build-appliance-image: Update to dunfell head revision

(From OE-Core rev: db81e3c7e7f1d4d9eba52ac35ac97627d0240b63)

Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>

bitbake/bin/bitbake-getvar

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env python3
+#
+# Copyright (C) 2021 Richard Purdie
+#
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+#
+
+import argparse
+import io
+import os
+import sys
+
+bindir = os.path.dirname(__file__)
+topdir = os.path.dirname(bindir)
+sys.path[0:0] = [os.path.join(topdir, 'lib')]
+
+import bb.tinfoil
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Bitbake Query Variable")
+    parser.add_argument("variable", help="variable name to query")
+    parser.add_argument("-r", "--recipe", help="Recipe name to query", default=None, required=False)
+    parser.add_argument('-u', '--unexpand', help='Do not expand the value (with --value)', action="store_true")
+    parser.add_argument('-f', '--flag', help='Specify a variable flag to query (with --value)', default=None)
+    parser.add_argument('--value', help='Only report the value, no history and no variable name', action="store_true")
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+
+    if args.unexpand and not args.value:
+        print("--unexpand only makes sense with --value")
+        sys.exit(1)
+
+    if args.flag and not args.value:
+        print("--flag only makes sense with --value")
+        sys.exit(1)
+
+    with bb.tinfoil.Tinfoil(tracking=True) as tinfoil:
+        if args.recipe:
+            tinfoil.prepare(quiet=2)
+            d = tinfoil.parse_recipe(args.recipe)
+        else:
+            tinfoil.prepare(quiet=2, config_only=True)
+            d = tinfoil.config_data
+        if args.flag:
+            print(str(d.getVarFlag(args.variable, args.flag, expand=(not args.unexpand))))
+        elif args.value:
+            print(str(d.getVar(args.variable, expand=(not args.unexpand))))
+        else:
+            bb.data.emit_var(args.variable, d=d, all=True)

bitbake/lib/bb/command.py

@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ Commands are queued in a CommandQueue
 
 from collections import OrderedDict, defaultdict
 
+import io
 import bb.event
 import bb.cooker
 import bb.remotedata
@@ -478,6 +479,17 @@ class CommandsSync:
         d = command.remotedatastores[dsindex].varhistory
         return getattr(d, method)(*args, **kwargs)
 
+    def dataStoreConnectorVarHistCmdEmit(self, command, params):
+        dsindex = params[0]
+        var = params[1]
+        oval = params[2]
+        val = params[3]
+        d = command.remotedatastores[params[4]]
+
+        o = io.StringIO()
+        command.remotedatastores[dsindex].varhistory.emit(var, oval, val, o, d)
+        return o.getvalue()
+
     def dataStoreConnectorIncHistCmd(self, command, params):
         dsindex = params[0]
         method = params[1]

bitbake/lib/bb/fetch2/git.py

@@ -224,7 +224,12 @@ class Git(FetchMethod):
             ud.shallow = False
 
         if ud.usehead:
-            ud.unresolvedrev['default'] = 'HEAD'
+            # When usehead is set let's associate 'HEAD' with the unresolved
+            # rev of this repository. This will get resolved into a revision
+            # later. If an actual revision happens to have also been provided
+            # then this setting will be overridden.
+            for name in ud.names:
+                ud.unresolvedrev[name] = 'HEAD'
 
         ud.basecmd = d.getVar("FETCHCMD_git") or "git -c core.fsyncobjectfiles=0"
 

bitbake/lib/bb/fetch2/wget.py

@@ -52,6 +52,12 @@ class WgetProgressHandler(bb.progress.LineFilterProgressHandler):
 
 
 class Wget(FetchMethod):
+
+    # CDNs like CloudFlare may do a 'browser integrity test' which can fail
+    # with the standard wget/urllib User-Agent, so pretend to be a modern
+    # browser.
+    user_agent = "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:84.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/84.0"
+
     """Class to fetch urls via 'wget'"""
     def supports(self, ud, d):
         """
@@ -91,10 +97,9 @@ class Wget(FetchMethod):
 
         fetchcmd = self.basecmd
 
-        if 'downloadfilename' in ud.parm:
-            localpath = os.path.join(d.getVar("DL_DIR"), ud.localfile)
-            bb.utils.mkdirhier(os.path.dirname(localpath))
-            fetchcmd += " -O %s" % shlex.quote(localpath)
+        localpath = os.path.join(d.getVar("DL_DIR"), ud.localfile) + ".tmp"
+        bb.utils.mkdirhier(os.path.dirname(localpath))
+        fetchcmd += " -O %s" % shlex.quote(localpath)
 
         if ud.user and ud.pswd:
             fetchcmd += " --user=%s --password=%s --auth-no-challenge" % (ud.user, ud.pswd)
@@ -108,6 +113,10 @@ class Wget(FetchMethod):
 
         self._runwget(ud, d, fetchcmd, False)
 
+        # Remove the ".tmp" and move the file into position atomically
+        # Our lock prevents multiple writers but mirroring code may grab incomplete files
+        os.rename(localpath, localpath[:-4])
+
         # Sanity check since wget can pretend it succeed when it didn't
         # Also, this used to happen if sourceforge sent us to the mirror page
         if not os.path.exists(ud.localpath):
@@ -300,7 +309,7 @@ class Wget(FetchMethod):
             # Some servers (FusionForge, as used on Alioth) require that the
             # optional Accept header is set.
             r.add_header("Accept", "*/*")
-            r.add_header("User-Agent", "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; en-US; rv:1.9.2.12) Gecko/20101027 Ubuntu/9.10 (karmic) Firefox/3.6.12")
+            r.add_header("User-Agent", self.user_agent)
             def add_basic_auth(login_str, request):
                 '''Adds Basic auth to http request, pass in login:password as string'''
                 import base64
@@ -404,9 +413,8 @@ class Wget(FetchMethod):
         """
         f = tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile()
         with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="wget-index-") as workdir, tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(dir=workdir, prefix="wget-listing-") as f:
-            agent = "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; en-US; rv:1.9.2.12) Gecko/20101027 Ubuntu/9.10 (karmic) Firefox/3.6.12"
             fetchcmd = self.basecmd
-            fetchcmd += " -O " + f.name + " --user-agent='" + agent + "' '" + uri + "'"
+            fetchcmd += " -O " + f.name + " --user-agent='" + self.user_agent + "' '" + uri + "'"
             try:
                 self._runwget(ud, d, fetchcmd, True, workdir=workdir)
                 fetchresult = f.read()

bitbake/lib/bb/runqueue.py

@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ import pickle
 from multiprocessing import Process
 import shlex
 import pprint
+import time
 
 bblogger = logging.getLogger("BitBake")
 logger = logging.getLogger("BitBake.RunQueue")
@@ -142,6 +143,55 @@ class RunQueueScheduler(object):
                 self.buildable.append(tid)
 
         self.rev_prio_map = None
+        self.is_pressure_usable()
+
+    def is_pressure_usable(self):
+        """
+        If monitoring pressure, return True if pressure files can be open and read. For example
+        openSUSE /proc/pressure/* files have readable file permissions but when read the error EOPNOTSUPP (Operation not supported)
+        is returned.
+        """
+        if self.rq.max_cpu_pressure or self.rq.max_io_pressure or self.rq.max_memory_pressure:
+            try:
+                with open("/proc/pressure/cpu") as cpu_pressure_fds, \
+                    open("/proc/pressure/io") as io_pressure_fds, \
+                    open("/proc/pressure/memory") as memory_pressure_fds:
+
+                    self.prev_cpu_pressure = cpu_pressure_fds.readline().split()[4].split("=")[1]
+                    self.prev_io_pressure = io_pressure_fds.readline().split()[4].split("=")[1]
+                    self.prev_memory_pressure = memory_pressure_fds.readline().split()[4].split("=")[1]
+                    self.prev_pressure_time = time.time()
+                self.check_pressure = True
+            except:
+                bb.note("The /proc/pressure files can't be read. Continuing build without monitoring pressure")
+                self.check_pressure = False
+        else:
+            self.check_pressure = False
+
+    def exceeds_max_pressure(self):
+        """
+        Monitor the difference in total pressure at least once per second, if
+        BB_PRESSURE_MAX_{CPU|IO|MEMORY} are set, return True if above threshold.
+        """
+        if self.check_pressure:
+            with open("/proc/pressure/cpu") as cpu_pressure_fds, \
+                open("/proc/pressure/io") as io_pressure_fds, \
+                open("/proc/pressure/memory") as memory_pressure_fds:
+                # extract "total" from /proc/pressure/{cpu|io}
+                curr_cpu_pressure = cpu_pressure_fds.readline().split()[4].split("=")[1]
+                curr_io_pressure = io_pressure_fds.readline().split()[4].split("=")[1]
+                curr_memory_pressure = memory_pressure_fds.readline().split()[4].split("=")[1]
+                exceeds_cpu_pressure =  self.rq.max_cpu_pressure and (float(curr_cpu_pressure) - float(self.prev_cpu_pressure)) > self.rq.max_cpu_pressure
+                exceeds_io_pressure =  self.rq.max_io_pressure and (float(curr_io_pressure) - float(self.prev_io_pressure)) > self.rq.max_io_pressure
+                exceeds_memory_pressure = self.rq.max_memory_pressure and (float(curr_memory_pressure) - float(self.prev_memory_pressure)) > self.rq.max_memory_pressure
+                now = time.time()
+                if now - self.prev_pressure_time > 1.0:
+                    self.prev_cpu_pressure = curr_cpu_pressure
+                    self.prev_io_pressure = curr_io_pressure
+                    self.prev_memory_pressure = curr_memory_pressure
+                    self.prev_pressure_time = now
+            return (exceeds_cpu_pressure or exceeds_io_pressure or exceeds_memory_pressure)
+        return False
 
     def next_buildable_task(self):
         """
@@ -155,6 +205,12 @@ class RunQueueScheduler(object):
         if not buildable:
             return None
 
+        # Bitbake requires that at least one task be active. Only check for pressure if
+        # this is the case, otherwise the pressure limitation could result in no tasks
+        # being active and no new tasks started thereby, at times, breaking the scheduler.
+        if self.rq.stats.active and self.exceeds_max_pressure():
+            return None
+
         # Filter out tasks that have a max number of threads that have been exceeded
         skip_buildable = {}
         for running in self.rq.runq_running.difference(self.rq.runq_complete):
@@ -1700,6 +1756,9 @@ class RunQueueExecute:
 
         self.number_tasks = int(self.cfgData.getVar("BB_NUMBER_THREADS") or 1)
         self.scheduler = self.cfgData.getVar("BB_SCHEDULER") or "speed"
+        self.max_cpu_pressure = self.cfgData.getVar("BB_PRESSURE_MAX_CPU")
+        self.max_io_pressure = self.cfgData.getVar("BB_PRESSURE_MAX_IO")
+        self.max_memory_pressure = self.cfgData.getVar("BB_PRESSURE_MAX_MEMORY")
 
         self.sq_buildable = set()
         self.sq_running = set()
@@ -1735,6 +1794,29 @@ class RunQueueExecute:
         if self.number_tasks <= 0:
              bb.fatal("Invalid BB_NUMBER_THREADS %s" % self.number_tasks)
 
+        lower_limit = 1.0
+        upper_limit = 1000000.0
+        if self.max_cpu_pressure:
+            self.max_cpu_pressure = float(self.max_cpu_pressure)
+            if self.max_cpu_pressure < lower_limit:
+                bb.fatal("Invalid BB_PRESSURE_MAX_CPU %s, minimum value is %s." % (self.max_cpu_pressure, lower_limit))
+            if self.max_cpu_pressure > upper_limit:
+                bb.warn("Your build will be largely unregulated since BB_PRESSURE_MAX_CPU is set to %s. It is very unlikely that such high pressure will be experienced." % (self.max_cpu_pressure))
+
+        if self.max_io_pressure:
+            self.max_io_pressure = float(self.max_io_pressure)
+            if self.max_io_pressure < lower_limit:
+                bb.fatal("Invalid BB_PRESSURE_MAX_IO %s, minimum value is %s." % (self.max_io_pressure, lower_limit))
+            if self.max_io_pressure > upper_limit:
+                bb.warn("Your build will be largely unregulated since BB_PRESSURE_MAX_IO is set to %s. It is very unlikely that such high pressure will be experienced." % (self.max_io_pressure))
+
+        if self.max_memory_pressure:
+            self.max_memory_pressure = float(self.max_memory_pressure)
+            if self.max_memory_pressure < lower_limit:
+                bb.fatal("Invalid BB_PRESSURE_MAX_MEMORY %s, minimum value is %s." % (self.max_memory_pressure, lower_limit))
+            if self.max_memory_pressure > upper_limit:
+                bb.warn("Your build will be largely unregulated since BB_PRESSURE_MAX_MEMORY is set to %s. It is very unlikely that such high pressure will be experienced." % (self.max_io_pressure))
+            
         # List of setscene tasks which we've covered
         self.scenequeue_covered = set()
         # List of tasks which are covered (including setscene ones)

bitbake/lib/bb/tests/fetch.py

@@ -650,6 +650,58 @@ class FetcherLocalTest(FetcherTest):
         with self.assertRaises(bb.fetch2.UnpackError):
             self.fetchUnpack(['file://a;subdir=/bin/sh'])
 
+    def test_local_gitfetch_usehead(self):
+        # Create dummy local Git repo
+        src_dir = tempfile.mkdtemp(dir=self.tempdir,
+                                   prefix='gitfetch_localusehead_')
+        src_dir = os.path.abspath(src_dir)
+        bb.process.run("git init", cwd=src_dir)
+        bb.process.run("git commit --allow-empty -m'Dummy commit'",
+                       cwd=src_dir)
+        # Use other branch than master
+        bb.process.run("git checkout -b my-devel", cwd=src_dir)
+        bb.process.run("git commit --allow-empty -m'Dummy commit 2'",
+                       cwd=src_dir)
+        stdout = bb.process.run("git rev-parse HEAD", cwd=src_dir)
+        orig_rev = stdout[0].strip()
+
+        # Fetch and check revision
+        self.d.setVar("SRCREV", "AUTOINC")
+        url = "git://" + src_dir + ";protocol=file;usehead=1"
+        fetcher = bb.fetch.Fetch([url], self.d)
+        fetcher.download()
+        fetcher.unpack(self.unpackdir)
+        stdout = bb.process.run("git rev-parse HEAD",
+                                cwd=os.path.join(self.unpackdir, 'git'))
+        unpack_rev = stdout[0].strip()
+        self.assertEqual(orig_rev, unpack_rev)
+
+    def test_local_gitfetch_usehead_withname(self):
+        # Create dummy local Git repo
+        src_dir = tempfile.mkdtemp(dir=self.tempdir,
+                                   prefix='gitfetch_localusehead_')
+        src_dir = os.path.abspath(src_dir)
+        bb.process.run("git init", cwd=src_dir)
+        bb.process.run("git commit --allow-empty -m'Dummy commit'",
+                       cwd=src_dir)
+        # Use other branch than master
+        bb.process.run("git checkout -b my-devel", cwd=src_dir)
+        bb.process.run("git commit --allow-empty -m'Dummy commit 2'",
+                       cwd=src_dir)
+        stdout = bb.process.run("git rev-parse HEAD", cwd=src_dir)
+        orig_rev = stdout[0].strip()
+
+        # Fetch and check revision
+        self.d.setVar("SRCREV", "AUTOINC")
+        url = "git://" + src_dir + ";protocol=file;usehead=1;name=newName"
+        fetcher = bb.fetch.Fetch([url], self.d)
+        fetcher.download()
+        fetcher.unpack(self.unpackdir)
+        stdout = bb.process.run("git rev-parse HEAD",
+                                cwd=os.path.join(self.unpackdir, 'git'))
+        unpack_rev = stdout[0].strip()
+        self.assertEqual(orig_rev, unpack_rev)
+
 class FetcherNoNetworkTest(FetcherTest):
     def setUp(self):
         super().setUp()
@@ -1698,7 +1750,7 @@ class GitShallowTest(FetcherTest):
         self.add_empty_file('bsub', cwd=smdir)
 
         self.git('submodule init', cwd=self.srcdir)
-        self.git('submodule add file://%s' % smdir, cwd=self.srcdir)
+        self.git('-c protocol.file.allow=always submodule add file://%s' % smdir, cwd=self.srcdir)
         self.git('submodule update', cwd=self.srcdir)
         self.git('commit -m submodule -a', cwd=self.srcdir)
 
@@ -1730,7 +1782,7 @@ class GitShallowTest(FetcherTest):
         self.add_empty_file('bsub', cwd=smdir)
 
         self.git('submodule init', cwd=self.srcdir)
-        self.git('submodule add file://%s' % smdir, cwd=self.srcdir)
+        self.git('-c protocol.file.allow=always submodule add file://%s' % smdir, cwd=self.srcdir)
         self.git('submodule update', cwd=self.srcdir)
         self.git('commit -m submodule -a', cwd=self.srcdir)
 

bitbake/lib/bb/tinfoil.py

@@ -53,6 +53,10 @@ class TinfoilDataStoreConnectorVarHistory:
     def remoteCommand(self, cmd, *args, **kwargs):
         return self.tinfoil.run_command('dataStoreConnectorVarHistCmd', self.dsindex, cmd, args, kwargs)
 
+    def emit(self, var, oval, val, o, d):
+        ret = self.tinfoil.run_command('dataStoreConnectorVarHistCmdEmit', self.dsindex, var, oval, val, d.dsindex)
+        o.write(ret)
+
     def __getattr__(self, name):
         if not hasattr(bb.data_smart.VariableHistory, name):
             raise AttributeError("VariableHistory has no such method %s" % name)

bitbake/lib/bb/ui/knotty.py

@@ -227,7 +227,9 @@ class TerminalFilter(object):
 
     def keepAlive(self, t):
         if not self.cuu:
-            print("Bitbake still alive (%ds)" % t)
+            print("Bitbake still alive (no events for %ds). Active tasks:" % t)
+            for t in self.helper.running_tasks:
+                print(t)
             sys.stdout.flush()
 
     def updateFooter(self):
@@ -597,7 +599,8 @@ def main(server, eventHandler, params, tf = TerminalFilter):
     warnings = 0
     taskfailures = []
 
-    printinterval = 5000
+    printintervaldelta = 10 * 60 # 10 minutes
+    printinterval = printintervaldelta
     lastprint = time.time()
 
     termfilter = tf(main, helper, console_handlers, params.options.quiet)
@@ -607,7 +610,7 @@ def main(server, eventHandler, params, tf = TerminalFilter):
         try:
             if (lastprint + printinterval) <= time.time():
                 termfilter.keepAlive(printinterval)
-                printinterval += 5000
+                printinterval += printintervaldelta
             event = eventHandler.waitEvent(0)
             if event is None:
                 if main.shutdown > 1:
@@ -638,7 +641,7 @@ def main(server, eventHandler, params, tf = TerminalFilter):
 
             if isinstance(event, logging.LogRecord):
                 lastprint = time.time()
-                printinterval = 5000
+                printinterval = printintervaldelta
                 if event.levelno >= bb.msg.BBLogFormatter.ERROR:
                     errors = errors + 1
                     return_value = 1

bitbake/lib/bb/utils.py

@@ -421,12 +421,14 @@ def better_eval(source, locals, extraglobals = None):
     return eval(source, ctx, locals)
 
 @contextmanager
-def fileslocked(files):
+def fileslocked(files, *args, **kwargs):
     """Context manager for locking and unlocking file locks."""
     locks = []
     if files:
         for lockfile in files:
-            locks.append(bb.utils.lockfile(lockfile))
+            l = bb.utils.lockfile(lockfile, *args, **kwargs)
+            if l is not None:
+                locks.append(l)
 
     try:
         yield
@@ -459,9 +461,16 @@ def lockfile(name, shared=False, retry=True, block=False):
     consider the possibility of sending a signal to the process to break
     out - at which point you want block=True rather than retry=True.
     """
+    basename = os.path.basename(name)
+    if len(basename) > 255:
+        root, ext = os.path.splitext(basename)
+        basename = root[:255 - len(ext)] + ext
+
     dirname = os.path.dirname(name)
     mkdirhier(dirname)
 
+    name = os.path.join(dirname, basename)
+
     if not os.access(dirname, os.W_OK):
         logger.error("Unable to acquire lock '%s', directory is not writable",
                      name)
@@ -495,7 +504,7 @@ def lockfile(name, shared=False, retry=True, block=False):
                     return lf
             lf.close()
         except OSError as e:
-            if e.errno == errno.EACCES:
+            if e.errno == errno.EACCES or e.errno == errno.ENAMETOOLONG:
                 logger.error("Unable to acquire lock '%s', %s",
                              e.strerror, name)
                 sys.exit(1)

documentation/brief-yoctoprojectqs/brief-yoctoprojectqs.rst

@@ -222,19 +222,10 @@ an entire Linux distribution, including the toolchain, from source.
    .. tip::
 
       You can significantly speed up your build and guard against fetcher
-      failures by using mirrors. To use mirrors, add these lines to your
-      local.conf file in the Build directory: ::
+      failures by using mirrors. To use mirrors, add this line to your
+      ``local.conf`` file in the :term:`Build Directory`: ::
 
-         SSTATE_MIRRORS = "\
-         file://.* http://sstate.yoctoproject.org/dev/PATH;downloadfilename=PATH \n \
-         file://.* http://sstate.yoctoproject.org/&YOCTO_DOC_VERSION_MINUS_ONE;/PATH;downloadfilename=PATH \n \
-         file://.* http://sstate.yoctoproject.org/&YOCTO_DOC_VERSION;/PATH;downloadfilename=PATH \n \
-         "
-
-
-      The previous examples showed how to add sstate paths for Yocto Project
-      &YOCTO_DOC_VERSION_MINUS_ONE;, &YOCTO_DOC_VERSION;, and a development
-      area. For a complete index of sstate locations, see http://sstate.yoctoproject.org/.
+         SSTATE_MIRRORS ?= "file://.* https://sstate.yoctoproject.org/all/PATH;downloadfilename=PATH"
 
 #. **Start the Build:** Continue with the following command to build an OS
    image for the target, which is ``core-image-sato`` in this example:

documentation/dev-manual/dev-manual-common-tasks.rst

@@ -2628,7 +2628,7 @@ Recipe Syntax
 Understanding recipe file syntax is important for writing recipes. The
 following list overviews the basic items that make up a BitBake recipe
 file. For more complete BitBake syntax descriptions, see the
-":doc:`bitbake-user-manual/bitbake-user-manual-metadata`"
+":doc:`bitbake:bitbake-user-manual/bitbake-user-manual-metadata`"
 chapter of the BitBake User Manual.
 
