PASSWORD @apr_procattr_user_set_requires_password@
  
 diff --git a/test/testlock.c b/test/testlock.c
-index a43f477..6233d0b 100644
+index e3437c1..04e01b9 100644
 --- a/test/testlock.c
 +++ b/test/testlock.c
-@@ -396,13 +396,13 @@ abts_suite *testlock(abts_suite *suite)
+@@ -535,7 +535,7 @@ abts_suite *testlock(abts_suite *suite)
      abts_run_test(suite, threads_not_impl, NULL);
  #else
      abts_run_test(suite, test_thread_mutex, NULL);
@@ -56,6 +57,8 @@ index a43f477..6233d0b 100644
 +#if APR_HAS_TIMEDLOCKS && APR_HAVE_TIME_DEPENDANT_TESTS
      abts_run_test(suite, test_thread_timedmutex, NULL);
  #endif
+     abts_run_test(suite, test_thread_nestedmutex, NULL);
+@@ -543,7 +543,7 @@ abts_suite *testlock(abts_suite *suite)
      abts_run_test(suite, test_thread_rwlock, NULL);
      abts_run_test(suite, test_cond, NULL);
      abts_run_test(suite, test_timeoutcond, NULL);
@@ -63,7 +66,4 @@ index a43f477..6233d0b 100644
 +#if APR_HAS_TIMEDLOCKS && APR_HAVE_TIME_DEPENDANT_TESTS
      abts_run_test(suite, test_timeoutmutex, NULL);
  #endif
- #endif
--- 
-2.23.0
-
+ #ifdef WIN32

meta/recipes-support/apr/apr/0001-configure-Remove-runtime-test-for-mmap-that-can-map-.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+From 316b81c462f065927d7fec56aadd5c8cb94d1cf0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
+Date: Fri, 26 Aug 2022 00:28:08 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] configure: Remove runtime test for mmap that can map
+ /dev/zero
+
+This never works for cross-compile moreover it ends up disabling
+ac_cv_file__dev_zero which then results in compiler errors in shared
+mutexes
+
+Upstream-Status: Inappropriate [Cross-compile specific]
+Signed-off-by: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
+
+---
+ configure.in | 30 ------------------------------
+ 1 file changed, 30 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/configure.in b/configure.in
+index 3663220..dce9789 100644
+--- a/configure.in
++++ b/configure.in
+@@ -1303,36 +1303,6 @@ AC_CHECK_FUNCS([mmap munmap shm_open shm_unlink shmget shmat shmdt shmctl \
+ APR_CHECK_DEFINE(MAP_ANON, sys/mman.h)
+ AC_CHECK_FILE(/dev/zero)
+ 
+-# Not all systems can mmap /dev/zero (such as HP-UX).  Check for that.
+-if test "$ac_cv_func_mmap" = "yes" &&
+-  test "$ac_cv_file__dev_zero" = "yes"; then
+-    AC_CACHE_CHECK([for mmap that can map /dev/zero],
+-    [ac_cv_mmap__dev_zero],
+-    [AC_TRY_RUN([#include <sys/types.h>
+-#include <sys/stat.h>
+-#include <fcntl.h>
+-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_MMAN_H
+-#include <sys/mman.h>
+-#endif
+-    int main()
+-    {
+-        int fd;
+-        void *m;
+-        fd = open("/dev/zero", O_RDWR);
+-        if (fd < 0) {
+-            return 1;
+-        }
+-        m = mmap(0, sizeof(void*), PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
+-        if (m == (void *)-1) {  /* aka MAP_FAILED */
+-            return 2;
+-        }
+-        if (munmap(m, sizeof(void*)) < 0) {
+-            return 3;
+-        }
+-        return 0;
+-    }], [], [ac_cv_file__dev_zero=no], [ac_cv_file__dev_zero=no])])
+-fi
+-
+ # Now we determine which one is our anonymous shmem preference.
+ haveshmgetanon="0"
+ havemmapzero="0"

meta/recipes-support/apr/apr/0002-apr-Remove-workdir-path-references-from-installed-ap.patch

