build-appliance-image: Update to dunfell head revision

(From OE-Core rev: efb1a73a13907bed3acac8e06053aef3e2ef57f5)

Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>

bitbake/doc/bitbake-user-manual/bitbake-user-manual-fetching.rst

@@ -405,8 +405,8 @@ This fetcher supports the following parameters:
 
 -  *"nobranch":* Tells the fetcher to not check the SHA validation for
    the branch when set to "1". The default is "0". Set this option for
-   the recipe that refers to the commit that is valid for a tag instead
-   of the branch.
+   the recipe that refers to the commit that is valid for any namespace
+   (branch, tag, ...) instead of the branch.
 
 -  *"bareclone":* Tells the fetcher to clone a bare clone into the
    destination directory without checking out a working tree. Only the

bitbake/lib/bb/cooker.py

@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@ import sys, os, glob, os.path, re, time
 import itertools
 import logging
 import multiprocessing
-import sre_constants
 import threading
 from io import StringIO, UnsupportedOperation
 from contextlib import closing
@@ -1795,7 +1794,7 @@ class CookerCollectFiles(object):
                 try:
                     re.compile(mask)
                     bbmasks.append(mask)
-                except sre_constants.error:
+                except re.error:
                     collectlog.critical("BBMASK contains an invalid regular expression, ignoring: %s" % mask)
 
             # Then validate the combined regular expressions. This should never
@@ -1803,7 +1802,7 @@ class CookerCollectFiles(object):
             bbmask = "|".join(bbmasks)
             try:
                 bbmask_compiled = re.compile(bbmask)
-            except sre_constants.error:
+            except re.error:
                 collectlog.critical("BBMASK is not a valid regular expression, ignoring: %s" % bbmask)
                 bbmask = None
 

bitbake/lib/bb/fetch2/git.py

@@ -44,7 +44,8 @@ Supported SRC_URI options are:
 
 - nobranch
    Don't check the SHA validation for branch. set this option for the recipe
-   referring to commit which is valid in tag instead of branch.
+   referring to commit which is valid in any namespace (branch, tag, ...)
+   instead of branch.
    The default is "0", set nobranch=1 if needed.
 
 - usehead
@@ -63,6 +64,7 @@ import errno
 import fnmatch
 import os
 import re
+import shlex
 import subprocess
 import tempfile
 import bb
@@ -352,7 +354,7 @@ class Git(FetchMethod):
             # We do this since git will use a "-l" option automatically for local urls where possible
             if repourl.startswith("file://"):
                 repourl = repourl[7:]
-            clone_cmd = "LANG=C %s clone --bare --mirror \"%s\" %s --progress" % (ud.basecmd, repourl, ud.clonedir)
+            clone_cmd = "LANG=C %s clone --bare --mirror %s %s --progress" % (ud.basecmd, shlex.quote(repourl), ud.clonedir)
             if ud.proto.lower() != 'file':
                 bb.fetch2.check_network_access(d, clone_cmd, ud.url)
             progresshandler = GitProgressHandler(d)
@@ -364,8 +366,12 @@ class Git(FetchMethod):
             if "origin" in output:
               runfetchcmd("%s remote rm origin" % ud.basecmd, d, workdir=ud.clonedir)
 
-            runfetchcmd("%s remote add --mirror=fetch origin \"%s\"" % (ud.basecmd, repourl), d, workdir=ud.clonedir)
-            fetch_cmd = "LANG=C %s fetch -f --progress \"%s\" refs/*:refs/*" % (ud.basecmd, repourl)
+            runfetchcmd("%s remote add --mirror=fetch origin %s" % (ud.basecmd, shlex.quote(repourl)), d, workdir=ud.clonedir)
+
+            if ud.nobranch:
+                fetch_cmd = "LANG=C %s fetch -f --progress %s refs/*:refs/*" % (ud.basecmd, shlex.quote(repourl))
+            else:
+                fetch_cmd = "LANG=C %s fetch -f --progress %s refs/heads/*:refs/heads/* refs/tags/*:refs/tags/*" % (ud.basecmd, shlex.quote(repourl))
             if ud.proto.lower() != 'file':
                 bb.fetch2.check_network_access(d, fetch_cmd, ud.url)
             progresshandler = GitProgressHandler(d)
@@ -559,7 +565,7 @@ class Git(FetchMethod):
             raise bb.fetch2.UnpackError("No up to date source found: " + "; ".join(source_error), ud.url)
 
         repourl = self._get_repo_url(ud)
-        runfetchcmd("%s remote set-url origin \"%s\"" % (ud.basecmd, repourl), d, workdir=destdir)
+        runfetchcmd("%s remote set-url origin %s" % (ud.basecmd, shlex.quote(repourl)), d, workdir=destdir)
 
         if self._contains_lfs(ud, d, destdir):
             if need_lfs and not self._find_git_lfs(d):
@@ -687,8 +693,8 @@ class Git(FetchMethod):
         d.setVar('_BB_GIT_IN_LSREMOTE', '1')
         try:
             repourl = self._get_repo_url(ud)
-            cmd = "%s ls-remote \"%s\" %s" % \
-                (ud.basecmd, repourl, search)
+            cmd = "%s ls-remote %s %s" % \
+                (ud.basecmd, shlex.quote(repourl), search)
             if ud.proto.lower() != 'file':
                 bb.fetch2.check_network_access(d, cmd, repourl)
             output = runfetchcmd(cmd, d, True)

bitbake/lib/bb/runqueue.py

@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ import pickle
 from multiprocessing import Process
 import shlex
 import pprint
+import time
 
 bblogger = logging.getLogger("BitBake")
 logger = logging.getLogger("BitBake.RunQueue")
@@ -142,6 +143,55 @@ class RunQueueScheduler(object):
                 self.buildable.append(tid)
 
         self.rev_prio_map = None
+        self.is_pressure_usable()
+
+    def is_pressure_usable(self):
+        """
+        If monitoring pressure, return True if pressure files can be open and read. For example
+        openSUSE /proc/pressure/* files have readable file permissions but when read the error EOPNOTSUPP (Operation not supported)
+        is returned.
+        """
+        if self.rq.max_cpu_pressure or self.rq.max_io_pressure or self.rq.max_memory_pressure:
+            try:
+                with open("/proc/pressure/cpu") as cpu_pressure_fds, \
+                    open("/proc/pressure/io") as io_pressure_fds, \
+                    open("/proc/pressure/memory") as memory_pressure_fds:
+
+                    self.prev_cpu_pressure = cpu_pressure_fds.readline().split()[4].split("=")[1]
+                    self.prev_io_pressure = io_pressure_fds.readline().split()[4].split("=")[1]
+                    self.prev_memory_pressure = memory_pressure_fds.readline().split()[4].split("=")[1]
+                    self.prev_pressure_time = time.time()
+                self.check_pressure = True
+            except:
+                bb.note("The /proc/pressure files can't be read. Continuing build without monitoring pressure")
+                self.check_pressure = False
+        else:
+            self.check_pressure = False
+
+    def exceeds_max_pressure(self):
+        """
+        Monitor the difference in total pressure at least once per second, if
+        BB_PRESSURE_MAX_{CPU|IO|MEMORY} are set, return True if above threshold.
+        """
+        if self.check_pressure:
+            with open("/proc/pressure/cpu") as cpu_pressure_fds, \
+                open("/proc/pressure/io") as io_pressure_fds, \
+                open("/proc/pressure/memory") as memory_pressure_fds:
+                # extract "total" from /proc/pressure/{cpu|io}
+                curr_cpu_pressure = cpu_pressure_fds.readline().split()[4].split("=")[1]
+                curr_io_pressure = io_pressure_fds.readline().split()[4].split("=")[1]
+                curr_memory_pressure = memory_pressure_fds.readline().split()[4].split("=")[1]
+                exceeds_cpu_pressure =  self.rq.max_cpu_pressure and (float(curr_cpu_pressure) - float(self.prev_cpu_pressure)) > self.rq.max_cpu_pressure
+                exceeds_io_pressure =  self.rq.max_io_pressure and (float(curr_io_pressure) - float(self.prev_io_pressure)) > self.rq.max_io_pressure
+                exceeds_memory_pressure = self.rq.max_memory_pressure and (float(curr_memory_pressure) - float(self.prev_memory_pressure)) > self.rq.max_memory_pressure
+                now = time.time()
+                if now - self.prev_pressure_time > 1.0:
+                    self.prev_cpu_pressure = curr_cpu_pressure
+                    self.prev_io_pressure = curr_io_pressure
+                    self.prev_memory_pressure = curr_memory_pressure
+                    self.prev_pressure_time = now
+            return (exceeds_cpu_pressure or exceeds_io_pressure or exceeds_memory_pressure)
+        return False
 
     def next_buildable_task(self):
         """
@@ -155,6 +205,12 @@ class RunQueueScheduler(object):
         if not buildable:
             return None
 
+        # Bitbake requires that at least one task be active. Only check for pressure if
+        # this is the case, otherwise the pressure limitation could result in no tasks
+        # being active and no new tasks started thereby, at times, breaking the scheduler.
+        if self.rq.stats.active and self.exceeds_max_pressure():
+            return None
+
         # Filter out tasks that have a max number of threads that have been exceeded
         skip_buildable = {}
         for running in self.rq.runq_running.difference(self.rq.runq_complete):
@@ -1700,6 +1756,9 @@ class RunQueueExecute:
 
         self.number_tasks = int(self.cfgData.getVar("BB_NUMBER_THREADS") or 1)
         self.scheduler = self.cfgData.getVar("BB_SCHEDULER") or "speed"
+        self.max_cpu_pressure = self.cfgData.getVar("BB_PRESSURE_MAX_CPU")
+        self.max_io_pressure = self.cfgData.getVar("BB_PRESSURE_MAX_IO")
+        self.max_memory_pressure = self.cfgData.getVar("BB_PRESSURE_MAX_MEMORY")
 
         self.sq_buildable = set()
         self.sq_running = set()
@@ -1735,6 +1794,29 @@ class RunQueueExecute:
         if self.number_tasks <= 0:
              bb.fatal("Invalid BB_NUMBER_THREADS %s" % self.number_tasks)
 
+        lower_limit = 1.0
+        upper_limit = 1000000.0
+        if self.max_cpu_pressure:
+            self.max_cpu_pressure = float(self.max_cpu_pressure)
+            if self.max_cpu_pressure < lower_limit:
+                bb.fatal("Invalid BB_PRESSURE_MAX_CPU %s, minimum value is %s." % (self.max_cpu_pressure, lower_limit))
+            if self.max_cpu_pressure > upper_limit:
+                bb.warn("Your build will be largely unregulated since BB_PRESSURE_MAX_CPU is set to %s. It is very unlikely that such high pressure will be experienced." % (self.max_cpu_pressure))
+
+        if self.max_io_pressure:
+            self.max_io_pressure = float(self.max_io_pressure)
+            if self.max_io_pressure < lower_limit:
+                bb.fatal("Invalid BB_PRESSURE_MAX_IO %s, minimum value is %s." % (self.max_io_pressure, lower_limit))
+            if self.max_io_pressure > upper_limit:
+                bb.warn("Your build will be largely unregulated since BB_PRESSURE_MAX_IO is set to %s. It is very unlikely that such high pressure will be experienced." % (self.max_io_pressure))
+
+        if self.max_memory_pressure:
+            self.max_memory_pressure = float(self.max_memory_pressure)
+            if self.max_memory_pressure < lower_limit:
+                bb.fatal("Invalid BB_PRESSURE_MAX_MEMORY %s, minimum value is %s." % (self.max_memory_pressure, lower_limit))
+            if self.max_memory_pressure > upper_limit:
+                bb.warn("Your build will be largely unregulated since BB_PRESSURE_MAX_MEMORY is set to %s. It is very unlikely that such high pressure will be experienced." % (self.max_io_pressure))
+            
         # List of setscene tasks which we've covered
         self.scenequeue_covered = set()
         # List of tasks which are covered (including setscene ones)
@@ -1893,6 +1975,12 @@ class RunQueueExecute:
                 self.setbuildable(revdep)
                 logger.debug(1, "Marking task %s as buildable", revdep)
 
+        for t in self.sq_deferred.copy():
+            if self.sq_deferred[t] == task:
+                logger.debug(2, "Deferred task %s now buildable" % t)
+                del self.sq_deferred[t]
+                update_scenequeue_data([t], self.sqdata, self.rqdata, self.rq, self.cooker, self.stampcache, self, summary=False)
+
     def task_complete(self, task):
         self.stats.taskCompleted()
         bb.event.fire(runQueueTaskCompleted(task, self.stats, self.rq), self.cfgData)
@@ -2002,8 +2090,6 @@ class RunQueueExecute:
                             logger.debug(1, "%s didn't become valid, skipping setscene" % nexttask)
                             self.sq_task_failoutright(nexttask)
                             return True
-                        else:
-                            self.sqdata.outrightfail.remove(nexttask)
                     if nexttask in self.sqdata.outrightfail:
                         logger.debug(2, 'No package found, so skipping setscene task %s', nexttask)
                         self.sq_task_failoutright(nexttask)
@@ -2154,7 +2240,8 @@ class RunQueueExecute:
         if self.sq_deferred:
             tid = self.sq_deferred.pop(list(self.sq_deferred.keys())[0])
             logger.warning("Runqeueue deadlocked on deferred tasks, forcing task %s" % tid)
-            self.sq_task_failoutright(tid)
+            if tid not in self.runq_complete:
+                self.sq_task_failoutright(tid)
             return True
 
         if len(self.failed_tids) != 0:
@@ -2268,10 +2355,16 @@ class RunQueueExecute:
             self.updated_taskhash_queue.remove((tid, unihash))
 
             if unihash != self.rqdata.runtaskentries[tid].unihash:
-                hashequiv_logger.verbose("Task %s unihash changed to %s" % (tid, unihash))
-                self.rqdata.runtaskentries[tid].unihash = unihash
-                bb.parse.siggen.set_unihash(tid, unihash)
-                toprocess.add(tid)
+                # Make sure we rehash any other tasks with the same task hash that we're deferred against.
+                torehash = [tid]
+                for deftid in self.sq_deferred:
+                    if self.sq_deferred[deftid] == tid:
+                        torehash.append(deftid)
+                for hashtid in torehash:
+                    hashequiv_logger.verbose("Task %s unihash changed to %s" % (hashtid, unihash))
+                    self.rqdata.runtaskentries[hashtid].unihash = unihash
+                    bb.parse.siggen.set_unihash(hashtid, unihash)
+                    toprocess.add(hashtid)
 
         # Work out all tasks which depend upon these
         total = set()
@@ -2410,6 +2503,14 @@ class RunQueueExecute:
 
         if update_tasks:
             self.sqdone = False
+            for mc in sorted(self.sqdata.multiconfigs):
+                for tid in sorted([t[0] for t in update_tasks]):
+                    if mc_from_tid(tid) != mc:
+                        continue
+                    h = pending_hash_index(tid, self.rqdata)
+                    if h in self.sqdata.hashes and tid != self.sqdata.hashes[h]:
+                        self.sq_deferred[tid] = self.sqdata.hashes[h]
+                        bb.note("Deferring %s after %s" % (tid, self.sqdata.hashes[h]))
             update_scenequeue_data([t[0] for t in update_tasks], self.sqdata, self.rqdata, self.rq, self.cooker, self.stampcache, self, summary=False)
 
         for (tid, harddepfail, origvalid) in update_tasks:
@@ -2750,6 +2851,19 @@ def build_scenequeue_data(sqdata, rqdata, rq, cooker, stampcache, sqrq):
     sqdata.stamppresent = set()
     sqdata.valid = set()
 
+    sqdata.hashes = {}
+    sqrq.sq_deferred = {}
+    for mc in sorted(sqdata.multiconfigs):
+        for tid in sorted(sqdata.sq_revdeps):
+            if mc_from_tid(tid) != mc:
+                continue
+            h = pending_hash_index(tid, rqdata)
+            if h not in sqdata.hashes:
+                sqdata.hashes[h] = tid
+            else:
+                sqrq.sq_deferred[tid] = sqdata.hashes[h]
+                bb.note("Deferring %s after %s" % (tid, sqdata.hashes[h]))
+
     update_scenequeue_data(sqdata.sq_revdeps, sqdata, rqdata, rq, cooker, stampcache, sqrq, summary=True)
 
 def update_scenequeue_data(tids, sqdata, rqdata, rq, cooker, stampcache, sqrq, summary=True):
@@ -2761,6 +2875,8 @@ def update_scenequeue_data(tids, sqdata, rqdata, rq, cooker, stampcache, sqrq, s
             sqdata.stamppresent.remove(tid)
         if tid in sqdata.valid:
             sqdata.valid.remove(tid)
+        if tid in sqdata.outrightfail:
+            sqdata.outrightfail.remove(tid)
 
         (mc, fn, taskname, taskfn) = split_tid_mcfn(tid)
 
@@ -2788,32 +2904,20 @@ def update_scenequeue_data(tids, sqdata, rqdata, rq, cooker, stampcache, sqrq, s
 
     sqdata.valid |= rq.validate_hashes(tocheck, cooker.data, len(sqdata.stamppresent), False, summary=summary)
 
-    sqdata.hashes = {}
-    sqrq.sq_deferred = {}
-    for mc in sorted(sqdata.multiconfigs):
-        for tid in sorted(sqdata.sq_revdeps):
-            if mc_from_tid(tid) != mc:
-                continue
-            if tid in sqdata.stamppresent:
-                continue
-            if tid in sqdata.valid:
-                continue
-            if tid in sqdata.noexec:
-                continue
-            if tid in sqrq.scenequeue_notcovered:
-                continue
-            if tid in sqrq.scenequeue_covered:
-                continue
-
-            sqdata.outrightfail.add(tid)
-
-            h = pending_hash_index(tid, rqdata)
-            if h not in sqdata.hashes:
-                sqdata.hashes[h] = tid
-            else:
-                sqrq.sq_deferred[tid] = sqdata.hashes[h]
-                bb.note("Deferring %s after %s" % (tid, sqdata.hashes[h]))
-
+    for tid in tids:
+        if tid in sqdata.stamppresent:
+            continue
+        if tid in sqdata.valid:
+            continue
+        if tid in sqdata.noexec:
+            continue
+        if tid in sqrq.scenequeue_covered:
+            continue
+        if tid in sqrq.scenequeue_notcovered:
+            continue
+        if tid in sqrq.sq_deferred:
+            continue
+        sqdata.outrightfail.add(tid)
 
 class TaskFailure(Exception):
     """

bitbake/lib/bb/tests/fetch.py

@@ -1750,7 +1750,7 @@ class GitShallowTest(FetcherTest):
         self.add_empty_file('bsub', cwd=smdir)
 
         self.git('submodule init', cwd=self.srcdir)
-        self.git('submodule add file://%s' % smdir, cwd=self.srcdir)
+        self.git('-c protocol.file.allow=always submodule add file://%s' % smdir, cwd=self.srcdir)
         self.git('submodule update', cwd=self.srcdir)
         self.git('commit -m submodule -a', cwd=self.srcdir)
 
@@ -1782,7 +1782,7 @@ class GitShallowTest(FetcherTest):
         self.add_empty_file('bsub', cwd=smdir)
 
         self.git('submodule init', cwd=self.srcdir)
-        self.git('submodule add file://%s' % smdir, cwd=self.srcdir)
+        self.git('-c protocol.file.allow=always submodule add file://%s' % smdir, cwd=self.srcdir)
         self.git('submodule update', cwd=self.srcdir)
         self.git('commit -m submodule -a', cwd=self.srcdir)
 

bitbake/lib/bb/utils.py

@@ -421,12 +421,14 @@ def better_eval(source, locals, extraglobals = None):
     return eval(source, ctx, locals)
 
 @contextmanager
-def fileslocked(files):
+def fileslocked(files, *args, **kwargs):
     """Context manager for locking and unlocking file locks."""
     locks = []
     if files:
         for lockfile in files:
-            locks.append(bb.utils.lockfile(lockfile))
+            l = bb.utils.lockfile(lockfile, *args, **kwargs)
+            if l is not None:
+                locks.append(l)
 
     try:
         yield
@@ -459,9 +461,16 @@ def lockfile(name, shared=False, retry=True, block=False):
     consider the possibility of sending a signal to the process to break
     out - at which point you want block=True rather than retry=True.
     """
+    basename = os.path.basename(name)
+    if len(basename) > 255:
+        root, ext = os.path.splitext(basename)
+        basename = root[:255 - len(ext)] + ext
+
     dirname = os.path.dirname(name)
     mkdirhier(dirname)
 
+    name = os.path.join(dirname, basename)
+
     if not os.access(dirname, os.W_OK):
         logger.error("Unable to acquire lock '%s', directory is not writable",
                      name)
@@ -495,7 +504,7 @@ def lockfile(name, shared=False, retry=True, block=False):
                     return lf
             lf.close()
         except OSError as e:
-            if e.errno == errno.EACCES:
+            if e.errno == errno.EACCES or e.errno == errno.ENAMETOOLONG:
                 logger.error("Unable to acquire lock '%s', %s",
                              e.strerror, name)
                 sys.exit(1)
@@ -1561,21 +1570,22 @@ def set_process_name(name):
 
 # export common proxies variables from datastore to environment
 def export_proxies(d):
-    import os
+    """ export common proxies variables from datastore to environment """
 
     variables = ['http_proxy', 'HTTP_PROXY', 'https_proxy', 'HTTPS_PROXY',
                     'ftp_proxy', 'FTP_PROXY', 'no_proxy', 'NO_PROXY',
-                    'GIT_PROXY_COMMAND']
+                    'GIT_PROXY_COMMAND', 'SSL_CERT_FILE', 'SSL_CERT_DIR']
     exported = False
 
-    for v in variables:
-        if v in os.environ.keys():
+    origenv = d.getVar("BB_ORIGENV")
+
+    for name in variables:
+        value = d.getVar(name)
+        if not value and origenv:
+            value = origenv.getVar(name)
+        if value:
+            os.environ[name] = value
             exported = True
-        else:
-            v_proxy = d.getVar(v)
-            if v_proxy is not None:
-                os.environ[v] = v_proxy
-                exported = True
 
     return exported
 

documentation/conf.py

@@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ extlinks = {
     'yocto_git': ('https://git.yoctoproject.org%s', None),
     'oe_home': ('https://www.openembedded.org%s', None),
     'oe_lists': ('https://lists.openembedded.org%s', None),
+    'oe_git': ('https://git.openembedded.org%s', None),
 }
 
 # Intersphinx config to use cross reference with Bitbake user manual

documentation/dev-manual/dev-manual-common-tasks.rst

@@ -2628,7 +2628,7 @@ Recipe Syntax
 Understanding recipe file syntax is important for writing recipes. The
 following list overviews the basic items that make up a BitBake recipe
 file. For more complete BitBake syntax descriptions, see the
-":doc:`bitbake-user-manual/bitbake-user-manual-metadata`"
+":doc:`bitbake:bitbake-user-manual/bitbake-user-manual-metadata`"
 chapter of the BitBake User Manual.
 
 -  *Variable Assignments and Manipulations:* Variable assignments allow
@@ -3854,7 +3854,7 @@ Setting Up and Running a Multiple Configuration Build
 
 To accomplish a multiple configuration build, you must define each
 target's configuration separately using a parallel configuration file in
-the :term:`Build Directory`, and you
+the :term:`Build Directory` or configuration directory within a layer, and you
 must follow a required file hierarchy. Additionally, you must enable the
 multiple configuration builds in your ``local.conf`` file.
 
@@ -3862,47 +3862,47 @@ Follow these steps to set up and execute multiple configuration builds:
 
 -  *Create Separate Configuration Files*: You need to create a single
    configuration file for each build target (each multiconfig).
-   Minimally, each configuration file must define the machine and the
-   temporary directory BitBake uses for the build. Suggested practice
-   dictates that you do not overlap the temporary directories used
-   during the builds. However, it is possible that you can share the
-   temporary directory
-   (:term:`TMPDIR`). For example,
-   consider a scenario with two different multiconfigs for the same
+   The configuration definitions are implementation dependent but often
+   each configuration file will define the machine and the
+   temporary directory BitBake uses for the build. Whether the same
+   temporary directory (:term:`TMPDIR`) can be shared will depend on what is
+   similar and what is different between the configurations. Multiple MACHINE
+   targets can share the same (:term:`TMPDIR`) as long as the rest of the
+   configuration is the same, multiple DISTRO settings would need separate
+   (:term:`TMPDIR`) directories.
+
+   For example, consider a scenario with two different multiconfigs for the same
    :term:`MACHINE`: "qemux86" built
    for two distributions such as "poky" and "poky-lsb". In this case,
-   you might want to use the same ``TMPDIR``.
+   you would need to use the different :term:`TMPDIR`.
 
    Here is an example showing the minimal statements needed in a
    configuration file for a "qemux86" target whose temporary build
-   directory is ``tmpmultix86``:
-   ::
+   directory is ``tmpmultix86``::
 
       MACHINE = "qemux86"
       TMPDIR = "${TOPDIR}/tmpmultix86"
 
    The location for these multiconfig configuration files is specific.
-   They must reside in the current build directory in a sub-directory of
-   ``conf`` named ``multiconfig``. Following is an example that defines
+   They must reside in the current :term:`Build Directory` in a sub-directory of
+   ``conf`` named ``multiconfig`` or within a layer's ``conf`` directory
+   under a directory named ``multiconfig``. Following is an example that defines
    two configuration files for the "x86" and "arm" multiconfigs:
 
    .. image:: figures/multiconfig_files.png
       :align: center
+      :width: 50%
 
-   The reason for this required file hierarchy is because the ``BBPATH``
-   variable is not constructed until the layers are parsed.
-   Consequently, using the configuration file as a pre-configuration
-   file is not possible unless it is located in the current working
-   directory.
+   The usual :term:`BBPATH` search path is used to locate multiconfig files in
+   a similar way to other conf files.
 
 -  *Add the BitBake Multi-configuration Variable to the Local
    Configuration File*: Use the
    :term:`BBMULTICONFIG`
    variable in your ``conf/local.conf`` configuration file to specify
    each multiconfig. Continuing with the example from the previous
-   figure, the ``BBMULTICONFIG`` variable needs to enable two
-   multiconfigs: "x86" and "arm" by specifying each configuration file:
-   ::
+   figure, the :term:`BBMULTICONFIG` variable needs to enable two
+   multiconfigs: "x86" and "arm" by specifying each configuration file::
 
       BBMULTICONFIG = "x86 arm"
 
@@ -3916,13 +3916,11 @@ Follow these steps to set up and execute multiple configuration builds:
       with "".
 