 -  *Variable Assignments and Manipulations:* Variable assignments allow
@@ -3854,7 +3854,7 @@ Setting Up and Running a Multiple Configuration Build
 
 To accomplish a multiple configuration build, you must define each
 target's configuration separately using a parallel configuration file in
-the :term:`Build Directory`, and you
+the :term:`Build Directory` or configuration directory within a layer, and you
 must follow a required file hierarchy. Additionally, you must enable the
 multiple configuration builds in your ``local.conf`` file.
 
@@ -3862,47 +3862,47 @@ Follow these steps to set up and execute multiple configuration builds:
 
 -  *Create Separate Configuration Files*: You need to create a single
    configuration file for each build target (each multiconfig).
-   Minimally, each configuration file must define the machine and the
-   temporary directory BitBake uses for the build. Suggested practice
-   dictates that you do not overlap the temporary directories used
-   during the builds. However, it is possible that you can share the
-   temporary directory
-   (:term:`TMPDIR`). For example,
-   consider a scenario with two different multiconfigs for the same
+   The configuration definitions are implementation dependent but often
+   each configuration file will define the machine and the
+   temporary directory BitBake uses for the build. Whether the same
+   temporary directory (:term:`TMPDIR`) can be shared will depend on what is
+   similar and what is different between the configurations. Multiple MACHINE
+   targets can share the same (:term:`TMPDIR`) as long as the rest of the
+   configuration is the same, multiple DISTRO settings would need separate
+   (:term:`TMPDIR`) directories.
+
+   For example, consider a scenario with two different multiconfigs for the same
    :term:`MACHINE`: "qemux86" built
    for two distributions such as "poky" and "poky-lsb". In this case,
-   you might want to use the same ``TMPDIR``.
+   you would need to use the different :term:`TMPDIR`.
 
    Here is an example showing the minimal statements needed in a
    configuration file for a "qemux86" target whose temporary build
-   directory is ``tmpmultix86``:
-   ::
+   directory is ``tmpmultix86``::
 
       MACHINE = "qemux86"
       TMPDIR = "${TOPDIR}/tmpmultix86"
 
    The location for these multiconfig configuration files is specific.
-   They must reside in the current build directory in a sub-directory of
-   ``conf`` named ``multiconfig``. Following is an example that defines
+   They must reside in the current :term:`Build Directory` in a sub-directory of
+   ``conf`` named ``multiconfig`` or within a layer's ``conf`` directory
+   under a directory named ``multiconfig``. Following is an example that defines
    two configuration files for the "x86" and "arm" multiconfigs:
 
    .. image:: figures/multiconfig_files.png
       :align: center
+      :width: 50%
 
-   The reason for this required file hierarchy is because the ``BBPATH``
-   variable is not constructed until the layers are parsed.
-   Consequently, using the configuration file as a pre-configuration
-   file is not possible unless it is located in the current working
-   directory.
+   The usual :term:`BBPATH` search path is used to locate multiconfig files in
+   a similar way to other conf files.
 
 -  *Add the BitBake Multi-configuration Variable to the Local
    Configuration File*: Use the
    :term:`BBMULTICONFIG`
    variable in your ``conf/local.conf`` configuration file to specify
    each multiconfig. Continuing with the example from the previous
-   figure, the ``BBMULTICONFIG`` variable needs to enable two
-   multiconfigs: "x86" and "arm" by specifying each configuration file:
-   ::
+   figure, the :term:`BBMULTICONFIG` variable needs to enable two
+   multiconfigs: "x86" and "arm" by specifying each configuration file::
 
       BBMULTICONFIG = "x86 arm"
 
@@ -3916,13 +3916,11 @@ Follow these steps to set up and execute multiple configuration builds:
       with "".
 
 -  *Launch BitBake*: Use the following BitBake command form to launch
-   the multiple configuration build:
-   ::
+   the multiple configuration build::
 
       $ bitbake [mc:multiconfigname:]target [[[mc:multiconfigname:]target] ... ]
 
-   For the example in this section, the following command applies:
-   ::
+   For the example in this section, the following command applies::
 
       $ bitbake mc:x86:core-image-minimal mc:arm:core-image-sato mc::core-image-base
 
@@ -3937,7 +3935,7 @@ Follow these steps to set up and execute multiple configuration builds:
    Support for multiple configuration builds in the Yocto Project &DISTRO;
    (&DISTRO_NAME;) Release does not include Shared State (sstate)
    optimizations. Consequently, if a build uses the same object twice
-   in, for example, two different ``TMPDIR``
+   in, for example, two different :term:`TMPDIR`
    directories, the build either loads from an existing sstate cache for
    that build at the start or builds the object fresh.
 
@@ -3958,38 +3956,34 @@ essentially that the
 
 To enable dependencies in a multiple configuration build, you must
 declare the dependencies in the recipe using the following statement
-form:
-::
+form::
 
    task_or_package[mcdepends] = "mc:from_multiconfig:to_multiconfig:recipe_name:task_on_which_to_depend"
 
 To better show how to use this statement, consider the example scenario
 from the first paragraph of this section. The following statement needs
-to be added to the recipe that builds the ``core-image-sato`` image:
-::
+to be added to the recipe that builds the ``core-image-sato`` image::
 
    do_image[mcdepends] = "mc:x86:arm:core-image-minimal:do_rootfs"
 
 In this example, the `from_multiconfig` is "x86". The `to_multiconfig` is "arm". The
-task on which the ``do_image`` task in the recipe depends is the
-``do_rootfs`` task from the ``core-image-minimal`` recipe associated
+task on which the :ref:`ref-tasks-image` task in the recipe depends is the
+:ref:`ref-tasks-rootfs` task from the ``core-image-minimal`` recipe associated
 with the "arm" multiconfig.
 
 Once you set up this dependency, you can build the "x86" multiconfig
-using a BitBake command as follows:
-::
+using a BitBake command as follows::
 
    $ bitbake mc:x86:core-image-sato
 
 This command executes all the tasks needed to create the
 ``core-image-sato`` image for the "x86" multiconfig. Because of the
-dependency, BitBake also executes through the ``do_rootfs`` task for the
+dependency, BitBake also executes through the :ref:`ref-tasks-rootfs` task for the
 "arm" multiconfig build.
 
 Having a recipe depend on the root filesystem of another build might not
 seem that useful. Consider this change to the statement in the
-``core-image-sato`` recipe:
-::
+``core-image-sato`` recipe::
 
    do_image[mcdepends] = "mc:x86:arm:core-image-minimal:do_image"
 

documentation/overview-manual/overview-manual-concepts.rst

@@ -1986,9 +1986,7 @@ Behind the scenes, the shared state code works by looking in
 shared state files. Here is an example:
 ::
 
-   SSTATE_MIRRORS ?= "\
-       file://.\* http://someserver.tld/share/sstate/PATH;downloadfilename=PATH \n \
-       file://.\* file:///some/local/dir/sstate/PATH"
+   SSTATE_MIRRORS ?= "file://.* https://sstate.yoctoproject.org/all/PATH;downloadfilename=PATH"
 
 .. note::
 

documentation/poky.yaml

@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
-DISTRO : "3.1.17"
+DISTRO : "3.1.22"
 DISTRO_NAME_NO_CAP : "dunfell"
 DISTRO_NAME : "Dunfell"
 DISTRO_NAME_NO_CAP_MINUS_ONE : "zeus"
-YOCTO_DOC_VERSION : "3.1.17"
+YOCTO_DOC_VERSION : "3.1.22"
 YOCTO_DOC_VERSION_MINUS_ONE : "3.0.4"
-DISTRO_REL_TAG : "yocto-3.1.17"
-DOCCONF_VERSION : "3.1.17"
+DISTRO_REL_TAG : "yocto-3.1.22"
+DOCCONF_VERSION : "3.1.22"
 BITBAKE_SERIES : "1.46"
-POKYVERSION : "23.0.17"
+POKYVERSION : "23.0.22"
 YOCTO_POKY : "poky-&DISTRO_NAME_NO_CAP;-&POKYVERSION;"
 YOCTO_DL_URL : "https://downloads.yoctoproject.org"
 YOCTO_AB_URL : "https://autobuilder.yoctoproject.org"

documentation/ref-manual/ref-features.rst

@@ -63,6 +63,8 @@ Project metadata:
 
 -  *keyboard:* Hardware has a keyboard
 
+-  *numa:* Hardware has non-uniform memory access
+
 -  *pcbios:* Support for booting through BIOS
 
 -  *pci:* Hardware has a PCI bus

documentation/ref-manual/ref-variables.rst

@@ -7542,7 +7542,7 @@ system and gives an overview of their function and contents.
       ``SYSTEMD_BOOT_CFG`` as follows:
       ::
 
-         SYSTEMD_BOOT_CFG ?= "${:term:`S`}/loader.conf"
+         SYSTEMD_BOOT_CFG ?= "${S}/loader.conf"
 
       For information on Systemd-boot, see the `Systemd-boot
       documentation <http://www.freedesktop.org/wiki/Software/systemd/systemd-boot/>`__.
@@ -8745,4 +8745,22 @@ system and gives an overview of their function and contents.
 
       The default value of ``XSERVER``, if not specified in the machine
       configuration, is "xserver-xorg xf86-video-fbdev xf86-input-evdev".
-   
+
+   :term:`XZ_THREADS`
+      Specifies the number of parallel threads that should be used when
+      using xz compression.
+
+      By default this scales with core count, but is never set less than 2
+      to ensure that multi-threaded mode is always used so that the output
+      file contents are deterministic. Builds will work with a value of 1
+      but the output will differ compared to the output from the compression
+      generated when more than one thread is used.
+
+      On systems where many tasks run in parallel, setting a limit to this
+      can be helpful in controlling system resource usage.
+
+    :term:`XZ_MEMLIMIT`
+      Specifies the maximum memory the xz compression should use as a percentage
+      of system memory. If unconstrained the xz compressor can use large amounts of
+      memory and become problematic with parallelism elsewhere in the build.
+      "50%" has been found to be a good value.

meta-poky/conf/distro/poky.conf

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 DISTRO = "poky"
 DISTRO_NAME = "Poky (Yocto Project Reference Distro)"
-DISTRO_VERSION = "3.1.17"
+DISTRO_VERSION = "3.1.22"
 DISTRO_CODENAME = "dunfell"
 SDK_VENDOR = "-pokysdk"
 SDK_VERSION = "${@d.getVar('DISTRO_VERSION').replace('snapshot-${DATE}', 'snapshot')}"

meta-poky/conf/local.conf.sample

@@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ BB_DISKMON_DIRS ??= "\
 # present in the cache. It assumes you can download something faster than you can build it
 # which will depend on your network.
 #
-#SSTATE_MIRRORS ?= "file://.* http://sstate.yoctoproject.org/2.5/PATH;downloadfilename=PATH"
+#SSTATE_MIRRORS ?= "file://.* http://sstate.yoctoproject.org/all/PATH;downloadfilename=PATH"
 
 #
 # Qemu configuration

meta-selftest/recipes-test/images/oe-selftest-image.bb

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 SUMMARY = "An image used during oe-selftest tests"
 
-IMAGE_INSTALL = "packagegroup-core-boot dropbear"
+IMAGE_INSTALL = "packagegroup-core-boot packagegroup-core-ssh-dropbear"
 IMAGE_FEATURES = "debug-tweaks"
 
 IMAGE_LINGUAS = " "

meta-yocto-bsp/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto_5.4.bbappend

@@ -7,8 +7,8 @@ KMACHINE_genericx86 ?= "common-pc"
 KMACHINE_genericx86-64 ?= "common-pc-64"
 KMACHINE_beaglebone-yocto ?= "beaglebone"
 
-SRCREV_machine_genericx86 ?= "e2020dbe2ccaef50d7e8f37a5bf08c68a006a064"
-SRCREV_machine_genericx86-64 ?= "e2020dbe2ccaef50d7e8f37a5bf08c68a006a064"
+SRCREV_machine_genericx86 ?= "35826e154ee014b64ccfa0d1f12d36b8f8a75939"
+SRCREV_machine_genericx86-64 ?= "35826e154ee014b64ccfa0d1f12d36b8f8a75939"
 SRCREV_machine_edgerouter ?= "706efec4c1e270ec5dda92275898cd465dfdc7dd"
 SRCREV_machine_beaglebone-yocto ?= "706efec4c1e270ec5dda92275898cd465dfdc7dd"
 
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ COMPATIBLE_MACHINE_genericx86-64 = "genericx86-64"
 COMPATIBLE_MACHINE_edgerouter = "edgerouter"
 COMPATIBLE_MACHINE_beaglebone-yocto = "beaglebone-yocto"
 
-LINUX_VERSION_genericx86 = "5.4.178"
-LINUX_VERSION_genericx86-64 = "5.4.178"
+LINUX_VERSION_genericx86 = "5.4.219"
+LINUX_VERSION_genericx86-64 = "5.4.219"
 LINUX_VERSION_edgerouter = "5.4.58"
 LINUX_VERSION_beaglebone-yocto = "5.4.58"

meta/classes/archiver.bbclass

@@ -54,9 +54,10 @@ ARCHIVER_MODE[mirror] ?= "split"
 
 DEPLOY_DIR_SRC ?= "${DEPLOY_DIR}/sources"
 ARCHIVER_TOPDIR ?= "${WORKDIR}/archiver-sources"
-ARCHIVER_OUTDIR = "${ARCHIVER_TOPDIR}/${TARGET_SYS}/${PF}/"
+ARCHIVER_ARCH = "${TARGET_SYS}"
+ARCHIVER_OUTDIR = "${ARCHIVER_TOPDIR}/${ARCHIVER_ARCH}/${PF}/"
 ARCHIVER_RPMTOPDIR ?= "${WORKDIR}/deploy-sources-rpm"
-ARCHIVER_RPMOUTDIR = "${ARCHIVER_RPMTOPDIR}/${TARGET_SYS}/${PF}/"
+ARCHIVER_RPMOUTDIR = "${ARCHIVER_RPMTOPDIR}/${ARCHIVER_ARCH}/${PF}/"
 ARCHIVER_WORKDIR = "${WORKDIR}/archiver-work/"
 
 # When producing a combined mirror directory, allow duplicates for the case
@@ -100,6 +101,10 @@ python () {
         bb.debug(1, 'archiver: %s is excluded, covered by gcc-source' % pn)
         return
 
+    # TARGET_SYS in ARCHIVER_ARCH will break the stamp for gcc-source in multiconfig
+    if pn.startswith('gcc-source'):
+        d.setVar('ARCHIVER_ARCH', "allarch")
+
     def hasTask(task):
         return bool(d.getVarFlag(task, "task", False)) and not bool(d.getVarFlag(task, "noexec", False))
 
@@ -578,7 +583,7 @@ python do_dumpdata () {
 
 SSTATETASKS += "do_deploy_archives"
 do_deploy_archives () {
-    echo "Deploying source archive files from ${ARCHIVER_TOPDIR} to ${DEPLOY_DIR_SRC}."
+    bbnote "Deploying source archive files from ${ARCHIVER_TOPDIR} to ${DEPLOY_DIR_SRC}."
 }
 python do_deploy_archives_setscene () {
     sstate_setscene(d)

meta/classes/base.bbclass

@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ def setup_hosttools_dir(dest, toolsvar, d, fatal=True):
             # /usr/local/bin/ccache/gcc -> /usr/bin/ccache, then which(gcc)
             # would return /usr/local/bin/ccache/gcc, but what we need is
             # /usr/bin/gcc, this code can check and fix that.
-            if "ccache" in srctool:
+            if os.path.islink(srctool) and os.path.basename(os.readlink(srctool)) == 'ccache':
                 srctool = bb.utils.which(path, tool, executable=True, direction=1)
             if srctool:
                 os.symlink(srctool, desttool)

meta/classes/bin_package.bbclass

@@ -30,8 +30,9 @@ bin_package_do_install () {
         bbfatal bin_package has nothing to install. Be sure the SRC_URI unpacks into S.
     fi
     cd ${S}
+    install -d ${D}${base_prefix}
     tar --no-same-owner --exclude='./patches' --exclude='./.pc' -cpf - . \
-        | tar --no-same-owner -xpf - -C ${D}
+        | tar --no-same-owner -xpf - -C ${D}${base_prefix}
 }
 
 FILES_${PN} = "/"

meta/classes/cve-check.bbclass

@@ -47,7 +47,9 @@ CVE_CHECK_MANIFEST_JSON ?= "${DEPLOY_DIR_IMAGE}/${IMAGE_NAME}${IMAGE_NAME_SUFFIX
 CVE_CHECK_COPY_FILES ??= "1"
 CVE_CHECK_CREATE_MANIFEST ??= "1"
 
+# Report Patched or Ignored/Whitelisted CVEs
 CVE_CHECK_REPORT_PATCHED ??= "1"
+
 CVE_CHECK_SHOW_WARNINGS ??= "1"
 
 # Provide text output
@@ -56,6 +58,9 @@ CVE_CHECK_FORMAT_TEXT ??= "1"
 # Provide JSON output - disabled by default for backward compatibility
 CVE_CHECK_FORMAT_JSON ??= "0"
 
+# Check for packages without CVEs (no issues or missing product name)
+CVE_CHECK_COVERAGE ??= "1"
+
 # Whitelist for packages (PN)
 CVE_CHECK_PN_WHITELIST ?= ""
 
@@ -76,16 +81,10 @@ CVE_CHECK_LAYER_INCLUDELIST ??= ""
 # set to "alphabetical" for version using single alphabetical character as increment release
 CVE_VERSION_SUFFIX ??= ""
 
-def update_symlinks(target_path, link_path):
-    if link_path != target_path and os.path.exists(target_path):
-        if os.path.exists(os.path.realpath(link_path)):
-            os.remove(link_path)
-        os.symlink(os.path.basename(target_path), link_path)
-
 def generate_json_report(d, out_path, link_path):
     if os.path.exists(d.getVar("CVE_CHECK_SUMMARY_INDEX_PATH")):
         import json
-        from oe.cve_check import cve_check_merge_jsons
+        from oe.cve_check import cve_check_merge_jsons, update_symlinks
 
         bb.note("Generating JSON CVE summary")
         index_file = d.getVar("CVE_CHECK_SUMMARY_INDEX_PATH")
@@ -106,6 +105,7 @@ def generate_json_report(d, out_path, link_path):
 python cve_save_summary_handler () {
     import shutil
     import datetime
+    from oe.cve_check import update_symlinks
 
     cve_tmp_file = d.getVar("CVE_CHECK_TMP_FILE")
 
@@ -136,18 +136,20 @@ python do_cve_check () {
     """
     Check recipe for patched and unpatched CVEs
     """
+    from oe.cve_check import get_patched_cves
 
-    if os.path.exists(d.getVar("CVE_CHECK_DB_FILE")):
-        try:
-            patched_cves = get_patches_cves(d)
-        except FileNotFoundError:
-            bb.fatal("Failure in searching patches")
-        whitelisted, patched, unpatched = check_cves(d, patched_cves)
-        if patched or unpatched:
-            cve_data = get_cve_info(d, patched + unpatched)
-            cve_write_data(d, patched, unpatched, whitelisted, cve_data)
-    else:
-        bb.note("No CVE database found, skipping CVE check")
+    with bb.utils.fileslocked([d.getVar("CVE_CHECK_DB_FILE_LOCK")], shared=True):
+        if os.path.exists(d.getVar("CVE_CHECK_DB_FILE")):
+            try:
+                patched_cves = get_patched_cves(d)
+            except FileNotFoundError:
+                bb.fatal("Failure in searching patches")
+            ignored, patched, unpatched, status = check_cves(d, patched_cves)
+            if patched or unpatched or (d.getVar("CVE_CHECK_COVERAGE") == "1" and status):
+                cve_data = get_cve_info(d, patched + unpatched + ignored)
+                cve_write_data(d, patched, unpatched, ignored, cve_data, status)
+        else:
+            bb.note("No CVE database found, skipping CVE check")
 
 }
 
@@ -164,7 +166,7 @@ python cve_check_cleanup () {
 }
 
 addhandler cve_check_cleanup
-cve_check_cleanup[eventmask] = "bb.cooker.CookerExit"
+cve_check_cleanup[eventmask] = "bb.event.BuildCompleted"
 
 python cve_check_write_rootfs_manifest () {
     """
@@ -174,7 +176,7 @@ python cve_check_write_rootfs_manifest () {
     import shutil
     import json
     from oe.rootfs import image_list_installed_packages
-    from oe.cve_check import cve_check_merge_jsons
+    from oe.cve_check import cve_check_merge_jsons, update_symlinks
 
     if d.getVar("CVE_CHECK_COPY_FILES") == "1":
         deploy_file = d.getVar("CVE_CHECK_RECIPE_FILE")
@@ -247,65 +249,6 @@ ROOTFS_POSTPROCESS_COMMAND_prepend = "${@'cve_check_write_rootfs_manifest; ' if
 do_rootfs[recrdeptask] += "${@'do_cve_check' if d.getVar('CVE_CHECK_CREATE_MANIFEST') == '1' else ''}"
 do_populate_sdk[recrdeptask] += "${@'do_cve_check' if d.getVar('CVE_CHECK_CREATE_MANIFEST') == '1' else ''}"
 