@@ -1,8 +1,7 @@
-From 5925b20da8bbc34d9bf5a5dca123ef38864d43c6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 689a8db96a6d1e1cae9cbfb35d05ac82140a6555 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com>
 Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2018 09:39:06 +0800
-Subject: [PATCH 2/7] apr: Remove workdir path references from installed apr
- files
+Subject: [PATCH] apr: Remove workdir path references from installed apr files
 
 Upstream-Status: Inappropriate [configuration]
 
@@ -14,20 +13,23 @@ packages at target run time, the workdir path caused confusion.
 Rebase to 1.6.3
 
 Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com>
+
 ---
- apr-config.in | 26 ++------------------------
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
+ apr-config.in | 32 ++------------------------------
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
 
 diff --git a/apr-config.in b/apr-config.in
-index 84b4073..bbbf651 100644
+index bed47ca..47874e5 100644
 --- a/apr-config.in
 +++ b/apr-config.in
-@@ -152,14 +152,7 @@ while test $# -gt 0; do
+@@ -164,16 +164,7 @@ while test $# -gt 0; do
      flags="$flags $LDFLAGS"
      ;;
      --includes)
 -    if test "$location" = "installed"; then
          flags="$flags -I$includedir $EXTRA_INCLUDES"
+-    elif test "$location" = "crosscompile"; then
+-        flags="$flags -I$APR_TARGET_DIR/$includedir $EXTRA_INCLUDES"
 -    elif test "$location" = "source"; then
 -        flags="$flags -I$APR_SOURCE_DIR/include $EXTRA_INCLUDES"
 -    else
@@ -37,13 +39,15 @@ index 84b4073..bbbf651 100644
      ;;
      --srcdir)
      echo $APR_SOURCE_DIR
-@@ -181,29 +174,14 @@ while test $# -gt 0; do
+@@ -197,33 +188,14 @@ while test $# -gt 0; do
      exit 0
      ;;
      --link-ld)
 -    if test "$location" = "installed"; then
 -        ### avoid using -L if libdir is a "standard" location like /usr/lib
 -        flags="$flags -L$libdir -l${APR_LIBNAME}"
+-    elif test "$location" = "crosscompile"; then
+-        flags="$flags -L$APR_TARGET_DIR/$libdir -l${APR_LIBNAME}"
 -    else
 -        ### this surely can't work since the library is in .libs?
 -        flags="$flags -L$APR_BUILD_DIR -l${APR_LIBNAME}"
@@ -62,6 +66,8 @@ index 84b4073..bbbf651 100644
 -        # Since the user is specifying they are linking with libtool, we
 -        # *know* that -R will be recognized by libtool.
 -        flags="$flags -L$libdir -R$libdir -l${APR_LIBNAME}"
+-    elif test "$location" = "crosscompile"; then
+-        flags="$flags  -L${APR_TARGET_DIR}/$libdir  -l${APR_LIBNAME}"
 -    else
 -        flags="$flags $LA_FILE"
 -    fi
@@ -69,6 +75,3 @@ index 84b4073..bbbf651 100644
      ;;
      --shlib-path-var)
      echo "$SHLIBPATH_VAR"
--- 
-1.8.3.1
-

meta/recipes-support/apr/apr/0003-Makefile.in-configure.in-support-cross-compiling.patch