 -  *Launch BitBake*: Use the following BitBake command form to launch
-   the multiple configuration build:
-   ::
+   the multiple configuration build::
 
       $ bitbake [mc:multiconfigname:]target [[[mc:multiconfigname:]target] ... ]
 
-   For the example in this section, the following command applies:
-   ::
+   For the example in this section, the following command applies::
 
       $ bitbake mc:x86:core-image-minimal mc:arm:core-image-sato mc::core-image-base
 
@@ -3937,7 +3935,7 @@ Follow these steps to set up and execute multiple configuration builds:
    Support for multiple configuration builds in the Yocto Project &DISTRO;
    (&DISTRO_NAME;) Release does not include Shared State (sstate)
    optimizations. Consequently, if a build uses the same object twice
-   in, for example, two different ``TMPDIR``
+   in, for example, two different :term:`TMPDIR`
    directories, the build either loads from an existing sstate cache for
    that build at the start or builds the object fresh.
 
@@ -3958,38 +3956,34 @@ essentially that the
 
 To enable dependencies in a multiple configuration build, you must
 declare the dependencies in the recipe using the following statement
-form:
-::
+form::
 
    task_or_package[mcdepends] = "mc:from_multiconfig:to_multiconfig:recipe_name:task_on_which_to_depend"
 
 To better show how to use this statement, consider the example scenario
 from the first paragraph of this section. The following statement needs
-to be added to the recipe that builds the ``core-image-sato`` image:
-::
+to be added to the recipe that builds the ``core-image-sato`` image::
 
    do_image[mcdepends] = "mc:x86:arm:core-image-minimal:do_rootfs"
 
 In this example, the `from_multiconfig` is "x86". The `to_multiconfig` is "arm". The
-task on which the ``do_image`` task in the recipe depends is the
-``do_rootfs`` task from the ``core-image-minimal`` recipe associated
+task on which the :ref:`ref-tasks-image` task in the recipe depends is the
+:ref:`ref-tasks-rootfs` task from the ``core-image-minimal`` recipe associated
 with the "arm" multiconfig.
 
 Once you set up this dependency, you can build the "x86" multiconfig
-using a BitBake command as follows:
-::
+using a BitBake command as follows::
 
    $ bitbake mc:x86:core-image-sato
 
 This command executes all the tasks needed to create the
 ``core-image-sato`` image for the "x86" multiconfig. Because of the
-dependency, BitBake also executes through the ``do_rootfs`` task for the
+dependency, BitBake also executes through the :ref:`ref-tasks-rootfs` task for the
 "arm" multiconfig build.
 
 Having a recipe depend on the root filesystem of another build might not
 seem that useful. Consider this change to the statement in the
-``core-image-sato`` recipe:
-::
+``core-image-sato`` recipe::
 
    do_image[mcdepends] = "mc:x86:arm:core-image-minimal:do_image"
 

documentation/overview-manual/overview-manual-yp-intro.rst

@@ -377,7 +377,7 @@ activities using the Yocto Project:
    Index <http://layers.openembedded.org/layerindex/layers/>`__, which
    is a website that indexes OpenEmbedded-Core layers.
 
--  *Patchwork:* `Patchwork <http://jk.ozlabs.org/projects/patchwork/>`__
+-  *Patchwork:* `Patchwork <https://patchwork.yoctoproject.org/>`__
    is a fork of a project originally started by
    `OzLabs <http://ozlabs.org/>`__. The project is a web-based tracking
    system designed to streamline the process of bringing contributions

documentation/poky.yaml

@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
-DISTRO : "3.1.19"
+DISTRO : "3.1.24"
 DISTRO_NAME_NO_CAP : "dunfell"
 DISTRO_NAME : "Dunfell"
 DISTRO_NAME_NO_CAP_MINUS_ONE : "zeus"
-YOCTO_DOC_VERSION : "3.1.19"
+YOCTO_DOC_VERSION : "3.1.24"
 YOCTO_DOC_VERSION_MINUS_ONE : "3.0.4"
-DISTRO_REL_TAG : "yocto-3.1.19"
-DOCCONF_VERSION : "3.1.19"
+DISTRO_REL_TAG : "yocto-3.1.24"
+DOCCONF_VERSION : "3.1.24"
 BITBAKE_SERIES : "1.46"
-POKYVERSION : "23.0.19"
+POKYVERSION : "23.0.24"
 YOCTO_POKY : "poky-&DISTRO_NAME_NO_CAP;-&POKYVERSION;"
 YOCTO_DL_URL : "https://downloads.yoctoproject.org"
 YOCTO_AB_URL : "https://autobuilder.yoctoproject.org"

documentation/profile-manual/profile-manual-usage.rst

@@ -1734,7 +1734,7 @@ events':
 
 The tool is pretty self-explanatory, but for more detailed information
 on navigating through the data, see the `kernelshark
-website <http://rostedt.homelinux.com/kernelshark/>`__.
+website <https://kernelshark.org/Documentation.html>`__.
 
 .. _ftrace-documentation:
 
@@ -1765,8 +1765,8 @@ There is a nice series of articles on using ftrace and trace-cmd at LWN:
 -  `trace-cmd: A front-end for
    Ftrace <https://lwn.net/Articles/410200/>`__
 
-There's more detailed documentation kernelshark usage here:
-`KernelShark <http://rostedt.homelinux.com/kernelshark/>`__
+See also `KernelShark's documentation <https://kernelshark.org/Documentation.html>`__
+for further usage details.
 
 An amusing yet useful README (a tracing mini-HOWTO) can be found in
 ``/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/README``.

documentation/ref-manual/ref-features.rst

@@ -63,6 +63,8 @@ Project metadata:
 
 -  *keyboard:* Hardware has a keyboard
 
+-  *numa:* Hardware has non-uniform memory access
+
 -  *pcbios:* Support for booting through BIOS
 
 -  *pci:* Hardware has a PCI bus

documentation/ref-manual/ref-system-requirements.rst

@@ -45,6 +45,8 @@ distributions:
 
 -  Ubuntu 20.04
 
+-  Ubuntu 22.04
+
 -  Fedora 28
 
 -  Fedora 29
@@ -61,6 +63,8 @@ distributions:
 
 -  Fedora 35
 
+-  Fedora 36
+
 -  CentOS 7.x
 
 -  Debian GNU/Linux 8.x (Jessie)
@@ -79,6 +83,8 @@ distributions:
 
 -  AlmaLinux 8.5
 
+-  AlmaLinux 8.7
+
 .. note::
 
    -  While the Yocto Project Team attempts to ensure all Yocto Project

documentation/ref-manual/ref-variables.rst

@@ -7147,6 +7147,32 @@ system and gives an overview of their function and contents.
    :term:`SSTATE_DIR`
       The directory for the shared state cache.
 
+   :term:`SSTATE_EXCLUDEDEPS_SYSROOT`
+      This variable allows to specify indirect dependencies to exclude
+      from sysroots, for example to avoid the situations when a dependency on
+      any ``-native`` recipe will pull in all dependencies of that recipe
+      in the recipe sysroot. This behaviour might not always be wanted,
+      for example when that ``-native`` recipe depends on build tools
+      that are not relevant for the current recipe.
+
+      This way, irrelevant dependencies are ignored, which could have
+      prevented the reuse of prebuilt artifacts stored in the Shared
+      State Cache.
+
+      :term:`SSTATE_EXCLUDEDEPS_SYSROOT` is evaluated as two regular
+      expressions of recipe and dependency to ignore. An example
+      is the rule in :oe_git:`meta/conf/layer.conf </openembedded-core/tree/meta/conf/layer.conf>`::
+
+         # Nothing needs to depend on libc-initial
+         # base-passwd/shadow-sysroot don't need their dependencies
+         SSTATE_EXCLUDEDEPS_SYSROOT += "\
+             .*->.*-initial.* \
+             .*(base-passwd|shadow-sysroot)->.* \
+         "
+
+      The ``->`` substring represents the dependency between
+      the two regular expressions.
+
    :term:`SSTATE_MIRROR_ALLOW_NETWORK`
       If set to "1", allows fetches from mirrors that are specified in
       :term:`SSTATE_MIRRORS` to work even when

meta-poky/conf/distro/poky.conf

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 DISTRO = "poky"
 DISTRO_NAME = "Poky (Yocto Project Reference Distro)"
-DISTRO_VERSION = "3.1.19"
+DISTRO_VERSION = "3.1.24"
 DISTRO_CODENAME = "dunfell"
 SDK_VENDOR = "-pokysdk"
 SDK_VERSION = "${@d.getVar('DISTRO_VERSION').replace('snapshot-${DATE}', 'snapshot')}"
@@ -47,12 +47,14 @@ SANITY_TESTED_DISTROS ?= " \
             ubuntu-18.04 \n \
             ubuntu-19.04 \n \
             ubuntu-20.04 \n \
+            ubuntu-22.04 \n \
             fedora-30 \n \
             fedora-31 \n \
             fedora-32 \n \
             fedora-33 \n \
             fedora-34 \n \
             fedora-35 \n \
+            fedora-36 \n \
             centos-7 \n \
             centos-8 \n \
             debian-8 \n \
@@ -63,6 +65,7 @@ SANITY_TESTED_DISTROS ?= " \
             opensuseleap-15.2 \n \
             opensuseleap-15.3 \n \
             almalinux-8.5 \n \
+            almalinux-8.7 \n \
             "
 # add poky sanity bbclass
 INHERIT += "poky-sanity"

meta-yocto-bsp/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto_5.4.bbappend

@@ -7,8 +7,8 @@ KMACHINE_genericx86 ?= "common-pc"
 KMACHINE_genericx86-64 ?= "common-pc-64"
 KMACHINE_beaglebone-yocto ?= "beaglebone"
 
-SRCREV_machine_genericx86 ?= "e2020dbe2ccaef50d7e8f37a5bf08c68a006a064"
-SRCREV_machine_genericx86-64 ?= "e2020dbe2ccaef50d7e8f37a5bf08c68a006a064"
+SRCREV_machine_genericx86 ?= "35826e154ee014b64ccfa0d1f12d36b8f8a75939"
+SRCREV_machine_genericx86-64 ?= "35826e154ee014b64ccfa0d1f12d36b8f8a75939"
 SRCREV_machine_edgerouter ?= "706efec4c1e270ec5dda92275898cd465dfdc7dd"
 SRCREV_machine_beaglebone-yocto ?= "706efec4c1e270ec5dda92275898cd465dfdc7dd"
 
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ COMPATIBLE_MACHINE_genericx86-64 = "genericx86-64"
 COMPATIBLE_MACHINE_edgerouter = "edgerouter"
 COMPATIBLE_MACHINE_beaglebone-yocto = "beaglebone-yocto"
 
-LINUX_VERSION_genericx86 = "5.4.178"
-LINUX_VERSION_genericx86-64 = "5.4.178"
+LINUX_VERSION_genericx86 = "5.4.219"
+LINUX_VERSION_genericx86-64 = "5.4.219"
 LINUX_VERSION_edgerouter = "5.4.58"
 LINUX_VERSION_beaglebone-yocto = "5.4.58"

meta/classes/base.bbclass

@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ def setup_hosttools_dir(dest, toolsvar, d, fatal=True):
             # /usr/local/bin/ccache/gcc -> /usr/bin/ccache, then which(gcc)
             # would return /usr/local/bin/ccache/gcc, but what we need is
             # /usr/bin/gcc, this code can check and fix that.
-            if "ccache" in srctool:
+            if os.path.islink(srctool) and os.path.basename(os.readlink(srctool)) == 'ccache':
                 srctool = bb.utils.which(path, tool, executable=True, direction=1)
             if srctool:
                 os.symlink(srctool, desttool)

meta/classes/cve-check.bbclass

@@ -42,8 +42,8 @@ CVE_CHECK_LOG_JSON ?= "${T}/cve.json"
 CVE_CHECK_DIR ??= "${DEPLOY_DIR}/cve"
 CVE_CHECK_RECIPE_FILE ?= "${CVE_CHECK_DIR}/${PN}"
 CVE_CHECK_RECIPE_FILE_JSON ?= "${CVE_CHECK_DIR}/${PN}_cve.json"
-CVE_CHECK_MANIFEST ?= "${DEPLOY_DIR_IMAGE}/${IMAGE_NAME}${IMAGE_NAME_SUFFIX}.cve"
-CVE_CHECK_MANIFEST_JSON ?= "${DEPLOY_DIR_IMAGE}/${IMAGE_NAME}${IMAGE_NAME_SUFFIX}.json"
+CVE_CHECK_MANIFEST ?= "${IMGDEPLOYDIR}/${IMAGE_NAME}${IMAGE_NAME_SUFFIX}.cve"
+CVE_CHECK_MANIFEST_JSON ?= "${IMGDEPLOYDIR}/${IMAGE_NAME}${IMAGE_NAME_SUFFIX}.json"
 CVE_CHECK_COPY_FILES ??= "1"
 CVE_CHECK_CREATE_MANIFEST ??= "1"
 
@@ -138,17 +138,18 @@ python do_cve_check () {
     """
     from oe.cve_check import get_patched_cves
 
-    if os.path.exists(d.getVar("CVE_CHECK_DB_FILE")):
-        try:
-            patched_cves = get_patched_cves(d)
-        except FileNotFoundError:
-            bb.fatal("Failure in searching patches")
-        whitelisted, patched, unpatched, status = check_cves(d, patched_cves)
-        if patched or unpatched or (d.getVar("CVE_CHECK_COVERAGE") == "1" and status):
-            cve_data = get_cve_info(d, patched + unpatched + whitelisted)
-            cve_write_data(d, patched, unpatched, whitelisted, cve_data, status)
-    else:
-        bb.note("No CVE database found, skipping CVE check")
+    with bb.utils.fileslocked([d.getVar("CVE_CHECK_DB_FILE_LOCK")], shared=True):
+        if os.path.exists(d.getVar("CVE_CHECK_DB_FILE")):
+            try:
+                patched_cves = get_patched_cves(d)
+            except FileNotFoundError:
+                bb.fatal("Failure in searching patches")
+            ignored, patched, unpatched, status = check_cves(d, patched_cves)
+            if patched or unpatched or (d.getVar("CVE_CHECK_COVERAGE") == "1" and status):
+                cve_data = get_cve_info(d, patched + unpatched + ignored)
+                cve_write_data(d, patched, unpatched, ignored, cve_data, status)
+        else:
+            bb.note("No CVE database found, skipping CVE check")
 
 }
 
@@ -194,7 +195,7 @@ python cve_check_write_rootfs_manifest () {
         recipies.add(pkg_data["PN"])
 
     bb.note("Writing rootfs CVE manifest")
-    deploy_dir = d.getVar("DEPLOY_DIR_IMAGE")
+    deploy_dir = d.getVar("IMGDEPLOYDIR")
     link_name = d.getVar("IMAGE_LINK_NAME")
 
     json_data = {"version":"1", "package": []}
@@ -289,7 +290,8 @@ def check_cves(d, patched_cves):
             vendor = "%"
 
         # Find all relevant CVE IDs.
-        for cverow in conn.execute("SELECT DISTINCT ID FROM PRODUCTS WHERE PRODUCT IS ? AND VENDOR LIKE ?", (product, vendor)):
+        cve_cursor = conn.execute("SELECT DISTINCT ID FROM PRODUCTS WHERE PRODUCT IS ? AND VENDOR LIKE ?", (product, vendor))
+        for cverow in cve_cursor:
             cve = cverow[0]
 
             if cve in cve_whitelist:
@@ -308,7 +310,8 @@ def check_cves(d, patched_cves):
             vulnerable = False
             ignored = False
 
-            for row in conn.execute("SELECT * FROM PRODUCTS WHERE ID IS ? AND PRODUCT IS ? AND VENDOR LIKE ?", (cve, product, vendor)):
+            product_cursor = conn.execute("SELECT * FROM PRODUCTS WHERE ID IS ? AND PRODUCT IS ? AND VENDOR LIKE ?", (cve, product, vendor))
+            for row in product_cursor:
                 (_, _, _, version_start, operator_start, version_end, operator_end) = row
                 #bb.debug(2, "Evaluating row " + str(row))
                 if cve in cve_whitelist:
@@ -352,10 +355,12 @@ def check_cves(d, patched_cves):
                         bb.note("%s-%s is vulnerable to %s" % (pn, real_pv, cve))
                         cves_unpatched.append(cve)
                     break
+            product_cursor.close()
 
             if not vulnerable:
                 bb.note("%s-%s is not vulnerable to %s" % (pn, real_pv, cve))
                 patched_cves.add(cve)
+        cve_cursor.close()
 
         if not cves_in_product:
             bb.note("No CVE records found for product %s, pn %s" % (product, pn))
@@ -377,14 +382,15 @@ def get_cve_info(d, cves):
     conn = sqlite3.connect(db_file, uri=True)
 
     for cve in cves:
-        for row in conn.execute("SELECT * FROM NVD WHERE ID IS ?", (cve,)):
+        cursor = conn.execute("SELECT * FROM NVD WHERE ID IS ?", (cve,))
+        for row in cursor:
             cve_data[row[0]] = {}
             cve_data[row[0]]["summary"] = row[1]
             cve_data[row[0]]["scorev2"] = row[2]
             cve_data[row[0]]["scorev3"] = row[3]
             cve_data[row[0]]["modified"] = row[4]
             cve_data[row[0]]["vector"] = row[5]
-
+        cursor.close()
     conn.close()
     return cve_data
 

meta/classes/devshell.bbclass

@@ -2,8 +2,6 @@ inherit terminal
 
 DEVSHELL = "${SHELL}"
 
-PATH:prepend:task-devshell = "${COREBASE}/scripts/git-intercept:"
-
 python do_devshell () {
     if d.getVarFlag("do_devshell", "manualfakeroot"):
        d.prependVar("DEVSHELL", "pseudo ")

meta/classes/externalsrc.bbclass

@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ python () {
         if externalsrcbuild:
             d.setVar('B', externalsrcbuild)
         else:
-            d.setVar('B', '${WORKDIR}/${BPN}-${PV}/')
+            d.setVar('B', '${WORKDIR}/${BPN}-${PV}')
 
         local_srcuri = []
         fetch = bb.fetch2.Fetch((d.getVar('SRC_URI') or '').split(), d)
@@ -207,8 +207,8 @@ def srctree_hash_files(d, srcdir=None):
     try:
         git_dir = os.path.join(s_dir,
             subprocess.check_output(['git', '-C', s_dir, 'rev-parse', '--git-dir'], stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL).decode("utf-8").rstrip())
-        top_git_dir = os.path.join(s_dir, subprocess.check_output(['git', '-C', d.getVar("TOPDIR"), 'rev-parse', '--git-dir'],
-            stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL).decode("utf-8").rstrip())
+        top_git_dir = os.path.join(d.getVar("TOPDIR"),
+            subprocess.check_output(['git', '-C', d.getVar("TOPDIR"), 'rev-parse', '--git-dir'], stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL).decode("utf-8").rstrip())
         if git_dir == top_git_dir:
             git_dir = None
     except subprocess.CalledProcessError:
@@ -225,15 +225,16 @@ def srctree_hash_files(d, srcdir=None):
             env['GIT_INDEX_FILE'] = tmp_index.name
             subprocess.check_output(['git', 'add', '-A', '.'], cwd=s_dir, env=env)
             git_sha1 = subprocess.check_output(['git', 'write-tree'], cwd=s_dir, env=env).decode("utf-8")
-            submodule_helper = subprocess.check_output(['git', 'submodule--helper', 'list'], cwd=s_dir, env=env).decode("utf-8")
-            for line in submodule_helper.splitlines():
-                module_dir = os.path.join(s_dir, line.rsplit(maxsplit=1)[1])
-                if os.path.isdir(module_dir):
-                    proc = subprocess.Popen(['git', 'add', '-A', '.'], cwd=module_dir, env=env, stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL)
-                    proc.communicate()
-                    proc = subprocess.Popen(['git', 'write-tree'], cwd=module_dir, env=env, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL)
-                    stdout, _ = proc.communicate()
-                    git_sha1 += stdout.decode("utf-8")
+            if os.path.exists(os.path.join(s_dir, ".gitmodules")) and os.path.getsize(os.path.join(s_dir, ".gitmodules")) > 0:
+                submodule_helper = subprocess.check_output(["git", "config", "--file", ".gitmodules", "--get-regexp", "path"], cwd=s_dir, env=env).decode("utf-8")
+                for line in submodule_helper.splitlines():
+                    module_dir = os.path.join(s_dir, line.rsplit(maxsplit=1)[1])
+                    if os.path.isdir(module_dir):
+                        proc = subprocess.Popen(['git', 'add', '-A', '.'], cwd=module_dir, env=env, stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL)
+                        proc.communicate()
+                        proc = subprocess.Popen(['git', 'write-tree'], cwd=module_dir, env=env, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL)
+                        stdout, _ = proc.communicate()
+                        git_sha1 += stdout.decode("utf-8")
             sha1 = hashlib.sha1(git_sha1.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
         with open(oe_hash_file, 'w') as fobj:
             fobj.write(sha1)

meta/classes/fs-uuid.bbclass

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 def get_rootfs_uuid(d):
     import subprocess
     rootfs = d.getVar('ROOTFS')
-    output = subprocess.check_output(['tune2fs', '-l', rootfs])
+    output = subprocess.check_output(['tune2fs', '-l', rootfs], text=True)
     for line in output.split('\n'):
         if line.startswith('Filesystem UUID:'):
             uuid = line.split()[-1]

meta/classes/image.bbclass

@@ -311,7 +311,7 @@ fakeroot python do_image_qa () {
         except oe.utils.ImageQAFailed as e:
             qamsg = qamsg + '\tImage QA function %s failed: %s\n' % (e.name, e.description)
         except Exception as e:
-            qamsg = qamsg + '\tImage QA function %s failed\n' % cmd
+            qamsg = qamsg + '\tImage QA function %s failed: %s\n' % (cmd, e)
 
     if qamsg:
         imgname = d.getVar('IMAGE_NAME')
@@ -437,7 +437,7 @@ python () {
         localdata.delVar('DATETIME')
         localdata.delVar('DATE')
         localdata.delVar('TMPDIR')
-        vardepsexclude = (d.getVarFlag('IMAGE_CMD_' + realt, 'vardepsexclude', True) or '').split()
+        vardepsexclude = (d.getVarFlag('IMAGE_CMD_' + realt, 'vardepsexclude') or '').split()
         for dep in vardepsexclude:
             localdata.delVar(dep)
 

meta/classes/kernel-arch.bbclass

@@ -64,5 +64,5 @@ HOST_AR_KERNEL_ARCH ?= "${TARGET_AR_KERNEL_ARCH}"
 KERNEL_CC = "${CCACHE}${HOST_PREFIX}gcc ${HOST_CC_KERNEL_ARCH} -fuse-ld=bfd ${DEBUG_PREFIX_MAP} -fdebug-prefix-map=${STAGING_KERNEL_DIR}=${KERNEL_SRC_PATH} -fdebug-prefix-map=${STAGING_KERNEL_BUILDDIR}=${KERNEL_SRC_PATH}"
 KERNEL_LD = "${CCACHE}${HOST_PREFIX}ld.bfd ${HOST_LD_KERNEL_ARCH}"
 KERNEL_AR = "${CCACHE}${HOST_PREFIX}ar ${HOST_AR_KERNEL_ARCH}"
-TOOLCHAIN = "gcc"
+TOOLCHAIN ?= "gcc"
 

meta/classes/kernel-fitimage.bbclass

@@ -59,6 +59,9 @@ FIT_SIGN_ALG ?= "rsa2048"
 # fitImage Padding Algo
 FIT_PAD_ALG ?= "pkcs-1.5"
 
+# Arguments passed to mkimage for signing
+UBOOT_MKIMAGE_SIGN_ARGS ?= ""
+
 #
 # Emit the fitImage ITS header
 #
@@ -479,7 +482,8 @@ fitimage_assemble() {
 			${@'-D "${UBOOT_MKIMAGE_DTCOPTS}"' if len('${UBOOT_MKIMAGE_DTCOPTS}') else ''} \
 			-F -k "${UBOOT_SIGN_KEYDIR}" \
 			$add_key_to_u_boot \
-			-r arch/${ARCH}/boot/${2}
+			-r arch/${ARCH}/boot/${2} \
+			${UBOOT_MKIMAGE_SIGN_ARGS}
 	fi
 }
 

meta/classes/kernel-yocto.bbclass

@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ do_kernel_metadata() {
 	# SRC_URI. If they were supplied, we convert them into include directives
 	# for the update part of the process
 	for f in ${feat_dirs}; do
-		if [ -d "${WORKDIR}/$f/meta" ]; then
+		if [ -d "${WORKDIR}/$f/kernel-meta" ]; then
 			includes="$includes -I${WORKDIR}/$f/kernel-meta"
 		elif [ -d "${WORKDIR}/../oe-local-files/$f" ]; then
 			includes="$includes -I${WORKDIR}/../oe-local-files/$f"

meta/classes/kernel.bbclass

@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ python __anonymous () {
     # KERNEL_IMAGETYPES may contain a mixture of image types supported directly
     # by the kernel build system and types which are created by post-processing
     # the output of the kernel build system (e.g. compressing vmlinux ->
-    # vmlinux.gz in kernel_do_compile()).
+    # vmlinux.gz in kernel_do_transform_kernel()).
     # KERNEL_IMAGETYPE_FOR_MAKE should contain only image types supported
     # directly by the kernel build system.
     if not d.getVar('KERNEL_IMAGETYPE_FOR_MAKE'):
@@ -106,6 +106,8 @@ python __anonymous () {
     # standalone for use by wic and other tools.
     if image:
         d.appendVarFlag('do_bundle_initramfs', 'depends', ' ${INITRAMFS_IMAGE}:do_image_complete')
+    if image and bb.utils.to_boolean(d.getVar('INITRAMFS_IMAGE_BUNDLE')):
+        bb.build.addtask('do_transform_bundled_initramfs', 'do_deploy', 'do_bundle_initramfs', d)
 
     # NOTE: setting INITRAMFS_TASK is for backward compatibility
     #       The preferred method is to set INITRAMFS_IMAGE, because
@@ -280,6 +282,14 @@ do_bundle_initramfs () {
 }
 do_bundle_initramfs[dirs] = "${B}"
 