-def get_patches_cves(d):
-    """
-    Get patches that solve CVEs using the "CVE: " tag.
-    """
-
-    import re
-
-    pn = d.getVar("PN")
-    cve_match = re.compile("CVE:( CVE\-\d{4}\-\d+)+")
-
-    # Matches the last "CVE-YYYY-ID" in the file name, also if written
-    # in lowercase. Possible to have multiple CVE IDs in a single
-    # file name, but only the last one will be detected from the file name.
-    # However, patch files contents addressing multiple CVE IDs are supported
-    # (cve_match regular expression)
-
-    cve_file_name_match = re.compile(".*([Cc][Vv][Ee]\-\d{4}\-\d+)")
-
-    patched_cves = set()
-    bb.debug(2, "Looking for patches that solves CVEs for %s" % pn)
-    for url in src_patches(d):
-        patch_file = bb.fetch.decodeurl(url)[2]
-
-        if not os.path.isfile(patch_file):
-            bb.error("File Not found: %s" % patch_file)
-            raise FileNotFoundError
-
-        # Check patch file name for CVE ID
-        fname_match = cve_file_name_match.search(patch_file)
-        if fname_match:
-            cve = fname_match.group(1).upper()
-            patched_cves.add(cve)
-            bb.debug(2, "Found CVE %s from patch file name %s" % (cve, patch_file))
-
-        with open(patch_file, "r", encoding="utf-8") as f:
-            try:
-                patch_text = f.read()
-            except UnicodeDecodeError:
-                bb.debug(1, "Failed to read patch %s using UTF-8 encoding"
-                        " trying with iso8859-1" %  patch_file)
-                f.close()
-                with open(patch_file, "r", encoding="iso8859-1") as f:
-                    patch_text = f.read()
-
-        # Search for one or more "CVE: " lines
-        text_match = False
-        for match in cve_match.finditer(patch_text):
-            # Get only the CVEs without the "CVE: " tag
-            cves = patch_text[match.start()+5:match.end()]
-            for cve in cves.split():
-                bb.debug(2, "Patch %s solves %s" % (patch_file, cve))
-                patched_cves.add(cve)
-                text_match = True
-
-        if not fname_match and not text_match:
-            bb.debug(2, "Patch %s doesn't solve CVEs" % patch_file)
-
-    return patched_cves
-
 def check_cves(d, patched_cves):
     """
     Connect to the NVD database and find unpatched cves.
@@ -317,17 +260,20 @@ def check_cves(d, patched_cves):
     suffix = d.getVar("CVE_VERSION_SUFFIX")
 
     cves_unpatched = []
+    cves_ignored = []
+    cves_status = []
+    cves_in_recipe = False
     # CVE_PRODUCT can contain more than one product (eg. curl/libcurl)
     products = d.getVar("CVE_PRODUCT").split()
     # If this has been unset then we're not scanning for CVEs here (for example, image recipes)
     if not products:
-        return ([], [], [])
+        return ([], [], [], [])
     pv = d.getVar("CVE_VERSION").split("+git")[0]
 
     # If the recipe has been whitelisted we return empty lists
     if pn in d.getVar("CVE_CHECK_PN_WHITELIST").split():
         bb.note("Recipe has been whitelisted, skipping check")
-        return ([], [], [])
+        return ([], [], [], [])
 
     cve_whitelist = d.getVar("CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST").split()
 
@@ -337,28 +283,39 @@ def check_cves(d, patched_cves):
 
     # For each of the known product names (e.g. curl has CPEs using curl and libcurl)...
     for product in products:
+        cves_in_product = False
         if ":" in product:
             vendor, product = product.split(":", 1)
         else:
             vendor = "%"
 
         # Find all relevant CVE IDs.
-        for cverow in conn.execute("SELECT DISTINCT ID FROM PRODUCTS WHERE PRODUCT IS ? AND VENDOR LIKE ?", (product, vendor)):
+        cve_cursor = conn.execute("SELECT DISTINCT ID FROM PRODUCTS WHERE PRODUCT IS ? AND VENDOR LIKE ?", (product, vendor))
+        for cverow in cve_cursor:
             cve = cverow[0]
 
             if cve in cve_whitelist:
                 bb.note("%s-%s has been whitelisted for %s" % (product, pv, cve))
-                # TODO: this should be in the report as 'whitelisted'
-                patched_cves.add(cve)
+                cves_ignored.append(cve)
                 continue
             elif cve in patched_cves:
                 bb.note("%s has been patched" % (cve))
                 continue
+            # Write status once only for each product
+            if not cves_in_product:
+                cves_status.append([product, True])
+                cves_in_product = True
+                cves_in_recipe = True
 
             vulnerable = False
-            for row in conn.execute("SELECT * FROM PRODUCTS WHERE ID IS ? AND PRODUCT IS ? AND VENDOR LIKE ?", (cve, product, vendor)):
+            ignored = False
+
+            product_cursor = conn.execute("SELECT * FROM PRODUCTS WHERE ID IS ? AND PRODUCT IS ? AND VENDOR LIKE ?", (cve, product, vendor))
+            for row in product_cursor:
                 (_, _, _, version_start, operator_start, version_end, operator_end) = row
                 #bb.debug(2, "Evaluating row " + str(row))
+                if cve in cve_whitelist:
+                    ignored = True
 
                 if (operator_start == '=' and pv == version_start) or version_start == '-':
                     vulnerable = True
@@ -391,18 +348,27 @@ def check_cves(d, patched_cves):
                         vulnerable = vulnerable_start or vulnerable_end
 
                 if vulnerable:
-                    bb.note("%s-%s is vulnerable to %s" % (pn, real_pv, cve))
-                    cves_unpatched.append(cve)
+                    if ignored:
+                        bb.note("%s is ignored in %s-%s" % (cve, pn, real_pv))
+                        cves_ignored.append(cve)
+                    else:
+                        bb.note("%s-%s is vulnerable to %s" % (pn, real_pv, cve))
+                        cves_unpatched.append(cve)
                     break
+            product_cursor.close()
 
             if not vulnerable:
                 bb.note("%s-%s is not vulnerable to %s" % (pn, real_pv, cve))
-                # TODO: not patched but not vulnerable
                 patched_cves.add(cve)
+        cve_cursor.close()
+
+        if not cves_in_product:
+            bb.note("No CVE records found for product %s, pn %s" % (product, pn))
+            cves_status.append([product, False])
 
     conn.close()
 
-    return (list(cve_whitelist), list(patched_cves), cves_unpatched)
+    return (list(cves_ignored), list(patched_cves), cves_unpatched, cves_status)
 
 def get_cve_info(d, cves):
     """
@@ -416,14 +382,15 @@ def get_cve_info(d, cves):
     conn = sqlite3.connect(db_file, uri=True)
 
     for cve in cves:
-        for row in conn.execute("SELECT * FROM NVD WHERE ID IS ?", (cve,)):
+        cursor = conn.execute("SELECT * FROM NVD WHERE ID IS ?", (cve,))
+        for row in cursor:
             cve_data[row[0]] = {}
             cve_data[row[0]]["summary"] = row[1]
             cve_data[row[0]]["scorev2"] = row[2]
             cve_data[row[0]]["scorev3"] = row[3]
             cve_data[row[0]]["modified"] = row[4]
             cve_data[row[0]]["vector"] = row[5]
-
+        cursor.close()
     conn.close()
     return cve_data
 
@@ -433,7 +400,6 @@ def cve_write_data_text(d, patched, unpatched, whitelisted, cve_data):
     CVE manifest if enabled.
     """
 
-
     cve_file = d.getVar("CVE_CHECK_LOG")
     fdir_name  = d.getVar("FILE_DIRNAME")
     layer = fdir_name.split("/")[-3]
@@ -441,12 +407,18 @@ def cve_write_data_text(d, patched, unpatched, whitelisted, cve_data):
     include_layers = d.getVar("CVE_CHECK_LAYER_INCLUDELIST").split()
     exclude_layers = d.getVar("CVE_CHECK_LAYER_EXCLUDELIST").split()
 
+    report_all = d.getVar("CVE_CHECK_REPORT_PATCHED") == "1"
+
     if exclude_layers and layer in exclude_layers:
         return
 
     if include_layers and layer not in include_layers:
         return
 
+    # Early exit, the text format does not report packages without CVEs
+    if not patched+unpatched+whitelisted:
+        return
+
     nvd_link = "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/"
     write_string = ""
     unpatched_cves = []
@@ -454,13 +426,16 @@ def cve_write_data_text(d, patched, unpatched, whitelisted, cve_data):
 
     for cve in sorted(cve_data):
         is_patched = cve in patched
-        if is_patched and (d.getVar("CVE_CHECK_REPORT_PATCHED") != "1"):
+        is_ignored = cve in whitelisted
+
+        if (is_patched or is_ignored) and not report_all:
             continue
+
         write_string += "LAYER: %s\n" % layer
         write_string += "PACKAGE NAME: %s\n" % d.getVar("PN")
         write_string += "PACKAGE VERSION: %s%s\n" % (d.getVar("EXTENDPE"), d.getVar("PV"))
         write_string += "CVE: %s\n" % cve
-        if cve in whitelisted:
+        if is_ignored:
             write_string += "CVE STATUS: Whitelisted\n"
         elif is_patched:
             write_string += "CVE STATUS: Patched\n"
@@ -476,23 +451,22 @@ def cve_write_data_text(d, patched, unpatched, whitelisted, cve_data):
     if unpatched_cves and d.getVar("CVE_CHECK_SHOW_WARNINGS") == "1":
         bb.warn("Found unpatched CVE (%s), for more information check %s" % (" ".join(unpatched_cves),cve_file))
 
-    if write_string:
-        with open(cve_file, "w") as f:
-            bb.note("Writing file %s with CVE information" % cve_file)
+    with open(cve_file, "w") as f:
+        bb.note("Writing file %s with CVE information" % cve_file)
+        f.write(write_string)
+
+    if d.getVar("CVE_CHECK_COPY_FILES") == "1":
+        deploy_file = d.getVar("CVE_CHECK_RECIPE_FILE")
+        bb.utils.mkdirhier(os.path.dirname(deploy_file))
+        with open(deploy_file, "w") as f:
             f.write(write_string)
 
-        if d.getVar("CVE_CHECK_COPY_FILES") == "1":
-            deploy_file = d.getVar("CVE_CHECK_RECIPE_FILE")
-            bb.utils.mkdirhier(os.path.dirname(deploy_file))
-            with open(deploy_file, "w") as f:
-                f.write(write_string)
+    if d.getVar("CVE_CHECK_CREATE_MANIFEST") == "1":
+        cvelogpath = d.getVar("CVE_CHECK_SUMMARY_DIR")
+        bb.utils.mkdirhier(cvelogpath)
 
-        if d.getVar("CVE_CHECK_CREATE_MANIFEST") == "1":
-            cvelogpath = d.getVar("CVE_CHECK_SUMMARY_DIR")
-            bb.utils.mkdirhier(cvelogpath)
-
-            with open(d.getVar("CVE_CHECK_TMP_FILE"), "a") as f:
-                f.write("%s" % write_string)
+        with open(d.getVar("CVE_CHECK_TMP_FILE"), "a") as f:
+            f.write("%s" % write_string)
 
 def cve_check_write_json_output(d, output, direct_file, deploy_file, manifest_file):
     """
@@ -524,7 +498,7 @@ def cve_check_write_json_output(d, output, direct_file, deploy_file, manifest_fi
         with open(index_path, "a+") as f:
             f.write("%s\n" % fragment_path)
 
-def cve_write_data_json(d, patched, unpatched, ignored, cve_data):
+def cve_write_data_json(d, patched, unpatched, ignored, cve_data, cve_status):
     """
     Prepare CVE data for the JSON format, then write it.
     """
@@ -538,6 +512,8 @@ def cve_write_data_json(d, patched, unpatched, ignored, cve_data):
     include_layers = d.getVar("CVE_CHECK_LAYER_INCLUDELIST").split()
     exclude_layers = d.getVar("CVE_CHECK_LAYER_EXCLUDELIST").split()
 
+    report_all = d.getVar("CVE_CHECK_REPORT_PATCHED") == "1"
+
     if exclude_layers and layer in exclude_layers:
         return
 
@@ -546,20 +522,29 @@ def cve_write_data_json(d, patched, unpatched, ignored, cve_data):
 
     unpatched_cves = []
 
+    product_data = []
+    for s in cve_status:
+        p = {"product": s[0], "cvesInRecord": "Yes"}
+        if s[1] == False:
+            p["cvesInRecord"] = "No"
+        product_data.append(p)
+
     package_version = "%s%s" % (d.getVar("EXTENDPE"), d.getVar("PV"))
     package_data = {
         "name" : d.getVar("PN"),
         "layer" : layer,
-        "version" : package_version
+        "version" : package_version,
+        "products": product_data
     }
     cve_list = []
 
     for cve in sorted(cve_data):
         is_patched = cve in patched
+        is_ignored = cve in ignored
         status = "Unpatched"
-        if is_patched and (d.getVar("CVE_CHECK_REPORT_PATCHED") != "1"):
+        if (is_patched or is_ignored) and not report_all:
             continue
-        if cve in ignored:
+        if is_ignored:
             status = "Ignored"
         elif is_patched:
             status = "Patched"
@@ -589,7 +574,7 @@ def cve_write_data_json(d, patched, unpatched, ignored, cve_data):
 
     cve_check_write_json_output(d, output, direct_file, deploy_file, manifest_file)
 
-def cve_write_data(d, patched, unpatched, ignored, cve_data):
+def cve_write_data(d, patched, unpatched, ignored, cve_data, status):
     """
     Write CVE data in each enabled format.
     """
@@ -597,4 +582,4 @@ def cve_write_data(d, patched, unpatched, ignored, cve_data):
     if d.getVar("CVE_CHECK_FORMAT_TEXT") == "1":
         cve_write_data_text(d, patched, unpatched, ignored, cve_data)
     if d.getVar("CVE_CHECK_FORMAT_JSON") == "1":
-        cve_write_data_json(d, patched, unpatched, ignored, cve_data)
+        cve_write_data_json(d, patched, unpatched, ignored, cve_data, status)

meta/classes/externalsrc.bbclass

@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ python () {
         if externalsrcbuild:
             d.setVar('B', externalsrcbuild)
         else:
-            d.setVar('B', '${WORKDIR}/${BPN}-${PV}/')
+            d.setVar('B', '${WORKDIR}/${BPN}-${PV}')
 
         local_srcuri = []
         fetch = bb.fetch2.Fetch((d.getVar('SRC_URI') or '').split(), d)
@@ -207,8 +207,8 @@ def srctree_hash_files(d, srcdir=None):
     try:
         git_dir = os.path.join(s_dir,
             subprocess.check_output(['git', '-C', s_dir, 'rev-parse', '--git-dir'], stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL).decode("utf-8").rstrip())
-        top_git_dir = os.path.join(s_dir, subprocess.check_output(['git', '-C', d.getVar("TOPDIR"), 'rev-parse', '--git-dir'],
-            stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL).decode("utf-8").rstrip())
+        top_git_dir = os.path.join(d.getVar("TOPDIR"),
+            subprocess.check_output(['git', '-C', d.getVar("TOPDIR"), 'rev-parse', '--git-dir'], stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL).decode("utf-8").rstrip())
         if git_dir == top_git_dir:
             git_dir = None
     except subprocess.CalledProcessError:
@@ -225,15 +225,16 @@ def srctree_hash_files(d, srcdir=None):
             env['GIT_INDEX_FILE'] = tmp_index.name
             subprocess.check_output(['git', 'add', '-A', '.'], cwd=s_dir, env=env)
             git_sha1 = subprocess.check_output(['git', 'write-tree'], cwd=s_dir, env=env).decode("utf-8")
-            submodule_helper = subprocess.check_output(['git', 'submodule--helper', 'list'], cwd=s_dir, env=env).decode("utf-8")
-            for line in submodule_helper.splitlines():
-                module_dir = os.path.join(s_dir, line.rsplit(maxsplit=1)[1])
-                if os.path.isdir(module_dir):
-                    proc = subprocess.Popen(['git', 'add', '-A', '.'], cwd=module_dir, env=env, stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL)
-                    proc.communicate()
-                    proc = subprocess.Popen(['git', 'write-tree'], cwd=module_dir, env=env, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL)
-                    stdout, _ = proc.communicate()
-                    git_sha1 += stdout.decode("utf-8")
+            if os.path.exists(os.path.join(s_dir, ".gitmodules")):
+                submodule_helper = subprocess.check_output(["git", "config", "--file", ".gitmodules", "--get-regexp", "path"], cwd=s_dir, env=env).decode("utf-8")
+                for line in submodule_helper.splitlines():
+                    module_dir = os.path.join(s_dir, line.rsplit(maxsplit=1)[1])
+                    if os.path.isdir(module_dir):
+                        proc = subprocess.Popen(['git', 'add', '-A', '.'], cwd=module_dir, env=env, stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL)
+                        proc.communicate()
+                        proc = subprocess.Popen(['git', 'write-tree'], cwd=module_dir, env=env, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL)
+                        stdout, _ = proc.communicate()
+                        git_sha1 += stdout.decode("utf-8")
             sha1 = hashlib.sha1(git_sha1.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
         with open(oe_hash_file, 'w') as fobj:
             fobj.write(sha1)

meta/classes/image.bbclass

@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ python () {
 def rootfs_variables(d):
     from oe.rootfs import variable_depends
     variables = ['IMAGE_DEVICE_TABLE','IMAGE_DEVICE_TABLES','BUILD_IMAGES_FROM_FEEDS','IMAGE_TYPES_MASKED','IMAGE_ROOTFS_ALIGNMENT','IMAGE_OVERHEAD_FACTOR','IMAGE_ROOTFS_SIZE','IMAGE_ROOTFS_EXTRA_SPACE',
-                 'IMAGE_ROOTFS_MAXSIZE','IMAGE_NAME','IMAGE_LINK_NAME','IMAGE_MANIFEST','DEPLOY_DIR_IMAGE','IMAGE_FSTYPES','IMAGE_INSTALL_COMPLEMENTARY','IMAGE_LINGUAS', 'IMAGE_LINGUAS_COMPLEMENTARY',
+                 'IMAGE_ROOTFS_MAXSIZE','IMAGE_NAME','IMAGE_LINK_NAME','IMAGE_MANIFEST','DEPLOY_DIR_IMAGE','IMAGE_FSTYPES','IMAGE_INSTALL_COMPLEMENTARY','IMAGE_LINGUAS', 'IMAGE_LINGUAS_COMPLEMENTARY', 'IMAGE_LOCALES_ARCHIVE',
                  'MULTILIBRE_ALLOW_REP','MULTILIB_TEMP_ROOTFS','MULTILIB_VARIANTS','MULTILIBS','ALL_MULTILIB_PACKAGE_ARCHS','MULTILIB_GLOBAL_VARIANTS','BAD_RECOMMENDATIONS','NO_RECOMMENDATIONS',
                  'PACKAGE_ARCHS','PACKAGE_CLASSES','TARGET_VENDOR','TARGET_ARCH','TARGET_OS','OVERRIDES','BBEXTENDVARIANT','FEED_DEPLOYDIR_BASE_URI','INTERCEPT_DIR','USE_DEVFS',
                  'CONVERSIONTYPES', 'IMAGE_GEN_DEBUGFS', 'ROOTFS_RO_UNNEEDED', 'IMGDEPLOYDIR', 'PACKAGE_EXCLUDE_COMPLEMENTARY', 'REPRODUCIBLE_TIMESTAMP_ROOTFS', 'IMAGE_INSTALL_DEBUGFS']
@@ -176,6 +176,9 @@ IMAGE_LINGUAS ?= "de-de fr-fr en-gb"
 
 LINGUAS_INSTALL ?= "${@" ".join(map(lambda s: "locale-base-%s" % s, d.getVar('IMAGE_LINGUAS').split()))}"
 
+# per default create a locale archive
+IMAGE_LOCALES_ARCHIVE ?= '1'
+
 # Prefer image, but use the fallback files for lookups if the image ones
 # aren't yet available.
 PSEUDO_PASSWD = "${IMAGE_ROOTFS}:${STAGING_DIR_NATIVE}"

meta/classes/insane.bbclass

@@ -452,12 +452,14 @@ def package_qa_check_buildpaths(path, name, d, elf, messages):
     """
     Check for build paths inside target files and error if not found in the whitelist
     """
+    import stat
     # Ignore .debug files, not interesting
     if path.find(".debug") != -1:
         return
 
-    # Ignore symlinks
-    if os.path.islink(path):
+    # Ignore symlinks/devs/fifos
+    mode = os.lstat(path).st_mode
+    if stat.S_ISLNK(mode) or stat.S_ISBLK(mode) or stat.S_ISFIFO(mode) or stat.S_ISCHR(mode) or stat.S_ISSOCK(mode):
         return
 
     tmpdir = bytes(d.getVar('TMPDIR'), encoding="utf-8")
@@ -945,7 +947,7 @@ def package_qa_check_host_user(path, name, d, elf, messages):
 
     dest = d.getVar('PKGDEST')
     pn = d.getVar('PN')
-    home = os.path.join(dest, 'home')
+    home = os.path.join(dest, name, 'home')
     if path == home or path.startswith(home + os.sep):
         return
 

meta/classes/kernel-arch.bbclass

@@ -61,8 +61,8 @@ HOST_LD_KERNEL_ARCH ?= "${TARGET_LD_KERNEL_ARCH}"
 TARGET_AR_KERNEL_ARCH ?= ""
 HOST_AR_KERNEL_ARCH ?= "${TARGET_AR_KERNEL_ARCH}"
 
-KERNEL_CC = "${CCACHE}${HOST_PREFIX}gcc ${HOST_CC_KERNEL_ARCH} -fuse-ld=bfd ${DEBUG_PREFIX_MAP} -fdebug-prefix-map=${STAGING_KERNEL_DIR}=${KERNEL_SRC_PATH}"
+KERNEL_CC = "${CCACHE}${HOST_PREFIX}gcc ${HOST_CC_KERNEL_ARCH} -fuse-ld=bfd ${DEBUG_PREFIX_MAP} -fdebug-prefix-map=${STAGING_KERNEL_DIR}=${KERNEL_SRC_PATH} -fdebug-prefix-map=${STAGING_KERNEL_BUILDDIR}=${KERNEL_SRC_PATH}"
 KERNEL_LD = "${CCACHE}${HOST_PREFIX}ld.bfd ${HOST_LD_KERNEL_ARCH}"
 KERNEL_AR = "${CCACHE}${HOST_PREFIX}ar ${HOST_AR_KERNEL_ARCH}"
-TOOLCHAIN = "gcc"
+TOOLCHAIN ?= "gcc"
 

meta/classes/kernel-fitimage.bbclass

@@ -56,6 +56,12 @@ FIT_HASH_ALG ?= "sha256"
 # fitImage Signature Algo
 FIT_SIGN_ALG ?= "rsa2048"
 