@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
-From d5028c10f156c224475b340cfb1ba025d6797243 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com>
-Date: Fri, 2 Feb 2018 15:51:42 +0800
-Subject: [PATCH 3/7] Makefile.in/configure.in: support cross compiling
-
-While cross compiling, the tools/gen_test_char could not
-be executed at build time, use AX_PROG_CC_FOR_BUILD to
-build native tools/gen_test_char
-
-Upstream-Status: Submitted [https://github.com/apache/apr/pull/8]
-
-Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com>
----
- Makefile.in  | 10 +++-------
- configure.in |  3 +++
- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
-index 5fb760e..8675f90 100644
---- a/Makefile.in
-+++ b/Makefile.in
-@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ LT_VERSION = @LT_VERSION@
- 
- CLEAN_TARGETS = apr-config.out apr.exp exports.c export_vars.c .make.dirs \
- 	build/apr_rules.out tools/gen_test_char@EXEEXT@ \
--	tools/gen_test_char.o tools/gen_test_char.lo \
-+	tools/gen_test_char.o \
- 	include/private/apr_escape_test_char.h
- DISTCLEAN_TARGETS = config.cache config.log config.status \
- 	include/apr.h include/arch/unix/apr_private.h \
-@@ -131,13 +131,9 @@ check: $(TARGET_LIB)
- etags:
- 	etags `find . -name '*.[ch]'`
- 
--OBJECTS_gen_test_char = tools/gen_test_char.lo $(LOCAL_LIBS)
--tools/gen_test_char.lo: tools/gen_test_char.c
-+tools/gen_test_char@EXEEXT@: tools/gen_test_char.c
- 	$(APR_MKDIR) tools
--	$(LT_COMPILE)
--
--tools/gen_test_char@EXEEXT@: $(OBJECTS_gen_test_char)
--	$(LINK_PROG) $(OBJECTS_gen_test_char) $(ALL_LIBS)
-+	$(CC_FOR_BUILD) $(CFLAGS_FOR_BUILD) $< -o $@
- 
- include/private/apr_escape_test_char.h: tools/gen_test_char@EXEEXT@
- 	$(APR_MKDIR) include/private
-diff --git a/configure.in b/configure.in
-index 719f331..361120f 100644
---- a/configure.in
-+++ b/configure.in
-@@ -183,6 +183,9 @@ dnl can only be used once within a configure script, so this prevents a
- dnl preload section from invoking the macro to get compiler info.
- AC_PROG_CC
- 
-+dnl Check build CC for gen_test_char compiling which is executed at build time.
-+AX_PROG_CC_FOR_BUILD
-+
- dnl AC_PROG_SED is only avaliable in recent autoconf versions.
- dnl Use AC_CHECK_PROG instead if AC_PROG_SED is not present.
- ifdef([AC_PROG_SED],
--- 
-1.8.3.1
-

meta/recipes-support/apr/apr/0006-apr-fix-off_t-size-doesn-t-match-in-glibc-when-cross.patch

@@ -1,76 +0,0 @@
-From 49661ea3858cf8494926cccf57d3e8c6dcb47117 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dengke Du <dengke.du@windriver.com>
-Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2016 18:13:08 +0800
-Subject: [PATCH] apr: fix off_t size doesn't match in glibc when cross
- compiling
-
-In configure.in, it contains the following:
-
-	APR_CHECK_SIZEOF_EXTENDED([#include <sys/types.h>], off_t, 8)
-
-the macro "APR_CHECK_SIZEOF_EXTENDED" was defined in build/apr_common.m4,
-it use the "AC_TRY_RUN" macro, this macro let the off_t to 8, when cross
-compiling enable.
-
-So it was hardcoded for cross compiling, we should detect it dynamic based on
-the sysroot's glibc. We change it to the following:
-
-	AC_CHECK_SIZEOF(off_t)
-
-The same for the following hardcoded types for cross compiling:
-
-	pid_t	8
-	ssize_t	8
-	size_t	8
-	off_t	8
-
-Change the above correspondingly.
-
-Signed-off-by: Dengke Du <dengke.du@windriver.com>
-
-Upstream-Status: Pending
-
----
- configure.in | 8 ++++----
- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/configure.in b/configure.in
-index 27b8539..fb408d1 100644
---- a/configure.in
-+++ b/configure.in
-@@ -1801,7 +1801,7 @@ else
-     socklen_t_value="int"
- fi
- 
--APR_CHECK_SIZEOF_EXTENDED([#include <sys/types.h>], pid_t, 8)
-+AC_CHECK_SIZEOF(pid_t)
- 
- if test "$ac_cv_sizeof_pid_t" = "$ac_cv_sizeof_short"; then
-     pid_t_fmt='#define APR_PID_T_FMT "hd"'
-@@ -1873,7 +1873,7 @@ APR_CHECK_TYPES_FMT_COMPATIBLE(size_t, unsigned long, lu, [size_t_fmt="lu"], [
- APR_CHECK_TYPES_FMT_COMPATIBLE(size_t, unsigned int, u, [size_t_fmt="u"])
- ])
- 
--APR_CHECK_SIZEOF_EXTENDED([#include <sys/types.h>], ssize_t, 8)
-+AC_CHECK_SIZEOF(ssize_t)
- 
- dnl the else cases below should no longer occur;
- AC_MSG_CHECKING([which format to use for apr_ssize_t])
-@@ -1891,7 +1891,7 @@ fi
- 
- ssize_t_fmt="#define APR_SSIZE_T_FMT \"$ssize_t_fmt\""
- 
--APR_CHECK_SIZEOF_EXTENDED([#include <stddef.h>], size_t, 8)
-+AC_CHECK_SIZEOF(size_t)
- 
- # else cases below should no longer occur;
- AC_MSG_CHECKING([which format to use for apr_size_t])
-@@ -1909,7 +1909,7 @@ fi
- 
- size_t_fmt="#define APR_SIZE_T_FMT \"$size_t_fmt\""
- 
--APR_CHECK_SIZEOF_EXTENDED([#include <sys/types.h>], off_t, 8)
-+AC_CHECK_SIZEOF(off_t)
- 
- if test "${ac_cv_sizeof_off_t}${apr_cv_use_lfs64}" = "4yes"; then
-     # Enable LFS