+kernel_do_transform_bundled_initramfs() {
+        # vmlinux.gz is not built by kernel
+	if (echo "${KERNEL_IMAGETYPES}" | grep -wq "vmlinux\.gz"); then
+		gzip -9cn < ${KERNEL_OUTPUT_DIR}/vmlinux.initramfs > ${KERNEL_OUTPUT_DIR}/vmlinux.gz.initramfs
+        fi
+}
+do_transform_bundled_initramfs[dirs] = "${B}"
+
 python do_devshell_prepend () {
     os.environ["LDFLAGS"] = ''
 }
@@ -311,6 +321,10 @@ kernel_do_compile() {
 		export KBUILD_BUILD_TIMESTAMP="$ts"
 		export KCONFIG_NOTIMESTAMP=1
 		bbnote "KBUILD_BUILD_TIMESTAMP: $ts"
+	else
+		ts=`LC_ALL=C date`
+		export KBUILD_BUILD_TIMESTAMP="$ts"
+		bbnote "KBUILD_BUILD_TIMESTAMP: $ts"
 	fi
 	# The $use_alternate_initrd is only set from
 	# do_bundle_initramfs() This variable is specifically for the
@@ -329,12 +343,17 @@ kernel_do_compile() {
 	for typeformake in ${KERNEL_IMAGETYPE_FOR_MAKE} ; do
 		oe_runmake ${typeformake} CC="${KERNEL_CC} $cc_extra " LD="${KERNEL_LD}" ${KERNEL_EXTRA_ARGS} $use_alternate_initrd
 	done
+}
+
+kernel_do_transform_kernel() {
 	# vmlinux.gz is not built by kernel
 	if (echo "${KERNEL_IMAGETYPES}" | grep -wq "vmlinux\.gz"); then
 		mkdir -p "${KERNEL_OUTPUT_DIR}"
 		gzip -9cn < ${B}/vmlinux > "${KERNEL_OUTPUT_DIR}/vmlinux.gz"
 	fi
 }
+do_transform_kernel[dirs] = "${B}"
+addtask transform_kernel after do_compile before do_install
 
 do_compile_kernelmodules() {
 	unset CFLAGS CPPFLAGS CXXFLAGS LDFLAGS MACHINE
@@ -352,6 +371,10 @@ do_compile_kernelmodules() {
 		export KBUILD_BUILD_TIMESTAMP="$ts"
 		export KCONFIG_NOTIMESTAMP=1
 		bbnote "KBUILD_BUILD_TIMESTAMP: $ts"
+	else
+		ts=`LC_ALL=C date`
+		export KBUILD_BUILD_TIMESTAMP="$ts"
+		bbnote "KBUILD_BUILD_TIMESTAMP: $ts"
 	fi
 	if (grep -q -i -e '^CONFIG_MODULES=y$' ${B}/.config); then
 		cc_extra=$(get_cc_option)
@@ -572,11 +595,11 @@ do_savedefconfig() {
 do_savedefconfig[nostamp] = "1"
 addtask savedefconfig after do_configure
 
-inherit cml1
+inherit cml1 pkgconfig
 
 KCONFIG_CONFIG_COMMAND_append = " LD='${KERNEL_LD}' HOSTLDFLAGS='${BUILD_LDFLAGS}'"
 
-EXPORT_FUNCTIONS do_compile do_install do_configure
+EXPORT_FUNCTIONS do_compile do_transform_kernel do_transform_bundled_initramfs do_install do_configure
 
 # kernel-base becomes kernel-${KERNEL_VERSION}
 # kernel-image becomes kernel-image-${KERNEL_VERSION}
@@ -721,7 +744,7 @@ kernel_do_deploy() {
 	fi
 
 	if [ ! -z "${INITRAMFS_IMAGE}" -a x"${INITRAMFS_IMAGE_BUNDLE}" = x1 ]; then
-		for imageType in ${KERNEL_IMAGETYPE_FOR_MAKE} ; do
+		for imageType in ${KERNEL_IMAGETYPES} ; do
 			if [ "$imageType" = "fitImage" ] ; then
 				continue
 			fi

meta/classes/libc-package.bbclass

@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ PACKAGE_NO_GCONV ?= "0"
 OVERRIDES_append = ":${TARGET_ARCH}-${TARGET_OS}"
 
 locale_base_postinst_ontarget() {
+mkdir ${libdir}/locale
 localedef --inputfile=${datadir}/i18n/locales/%s --charmap=%s %s
 }
 

meta/classes/license_image.bbclass

@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ def get_deployed_dependencies(d):
     deploy = {}
     # Get all the dependencies for the current task (rootfs).
     taskdata = d.getVar("BB_TASKDEPDATA", False)
-    pn = d.getVar("PN", True)
+    pn = d.getVar("PN")
     depends = list(set([dep[0] for dep
                     in list(taskdata.values())
                     if not dep[0].endswith("-native") and not dep[0] == pn]))

meta/classes/nativesdk.bbclass

@@ -113,3 +113,5 @@ do_packagedata[stamp-extra-info] = ""
 USE_NLS = "${SDKUSE_NLS}"
 
 OLDEST_KERNEL = "${SDK_OLDEST_KERNEL}"
+
+PATH_prepend = "${COREBASE}/scripts/nativesdk-intercept:"

meta/classes/populate_sdk_ext.bbclass

@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ python write_host_sdk_ext_manifest () {
                 f.write("%s %s %s\n" % (info[1], info[2], info[3]))
 }
 
-SDK_POSTPROCESS_COMMAND_append_task-populate-sdk-ext = "write_target_sdk_ext_manifest; write_host_sdk_ext_manifest; "    
+SDK_POSTPROCESS_COMMAND_append_task-populate-sdk-ext = " write_target_sdk_ext_manifest; write_host_sdk_ext_manifest; "    
 
 SDK_TITLE_task-populate-sdk-ext = "${@d.getVar('DISTRO_NAME') or d.getVar('DISTRO')} Extensible SDK"
 

meta/classes/qemuboot.bbclass

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
 # QB_OPT_APPEND: options to append to qemu, e.g., "-show-cursor"
 #
 # QB_DEFAULT_KERNEL: default kernel to boot, e.g., "bzImage"
+#                                            e.g., "bzImage-initramfs-qemux86-64.bin" if INITRAMFS_IMAGE_BUNDLE is set to 1.
 #
 # QB_DEFAULT_FSTYPE: default FSTYPE to boot, e.g., "ext4"
 #
@@ -75,7 +76,7 @@
 
 QB_MEM ?= "-m 256"
 QB_SERIAL_OPT ?= "-serial mon:stdio -serial null"
-QB_DEFAULT_KERNEL ?= "${KERNEL_IMAGETYPE}"
+QB_DEFAULT_KERNEL ?= "${@bb.utils.contains("INITRAMFS_IMAGE_BUNDLE", "1", "${KERNEL_IMAGETYPE}-${INITRAMFS_LINK_NAME}.bin", "${KERNEL_IMAGETYPE}", d)}"
 QB_DEFAULT_FSTYPE ?= "ext4"
 QB_OPT_APPEND ?= "-show-cursor"
 QB_NETWORK_DEVICE ?= "-device virtio-net-pci,netdev=net0,mac=@MAC@"

meta/classes/rm_work.bbclass

@@ -27,6 +27,13 @@ BB_SCHEDULER ?= "completion"
 BB_TASK_IONICE_LEVEL_task-rm_work = "3.0"
 
 do_rm_work () {
+    # Force using the HOSTTOOLS 'rm' - otherwise the SYSROOT_NATIVE 'rm' can be selected depending on PATH
+    # Avoids race-condition accessing 'rm' when deleting WORKDIR folders at the end of this function
+    RM_BIN="$(PATH=${HOSTTOOLS_DIR} command -v rm)"
+    if [ -z "${RM_BIN}" ]; then
+        bbfatal "Binary 'rm' not found in HOSTTOOLS_DIR, cannot remove WORKDIR data."
+    fi
+
     # If the recipe name is in the RM_WORK_EXCLUDE, skip the recipe.
     for p in ${RM_WORK_EXCLUDE}; do
         if [ "$p" = "${PN}" ]; then
@@ -73,7 +80,7 @@ do_rm_work () {
             # sstate version since otherwise we'd need to leave 'plaindirs' around
             # such as 'packages' and 'packages-split' and these can be large. No end
             # of chain tasks depend directly on do_package anymore.
-            rm -f -- $i;
+            "${RM_BIN}" -f -- $i;
             ;;
         *_setscene*)
             # Skip stamps which are already setscene versions
@@ -90,7 +97,7 @@ do_rm_work () {
                     ;;
                 esac
             done
-            rm -f -- $i
+            "${RM_BIN}" -f -- $i
         esac
     done
 
@@ -100,9 +107,9 @@ do_rm_work () {
         # Retain only logs and other files in temp, safely ignore
         # failures of removing pseudo folers on NFS2/3 server.
         if [ $dir = 'pseudo' ]; then
-            rm -rf -- $dir 2> /dev/null || true
+            "${RM_BIN}" -rf -- $dir 2> /dev/null || true
         elif ! echo "$excludes" | grep -q -w "$dir"; then
-            rm -rf -- $dir
+            "${RM_BIN}" -rf -- $dir
         fi
     done
 }

meta/classes/sanity.bbclass

@@ -561,6 +561,14 @@ def check_tar_version(sanity_data):
     version = result.split()[3]
     if LooseVersion(version) < LooseVersion("1.28"):
         return "Your version of tar is older than 1.28 and does not have the support needed to enable reproducible builds. Please install a newer version of tar (you could use the project's buildtools-tarball from our last release or use scripts/install-buildtools).\n"
+
+    try:
+        result = subprocess.check_output(["tar", "--help"], stderr=subprocess.STDOUT).decode('utf-8')
+        if "--xattrs" not in result:
+            return "Your tar doesn't support --xattrs, please use GNU tar.\n"
+    except subprocess.CalledProcessError as e:
+        return "Unable to execute tar --help, exit code %d\n%s\n" % (e.returncode, e.output)
+
     return None
 
 # We use git parameters and functionality only found in 1.7.8 or later

meta/classes/sstate.bbclass

@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ def generate_sstatefn(spec, hash, taskname, siginfo, d):
         components = spec.split(":")
         # Fields 0,5,6 are mandatory, 1 is most useful, 2,3,4 are just for information
         # 7 is for the separators
-        avail = (254 - len(hash + "_" + taskname + extension) - len(components[0]) - len(components[1]) - len(components[5]) - len(components[6]) - 7) // 3
+        avail = (limit - len(hash + "_" + taskname + extension) - len(components[0]) - len(components[1]) - len(components[5]) - len(components[6]) - 7) // 3
         components[2] = components[2][:avail]
         components[3] = components[3][:avail]
         components[4] = components[4][:avail]

meta/classes/toolchain-scripts.bbclass

@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ toolchain_create_sdk_env_script () {
 	echo '# http://tldp.org/HOWTO/Program-Library-HOWTO/shared-libraries.html#AEN80' >> $script
 	echo '# http://xahlee.info/UnixResource_dir/_/ldpath.html' >> $script
 	echo '# Only disable this check if you are absolutely know what you are doing!' >> $script
-	echo 'if [ ! -z "$LD_LIBRARY_PATH" ]; then' >> $script
+	echo 'if [ ! -z "${LD_LIBRARY_PATH:-}" ]; then' >> $script
 	echo "    echo \"Your environment is misconfigured, you probably need to 'unset LD_LIBRARY_PATH'\"" >> $script
 	echo "    echo \"but please check why this was set in the first place and that it's safe to unset.\"" >> $script
 	echo '    echo "The SDK will not operate correctly in most cases when LD_LIBRARY_PATH is set."' >> $script

meta/conf/distro/include/maintainers.inc

@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ RECIPE_MAINTAINER_pn-gcc-cross-canadian-${TRANSLATED_TARGET_ARCH} = "Khem Raj <r
 RECIPE_MAINTAINER_pn-gcc-crosssdk-${SDK_SYS} = "Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>"
 RECIPE_MAINTAINER_pn-gcc-runtime = "Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>"
 RECIPE_MAINTAINER_pn-gcc-sanitizers = "Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>"
-RECIPE_MAINTAINER_pn-gcc-source-9.3.0 = "Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>"
+RECIPE_MAINTAINER_pn-gcc-source-9.5.0 = "Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>"
 RECIPE_MAINTAINER_pn-gconf = "Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com>"
 RECIPE_MAINTAINER_pn-gcr = "Alexander Kanavin <alex.kanavin@gmail.com>"
 RECIPE_MAINTAINER_pn-gdb = "Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>"

meta/conf/distro/include/yocto-uninative.inc

@@ -6,10 +6,10 @@
 # to the distro running on the build machine.
 #
 
-UNINATIVE_MAXGLIBCVERSION = "2.35"
-UNINATIVE_VERSION = "3.6"
+UNINATIVE_MAXGLIBCVERSION = "2.36"
+UNINATIVE_VERSION = "3.7"
 
 UNINATIVE_URL ?= "http://downloads.yoctoproject.org/releases/uninative/${UNINATIVE_VERSION}/"
-UNINATIVE_CHECKSUM[aarch64] ?= "d64831cf2792c8e470c2e42230660e1a8e5de56a579cdd59978791f663c2f3ed"
-UNINATIVE_CHECKSUM[i686] ?= "2f0ee9b66b1bb2c85e2b592fb3c9c7f5d77399fa638d74961330cdb8de34ca3b"
-UNINATIVE_CHECKSUM[x86_64] ?= "9bfc4c970495b3716b2f9e52c4df9f968c02463a9a95000f6657fbc3fde1f098"
+UNINATIVE_CHECKSUM[aarch64] ?= "6a29bcae4b5b716d2d520e18800b33943b65f8a835eac1ff8793fc5ee65b4be6"
+UNINATIVE_CHECKSUM[i686] ?= "3f6d52e64996570c716108d49f8108baccf499a283bbefae438c7266b7a93305"
+UNINATIVE_CHECKSUM[x86_64] ?= "b110bf2e10fe420f5ca2f3ec55f048ee5f0a54c7e34856a3594e51eb2aea0570"

meta/conf/licenses.conf

@@ -13,24 +13,31 @@
 SPDXLICENSEMAP[AGPL-3] = "AGPL-3.0"
 SPDXLICENSEMAP[AGPLv3] = "AGPL-3.0"
 SPDXLICENSEMAP[AGPLv3.0] = "AGPL-3.0"
+SPDXLICENSEMAP[AGPL-3.0-only] = "AGPL-3.0"
 
 # GPL variations
 SPDXLICENSEMAP[GPL-1] = "GPL-1.0"
 SPDXLICENSEMAP[GPLv1] = "GPL-1.0"
 SPDXLICENSEMAP[GPLv1.0] = "GPL-1.0"
+SPDXLICENSEMAP[GPL-1.0-only] = "GPL-1.0"
 SPDXLICENSEMAP[GPL-2] = "GPL-2.0"
 SPDXLICENSEMAP[GPLv2] = "GPL-2.0"
 SPDXLICENSEMAP[GPLv2.0] = "GPL-2.0"
+SPDXLICENSEMAP[GPL-2.0-only] = "GPL-2.0"
 SPDXLICENSEMAP[GPL-3] = "GPL-3.0"
 SPDXLICENSEMAP[GPLv3] = "GPL-3.0"
 SPDXLICENSEMAP[GPLv3.0] = "GPL-3.0"
+SPDXLICENSEMAP[GPL-3.0-only] = "GPL-3.0"
 
 #LGPL variations
 SPDXLICENSEMAP[LGPLv2] = "LGPL-2.0"
 SPDXLICENSEMAP[LGPLv2.0] = "LGPL-2.0"
+SPDXLICENSEMAP[LGPL-2.0-only] = "LGPL-2.0"
 SPDXLICENSEMAP[LGPL2.1] = "LGPL-2.1"
 SPDXLICENSEMAP[LGPLv2.1] = "LGPL-2.1"
+SPDXLICENSEMAP[LGPL-2.1-only] = "LGPL-2.1"
 SPDXLICENSEMAP[LGPLv3] = "LGPL-3.0"
+SPDXLICENSEMAP[LGPL-3.0-only] = "LGPL-3.0"
 
 #MPL variations
 SPDXLICENSEMAP[MPL-1] = "MPL-1.0"

meta/lib/oe/cve_check.py

@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ def get_cpe_ids(cve_product, version):
         else:
             vendor = "*"
 
-        cpe_id = f'cpe:2.3:a:{vendor}:{product}:{version}:*:*:*:*:*:*:*'
+        cpe_id = 'cpe:2.3:a:{}:{}:{}:*:*:*:*:*:*:*'.format(vendor, product, version)
         cpe_ids.append(cpe_id)
 
     return cpe_ids

meta/lib/oe/reproducible.py

@@ -62,7 +62,8 @@ def get_source_date_epoch_from_git(d, sourcedir):
         return None
 
     bb.debug(1, "git repository: %s" % gitpath)
-    p = subprocess.run(['git', '--git-dir', gitpath, 'log', '-1', '--pretty=%ct'], check=True, stdout=subprocess.PIPE)
+    p = subprocess.run(['git', '-c', 'log.showSignature=false', '--git-dir', gitpath, 'log', '-1', '--pretty=%ct'],
+                       check=True, stdout=subprocess.PIPE)
     return int(p.stdout.decode('utf-8'))
 
 def get_source_date_epoch_from_youngest_file(d, sourcedir):

meta/lib/oeqa/runtime/cases/rpm.py

@@ -49,21 +49,20 @@ class RpmBasicTest(OERuntimeTestCase):
             msg = 'status: %s. Cannot run rpm -qa: %s' % (status, output)
             self.assertEqual(status, 0, msg=msg)
 
-        def check_no_process_for_user(u):
-            _, output = self.target.run(self.tc.target_cmds['ps'])
-            if u + ' ' in output:
-                return False
-            else:
-                return True
+        def wait_for_no_process_for_user(u, timeout = 120):
+            timeout_at = time.time() + timeout
+            while time.time() < timeout_at:
+                _, output = self.target.run(self.tc.target_cmds['ps'])
+                if u + ' ' not in output:
+                    return
+                time.sleep(1)
+            user_pss = [ps for ps in output.split("\n") if u + ' ' in ps]
+            msg = "There're %s 's process(es) still running: %s".format(u, "\n".join(user_pss))
+            assertTrue(True, msg=msg)
 
         def unset_up_test_user(u):
             # ensure no test1 process in running
-            timeout = time.time() + 30
-            while time.time() < timeout:
-                if check_no_process_for_user(u):
-                    break
-                else:
-                    time.sleep(1)
+            wait_for_no_process_for_user(u)
             status, output = self.target.run('userdel -r %s' % u)
             msg = 'Failed to erase user: %s' % output
             self.assertTrue(status == 0, msg=msg)

meta/lib/oeqa/runtime/context.py

@@ -67,11 +67,11 @@ class OERuntimeTestContextExecutor(OETestContextExecutor):
                 % self.default_target_type)
         runtime_group.add_argument('--target-ip', action='store',
                 default=self.default_target_ip,
-                help="IP address of device under test, default: %s" \
+                help="IP address and optionally ssh port (default 22) of device under test, for example '192.168.0.7:22'. Default: %s" \
                 % self.default_target_ip)
         runtime_group.add_argument('--server-ip', action='store',
                 default=self.default_target_ip,
-                help="IP address of device under test, default: %s" \
+                help="IP address of the test host from test target machine, default: %s" \
                 % self.default_server_ip)
 
         runtime_group.add_argument('--host-dumper-dir', action='store',

meta/lib/oeqa/selftest/cases/devtool.py

@@ -1323,7 +1323,7 @@ class DevtoolExtractTests(DevtoolBase):
             # Now really test deploy-target
             result = runCmd('devtool deploy-target -c %s root@%s' % (testrecipe, qemu.ip))
             # Run a test command to see if it was installed properly
-            sshargs = '-o UserKnownHostsFile=/dev/null -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no'
+            sshargs = '-o UserKnownHostsFile=/dev/null -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o HostKeyAlgorithms=+ssh-rsa'
             result = runCmd('ssh %s root@%s %s' % (sshargs, qemu.ip, testcommand))
             # Check if it deployed all of the files with the right ownership/perms
             # First look on the host - need to do this under pseudo to get the correct ownership/perms

meta/lib/oeqa/selftest/cases/prservice.py

@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ class BitbakePrTests(OESelftestTestCase):
         exported_db_path = os.path.join(self.builddir, 'export.inc')
         export_result = runCmd("bitbake-prserv-tool export %s" % exported_db_path, ignore_status=True)
         self.assertEqual(export_result.status, 0, msg="PR Service database export failed: %s" % export_result.output)
-        self.assertTrue(os.path.exists(exported_db_path))
+        self.assertTrue(os.path.exists(exported_db_path), msg="%s didn't exist, tool output %s" % (exported_db_path, export_result.output))
 
         if replace_current_db:
             current_db_path = os.path.join(get_bb_var('PERSISTENT_DIR'), 'prserv.sqlite3')

meta/lib/oeqa/selftest/cases/reproducible.py

@@ -39,7 +39,6 @@ exclude_packages = [
 	'gstreamer1.0-python',
 	'hwlatdetect',
         'kernel-devsrc',
-	'libaprutil',
 	'libcap-ng',
 	'libjson',
 	'libproxy',

meta/lib/oeqa/selftest/cases/runtime_test.py

@@ -175,8 +175,8 @@ class TestImage(OESelftestTestCase):
         if "DISPLAY" not in os.environ:
             self.skipTest("virgl gtk test must be run inside a X session")
         distro = oe.lsb.distro_identifier()
-        if distro and distro == 'almalinux-8.6':
-            self.skipTest('virgl isn\'t working with Alma 8')
+        if distro and distro.startswith('almalinux'):
+            self.skipTest('virgl isn\'t working with Alma Linux')
         if distro and distro == 'debian-8':
             self.skipTest('virgl isn\'t working with Debian 8')
         if distro and distro == 'centos-7':
@@ -191,6 +191,8 @@ class TestImage(OESelftestTestCase):
             self.skipTest('virgl isn\'t working with Fedora 36')
         if distro and distro == 'opensuseleap-15.0':
             self.skipTest('virgl isn\'t working with Opensuse 15.0')
+        if distro and distro == 'ubuntu-22.04':
+            self.skipTest('virgl isn\'t working with Ubuntu 22.04')
 
         qemu_packageconfig = get_bb_var('PACKAGECONFIG', 'qemu-system-native')
         sdl_packageconfig = get_bb_var('PACKAGECONFIG', 'libsdl2-native')
@@ -234,7 +236,7 @@ class TestImage(OESelftestTestCase):
         except FileNotFoundError:
             self.skipTest("/dev/dri directory does not exist; no render nodes available on this machine.")
         try:
-            dripath = subprocess.check_output("pkg-config --variable=dridriverdir dri", shell=True)
+            dripath = subprocess.check_output("PATH=/bin:/usr/bin:$PATH pkg-config --variable=dridriverdir dri", shell=True)
         except subprocess.CalledProcessError as e:
             self.skipTest("Could not determine the path to dri drivers on the host via pkg-config.\nPlease install Mesa development files (particularly, dri.pc) on the host machine.")
         qemu_packageconfig = get_bb_var('PACKAGECONFIG', 'qemu-system-native')

meta/lib/oeqa/selftest/cases/tinfoil.py

@@ -65,6 +65,20 @@ class TinfoilTests(OESelftestTestCase):
             localdata.setVar('PN', 'hello')
             self.assertEqual('hello', localdata.getVar('BPN'))
 