+# fitImage Padding Algo
+FIT_PAD_ALG ?= "pkcs-1.5"
+
+# Arguments passed to mkimage for signing
+UBOOT_MKIMAGE_SIGN_ARGS ?= ""
+
 #
 # Emit the fitImage ITS header
 #
@@ -250,6 +256,7 @@ fitimage_emit_section_config() {
 
 	conf_csum="${FIT_HASH_ALG}"
 	conf_sign_algo="${FIT_SIGN_ALG}"
+	conf_padding_algo="${FIT_PAD_ALG}"
 	if [ "${UBOOT_SIGN_ENABLE}" = "1" ] ; then
 		conf_sign_keyname="${UBOOT_SIGN_KEYNAME}"
 	fi
@@ -333,6 +340,7 @@ EOF
                         signature-1 {
                                 algo = "${conf_csum},${conf_sign_algo}";
                                 key-name-hint = "${conf_sign_keyname}";
+                                padding = "${conf_padding_algo}";
 				${sign_line}
                         };
 EOF
@@ -474,7 +482,8 @@ fitimage_assemble() {
 			${@'-D "${UBOOT_MKIMAGE_DTCOPTS}"' if len('${UBOOT_MKIMAGE_DTCOPTS}') else ''} \
 			-F -k "${UBOOT_SIGN_KEYDIR}" \
 			$add_key_to_u_boot \
-			-r arch/${ARCH}/boot/${2}
+			-r arch/${ARCH}/boot/${2} \
+			${UBOOT_MKIMAGE_SIGN_ARGS}
 	fi
 }
 

meta/classes/kernel-yocto.bbclass

@@ -269,6 +269,8 @@ do_kernel_metadata() {
 		bbnote "KERNEL_FEATURES: $KERNEL_FEATURES_FINAL"
 		bbnote "Final scc/cfg list: $sccs_defconfig $bsp_definition $sccs $KERNEL_FEATURES_FINAL"
 	fi
+
+	set -e
 }
 
 do_patch() {
@@ -298,6 +300,8 @@ do_patch() {
 			fi
 		done
 	fi
+
+	set -e
 }
 
 do_kernel_checkout() {
@@ -356,6 +360,8 @@ do_kernel_checkout() {
 		git commit -q -m "baseline commit: creating repo for ${PN}-${PV}"
 		git clean -d -f
 	fi
+
+	set -e
 }
 do_kernel_checkout[dirs] = "${S}"
 
@@ -523,6 +529,8 @@ do_validate_branches() {
 			kgit-s2q --clean
 		fi
 	fi
+
+	set -e
 }
 
 OE_TERMINAL_EXPORTS += "KBUILD_OUTPUT"

meta/classes/kernel.bbclass

@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ python __anonymous () {
     # KERNEL_IMAGETYPES may contain a mixture of image types supported directly
     # by the kernel build system and types which are created by post-processing
     # the output of the kernel build system (e.g. compressing vmlinux ->
-    # vmlinux.gz in kernel_do_compile()).
+    # vmlinux.gz in kernel_do_transform_kernel()).
     # KERNEL_IMAGETYPE_FOR_MAKE should contain only image types supported
     # directly by the kernel build system.
     if not d.getVar('KERNEL_IMAGETYPE_FOR_MAKE'):
@@ -106,6 +106,8 @@ python __anonymous () {
     # standalone for use by wic and other tools.
     if image:
         d.appendVarFlag('do_bundle_initramfs', 'depends', ' ${INITRAMFS_IMAGE}:do_image_complete')
+    if image and bb.utils.to_boolean(d.getVar('INITRAMFS_IMAGE_BUNDLE')):
+        bb.build.addtask('do_transform_bundled_initramfs', 'do_deploy', 'do_bundle_initramfs', d)
 
     # NOTE: setting INITRAMFS_TASK is for backward compatibility
     #       The preferred method is to set INITRAMFS_IMAGE, because
@@ -280,6 +282,14 @@ do_bundle_initramfs () {
 }
 do_bundle_initramfs[dirs] = "${B}"
 
+kernel_do_transform_bundled_initramfs() {
+        # vmlinux.gz is not built by kernel
+	if (echo "${KERNEL_IMAGETYPES}" | grep -wq "vmlinux\.gz"); then
+		gzip -9cn < ${KERNEL_OUTPUT_DIR}/vmlinux.initramfs > ${KERNEL_OUTPUT_DIR}/vmlinux.gz.initramfs
+        fi
+}
+do_transform_bundled_initramfs[dirs] = "${B}"
+
 python do_devshell_prepend () {
     os.environ["LDFLAGS"] = ''
 }
@@ -311,6 +321,10 @@ kernel_do_compile() {
 		export KBUILD_BUILD_TIMESTAMP="$ts"
 		export KCONFIG_NOTIMESTAMP=1
 		bbnote "KBUILD_BUILD_TIMESTAMP: $ts"
+	else
+		ts=`LC_ALL=C date`
+		export KBUILD_BUILD_TIMESTAMP="$ts"
+		bbnote "KBUILD_BUILD_TIMESTAMP: $ts"
 	fi
 	# The $use_alternate_initrd is only set from
 	# do_bundle_initramfs() This variable is specifically for the
@@ -329,12 +343,17 @@ kernel_do_compile() {
 	for typeformake in ${KERNEL_IMAGETYPE_FOR_MAKE} ; do
 		oe_runmake ${typeformake} CC="${KERNEL_CC} $cc_extra " LD="${KERNEL_LD}" ${KERNEL_EXTRA_ARGS} $use_alternate_initrd
 	done
+}
+
+kernel_do_transform_kernel() {
 	# vmlinux.gz is not built by kernel
 	if (echo "${KERNEL_IMAGETYPES}" | grep -wq "vmlinux\.gz"); then
 		mkdir -p "${KERNEL_OUTPUT_DIR}"
 		gzip -9cn < ${B}/vmlinux > "${KERNEL_OUTPUT_DIR}/vmlinux.gz"
 	fi
 }
+do_transform_kernel[dirs] = "${B}"
+addtask transform_kernel after do_compile before do_install
 
 do_compile_kernelmodules() {
 	unset CFLAGS CPPFLAGS CXXFLAGS LDFLAGS MACHINE
@@ -352,6 +371,10 @@ do_compile_kernelmodules() {
 		export KBUILD_BUILD_TIMESTAMP="$ts"
 		export KCONFIG_NOTIMESTAMP=1
 		bbnote "KBUILD_BUILD_TIMESTAMP: $ts"
+	else
+		ts=`LC_ALL=C date`
+		export KBUILD_BUILD_TIMESTAMP="$ts"
+		bbnote "KBUILD_BUILD_TIMESTAMP: $ts"
 	fi
 	if (grep -q -i -e '^CONFIG_MODULES=y$' ${B}/.config); then
 		cc_extra=$(get_cc_option)
@@ -576,7 +599,7 @@ inherit cml1
 
 KCONFIG_CONFIG_COMMAND_append = " LD='${KERNEL_LD}' HOSTLDFLAGS='${BUILD_LDFLAGS}'"
 
-EXPORT_FUNCTIONS do_compile do_install do_configure
+EXPORT_FUNCTIONS do_compile do_transform_kernel do_transform_bundled_initramfs do_install do_configure
 
 # kernel-base becomes kernel-${KERNEL_VERSION}
 # kernel-image becomes kernel-image-${KERNEL_VERSION}
@@ -721,7 +744,7 @@ kernel_do_deploy() {
 	fi
 
 	if [ ! -z "${INITRAMFS_IMAGE}" -a x"${INITRAMFS_IMAGE_BUNDLE}" = x1 ]; then
-		for imageType in ${KERNEL_IMAGETYPE_FOR_MAKE} ; do
+		for imageType in ${KERNEL_IMAGETYPES} ; do
 			if [ "$imageType" = "fitImage" ] ; then
 				continue
 			fi

meta/classes/license.bbclass

@@ -91,17 +91,17 @@ def copy_license_files(lic_files_paths, destdir):
                     os.link(src, dst)
                 except OSError as err:
                     if err.errno == errno.EXDEV:
-                        # Copy license files if hard-link is not possible even if st_dev is the
+                        # Copy license files if hardlink is not possible even if st_dev is the
                         # same on source and destination (docker container with device-mapper?)
                         canlink = False
                     else:
                         raise
-                # Only chown if we did hardling, and, we're running under pseudo
+                # Only chown if we did hardlink and we're running under pseudo
                 if canlink and os.environ.get('PSEUDO_DISABLED') == '0':
                     os.chown(dst,0,0)
             if not canlink:
-                begin_idx = int(beginline)-1 if beginline is not None else None
-                end_idx = int(endline) if endline is not None else None
+                begin_idx = max(0, int(beginline) - 1) if beginline is not None else None
+                end_idx = max(0, int(endline)) if endline is not None else None
                 if begin_idx is None and end_idx is None:
                     shutil.copyfile(src, dst)
                 else:

meta/classes/qemuboot.bbclass

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
 # QB_OPT_APPEND: options to append to qemu, e.g., "-show-cursor"
 #
 # QB_DEFAULT_KERNEL: default kernel to boot, e.g., "bzImage"
+#                                            e.g., "bzImage-initramfs-qemux86-64.bin" if INITRAMFS_IMAGE_BUNDLE is set to 1.
 #
 # QB_DEFAULT_FSTYPE: default FSTYPE to boot, e.g., "ext4"
 #
@@ -75,7 +76,7 @@
 
 QB_MEM ?= "-m 256"
 QB_SERIAL_OPT ?= "-serial mon:stdio -serial null"
-QB_DEFAULT_KERNEL ?= "${KERNEL_IMAGETYPE}"
+QB_DEFAULT_KERNEL ?= "${@bb.utils.contains("INITRAMFS_IMAGE_BUNDLE", "1", "${KERNEL_IMAGETYPE}-${INITRAMFS_LINK_NAME}.bin", "${KERNEL_IMAGETYPE}", d)}"
 QB_DEFAULT_FSTYPE ?= "ext4"
 QB_OPT_APPEND ?= "-show-cursor"
 QB_NETWORK_DEVICE ?= "-device virtio-net-pci,netdev=net0,mac=@MAC@"

meta/classes/rm_work.bbclass

@@ -27,6 +27,13 @@ BB_SCHEDULER ?= "completion"
 BB_TASK_IONICE_LEVEL_task-rm_work = "3.0"
 
 do_rm_work () {
+    # Force using the HOSTTOOLS 'rm' - otherwise the SYSROOT_NATIVE 'rm' can be selected depending on PATH
+    # Avoids race-condition accessing 'rm' when deleting WORKDIR folders at the end of this function
+    RM_BIN="$(PATH=${HOSTTOOLS_DIR} command -v rm)"
+    if [ -z "${RM_BIN}" ]; then
+        bbfatal "Binary 'rm' not found in HOSTTOOLS_DIR, cannot remove WORKDIR data."
+    fi
+
     # If the recipe name is in the RM_WORK_EXCLUDE, skip the recipe.
     for p in ${RM_WORK_EXCLUDE}; do
         if [ "$p" = "${PN}" ]; then
@@ -73,7 +80,7 @@ do_rm_work () {
             # sstate version since otherwise we'd need to leave 'plaindirs' around
             # such as 'packages' and 'packages-split' and these can be large. No end
             # of chain tasks depend directly on do_package anymore.
-            rm -f -- $i;
+            "${RM_BIN}" -f -- $i;
             ;;
         *_setscene*)
             # Skip stamps which are already setscene versions
@@ -90,7 +97,7 @@ do_rm_work () {
                     ;;
                 esac
             done
-            rm -f -- $i
+            "${RM_BIN}" -f -- $i
         esac
     done
 
@@ -100,9 +107,9 @@ do_rm_work () {
         # Retain only logs and other files in temp, safely ignore
         # failures of removing pseudo folers on NFS2/3 server.
         if [ $dir = 'pseudo' ]; then
-            rm -rf -- $dir 2> /dev/null || true
+            "${RM_BIN}" -rf -- $dir 2> /dev/null || true
         elif ! echo "$excludes" | grep -q -w "$dir"; then
-            rm -rf -- $dir
+            "${RM_BIN}" -rf -- $dir
         fi
     done
 }

meta/classes/rootfs-postcommands.bbclass

@@ -305,7 +305,7 @@ rootfs_trim_schemas () {
 }
 
 rootfs_check_host_user_contaminated () {
-	contaminated="${WORKDIR}/host-user-contaminated.txt"
+	contaminated="${S}/host-user-contaminated.txt"
 	HOST_USER_UID="$(PSEUDO_UNLOAD=1 id -u)"
 	HOST_USER_GID="$(PSEUDO_UNLOAD=1 id -g)"
 

meta/classes/sanity.bbclass

@@ -561,6 +561,14 @@ def check_tar_version(sanity_data):
     version = result.split()[3]
     if LooseVersion(version) < LooseVersion("1.28"):
         return "Your version of tar is older than 1.28 and does not have the support needed to enable reproducible builds. Please install a newer version of tar (you could use the project's buildtools-tarball from our last release or use scripts/install-buildtools).\n"
+
+    try:
+        result = subprocess.check_output(["tar", "--help"], stderr=subprocess.STDOUT).decode('utf-8')
+        if "--xattrs" not in result:
+            return "Your tar doesn't support --xattrs, please use GNU tar.\n"
+    except subprocess.CalledProcessError as e:
+        return "Unable to execute tar --help, exit code %d\n%s\n" % (e.returncode, e.output)
+
     return None
 
 # We use git parameters and functionality only found in 1.7.8 or later

meta/classes/sstate.bbclass

@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ def generate_sstatefn(spec, hash, taskname, siginfo, d):
         components = spec.split(":")
         # Fields 0,5,6 are mandatory, 1 is most useful, 2,3,4 are just for information
         # 7 is for the separators
-        avail = (254 - len(hash + "_" + taskname + extension) - len(components[0]) - len(components[1]) - len(components[5]) - len(components[6]) - 7) // 3
+        avail = (limit - len(hash + "_" + taskname + extension) - len(components[0]) - len(components[1]) - len(components[5]) - len(components[6]) - 7) // 3
         components[2] = components[2][:avail]
         components[3] = components[3][:avail]
         components[4] = components[4][:avail]

meta/conf/distro/include/cve-extra-exclusions.inc

@@ -53,24 +53,23 @@ CVE-2015-4778 CVE-2015-4779 CVE-2015-4780 CVE-2015-4781 CVE-2015-4782 CVE-2015-4
 CVE-2015-4785 CVE-2015-4786 CVE-2015-4787 CVE-2015-4788 CVE-2015-4789 CVE-2015-4790 CVE-2016-0682 \
 CVE-2016-0689 CVE-2016-0692 CVE-2016-0694 CVE-2016-3418 CVE-2020-2981"
 
-#### CPE update pending ####
-
-# groff:groff-native https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2000-0803
-# Appears it was fixed in https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/groff.git/commit/?id=07f95f1674217275ed4612f1dcaa95a88435c6a7
-# so from 1.17 onwards. Reported to the database for update by RP 2021/5/9. Update accepted 2021/5/10.
-#CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2000-0803"
-
-
-
-#### Upstream still working on ####
-
 # qemu:qemu-native:qemu-system-native https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2021-20255
 # There was a proposed patch https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2021-02/msg06098.html
-# however qemu maintainers are sure the patch is incorrect and should not be applied.
+# qemu maintainers say the patch is incorrect and should not be applied
+# Ignore from OE's perspectivee as the issue is of low impact, at worst sitting in an infinite loop rather than exploitable
+CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2021-20255"
 
-# wget https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2021-31879
-# https://mail.gnu.org/archive/html/bug-wget/2021-02/msg00002.html
-# No response upstream as of 2021/5/12
+# qemu:qemu-native:qemu-system-native https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2019-12067
+# There was a proposed patch but rejected by upstream qemu. It is unclear if the issue can
+# still be reproduced or where exactly any bug is.
+# Ignore from OE's perspective as we'll pick up any fix when upstream accepts one.
+CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2019-12067"
+
+# nasm:nasm-native https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2020-18974
+# It is a fuzzing related buffer overflow. It is of low impact since most devices
+# wouldn't expose an assembler. The upstream is inactive and there is little to be
+# done about the bug, ignore from an OE perspective.
+CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2020-18974"
 
 
 

meta/conf/distro/include/maintainers.inc

@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ RECIPE_MAINTAINER_pn-gcc-cross-canadian-${TRANSLATED_TARGET_ARCH} = "Khem Raj <r
 RECIPE_MAINTAINER_pn-gcc-crosssdk-${SDK_SYS} = "Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>"
 RECIPE_MAINTAINER_pn-gcc-runtime = "Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>"
 RECIPE_MAINTAINER_pn-gcc-sanitizers = "Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>"
-RECIPE_MAINTAINER_pn-gcc-source-9.3.0 = "Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>"
+RECIPE_MAINTAINER_pn-gcc-source-9.5.0 = "Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>"
 RECIPE_MAINTAINER_pn-gconf = "Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com>"
 RECIPE_MAINTAINER_pn-gcr = "Alexander Kanavin <alex.kanavin@gmail.com>"
 RECIPE_MAINTAINER_pn-gdb = "Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>"

meta/conf/distro/include/yocto-uninative.inc

@@ -6,10 +6,10 @@
 # to the distro running on the build machine.
 #
 
-UNINATIVE_MAXGLIBCVERSION = "2.35"
-UNINATIVE_VERSION = "3.6"
+UNINATIVE_MAXGLIBCVERSION = "2.36"
+UNINATIVE_VERSION = "3.7"
 
 UNINATIVE_URL ?= "http://downloads.yoctoproject.org/releases/uninative/${UNINATIVE_VERSION}/"
-UNINATIVE_CHECKSUM[aarch64] ?= "d64831cf2792c8e470c2e42230660e1a8e5de56a579cdd59978791f663c2f3ed"
-UNINATIVE_CHECKSUM[i686] ?= "2f0ee9b66b1bb2c85e2b592fb3c9c7f5d77399fa638d74961330cdb8de34ca3b"
-UNINATIVE_CHECKSUM[x86_64] ?= "9bfc4c970495b3716b2f9e52c4df9f968c02463a9a95000f6657fbc3fde1f098"
+UNINATIVE_CHECKSUM[aarch64] ?= "6a29bcae4b5b716d2d520e18800b33943b65f8a835eac1ff8793fc5ee65b4be6"
+UNINATIVE_CHECKSUM[i686] ?= "3f6d52e64996570c716108d49f8108baccf499a283bbefae438c7266b7a93305"
+UNINATIVE_CHECKSUM[x86_64] ?= "b110bf2e10fe420f5ca2f3ec55f048ee5f0a54c7e34856a3594e51eb2aea0570"

meta/conf/licenses.conf

@@ -13,24 +13,31 @@
 SPDXLICENSEMAP[AGPL-3] = "AGPL-3.0"
 SPDXLICENSEMAP[AGPLv3] = "AGPL-3.0"
 SPDXLICENSEMAP[AGPLv3.0] = "AGPL-3.0"
+SPDXLICENSEMAP[AGPL-3.0-only] = "AGPL-3.0"
 
 # GPL variations
 SPDXLICENSEMAP[GPL-1] = "GPL-1.0"
 SPDXLICENSEMAP[GPLv1] = "GPL-1.0"
 SPDXLICENSEMAP[GPLv1.0] = "GPL-1.0"
+SPDXLICENSEMAP[GPL-1.0-only] = "GPL-1.0"
 SPDXLICENSEMAP[GPL-2] = "GPL-2.0"
 SPDXLICENSEMAP[GPLv2] = "GPL-2.0"
 SPDXLICENSEMAP[GPLv2.0] = "GPL-2.0"
+SPDXLICENSEMAP[GPL-2.0-only] = "GPL-2.0"
 SPDXLICENSEMAP[GPL-3] = "GPL-3.0"
 SPDXLICENSEMAP[GPLv3] = "GPL-3.0"
 SPDXLICENSEMAP[GPLv3.0] = "GPL-3.0"
+SPDXLICENSEMAP[GPL-3.0-only] = "GPL-3.0"
 
 #LGPL variations
 SPDXLICENSEMAP[LGPLv2] = "LGPL-2.0"
 SPDXLICENSEMAP[LGPLv2.0] = "LGPL-2.0"
+SPDXLICENSEMAP[LGPL-2.0-only] = "LGPL-2.0"
 SPDXLICENSEMAP[LGPL2.1] = "LGPL-2.1"
 SPDXLICENSEMAP[LGPLv2.1] = "LGPL-2.1"
+SPDXLICENSEMAP[LGPL-2.1-only] = "LGPL-2.1"
 SPDXLICENSEMAP[LGPLv3] = "LGPL-3.0"
+SPDXLICENSEMAP[LGPL-3.0-only] = "LGPL-3.0"
 