meta/recipes-support/apr/apr/CVE-2021-35940.patch

@@ -1,58 +0,0 @@
-
-SECURITY: CVE-2021-35940 (cve.mitre.org)
-
-Restore fix for CVE-2017-12613 which was missing in 1.7.x branch, though
-was addressed in 1.6.x in 1.6.3 and later via r1807976.
-
-The fix was merged back to 1.7.x in r1891198.
-
-Since this was a regression in 1.7.0, a new CVE name has been assigned
-to track this, CVE-2021-35940.
-
-Thanks to Iveta Cesalova <icesalov redhat.com> for reporting this issue.
-
-https://svn.apache.org/viewvc?view=revision&revision=1891198
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-CVE: CVE-2021-35940
-Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
-
-
-Index: time/unix/time.c
-===================================================================
---- a/time/unix/time.c	(revision 1891197)
-+++ b/time/unix/time.c	(revision 1891198)
-@@ -142,6 +142,9 @@
-     static const int dayoffset[12] =
-     {306, 337, 0, 31, 61, 92, 122, 153, 184, 214, 245, 275};
- 
-+    if (xt->tm_mon < 0 || xt->tm_mon >= 12)
-+        return APR_EBADDATE;
-+
-     /* shift new year to 1st March in order to make leap year calc easy */
- 
-     if (xt->tm_mon < 2)
-Index: time/win32/time.c
-===================================================================
---- a/time/win32/time.c	(revision 1891197)
-+++ b/time/win32/time.c	(revision 1891198)
-@@ -54,6 +54,9 @@
-     static const int dayoffset[12] =
-     {0, 31, 59, 90, 120, 151, 181, 212, 243, 273, 304, 334};
- 
-+    if (tm->wMonth < 1 || tm->wMonth > 12)
-+        return APR_EBADDATE;
-+
-     /* Note; the caller is responsible for filling in detailed tm_usec,
-      * tm_gmtoff and tm_isdst data when applicable.
-      */
-@@ -228,6 +231,9 @@
-     static const int dayoffset[12] =
-     {306, 337, 0, 31, 61, 92, 122, 153, 184, 214, 245, 275};
- 
-+    if (xt->tm_mon < 0 || xt->tm_mon >= 12)
-+        return APR_EBADDATE;
-+
-     /* shift new year to 1st March in order to make leap year calc easy */
- 
-     if (xt->tm_mon < 2)

meta/recipes-support/apr/apr/libtoolize_check.patch

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
+From 17835709bc55657b7af1f7c99b3f572b819cf97e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Helmut Grohne <helmut@subdivi.de>
-Subject: check for libtoolize rather than libtool
-Last-Update: 2014-09-19
+Date: Tue, 7 Feb 2023 07:04:00 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] check for libtoolize rather than libtool
 
 libtool is now in package libtool-bin, but apr only needs libtoolize.
 