+    # The config_data API tp parse_recipe_file is used by:
+    # layerindex-web layerindex/update_layer.py
+    def test_parse_recipe_custom_data(self):
+        with bb.tinfoil.Tinfoil() as tinfoil:
+            tinfoil.prepare(config_only=False, quiet=2)
+            localdata = bb.data.createCopy(tinfoil.config_data)
+            localdata.setVar("TESTVAR", "testval")
+            testrecipe = 'mdadm'
+            best = tinfoil.find_best_provider(testrecipe)
+            if not best:
+                self.fail('Unable to find recipe providing %s' % testrecipe)
+            rd = tinfoil.parse_recipe_file(best[3], config_data=localdata)
+            self.assertEqual("testval", rd.getVar('TESTVAR'))
+
     def test_list_recipes(self):
         with bb.tinfoil.Tinfoil() as tinfoil:
             tinfoil.prepare(config_only=False, quiet=2)

meta/lib/oeqa/utils/qemurunner.py

@@ -432,10 +432,13 @@ class QemuRunner:
                 except OSError as e:
                     if e.errno != errno.ESRCH:
                         raise
-            endtime = time.time() + self.runqemutime
-            while self.runqemu.poll() is None and time.time() < endtime:
-                time.sleep(1)
-            if self.runqemu.poll() is None:
+            try:
+                outs, errs = self.runqemu.communicate(timeout = self.runqemutime)
+                if outs:
+                    self.logger.info("Output from runqemu:\n%s", outs.decode("utf-8"))
+                if errs:
+                    self.logger.info("Stderr from runqemu:\n%s", errs.decode("utf-8"))
+            except TimeoutExpired:
                 self.logger.debug("Sending SIGKILL to runqemu")
                 os.killpg(os.getpgid(self.runqemu.pid), signal.SIGKILL)
             if not self.runqemu.stdout.closed:

meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2022-2601.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+From e8060722acf0bcca037982d7fb29472363ccdfd4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Zhang Boyang <zhangboyang.id@gmail.com>
+Date: Fri, 5 Aug 2022 01:58:27 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] font: Fix several integer overflows in
+ grub_font_construct_glyph()
+
+This patch fixes several integer overflows in grub_font_construct_glyph().
+Glyphs of invalid size, zero or leading to an overflow, are rejected.
+The inconsistency between "glyph" and "max_glyph_size" when grub_malloc()
+returns NULL is fixed too.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2022-2601
+
+Reported-by: Zhang Boyang <zhangboyang.id@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Zhang Boyang <zhangboyang.id@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+
+Signed-off-by: Xiangyu Chen <xiangyu.chen@windriver.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=768e1ef2fc159f6e14e7246e4be09363708ac39e]
+CVE: CVE-2022-2601
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+---
+ grub-core/font/font.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++------------
+ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/font/font.c b/grub-core/font/font.c
+index df17dba..f110db9 100644
+--- a/grub-core/font/font.c
++++ b/grub-core/font/font.c
+@@ -1509,6 +1509,7 @@ grub_font_construct_glyph (grub_font_t hinted_font,
+   struct grub_video_signed_rect bounds;
+   static struct grub_font_glyph *glyph = 0;
+   static grub_size_t max_glyph_size = 0;
++  grub_size_t cur_glyph_size;
+ 
+   ensure_comb_space (glyph_id);
+ 
+@@ -1525,29 +1526,33 @@ grub_font_construct_glyph (grub_font_t hinted_font,
+   if (!glyph_id->ncomb && !glyph_id->attributes)
+     return main_glyph;
+ 
+-  if (max_glyph_size < sizeof (*glyph) + (bounds.width * bounds.height + GRUB_CHAR_BIT - 1) / GRUB_CHAR_BIT)
++  if (grub_video_bitmap_calc_1bpp_bufsz (bounds.width, bounds.height, &cur_glyph_size) ||
++      grub_add (sizeof (*glyph), cur_glyph_size, &cur_glyph_size))
++    return main_glyph;
++
++  if (max_glyph_size < cur_glyph_size)
+     {
+       grub_free (glyph);
+-      max_glyph_size = (sizeof (*glyph) + (bounds.width * bounds.height + GRUB_CHAR_BIT - 1) / GRUB_CHAR_BIT) * 2;
+-      if (max_glyph_size < 8)
+-	max_glyph_size = 8;
+-      glyph = grub_malloc (max_glyph_size);
++      if (grub_mul (cur_glyph_size, 2, &max_glyph_size))
++	max_glyph_size = 0;
++      glyph = max_glyph_size > 0 ? grub_malloc (max_glyph_size) : NULL;
+     }
+   if (!glyph)
+     {
++      max_glyph_size = 0;
+       grub_errno = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+       return main_glyph;
+     }
+ 
+-  grub_memset (glyph, 0, sizeof (*glyph)
+-	       + (bounds.width * bounds.height
+-		  + GRUB_CHAR_BIT - 1) / GRUB_CHAR_BIT);
++  grub_memset (glyph, 0, cur_glyph_size);
+ 
+   glyph->font = main_glyph->font;
+-  glyph->width = bounds.width;
+-  glyph->height = bounds.height;
+-  glyph->offset_x = bounds.x;
+-  glyph->offset_y = bounds.y;
++  if (bounds.width == 0 || bounds.height == 0 ||
++      grub_cast (bounds.width, &glyph->width) ||
++      grub_cast (bounds.height, &glyph->height) ||
++      grub_cast (bounds.x, &glyph->offset_x) ||
++      grub_cast (bounds.y, &glyph->offset_y))
++    return main_glyph;
+ 
+   if (glyph_id->attributes & GRUB_UNICODE_GLYPH_ATTRIBUTE_MIRROR)
+     grub_font_blit_glyph_mirror (glyph, main_glyph,
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2022-28735.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,271 @@
+From 6fe755c5c07bb386fda58306bfd19e4a1c974c53 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Julian Andres Klode <julian.klode@canonical.com>
+Date: Thu, 2 Dec 2021 15:03:53 +0100
+Subject: kern/efi/sb: Reject non-kernel files in the shim_lock verifier
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=6fe755c5c07bb386fda58306bfd19e4a1c974c53]
+CVE: CVE-2022-28735
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+
+We must not allow other verifiers to pass things like the GRUB modules.
+Instead of maintaining a blocklist, maintain an allowlist of things
+that we do not care about.
+
+This allowlist really should be made reusable, and shared by the
+lockdown verifier, but this is the minimal patch addressing
+security concerns where the TPM verifier was able to mark modules
+as verified (or the OpenPGP verifier for that matter), when it
+should not do so on shim-powered secure boot systems.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2022-28735
+
+Signed-off-by: Julian Andres Klode <julian.klode@canonical.com>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+---
+ grub-core/kern/efi/sb.c | 221 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ include/grub/verify.h   |   1 +
+ 2 files changed, 222 insertions(+)
+ create mode 100644 grub-core/kern/efi/sb.c
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/kern/efi/sb.c b/grub-core/kern/efi/sb.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..89c4bb3
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/grub-core/kern/efi/sb.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,221 @@
++/*
++ *  GRUB  --  GRand Unified Bootloader
++ *  Copyright (C) 2020  Free Software Foundation, Inc.
++ *
++ *  GRUB is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
++ *  it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
++ *  the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
++ *  (at your option) any later version.
++ *
++ *  GRUB is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
++ *  but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
++ *  MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
++ *  GNU General Public License for more details.
++ *
++ *  You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
++ *  along with GRUB.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
++ *
++ *  UEFI Secure Boot related checkings.
++ */
++
++#include <grub/efi/efi.h>
++#include <grub/efi/pe32.h>
++#include <grub/efi/sb.h>
++#include <grub/env.h>
++#include <grub/err.h>
++#include <grub/file.h>
++#include <grub/i386/linux.h>
++#include <grub/kernel.h>
++#include <grub/mm.h>
++#include <grub/types.h>
++#include <grub/verify.h>
++
++static grub_efi_guid_t shim_lock_guid = GRUB_EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID;
++
++/*
++ * Determine whether we're in secure boot mode.
++ *
++ * Please keep the logic in sync with the Linux kernel,
++ * drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c:efi_get_secureboot().
++ */
++grub_uint8_t
++grub_efi_get_secureboot (void)
++{
++  static grub_efi_guid_t efi_variable_guid = GRUB_EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID;
++  grub_efi_status_t status;
++  grub_efi_uint32_t attr = 0;
++  grub_size_t size = 0;
++  grub_uint8_t *secboot = NULL;
++  grub_uint8_t *setupmode = NULL;
++  grub_uint8_t *moksbstate = NULL;
++  grub_uint8_t secureboot = GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_UNKNOWN;
++  const char *secureboot_str = "UNKNOWN";
++
++  status = grub_efi_get_variable ("SecureBoot", &efi_variable_guid,
++				  &size, (void **) &secboot);
++
++  if (status == GRUB_EFI_NOT_FOUND)
++    {
++      secureboot = GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_DISABLED;
++      goto out;
++    }
++
++  if (status != GRUB_EFI_SUCCESS)
++    goto out;
++
++  status = grub_efi_get_variable ("SetupMode", &efi_variable_guid,
++				  &size, (void **) &setupmode);
++
++  if (status != GRUB_EFI_SUCCESS)
++    goto out;
++
++  if ((*secboot == 0) || (*setupmode == 1))
++    {
++      secureboot = GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_DISABLED;
++      goto out;
++    }
++
++  /*
++   * See if a user has put the shim into insecure mode. If so, and if the
++   * variable doesn't have the runtime attribute set, we might as well
++   * honor that.
++   */
++  status = grub_efi_get_variable_with_attributes ("MokSBState", &shim_lock_guid,
++						  &size, (void **) &moksbstate, &attr);
++
++  /* If it fails, we don't care why. Default to secure. */
++  if (status != GRUB_EFI_SUCCESS)
++    {
++      secureboot = GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_ENABLED;
++      goto out;
++    }
++
++  if (!(attr & GRUB_EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS) && *moksbstate == 1)
++    {
++      secureboot = GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_DISABLED;
++      goto out;
++    }
++
++  secureboot = GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_ENABLED;
++
++ out:
++  grub_free (moksbstate);
++  grub_free (setupmode);
++  grub_free (secboot);
++
++  if (secureboot == GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_DISABLED)
++    secureboot_str = "Disabled";
++  else if (secureboot == GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_ENABLED)
++    secureboot_str = "Enabled";
++
++  grub_dprintf ("efi", "UEFI Secure Boot state: %s\n", secureboot_str);
++
++  return secureboot;
++}
++
++static grub_err_t
++shim_lock_verifier_init (grub_file_t io __attribute__ ((unused)),
++			 enum grub_file_type type,
++			 void **context __attribute__ ((unused)),
++			 enum grub_verify_flags *flags)
++{
++  *flags = GRUB_VERIFY_FLAGS_NONE;
++
++  switch (type & GRUB_FILE_TYPE_MASK)
++    {
++    /* Files we check. */
++    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_LINUX_KERNEL:
++    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_MULTIBOOT_KERNEL:
++    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_BSD_KERNEL:
++    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_XNU_KERNEL:
++    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_PLAN9_KERNEL:
++    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_EFI_CHAINLOADED_IMAGE:
++      *flags = GRUB_VERIFY_FLAGS_SINGLE_CHUNK;
++      return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
++
++    /* Files that do not affect secureboot state. */
++    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_NONE:
++    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_LOOPBACK:
++    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_LINUX_INITRD:
++    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_OPENBSD_RAMDISK:
++    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_XNU_RAMDISK:
++    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_SIGNATURE:
++    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY:
++    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_TRUST:
++    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_PRINT_BLOCKLIST:
++    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_TESTLOAD:
++    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_GET_SIZE:
++    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_FONT:
++    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_ZFS_ENCRYPTION_KEY:
++    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_CAT:
++    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_HEXCAT:
++    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_CMP:
++    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_HASHLIST:
++    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_TO_HASH:
++    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_KEYBOARD_LAYOUT:
++    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_PIXMAP:
++    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_GRUB_MODULE_LIST:
++    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_CONFIG:
++    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_THEME:
++    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_GETTEXT_CATALOG:
++    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_FS_SEARCH:
++    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_LOADENV:
++    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_SAVEENV:
++    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_VERIFY_SIGNATURE:
++      *flags = GRUB_VERIFY_FLAGS_SKIP_VERIFICATION;
++      return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
++
++    /* Other files. */
++    default:
++      return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_ACCESS_DENIED, N_("prohibited by secure boot policy"));
++    }
++}
++
++static grub_err_t
++shim_lock_verifier_write (void *context __attribute__ ((unused)), void *buf, grub_size_t size)
++{
++  grub_efi_shim_lock_protocol_t *sl = grub_efi_locate_protocol (&shim_lock_guid, 0);
++
++  if (!sl)
++    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_ACCESS_DENIED, N_("shim_lock protocol not found"));
++
++  if (sl->verify (buf, size) != GRUB_EFI_SUCCESS)
++    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE, N_("bad shim signature"));
++
++  return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
++}
++
++struct grub_file_verifier shim_lock_verifier =
++  {
++    .name = "shim_lock_verifier",
++    .init = shim_lock_verifier_init,
++    .write = shim_lock_verifier_write
++  };
++
++void
++grub_shim_lock_verifier_setup (void)
++{
++  struct grub_module_header *header;
++  grub_efi_shim_lock_protocol_t *sl =
++    grub_efi_locate_protocol (&shim_lock_guid, 0);
++
++  /* shim_lock is missing, check if GRUB image is built with --disable-shim-lock. */
++  if (!sl)
++    {
++      FOR_MODULES (header)
++	{
++	  if (header->type == OBJ_TYPE_DISABLE_SHIM_LOCK)
++	    return;
++	}
++    }
++
++  /* Secure Boot is off. Do not load shim_lock. */
++  if (grub_efi_get_secureboot () != GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_ENABLED)
++    return;
++
++  /* Enforce shim_lock_verifier. */
++  grub_verifier_register (&shim_lock_verifier);
++
++  grub_env_set ("shim_lock", "y");
++  grub_env_export ("shim_lock");
++}
+diff --git a/include/grub/verify.h b/include/grub/verify.h
+index cd129c3..672ae16 100644
+--- a/include/grub/verify.h
++++ b/include/grub/verify.h
+@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
+ 
+ enum grub_verify_flags
+   {
++    GRUB_VERIFY_FLAGS_NONE		= 0,
+     GRUB_VERIFY_FLAGS_SKIP_VERIFICATION	= 1,
+     GRUB_VERIFY_FLAGS_SINGLE_CHUNK	= 2,
+     /* Defer verification to another authority. */
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2022-3775.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+From fdbe7209152ad6f09a1166f64f162017f2145ba3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Zhang Boyang <zhangboyang.id@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 24 Oct 2022 08:05:35 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] font: Fix an integer underflow in blit_comb()
+
+The expression (ctx.bounds.height - combining_glyphs[i]->height) / 2 may
+evaluate to a very big invalid value even if both ctx.bounds.height and
+combining_glyphs[i]->height are small integers. For example, if
+ctx.bounds.height is 10 and combining_glyphs[i]->height is 12, this
+expression evaluates to 2147483647 (expected -1). This is because
+coordinates are allowed to be negative but ctx.bounds.height is an
+unsigned int. So, the subtraction operates on unsigned ints and
+underflows to a very big value. The division makes things even worse.
+The quotient is still an invalid value even if converted back to int.
+
+This patch fixes the problem by casting ctx.bounds.height to int. As
+a result the subtraction will operate on int and grub_uint16_t which
+will be promoted to an int. So, the underflow will no longer happen. Other
+uses of ctx.bounds.height (and ctx.bounds.width) are also casted to int,
+to ensure coordinates are always calculated on signed integers.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2022-3775
+
+Reported-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
+Signed-off-by: Zhang Boyang <zhangboyang.id@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+
+Signed-off-by: Xiangyu Chen <xiangyu.chen@windriver.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=992c06191babc1e109caf40d6a07ec6fdef427af]
+CVE: CVE-2022-3775
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+---
+ grub-core/font/font.c | 16 ++++++++--------
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/font/font.c b/grub-core/font/font.c
+index f110db9..3b76b22 100644
+--- a/grub-core/font/font.c
++++ b/grub-core/font/font.c
+@@ -1200,12 +1200,12 @@ blit_comb (const struct grub_unicode_glyph *glyph_id,
+   ctx.bounds.height = main_glyph->height;
+ 
+   above_rightx = main_glyph->offset_x + main_glyph->width;
+-  above_righty = ctx.bounds.y + ctx.bounds.height;
++  above_righty = ctx.bounds.y + (int) ctx.bounds.height;
+ 
+   above_leftx = main_glyph->offset_x;
+-  above_lefty = ctx.bounds.y + ctx.bounds.height;
++  above_lefty = ctx.bounds.y + (int) ctx.bounds.height;
+ 
+-  below_rightx = ctx.bounds.x + ctx.bounds.width;
++  below_rightx = ctx.bounds.x + (int) ctx.bounds.width;
+   below_righty = ctx.bounds.y;
+ 
+   comb = grub_unicode_get_comb (glyph_id);
+@@ -1218,7 +1218,7 @@ blit_comb (const struct grub_unicode_glyph *glyph_id,
+ 
+       if (!combining_glyphs[i])
+ 	continue;
+-      targetx = (ctx.bounds.width - combining_glyphs[i]->width) / 2 + ctx.bounds.x;
++      targetx = ((int) ctx.bounds.width - combining_glyphs[i]->width) / 2 + ctx.bounds.x;
+       /* CGJ is to avoid diacritics reordering. */
+       if (comb[i].code
+ 	  == GRUB_UNICODE_COMBINING_GRAPHEME_JOINER)
+@@ -1228,8 +1228,8 @@ blit_comb (const struct grub_unicode_glyph *glyph_id,
+ 	case GRUB_UNICODE_COMB_OVERLAY:
+ 	  do_blit (combining_glyphs[i],
+ 		   targetx,
+-		   (ctx.bounds.height - combining_glyphs[i]->height) / 2
+-		   - (ctx.bounds.height + ctx.bounds.y), &ctx);
++		   ((int) ctx.bounds.height - combining_glyphs[i]->height) / 2
++		   - ((int) ctx.bounds.height + ctx.bounds.y), &ctx);
+ 	  if (min_devwidth < combining_glyphs[i]->width)
+ 	    min_devwidth = combining_glyphs[i]->width;
+ 	  break;
+@@ -1302,7 +1302,7 @@ blit_comb (const struct grub_unicode_glyph *glyph_id,
+ 	  /* Fallthrough.  */
+ 	case GRUB_UNICODE_STACK_ATTACHED_ABOVE:
+ 	  do_blit (combining_glyphs[i], targetx,
+-		   -(ctx.bounds.height + ctx.bounds.y + space
++		   -((int) ctx.bounds.height + ctx.bounds.y + space
+ 		     + combining_glyphs[i]->height), &ctx);
+ 	  if (min_devwidth < combining_glyphs[i]->width)
+ 	    min_devwidth = combining_glyphs[i]->width;
+@@ -1310,7 +1310,7 @@ blit_comb (const struct grub_unicode_glyph *glyph_id,
+ 
+ 	case GRUB_UNICODE_COMB_HEBREW_DAGESH:
+ 	  do_blit (combining_glyphs[i], targetx,
+-		   -(ctx.bounds.height / 2 + ctx.bounds.y
++		   -((int) ctx.bounds.height / 2 + ctx.bounds.y
+ 		     + combining_glyphs[i]->height / 2), &ctx);
+ 	  if (min_devwidth < combining_glyphs[i]->width)
+ 	    min_devwidth = combining_glyphs[i]->width;
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/font-Fix-size-overflow-in-grub_font_get_glyph_intern.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+From 1f511ae054fe42dce7aedfbfe0f234fa1e0a7a3e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Zhang Boyang <zhangboyang.id@gmail.com>
+Date: Fri, 5 Aug 2022 00:51:20 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] font: Fix size overflow in grub_font_get_glyph_internal()
+
+The length of memory allocation and file read may overflow. This patch
+fixes the problem by using safemath macros.
+
+There is a lot of code repetition like "(x * y + 7) / 8". It is unsafe
+if overflow happens. This patch introduces grub_video_bitmap_calc_1bpp_bufsz().
+It is safe replacement for such code. It has safemath-like prototype.
+
+This patch also introduces grub_cast(value, pointer), it casts value to
+typeof(*pointer) then store the value to *pointer. It returns true when
+overflow occurs or false if there is no overflow. The semantics of arguments
+and return value are designed to be consistent with other safemath macros.
+
+Signed-off-by: Zhang Boyang <zhangboyang.id@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=9c76ec09ae08155df27cd237eaea150b4f02f532]
+
+Signed-off-by: Xiangyu Chen <xiangyu.chen@windriver.com>
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+---
+ grub-core/font/font.c   | 17 +++++++++++++----
+ include/grub/bitmap.h   | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
+ include/grub/safemath.h |  2 ++
+ 3 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/font/font.c b/grub-core/font/font.c
+index 5edb477..df17dba 100644
+--- a/grub-core/font/font.c
++++ b/grub-core/font/font.c
+@@ -733,7 +733,8 @@ grub_font_get_glyph_internal (grub_font_t font, grub_uint32_t code)
+       grub_int16_t xoff;
+       grub_int16_t yoff;
+       grub_int16_t dwidth;
+-      int len;
++      grub_ssize_t len;
++      grub_size_t sz;
+ 
+       if (index_entry->glyph)
+ 	/* Return cached glyph.  */
+@@ -760,9 +761,17 @@ grub_font_get_glyph_internal (grub_font_t font, grub_uint32_t code)
+ 	  return 0;
+ 	}
+ 
+-      len = (width * height + 7) / 8;
+-      glyph = grub_malloc (sizeof (struct grub_font_glyph) + len);
+-      if (!glyph)
++      /* Calculate real struct size of current glyph. */
++      if (grub_video_bitmap_calc_1bpp_bufsz (width, height, &len) ||
++	  grub_add (sizeof (struct grub_font_glyph), len, &sz))
++	{
++	  remove_font (font);
++	  return 0;
++	}
++
++      /* Allocate and initialize the glyph struct. */
++      glyph = grub_malloc (sz);
++      if (glyph == NULL)
+ 	{
+ 	  remove_font (font);
+ 	  return 0;
+diff --git a/include/grub/bitmap.h b/include/grub/bitmap.h
+index 5728f8c..0d9603f 100644
+--- a/include/grub/bitmap.h
++++ b/include/grub/bitmap.h
+@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
+ #include <grub/symbol.h>
+ #include <grub/types.h>
+ #include <grub/video.h>
++#include <grub/safemath.h>
+ 
+ struct grub_video_bitmap
+ {
+@@ -79,6 +80,23 @@ grub_video_bitmap_get_height (struct grub_video_bitmap *bitmap)
+   return bitmap->mode_info.height;
+ }
+ 
++/*
++ * Calculate and store the size of data buffer of 1bit bitmap in result.
++ * Equivalent to "*result = (width * height + 7) / 8" if no overflow occurs.
++ * Return true when overflow occurs or false if there is no overflow.
++ * This function is intentionally implemented as a macro instead of
++ * an inline function. Although a bit awkward, it preserves data types for
++ * safemath macros and reduces macro side effects as much as possible.
++ *
++ * XXX: Will report false overflow if width * height > UINT64_MAX.
++ */
++#define grub_video_bitmap_calc_1bpp_bufsz(width, height, result) \
++({ \
++  grub_uint64_t _bitmap_pixels; \
++  grub_mul ((width), (height), &_bitmap_pixels) ? 1 : \
++    grub_cast (_bitmap_pixels / GRUB_CHAR_BIT + !!(_bitmap_pixels % GRUB_CHAR_BIT), (result)); \
++})
++
+ void EXPORT_FUNC (grub_video_bitmap_get_mode_info) (struct grub_video_bitmap *bitmap,
+ 						    struct grub_video_mode_info *mode_info);
+ 
+diff --git a/include/grub/safemath.h b/include/grub/safemath.h
+index c17b89b..bb0f826 100644
+--- a/include/grub/safemath.h
++++ b/include/grub/safemath.h
+@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@
+ #define grub_sub(a, b, res)	__builtin_sub_overflow(a, b, res)
+ #define grub_mul(a, b, res)	__builtin_mul_overflow(a, b, res)
+ 
++#define grub_cast(a, res)	grub_add ((a), 0, (res))
++
+ #else
+ #error gcc 5.1 or newer or clang 3.8 or newer is required
+ #endif
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc

@@ -102,6 +102,10 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://CVE-2022-28733.patch \
            file://CVE-2022-28734.patch \
            file://CVE-2022-28736.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-28735.patch \
+           file://font-Fix-size-overflow-in-grub_font_get_glyph_intern.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-2601.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-3775.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"

meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2022-2795.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+From 36c878a0124973f29b7ca49e6bb18310f9b2601f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Micha=C5=82=20K=C4=99pie=C5=84?= <michal@isc.org>
+Date: Thu, 8 Sep 2022 11:11:30 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 1/3] Bound the amount of work performed for delegations
+
+Limit the amount of database lookups that can be triggered in
+fctx_getaddresses() (i.e. when determining the name server addresses to
+query next) by setting a hard limit on the number of NS RRs processed
+for any delegation encountered.  Without any limit in place, named can
+be forced to perform large amounts of database lookups per each query
+received, which severely impacts resolver performance.
+
+The limit used (20) is an arbitrary value that is considered to be big
+enough for any sane DNS delegation.
+
+(cherry picked from commit 3a44097fd6c6c260765b628cd1d2c9cb7efb0b2a)
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+CVE: CVE-2022-2795
+Reference to upstream patch:
+https://gitlab.isc.org/isc-projects/bind9/-/commit/bf2ea6d8525bfd96a84dad221ba9e004adb710a8
+
+Signed-off-by: Mathieu Dubois-Briand <mbriand@witekio.com>
+---
+ lib/dns/resolver.c | 12 ++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/lib/dns/resolver.c b/lib/dns/resolver.c
+index 8ae9a993bbd7..ac9a9ef5d009 100644
+--- a/lib/dns/resolver.c
++++ b/lib/dns/resolver.c
+@@ -180,6 +180,12 @@
+  */
+ #define NS_FAIL_LIMIT 4
+ #define NS_RR_LIMIT   5
++/*
++ * IP address lookups are performed for at most NS_PROCESSING_LIMIT NS RRs in
++ * any NS RRset encountered, to avoid excessive resource use while processing
++ * large delegations.
++ */
++#define NS_PROCESSING_LIMIT 20
+ 
+ /* Number of hash buckets for zone counters */
+ #ifndef RES_DOMAIN_BUCKETS
+@@ -3318,6 +3324,7 @@ fctx_getaddresses(fetchctx_t *fctx, bool badcache) {
+ 	bool need_alternate = false;
+ 	bool all_spilled = true;
+ 	unsigned int no_addresses = 0;
++	unsigned int ns_processed = 0;
+ 
+ 	FCTXTRACE5("getaddresses", "fctx->depth=", fctx->depth);
+ 
+@@ -3504,6 +3511,11 @@ fctx_getaddresses(fetchctx_t *fctx, bool badcache) {
+ 
+ 		dns_rdata_reset(&rdata);
+ 		dns_rdata_freestruct(&ns);
++
++		if (++ns_processed >= NS_PROCESSING_LIMIT) {
++			result = ISC_R_NOMORE;
++			break;
++		}
+ 	}
+ 	if (result != ISC_R_NOMORE) {
+ 		return (result);
+-- 
+2.34.1
+

meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2022-38177.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+From ef3d1a84ff807eea27b4fef601a15932c5ffbfbf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org>
+Date: Thu, 11 Aug 2022 15:15:34 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH 2/3] Free eckey on siglen mismatch
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+CVE: CVE-2022-38177
+Reference to upstream patch:
+https://gitlab.isc.org/isc-projects/bind9/-/commit/5b2282afff760b1ed3471f6666bdfe8e1d34e590
+
+Signed-off-by: Mathieu Dubois-Briand <mbriand@witekio.com>
+---
+ lib/dns/opensslecdsa_link.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/dns/opensslecdsa_link.c b/lib/dns/opensslecdsa_link.c
+index 83b5b51cd78c..7576e04ac635 100644
+--- a/lib/dns/opensslecdsa_link.c
++++ b/lib/dns/opensslecdsa_link.c
+@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ opensslecdsa_verify(dst_context_t *dctx, const isc_region_t *sig) {
+ 		siglen = DNS_SIG_ECDSA384SIZE;
+ 
+ 	if (sig->length != siglen)
+-		return (DST_R_VERIFYFAILURE);
++		DST_RET(DST_R_VERIFYFAILURE);
+ 
+ 	if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(evp_md_ctx, digest, &dgstlen))
+ 		DST_RET (dst__openssl_toresult3(dctx->category,
+-- 
+2.34.1
+

meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2022-38178.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+From 65f5b2f0162d5d2ab25f463aa14a8bae71ace3d9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org>
+Date: Thu, 11 Aug 2022 15:28:13 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH 3/3] Free ctx on invalid siglen
+
+(cherry picked from commit 6ddb480a84836641a0711768a94122972c166825)
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+CVE: CVE-2022-38178
+Reference to upstream patch:
+https://gitlab.isc.org/isc-projects/bind9/-/commit/1af23378ebb11da2eb0f412e4563d6
+
+Signed-off-by: Mathieu Dubois-Briand <mbriand@witekio.com>
+---
+ lib/dns/openssleddsa_link.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/dns/openssleddsa_link.c b/lib/dns/openssleddsa_link.c
+index 8b115ec283f0..b4fcd607c131 100644
+--- a/lib/dns/openssleddsa_link.c
++++ b/lib/dns/openssleddsa_link.c
+@@ -325,7 +325,7 @@ openssleddsa_verify(dst_context_t *dctx, const isc_region_t *sig) {
+ 		siglen = DNS_SIG_ED448SIZE;
+ 
+ 	if (sig->length != siglen)
+-		return (DST_R_VERIFYFAILURE);
++		DST_RET(ISC_R_NOTIMPLEMENTED);
+ 
+ 	isc_buffer_usedregion(buf, &tbsreg);
+ 
+-- 
+2.34.1
+

meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind_9.11.37.bb

@@ -19,6 +19,9 @@ SRC_URI = "https://ftp.isc.org/isc/bind9/${PV}/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://0001-configure.in-remove-useless-L-use_openssl-lib.patch \
            file://0001-named-lwresd-V-and-start-log-hide-build-options.patch \
            file://0001-avoid-start-failure-with-bind-user.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-2795.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-38177.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-38178.patch \
            "
 