 #MPL variations
 SPDXLICENSEMAP[MPL-1] = "MPL-1.0"

meta/lib/oe/cve_check.py

@@ -79,3 +79,96 @@ def cve_check_merge_jsons(output, data):
             return
 
     output["package"].append(data["package"][0])
+
+def update_symlinks(target_path, link_path):
+    """
+    Update a symbolic link link_path to point to target_path.
+    Remove the link and recreate it if exist and is different.
+    """
+    if link_path != target_path and os.path.exists(target_path):
+        if os.path.exists(os.path.realpath(link_path)):
+            os.remove(link_path)
+        os.symlink(os.path.basename(target_path), link_path)
+
+def get_patched_cves(d):
+    """
+    Get patches that solve CVEs using the "CVE: " tag.
+    """
+
+    import re
+    import oe.patch
+
+    pn = d.getVar("PN")
+    cve_match = re.compile("CVE:( CVE\-\d{4}\-\d+)+")
+
+    # Matches the last "CVE-YYYY-ID" in the file name, also if written
+    # in lowercase. Possible to have multiple CVE IDs in a single
+    # file name, but only the last one will be detected from the file name.
+    # However, patch files contents addressing multiple CVE IDs are supported
+    # (cve_match regular expression)
+
+    cve_file_name_match = re.compile(".*([Cc][Vv][Ee]\-\d{4}\-\d+)")
+
+    patched_cves = set()
+    bb.debug(2, "Looking for patches that solves CVEs for %s" % pn)
+    for url in oe.patch.src_patches(d):
+        patch_file = bb.fetch.decodeurl(url)[2]
+
+        # Remote compressed patches may not be unpacked, so silently ignore them
+        if not os.path.isfile(patch_file):
+            bb.warn("%s does not exist, cannot extract CVE list" % patch_file)
+            continue
+
+        # Check patch file name for CVE ID
+        fname_match = cve_file_name_match.search(patch_file)
+        if fname_match:
+            cve = fname_match.group(1).upper()
+            patched_cves.add(cve)
+            bb.debug(2, "Found CVE %s from patch file name %s" % (cve, patch_file))
+
+        with open(patch_file, "r", encoding="utf-8") as f:
+            try:
+                patch_text = f.read()
+            except UnicodeDecodeError:
+                bb.debug(1, "Failed to read patch %s using UTF-8 encoding"
+                        " trying with iso8859-1" %  patch_file)
+                f.close()
+                with open(patch_file, "r", encoding="iso8859-1") as f:
+                    patch_text = f.read()
+
+        # Search for one or more "CVE: " lines
+        text_match = False
+        for match in cve_match.finditer(patch_text):
+            # Get only the CVEs without the "CVE: " tag
+            cves = patch_text[match.start()+5:match.end()]
+            for cve in cves.split():
+                bb.debug(2, "Patch %s solves %s" % (patch_file, cve))
+                patched_cves.add(cve)
+                text_match = True
+
+        if not fname_match and not text_match:
+            bb.debug(2, "Patch %s doesn't solve CVEs" % patch_file)
+
+    return patched_cves
+
+
+def get_cpe_ids(cve_product, version):
+    """
+    Get list of CPE identifiers for the given product and version
+    """
+
+    version = version.split("+git")[0]
+
+    cpe_ids = []
+    for product in cve_product.split():
+        # CVE_PRODUCT in recipes may include vendor information for CPE identifiers. If not,
+        # use wildcard for vendor.
+        if ":" in product:
+            vendor, product = product.split(":", 1)
+        else:
+            vendor = "*"
+
+        cpe_id = 'cpe:2.3:a:{}:{}:{}:*:*:*:*:*:*:*'.format(vendor, product, version)
+        cpe_ids.append(cpe_id)
+
+    return cpe_ids

meta/lib/oe/package_manager.py

@@ -611,12 +611,13 @@ class PackageManager(object, metaclass=ABCMeta):
                          "'%s' returned %d:\n%s" %
                          (' '.join(cmd), e.returncode, e.output.decode("utf-8")))
 
-        target_arch = self.d.getVar('TARGET_ARCH')
-        localedir = oe.path.join(self.target_rootfs, self.d.getVar("libdir"), "locale")
-        if os.path.exists(localedir) and os.listdir(localedir):
-            generate_locale_archive(self.d, self.target_rootfs, target_arch, localedir)
-            # And now delete the binary locales
-            self.remove(fnmatch.filter(self.list_installed(), "glibc-binary-localedata-*"), False)
+        if self.d.getVar('IMAGE_LOCALES_ARCHIVE') == '1':
+            target_arch = self.d.getVar('TARGET_ARCH')
+            localedir = oe.path.join(self.target_rootfs, self.d.getVar("libdir"), "locale")
+            if os.path.exists(localedir) and os.listdir(localedir):
+                generate_locale_archive(self.d, self.target_rootfs, target_arch, localedir)
+                # And now delete the binary locales
+                self.remove(fnmatch.filter(self.list_installed(), "glibc-binary-localedata-*"), False)
 
     def deploy_dir_lock(self):
         if self.deploy_dir is None:

meta/lib/oe/rootfs.py

@@ -321,7 +321,9 @@ class Rootfs(object, metaclass=ABCMeta):
         if not os.path.exists(kernel_abi_ver_file):
             bb.fatal("No kernel-abiversion file found (%s), cannot run depmod, aborting" % kernel_abi_ver_file)
 
-        kernel_ver = open(kernel_abi_ver_file).read().strip(' \n')
+        with open(kernel_abi_ver_file) as f:
+            kernel_ver = f.read().strip(' \n')
+
         versioned_modules_dir = os.path.join(self.image_rootfs, modules_dir, kernel_ver)
 
         bb.utils.mkdirhier(versioned_modules_dir)

meta/lib/oeqa/runtime/cases/rpm.py

@@ -49,21 +49,20 @@ class RpmBasicTest(OERuntimeTestCase):
             msg = 'status: %s. Cannot run rpm -qa: %s' % (status, output)
             self.assertEqual(status, 0, msg=msg)
 
-        def check_no_process_for_user(u):
-            _, output = self.target.run(self.tc.target_cmds['ps'])
-            if u + ' ' in output:
-                return False
-            else:
-                return True
+        def wait_for_no_process_for_user(u, timeout = 120):
+            timeout_at = time.time() + timeout
+            while time.time() < timeout_at:
+                _, output = self.target.run(self.tc.target_cmds['ps'])
+                if u + ' ' not in output:
+                    return
+                time.sleep(1)
+            user_pss = [ps for ps in output.split("\n") if u + ' ' in ps]
+            msg = "There're %s 's process(es) still running: %s".format(u, "\n".join(user_pss))
+            assertTrue(True, msg=msg)
 
         def unset_up_test_user(u):
             # ensure no test1 process in running
-            timeout = time.time() + 30
-            while time.time() < timeout:
-                if check_no_process_for_user(u):
-                    break
-                else:
-                    time.sleep(1)
+            wait_for_no_process_for_user(u)
             status, output = self.target.run('userdel -r %s' % u)
             msg = 'Failed to erase user: %s' % output
             self.assertTrue(status == 0, msg=msg)

meta/lib/oeqa/runtime/cases/scp.py

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ class ScpTest(OERuntimeTestCase):
         os.remove(cls.tmp_path)
 
     @OETestDepends(['ssh.SSHTest.test_ssh'])
-    @OEHasPackage(['openssh-scp', 'dropbear'])
+    @OEHasPackage(['openssh-scp'])
     def test_scp_file(self):
         dst = '/tmp/test_scp_file'
 

meta/lib/oeqa/selftest/cases/cve_check.py

@@ -117,3 +117,85 @@ CVE_CHECK_FORMAT_JSON = "1"
         self.assertEqual(report["version"], "1")
         self.assertEqual(len(report["package"]), 1)
         self.assertEqual(report["package"][0]["name"], recipename)
+
+
+    def test_recipe_report_json_unpatched(self):
+        config = """
+INHERIT += "cve-check"
+CVE_CHECK_FORMAT_JSON = "1"
+CVE_CHECK_REPORT_PATCHED = "0"
+"""
+        self.write_config(config)
+
+        vars = get_bb_vars(["CVE_CHECK_SUMMARY_DIR", "CVE_CHECK_SUMMARY_FILE_NAME_JSON"])
+        summary_json = os.path.join(vars["CVE_CHECK_SUMMARY_DIR"], vars["CVE_CHECK_SUMMARY_FILE_NAME_JSON"])
+        recipe_json = os.path.join(vars["CVE_CHECK_SUMMARY_DIR"], "m4-native_cve.json")
+
+        try:
+            os.remove(summary_json)
+            os.remove(recipe_json)
+        except FileNotFoundError:
+            pass
+
+        bitbake("m4-native -c cve_check")
+
+        def check_m4_json(filename):
+            with open(filename) as f:
+                report = json.load(f)
+            self.assertEqual(report["version"], "1")
+            self.assertEqual(len(report["package"]), 1)
+            package = report["package"][0]
+            self.assertEqual(package["name"], "m4-native")
+            #m4 had only Patched CVEs, so the issues array will be empty
+            self.assertEqual(package["issue"], [])
+
+        self.assertExists(summary_json)
+        check_m4_json(summary_json)
+        self.assertExists(recipe_json)
+        check_m4_json(recipe_json)
+
+
+    def test_recipe_report_json_ignored(self):
+        config = """
+INHERIT += "cve-check"
+CVE_CHECK_FORMAT_JSON = "1"
+CVE_CHECK_REPORT_PATCHED = "1"
+"""
+        self.write_config(config)
+
+        vars = get_bb_vars(["CVE_CHECK_SUMMARY_DIR", "CVE_CHECK_SUMMARY_FILE_NAME_JSON"])
+        summary_json = os.path.join(vars["CVE_CHECK_SUMMARY_DIR"], vars["CVE_CHECK_SUMMARY_FILE_NAME_JSON"])
+        recipe_json = os.path.join(vars["CVE_CHECK_SUMMARY_DIR"], "logrotate_cve.json")
+
+        try:
+            os.remove(summary_json)
+            os.remove(recipe_json)
+        except FileNotFoundError:
+            pass
+
+        bitbake("logrotate -c cve_check")
+
+        def check_m4_json(filename):
+            with open(filename) as f:
+                report = json.load(f)
+            self.assertEqual(report["version"], "1")
+            self.assertEqual(len(report["package"]), 1)
+            package = report["package"][0]
+            self.assertEqual(package["name"], "logrotate")
+            found_cves = { issue["id"]: issue["status"] for issue in package["issue"]}
+            # m4 CVE should not be in logrotate
+            self.assertNotIn("CVE-2008-1687", found_cves)
+            # logrotate has both Patched and Ignored CVEs
+            self.assertIn("CVE-2011-1098", found_cves)
+            self.assertEqual(found_cves["CVE-2011-1098"], "Patched")
+            self.assertIn("CVE-2011-1548", found_cves)
+            self.assertEqual(found_cves["CVE-2011-1548"], "Ignored")
+            self.assertIn("CVE-2011-1549", found_cves)
+            self.assertEqual(found_cves["CVE-2011-1549"], "Ignored")
+            self.assertIn("CVE-2011-1550", found_cves)
+            self.assertEqual(found_cves["CVE-2011-1550"], "Ignored")
+
+        self.assertExists(summary_json)
+        check_m4_json(summary_json)
+        self.assertExists(recipe_json)
+        check_m4_json(recipe_json)

meta/lib/oeqa/selftest/cases/devtool.py

@@ -1323,7 +1323,7 @@ class DevtoolExtractTests(DevtoolBase):
             # Now really test deploy-target
             result = runCmd('devtool deploy-target -c %s root@%s' % (testrecipe, qemu.ip))
             # Run a test command to see if it was installed properly
-            sshargs = '-o UserKnownHostsFile=/dev/null -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no'
+            sshargs = '-o UserKnownHostsFile=/dev/null -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o HostKeyAlgorithms=+ssh-rsa'
             result = runCmd('ssh %s root@%s %s' % (sshargs, qemu.ip, testcommand))
             # Check if it deployed all of the files with the right ownership/perms
             # First look on the host - need to do this under pseudo to get the correct ownership/perms

meta/lib/oeqa/selftest/cases/oescripts.py

@@ -133,7 +133,8 @@ class OEListPackageconfigTests(OEScriptTests):
     def check_endlines(self, results,  expected_endlines): 
         for line in results.output.splitlines():
             for el in expected_endlines:
-                if line.split() == el.split():
+                if line and line.split()[0] == el.split()[0] and \
+                   ' '.join(sorted(el.split())) in ' '.join(sorted(line.split())):
                     expected_endlines.remove(el)
                     break
 

meta/lib/oeqa/selftest/cases/runtime_test.py

@@ -175,8 +175,8 @@ class TestImage(OESelftestTestCase):
         if "DISPLAY" not in os.environ:
             self.skipTest("virgl gtk test must be run inside a X session")
         distro = oe.lsb.distro_identifier()
-        if distro and distro == 'almalinux-8.6':
-            self.skipTest('virgl isn\'t working with Alma 8')
+        if distro and distro.startswith('almalinux'):
+            self.skipTest('virgl isn\'t working with Alma Linux')
         if distro and distro == 'debian-8':
             self.skipTest('virgl isn\'t working with Debian 8')
         if distro and distro == 'centos-7':
@@ -187,8 +187,12 @@ class TestImage(OESelftestTestCase):
             self.skipTest('virgl isn\'t working with Fedora 34')
         if distro and distro == 'fedora-35':
             self.skipTest('virgl isn\'t working with Fedora 35')
+        if distro and distro == 'fedora-36':
+            self.skipTest('virgl isn\'t working with Fedora 36')
         if distro and distro == 'opensuseleap-15.0':
             self.skipTest('virgl isn\'t working with Opensuse 15.0')
+        if distro and distro == 'ubuntu-22.04':
+            self.skipTest('virgl isn\'t working with Ubuntu 22.04')
 
         qemu_packageconfig = get_bb_var('PACKAGECONFIG', 'qemu-system-native')
         sdl_packageconfig = get_bb_var('PACKAGECONFIG', 'libsdl2-native')

meta/lib/oeqa/selftest/cases/tinfoil.py

@@ -65,6 +65,20 @@ class TinfoilTests(OESelftestTestCase):
             localdata.setVar('PN', 'hello')
             self.assertEqual('hello', localdata.getVar('BPN'))
 
+    # The config_data API tp parse_recipe_file is used by:
+    # layerindex-web layerindex/update_layer.py
+    def test_parse_recipe_custom_data(self):
+        with bb.tinfoil.Tinfoil() as tinfoil:
+            tinfoil.prepare(config_only=False, quiet=2)
+            localdata = bb.data.createCopy(tinfoil.config_data)
+            localdata.setVar("TESTVAR", "testval")
+            testrecipe = 'mdadm'
+            best = tinfoil.find_best_provider(testrecipe)
+            if not best:
+                self.fail('Unable to find recipe providing %s' % testrecipe)
+            rd = tinfoil.parse_recipe_file(best[3], config_data=localdata)
+            self.assertEqual("testval", rd.getVar('TESTVAR'))
+
     def test_list_recipes(self):
         with bb.tinfoil.Tinfoil() as tinfoil:
             tinfoil.prepare(config_only=False, quiet=2)

meta/recipes-bsp/efivar/efivar_37.bb

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=6626bb1e20189cfa95f2c508ba286393"
 
 COMPATIBLE_HOST = "(i.86|x86_64|arm|aarch64).*-linux"
 
-SRC_URI = "git://github.com/rhinstaller/efivar.git;branch=master;protocol=https \
+SRC_URI = "git://github.com/rhinstaller/efivar.git;branch=main;protocol=https \
            file://determinism.patch \
            file://no-werror.patch"
 SRCREV = "c1d6b10e1ed4ba2be07f385eae5bceb694478a10"

meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2021-3695.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
+From 0693d672abcf720419f86c56bda6428c540e2bb1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+Date: Wed, 20 Jul 2022 10:01:35 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2021-3695
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=grub.git;a=commit;h=e623866d9286410156e8b9d2c82d6253a1b22d08]
+CVE: CVE-2021-3695
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+
+ video/readers/png: Drop greyscale support to fix heap out-of-bounds write
+
+A 16-bit greyscale PNG without alpha is processed in the following loop:
+
+      for (i = 0; i < (data->image_width * data->image_height);
+   i++, d1 += 4, d2 += 2)
+{
+  d1[R3] = d2[1];
+  d1[G3] = d2[1];
+  d1[B3] = d2[1];
+}
+
+The increment of d1 is wrong. d1 is incremented by 4 bytes per iteration,
+but there are only 3 bytes allocated for storage. This means that image
+data will overwrite somewhat-attacker-controlled parts of memory - 3 bytes
+out of every 4 following the end of the image.
+
+This has existed since greyscale support was added in 2013 in commit
+3ccf16dff98f (grub-core/video/readers/png.c: Support grayscale).
+
+Saving starfield.png as a 16-bit greyscale image without alpha in the gimp
+and attempting to load it causes grub-emu to crash - I don't think this code
+has ever worked.
+
+Delete all PNG greyscale support.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2021-3695
+
+Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+---
+ grub-core/video/readers/png.c | 89 ++++-------------------------------
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 81 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/video/readers/png.c b/grub-core/video/readers/png.c
+index 0157ff7..db4a9d4 100644
+--- a/grub-core/video/readers/png.c
++++ b/grub-core/video/readers/png.c
+@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ struct grub_png_data
+ 
+   unsigned image_width, image_height;
+   int bpp, is_16bit;
+-  int raw_bytes, is_gray, is_alpha, is_palette;
++  int raw_bytes, is_alpha, is_palette;
+   int row_bytes, color_bits;
+   grub_uint8_t *image_data;
+ 
+@@ -280,13 +280,13 @@ grub_png_decode_image_header (struct grub_png_data *data)
+     data->bpp = 3;
+   else
+     {
+-      data->is_gray = 1;
+-      data->bpp = 1;
++      return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE,
++			 "png: color type not supported");
+     }
+ 
+   if ((color_bits != 8) && (color_bits != 16)
+       && (color_bits != 4
+-	  || !(data->is_gray || data->is_palette)))
++	  || !data->is_palette))
+     return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE,
+                        "png: bit depth must be 8 or 16");
+ 
+@@ -315,7 +315,7 @@ grub_png_decode_image_header (struct grub_png_data *data)
+     }
+ 
+ #ifndef GRUB_CPU_WORDS_BIGENDIAN
+-  if (data->is_16bit || data->is_gray || data->is_palette)
++  if (data->is_16bit || data->is_palette)
+ #endif
+     {
+       data->image_data = grub_calloc (data->image_height, data->row_bytes);
+@@ -859,27 +859,8 @@ grub_png_convert_image (struct grub_png_data *data)
+       int shift;
+       int mask = (1 << data->color_bits) - 1;
+       unsigned j;
+-      if (data->is_gray)
+-	{
+-	  /* Generic formula is
+-	     (0xff * i) / ((1U << data->color_bits) - 1)
+-	     but for allowed bit depth of 1, 2 and for it's
+-	     equivalent to
+-	     (0xff / ((1U << data->color_bits) - 1)) * i
+-	     Precompute the multipliers to avoid division.
+-	  */
+-
+-	  const grub_uint8_t multipliers[5] = { 0xff, 0xff, 0x55, 0x24, 0x11 };
+-	  for (i = 0; i < (1U << data->color_bits); i++)
+-	    {
+-	      grub_uint8_t col = multipliers[data->color_bits] * i;
+-	      palette[i][0] = col;
+-	      palette[i][1] = col;
+-	      palette[i][2] = col;
+-	    }
+-	}
+-      else
+-	grub_memcpy (palette, data->palette, 3 << data->color_bits);
++
++      grub_memcpy (palette, data->palette, 3 << data->color_bits);
+       d1c = d1;
+       d2c = d2;
+       for (j = 0; j < data->image_height; j++, d1c += data->image_width * 3,
+@@ -917,61 +898,7 @@ grub_png_convert_image (struct grub_png_data *data)
+       return;
+     }
+   
+-  if (data->is_gray)
+-    {
+-      switch (data->bpp)
+-	{
+-	case 4:
+-	  /* 16-bit gray with alpha.  */
+-	  for (i = 0; i < (data->image_width * data->image_height);
+-	       i++, d1 += 4, d2 += 4)
+-	    {
+-	      d1[R4] = d2[3];
+-	      d1[G4] = d2[3];
+-	      d1[B4] = d2[3];
+-	      d1[A4] = d2[1];
+-	    }
+-	  break;
+-	case 2:
+-	  if (data->is_16bit)
+-	    /* 16-bit gray without alpha.  */
+-	    {
+-	      for (i = 0; i < (data->image_width * data->image_height);
+-		   i++, d1 += 4, d2 += 2)
+-		{
+-		  d1[R3] = d2[1];
+-		  d1[G3] = d2[1];
+-		  d1[B3] = d2[1];
+-		}
+-	    }
+-	  else
+-	    /* 8-bit gray with alpha.  */
+-	    {
+-	      for (i = 0; i < (data->image_width * data->image_height);
+-		   i++, d1 += 4, d2 += 2)
+-		{
+-		  d1[R4] = d2[1];
+-		  d1[G4] = d2[1];
+-		  d1[B4] = d2[1];
+-		  d1[A4] = d2[0];
+-		}
+-	    }
+-	  break;
+-	  /* 8-bit gray without alpha.  */
+-	case 1:
+-	  for (i = 0; i < (data->image_width * data->image_height);
+-	       i++, d1 += 3, d2++)
+-	    {
+-	      d1[R3] = d2[0];
+-	      d1[G3] = d2[0];
+-	      d1[B3] = d2[0];
+-	    }
+-	  break;
+-	}
+-      return;
+-    }
+-
+-    {
++  {
+   /* Only copy the upper 8 bit.  */
+ #ifndef GRUB_CPU_WORDS_BIGENDIAN
+       for (i = 0; i < (data->image_width * data->image_height * data->bpp >> 1);
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2021-3696.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+From b18ce59d6496a9313d75f9497a0efac61dcf4191 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+Date: Wed, 20 Jul 2022 10:05:42 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2021-3696
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=grub.git;a=commit;h=210245129c932dc9e1c2748d9d35524fb95b5042]
+CVE: CVE-2021-3696
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+
+video/readers/png: Avoid heap OOB R/W inserting huff table items
+
+In fuzzing we observed crashes where a code would attempt to be inserted
+into a huffman table before the start, leading to a set of heap OOB reads
+and writes as table entries with negative indices were shifted around and
+the new code written in.
+
+Catch the case where we would underflow the array and bail.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2021-3696
+Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+---
+ grub-core/video/readers/png.c | 7 +++++++
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/video/readers/png.c b/grub-core/video/readers/png.c
+index 36b3f10..3c05951 100644
+--- a/grub-core/video/readers/png.c
++++ b/grub-core/video/readers/png.c
+@@ -416,6 +416,13 @@ grub_png_insert_huff_item (struct huff_table *ht, int code, int len)
+   for (i = len; i < ht->max_length; i++)
+     n += ht->maxval[i];
+ 
++  if (n > ht->num_values)
++    {
++      grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE,
++		  "png: out of range inserting huffman table item");
++      return;
++    }
++
+   for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
+     ht->values[ht->num_values - i] = ht->values[ht->num_values - i - 1];
+ 
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2021-3697.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+From 4de9de9d14f4ac27229e45514627534e32cc4406 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+Date: Tue, 19 Jul 2022 11:13:02 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2021-3697
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=grub.git;a=commit;h=22a3f97d39f6a10b08ad7fd1cc47c4dcd10413f6]
+CVE: CVE-2021-3697
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+
+video/readers/jpeg: Block int underflow -> wild pointer write
+
+Certain 1 px wide images caused a wild pointer write in
+grub_jpeg_ycrcb_to_rgb(). This was caused because in grub_jpeg_decode_data(),
+we have the following loop:
+
+for (; data->r1 < nr1 && (!data->dri || rst);
+     data->r1++, data->bitmap_ptr += (vb * data->image_width - hb * nc1) * 3)
+
+We did not check if vb * width >= hb * nc1.
+
+On a 64-bit platform, if that turns out to be negative, it will underflow,
+be interpreted as unsigned 64-bit, then be added to the 64-bit pointer, so
+we see data->bitmap_ptr jump, e.g.:
+
+0x6180_0000_0480 to
+0x6181_0000_0498
+     ^
+     ~--- carry has occurred and this pointer is now far away from
+          any object.
+
+On a 32-bit platform, it will decrement the pointer, creating a pointer
+that won't crash but will overwrite random data.
+
+Catch the underflow and error out.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2021-3697
+
+Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+---
+ grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c | 10 +++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c b/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c
+index 31359a4..545a60b 100644
+--- a/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c
++++ b/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c
+@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
+ #include <grub/mm.h>
+ #include <grub/misc.h>
+ #include <grub/bufio.h>
++#include <grub/safemath.h>
+ 
+ GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
+ 
+@@ -617,6 +618,7 @@ static grub_err_t
+ grub_jpeg_decode_data (struct grub_jpeg_data *data)
+ {
+   unsigned c1, vb, hb, nr1, nc1;
++  unsigned stride_a, stride_b, stride;
+   int rst = data->dri;
+ 
+   vb = 8 << data->log_vs;
+@@ -624,8 +626,14 @@ grub_jpeg_decode_data (struct grub_jpeg_data *data)
+   nr1 = (data->image_height + vb - 1) >> (3 + data->log_vs);
+   nc1 = (data->image_width + hb - 1)  >> (3 + data->log_hs);
+ 
++  if (grub_mul(vb, data->image_width, &stride_a) ||
++      grub_mul(hb, nc1, &stride_b) ||
++      grub_sub(stride_a, stride_b, &stride))
++    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE,
++		       "jpeg: cannot decode image with these dimensions");
++
+   for (; data->r1 < nr1 && (!data->dri || rst);
+-       data->r1++, data->bitmap_ptr += (vb * data->image_width - hb * nc1) * 3)
++       data->r1++, data->bitmap_ptr += stride * 3)
+     for (c1 = 0;  c1 < nc1 && (!data->dri || rst);
+ 	c1++, rst--, data->bitmap_ptr += hb * 3)
+       {
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2021-3981.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+From 67740c43c9326956ea5cd6be77f813b5499a56a5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+Date: Mon, 27 Jun 2022 10:15:29 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2021-3981
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/diff/util/grub-mkconfig.in?id=0adec29674561034771c13e446069b41ef41e4d4]
+CVE: CVE-2021-3981
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+---
+ util/grub-mkconfig.in | 6 +++++-
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/util/grub-mkconfig.in b/util/grub-mkconfig.in
+index 9f477ff..ead94a6 100644
+--- a/util/grub-mkconfig.in
++++ b/util/grub-mkconfig.in
+@@ -287,7 +287,11 @@ and /etc/grub.d/* files or please file a bug report with
+     exit 1
+   else
+     # none of the children aborted with error, install the new grub.cfg
+-    mv -f ${grub_cfg}.new ${grub_cfg}
++    oldumask=$(umask)
++    umask 077
++    cat ${grub_cfg}.new > ${grub_cfg}
++    umask $oldumask
++    rm -f ${grub_cfg}.new
+   fi
+ fi
+ 
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2022-2601.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+From e8060722acf0bcca037982d7fb29472363ccdfd4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Zhang Boyang <zhangboyang.id@gmail.com>
+Date: Fri, 5 Aug 2022 01:58:27 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] font: Fix several integer overflows in
+ grub_font_construct_glyph()
+
+This patch fixes several integer overflows in grub_font_construct_glyph().
+Glyphs of invalid size, zero or leading to an overflow, are rejected.
+The inconsistency between "glyph" and "max_glyph_size" when grub_malloc()
+returns NULL is fixed too.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2022-2601
+
+Reported-by: Zhang Boyang <zhangboyang.id@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Zhang Boyang <zhangboyang.id@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+
+Signed-off-by: Xiangyu Chen <xiangyu.chen@windriver.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=768e1ef2fc159f6e14e7246e4be09363708ac39e]
+CVE: CVE-2022-2601
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+---
+ grub-core/font/font.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++------------
+ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/font/font.c b/grub-core/font/font.c
+index df17dba..f110db9 100644
+--- a/grub-core/font/font.c
++++ b/grub-core/font/font.c
+@@ -1509,6 +1509,7 @@ grub_font_construct_glyph (grub_font_t hinted_font,
+   struct grub_video_signed_rect bounds;
+   static struct grub_font_glyph *glyph = 0;
+   static grub_size_t max_glyph_size = 0;
++  grub_size_t cur_glyph_size;
+ 
+   ensure_comb_space (glyph_id);
+ 
+@@ -1525,29 +1526,33 @@ grub_font_construct_glyph (grub_font_t hinted_font,
+   if (!glyph_id->ncomb && !glyph_id->attributes)
+     return main_glyph;
+ 
+-  if (max_glyph_size < sizeof (*glyph) + (bounds.width * bounds.height + GRUB_CHAR_BIT - 1) / GRUB_CHAR_BIT)
++  if (grub_video_bitmap_calc_1bpp_bufsz (bounds.width, bounds.height, &cur_glyph_size) ||
++      grub_add (sizeof (*glyph), cur_glyph_size, &cur_glyph_size))
++    return main_glyph;
++
++  if (max_glyph_size < cur_glyph_size)
+     {
+       grub_free (glyph);
+-      max_glyph_size = (sizeof (*glyph) + (bounds.width * bounds.height + GRUB_CHAR_BIT - 1) / GRUB_CHAR_BIT) * 2;
+-      if (max_glyph_size < 8)
+-	max_glyph_size = 8;
+-      glyph = grub_malloc (max_glyph_size);
++      if (grub_mul (cur_glyph_size, 2, &max_glyph_size))
++	max_glyph_size = 0;
++      glyph = max_glyph_size > 0 ? grub_malloc (max_glyph_size) : NULL;
+     }
+   if (!glyph)
+     {
++      max_glyph_size = 0;
+       grub_errno = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+       return main_glyph;
+     }
+ 
+-  grub_memset (glyph, 0, sizeof (*glyph)
+-	       + (bounds.width * bounds.height
+-		  + GRUB_CHAR_BIT - 1) / GRUB_CHAR_BIT);
++  grub_memset (glyph, 0, cur_glyph_size);
+ 
+   glyph->font = main_glyph->font;
+-  glyph->width = bounds.width;
+-  glyph->height = bounds.height;
+-  glyph->offset_x = bounds.x;
+-  glyph->offset_y = bounds.y;
++  if (bounds.width == 0 || bounds.height == 0 ||
++      grub_cast (bounds.width, &glyph->width) ||
++      grub_cast (bounds.height, &glyph->height) ||
++      grub_cast (bounds.x, &glyph->offset_x) ||
++      grub_cast (bounds.y, &glyph->offset_y))
++    return main_glyph;
+ 
+   if (glyph_id->attributes & GRUB_UNICODE_GLYPH_ATTRIBUTE_MIRROR)
+     grub_font_blit_glyph_mirror (glyph, main_glyph,
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2022-28733.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+From 415fb5eb83cbd3b5cfc25ac1290f2de4fe3d231c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+Date: Mon, 1 Aug 2022 10:48:34 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2022-28733
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=grub.git;a=commit;h=3e4817538de828319ba6d59ced2fbb9b5ca13287]
+CVE: CVE-2022-28733
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+
+net/ip: Do IP fragment maths safely
+
+We can receive packets with invalid IP fragmentation information. This
+can lead to rsm->total_len underflowing and becoming very large.
+
+Then, in grub_netbuff_alloc(), we add to this very large number, which can
+cause it to overflow and wrap back around to a small positive number.
+The allocation then succeeds, but the resulting buffer is too small and
+subsequent operations can write past the end of the buffer.
+
+Catch the underflow here.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2022-28733
+
+Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+---
+ grub-core/net/ip.c | 10 +++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/net/ip.c b/grub-core/net/ip.c
+index ea5edf8..74e4e8b 100644
+--- a/grub-core/net/ip.c
++++ b/grub-core/net/ip.c
+@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
+ #include <grub/net/netbuff.h>
+ #include <grub/mm.h>
+ #include <grub/priority_queue.h>
++#include <grub/safemath.h>
+ #include <grub/time.h>
+ 
+ struct iphdr {
+@@ -512,7 +513,14 @@ grub_net_recv_ip4_packets (struct grub_net_buff *nb,
+     {
+       rsm->total_len = (8 * (grub_be_to_cpu16 (iph->frags) & OFFSET_MASK)
+ 			+ (nb->tail - nb->data));
+-      rsm->total_len -= ((iph->verhdrlen & 0xf) * sizeof (grub_uint32_t));
++
++      if (grub_sub (rsm->total_len, (iph->verhdrlen & 0xf) * sizeof (grub_uint32_t),
++		    &rsm->total_len))
++	{
++	  grub_dprintf ("net", "IP reassembly size underflow\n");
++	  return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
++	}
++
+       rsm->asm_netbuff = grub_netbuff_alloc (rsm->total_len);
+       if (!rsm->asm_netbuff)
+ 	{
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2022-28734.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+From f03f09c2a07eae7f3a4646e33a406ae2689afb9e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+Date: Mon, 1 Aug 2022 10:59:41 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2022-28734
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=grub.git;a=commit;h=b26b4c08e7119281ff30d0fb4a6169bd2afa8fe4]
+CVE: CVE-2022-28734
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+
+net/http: Fix OOB write for split http headers
+
+GRUB has special code for handling an http header that is split
+across two packets.
+
+The code tracks the end of line by looking for a "\n" byte. The
+code for split headers has always advanced the pointer just past the
+end of the line, whereas the code that handles unsplit headers does
+not advance the pointer. This extra advance causes the length to be
+one greater, which breaks an assumption in parse_line(), leading to
+it writing a NUL byte one byte past the end of the buffer where we
+reconstruct the line from the two packets.
+
+It's conceivable that an attacker controlled set of packets could
+cause this to zero out the first byte of the "next" pointer of the
+grub_mm_region structure following the current_line buffer.
+
+Do not advance the pointer in the split header case.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2022-28734
+---
+ grub-core/net/http.c | 12 +++++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/net/http.c b/grub-core/net/http.c
+index 5aa4ad3..a220d21 100644
+--- a/grub-core/net/http.c
++++ b/grub-core/net/http.c
+@@ -68,7 +68,15 @@ parse_line (grub_file_t file, http_data_t data, char *ptr, grub_size_t len)
+   char *end = ptr + len;
+   while (end > ptr && *(end - 1) == '\r')
+     end--;
++
++  /* LF without CR. */
++  if (end == ptr + len)
++    {
++      data->errmsg = grub_strdup (_("invalid HTTP header - LF without CR"));
++      return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
++    }
+   *end = 0;
++
+   /* Trailing CRLF.  */
+   if (data->in_chunk_len == 1)
+     {
+@@ -190,9 +198,7 @@ http_receive (grub_net_tcp_socket_t sock __attribute__ ((unused)),
+ 	  int have_line = 1;
+ 	  char *t;
+ 	  ptr = grub_memchr (nb->data, '\n', nb->tail - nb->data);
+-	  if (ptr)
+-	    ptr++;
+-	  else
++	  if (ptr == NULL)
+ 	    {
+ 	      have_line = 0;
+ 	      ptr = (char *) nb->tail;
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2022-28735.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,271 @@
+From 6fe755c5c07bb386fda58306bfd19e4a1c974c53 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Julian Andres Klode <julian.klode@canonical.com>
+Date: Thu, 2 Dec 2021 15:03:53 +0100
+Subject: kern/efi/sb: Reject non-kernel files in the shim_lock verifier
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=6fe755c5c07bb386fda58306bfd19e4a1c974c53]
+CVE: CVE-2022-28735
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+
+We must not allow other verifiers to pass things like the GRUB modules.
+Instead of maintaining a blocklist, maintain an allowlist of things
+that we do not care about.
+
+This allowlist really should be made reusable, and shared by the
+lockdown verifier, but this is the minimal patch addressing
+security concerns where the TPM verifier was able to mark modules
+as verified (or the OpenPGP verifier for that matter), when it
+should not do so on shim-powered secure boot systems.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2022-28735
+
+Signed-off-by: Julian Andres Klode <julian.klode@canonical.com>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+---
+ grub-core/kern/efi/sb.c | 221 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ include/grub/verify.h   |   1 +
+ 2 files changed, 222 insertions(+)
+ create mode 100644 grub-core/kern/efi/sb.c
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/kern/efi/sb.c b/grub-core/kern/efi/sb.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..89c4bb3
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/grub-core/kern/efi/sb.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,221 @@
++/*
++ *  GRUB  --  GRand Unified Bootloader
++ *  Copyright (C) 2020  Free Software Foundation, Inc.
++ *
++ *  GRUB is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
++ *  it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
++ *  the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
++ *  (at your option) any later version.
++ *
++ *  GRUB is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
++ *  but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
++ *  MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
++ *  GNU General Public License for more details.
++ *
++ *  You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
++ *  along with GRUB.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
++ *
++ *  UEFI Secure Boot related checkings.
++ */
++
++#include <grub/efi/efi.h>
++#include <grub/efi/pe32.h>
++#include <grub/efi/sb.h>
++#include <grub/env.h>
++#include <grub/err.h>
++#include <grub/file.h>
++#include <grub/i386/linux.h>
++#include <grub/kernel.h>
++#include <grub/mm.h>
++#include <grub/types.h>
++#include <grub/verify.h>
++
++static grub_efi_guid_t shim_lock_guid = GRUB_EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID;
++
++/*
++ * Determine whether we're in secure boot mode.
++ *
++ * Please keep the logic in sync with the Linux kernel,
++ * drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c:efi_get_secureboot().
++ */
++grub_uint8_t
++grub_efi_get_secureboot (void)
++{
++  static grub_efi_guid_t efi_variable_guid = GRUB_EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID;
++  grub_efi_status_t status;
++  grub_efi_uint32_t attr = 0;
++  grub_size_t size = 0;
++  grub_uint8_t *secboot = NULL;
++  grub_uint8_t *setupmode = NULL;
++  grub_uint8_t *moksbstate = NULL;
++  grub_uint8_t secureboot = GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_UNKNOWN;
++  const char *secureboot_str = "UNKNOWN";
++
++  status = grub_efi_get_variable ("SecureBoot", &efi_variable_guid,
++				  &size, (void **) &secboot);
++
++  if (status == GRUB_EFI_NOT_FOUND)
++    {
++      secureboot = GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_DISABLED;
++      goto out;
++    }
++
++  if (status != GRUB_EFI_SUCCESS)
++    goto out;
++
++  status = grub_efi_get_variable ("SetupMode", &efi_variable_guid,
++				  &size, (void **) &setupmode);
++
++  if (status != GRUB_EFI_SUCCESS)
++    goto out;
++
++  if ((*secboot == 0) || (*setupmode == 1))
++    {
++      secureboot = GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_DISABLED;
++      goto out;
++    }
++
++  /*
++   * See if a user has put the shim into insecure mode. If so, and if the
++   * variable doesn't have the runtime attribute set, we might as well
++   * honor that.
++   */
++  status = grub_efi_get_variable_with_attributes ("MokSBState", &shim_lock_guid,
++						  &size, (void **) &moksbstate, &attr);
++
++  /* If it fails, we don't care why. Default to secure. */
++  if (status != GRUB_EFI_SUCCESS)
++    {
++      secureboot = GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_ENABLED;
++      goto out;
++    }
++
++  if (!(attr & GRUB_EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS) && *moksbstate == 1)
++    {
++      secureboot = GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_DISABLED;
++      goto out;
++    }
++
++  secureboot = GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_ENABLED;
++
++ out:
++  grub_free (moksbstate);
++  grub_free (setupmode);
++  grub_free (secboot);
++
++  if (secureboot == GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_DISABLED)
++    secureboot_str = "Disabled";
++  else if (secureboot == GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_ENABLED)
++    secureboot_str = "Enabled";
++
++  grub_dprintf ("efi", "UEFI Secure Boot state: %s\n", secureboot_str);
++
++  return secureboot;
++}
++
++static grub_err_t
++shim_lock_verifier_init (grub_file_t io __attribute__ ((unused)),
++			 enum grub_file_type type,
++			 void **context __attribute__ ((unused)),
++			 enum grub_verify_flags *flags)
++{
++  *flags = GRUB_VERIFY_FLAGS_NONE;
++
++  switch (type & GRUB_FILE_TYPE_MASK)
++    {
++    /* Files we check. */
++    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_LINUX_KERNEL:
++    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_MULTIBOOT_KERNEL:
++    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_BSD_KERNEL:
++    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_XNU_KERNEL:
++    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_PLAN9_KERNEL:
++    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_EFI_CHAINLOADED_IMAGE:
++      *flags = GRUB_VERIFY_FLAGS_SINGLE_CHUNK;
++      return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
++
++    /* Files that do not affect secureboot state. */
++    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_NONE:
++    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_LOOPBACK:
++    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_LINUX_INITRD:
++    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_OPENBSD_RAMDISK:
++    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_XNU_RAMDISK:
++    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_SIGNATURE:
++    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY:
++    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_TRUST:
++    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_PRINT_BLOCKLIST:
++    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_TESTLOAD:
++    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_GET_SIZE:
++    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_FONT:
++    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_ZFS_ENCRYPTION_KEY:
++    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_CAT:
++    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_HEXCAT:
++    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_CMP:
++    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_HASHLIST:
++    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_TO_HASH:
++    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_KEYBOARD_LAYOUT:
++    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_PIXMAP:
++    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_GRUB_MODULE_LIST:
++    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_CONFIG:
++    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_THEME:
++    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_GETTEXT_CATALOG:
++    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_FS_SEARCH:
++    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_LOADENV:
++    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_SAVEENV:
++    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_VERIFY_SIGNATURE:
++      *flags = GRUB_VERIFY_FLAGS_SKIP_VERIFICATION;
++      return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
++
++    /* Other files. */
++    default:
++      return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_ACCESS_DENIED, N_("prohibited by secure boot policy"));
++    }
++}
++
++static grub_err_t
++shim_lock_verifier_write (void *context __attribute__ ((unused)), void *buf, grub_size_t size)
++{
++  grub_efi_shim_lock_protocol_t *sl = grub_efi_locate_protocol (&shim_lock_guid, 0);
++
++  if (!sl)
++    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_ACCESS_DENIED, N_("shim_lock protocol not found"));
++
++  if (sl->verify (buf, size) != GRUB_EFI_SUCCESS)
++    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE, N_("bad shim signature"));
++
++  return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
++}
++
++struct grub_file_verifier shim_lock_verifier =
++  {
++    .name = "shim_lock_verifier",
++    .init = shim_lock_verifier_init,
++    .write = shim_lock_verifier_write
++  };
++
++void
++grub_shim_lock_verifier_setup (void)
++{
++  struct grub_module_header *header;
++  grub_efi_shim_lock_protocol_t *sl =
++    grub_efi_locate_protocol (&shim_lock_guid, 0);
++
++  /* shim_lock is missing, check if GRUB image is built with --disable-shim-lock. */
++  if (!sl)
++    {
++      FOR_MODULES (header)
++	{
++	  if (header->type == OBJ_TYPE_DISABLE_SHIM_LOCK)
++	    return;
++	}
++    }
++
++  /* Secure Boot is off. Do not load shim_lock. */
++  if (grub_efi_get_secureboot () != GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_ENABLED)
++    return;
++
++  /* Enforce shim_lock_verifier. */
++  grub_verifier_register (&shim_lock_verifier);
++
++  grub_env_set ("shim_lock", "y");
++  grub_env_export ("shim_lock");
++}
+diff --git a/include/grub/verify.h b/include/grub/verify.h
+index cd129c3..672ae16 100644
+--- a/include/grub/verify.h
++++ b/include/grub/verify.h
+@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
+ 
+ enum grub_verify_flags
+   {
++    GRUB_VERIFY_FLAGS_NONE		= 0,
+     GRUB_VERIFY_FLAGS_SKIP_VERIFICATION	= 1,
+     GRUB_VERIFY_FLAGS_SINGLE_CHUNK	= 2,
+     /* Defer verification to another authority. */
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2022-28736.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,275 @@
+From 431a111c60095fc973d83fe9209f26f29ce78784 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+Date: Mon, 1 Aug 2022 11:17:17 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2022-28736
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=grub.git;a=commit;h=04c86e0bb7b58fc2f913f798cdb18934933e532d]
+CVE: CVE-2022-28736
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+
+loader/efi/chainloader: Use grub_loader_set_ex()
+
+This ports the EFI chainloader to use grub_loader_set_ex() in order to fix
+a use-after-free bug that occurs when grub_cmd_chainloader() is executed
+more than once before a boot attempt is performed.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2022-28736
+
+Signed-off-by: Chris Coulson <chris.coulson@canonical.com>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+---
+ grub-core/commands/boot.c          | 66 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
+ grub-core/loader/efi/chainloader.c | 46 +++++++++++----------
+ include/grub/loader.h              |  5 +++
+ 3 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/commands/boot.c b/grub-core/commands/boot.c
+index bbca81e..6151478 100644
+--- a/grub-core/commands/boot.c
++++ b/grub-core/commands/boot.c
+@@ -27,10 +27,20 @@
+ 
+ GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
+ 
+-static grub_err_t (*grub_loader_boot_func) (void);
+-static grub_err_t (*grub_loader_unload_func) (void);
++static grub_err_t (*grub_loader_boot_func) (void *context);
++static grub_err_t (*grub_loader_unload_func) (void *context);
++static void *grub_loader_context;
+ static int grub_loader_flags;
+ 
++struct grub_simple_loader_hooks
++{
++  grub_err_t (*boot) (void);
++  grub_err_t (*unload) (void);
++};
++
++/* Don't heap allocate this to avoid making grub_loader_set() fallible. */
++static struct grub_simple_loader_hooks simple_loader_hooks;
++
+ struct grub_preboot
+ {
+   grub_err_t (*preboot_func) (int);
+@@ -44,6 +54,29 @@ static int grub_loader_loaded;
+ static struct grub_preboot *preboots_head = 0,
+   *preboots_tail = 0;
+ 
++static grub_err_t
++grub_simple_boot_hook (void *context)
++{
++  struct grub_simple_loader_hooks *hooks;
++
++  hooks = (struct grub_simple_loader_hooks *) context;
++  return hooks->boot ();
++}
++
++static grub_err_t
++grub_simple_unload_hook (void *context)
++{
++  struct grub_simple_loader_hooks *hooks;
++  grub_err_t ret;
++
++  hooks = (struct grub_simple_loader_hooks *) context;
++
++  ret = hooks->unload ();
++  grub_memset (hooks, 0, sizeof (*hooks));
++
++  return ret;
++}
++
+ int
+ grub_loader_is_loaded (void)
+ {
+@@ -110,28 +143,45 @@ grub_loader_unregister_preboot_hook (struct grub_preboot *hnd)
+ }
+ 
+ void
+-grub_loader_set (grub_err_t (*boot) (void),
+-		 grub_err_t (*unload) (void),
+-		 int flags)
++grub_loader_set_ex (grub_err_t (*boot) (void *context),
++		    grub_err_t (*unload) (void *context),
++		    void *context,
++		    int flags)
+ {
+   if (grub_loader_loaded && grub_loader_unload_func)
+-    grub_loader_unload_func ();
++    grub_loader_unload_func (grub_loader_context);
+ 
+   grub_loader_boot_func = boot;
+   grub_loader_unload_func = unload;
++  grub_loader_context = context;
+   grub_loader_flags = flags;
+ 
+   grub_loader_loaded = 1;
+ }
+ 
++void
++grub_loader_set (grub_err_t (*boot) (void),
++		 grub_err_t (*unload) (void),
++		 int flags)
++{
++  grub_loader_set_ex (grub_simple_boot_hook,
++		      grub_simple_unload_hook,
++		      &simple_loader_hooks,
++		      flags);
++
++  simple_loader_hooks.boot = boot;
++  simple_loader_hooks.unload = unload;
++}
++
+ void
+ grub_loader_unset(void)
+ {
+   if (grub_loader_loaded && grub_loader_unload_func)
+-    grub_loader_unload_func ();
++    grub_loader_unload_func (grub_loader_context);
+ 
+   grub_loader_boot_func = 0;
+   grub_loader_unload_func = 0;
++  grub_loader_context = 0;
+ 
+   grub_loader_loaded = 0;
+ }
+@@ -158,7 +208,7 @@ grub_loader_boot (void)
+ 	  return err;
+ 	}
+     }
+-  err = (grub_loader_boot_func) ();
++  err = (grub_loader_boot_func) (grub_loader_context);
+ 
+   for (cur = preboots_tail; cur; cur = cur->prev)
+     if (! err)
+diff --git a/grub-core/loader/efi/chainloader.c b/grub-core/loader/efi/chainloader.c
+index a8d7b91..93a028a 100644
+--- a/grub-core/loader/efi/chainloader.c
++++ b/grub-core/loader/efi/chainloader.c
+@@ -44,33 +44,28 @@ GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
+ 
+ static grub_dl_t my_mod;
+ 
+-static grub_efi_physical_address_t address;
+-static grub_efi_uintn_t pages;
+-static grub_efi_device_path_t *file_path;
+-static grub_efi_handle_t image_handle;
+-static grub_efi_char16_t *cmdline;
+-
+ static grub_err_t
+-grub_chainloader_unload (void)
++grub_chainloader_unload (void *context)
+ {
++  grub_efi_handle_t image_handle = (grub_efi_handle_t) context;
++  grub_efi_loaded_image_t *loaded_image;
+   grub_efi_boot_services_t *b;
+ 
++  loaded_image = grub_efi_get_loaded_image (image_handle);
++  if (loaded_image != NULL)
++    grub_free (loaded_image->load_options);
++
+   b = grub_efi_system_table->boot_services;
+   efi_call_1 (b->unload_image, image_handle);
+-  efi_call_2 (b->free_pages, address, pages);
+-
+-  grub_free (file_path);
+-  grub_free (cmdline);
+-  cmdline = 0;
+-  file_path = 0;
+ 
+   grub_dl_unref (my_mod);
+   return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+ }
+ 
+ static grub_err_t
+-grub_chainloader_boot (void)
++grub_chainloader_boot (void *context)
+ {
++  grub_efi_handle_t image_handle = (grub_efi_handle_t) context;
+   grub_efi_boot_services_t *b;
+   grub_efi_status_t status;
+   grub_efi_uintn_t exit_data_size;
+@@ -139,7 +134,7 @@ make_file_path (grub_efi_device_path_t *dp, const char *filename)
+   char *dir_start;
+   char *dir_end;
+   grub_size_t size;
+-  grub_efi_device_path_t *d;
++  grub_efi_device_path_t *d, *file_path;
+ 
+   dir_start = grub_strchr (filename, ')');
+   if (! dir_start)
+@@ -215,11 +210,15 @@ grub_cmd_chainloader (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),
+   grub_efi_status_t status;
+   grub_efi_boot_services_t *b;
+   grub_device_t dev = 0;
+-  grub_efi_device_path_t *dp = 0;
++  grub_efi_device_path_t *dp = NULL, *file_path = NULL;
+   grub_efi_loaded_image_t *loaded_image;
+   char *filename;
+   void *boot_image = 0;
+   grub_efi_handle_t dev_handle = 0;
++  grub_efi_physical_address_t address = 0;
++  grub_efi_uintn_t pages = 0;
++  grub_efi_char16_t *cmdline = NULL;
++  grub_efi_handle_t image_handle = NULL;
+ 
+   if (argc == 0)
+     return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, N_("filename expected"));
+@@ -227,11 +226,6 @@ grub_cmd_chainloader (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),
+ 
+   grub_dl_ref (my_mod);
+ 
+-  /* Initialize some global variables.  */
+-  address = 0;
+-  image_handle = 0;
+-  file_path = 0;
+-
+   b = grub_efi_system_table->boot_services;
+ 
+   file = grub_file_open (filename, GRUB_FILE_TYPE_EFI_CHAINLOADED_IMAGE);
+@@ -401,7 +395,11 @@ grub_cmd_chainloader (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),
+   grub_file_close (file);
+   grub_device_close (dev);
+ 
+-  grub_loader_set (grub_chainloader_boot, grub_chainloader_unload, 0);
++  /* We're finished with the source image buffer and file path now. */
++  efi_call_2 (b->free_pages, address, pages);
++  grub_free (file_path);
++
++  grub_loader_set_ex (grub_chainloader_boot, grub_chainloader_unload, image_handle, 0);
+   return 0;
+ 
+  fail:
+@@ -412,11 +410,15 @@ grub_cmd_chainloader (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),
+   if (file)
+     grub_file_close (file);
+ 
++  grub_free (cmdline);
+   grub_free (file_path);
+ 
+   if (address)
+     efi_call_2 (b->free_pages, address, pages);
+ 
++  if (image_handle != NULL)
++    efi_call_1 (b->unload_image, image_handle);
++
+   grub_dl_unref (my_mod);
+ 
+   return grub_errno;
+diff --git a/include/grub/loader.h b/include/grub/loader.h
+index 7f82a49..3071a50 100644
+--- a/include/grub/loader.h
++++ b/include/grub/loader.h
+@@ -39,6 +39,11 @@ void EXPORT_FUNC (grub_loader_set) (grub_err_t (*boot) (void),
+ 				    grub_err_t (*unload) (void),
+ 				    int flags);
+ 
++void EXPORT_FUNC (grub_loader_set_ex) (grub_err_t (*boot) (void *context),
++				       grub_err_t (*unload) (void *context),
++				       void *context,
++				       int flags);
++
+ /* Unset current loader, if any.  */
+ void EXPORT_FUNC (grub_loader_unset) (void);
+ 
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2022-3775.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+From fdbe7209152ad6f09a1166f64f162017f2145ba3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Zhang Boyang <zhangboyang.id@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 24 Oct 2022 08:05:35 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] font: Fix an integer underflow in blit_comb()
+
+The expression (ctx.bounds.height - combining_glyphs[i]->height) / 2 may
+evaluate to a very big invalid value even if both ctx.bounds.height and
+combining_glyphs[i]->height are small integers. For example, if
+ctx.bounds.height is 10 and combining_glyphs[i]->height is 12, this
+expression evaluates to 2147483647 (expected -1). This is because
+coordinates are allowed to be negative but ctx.bounds.height is an
+unsigned int. So, the subtraction operates on unsigned ints and
+underflows to a very big value. The division makes things even worse.
+The quotient is still an invalid value even if converted back to int.
+
+This patch fixes the problem by casting ctx.bounds.height to int. As
+a result the subtraction will operate on int and grub_uint16_t which
+will be promoted to an int. So, the underflow will no longer happen. Other
+uses of ctx.bounds.height (and ctx.bounds.width) are also casted to int,
+to ensure coordinates are always calculated on signed integers.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2022-3775
+
+Reported-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
+Signed-off-by: Zhang Boyang <zhangboyang.id@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+
+Signed-off-by: Xiangyu Chen <xiangyu.chen@windriver.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=992c06191babc1e109caf40d6a07ec6fdef427af]
+CVE: CVE-2022-3775
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+---
+ grub-core/font/font.c | 16 ++++++++--------
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/font/font.c b/grub-core/font/font.c
+index f110db9..3b76b22 100644
+--- a/grub-core/font/font.c
++++ b/grub-core/font/font.c
+@@ -1200,12 +1200,12 @@ blit_comb (const struct grub_unicode_glyph *glyph_id,
+   ctx.bounds.height = main_glyph->height;
+ 
+   above_rightx = main_glyph->offset_x + main_glyph->width;
+-  above_righty = ctx.bounds.y + ctx.bounds.height;
++  above_righty = ctx.bounds.y + (int) ctx.bounds.height;
+ 
+   above_leftx = main_glyph->offset_x;
+-  above_lefty = ctx.bounds.y + ctx.bounds.height;
++  above_lefty = ctx.bounds.y + (int) ctx.bounds.height;
+ 
+-  below_rightx = ctx.bounds.x + ctx.bounds.width;
++  below_rightx = ctx.bounds.x + (int) ctx.bounds.width;
+   below_righty = ctx.bounds.y;
+ 
+   comb = grub_unicode_get_comb (glyph_id);
+@@ -1218,7 +1218,7 @@ blit_comb (const struct grub_unicode_glyph *glyph_id,
+ 
+       if (!combining_glyphs[i])
+ 	continue;
+-      targetx = (ctx.bounds.width - combining_glyphs[i]->width) / 2 + ctx.bounds.x;
++      targetx = ((int) ctx.bounds.width - combining_glyphs[i]->width) / 2 + ctx.bounds.x;
+       /* CGJ is to avoid diacritics reordering. */
+       if (comb[i].code
+ 	  == GRUB_UNICODE_COMBINING_GRAPHEME_JOINER)
+@@ -1228,8 +1228,8 @@ blit_comb (const struct grub_unicode_glyph *glyph_id,
+ 	case GRUB_UNICODE_COMB_OVERLAY:
+ 	  do_blit (combining_glyphs[i],
+ 		   targetx,
+-		   (ctx.bounds.height - combining_glyphs[i]->height) / 2
+-		   - (ctx.bounds.height + ctx.bounds.y), &ctx);
++		   ((int) ctx.bounds.height - combining_glyphs[i]->height) / 2
++		   - ((int) ctx.bounds.height + ctx.bounds.y), &ctx);
+ 	  if (min_devwidth < combining_glyphs[i]->width)
+ 	    min_devwidth = combining_glyphs[i]->width;
+ 	  break;
+@@ -1302,7 +1302,7 @@ blit_comb (const struct grub_unicode_glyph *glyph_id,
+ 	  /* Fallthrough.  */
+ 	case GRUB_UNICODE_STACK_ATTACHED_ABOVE:
+ 	  do_blit (combining_glyphs[i], targetx,
+-		   -(ctx.bounds.height + ctx.bounds.y + space
++		   -((int) ctx.bounds.height + ctx.bounds.y + space
+ 		     + combining_glyphs[i]->height), &ctx);
+ 	  if (min_devwidth < combining_glyphs[i]->width)
+ 	    min_devwidth = combining_glyphs[i]->width;
+@@ -1310,7 +1310,7 @@ blit_comb (const struct grub_unicode_glyph *glyph_id,
+ 
+ 	case GRUB_UNICODE_COMB_HEBREW_DAGESH:
+ 	  do_blit (combining_glyphs[i], targetx,
+-		   -(ctx.bounds.height / 2 + ctx.bounds.y
++		   -((int) ctx.bounds.height / 2 + ctx.bounds.y
+ 		     + combining_glyphs[i]->height / 2), &ctx);
+ 	  if (min_devwidth < combining_glyphs[i]->width)
+ 	    min_devwidth = combining_glyphs[i]->width;
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/font-Fix-size-overflow-in-grub_font_get_glyph_intern.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+From 1f511ae054fe42dce7aedfbfe0f234fa1e0a7a3e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Zhang Boyang <zhangboyang.id@gmail.com>
+Date: Fri, 5 Aug 2022 00:51:20 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] font: Fix size overflow in grub_font_get_glyph_internal()
+
+The length of memory allocation and file read may overflow. This patch
+fixes the problem by using safemath macros.
+
+There is a lot of code repetition like "(x * y + 7) / 8". It is unsafe
+if overflow happens. This patch introduces grub_video_bitmap_calc_1bpp_bufsz().
+It is safe replacement for such code. It has safemath-like prototype.
+
+This patch also introduces grub_cast(value, pointer), it casts value to
+typeof(*pointer) then store the value to *pointer. It returns true when
+overflow occurs or false if there is no overflow. The semantics of arguments
+and return value are designed to be consistent with other safemath macros.
+
+Signed-off-by: Zhang Boyang <zhangboyang.id@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=9c76ec09ae08155df27cd237eaea150b4f02f532]
+
+Signed-off-by: Xiangyu Chen <xiangyu.chen@windriver.com>
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+---
+ grub-core/font/font.c   | 17 +++++++++++++----
+ include/grub/bitmap.h   | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
+ include/grub/safemath.h |  2 ++
+ 3 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/font/font.c b/grub-core/font/font.c
+index 5edb477..df17dba 100644
+--- a/grub-core/font/font.c
++++ b/grub-core/font/font.c
+@@ -733,7 +733,8 @@ grub_font_get_glyph_internal (grub_font_t font, grub_uint32_t code)
+       grub_int16_t xoff;
+       grub_int16_t yoff;
+       grub_int16_t dwidth;
+-      int len;
++      grub_ssize_t len;
++      grub_size_t sz;
+ 
+       if (index_entry->glyph)
+ 	/* Return cached glyph.  */
+@@ -760,9 +761,17 @@ grub_font_get_glyph_internal (grub_font_t font, grub_uint32_t code)
+ 	  return 0;
+ 	}
+ 
+-      len = (width * height + 7) / 8;
+-      glyph = grub_malloc (sizeof (struct grub_font_glyph) + len);
+-      if (!glyph)
++      /* Calculate real struct size of current glyph. */
++      if (grub_video_bitmap_calc_1bpp_bufsz (width, height, &len) ||
++	  grub_add (sizeof (struct grub_font_glyph), len, &sz))
++	{
++	  remove_font (font);
++	  return 0;
++	}
++
++      /* Allocate and initialize the glyph struct. */
++      glyph = grub_malloc (sz);
++      if (glyph == NULL)
+ 	{
+ 	  remove_font (font);
+ 	  return 0;
+diff --git a/include/grub/bitmap.h b/include/grub/bitmap.h
+index 5728f8c..0d9603f 100644
+--- a/include/grub/bitmap.h
++++ b/include/grub/bitmap.h
+@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
+ #include <grub/symbol.h>
+ #include <grub/types.h>
+ #include <grub/video.h>
++#include <grub/safemath.h>
+ 
+ struct grub_video_bitmap
+ {
+@@ -79,6 +80,23 @@ grub_video_bitmap_get_height (struct grub_video_bitmap *bitmap)
+   return bitmap->mode_info.height;
+ }
+ 
++/*
++ * Calculate and store the size of data buffer of 1bit bitmap in result.
++ * Equivalent to "*result = (width * height + 7) / 8" if no overflow occurs.
++ * Return true when overflow occurs or false if there is no overflow.
++ * This function is intentionally implemented as a macro instead of
++ * an inline function. Although a bit awkward, it preserves data types for
++ * safemath macros and reduces macro side effects as much as possible.
++ *
++ * XXX: Will report false overflow if width * height > UINT64_MAX.
++ */
++#define grub_video_bitmap_calc_1bpp_bufsz(width, height, result) \
++({ \
++  grub_uint64_t _bitmap_pixels; \
++  grub_mul ((width), (height), &_bitmap_pixels) ? 1 : \
++    grub_cast (_bitmap_pixels / GRUB_CHAR_BIT + !!(_bitmap_pixels % GRUB_CHAR_BIT), (result)); \
++})
++
+ void EXPORT_FUNC (grub_video_bitmap_get_mode_info) (struct grub_video_bitmap *bitmap,
+ 						    struct grub_video_mode_info *mode_info);
+ 
+diff --git a/include/grub/safemath.h b/include/grub/safemath.h
+index c17b89b..bb0f826 100644
+--- a/include/grub/safemath.h
++++ b/include/grub/safemath.h
+@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@
+ #define grub_sub(a, b, res)	__builtin_sub_overflow(a, b, res)
+ #define grub_mul(a, b, res)	__builtin_mul_overflow(a, b, res)
+ 
++#define grub_cast(a, res)	grub_add ((a), 0, (res))
++
+ #else
+ #error gcc 5.1 or newer or clang 3.8 or newer is required
+ #endif
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc

@@ -95,6 +95,17 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://0044-script-execute-Fix-NULL-dereference-in-grub_script_e.patch \
            file://0045-commands-ls-Require-device_name-is-not-NULL-before-p.patch \
            file://0046-script-execute-Avoid-crash-when-using-outside-a-func.patch \
+           file://CVE-2021-3981.patch \
+           file://CVE-2021-3695.patch \
+           file://CVE-2021-3696.patch \
+           file://CVE-2021-3697.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-28733.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-28734.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-28736.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-28735.patch \
+           file://font-Fix-size-overflow-in-grub_font_get_glyph_intern.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-2601.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-3775.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"

meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2022-2795.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+From 36c878a0124973f29b7ca49e6bb18310f9b2601f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Micha=C5=82=20K=C4=99pie=C5=84?= <michal@isc.org>
+Date: Thu, 8 Sep 2022 11:11:30 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 1/3] Bound the amount of work performed for delegations
+
+Limit the amount of database lookups that can be triggered in
+fctx_getaddresses() (i.e. when determining the name server addresses to
+query next) by setting a hard limit on the number of NS RRs processed
+for any delegation encountered.  Without any limit in place, named can
+be forced to perform large amounts of database lookups per each query
+received, which severely impacts resolver performance.
+
+The limit used (20) is an arbitrary value that is considered to be big
+enough for any sane DNS delegation.
+
+(cherry picked from commit 3a44097fd6c6c260765b628cd1d2c9cb7efb0b2a)
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+CVE: CVE-2022-2795
+Reference to upstream patch:
+https://gitlab.isc.org/isc-projects/bind9/-/commit/bf2ea6d8525bfd96a84dad221ba9e004adb710a8
+
+Signed-off-by: Mathieu Dubois-Briand <mbriand@witekio.com>
+---
+ lib/dns/resolver.c | 12 ++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/lib/dns/resolver.c b/lib/dns/resolver.c
+index 8ae9a993bbd7..ac9a9ef5d009 100644
+--- a/lib/dns/resolver.c
++++ b/lib/dns/resolver.c
+@@ -180,6 +180,12 @@
+  */
+ #define NS_FAIL_LIMIT 4
+ #define NS_RR_LIMIT   5
++/*
++ * IP address lookups are performed for at most NS_PROCESSING_LIMIT NS RRs in
++ * any NS RRset encountered, to avoid excessive resource use while processing
++ * large delegations.
++ */
++#define NS_PROCESSING_LIMIT 20
+ 
+ /* Number of hash buckets for zone counters */
+ #ifndef RES_DOMAIN_BUCKETS
+@@ -3318,6 +3324,7 @@ fctx_getaddresses(fetchctx_t *fctx, bool badcache) {
+ 	bool need_alternate = false;
+ 	bool all_spilled = true;
+ 	unsigned int no_addresses = 0;
++	unsigned int ns_processed = 0;
+ 
+ 	FCTXTRACE5("getaddresses", "fctx->depth=", fctx->depth);
+ 
+@@ -3504,6 +3511,11 @@ fctx_getaddresses(fetchctx_t *fctx, bool badcache) {
+ 
+ 		dns_rdata_reset(&rdata);
+ 		dns_rdata_freestruct(&ns);
++
++		if (++ns_processed >= NS_PROCESSING_LIMIT) {
++			result = ISC_R_NOMORE;
++			break;
++		}
+ 	}
+ 	if (result != ISC_R_NOMORE) {
+ 		return (result);
+-- 
+2.34.1
+

meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2022-38177.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+From ef3d1a84ff807eea27b4fef601a15932c5ffbfbf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org>
+Date: Thu, 11 Aug 2022 15:15:34 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH 2/3] Free eckey on siglen mismatch
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+CVE: CVE-2022-38177
+Reference to upstream patch:
+https://gitlab.isc.org/isc-projects/bind9/-/commit/5b2282afff760b1ed3471f6666bdfe8e1d34e590
+
+Signed-off-by: Mathieu Dubois-Briand <mbriand@witekio.com>
+---
+ lib/dns/opensslecdsa_link.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/dns/opensslecdsa_link.c b/lib/dns/opensslecdsa_link.c
+index 83b5b51cd78c..7576e04ac635 100644
+--- a/lib/dns/opensslecdsa_link.c
++++ b/lib/dns/opensslecdsa_link.c
+@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ opensslecdsa_verify(dst_context_t *dctx, const isc_region_t *sig) {
+ 		siglen = DNS_SIG_ECDSA384SIZE;
+ 
+ 	if (sig->length != siglen)
+-		return (DST_R_VERIFYFAILURE);
++		DST_RET(DST_R_VERIFYFAILURE);
+ 
+ 	if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(evp_md_ctx, digest, &dgstlen))
+ 		DST_RET (dst__openssl_toresult3(dctx->category,
+-- 
+2.34.1
+

meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2022-38178.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+From 65f5b2f0162d5d2ab25f463aa14a8bae71ace3d9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org>
+Date: Thu, 11 Aug 2022 15:28:13 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH 3/3] Free ctx on invalid siglen
+
+(cherry picked from commit 6ddb480a84836641a0711768a94122972c166825)
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+CVE: CVE-2022-38178
+Reference to upstream patch:
+https://gitlab.isc.org/isc-projects/bind9/-/commit/1af23378ebb11da2eb0f412e4563d6
+
+Signed-off-by: Mathieu Dubois-Briand <mbriand@witekio.com>
+---
+ lib/dns/openssleddsa_link.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/dns/openssleddsa_link.c b/lib/dns/openssleddsa_link.c
+index 8b115ec283f0..b4fcd607c131 100644
+--- a/lib/dns/openssleddsa_link.c
++++ b/lib/dns/openssleddsa_link.c
+@@ -325,7 +325,7 @@ openssleddsa_verify(dst_context_t *dctx, const isc_region_t *sig) {
+ 		siglen = DNS_SIG_ED448SIZE;
+ 
+ 	if (sig->length != siglen)
+-		return (DST_R_VERIFYFAILURE);
++		DST_RET(ISC_R_NOTIMPLEMENTED);
+ 
+ 	isc_buffer_usedregion(buf, &tbsreg);
+ 
+-- 
+2.34.1
+

meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind_9.11.37.bb

@@ -19,6 +19,9 @@ SRC_URI = "https://ftp.isc.org/isc/bind9/${PV}/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://0001-configure.in-remove-useless-L-use_openssl-lib.patch \
            file://0001-named-lwresd-V-and-start-log-hide-build-options.patch \
            file://0001-avoid-start-failure-with-bind-user.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-2795.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-38177.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-38178.patch \
            "
 