@@ -8,14 +9,22 @@ Upstream-Status: Pending [ from debian: https://sources.debian.org/data/main/a/a
 
 Signed-off-by: Robert Yang <liezhi.yang@windriver.com>
 
---- apr.orig/build/buildcheck.sh
-+++ apr/build/buildcheck.sh
-@@ -39,11 +39,11 @@ fi
+---
+ build/buildcheck.sh | 10 ++++------
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/build/buildcheck.sh b/build/buildcheck.sh
+index 44921b5..08bc8a8 100755
+--- a/build/buildcheck.sh
++++ b/build/buildcheck.sh
+@@ -39,13 +39,11 @@ fi
  # ltmain.sh (GNU libtool 1.1361 2004/01/02 23:10:52) 1.5a
  # output is multiline from 1.5 onwards
  
 -# Require libtool 1.4 or newer
--libtool=`build/PrintPath glibtool1 glibtool libtool libtool15 libtool14`
+-if test -z "$libtool"; then
+-  libtool=`build/PrintPath glibtool1 glibtool libtool libtool15 libtool14`
+-fi
 -lt_pversion=`$libtool --version 2>/dev/null|sed -e 's/([^)]*)//g;s/^[^0-9]*//;s/[- ].*//g;q'`
 +# Require libtoolize 1.4 or newer
 +libtoolize=`build/PrintPath glibtoolize1 glibtoolize libtoolize libtoolize15 libtoolize14`

meta/recipes-support/apr/apr_1.7.2.bb

@@ -16,18 +16,15 @@ BBCLASSEXTEND = "native nativesdk"
 SRC_URI = "${APACHE_MIRROR}/apr/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
            file://run-ptest \
            file://0002-apr-Remove-workdir-path-references-from-installed-ap.patch \
-           file://0003-Makefile.in-configure.in-support-cross-compiling.patch \
            file://0004-Fix-packet-discards-HTTP-redirect.patch \
            file://0005-configure.in-fix-LTFLAGS-to-make-it-work-with-ccache.patch \
-           file://0006-apr-fix-off_t-size-doesn-t-match-in-glibc-when-cross.patch \
            file://0007-explicitly-link-libapr-against-phtread-to-make-gold-.patch \
            file://libtoolize_check.patch \
            file://0001-Add-option-to-disable-timed-dependant-tests.patch \
-           file://CVE-2021-35940.patch \
+           file://0001-configure-Remove-runtime-test-for-mmap-that-can-map-.patch \
            "
 
-SRC_URI[md5sum] = "7a14a83d664e87599ea25ff4432e48a7"
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "e2e148f0b2e99b8e5c6caa09f6d4fb4dd3e83f744aa72a952f94f5a14436f7ea"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "75e77cc86776c030c0a5c408dfbd0bf2a0b75eed5351e52d5439fa1e5509a43e"
 
 inherit autotools-brokensep lib_package binconfig multilib_header ptest multilib_script
 
@@ -35,17 +32,30 @@ OE_BINCONFIG_EXTRA_MANGLE = " -e 's:location=source:location=installed:'"
 