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "0d8efbe7ec166ada90e46add4267b7e7c934790cba9bd5af6b8380a4fbfb5aff"

meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5.inc

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=12f884d2ae1ff87c09e5b7ccc2c4ca7e \
                     file://COPYING.LIB;md5=fb504b67c50331fc78734fed90fb0e09 \
                     file://src/main.c;beginline=1;endline=24;md5=9bc54b93cd7e17bf03f52513f39f926e"
 DEPENDS = "dbus glib-2.0"
+RDEPENDS:${PN} += "dbus"
 PROVIDES += "bluez-hcidump"
 RPROVIDES_${PN} += "bluez-hcidump"
 
@@ -56,6 +57,8 @@ SRC_URI = "${KERNELORG_MIRROR}/linux/bluetooth/bluez-${PV}.tar.xz \
            file://CVE-2021-3588.patch \
           file://CVE-2021-3658.patch \
            file://CVE-2022-0204.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-39176.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-3637.patch \
            "
 S = "${WORKDIR}/bluez-${PV}"
 

meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5/CVE-2022-3637.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+From b808b2852a0b48c6f9dbb038f932613cea3126c2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+Date: Thu, 27 Oct 2022 09:51:27 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2022-3637
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/bluetooth/bluez.git/commit/monitor/jlink.c?id=1d6cfb8e625a944010956714c1802bc1e1fc6c4f]
+CVE: CVE-2022-3637
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+
+monitor: Fix crash when using RTT backend
+
+This fix regression introduced by "monitor: Fix memory leaks".
+J-Link shared library is in use if jlink_init() returns 0 and thus
+handle shall not be closed.
+---
+ monitor/jlink.c | 5 ++++-
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/monitor/jlink.c b/monitor/jlink.c
+index afa9d93..5bd4aed 100644
+--- a/monitor/jlink.c
++++ b/monitor/jlink.c
+@@ -120,9 +120,12 @@ int jlink_init(void)
+ 			!jlink.tif_select || !jlink.setspeed ||
+ 			!jlink.connect || !jlink.getsn ||
+ 			!jlink.emu_getproductname ||
+-			!jlink.rtterminal_control || !jlink.rtterminal_read)
++			!jlink.rtterminal_control || !jlink.rtterminal_read) {
++		dlclose(so);
+ 		return -EIO;
++	}
+ 
++	/* don't dlclose(so) here cause symbols from it are in use now */
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5/CVE-2022-39176.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+From 752c7f707c3cc1eb12eadc13bc336a5c484d4bdf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+Date: Wed, 28 Sep 2022 10:45:53 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2022-39176
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/bluez/5.53-0ubuntu3.6]
+CVE: CVE-2022-39176
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+---
+ profiles/audio/avdtp.c | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
+ profiles/audio/avrcp.c |  8 ++++++
+ 2 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/profiles/audio/avdtp.c b/profiles/audio/avdtp.c
+index 782268c..0adf413 100644
+--- a/profiles/audio/avdtp.c
++++ b/profiles/audio/avdtp.c
+@@ -1261,43 +1261,53 @@ struct avdtp_remote_sep *avdtp_find_remote_sep(struct avdtp *session,
+ 	return NULL;
+ }
+ 
+-static GSList *caps_to_list(uint8_t *data, int size,
++static GSList *caps_to_list(uint8_t *data, size_t size,
+ 				struct avdtp_service_capability **codec,
+ 				gboolean *delay_reporting)
+ {
++	struct avdtp_service_capability *cap;
+ 	GSList *caps;
+-	int processed;
+ 
+ 	if (delay_reporting)
+ 		*delay_reporting = FALSE;
+ 
+-	for (processed = 0, caps = NULL; processed + 2 <= size;) {
+-		struct avdtp_service_capability *cap;
+-		uint8_t length, category;
++	if (size < sizeof(*cap))
++		return NULL;
++
++	for (caps = NULL; size >= sizeof(*cap);) {
++		struct avdtp_service_capability *cpy;
+ 
+-		category = data[0];
+-		length = data[1];
++		cap = (struct avdtp_service_capability *)data;
+ 
+-		if (processed + 2 + length > size) {
++		if (sizeof(*cap) + cap->length > size) {
+ 			error("Invalid capability data in getcap resp");
+ 			break;
+ 		}
+ 
+-		cap = g_malloc(sizeof(struct avdtp_service_capability) +
+-					length);
+-		memcpy(cap, data, 2 + length);
++		if (cap->category == AVDTP_MEDIA_CODEC &&
++					cap->length < sizeof(**codec)) {
++			error("Invalid codec data in getcap resp");
++			break;
++		}
++
++		cpy = btd_malloc(sizeof(*cpy) + cap->length);
++		memcpy(cpy, cap, sizeof(*cap) + cap->length);
+ 
+-		processed += 2 + length;
+-		data += 2 + length;
++		size -= sizeof(*cap) + cap->length;
++		data += sizeof(*cap) + cap->length;
+ 
+-		caps = g_slist_append(caps, cap);
++		caps = g_slist_append(caps, cpy);
+ 
+-		if (category == AVDTP_MEDIA_CODEC &&
+-				length >=
+-				sizeof(struct avdtp_media_codec_capability))
+-			*codec = cap;
+-		else if (category == AVDTP_DELAY_REPORTING && delay_reporting)
+-			*delay_reporting = TRUE;
++		switch (cap->category) {
++		case AVDTP_MEDIA_CODEC:
++			if (codec)
++				*codec = cpy;
++			break;
++		case AVDTP_DELAY_REPORTING:
++			if (delay_reporting)
++				*delay_reporting = TRUE;
++			break;
++		}
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	return caps;
+@@ -1494,6 +1504,12 @@ static gboolean avdtp_setconf_cmd(struct avdtp *session, uint8_t transaction,
+ 					&stream->codec,
+ 					&stream->delay_reporting);
+ 
++	if (!stream->caps || !stream->codec) {
++		err = AVDTP_UNSUPPORTED_CONFIGURATION;
++		category = 0x00;
++		goto failed_stream;
++	}
++
+ 	/* Verify that the Media Transport capability's length = 0. Reject otherwise */
+ 	for (l = stream->caps; l != NULL; l = g_slist_next(l)) {
+ 		struct avdtp_service_capability *cap = l->data;
+diff --git a/profiles/audio/avrcp.c b/profiles/audio/avrcp.c
+index d9471c0..0233d53 100644
+--- a/profiles/audio/avrcp.c
++++ b/profiles/audio/avrcp.c
+@@ -1916,6 +1916,14 @@ static size_t handle_vendordep_pdu(struct avctp *conn, uint8_t transaction,
+ 		goto err_metadata;
+ 	}
+ 
++	operands += sizeof(*pdu);
++	operand_count -= sizeof(*pdu);
++
++	if (pdu->params_len != operand_count) {
++		DBG("AVRCP PDU parameters length don't match");
++		pdu->params_len = operand_count;
++	}
++
+ 	for (handler = session->control_handlers; handler->pdu_id; handler++) {
+ 		if (handler->pdu_id == pdu->pdu_id)
+ 			break;
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5_5.55.bb

@@ -6,6 +6,13 @@ SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "8863717113c4897e2ad3271fc808ea245319e6fd95eed2e934fae8e089
 # These issues have kernel fixes rather than bluez fixes so exclude here
 CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2020-12352 CVE-2020-24490"
 
+# Commit 7a80d2096f1b7125085e21448112aa02f49f5e9a, e2b0f0d8d63e1223bb714a9efb37e2257818268b 
+# and 0388794dc5fdb73a4ea88bcf148de0a12b4364d4 to fix CVE-2022-39177 
+# already backport in CVE-2022-39176.patch
+# https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/bluez/+bug/1977968
+
+CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2022-39177"
+
 # noinst programs in Makefile.tools that are conditional on READLINE
 # support
 NOINST_TOOLS_READLINE ?= " \

meta/recipes-connectivity/connman/connman/CVE-2022-32292.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+From d1a5ede5d255bde8ef707f8441b997563b9312bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Nathan Crandall <ncrandall@tesla.com>
+Date: Tue, 12 Jul 2022 08:56:34 +0200
+Subject: gweb: Fix OOB write in received_data()
+
+There is a mismatch of handling binary vs. C-string data with memchr
+and strlen, resulting in pos, count, and bytes_read to become out of
+sync and result in a heap overflow.  Instead, do not treat the buffer
+as an ASCII C-string. We calculate the count based on the return value
+of memchr, instead of strlen.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2022-32292
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/network/connman/connman.git/commit/?id=d1a5ede5d255bde8ef707f8441b997563b9312b
+CVE: CVE-2022-32292
+Signed-off-by: Lee Chee Yang <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
+---
+ gweb/gweb.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/gweb/gweb.c b/gweb/gweb.c
+index 12fcb1d8..13c6c5f2 100644
+--- a/gweb/gweb.c
++++ b/gweb/gweb.c
+@@ -918,7 +918,7 @@ static gboolean received_data(GIOChannel *channel, GIOCondition cond,
+ 		}
+ 
+ 		*pos = '\0';
+-		count = strlen((char *) ptr);
++		count = pos - ptr;
+ 		if (count > 0 && ptr[count - 1] == '\r') {
+ 			ptr[--count] = '\0';
+ 			bytes_read--;
+-- 
+cgit 
+

meta/recipes-connectivity/connman/connman/CVE-2022-32293.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,266 @@
+From 358a44b1442fae0f82846e10da0708b5c4e1ce27 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+Date: Tue, 20 Sep 2022 17:58:19 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2022-32293
+
+CVE: CVE-2022-32293
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/network/connman/connman.git/commit/?id=72343929836de80727a27d6744c869dff045757c && https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/network/connman/connman.git/commit/src/wispr.c?id=416bfaff988882c553c672e5bfc2d4f648d29e8a]
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+---
+ src/wispr.c | 83 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
+ 1 file changed, 63 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/wispr.c b/src/wispr.c
+index 473c0e0..97e0242 100644
+--- a/src/wispr.c
++++ b/src/wispr.c
+@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ struct wispr_route {
+ };
+ 
+ struct connman_wispr_portal_context {
++	int refcount;
+ 	struct connman_service *service;
+ 	enum connman_ipconfig_type type;
+ 	struct connman_wispr_portal *wispr_portal;
+@@ -96,10 +97,13 @@ static bool wispr_portal_web_result(GWebResult *result, gpointer user_data);
+ 
+ static GHashTable *wispr_portal_list = NULL;
+ 
++#define wispr_portal_context_ref(wp_context) \
++	wispr_portal_context_ref_debug(wp_context, __FILE__, __LINE__, __func__)
++#define wispr_portal_context_unref(wp_context) \
++	wispr_portal_context_unref_debug(wp_context, __FILE__, __LINE__, __func__)
++
+ static void connman_wispr_message_init(struct connman_wispr_message *msg)
+ {
+-	DBG("");
+-
+ 	msg->has_error = false;
+ 	msg->current_element = NULL;
+ 
+@@ -159,11 +163,6 @@ static void free_wispr_routes(struct connman_wispr_portal_context *wp_context)
+ static void free_connman_wispr_portal_context(
+ 		struct connman_wispr_portal_context *wp_context)
+ {
+-	DBG("context %p", wp_context);
+-
+-	if (!wp_context)
+-		return;
+-
+ 	if (wp_context->wispr_portal) {
+ 		if (wp_context->wispr_portal->ipv4_context == wp_context)
+ 			wp_context->wispr_portal->ipv4_context = NULL;
+@@ -200,9 +199,38 @@ static void free_connman_wispr_portal_context(
+ 	g_free(wp_context);
+ }
+ 
++static struct connman_wispr_portal_context *
++wispr_portal_context_ref_debug(struct connman_wispr_portal_context *wp_context,
++			const char *file, int line, const char *caller)
++{
++	DBG("%p ref %d by %s:%d:%s()", wp_context,
++		wp_context->refcount + 1, file, line, caller);
++
++	__sync_fetch_and_add(&wp_context->refcount, 1);
++
++	return wp_context;
++}
++
++static void wispr_portal_context_unref_debug(
++		struct connman_wispr_portal_context *wp_context,
++		const char *file, int line, const char *caller)
++{
++	if (!wp_context)
++		return;
++
++	DBG("%p ref %d by %s:%d:%s()", wp_context,
++		wp_context->refcount - 1, file, line, caller);
++
++	if (__sync_fetch_and_sub(&wp_context->refcount, 1) != 1)
++		return;
++
++	free_connman_wispr_portal_context(wp_context);
++}
++
+ static struct connman_wispr_portal_context *create_wispr_portal_context(void)
+ {
+-	return g_try_new0(struct connman_wispr_portal_context, 1);
++	return wispr_portal_context_ref(
++		g_new0(struct connman_wispr_portal_context, 1));
+ }
+ 
+ static void free_connman_wispr_portal(gpointer data)
+@@ -214,8 +242,8 @@ static void free_connman_wispr_portal(gpointer data)
+ 	if (!wispr_portal)
+ 		return;
+ 
+-	free_connman_wispr_portal_context(wispr_portal->ipv4_context);
+-	free_connman_wispr_portal_context(wispr_portal->ipv6_context);
++	wispr_portal_context_unref(wispr_portal->ipv4_context);
++	wispr_portal_context_unref(wispr_portal->ipv6_context);
+ 
+ 	g_free(wispr_portal);
+ }
+@@ -450,8 +478,6 @@ static void portal_manage_status(GWebResult *result,
+ 				&str))
+ 		connman_info("Client-Timezone: %s", str);
+ 
+-	free_connman_wispr_portal_context(wp_context);
+-
+ 	__connman_service_ipconfig_indicate_state(service,
+ 					CONNMAN_SERVICE_STATE_ONLINE, type);
+ }
+@@ -509,14 +535,17 @@ static void wispr_portal_request_portal(
+ {
+ 	DBG("");
+ 
++	wispr_portal_context_ref(wp_context);
+ 	wp_context->request_id = g_web_request_get(wp_context->web,
+ 					wp_context->status_url,
+ 					wispr_portal_web_result,
+ 					wispr_route_request,
+ 					wp_context);
+ 
+-	if (wp_context->request_id == 0)
++	if (wp_context->request_id == 0) {
+ 		wispr_portal_error(wp_context);
++		wispr_portal_context_unref(wp_context);
++	}
+ }
+ 
+ static bool wispr_input(const guint8 **data, gsize *length,
+@@ -562,13 +591,15 @@ static void wispr_portal_browser_reply_cb(struct connman_service *service,
+ 		return;
+ 
+ 	if (!authentication_done) {
+-		wispr_portal_error(wp_context);
+ 		free_wispr_routes(wp_context);
++		wispr_portal_error(wp_context);
++		wispr_portal_context_unref(wp_context);
+ 		return;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* Restarting the test */
+ 	__connman_service_wispr_start(service, wp_context->type);
++	wispr_portal_context_unref(wp_context);
+ }
+ 
+ static void wispr_portal_request_wispr_login(struct connman_service *service,
+@@ -592,7 +623,7 @@ static void wispr_portal_request_wispr_login(struct connman_service *service,
+ 				return;
+ 		}
+ 
+-		free_connman_wispr_portal_context(wp_context);
++		wispr_portal_context_unref(wp_context);
+ 		return;
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -644,11 +675,13 @@ static bool wispr_manage_message(GWebResult *result,
+ 
+ 		wp_context->wispr_result = CONNMAN_WISPR_RESULT_LOGIN;
+ 
++		wispr_portal_context_ref(wp_context);
+ 		if (__connman_agent_request_login_input(wp_context->service,
+ 					wispr_portal_request_wispr_login,
+-					wp_context) != -EINPROGRESS)
++					wp_context) != -EINPROGRESS) {
+ 			wispr_portal_error(wp_context);
+-		else
++			wispr_portal_context_unref(wp_context);
++		} else
+ 			return true;
+ 
+ 		break;
+@@ -697,6 +730,7 @@ static bool wispr_portal_web_result(GWebResult *result, gpointer user_data)
+ 		if (length > 0) {
+ 			g_web_parser_feed_data(wp_context->wispr_parser,
+ 								chunk, length);
++			wispr_portal_context_unref(wp_context);
+ 			return true;
+ 		}
+ 
+@@ -714,6 +748,7 @@ static bool wispr_portal_web_result(GWebResult *result, gpointer user_data)
+ 
+ 	switch (status) {
+ 	case 000:
++		wispr_portal_context_ref(wp_context);
+ 		__connman_agent_request_browser(wp_context->service,
+ 				wispr_portal_browser_reply_cb,
+ 				wp_context->status_url, wp_context);
+@@ -725,11 +760,14 @@ static bool wispr_portal_web_result(GWebResult *result, gpointer user_data)
+ 		if (g_web_result_get_header(result, "X-ConnMan-Status",
+ 						&str)) {
+ 			portal_manage_status(result, wp_context);
++			wispr_portal_context_unref(wp_context);
+ 			return false;
+-		} else
++		} else {
++			wispr_portal_context_ref(wp_context);
+ 			__connman_agent_request_browser(wp_context->service,
+ 					wispr_portal_browser_reply_cb,
+ 					wp_context->redirect_url, wp_context);
++		}
+ 
+ 		break;
+ 	case 302:
+@@ -737,6 +775,7 @@ static bool wispr_portal_web_result(GWebResult *result, gpointer user_data)
+ 			!g_web_result_get_header(result, "Location",
+ 							&redirect)) {
+ 
++			wispr_portal_context_ref(wp_context);
+ 			__connman_agent_request_browser(wp_context->service,
+ 					wispr_portal_browser_reply_cb,
+ 					wp_context->status_url, wp_context);
+@@ -747,6 +786,7 @@ static bool wispr_portal_web_result(GWebResult *result, gpointer user_data)
+ 
+ 		wp_context->redirect_url = g_strdup(redirect);
+ 
++		wispr_portal_context_ref(wp_context);
+ 		wp_context->request_id = g_web_request_get(wp_context->web,
+ 				redirect, wispr_portal_web_result,
+ 				wispr_route_request, wp_context);
+@@ -763,6 +803,7 @@ static bool wispr_portal_web_result(GWebResult *result, gpointer user_data)
+ 
+ 		break;
+ 	case 505:
++		wispr_portal_context_ref(wp_context);
+ 		__connman_agent_request_browser(wp_context->service,
+ 				wispr_portal_browser_reply_cb,
+ 				wp_context->status_url, wp_context);
+@@ -775,6 +816,7 @@ static bool wispr_portal_web_result(GWebResult *result, gpointer user_data)
+ 	wp_context->request_id = 0;
+ done:
+ 	wp_context->wispr_msg.message_type = -1;
++	wispr_portal_context_unref(wp_context);
+ 	return false;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -809,6 +851,7 @@ static void proxy_callback(const char *proxy, void *user_data)
+ 					xml_wispr_parser_callback, wp_context);
+ 
+ 	wispr_portal_request_portal(wp_context);
++	wispr_portal_context_unref(wp_context);
+ }
+ 
+ static gboolean no_proxy_callback(gpointer user_data)
+@@ -903,7 +946,7 @@ static int wispr_portal_detect(struct connman_wispr_portal_context *wp_context)
+ 
+ 		if (wp_context->token == 0) {
+ 			err = -EINVAL;
+-			free_connman_wispr_portal_context(wp_context);
++			wispr_portal_context_unref(wp_context);
+ 		}
+ 	} else if (wp_context->timeout == 0) {
+ 		wp_context->timeout = g_idle_add(no_proxy_callback, wp_context);
+@@ -952,7 +995,7 @@ int __connman_wispr_start(struct connman_service *service,
+ 
+ 	/* If there is already an existing context, we wipe it */
+ 	if (wp_context)
+-		free_connman_wispr_portal_context(wp_context);
++		wispr_portal_context_unref(wp_context);
+ 
+ 	wp_context = create_wispr_portal_context();
+ 	if (!wp_context)
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-connectivity/connman/connman_1.37.bb

@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ SRC_URI  = "${KERNELORG_MIRROR}/linux/network/${BPN}/${BP}.tar.xz \
             file://CVE-2021-33833.patch \
             file://CVE-2022-23096-7.patch \
             file://CVE-2022-23098.patch \
+            file://CVE-2022-32292.patch \
+	     file://CVE-2022-32293.patch \
 "
 
 SRC_URI_append_libc-musl = " file://0002-resolve-musl-does-not-implement-res_ninit.patch"

meta/recipes-connectivity/dhcp/dhcp/CVE-2022-2928.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+From 8a5d739eea10ee6e193f053b1662142d5657cbc6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+Date: Thu, 6 Oct 2022 09:39:18 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2022-2928
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://downloads.isc.org/isc/dhcp/4.4.3-P1/patches/]
+CVE: CVE-2022-2928
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+---
+ common/options.c               |  7 +++++
+ common/tests/option_unittest.c | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 61 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/common/options.c b/common/options.c
+index a7ed84c..4e53bb4 100644
+--- a/common/options.c
++++ b/common/options.c
+@@ -4452,6 +4452,8 @@ add_option(struct option_state *options,
+ 	if (!option_cache_allocate(&oc, MDL)) {
+ 		log_error("No memory for option cache adding %s (option %d).",
+ 			  option->name, option_num);
++		/* Get rid of reference created during hash lookup. */
++		option_dereference(&option, MDL);
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -4463,6 +4465,8 @@ add_option(struct option_state *options,
+ 			     MDL)) {
+ 		log_error("No memory for constant data adding %s (option %d).",
+ 			  option->name, option_num);
++		/* Get rid of reference created during hash lookup. */
++		option_dereference(&option, MDL);
+ 		option_cache_dereference(&oc, MDL);
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+@@ -4471,6 +4475,9 @@ add_option(struct option_state *options,
+ 	save_option(&dhcp_universe, options, oc);
+ 	option_cache_dereference(&oc, MDL);
+ 
++	/* Get rid of reference created during hash lookup. */
++	option_dereference(&option, MDL);
++
+ 	return 1;
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/common/tests/option_unittest.c b/common/tests/option_unittest.c
+index cd52cfb..690704d 100644
+--- a/common/tests/option_unittest.c
++++ b/common/tests/option_unittest.c
+@@ -130,6 +130,59 @@ ATF_TC_BODY(pretty_print_option, tc)
+ }
+ 
+ 
++ATF_TC(add_option_ref_cnt);
++
++ATF_TC_HEAD(add_option_ref_cnt, tc)
++{
++    atf_tc_set_md_var(tc, "descr",
++        "Verify add_option() does not leak option ref counts.");
++}
++
++ATF_TC_BODY(add_option_ref_cnt, tc)
++{
++    struct option_state *options = NULL;
++    struct option *option = NULL;
++    unsigned int cid_code = DHO_DHCP_CLIENT_IDENTIFIER;
++    char *cid_str = "1234";
++    int refcnt_before = 0;
++
++    // Look up the option we're going to add.
++    initialize_common_option_spaces();
++    if (!option_code_hash_lookup(&option, dhcp_universe.code_hash,
++                                 &cid_code, 0, MDL)) {
++        atf_tc_fail("cannot find option definition?");
++    }
++
++    // Get the option's reference count before we call add_options.
++    refcnt_before = option->refcnt;
++
++    // Allocate a option_state to which to add an option.
++    if (!option_state_allocate(&options, MDL)) {
++	    atf_tc_fail("cannot allocat options state");
++    }
++
++    // Call add_option() to add the option to the option state.
++    if (!add_option(options, cid_code, cid_str, strlen(cid_str))) {
++	    atf_tc_fail("add_option returned 0");
++    }
++
++    // Verify that calling add_option() only adds 1 to the option ref count.
++    if (option->refcnt != (refcnt_before + 1)) {
++        atf_tc_fail("after add_option(), count is wrong, before %d, after: %d",
++                    refcnt_before, option->refcnt);
++    }
++
++    // Derefrence the option_state, this should reduce the ref count to
++    // it's starting value.
++    option_state_dereference(&options, MDL);
++
++    // Verify that dereferencing option_state restores option ref count.
++    if (option->refcnt != refcnt_before) {
++        atf_tc_fail("after state deref, count is wrong, before %d, after: %d",
++                    refcnt_before, option->refcnt);
++    }
++}
++
+ /* This macro defines main() method that will call specified
+    test cases. tp and simple_test_case names can be whatever you want
+    as long as it is a valid variable identifier. */
+@@ -137,6 +190,7 @@ ATF_TP_ADD_TCS(tp)
+ {
+     ATF_TP_ADD_TC(tp, option_refcnt);
+     ATF_TP_ADD_TC(tp, pretty_print_option);
++    ATF_TP_ADD_TC(tp, add_option_ref_cnt);
+ 
+     return (atf_no_error());
+ }
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-connectivity/dhcp/dhcp/CVE-2022-2929.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+From 5c959166ebee7605e2048de573f2475b4d731ff7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+Date: Thu, 6 Oct 2022 09:42:59 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2022-2929
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://downloads.isc.org/isc/dhcp/4.4.3-P1/patches/]
+CVE: CVE-2022-2929
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+---
+ common/options.c | 8 ++++----
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/common/options.c b/common/options.c
+index 4e53bb4..28800fc 100644
+--- a/common/options.c
++++ b/common/options.c
+@@ -454,16 +454,16 @@ int fqdn_universe_decode (struct option_state *options,
+ 		while (s < &bp -> data[0] + length + 2) {
+ 			len = *s;
+ 			if (len > 63) {
+-				log_info ("fancy bits in fqdn option");
+-				return 0;
++				log_info ("label length exceeds 63 in fqdn option");
++				goto bad;
+ 			}
+ 			if (len == 0) {
+ 				terminated = 1;
+ 				break;
+ 			}
+ 			if (s + len > &bp -> data [0] + length + 3) {
+-				log_info ("fqdn tag longer than buffer");
+-				return 0;
++				log_info ("fqdn label longer than buffer");
++				goto bad;
+ 			}
+ 
+ 			if (first_len == 0) {
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-connectivity/dhcp/dhcp_4.4.2.bb

@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ SRC_URI += "file://0001-define-macro-_PATH_DHCPD_CONF-and-_PATH_DHCLIENT_CON.pat
             file://0013-fixup_use_libbind.patch \
             file://0001-workaround-busybox-limitation-in-linux-dhclient-script.patch \
             file://CVE-2021-25217.patch \
+            file://CVE-2022-2928.patch \
+            file://CVE-2022-2929.patch \
 "
 