 # Added to fix some issues with cmake. Refer to https://github.com/bmwcarit/meta-ros/issues/68#issuecomment-19896928
 CACHED_CONFIGUREVARS += "apr_cv_mutex_recursive=yes"
-
+# Enable largefile
+CACHED_CONFIGUREVARS += "apr_cv_use_lfs64=yes"
+# Additional AC_TRY_RUN tests which will need to be cached for cross compile
+CACHED_CONFIGUREVARS += "apr_cv_epoll=yes epoll_create1=yes apr_cv_sock_cloexec=yes \
+    ac_cv_struct_rlimit=yes \
+    ac_cv_func_sem_open=yes \
+    apr_cv_process_shared_works=yes \
+    apr_cv_mutex_robust_shared=yes \
+    "
 # Also suppress trying to use sctp.
 #
 CACHED_CONFIGUREVARS += "ac_cv_header_netinet_sctp_h=no ac_cv_header_netinet_sctp_uio_h=no"
 
-CACHED_CONFIGUREVARS += "ac_cv_sizeof_struct_iovec=yes"
+# ac_cv_sizeof_struct_iovec is deduced using runtime check which will fail during cross-compile
+CACHED_CONFIGUREVARS += "${@['ac_cv_sizeof_struct_iovec=16','ac_cv_sizeof_struct_iovec=8'][d.getVar('SITEINFO_BITS') != '32']}"
+
 CACHED_CONFIGUREVARS += "ac_cv_file__dev_zero=yes"
 
+CACHED_CONFIGUREVARS:append:libc-musl = " ac_cv_strerror_r_rc_int=yes"
 PACKAGECONFIG ??= "${@bb.utils.filter('DISTRO_FEATURES', 'ipv6', d)}"
+PACKAGECONFIG:append:libc-musl = " xsi-strerror"
 PACKAGECONFIG[ipv6] = "--enable-ipv6,--disable-ipv6,"
 PACKAGECONFIG[timed-tests] = "--enable-timed-tests,--disable-timed-tests,"
+PACKAGECONFIG[xsi-strerror] = "ac_cv_strerror_r_rc_int=yes,ac_cv_strerror_r_rc_int=no,"
 
 do_configure_prepend() {
 	# Avoid absolute paths for grep since it causes failures

meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2022-43552.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+rom 4f20188ac644afe174be6005ef4f6ffba232b8b2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Mon, 19 Dec 2022 08:38:37 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] smb/telnet: do not free the protocol struct in *_done()
+
+It is managed by the generic layer.
+
+Reported-by: Trail of Bits
+
+Closes #10112
+
+CVE: CVE-2022-43552
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/4f20188ac644afe174be6005ef4f6ffba232b8b2]
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+---
+ lib/smb.c    | 14 ++------------
+ lib/telnet.c |  3 ---
+ 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/smb.c b/lib/smb.c
+index 12f9925..8db3b27 100644
+--- a/lib/smb.c
++++ b/lib/smb.c
+@@ -61,8 +61,6 @@ static CURLcode smb_connect(struct connectdata *conn, bool *done);
+ static CURLcode smb_connection_state(struct connectdata *conn, bool *done);
+ static CURLcode smb_do(struct connectdata *conn, bool *done);
+ static CURLcode smb_request_state(struct connectdata *conn, bool *done);
+-static CURLcode smb_done(struct connectdata *conn, CURLcode status,
+-                         bool premature);
+ static CURLcode smb_disconnect(struct connectdata *conn, bool dead);
+ static int smb_getsock(struct connectdata *conn, curl_socket_t *socks);
+ static CURLcode smb_parse_url_path(struct connectdata *conn);
+@@ -74,7 +72,7 @@ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_smb = {
+   "SMB",                                /* scheme */
+   smb_setup_connection,                 /* setup_connection */
+   smb_do,                               /* do_it */
+-  smb_done,                             /* done */
++  ZERO_NULL,                            /* done */
+   ZERO_NULL,                            /* do_more */
+   smb_connect,                          /* connect_it */
+   smb_connection_state,                 /* connecting */
+@@ -99,7 +97,7 @@ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_smbs = {
+   "SMBS",                               /* scheme */
+   smb_setup_connection,                 /* setup_connection */
+   smb_do,                               /* do_it */
+-  smb_done,                             /* done */
++  ZERO_NULL,                            /* done */
+   ZERO_NULL,                            /* do_more */
+   smb_connect,                          /* connect_it */
+   smb_connection_state,                 /* connecting */
+@@ -919,14 +917,6 @@ static CURLcode smb_request_state(struct connectdata *conn, bool *done)
+   return CURLE_OK;
+ }
+ 
+-static CURLcode smb_done(struct connectdata *conn, CURLcode status,
+-                         bool premature)
+-{
+-  (void) premature;
+-  Curl_safefree(conn->data->req.protop);
+-  return status;
+-}
+-
+ static CURLcode smb_disconnect(struct connectdata *conn, bool dead)
+ {
+   struct smb_conn *smbc = &conn->proto.smbc;
+diff --git a/lib/telnet.c b/lib/telnet.c
+index 3347ad6..e3b9208 100644
+--- a/lib/telnet.c
++++ b/lib/telnet.c
+@@ -1294,9 +1294,6 @@ static CURLcode telnet_done(struct connectdata *conn,
+ 
+   curl_slist_free_all(tn->telnet_vars);
+   tn->telnet_vars = NULL;
+-
+-  Curl_safefree(conn->data->req.protop);
+-
+   return CURLE_OK;
+ }
+ 
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_7.69.1.bb