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "2afdaf8498dc1edaf3012efdd589b3e1"

meta/recipes-connectivity/inetutils/inetutils/CVE-2022-39028.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+From eaae65aac967f9628787dca4a2501ca860bb6598 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Minjae Kim <flowergom@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 26 Sep 2022 22:05:07 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] telnetd: Handle early IAC EC or IAC EL receipt
+
+Fix telnetd crash if the first two bytes of a new connection
+are 0xff 0xf7 (IAC EC) or 0xff 0xf8 (IAC EL).
+
+The problem was reported in:
+<https://pierrekim.github.io/blog/2022-08-24-2-byte-dos-freebsd-netbsd-telnetd-netkit-telnetd-inetutils-telnetd-kerberos-telnetd.html>.
+
+* NEWS: Mention fix.
+* telnetd/state.c (telrcv): Handle zero slctab[SLC_EC].sptr and
+zero slctab[SLC_EL].sptr.
+
+CVE: CVE-2022-39028
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/inetutils.git/commit/?id=fae8263e467380483c28513c0e5fac143e46f94f]
+Signed-off-by: Minjae Kim<flowergom@gmail.com>
+---
+ telnetd/state.c | 12 +++++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/telnetd/state.c b/telnetd/state.c
+index 2184bca..7948503 100644
+--- a/telnetd/state.c
++++ b/telnetd/state.c
+@@ -314,15 +314,21 @@ telrcv (void)
+ 	    case EC:
+ 	    case EL:
+ 	      {
+-		cc_t ch;
++		cc_t ch = (cc_t) (_POSIX_VDISABLE);
+ 
+ 		DEBUG (debug_options, 1, printoption ("td: recv IAC", c));
+ 		ptyflush ();	/* half-hearted */
+ 		init_termbuf ();
+ 		if (c == EC)
+-		  ch = *slctab[SLC_EC].sptr;
++		{
++		  if (slctab[SLC_EC].sptr)
++		    ch = *slctab[SLC_EC].sptr;
++		}
+ 		else
+-		  ch = *slctab[SLC_EL].sptr;
++		{
++		  if (slctab[SLC_EL].sptr)
++		    ch = *slctab[SLC_EL].sptr;
++		}
+ 		if (ch != (cc_t) (_POSIX_VDISABLE))
+ 		  pty_output_byte ((unsigned char) ch);
+ 		break;
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-connectivity/inetutils/inetutils_1.9.4.bb

@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/inetutils/inetutils-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://0001-rcp-fix-to-work-with-large-files.patch \
            file://fix-buffer-fortify-tfpt.patch \
            file://CVE-2021-40491.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-39028.patch \
 "
 
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "04852c26c47cc8c6b825f2b74f191f52"

meta/recipes-connectivity/mobile-broadband-provider-info/mobile-broadband-provider-info_git.bb

@@ -5,8 +5,8 @@ SECTION = "network"
 LICENSE = "PD"
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=87964579b2a8ece4bc6744d2dc9a8b04"
 
-SRCREV = "3d5c8d0f7e0264768a2c000d0fd4b4d4a991e041"
-PV = "20220511"
+SRCREV = "22a5de3ef637990ce03141f786fbdb327e9c5a3f"
+PV = "20221107"
 PE = "1"
 
 SRC_URI = "git://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/mobile-broadband-provider-info.git;protocol=https;branch=main"

meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.1.1t.bb

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ SRC_URI_append_class-nativesdk = " \
            file://environment.d-openssl.sh \
            "
 
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "d7939ce614029cdff0b6c20f0e2e5703158a489a72b2507b8bd51bf8c8fd10ca"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "8dee9b24bdb1dcbf0c3d1e9b02fb8f6bf22165e807f45adeb7c9677536859d3b"
 
 inherit lib_package multilib_header multilib_script ptest
 MULTILIB_SCRIPTS = "${PN}-bin:${bindir}/c_rehash"

meta/recipes-connectivity/ppp/ppp/CVE-2022-4603.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+From 2aeb41a9a3a43b11b1e46628d0bf98197ff9f141 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
+Date: Thu, 29 Dec 2022 18:00:20 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] pppdump: Avoid out-of-range access to packet buffer
+
+This fixes a potential vulnerability where data is written to spkt.buf
+and rpkt.buf without a check on the array index.  To fix this, we
+check the array index (pkt->cnt) before storing the byte or
+incrementing the count.  This also means we no longer have a potential
+signed integer overflow on the increment of pkt->cnt.
+
+Fortunately, pppdump is not used in the normal process of setting up a
+PPP connection, is not installed setuid-root, and is not invoked
+automatically in any scenario that I am aware of.
+
+Ustream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/ppp-project/ppp/commit/a75fb7b198eed50d769c80c36629f38346882cbf]
+CVE: CVE-2022-4603
+Signed-off-by:Minjae Kim <flowergom@gmail.com>
+---
+ pppdump/pppdump.c | 7 ++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/pppdump/pppdump.c b/pppdump/pppdump.c
+index 87c2e8f..dec4def 100644
+--- a/pppdump/pppdump.c
++++ b/pppdump/pppdump.c
+@@ -296,6 +296,10 @@ dumpppp(f)
+ 			    printf("%s aborted packet:\n     ", dir);
+ 			    q = "    ";
+ 			}
++			if (pkt->cnt >= sizeof(pkt->buf)) {
++			    printf("%s over-long packet truncated:\n     ", dir);
++			    q = "    ";
++			}
+ 			nb = pkt->cnt;
+ 			p = pkt->buf;
+ 			pkt->cnt = 0;
+@@ -399,7 +403,8 @@ dumpppp(f)
+ 			c ^= 0x20;
+ 			pkt->esc = 0;
+ 		    }
+-		    pkt->buf[pkt->cnt++] = c;
++		    if (pkt->cnt < sizeof(pkt->buf))
++			    pkt->buf[pkt->cnt++] = c;
+ 		    break;
+ 		}
+ 	    }
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-connectivity/ppp/ppp_2.4.7.bb

@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.samba.org/pub/${BPN}/${BP}.tar.gz \
            file://0001-ppp-Remove-unneeded-include.patch \
            file://ppp-2.4.7-DES-openssl.patch \
            file://0001-pppd-Fix-bounds-check-in-EAP-code.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-4603.patch \
 "
 
 SRC_URI_append_libc-musl = "\

meta/recipes-core/busybox/busybox.inc

@@ -139,6 +139,10 @@ do_configure () {
 	do_prepare_config
 	merge_config.sh -m .config ${@" ".join(find_cfgs(d))}
 	cml1_do_configure
+
+	# Save a copy of .config and autoconf.h.
+	cp .config .config.orig
+	cp include/autoconf.h include/autoconf.h.orig
 }
 
 do_compile() {
@@ -146,13 +150,17 @@ do_compile() {
 	if [ "${BUILD_REPRODUCIBLE_BINARIES}" = "1" ]; then
 		export KCONFIG_NOTIMESTAMP=1
 	fi
+
+	# Ensure we start do_compile with the original .config and autoconf.h.
+	# These files should always have matching timestamps.
+	cp .config.orig .config
+	cp include/autoconf.h.orig include/autoconf.h
+
 	if [ "${BUSYBOX_SPLIT_SUID}" = "1" -a x`grep "CONFIG_FEATURE_INDIVIDUAL=y" .config` = x ]; then
+		# Guard againt interrupted do_compile: clean temporary files.
+		rm -f .config.app.suid .config.app.nosuid .config.disable.apps .config.nonapps
+
 		# split the .config into two parts, and make two busybox binaries
-		if [ -e .config.orig ]; then
-			# Need to guard again an interrupted do_compile - restore any backup
-			cp .config.orig .config
-		fi
-		cp .config .config.orig
 		oe_runmake busybox.cfg.suid
 		oe_runmake busybox.cfg.nosuid
 
@@ -189,15 +197,18 @@ do_compile() {
 			bbfatal "busybox suid binary incorrectly provides /bin/sh"
 		fi
 
-		# copy .config.orig back to .config, because the install process may check this file
-		cp .config.orig .config
 		# cleanup
-		rm .config.orig .config.app.suid .config.app.nosuid .config.disable.apps .config.nonapps
+		rm .config.app.suid .config.app.nosuid .config.disable.apps .config.nonapps
 	else
 		oe_runmake busybox_unstripped
 		cp busybox_unstripped busybox
 		oe_runmake busybox.links
 	fi
+
+	# restore original .config and autoconf.h, because the install process
+	# may check these files
+	cp .config.orig .config
+	cp include/autoconf.h.orig include/autoconf.h
 }
 
 do_install () {

meta/recipes-core/coreutils/coreutils_8.31.bb

@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ PACKAGECONFIG_class-nativesdk ??= "xattr"
 PACKAGECONFIG[acl] = "--enable-acl,--disable-acl,acl,"
 PACKAGECONFIG[xattr] = "--enable-xattr,--disable-xattr,attr,"
 PACKAGECONFIG[single-binary] = "--enable-single-binary,--disable-single-binary,,"
+PACKAGECONFIG[openssl] = "--with-openssl=yes,--with-openssl=no,openssl"
 
 # [ df mktemp nice printenv base64 gets a special treatment and is not included in this
 bindir_progs = "arch basename chcon cksum comm csplit cut dir dircolors dirname du \

meta/recipes-core/dbus/dbus.inc

@@ -10,8 +10,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://dbus.freedesktop.org/releases/dbus/dbus-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://clear-guid_from_server-if-send_negotiate_unix_f.patch \
 "
 
-SRC_URI[md5sum] = "dfe8a71f412e0b53be26ed4fbfdc91c4"
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f77620140ecb4cdc67f37fb444f8a6bea70b5b6461f12f1cbe2cec60fa7de5fe"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "bc42d196c1756ac520d61bf3ccd6f42013617def45dd1e591a6091abf51dca38"
 
 EXTRA_OECONF = "--disable-xml-docs \
                 --disable-doxygen-docs \

meta/recipes-core/dropbear/dropbear.inc

@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://matt.ucc.asn.au/dropbear/releases/dropbear-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
            ${@bb.utils.contains('DISTRO_FEATURES', 'pam', '${PAM_SRC_URI}', '', d)} \
            ${@bb.utils.contains('PACKAGECONFIG', 'disable-weak-ciphers', 'file://dropbear-disable-weak-ciphers.patch', '', d)} \
            file://CVE-2020-36254.patch \
+           file://CVE-2021-36369.patch \
            "
 
 PAM_SRC_URI = "file://0005-dropbear-enable-pam.patch \

meta/recipes-core/dropbear/dropbear/CVE-2021-36369.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
+From e10dec82930863e487b22978d3df107274f366b2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Manfred Kaiser <37737811+manfred-kaiser@users.noreply.github.com>
+Date: Thu, 19 Aug 2021 17:37:14 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] added option to disable trivial auth methods (#128)
+
+* added option to disable trivial auth methods
+
+* rename argument to match with other ssh clients
+
+* fixed trivial auth detection for pubkeys
+
+[https://github.com/mkj/dropbear/pull/128]
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+CVE: CVE-2021-36369
+Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
+
+---
+ cli-auth.c         | 3 +++
+ cli-authinteract.c | 1 +
+ cli-authpasswd.c   | 2 +-
+ cli-authpubkey.c   | 1 +
+ cli-runopts.c      | 7 +++++++
+ cli-session.c      | 1 +
+ runopts.h          | 1 +
+ session.h          | 1 +
+ 8 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/cli-auth.c b/cli-auth.c
+index 2e509e5..6f04495 100644
+--- a/cli-auth.c
++++ b/cli-auth.c
+@@ -267,6 +267,9 @@ void recv_msg_userauth_success() {
+ 	if DROPBEAR_CLI_IMMEDIATE_AUTH is set */
+ 
+ 	TRACE(("received msg_userauth_success"))
++	if (cli_opts.disable_trivial_auth && cli_ses.is_trivial_auth) {
++		dropbear_exit("trivial authentication not allowed");
++	}
+ 	/* Note: in delayed-zlib mode, setting authdone here 
+ 	 * will enable compression in the transport layer */
+ 	ses.authstate.authdone = 1;
+diff --git a/cli-authinteract.c b/cli-authinteract.c
+index e1cc9a1..f7128ee 100644
+--- a/cli-authinteract.c
++++ b/cli-authinteract.c
+@@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ void recv_msg_userauth_info_request() {
+ 	m_free(instruction);
+ 
+ 	for (i = 0; i < num_prompts; i++) {
++		cli_ses.is_trivial_auth = 0;
+ 		unsigned int response_len = 0;
+ 		prompt = buf_getstring(ses.payload, NULL);
+ 		cleantext(prompt);
+diff --git a/cli-authpasswd.c b/cli-authpasswd.c
+index 00fdd8b..a24d43e 100644
+--- a/cli-authpasswd.c
++++ b/cli-authpasswd.c
+@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ void cli_auth_password() {
+ 
+ 	encrypt_packet();
+ 	m_burn(password, strlen(password));
+-
++	cli_ses.is_trivial_auth = 0;
+ 	TRACE(("leave cli_auth_password"))
+ }
+ #endif	/* DROPBEAR_CLI_PASSWORD_AUTH */
+diff --git a/cli-authpubkey.c b/cli-authpubkey.c
+index 7cee164..7da1a04 100644
+--- a/cli-authpubkey.c
++++ b/cli-authpubkey.c
+@@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ static void send_msg_userauth_pubkey(sign_key *key, int type, int realsign) {
+ 		buf_putbytes(sigbuf, ses.writepayload->data, ses.writepayload->len);
+ 		cli_buf_put_sign(ses.writepayload, key, type, sigbuf);
+ 		buf_free(sigbuf); /* Nothing confidential in the buffer */
++		cli_ses.is_trivial_auth = 0;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	encrypt_packet();
+diff --git a/cli-runopts.c b/cli-runopts.c
+index 7d1fffe..6bf8b8e 100644
+--- a/cli-runopts.c
++++ b/cli-runopts.c
+@@ -152,6 +152,7 @@ void cli_getopts(int argc, char ** argv) {
+ #if DROPBEAR_CLI_ANYTCPFWD
+ 	cli_opts.exit_on_fwd_failure = 0;
+ #endif
++	cli_opts.disable_trivial_auth = 0;
+ #if DROPBEAR_CLI_LOCALTCPFWD
+ 	cli_opts.localfwds = list_new();
+ 	opts.listen_fwd_all = 0;
+@@ -888,6 +889,7 @@ static void add_extendedopt(const char* origstr) {
+ #if DROPBEAR_CLI_ANYTCPFWD
+ 			"\tExitOnForwardFailure\n"
+ #endif
++			"\tDisableTrivialAuth\n"
+ #ifndef DISABLE_SYSLOG
+ 			"\tUseSyslog\n"
+ #endif
+@@ -915,5 +917,10 @@ static void add_extendedopt(const char* origstr) {
+ 		return;
+ 	}
+ 
++	if (match_extendedopt(&optstr, "DisableTrivialAuth") == DROPBEAR_SUCCESS) {
++		cli_opts.disable_trivial_auth = parse_flag_value(optstr);
++		return;
++	}
++
+ 	dropbear_log(LOG_WARNING, "Ignoring unknown configuration option '%s'", origstr);
+ }
+diff --git a/cli-session.c b/cli-session.c
+index 56dd4af..73ef0db 100644
+--- a/cli-session.c
++++ b/cli-session.c
+@@ -164,6 +164,7 @@ static void cli_session_init(pid_t proxy_cmd_pid) {
+ 	/* Auth */
+ 	cli_ses.lastprivkey = NULL;
+ 	cli_ses.lastauthtype = 0;
++	cli_ses.is_trivial_auth = 1;
+ 
+ 	/* For printing "remote host closed" for the user */
+ 	ses.remoteclosed = cli_remoteclosed;
+diff --git a/runopts.h b/runopts.h
+index 31eae1f..8519626 100644
+--- a/runopts.h
++++ b/runopts.h
+@@ -154,6 +154,7 @@ typedef struct cli_runopts {
+ #if DROPBEAR_CLI_ANYTCPFWD
+ 	int exit_on_fwd_failure;
+ #endif
++	int disable_trivial_auth;
+ #if DROPBEAR_CLI_REMOTETCPFWD
+ 	m_list * remotefwds;
+ #endif
+diff --git a/session.h b/session.h
+index 0f77055..8676054 100644
+--- a/session.h
++++ b/session.h
+@@ -287,6 +287,7 @@ struct clientsession {
+ 
+ 	int lastauthtype; /* either AUTH_TYPE_PUBKEY or AUTH_TYPE_PASSWORD,
+ 						 for the last type of auth we tried */
++	int is_trivial_auth;
+ 	int ignore_next_auth_response;
+ #if DROPBEAR_CLI_INTERACT_AUTH
+ 	int auth_interact_failed; /* flag whether interactive auth can still

meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2022-40674.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+From 4a32da87e931ba54393d465bb77c40b5c33d343b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Rhodri James <rhodri@wildebeest.org.uk>
+Date: Wed, 17 Aug 2022 18:26:18 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Ensure raw tagnames are safe exiting internalEntityParser
+
+It is possible to concoct a situation in which parsing is
+suspended while substituting in an internal entity, so that
+XML_ResumeParser directly uses internalEntityProcessor as
+its processor.  If the subsequent parse includes some unclosed
+tags, this will return without calling storeRawNames to ensure
+that the raw versions of the tag names are stored in memory other
+than the parse buffer itself.  If the parse buffer is then changed
+or reallocated (for example if processing a file line by line),
+badness will ensue.
+
+This patch ensures storeRawNames is always called when needed
+after calling doContent.  The earlier call do doContent does
+not need the same protection; it only deals with entity
+substitution, which cannot leave unbalanced tags, and in any
+case the raw names will be pointing into the stored entity
+value not the parse buffer.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/libexpat/libexpat/commit/4a32da87e931ba54393d465bb77c40b5c33d343b]
+CVE: CVE-2022-40674
+Signed-off-by: Virendra Thakur <virendrak@kpit.com>
+---
+ expat/lib/xmlparse.c | 13 +++++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+Index: expat/lib/xmlparse.c
+===================================================================
+--- a/lib/xmlparse.c
++++ b/lib/xmlparse.c
+@@ -5657,10 +5657,15 @@ internalEntityProcessor(XML_Parser parse
+   {
+     parser->m_processor = contentProcessor;
+     /* see externalEntityContentProcessor vs contentProcessor */
+-    return doContent(parser, parser->m_parentParser ? 1 : 0, parser->m_encoding,
+-                     s, end, nextPtr,
+-                     (XML_Bool)! parser->m_parsingStatus.finalBuffer,
+-                     XML_ACCOUNT_DIRECT);
++    result = doContent(parser, parser->m_parentParser ? 1 : 0,
++                       parser->m_encoding, s, end, nextPtr,
++                       (XML_Bool)! parser->m_parsingStatus.finalBuffer,
++                       XML_ACCOUNT_DIRECT);
++    if (result == XML_ERROR_NONE) {
++      if (! storeRawNames(parser))
++        return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
++    }
++    return result;
+   }
+ }
+ 

meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2022-43680.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+From 5290462a7ea1278a8d5c0d5b2860d4e244f997e4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sebastian Pipping <sebastian@pipping.org>
+Date: Tue, 20 Sep 2022 02:44:34 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] lib: Fix overeager DTD destruction in
+ XML_ExternalEntityParserCreate
+
+CVE: CVE-2022-43680
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/libexpat/libexpat/commit/5290462a7ea1278a8d5c0d5b2860d4e244f997e4.patch]
+Signed-off-by: Ranjitsinh Rathod <ranjitsinh.rathod@kpit.com>
+Comments: Hunk refreshed
+---
+ lib/xmlparse.c | 8 ++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/lib/xmlparse.c b/lib/xmlparse.c
+index aacd6e7fc..57bf103cc 100644
+--- a/lib/xmlparse.c
++++ b/lib/xmlparse.c
+@@ -1035,6 +1035,14 @@ parserCreate(const XML_Char *encodingNam
+   parserInit(parser, encodingName);
+ 
+   if (encodingName && ! parser->m_protocolEncodingName) {
++    if (dtd) {
++      // We need to stop the upcoming call to XML_ParserFree from happily
++      // destroying parser->m_dtd because the DTD is shared with the parent
++      // parser and the only guard that keeps XML_ParserFree from destroying
++      // parser->m_dtd is parser->m_isParamEntity but it will be set to
++      // XML_TRUE only later in XML_ExternalEntityParserCreate (or not at all).
++      parser->m_dtd = NULL;
++    }
+     XML_ParserFree(parser);
+     return NULL;
+   }

meta/recipes-core/expat/expat_2.2.9.bb

@@ -20,6 +20,8 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/libexpat/libexpat.git;protocol=https;branch=master \
            file://CVE-2022-25314.patch \
            file://CVE-2022-25315.patch \
            file://libtool-tag.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-40674.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-43680.patch \
          "
 
 SRCREV = "a7bc26b69768f7fb24f0c7976fae24b157b85b13"

meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc-version.inc

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 SRCBRANCH ?= "release/2.31/master"
 PV = "2.31+git${SRCPV}"
-SRCREV_glibc ?= "3ef8be9b89ef98300951741f381eb79126ac029f"
+SRCREV_glibc ?= "d4b75594574ab8a9c2c41209cd8c62aac76b5a04"
 SRCREV_localedef ?= "cd9f958c4c94a638fa7b2b4e21627364f1a1a655"
 
 GLIBC_GIT_URI ?= "git://sourceware.org/git/glibc.git"

meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc/CVE-2021-33574_1.patch

@@ -11,14 +11,10 @@ CVE: CVE-2021-33574 patch#1
 Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
 
 ---
- NEWS                                |  4 ++++
- sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/mq_notify.c | 15 ++++++++++-----
- 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
-
-Index: git/NEWS
-===================================================================
---- git.orig/NEWS
-+++ git/NEWS
+diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS
+index 8a20d3c4e3..be489243ac 100644
+--- a/NEWS
++++ b/NEWS
 @@ -7,6 +7,10 @@ using `glibc' in the "product" field.
  
  Version 2.31.1
@@ -28,12 +24,12 @@ Index: git/NEWS
 +  attribute with a non-default affinity mask.
 +
  The following bugs are resolved with this release:
+   [14231] stdio-common tests memory requirements
    [19519] iconv(1) with -c option hangs on illegal multi-byte sequences
-     (CVE-2016-10228)
-Index: git/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/mq_notify.c
-===================================================================
---- git.orig/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/mq_notify.c
-+++ git/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/mq_notify.c
+diff --git a/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/mq_notify.c b/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/mq_notify.c
+index f288bac477..dd47f0b777 100644
+--- a/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/mq_notify.c
++++ b/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/mq_notify.c
 @@ -135,8 +135,11 @@ helper_thread (void *arg)
  	    (void) __pthread_barrier_wait (&notify_barrier);
  	}
@@ -48,7 +44,7 @@ Index: git/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/mq_notify.c
      }
    return NULL;
  }
-@@ -257,8 +260,7 @@ mq_notify (mqd_t mqdes, const struct sig
+@@ -257,8 +260,7 @@ mq_notify (mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent *notification)
        if (data.attr == NULL)
  	return -1;
  
@@ -58,7 +54,7 @@ Index: git/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/mq_notify.c
      }
  
    /* Construct the new request.  */
-@@ -272,7 +274,10 @@ mq_notify (mqd_t mqdes, const struct sig
+@@ -272,7 +274,10 @@ mq_notify (mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent *notification)
  
    /* If it failed, free the allocated memory.  */
    if (__glibc_unlikely (retval != 0))

meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc/CVE-2023-0687.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+From 952aff5c00ad7c6b83c3f310f2643939538827f8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?=D0=9B=D0=B5=D0=BE=D0=BD=D0=B8=D0=B4=20=D0=AE=D1=80=D1=8C?=
+ =?UTF-8?q?=D0=B5=D0=B2=20=28Leonid=20Yuriev=29?= <leo@yuriev.ru>
+Date: Sat, 4 Feb 2023 14:41:38 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] gmon: Fix allocated buffer overflow (bug 29444)
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+The `__monstartup()` allocates a buffer used to store all the data
+accumulated by the monitor.
+
+The size of this buffer depends on the size of the internal structures
+used and the address range for which the monitor is activated, as well
+as on the maximum density of call instructions and/or callable functions
+that could be potentially on a segment of executable code.
+
+In particular a hash table of arcs is placed at the end of this buffer.
+The size of this hash table is calculated in bytes as
+   p->fromssize = p->textsize / HASHFRACTION;
+
+but actually should be
+   p->fromssize = ROUNDUP(p->textsize / HASHFRACTION, sizeof(*p->froms));
+
+This results in writing beyond the end of the allocated buffer when an
+added arc corresponds to a call near from the end of the monitored
+address range, since `_mcount()` check the incoming caller address for
+monitored range but not the intermediate result hash-like index that
+uses to write into the table.
+
+It should be noted that when the results are output to `gmon.out`, the
+table is read to the last element calculated from the allocated size in
+bytes, so the arcs stored outside the buffer boundary did not fall into
+`gprof` for analysis. Thus this "feature" help me to found this bug
+during working with https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=29438
+
+Just in case, I will explicitly note that the problem breaks the
+`make test t=gmon/tst-gmon-dso` added for Bug 29438.
+There, the arc of the `f3()` call disappears from the output, since in
+the DSO case, the call to `f3` is located close to the end of the
+monitored range.
+
+Signed-off-by: Леонид Юрьев (Leonid Yuriev) <leo@yuriev.ru>
+
+Another minor error seems a related typo in the calculation of
+`kcountsize`, but since kcounts are smaller than froms, this is
+actually to align the p->froms data.
+
+Co-authored-by: DJ Delorie <dj@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Carlos O'Donell <carlos@redhat.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=commit;h=801af9fafd4689337ebf27260aa115335a0cb2bc]
+CVE: CVE-2023-0687
+Signed-off-by: Shubham Kulkarni <skulkarni@mvista.com>
+---
+ gmon/gmon.c | 4 +++-
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/gmon/gmon.c b/gmon/gmon.c
+index dee6480..bf76358 100644
+--- a/gmon/gmon.c
++++ b/gmon/gmon.c
+@@ -132,6 +132,8 @@ __monstartup (u_long lowpc, u_long highpc)
+   p->lowpc = ROUNDDOWN(lowpc, HISTFRACTION * sizeof(HISTCOUNTER));
+   p->highpc = ROUNDUP(highpc, HISTFRACTION * sizeof(HISTCOUNTER));
+   p->textsize = p->highpc - p->lowpc;
++  /* This looks like a typo, but it's here to align the p->froms
++     section.  */
+   p->kcountsize = ROUNDUP(p->textsize / HISTFRACTION, sizeof(*p->froms));
+   p->hashfraction = HASHFRACTION;
+   p->log_hashfraction = -1;
+@@ -142,7 +144,7 @@ __monstartup (u_long lowpc, u_long highpc)
+	 instead of integer division.  Precompute shift amount. */
+       p->log_hashfraction = ffs(p->hashfraction * sizeof(*p->froms)) - 1;
+   }
+-  p->fromssize = p->textsize / HASHFRACTION;
++  p->fromssize = ROUNDUP(p->textsize / HASHFRACTION, sizeof(*p->froms));
+   p->tolimit = p->textsize * ARCDENSITY / 100;
+   if (p->tolimit < MINARCS)
+     p->tolimit = MINARCS;
+--
+2.7.4

meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc_2.31.bb

@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ SRC_URI =  "${GLIBC_GIT_URI};branch=${SRCBRANCH};name=glibc \
            file://0035-x86_64-Avoid-lazy-relocation-of-tlsdesc-BZ-27137.patch \
            file://0036-i386-Avoid-lazy-relocation-of-tlsdesc-BZ-27137.patch \
            file://0037-Avoid-deadlock-between-pthread_create-and-ctors.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-0687.patch \
            "
 S = "${WORKDIR}/git"
 B = "${WORKDIR}/build-${TARGET_SYS}"

meta/recipes-core/images/build-appliance-image_15.0.0.bb

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ IMAGE_FSTYPES = "wic.vmdk"
 
 inherit core-image setuptools3
 
-SRCREV ?= "23322786e02469c08e3db007043da1091bf0f466"
+SRCREV ?= "9fbfbf002e210dbdb2a4b9f3adf8012f245cf38f"
 SRC_URI = "git://git.yoctoproject.org/poky;branch=dunfell \
            file://Yocto_Build_Appliance.vmx \
            file://Yocto_Build_Appliance.vmxf \

meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2016-3709.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+From c1ba6f54d32b707ca6d91cb3257ce9de82876b6f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Nick Wellnhofer <wellnhofer@aevum.de>
+Date: Sat, 15 Aug 2020 18:32:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Revert "Do not URI escape in server side includes"
+
+This reverts commit 960f0e275616cadc29671a218d7fb9b69eb35588.
+
+This commit introduced
+
+- an infinite loop, found by OSS-Fuzz, which could be easily fixed.
+- an algorithm with quadratic runtime
+- a security issue, see
+  https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=769760
+
+A better approach is to add an option not to escape URLs at all
+which libxml2 should have possibly done in the first place.
+
+CVE: CVE-2016-3709
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/GNOME/libxml2/commit/c1ba6f54d32b707ca6d91cb3257ce9de82876b6f]
+Signed-off-by: Pawan Badganchi <Pawan.Badganchi@kpit.com>
+---
+ HTMLtree.c | 49 +++++++++++--------------------------------------
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/HTMLtree.c b/HTMLtree.c
+index 8d236bb35..cdb7f86a6 100644
+--- a/HTMLtree.c
++++ b/HTMLtree.c
+@@ -706,49 +706,22 @@ htmlAttrDumpOutput(xmlOutputBufferPtr buf, xmlDocPtr doc, xmlAttrPtr cur,
+ 		 (!xmlStrcasecmp(cur->name, BAD_CAST "src")) ||
+ 		 ((!xmlStrcasecmp(cur->name, BAD_CAST "name")) &&
+ 		  (!xmlStrcasecmp(cur->parent->name, BAD_CAST "a"))))) {
++		xmlChar *escaped;
+ 		xmlChar *tmp = value;
+-		/* xmlURIEscapeStr() escapes '"' so it can be safely used. */
+-		xmlBufCCat(buf->buffer, "\"");
+
+ 		while (IS_BLANK_CH(*tmp)) tmp++;
+
+-		/* URI Escape everything, except server side includes. */
+-		for ( ; ; ) {
+-		    xmlChar *escaped;
+-		    xmlChar endChar;
+-		    xmlChar *end = NULL;
+-		    xmlChar *start = (xmlChar *)xmlStrstr(tmp, BAD_CAST "<!--");
+-		    if (start != NULL) {
+-			end = (xmlChar *)xmlStrstr(tmp, BAD_CAST "-->");
+-			if (end != NULL) {
+-			    *start = '\0';
+-			}
+-		    }
+-
+-		    /* Escape the whole string, or until start (set to '\0'). */
+-		    escaped = xmlURIEscapeStr(tmp, BAD_CAST"@/:=?;#%&,+");
+-		    if (escaped != NULL) {
+-		        xmlBufCat(buf->buffer, escaped);
+-		        xmlFree(escaped);
+-		    } else {
+-		        xmlBufCat(buf->buffer, tmp);
+-		    }
+-
+-		    if (end == NULL) { /* Everything has been written. */
+-			break;
+-		    }
+-
+-		    /* Do not escape anything within server side includes. */
+-		    *start = '<'; /* Restore the first character of "<!--". */
+-		    end += 3; /* strlen("-->") */
+-		    endChar = *end;
+-		    *end = '\0';
+-		    xmlBufCat(buf->buffer, start);
+-		    *end = endChar;
+-		    tmp = end;
++		/*
++		 * the < and > have already been escaped at the entity level
++		 * And doing so here breaks server side includes
++		 */
++		escaped = xmlURIEscapeStr(tmp, BAD_CAST"@/:=?;#%&,+<>");
++		if (escaped != NULL) {
++		    xmlBufWriteQuotedString(buf->buffer, escaped);
++		    xmlFree(escaped);
++		} else {
++		    xmlBufWriteQuotedString(buf->buffer, value);
+ 		}
+-
+-		xmlBufCCat(buf->buffer, "\"");
+ 	    } else {
+ 		xmlBufWriteQuotedString(buf->buffer, value);
+ 	    }

meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2022-40303.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,623 @@
+From c846986356fc149915a74972bf198abc266bc2c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Nick Wellnhofer <wellnhofer@aevum.de>
+Date: Thu, 25 Aug 2022 17:43:08 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] [CVE-2022-40303] Fix integer overflows with XML_PARSE_HUGE
+
+Also impose size limits when XML_PARSE_HUGE is set. Limit size of names
+to XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH (10 million bytes) and other content to
+XML_MAX_HUGE_LENGTH (1 billion bytes).
+
+Move some the length checks to the end of the respective loop to make
+them strict.
+
+xmlParseEntityValue didn't have a length limitation at all. But without
+XML_PARSE_HUGE, this should eventually trigger an error in xmlGROW.
+
+Thanks to Maddie Stone working with Google Project Zero for the report!
+
+CVE: CVE-2022-40303
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libxml2/-/commit/c846986356fc149915a74972bf198abc266bc2c0]
+Comments: Refreshed hunk
+
+Signed-off-by: Bhabu Bindu <bhabu.bindu@kpit.com>
+---
+ parser.c | 233 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------
+ 1 file changed, 121 insertions(+), 112 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/parser.c b/parser.c
+index 93f031be..79479979 100644
+--- a/parser.c
++++ b/parser.c
+@@ -102,6 +102,8 @@ xmlParseElementEnd(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt);
+  *									*
+  ************************************************************************/
+ 
++#define XML_MAX_HUGE_LENGTH 1000000000
++
+ #define XML_PARSER_BIG_ENTITY 1000
+ #define XML_PARSER_LOT_ENTITY 5000
+ 
+@@ -552,7 +554,7 @@ xmlFatalErr(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlParserErrors error, const char *info)
+             errmsg = "Malformed declaration expecting version";
+             break;
+         case XML_ERR_NAME_TOO_LONG:
+-            errmsg = "Name too long use XML_PARSE_HUGE option";
++            errmsg = "Name too long";
+             break;
+ #if 0
+         case:
+@@ -3202,6 +3204,9 @@ xmlParseNameComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
+     int len = 0, l;
+     int c;
+     int count = 0;
++    int maxLength = (ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) ?
++                    XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH :
++                    XML_MAX_NAME_LENGTH;
+ 
+ #ifdef DEBUG
+     nbParseNameComplex++;
+@@ -3267,7 +3272,8 @@ xmlParseNameComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
+                 if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)
+                     return(NULL);
+ 	    }
+-	    len += l;
++            if (len <= INT_MAX - l)
++	        len += l;
+ 	    NEXTL(l);
+ 	    c = CUR_CHAR(l);
+ 	}
+@@ -3293,13 +3299,13 @@ xmlParseNameComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
+                 if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)
+                     return(NULL);
+ 	    }
+-	    len += l;
++            if (len <= INT_MAX - l)
++	        len += l;
+ 	    NEXTL(l);
+ 	    c = CUR_CHAR(l);
+ 	}
+     }
+-    if ((len > XML_MAX_NAME_LENGTH) &&
+-        ((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) {
++    if (len > maxLength) {
+         xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_TOO_LONG, "Name");
+         return(NULL);
+     }
+@@ -3338,7 +3344,10 @@ const xmlChar *
+ xmlParseName(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
+     const xmlChar *in;
+     const xmlChar *ret;
+-    int count = 0;
++    size_t count = 0;
++    size_t maxLength = (ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) ?
++                       XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH :
++                       XML_MAX_NAME_LENGTH;
+ 
+     GROW;
+ 
+@@ -3362,8 +3371,7 @@ xmlParseName(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
+ 	    in++;
+ 	if ((*in > 0) && (*in < 0x80)) {
+ 	    count = in - ctxt->input->cur;
+-            if ((count > XML_MAX_NAME_LENGTH) &&
+-                ((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) {
++            if (count > maxLength) {
+                 xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_TOO_LONG, "Name");
+                 return(NULL);
+             }
+@@ -3384,6 +3392,9 @@ xmlParseNCNameComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
+     int len = 0, l;
+     int c;
+     int count = 0;
++    int maxLength = (ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) ?
++                    XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH :
++                    XML_MAX_NAME_LENGTH;
+     size_t startPosition = 0;
+ 
+ #ifdef DEBUG
+@@ -3404,17 +3415,13 @@ xmlParseNCNameComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
+     while ((c != ' ') && (c != '>') && (c != '/') && /* test bigname.xml */
+ 	   (xmlIsNameChar(ctxt, c) && (c != ':'))) {
+ 	if (count++ > XML_PARSER_CHUNK_SIZE) {
+-            if ((len > XML_MAX_NAME_LENGTH) &&
+-                ((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) {
+-                xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_TOO_LONG, "NCName");
+-                return(NULL);
+-            }
+ 	    count = 0;
+ 	    GROW;
+             if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)
+                 return(NULL);
+ 	}
+-	len += l;
++        if (len <= INT_MAX - l)
++	    len += l;
+ 	NEXTL(l);
+ 	c = CUR_CHAR(l);
+ 	if (c == 0) {
+@@ -3432,8 +3439,7 @@ xmlParseNCNameComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
+ 	    c = CUR_CHAR(l);
+ 	}
+     }
+-    if ((len > XML_MAX_NAME_LENGTH) &&
+-        ((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) {
++    if (len > maxLength) {
+         xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_TOO_LONG, "NCName");
+         return(NULL);
+     }
+@@ -3459,7 +3465,10 @@ static const xmlChar *
+ xmlParseNCName(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
+     const xmlChar *in, *e;
+     const xmlChar *ret;
+-    int count = 0;
++    size_t count = 0;
++    size_t maxLength = (ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) ?
++                       XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH :
++                       XML_MAX_NAME_LENGTH;
+ 
+ #ifdef DEBUG
+     nbParseNCName++;
+@@ -3484,8 +3493,7 @@ xmlParseNCName(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
+ 	    goto complex;
+ 	if ((*in > 0) && (*in < 0x80)) {
+ 	    count = in - ctxt->input->cur;
+-            if ((count > XML_MAX_NAME_LENGTH) &&
+-                ((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) {
++            if (count > maxLength) {
+                 xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_TOO_LONG, "NCName");
+                 return(NULL);
+             }
+@@ -3567,6 +3575,9 @@ xmlParseStringName(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, const xmlChar** str) {
+     const xmlChar *cur = *str;
+     int len = 0, l;
+     int c;
++    int maxLength = (ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) ?
++                    XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH :
++                    XML_MAX_NAME_LENGTH;
+ 
+ #ifdef DEBUG
+     nbParseStringName++;
+@@ -3602,12 +3613,6 @@ xmlParseStringName(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, const xmlChar** str) {
+ 		if (len + 10 > max) {
+ 		    xmlChar *tmp;
+ 
+-                    if ((len > XML_MAX_NAME_LENGTH) &&
+-                        ((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) {
+-                        xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_TOO_LONG, "NCName");
+-			xmlFree(buffer);
+-                        return(NULL);
+-                    }
+ 		    max *= 2;
+ 		    tmp = (xmlChar *) xmlRealloc(buffer,
+ 			                            max * sizeof(xmlChar));
+@@ -3621,14 +3626,18 @@ xmlParseStringName(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, const xmlChar** str) {
+ 		COPY_BUF(l,buffer,len,c);
+ 		cur += l;
+ 		c = CUR_SCHAR(cur, l);
++                if (len > maxLength) {
++                    xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_TOO_LONG, "NCName");
++                    xmlFree(buffer);
++                    return(NULL);
++                }
+ 	    }
+ 	    buffer[len] = 0;
+ 	    *str = cur;
+ 	    return(buffer);
+ 	}
+     }
+-    if ((len > XML_MAX_NAME_LENGTH) &&
+-        ((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) {
++    if (len > maxLength) {
+         xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_TOO_LONG, "NCName");
+         return(NULL);
+     }
+@@ -3655,6 +3664,9 @@ xmlParseNmtoken(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
+     int len = 0, l;
+     int c;
+     int count = 0;
++    int maxLength = (ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) ?
++                    XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH :
++                    XML_MAX_NAME_LENGTH;
+ 
+ #ifdef DEBUG
+     nbParseNmToken++;
+@@ -3706,12 +3718,6 @@ xmlParseNmtoken(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
+ 		if (len + 10 > max) {
+ 		    xmlChar *tmp;
+ 
+-                    if ((max > XML_MAX_NAME_LENGTH) &&
+-                        ((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) {
+-                        xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_TOO_LONG, "NmToken");
+-                        xmlFree(buffer);
+-                        return(NULL);
+-                    }
+ 		    max *= 2;
+ 		    tmp = (xmlChar *) xmlRealloc(buffer,
+ 			                            max * sizeof(xmlChar));
+@@ -3725,6 +3731,11 @@ xmlParseNmtoken(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
+ 		COPY_BUF(l,buffer,len,c);
+ 		NEXTL(l);
+ 		c = CUR_CHAR(l);
++                if (len > maxLength) {
++                    xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_TOO_LONG, "NmToken");
++                    xmlFree(buffer);
++                    return(NULL);
++                }
+ 	    }
+ 	    buffer[len] = 0;
+ 	    return(buffer);
+@@ -3732,8 +3743,7 @@ xmlParseNmtoken(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
+     }
+     if (len == 0)
+         return(NULL);
+-    if ((len > XML_MAX_NAME_LENGTH) &&
+-        ((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) {
++    if (len > maxLength) {
+         xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_TOO_LONG, "NmToken");
+         return(NULL);
+     }
+@@ -3759,6 +3769,9 @@ xmlParseEntityValue(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlChar **orig) {
+     int len = 0;
+     int size = XML_PARSER_BUFFER_SIZE;
+     int c, l;
++    int maxLength = (ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) ?
++                    XML_MAX_HUGE_LENGTH :
++                    XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH;
+     xmlChar stop;
+     xmlChar *ret = NULL;
+     const xmlChar *cur = NULL;
+@@ -3818,6 +3831,12 @@ xmlParseEntityValue(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlChar **orig) {
+ 	    GROW;
+ 	    c = CUR_CHAR(l);
+ 	}
++
++        if (len > maxLength) {
++            xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITY_NOT_FINISHED,
++                           "entity value too long\n");
++            goto error;
++        }
+     }
+     buf[len] = 0;
+     if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)
+@@ -3905,6 +3924,9 @@ xmlParseAttValueComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int *attlen, int normalize) {
+     xmlChar *rep = NULL;
+     size_t len = 0;
+     size_t buf_size = 0;
++    size_t maxLength = (ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) ?
++                       XML_MAX_HUGE_LENGTH :
++                       XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH;
+     int c, l, in_space = 0;
+     xmlChar *current = NULL;
+     xmlEntityPtr ent;
+@@ -3925,16 +3925,6 @@
+     while (((NXT(0) != limit) && /* checked */
+             (IS_CHAR(c)) && (c != '<')) &&
+             (ctxt->instate != XML_PARSER_EOF)) {
+-        /*
+-         * Impose a reasonable limit on attribute size, unless XML_PARSE_HUGE
+-         * special option is given
+-         */
+-        if ((len > XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH) &&
+-            ((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) {
+-            xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_ATTRIBUTE_NOT_FINISHED,
+-                           "AttValue length too long\n");
+-            goto mem_error;
+-        }
+ 	if (c == 0) break;
+ 	if (c == '&') {
+ 	    in_space = 0;
+@@ -4093,6 +4105,11 @@ xmlParseAttValueComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int *attlen, int normalize) {
+ 	}
+ 	GROW;
+ 	c = CUR_CHAR(l);
++        if (len > maxLength) {
++            xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_ATTRIBUTE_NOT_FINISHED,
++                           "AttValue length too long\n");
++            goto mem_error;
++        }
+     }
+     if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)
+         goto error;
+@@ -4114,16 +4131,6 @@ xmlParseAttValueComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int *attlen, int normalize) {
+     } else
+ 	NEXT;
+ 
+-    /*
+-     * There we potentially risk an overflow, don't allow attribute value of
+-     * length more than INT_MAX it is a very reasonable assumption !
+-     */
+-    if (len >= INT_MAX) {
+-        xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_ATTRIBUTE_NOT_FINISHED,
+-                       "AttValue length too long\n");
+-        goto mem_error;
+-    }
+-
+     if (attlen != NULL) *attlen = (int) len;
+     return(buf);
+ 
+@@ -4194,6 +4201,9 @@ xmlParseSystemLiteral(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
+     int len = 0;
+     int size = XML_PARSER_BUFFER_SIZE;
+     int cur, l;
++    int maxLength = (ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) ?
++                    XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH :
++                    XML_MAX_NAME_LENGTH;
+     xmlChar stop;
+     int state = ctxt->instate;
+     int count = 0;
+@@ -4221,13 +4231,6 @@ xmlParseSystemLiteral(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
+ 	if (len + 5 >= size) {
+ 	    xmlChar *tmp;
+ 
+-            if ((size > XML_MAX_NAME_LENGTH) &&
+-                ((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) {
+-                xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_TOO_LONG, "SystemLiteral");
+-                xmlFree(buf);
+-		ctxt->instate = (xmlParserInputState) state;
+-                return(NULL);
+-            }
+ 	    size *= 2;
+ 	    tmp = (xmlChar *) xmlRealloc(buf, size * sizeof(xmlChar));
+ 	    if (tmp == NULL) {
+@@ -4256,6 +4259,12 @@ xmlParseSystemLiteral(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
+ 	    SHRINK;
+ 	    cur = CUR_CHAR(l);
+ 	}
++        if (len > maxLength) {
++            xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_TOO_LONG, "SystemLiteral");
++            xmlFree(buf);
++            ctxt->instate = (xmlParserInputState) state;
++            return(NULL);
++        }
+     }
+     buf[len] = 0;
+     ctxt->instate = (xmlParserInputState) state;
+@@ -4283,6 +4292,9 @@ xmlParsePubidLiteral(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
+     xmlChar *buf = NULL;
+     int len = 0;
+     int size = XML_PARSER_BUFFER_SIZE;
++    int maxLength = (ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) ?
++                    XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH :
++                    XML_MAX_NAME_LENGTH;
+     xmlChar cur;
+     xmlChar stop;
+     int count = 0;
+@@ -4310,12 +4322,6 @@ xmlParsePubidLiteral(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
+ 	if (len + 1 >= size) {
+ 	    xmlChar *tmp;
+ 
+-            if ((size > XML_MAX_NAME_LENGTH) &&
+-                ((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) {
+-                xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_TOO_LONG, "Public ID");
+-                xmlFree(buf);
+-                return(NULL);
+-            }
+ 	    size *= 2;
+ 	    tmp = (xmlChar *) xmlRealloc(buf, size * sizeof(xmlChar));
+ 	    if (tmp == NULL) {
+@@ -4343,6 +4349,11 @@ xmlParsePubidLiteral(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
+ 	    SHRINK;
+ 	    cur = CUR;
+ 	}
++        if (len > maxLength) {
++            xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_TOO_LONG, "Public ID");
++            xmlFree(buf);
++            return(NULL);
++        }
+     }
+     buf[len] = 0;
+     if (cur != stop) {
+@@ -4742,6 +4753,9 @@ xmlParseCommentComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlChar *buf,
+     int r, rl;
+     int cur, l;
+     size_t count = 0;
++    size_t maxLength = (ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) ?
++                       XML_MAX_HUGE_LENGTH :
++                       XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH;
+     int inputid;
+ 
+     inputid = ctxt->input->id;
+@@ -4787,13 +4801,6 @@ xmlParseCommentComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlChar *buf,
+ 	if ((r == '-') && (q == '-')) {
+ 	    xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_HYPHEN_IN_COMMENT, NULL);
+ 	}
+-        if ((len > XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH) &&
+-            ((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) {
+-            xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_COMMENT_NOT_FINISHED,
+-                         "Comment too big found", NULL);
+-            xmlFree (buf);
+-            return;
+-        }
+ 	if (len + 5 >= size) {
+ 	    xmlChar *new_buf;
+             size_t new_size;
+@@ -4831,6 +4838,13 @@ xmlParseCommentComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlChar *buf,
+ 	    GROW;
+ 	    cur = CUR_CHAR(l);
+ 	}
++
++        if (len > maxLength) {
++            xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_COMMENT_NOT_FINISHED,
++                         "Comment too big found", NULL);
++            xmlFree (buf);
++            return;
++        }
+     }
+     buf[len] = 0;
+     if (cur == 0) {
+@@ -4875,6 +4889,9 @@ xmlParseComment(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
+     xmlChar *buf = NULL;
+     size_t size = XML_PARSER_BUFFER_SIZE;
+     size_t len = 0;
++    size_t maxLength = (ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) ?
++                       XML_MAX_HUGE_LENGTH :
++                       XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH;
+     xmlParserInputState state;
+     const xmlChar *in;
+     size_t nbchar = 0;
+@@ -4958,8 +4975,7 @@ get_more:
+ 		buf[len] = 0;
+ 	    }
+ 	}
+-        if ((len > XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH) &&
+-            ((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) {
++        if (len > maxLength) {
+             xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_COMMENT_NOT_FINISHED,
+                          "Comment too big found", NULL);
+             xmlFree (buf);
+@@ -5159,6 +5175,9 @@ xmlParsePI(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
+     xmlChar *buf = NULL;
+     size_t len = 0;
+     size_t size = XML_PARSER_BUFFER_SIZE;
++    size_t maxLength = (ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) ?
++                       XML_MAX_HUGE_LENGTH :
++                       XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH;
+     int cur, l;
+     const xmlChar *target;
+     xmlParserInputState state;
+@@ -5234,14 +5253,6 @@ xmlParsePI(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
+                         return;
+                     }
+ 		    count = 0;
+-                    if ((len > XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH) &&
+-                        ((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) {
+-                        xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_PI_NOT_FINISHED,
+-                                          "PI %s too big found", target);
+-                        xmlFree(buf);
+-                        ctxt->instate = state;
+-                        return;
+-                    }
+ 		}
+ 		COPY_BUF(l,buf,len,cur);
+ 		NEXTL(l);
+@@ -5251,15 +5262,14 @@ xmlParsePI(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
+ 		    GROW;
+ 		    cur = CUR_CHAR(l);
+ 		}
++                if (len > maxLength) {
++                    xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_PI_NOT_FINISHED,
++                                      "PI %s too big found", target);
++                    xmlFree(buf);
++                    ctxt->instate = state;
++                    return;
++                }
+ 	    }
+-            if ((len > XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH) &&
+-                ((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) {
+-                xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_PI_NOT_FINISHED,
+-                                  "PI %s too big found", target);
+-                xmlFree(buf);
+-                ctxt->instate = state;
+-                return;
+-            }
+ 	    buf[len] = 0;
+ 	    if (cur != '?') {
+ 		xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_PI_NOT_FINISHED,
+@@ -8954,6 +8964,9 @@ xmlParseAttValueInternal(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int *len, int *alloc,
+     const xmlChar *in = NULL, *start, *end, *last;
+     xmlChar *ret = NULL;
+     int line, col;
++    int maxLength = (ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) ?
++                    XML_MAX_HUGE_LENGTH :
++                    XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH;
+ 
+     GROW;
+     in = (xmlChar *) CUR_PTR;
+@@ -8993,8 +9006,7 @@ xmlParseAttValueInternal(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int *len, int *alloc,
+ 	    start = in;
+ 	    if (in >= end) {
+                 GROW_PARSE_ATT_VALUE_INTERNAL(ctxt, in, start, end)
+-                if (((in - start) > XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH) &&
+-                    ((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) {
++                if ((in - start) > maxLength) {
+                     xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_ATTRIBUTE_NOT_FINISHED,
+                                    "AttValue length too long\n");
+                     return(NULL);
+@@ -9007,8 +9019,7 @@ xmlParseAttValueInternal(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int *len, int *alloc,
+ 	    if ((*in++ == 0x20) && (*in == 0x20)) break;
+ 	    if (in >= end) {
+                 GROW_PARSE_ATT_VALUE_INTERNAL(ctxt, in, start, end)
+-                if (((in - start) > XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH) &&
+-                    ((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) {
++                if ((in - start) > maxLength) {
+                     xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_ATTRIBUTE_NOT_FINISHED,
+                                    "AttValue length too long\n");
+                     return(NULL);
+@@ -9041,16 +9052,14 @@ xmlParseAttValueInternal(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int *len, int *alloc,
+ 		    last = last + delta;
+ 		}
+ 		end = ctxt->input->end;
+-                if (((in - start) > XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH) &&
+-                    ((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) {
++                if ((in - start) > maxLength) {
+                     xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_ATTRIBUTE_NOT_FINISHED,
+                                    "AttValue length too long\n");
+                     return(NULL);
+                 }
+ 	    }
+ 	}
+-        if (((in - start) > XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH) &&
+-            ((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) {
++        if ((in - start) > maxLength) {
+             xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_ATTRIBUTE_NOT_FINISHED,
+                            "AttValue length too long\n");
+             return(NULL);
+@@ -9063,8 +9072,7 @@ xmlParseAttValueInternal(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int *len, int *alloc,
+ 	    col++;
+ 	    if (in >= end) {
+                 GROW_PARSE_ATT_VALUE_INTERNAL(ctxt, in, start, end)
+-                if (((in - start) > XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH) &&
+-                    ((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) {
++                if ((in - start) > maxLength) {
+                     xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_ATTRIBUTE_NOT_FINISHED,
+                                    "AttValue length too long\n");
+                     return(NULL);
+@@ -9072,8 +9080,7 @@ xmlParseAttValueInternal(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int *len, int *alloc,
+ 	    }
+ 	}
+ 	last = in;
+-        if (((in - start) > XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH) &&
+-            ((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) {
++        if ((in - start) > maxLength) {
+             xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_ATTRIBUTE_NOT_FINISHED,
+                            "AttValue length too long\n");
+             return(NULL);
+@@ -9763,6 +9770,9 @@ xmlParseCDSect(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
+     int	s, sl;
+     int cur, l;
+     int count = 0;
++    int maxLength = (ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) ?
++                    XML_MAX_HUGE_LENGTH :
++                    XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH;
+ 
+     /* Check 2.6.0 was NXT(0) not RAW */
+     if (CMP9(CUR_PTR, '<', '!', '[', 'C', 'D', 'A', 'T', 'A', '[')) {
+@@ -9796,13 +9806,6 @@ xmlParseCDSect(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
+ 	if (len + 5 >= size) {
+ 	    xmlChar *tmp;
+ 
+-            if ((size > XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH) &&
+-                ((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) {
+-                xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_CDATA_NOT_FINISHED,
+-                             "CData section too big found", NULL);
+-                xmlFree (buf);
+-                return;
+-            }
+ 	    tmp = (xmlChar *) xmlRealloc(buf, size * 2 * sizeof(xmlChar));
+ 	    if (tmp == NULL) {
+ 	        xmlFree(buf);
+@@ -9829,6 +9832,12 @@ xmlParseCDSect(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
+ 	}
+ 	NEXTL(l);
+ 	cur = CUR_CHAR(l);
++        if (len > maxLength) {
++            xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_CDATA_NOT_FINISHED,
++                           "CData section too big found\n");
++            xmlFree(buf);
++            return;
++        }
+     }
+     buf[len] = 0;
+     ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_CONTENT;
+-- 
+GitLab

meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2022-40304.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+From 1b41ec4e9433b05bb0376be4725804c54ef1d80b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Nick Wellnhofer <wellnhofer@aevum.de>
+Date: Wed, 31 Aug 2022 22:11:25 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] [CVE-2022-40304] Fix dict corruption caused by entity
+ reference cycles
+
+When an entity reference cycle is detected, the entity content is
+cleared by setting its first byte to zero. But the entity content might
+be allocated from a dict. In this case, the dict entry becomes corrupted
+leading to all kinds of logic errors, including memory errors like
+double-frees.
+
+Stop storing entity content, orig, ExternalID and SystemID in a dict.
+These values are unlikely to occur multiple times in a document, so they
+shouldn't have been stored in a dict in the first place.
+
+Thanks to Ned Williamson and Nathan Wachholz working with Google Project
+Zero for the report!
+
+CVE: CVE-2022-40304
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libxml2/-/commit/1b41ec4e9433b05bb0376be4725804c54ef1d80b]
+Signed-off-by: Bhabu Bindu <bhabu.bindu@kpit.com>
+---
+ entities.c | 55 ++++++++++++++++--------------------------------------
+ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/entities.c b/entities.c
+index 84435515..d4e5412e 100644
+--- a/entities.c
++++ b/entities.c
+@@ -128,36 +128,19 @@ xmlFreeEntity(xmlEntityPtr entity)
+     if ((entity->children) && (entity->owner == 1) &&
+         (entity == (xmlEntityPtr) entity->children->parent))
+         xmlFreeNodeList(entity->children);
+-    if (dict != NULL) {
+-        if ((entity->name != NULL) && (!xmlDictOwns(dict, entity->name)))
+-            xmlFree((char *) entity->name);
+-        if ((entity->ExternalID != NULL) &&
+-	    (!xmlDictOwns(dict, entity->ExternalID)))
+-            xmlFree((char *) entity->ExternalID);
+-        if ((entity->SystemID != NULL) &&
+-	    (!xmlDictOwns(dict, entity->SystemID)))
+-            xmlFree((char *) entity->SystemID);
+-        if ((entity->URI != NULL) && (!xmlDictOwns(dict, entity->URI)))
+-            xmlFree((char *) entity->URI);
+-        if ((entity->content != NULL)
+-            && (!xmlDictOwns(dict, entity->content)))
+-            xmlFree((char *) entity->content);
+-        if ((entity->orig != NULL) && (!xmlDictOwns(dict, entity->orig)))
+-            xmlFree((char *) entity->orig);
+-    } else {
+-        if (entity->name != NULL)
+-            xmlFree((char *) entity->name);
+-        if (entity->ExternalID != NULL)
+-            xmlFree((char *) entity->ExternalID);
+-        if (entity->SystemID != NULL)
+-            xmlFree((char *) entity->SystemID);
+-        if (entity->URI != NULL)
+-            xmlFree((char *) entity->URI);
+-        if (entity->content != NULL)
+-            xmlFree((char *) entity->content);
+-        if (entity->orig != NULL)
+-            xmlFree((char *) entity->orig);
+-    }
++    if ((entity->name != NULL) &&
++        ((dict == NULL) || (!xmlDictOwns(dict, entity->name))))
++        xmlFree((char *) entity->name);
++    if (entity->ExternalID != NULL)
++        xmlFree((char *) entity->ExternalID);
++    if (entity->SystemID != NULL)
++        xmlFree((char *) entity->SystemID);
++    if (entity->URI != NULL)
++        xmlFree((char *) entity->URI);
++    if (entity->content != NULL)
++        xmlFree((char *) entity->content);
++    if (entity->orig != NULL)
++        xmlFree((char *) entity->orig);
+     xmlFree(entity);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -193,18 +176,12 @@ xmlCreateEntity(xmlDictPtr dict, const xmlChar *name, int type,
+ 	    ret->SystemID = xmlStrdup(SystemID);
+     } else {
+         ret->name = xmlDictLookup(dict, name, -1);
+-	if (ExternalID != NULL)
+-	    ret->ExternalID = xmlDictLookup(dict, ExternalID, -1);
+-	if (SystemID != NULL)
+-	    ret->SystemID = xmlDictLookup(dict, SystemID, -1);
++	ret->ExternalID = xmlStrdup(ExternalID);
++	ret->SystemID = xmlStrdup(SystemID);
+     }
+     if (content != NULL) {
+         ret->length = xmlStrlen(content);
+-	if ((dict != NULL) && (ret->length < 5))
+-	    ret->content = (xmlChar *)
+-	                   xmlDictLookup(dict, content, ret->length);
+-	else
+-	    ret->content = xmlStrndup(content, ret->length);
++	ret->content = xmlStrndup(content, ret->length);
+      } else {
+         ret->length = 0;
+         ret->content = NULL;
+-- 
+GitLab

meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2_2.9.10.bb

@@ -33,6 +33,9 @@ SRC_URI += "http://www.w3.org/XML/Test/xmlts20080827.tar.gz;subdir=${BP};name=te
            file://CVE-2022-29824-dependent.patch \
            file://CVE-2022-29824.patch \
            file://0001-Port-gentest.py-to-Python-3.patch \
+           file://CVE-2016-3709.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-40303.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-40304.patch \
            "
 
 SRC_URI[archive.sha256sum] = "593b7b751dd18c2d6abcd0c4bcb29efc203d0b4373a6df98e3a455ea74ae2813"

meta/recipes-core/meta/cve-update-db-native.bb

@@ -17,6 +17,12 @@ deltask do_populate_sysroot
 # Use a negative value to skip the update
 CVE_DB_UPDATE_INTERVAL ?= "86400"
 
+# Timeout for blocking socket operations, such as the connection attempt.
+CVE_SOCKET_TIMEOUT ?= "60"
+NVDCVE_URL ?= "https://nvd.nist.gov/feeds/json/cve/1.1/nvdcve-1.1-"
+
+CVE_DB_TEMP_FILE ?= "${CVE_CHECK_DB_DIR}/temp_nvdcve_1.1.db"
+
 python () {
     if not bb.data.inherits_class("cve-check", d):
         raise bb.parse.SkipRecipe("Skip recipe when cve-check class is not loaded.")
@@ -28,24 +34,15 @@ python do_fetch() {
     """
     import bb.utils
     import bb.progress
-    import sqlite3, urllib, urllib.parse, shutil, gzip
-    from datetime import date
+    import shutil
 
     bb.utils.export_proxies(d)
 
-    BASE_URL = "https://nvd.nist.gov/feeds/json/cve/1.1/nvdcve-1.1-"
-    YEAR_START = 2002
-
     db_file = d.getVar("CVE_CHECK_DB_FILE")
     db_dir = os.path.dirname(db_file)
+    db_tmp_file = d.getVar("CVE_DB_TEMP_FILE")
 
-    if os.path.exists("{0}-journal".format(db_file)):
-        # If a journal is present the last update might have been interrupted. In that case,
-        # just wipe any leftovers and force the DB to be recreated.
-        os.remove("{0}-journal".format(db_file))
-
-        if os.path.exists(db_file):
-            os.remove(db_file)
+    cleanup_db_download(db_file, db_tmp_file)
 
     # The NVD database changes once a day, so no need to update more frequently
     # Allow the user to force-update
@@ -62,28 +59,81 @@ python do_fetch() {
         pass
 
     bb.utils.mkdirhier(db_dir)
+    if os.path.exists(db_file):
+        shutil.copy2(db_file, db_tmp_file)
+
+    if update_db_file(db_tmp_file, d) == True:
+        # Update downloaded correctly, can swap files
+        shutil.move(db_tmp_file, db_file)
+    else:
+        # Update failed, do not modify the database
+        bb.note("CVE database update failed")
+        os.remove(db_tmp_file)
+}
+
+do_fetch[lockfiles] += "${CVE_CHECK_DB_FILE_LOCK}"
+do_fetch[file-checksums] = ""
+do_fetch[vardeps] = ""
+
+def cleanup_db_download(db_file, db_tmp_file):
+    """
+    Cleanup the download space from possible failed downloads
+    """
+
+    # Clean up the updates done on the main file
+    # Remove it only if a journal file exists - it means a complete re-download
+    if os.path.exists("{0}-journal".format(db_file)):
+        # If a journal is present the last update might have been interrupted. In that case,
+        # just wipe any leftovers and force the DB to be recreated.
+        os.remove("{0}-journal".format(db_file))
+
+        if os.path.exists(db_file):
+            os.remove(db_file)
+
+    # Clean-up the temporary file downloads, we can remove both journal
+    # and the temporary database
+    if os.path.exists("{0}-journal".format(db_tmp_file)):
+        # If a journal is present the last update might have been interrupted. In that case,
+        # just wipe any leftovers and force the DB to be recreated.
+        os.remove("{0}-journal".format(db_tmp_file))
+
+    if os.path.exists(db_tmp_file):
+        os.remove(db_tmp_file)
+
+def update_db_file(db_tmp_file, d):
+    """
+    Update the given database file
+    """
+    import bb.utils, bb.progress
+    from datetime import date
+    import urllib, gzip, sqlite3
+
+    YEAR_START = 2002
+    cve_socket_timeout = int(d.getVar("CVE_SOCKET_TIMEOUT"))
 
     # Connect to database
-    conn = sqlite3.connect(db_file)
-    c = conn.cursor()
-
-    initialize_db(c)
+    conn = sqlite3.connect(db_tmp_file)
+    initialize_db(conn)
 
     with bb.progress.ProgressHandler(d) as ph, open(os.path.join(d.getVar("TMPDIR"), 'cve_check'), 'a') as cve_f:
         total_years = date.today().year + 1 - YEAR_START
         for i, year in enumerate(range(YEAR_START, date.today().year + 1)):
+            bb.debug(2, "Updating %d" % year)
             ph.update((float(i + 1) / total_years) * 100)
-            year_url = BASE_URL + str(year)
+            year_url = (d.getVar('NVDCVE_URL')) + str(year)
             meta_url = year_url + ".meta"
             json_url = year_url + ".json.gz"
 
             # Retrieve meta last modified date
             try:
-                response = urllib.request.urlopen(meta_url)
+                response = urllib.request.urlopen(meta_url, timeout=cve_socket_timeout)
             except urllib.error.URLError as e:
                 cve_f.write('Warning: CVE db update error, Unable to fetch CVE data.\n\n')
-                bb.warn("Failed to fetch CVE data (%s)" % e.reason)
-                return
+                bb.warn("Failed to fetch CVE data (%s)" % e)
+                import socket
+                result = socket.getaddrinfo("nvd.nist.gov", 443, proto=socket.IPPROTO_TCP)
+                bb.warn("Host IPs are %s" % (", ".join(t[4][0] for t in result)))
+                return False
 
             if response:
                 for l in response.read().decode("utf-8").splitlines():
@@ -93,53 +143,58 @@ python do_fetch() {
                         break
                 else:
                     bb.warn("Cannot parse CVE metadata, update failed")
-                    return
+                    return False
 
             # Compare with current db last modified date
-            c.execute("select DATE from META where YEAR = ?", (year,))
-            meta = c.fetchone()
+            cursor = conn.execute("select DATE from META where YEAR = ?", (year,))
+            meta = cursor.fetchone()
+            cursor.close()
+
             if not meta or meta[0] != last_modified:
+                bb.debug(2, "Updating entries")
                 # Clear products table entries corresponding to current year
-                c.execute("delete from PRODUCTS where ID like ?", ('CVE-%d%%' % year,))
+                conn.execute("delete from PRODUCTS where ID like ?", ('CVE-%d%%' % year,)).close()
 
                 # Update db with current year json file
                 try:
-                    response = urllib.request.urlopen(json_url)
+                    response = urllib.request.urlopen(json_url, timeout=cve_socket_timeout)
                     if response:
-                        update_db(c, gzip.decompress(response.read()).decode('utf-8'))
-                    c.execute("insert or replace into META values (?, ?)", [year, last_modified])
+                        update_db(conn, gzip.decompress(response.read()).decode('utf-8'))
+                    conn.execute("insert or replace into META values (?, ?)", [year, last_modified]).close()
                 except urllib.error.URLError as e:
                     cve_f.write('Warning: CVE db update error, CVE data is outdated.\n\n')
                     bb.warn("Cannot parse CVE data (%s), update failed" % e.reason)
-                    return
-
+                    return False
+            else:
+                bb.debug(2, "Already up to date (last modified %s)" % last_modified)
             # Update success, set the date to cve_check file.
             if year == date.today().year:
                 cve_f.write('CVE database update : %s\n\n' % date.today())
 
         conn.commit()
         conn.close()
-}
+        return True
 
-do_fetch[lockfiles] += "${CVE_CHECK_DB_FILE_LOCK}"
-do_fetch[file-checksums] = ""
-do_fetch[vardeps] = ""
+def initialize_db(conn):
+    with conn:
+        c = conn.cursor()
 
-def initialize_db(c):
-    c.execute("CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS META (YEAR INTEGER UNIQUE, DATE TEXT)")
+        c.execute("CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS META (YEAR INTEGER UNIQUE, DATE TEXT)")
 
-    c.execute("CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS NVD (ID TEXT UNIQUE, SUMMARY TEXT, \
-        SCOREV2 TEXT, SCOREV3 TEXT, MODIFIED INTEGER, VECTOR TEXT)")
+        c.execute("CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS NVD (ID TEXT UNIQUE, SUMMARY TEXT, \
+            SCOREV2 TEXT, SCOREV3 TEXT, MODIFIED INTEGER, VECTOR TEXT)")
 
-    c.execute("CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS PRODUCTS (ID TEXT, \
-        VENDOR TEXT, PRODUCT TEXT, VERSION_START TEXT, OPERATOR_START TEXT, \
-        VERSION_END TEXT, OPERATOR_END TEXT)")
-    c.execute("CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS PRODUCT_ID_IDX on PRODUCTS(ID);")
+        c.execute("CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS PRODUCTS (ID TEXT, \
+            VENDOR TEXT, PRODUCT TEXT, VERSION_START TEXT, OPERATOR_START TEXT, \
+            VERSION_END TEXT, OPERATOR_END TEXT)")
+        c.execute("CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS PRODUCT_ID_IDX on PRODUCTS(ID);")
 
-def parse_node_and_insert(c, node, cveId):
+        c.close()
+
+def parse_node_and_insert(conn, node, cveId):
     # Parse children node if needed
     for child in node.get('children', ()):
-        parse_node_and_insert(c, child, cveId)
+        parse_node_and_insert(conn, child, cveId)
 
     def cpe_generator():
         for cpe in node.get('cpe_match', ()):
@@ -196,9 +251,9 @@ def parse_node_and_insert(c, node, cveId):
                     # Save processing by representing as -.
                     yield [cveId, vendor, product, '-', '', '', '']
 
-    c.executemany("insert into PRODUCTS values (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)", cpe_generator())
+    conn.executemany("insert into PRODUCTS values (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)", cpe_generator()).close()
 
-def update_db(c, jsondata):
+def update_db(conn, jsondata):
     import json
     root = json.loads(jsondata)
 
@@ -222,12 +277,12 @@ def update_db(c, jsondata):
             accessVector = accessVector or "UNKNOWN"
             cvssv3 = 0.0
 
-        c.execute("insert or replace into NVD values (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)",
-                [cveId, cveDesc, cvssv2, cvssv3, date, accessVector])
+        conn.execute("insert or replace into NVD values (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)",
+                [cveId, cveDesc, cvssv2, cvssv3, date, accessVector]).close()
 
         configurations = elt['configurations']['nodes']
         for config in configurations:
-            parse_node_and_insert(c, config, cveId)
+            parse_node_and_insert(conn, config, cveId)
 
 
 do_fetch[nostamp] = "1"

meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/0001-Basetools-genffs-fix-gcc12-warning.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+From 7b005f344e533cd913c3ca05b266f9872df886d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 24 Mar 2022 20:04:34 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] BaseTools: fix gcc12 warning
+
+GenFfs.c:545:5: error: pointer ?InFileHandle? used after ?fclose? [-Werror=use-after-free]
+  545 |     Error(NULL, 0, 4001, "Resource", "memory cannot be allocated  of %s", InFileHandle);
+      |     ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+GenFfs.c:544:5: note: call to ?fclose? here
+  544 |     fclose (InFileHandle);
+      |     ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Bob Feng <bob.c.feng@intel.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/7b005f344e533cd913c3ca05b266f9872df886d1]
+Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
+
+---
+ BaseTools/Source/C/GenFfs/GenFfs.c | 2 +-
+ BaseTools/Source/C/GenSec/GenSec.c | 2 +-
+ 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/BaseTools/Source/C/GenFfs/GenFfs.c b/BaseTools/Source/C/GenFfs/GenFfs.c
+index 949025c33325..d78d62ab3689 100644
+--- a/BaseTools/Source/C/GenFfs/GenFfs.c
++++ b/BaseTools/Source/C/GenFfs/GenFfs.c
+@@ -542,7 +542,7 @@ GetAlignmentFromFile(char *InFile, UINT32 *Alignment)
+   PeFileBuffer = (UINT8 *) malloc (PeFileSize);
+   if (PeFileBuffer == NULL) {
+     fclose (InFileHandle);
+-    Error(NULL, 0, 4001, "Resource", "memory cannot be allocated  of %s", InFileHandle);
++    Error(NULL, 0, 4001, "Resource", "memory cannot be allocated for %s", InFile);
+     return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
+   }
+   fread (PeFileBuffer, sizeof (UINT8), PeFileSize, InFileHandle);
+diff --git a/BaseTools/Source/C/GenSec/GenSec.c b/BaseTools/Source/C/GenSec/GenSec.c
+index d54a4f9e0a7d..b1d05367ec0b 100644
+--- a/BaseTools/Source/C/GenSec/GenSec.c
++++ b/BaseTools/Source/C/GenSec/GenSec.c
+@@ -1062,7 +1062,7 @@ GetAlignmentFromFile(char *InFile, UINT32 *Alignment)
+   PeFileBuffer = (UINT8 *) malloc (PeFileSize);
+   if (PeFileBuffer == NULL) {
+     fclose (InFileHandle);
+-    Error(NULL, 0, 4001, "Resource", "memory cannot be allocated  of %s", InFileHandle);
++    Error(NULL, 0, 4001, "Resource", "memory cannot be allocated for %s", InFile);
+     return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
+   }
+   fread (PeFileBuffer, sizeof (UINT8), PeFileSize, InFileHandle);

meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/0001-Basetools-lzmaenc-fix-gcc12-warning.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+From 24551a99d1f765c891a4dc21a36f18ccbf56e612 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
+Date: Tue, 10 Jan 2023 06:15:00 -1000
+Subject: [PATCH] BaseTools: fix gcc12 warning
+
+Sdk/C/LzmaEnc.c: In function ?LzmaEnc_CodeOneMemBlock?:
+Sdk/C/LzmaEnc.c:2828:19: error: storing the address of local variable ?outStream? in ?*p.rc.outStream? [-Werror=dangling-pointer=]
+ 2828 |   p->rc.outStream = &outStream.vt;
+      |   ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+Sdk/C/LzmaEnc.c:2811:28: note: ?outStream? declared here
+ 2811 |   CLzmaEnc_SeqOutStreamBuf outStream;
+      |                            ^~~~~~~~~
+Sdk/C/LzmaEnc.c:2811:28: note: ?pp? declared here
+Sdk/C/LzmaEnc.c:2828:19: error: storing the address of local variable ?outStream? in ?*(CLzmaEnc *)pp.rc.outStream? [-Werror=dangling-pointer=]
+ 2828 |   p->rc.outStream = &outStream.vt;
+      |   ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+Sdk/C/LzmaEnc.c:2811:28: note: ?outStream? declared here
+ 2811 |   CLzmaEnc_SeqOutStreamBuf outStream;
+      |                            ^~~~~~~~~
+Sdk/C/LzmaEnc.c:2811:28: note: ?pp? declared here
+cc1: all warnings being treated as errors
+
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Bob Feng <bob.c.feng@intel.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/85021f8cf22d1bd4114803c6c610dea5ef0059f1]
+Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
+---
+ BaseTools/Source/C/LzmaCompress/Sdk/C/LzmaEnc.c | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/BaseTools/Source/C/LzmaCompress/Sdk/C/LzmaEnc.c b/BaseTools/Source/C/LzmaCompress/Sdk/C/LzmaEnc.c
+index e281716fee..b575c4f888 100644
+--- a/BaseTools/Source/C/LzmaCompress/Sdk/C/LzmaEnc.c
++++ b/BaseTools/Source/C/LzmaCompress/Sdk/C/LzmaEnc.c
+@@ -2638,12 +2638,13 @@ SRes LzmaEnc_CodeOneMemBlock(CLzmaEncHandle pp, Bool reInit,
+ 
+   nowPos64 = p->nowPos64;
+   RangeEnc_Init(&p->rc);
+-  p->rc.outStream = &outStream.vt;
+ 
+   if (desiredPackSize == 0)
+     return SZ_ERROR_OUTPUT_EOF;
+ 
++  p->rc.outStream = &outStream.vt;
+   res = LzmaEnc_CodeOneBlock(p, desiredPackSize, *unpackSize);
++  p->rc.outStream = NULL;
+   
+   *unpackSize = (UInt32)(p->nowPos64 - nowPos64);
+   *destLen -= outStream.rem;
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/0001-Basetools-turn-off-gcc12-warning.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+From 22130dcd98b4d4b76ac8d922adb4a2dbc86fa52c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 24 Mar 2022 20:04:36 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] Basetools: turn off gcc12 warning
+
+In function ?SetDevicePathEndNode?,
+    inlined from ?FileDevicePath? at DevicePathUtilities.c:857:5:
+DevicePathUtilities.c:321:3: error: writing 4 bytes into a region of size 1 [-Werror=stringop-overflow=]
+  321 |   memcpy (Node, &mUefiDevicePathLibEndDevicePath, sizeof (mUefiDevicePathLibEndDevicePath));
+      |   ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+In file included from UefiDevicePathLib.h:22,
+                 from DevicePathUtilities.c:16:
+../Include/Protocol/DevicePath.h: In function ?FileDevicePath?:
+../Include/Protocol/DevicePath.h:51:9: note: destination object ?Type? of size 1
+   51 |   UINT8 Type;       ///< 0x01 Hardware Device Path.
+      |         ^~~~
+
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Bob Feng <bob.c.feng@intel.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/22130dcd98b4d4b76ac8d922adb4a2dbc86fa52c]
+Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
+
+---
+ BaseTools/Source/C/DevicePath/GNUmakefile | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/BaseTools/Source/C/DevicePath/GNUmakefile b/BaseTools/Source/C/DevicePath/GNUmakefile
+index 7ca08af9662d..b05d2bddfa68 100644
+--- a/BaseTools/Source/C/DevicePath/GNUmakefile
++++ b/BaseTools/Source/C/DevicePath/GNUmakefile
+@@ -13,6 +13,9 @@ OBJECTS = DevicePath.o UefiDevicePathLib.o DevicePathFromText.o  DevicePathUtili
+ 
+ include $(MAKEROOT)/Makefiles/app.makefile
+ 
++# gcc 12 trips over device path handling
++BUILD_CFLAGS += -Wno-error=stringop-overflow
++
+ LIBS = -lCommon
+ ifeq ($(CYGWIN), CYGWIN)
+   LIBS += -L/lib/e2fsprogs -luuid

meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf_git.bb

@@ -18,6 +18,9 @@ SRC_URI = "gitsm://github.com/tianocore/edk2.git;branch=master;protocol=https \
            file://0003-ovmf-enable-long-path-file.patch \
            file://0004-ovmf-Update-to-latest.patch \
            file://0001-Fix-VLA-parameter-warning.patch \
+           file://0001-Basetools-genffs-fix-gcc12-warning.patch \
+           file://0001-Basetools-lzmaenc-fix-gcc12-warning.patch \
+           file://0001-Basetools-turn-off-gcc12-warning.patch \
            "
 
 PV = "edk2-stable202008"

meta/recipes-core/psplash/files/psplash-start.service

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 Description=Start psplash boot splash screen
 DefaultDependencies=no
 RequiresMountsFor=/run
+ConditionFileIsExecutable=/usr/bin/psplash
 
 [Service]
 Type=notify

meta/recipes-core/psplash/files/psplash-systemd.service

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ DefaultDependencies=no
 After=psplash-start.service
 Requires=psplash-start.service
 RequiresMountsFor=/run
+ConditionFileIsExecutable=/usr/bin/psplash
 
 [Service]
 ExecStart=/usr/bin/psplash-systemd

meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/00-create-volatile.conf

@@ -3,5 +3,6 @@
 # inside /var/log.
 
 
+d		/run/lock		1777	-	-	-
 d		/var/volatile/log		-	-	-	-
 d		/var/volatile/tmp		1777	-	-