@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://curl.haxx.se/download/curl-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
            file://CVE-2022-35252.patch \
            file://CVE-2022-32221.patch \
            file://CVE-2022-35260.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-43552.patch \
 "
 
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "ec5fc263f898a3dfef08e805f1ecca42"

meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2023-0361.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+From 80a6ce8ddb02477cd724cd5b2944791aaddb702a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alexander Sosedkin <asosedkin@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 9 Aug 2022 16:05:53 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] auth/rsa: side-step potential side-channel
+
+Signed-off-by: Alexander Sosedkin <asosedkin@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
+Tested-by: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/-/commit/80a6ce8ddb02477cd724cd5b2944791aaddb702a
+                           https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/-/commit/4b7ff428291c7ed77c6d2635577c83a43bbae558]
+CVE: CVE-2023-0361
+Signed-off-by: Vivek Kumbhar <vkumbhar@mvista.com>
+---
+ lib/auth/rsa.c | 30 +++---------------------------
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/auth/rsa.c b/lib/auth/rsa.c
+index 8108ee8..858701f 100644
+--- a/lib/auth/rsa.c
++++ b/lib/auth/rsa.c
+@@ -155,13 +155,10 @@ static int
+ proc_rsa_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
+		   size_t _data_size)
+ {
+-	const char attack_error[] = "auth_rsa: Possible PKCS #1 attack\n";
+	gnutls_datum_t ciphertext;
+	int ret, dsize;
+	ssize_t data_size = _data_size;
+	volatile uint8_t ver_maj, ver_min;
+-	volatile uint8_t check_ver_min;
+-	volatile uint32_t ok;
+
+ #ifdef ENABLE_SSL3
+	if (get_num_version(session) == GNUTLS_SSL3) {
+@@ -187,7 +184,6 @@ proc_rsa_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
+
+	ver_maj = _gnutls_get_adv_version_major(session);
+	ver_min = _gnutls_get_adv_version_minor(session);
+-	check_ver_min = (session->internals.allow_wrong_pms == 0);
+
+	session->key.key.data = gnutls_malloc(GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE);
+	if (session->key.key.data == NULL) {
+@@ -206,10 +202,9 @@ proc_rsa_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+-	ret =
+-	    gnutls_privkey_decrypt_data2(session->internals.selected_key,
+-					 0, &ciphertext, session->key.key.data,
+-					 session->key.key.size);
++	gnutls_privkey_decrypt_data2(session->internals.selected_key,
++				     0, &ciphertext, session->key.key.data,
++				     session->key.key.size);
+	/* After this point, any conditional on failure that cause differences
+	 * in execution may create a timing or cache access pattern side
+	 * channel that can be used as an oracle, so treat very carefully */
+@@ -225,25 +220,6 @@ proc_rsa_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
+	 * Vlastimil Klima, Ondej Pokorny and Tomas Rosa.
+	 */
+
+-	/* ok is 0 in case of error and 1 in case of success. */
+-
+-	/* if ret < 0 */
+-	ok = CONSTCHECK_EQUAL(ret, 0);
+-	/* session->key.key.data[0] must equal ver_maj */
+-	ok &= CONSTCHECK_EQUAL(session->key.key.data[0], ver_maj);
+-	/* if check_ver_min then session->key.key.data[1] must equal ver_min */
+-	ok &= CONSTCHECK_NOT_EQUAL(check_ver_min, 0) &
+-	        CONSTCHECK_EQUAL(session->key.key.data[1], ver_min);
+-
+-	if (ok) {
+-		/* call logging function unconditionally so all branches are
+-		 * indistinguishable for timing and cache access when debug
+-		 * logging is disabled */
+-		_gnutls_no_log("%s", attack_error);
+-	} else {
+-		_gnutls_debug_log("%s", attack_error);
+-	}
+-
+	/* This is here to avoid the version check attack
+	 * discussed above.
+	 */
+--
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls_3.6.14.bb

@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://www.gnupg.org/ftp/gcrypt/gnutls/v${SHRT_VER}/gnutls-${PV}.tar
            file://CVE-2021-20232.patch \
            file://CVE-2022-2509.patch \
            file://CVE-2021-4209.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-0361.patch \
 "
 
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "5630751adec7025b8ef955af4d141d00d252a985769f51b4059e5affa3d39d63"

meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc

@@ -20,8 +20,8 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/vim/vim.git;branch=master;protocol=https \
            file://no-path-adjust.patch \
            "
 
-PV .= ".1211"
-SRCREV = "f7d1c6e1884c76680980571f1cf15e0928d247b5"
+PV .= ".1293"
+SRCREV = "0caaf1e46511f7a92e036f05e6aa9d5992540117"
 
 # Remove when 8.3 is out
 UPSTREAM_VERSION_UNKNOWN = "1"
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ S = "${WORKDIR}/git"
 
 VIMDIR = "vim${@d.getVar('PV').split('.')[0]}${@d.getVar('PV').split('.')[1]}"
 
-inherit autotools-brokensep update-alternatives mime-xdg
+inherit autotools-brokensep update-alternatives mime-xdg pkgconfig
 
 CLEANBROKEN = "1"
 

scripts/lib/devtool/menuconfig.py

@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ def menuconfig(args, config, basepath, workspace):
             return 1
 
         check_workspace_recipe(workspace, args.component)
-        pn = rd.getVar('PN', True)
+        pn = rd.getVar('PN')
 
         if not rd.getVarFlag('do_menuconfig','task'):
             raise DevtoolError("This recipe does not support menuconfig option")

scripts/nativesdk-intercept/chgrp

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+#
+# Wrapper around 'chgrp' that redirects to root in all cases
+
+import os
+import shutil
+import sys
+
+# calculate path to the real 'chgrp'
+path = os.environ['PATH']
+path = path.replace(os.path.dirname(sys.argv[0]), '')
+real_chgrp = shutil.which('chgrp', path=path)
+
+args = list()
+
+found = False
+for i in sys.argv:
+    if i.startswith("-"):
+        args.append(i)
+        continue
+    if not found:
+        args.append("root")
+        found = True
+    else:
+        args.append(i)
+
+os.execv(real_chgrp, args)

scripts/nativesdk-intercept/chown

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+#
+# Wrapper around 'chown' that redirects to root in all cases
+
+import os
+import shutil
+import sys
+
+# calculate path to the real 'chown'
+path = os.environ['PATH']
+path = path.replace(os.path.dirname(sys.argv[0]), '')
+real_chown = shutil.which('chown', path=path)
+
+args = list()
+
+found = False
+for i in sys.argv:
+    if i.startswith("-"):
+        args.append(i)
+        continue
+    if not found:
+        args.append("root:root")
+        found = True
+    else:
+        args.append(i)
+
+os.execv(real_chown, args)