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "0d8efbe7ec166ada90e46add4267b7e7c934790cba9bd5af6b8380a4fbfb5aff"

meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5.inc

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=12f884d2ae1ff87c09e5b7ccc2c4ca7e \
                     file://COPYING.LIB;md5=fb504b67c50331fc78734fed90fb0e09 \
                     file://src/main.c;beginline=1;endline=24;md5=9bc54b93cd7e17bf03f52513f39f926e"
 DEPENDS = "dbus glib-2.0"
+RDEPENDS:${PN} += "dbus"
 PROVIDES += "bluez-hcidump"
 RPROVIDES_${PN} += "bluez-hcidump"
 
@@ -56,6 +57,8 @@ SRC_URI = "${KERNELORG_MIRROR}/linux/bluetooth/bluez-${PV}.tar.xz \
            file://CVE-2021-3588.patch \
           file://CVE-2021-3658.patch \
            file://CVE-2022-0204.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-39176.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-3637.patch \
            "
 S = "${WORKDIR}/bluez-${PV}"
 

meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5/CVE-2022-3637.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+From b808b2852a0b48c6f9dbb038f932613cea3126c2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+Date: Thu, 27 Oct 2022 09:51:27 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2022-3637
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/bluetooth/bluez.git/commit/monitor/jlink.c?id=1d6cfb8e625a944010956714c1802bc1e1fc6c4f]
+CVE: CVE-2022-3637
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+
+monitor: Fix crash when using RTT backend
+
+This fix regression introduced by "monitor: Fix memory leaks".
+J-Link shared library is in use if jlink_init() returns 0 and thus
+handle shall not be closed.
+---
+ monitor/jlink.c | 5 ++++-
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/monitor/jlink.c b/monitor/jlink.c
+index afa9d93..5bd4aed 100644
+--- a/monitor/jlink.c
++++ b/monitor/jlink.c
+@@ -120,9 +120,12 @@ int jlink_init(void)
+ 			!jlink.tif_select || !jlink.setspeed ||
+ 			!jlink.connect || !jlink.getsn ||
+ 			!jlink.emu_getproductname ||
+-			!jlink.rtterminal_control || !jlink.rtterminal_read)
++			!jlink.rtterminal_control || !jlink.rtterminal_read) {
++		dlclose(so);
+ 		return -EIO;
++	}
+ 
++	/* don't dlclose(so) here cause symbols from it are in use now */
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5/CVE-2022-39176.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+From 752c7f707c3cc1eb12eadc13bc336a5c484d4bdf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+Date: Wed, 28 Sep 2022 10:45:53 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2022-39176
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/bluez/5.53-0ubuntu3.6]
+CVE: CVE-2022-39176
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+---
+ profiles/audio/avdtp.c | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
+ profiles/audio/avrcp.c |  8 ++++++
+ 2 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/profiles/audio/avdtp.c b/profiles/audio/avdtp.c
+index 782268c..0adf413 100644
+--- a/profiles/audio/avdtp.c
++++ b/profiles/audio/avdtp.c
+@@ -1261,43 +1261,53 @@ struct avdtp_remote_sep *avdtp_find_remote_sep(struct avdtp *session,
+ 	return NULL;
+ }
+ 
+-static GSList *caps_to_list(uint8_t *data, int size,
++static GSList *caps_to_list(uint8_t *data, size_t size,
+ 				struct avdtp_service_capability **codec,
+ 				gboolean *delay_reporting)
+ {
++	struct avdtp_service_capability *cap;
+ 	GSList *caps;
+-	int processed;
+ 
+ 	if (delay_reporting)
+ 		*delay_reporting = FALSE;
+ 
+-	for (processed = 0, caps = NULL; processed + 2 <= size;) {
+-		struct avdtp_service_capability *cap;
+-		uint8_t length, category;
++	if (size < sizeof(*cap))
++		return NULL;
++
++	for (caps = NULL; size >= sizeof(*cap);) {
++		struct avdtp_service_capability *cpy;
+ 
+-		category = data[0];
+-		length = data[1];
++		cap = (struct avdtp_service_capability *)data;
+ 
+-		if (processed + 2 + length > size) {
++		if (sizeof(*cap) + cap->length > size) {
+ 			error("Invalid capability data in getcap resp");
+ 			break;
+ 		}
+ 
+-		cap = g_malloc(sizeof(struct avdtp_service_capability) +
+-					length);
+-		memcpy(cap, data, 2 + length);
++		if (cap->category == AVDTP_MEDIA_CODEC &&
++					cap->length < sizeof(**codec)) {
++			error("Invalid codec data in getcap resp");
++			break;
++		}
++
++		cpy = btd_malloc(sizeof(*cpy) + cap->length);
++		memcpy(cpy, cap, sizeof(*cap) + cap->length);
+ 
+-		processed += 2 + length;
+-		data += 2 + length;
++		size -= sizeof(*cap) + cap->length;
++		data += sizeof(*cap) + cap->length;
+ 
+-		caps = g_slist_append(caps, cap);
++		caps = g_slist_append(caps, cpy);
+ 
+-		if (category == AVDTP_MEDIA_CODEC &&
+-				length >=
+-				sizeof(struct avdtp_media_codec_capability))
+-			*codec = cap;
+-		else if (category == AVDTP_DELAY_REPORTING && delay_reporting)
+-			*delay_reporting = TRUE;
++		switch (cap->category) {
++		case AVDTP_MEDIA_CODEC:
++			if (codec)
++				*codec = cpy;
++			break;
++		case AVDTP_DELAY_REPORTING:
++			if (delay_reporting)
++				*delay_reporting = TRUE;
++			break;
++		}
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	return caps;
+@@ -1494,6 +1504,12 @@ static gboolean avdtp_setconf_cmd(struct avdtp *session, uint8_t transaction,
+ 					&stream->codec,
+ 					&stream->delay_reporting);
+ 
++	if (!stream->caps || !stream->codec) {
++		err = AVDTP_UNSUPPORTED_CONFIGURATION;
++		category = 0x00;
++		goto failed_stream;
++	}
++
+ 	/* Verify that the Media Transport capability's length = 0. Reject otherwise */
+ 	for (l = stream->caps; l != NULL; l = g_slist_next(l)) {
+ 		struct avdtp_service_capability *cap = l->data;
+diff --git a/profiles/audio/avrcp.c b/profiles/audio/avrcp.c
+index d9471c0..0233d53 100644
+--- a/profiles/audio/avrcp.c
++++ b/profiles/audio/avrcp.c
+@@ -1916,6 +1916,14 @@ static size_t handle_vendordep_pdu(struct avctp *conn, uint8_t transaction,
+ 		goto err_metadata;
+ 	}
+ 
++	operands += sizeof(*pdu);
++	operand_count -= sizeof(*pdu);
++
++	if (pdu->params_len != operand_count) {
++		DBG("AVRCP PDU parameters length don't match");
++		pdu->params_len = operand_count;
++	}
++
+ 	for (handler = session->control_handlers; handler->pdu_id; handler++) {
+ 		if (handler->pdu_id == pdu->pdu_id)
+ 			break;
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-connectivity/connman/connman/CVE-2022-32292.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+From d1a5ede5d255bde8ef707f8441b997563b9312bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Nathan Crandall <ncrandall@tesla.com>
+Date: Tue, 12 Jul 2022 08:56:34 +0200
+Subject: gweb: Fix OOB write in received_data()
+
+There is a mismatch of handling binary vs. C-string data with memchr
+and strlen, resulting in pos, count, and bytes_read to become out of
+sync and result in a heap overflow.  Instead, do not treat the buffer
+as an ASCII C-string. We calculate the count based on the return value
+of memchr, instead of strlen.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2022-32292
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/network/connman/connman.git/commit/?id=d1a5ede5d255bde8ef707f8441b997563b9312b
+CVE: CVE-2022-32292
+Signed-off-by: Lee Chee Yang <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
+---
+ gweb/gweb.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/gweb/gweb.c b/gweb/gweb.c
+index 12fcb1d8..13c6c5f2 100644
+--- a/gweb/gweb.c
++++ b/gweb/gweb.c
+@@ -918,7 +918,7 @@ static gboolean received_data(GIOChannel *channel, GIOCondition cond,
+ 		}
+ 
+ 		*pos = '\0';
+-		count = strlen((char *) ptr);
++		count = pos - ptr;
+ 		if (count > 0 && ptr[count - 1] == '\r') {
+ 			ptr[--count] = '\0';
+ 			bytes_read--;
+-- 
+cgit 
+

meta/recipes-connectivity/connman/connman/CVE-2022-32293.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,266 @@
+From 358a44b1442fae0f82846e10da0708b5c4e1ce27 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+Date: Tue, 20 Sep 2022 17:58:19 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2022-32293
+
+CVE: CVE-2022-32293
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/network/connman/connman.git/commit/?id=72343929836de80727a27d6744c869dff045757c && https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/network/connman/connman.git/commit/src/wispr.c?id=416bfaff988882c553c672e5bfc2d4f648d29e8a]
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+---
+ src/wispr.c | 83 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
+ 1 file changed, 63 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/wispr.c b/src/wispr.c
+index 473c0e0..97e0242 100644
+--- a/src/wispr.c
++++ b/src/wispr.c
+@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ struct wispr_route {
+ };
+ 
+ struct connman_wispr_portal_context {
++	int refcount;
+ 	struct connman_service *service;
+ 	enum connman_ipconfig_type type;
+ 	struct connman_wispr_portal *wispr_portal;
+@@ -96,10 +97,13 @@ static bool wispr_portal_web_result(GWebResult *result, gpointer user_data);
+ 
+ static GHashTable *wispr_portal_list = NULL;
+ 
++#define wispr_portal_context_ref(wp_context) \
++	wispr_portal_context_ref_debug(wp_context, __FILE__, __LINE__, __func__)
++#define wispr_portal_context_unref(wp_context) \
++	wispr_portal_context_unref_debug(wp_context, __FILE__, __LINE__, __func__)
++
+ static void connman_wispr_message_init(struct connman_wispr_message *msg)
+ {
+-	DBG("");
+-
+ 	msg->has_error = false;
+ 	msg->current_element = NULL;
+ 
+@@ -159,11 +163,6 @@ static void free_wispr_routes(struct connman_wispr_portal_context *wp_context)
+ static void free_connman_wispr_portal_context(
+ 		struct connman_wispr_portal_context *wp_context)
+ {
+-	DBG("context %p", wp_context);
+-
+-	if (!wp_context)
+-		return;
+-
+ 	if (wp_context->wispr_portal) {
+ 		if (wp_context->wispr_portal->ipv4_context == wp_context)
+ 			wp_context->wispr_portal->ipv4_context = NULL;
+@@ -200,9 +199,38 @@ static void free_connman_wispr_portal_context(
+ 	g_free(wp_context);
+ }
+ 
++static struct connman_wispr_portal_context *
++wispr_portal_context_ref_debug(struct connman_wispr_portal_context *wp_context,
++			const char *file, int line, const char *caller)
++{
++	DBG("%p ref %d by %s:%d:%s()", wp_context,
++		wp_context->refcount + 1, file, line, caller);
++
++	__sync_fetch_and_add(&wp_context->refcount, 1);
++
++	return wp_context;
++}
++
++static void wispr_portal_context_unref_debug(
++		struct connman_wispr_portal_context *wp_context,
++		const char *file, int line, const char *caller)
++{
++	if (!wp_context)
++		return;
++
++	DBG("%p ref %d by %s:%d:%s()", wp_context,
++		wp_context->refcount - 1, file, line, caller);
++
++	if (__sync_fetch_and_sub(&wp_context->refcount, 1) != 1)
++		return;
++
++	free_connman_wispr_portal_context(wp_context);
++}
++
+ static struct connman_wispr_portal_context *create_wispr_portal_context(void)
+ {
+-	return g_try_new0(struct connman_wispr_portal_context, 1);
++	return wispr_portal_context_ref(
++		g_new0(struct connman_wispr_portal_context, 1));
+ }
+ 
+ static void free_connman_wispr_portal(gpointer data)
+@@ -214,8 +242,8 @@ static void free_connman_wispr_portal(gpointer data)
+ 	if (!wispr_portal)
+ 		return;
+ 
+-	free_connman_wispr_portal_context(wispr_portal->ipv4_context);
+-	free_connman_wispr_portal_context(wispr_portal->ipv6_context);
++	wispr_portal_context_unref(wispr_portal->ipv4_context);
++	wispr_portal_context_unref(wispr_portal->ipv6_context);
+ 
+ 	g_free(wispr_portal);
+ }
+@@ -450,8 +478,6 @@ static void portal_manage_status(GWebResult *result,
+ 				&str))
+ 		connman_info("Client-Timezone: %s", str);
+ 
+-	free_connman_wispr_portal_context(wp_context);
+-
+ 	__connman_service_ipconfig_indicate_state(service,
+ 					CONNMAN_SERVICE_STATE_ONLINE, type);
+ }
+@@ -509,14 +535,17 @@ static void wispr_portal_request_portal(
+ {
+ 	DBG("");
+ 
++	wispr_portal_context_ref(wp_context);
+ 	wp_context->request_id = g_web_request_get(wp_context->web,
+ 					wp_context->status_url,
+ 					wispr_portal_web_result,
+ 					wispr_route_request,
+ 					wp_context);
+ 
+-	if (wp_context->request_id == 0)
++	if (wp_context->request_id == 0) {
+ 		wispr_portal_error(wp_context);
++		wispr_portal_context_unref(wp_context);
++	}
+ }
+ 
+ static bool wispr_input(const guint8 **data, gsize *length,
+@@ -562,13 +591,15 @@ static void wispr_portal_browser_reply_cb(struct connman_service *service,
+ 		return;
+ 
+ 	if (!authentication_done) {
+-		wispr_portal_error(wp_context);
+ 		free_wispr_routes(wp_context);
++		wispr_portal_error(wp_context);
++		wispr_portal_context_unref(wp_context);
+ 		return;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* Restarting the test */
+ 	__connman_service_wispr_start(service, wp_context->type);
++	wispr_portal_context_unref(wp_context);
+ }
+ 
+ static void wispr_portal_request_wispr_login(struct connman_service *service,
+@@ -592,7 +623,7 @@ static void wispr_portal_request_wispr_login(struct connman_service *service,
+ 				return;
+ 		}
+ 
+-		free_connman_wispr_portal_context(wp_context);
++		wispr_portal_context_unref(wp_context);
+ 		return;
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -644,11 +675,13 @@ static bool wispr_manage_message(GWebResult *result,
+ 
+ 		wp_context->wispr_result = CONNMAN_WISPR_RESULT_LOGIN;
+ 
++		wispr_portal_context_ref(wp_context);
+ 		if (__connman_agent_request_login_input(wp_context->service,
+ 					wispr_portal_request_wispr_login,
+-					wp_context) != -EINPROGRESS)
++					wp_context) != -EINPROGRESS) {
+ 			wispr_portal_error(wp_context);
+-		else
++			wispr_portal_context_unref(wp_context);
++		} else
+ 			return true;
+ 
+ 		break;
+@@ -697,6 +730,7 @@ static bool wispr_portal_web_result(GWebResult *result, gpointer user_data)
+ 		if (length > 0) {
+ 			g_web_parser_feed_data(wp_context->wispr_parser,
+ 								chunk, length);
++			wispr_portal_context_unref(wp_context);
+ 			return true;
+ 		}
+ 
+@@ -714,6 +748,7 @@ static bool wispr_portal_web_result(GWebResult *result, gpointer user_data)
+ 
+ 	switch (status) {
+ 	case 000:
++		wispr_portal_context_ref(wp_context);
+ 		__connman_agent_request_browser(wp_context->service,
+ 				wispr_portal_browser_reply_cb,
+ 				wp_context->status_url, wp_context);
+@@ -725,11 +760,14 @@ static bool wispr_portal_web_result(GWebResult *result, gpointer user_data)
+ 		if (g_web_result_get_header(result, "X-ConnMan-Status",
+ 						&str)) {
+ 			portal_manage_status(result, wp_context);
++			wispr_portal_context_unref(wp_context);
+ 			return false;
+-		} else
++		} else {
++			wispr_portal_context_ref(wp_context);
+ 			__connman_agent_request_browser(wp_context->service,
+ 					wispr_portal_browser_reply_cb,
+ 					wp_context->redirect_url, wp_context);
++		}
+ 
+ 		break;
+ 	case 302:
+@@ -737,6 +775,7 @@ static bool wispr_portal_web_result(GWebResult *result, gpointer user_data)
+ 			!g_web_result_get_header(result, "Location",
+ 							&redirect)) {
+ 
++			wispr_portal_context_ref(wp_context);
+ 			__connman_agent_request_browser(wp_context->service,
+ 					wispr_portal_browser_reply_cb,
+ 					wp_context->status_url, wp_context);
+@@ -747,6 +786,7 @@ static bool wispr_portal_web_result(GWebResult *result, gpointer user_data)
+ 
+ 		wp_context->redirect_url = g_strdup(redirect);
+ 
++		wispr_portal_context_ref(wp_context);
+ 		wp_context->request_id = g_web_request_get(wp_context->web,
+ 				redirect, wispr_portal_web_result,
+ 				wispr_route_request, wp_context);
+@@ -763,6 +803,7 @@ static bool wispr_portal_web_result(GWebResult *result, gpointer user_data)
+ 
+ 		break;
+ 	case 505:
++		wispr_portal_context_ref(wp_context);
+ 		__connman_agent_request_browser(wp_context->service,
+ 				wispr_portal_browser_reply_cb,
+ 				wp_context->status_url, wp_context);
+@@ -775,6 +816,7 @@ static bool wispr_portal_web_result(GWebResult *result, gpointer user_data)
+ 	wp_context->request_id = 0;
+ done:
+ 	wp_context->wispr_msg.message_type = -1;
++	wispr_portal_context_unref(wp_context);
+ 	return false;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -809,6 +851,7 @@ static void proxy_callback(const char *proxy, void *user_data)
+ 					xml_wispr_parser_callback, wp_context);
+ 
+ 	wispr_portal_request_portal(wp_context);
++	wispr_portal_context_unref(wp_context);
+ }
+ 
+ static gboolean no_proxy_callback(gpointer user_data)
+@@ -903,7 +946,7 @@ static int wispr_portal_detect(struct connman_wispr_portal_context *wp_context)
+ 
+ 		if (wp_context->token == 0) {
+ 			err = -EINVAL;
+-			free_connman_wispr_portal_context(wp_context);
++			wispr_portal_context_unref(wp_context);
+ 		}
+ 	} else if (wp_context->timeout == 0) {
+ 		wp_context->timeout = g_idle_add(no_proxy_callback, wp_context);
+@@ -952,7 +995,7 @@ int __connman_wispr_start(struct connman_service *service,
+ 
+ 	/* If there is already an existing context, we wipe it */
+ 	if (wp_context)
+-		free_connman_wispr_portal_context(wp_context);
++		wispr_portal_context_unref(wp_context);
+ 
+ 	wp_context = create_wispr_portal_context();
+ 	if (!wp_context)
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-connectivity/connman/connman_1.37.bb

@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ SRC_URI  = "${KERNELORG_MIRROR}/linux/network/${BPN}/${BP}.tar.xz \
             file://CVE-2021-33833.patch \
             file://CVE-2022-23096-7.patch \
             file://CVE-2022-23098.patch \
+            file://CVE-2022-32292.patch \
+	     file://CVE-2022-32293.patch \
 "
 
 SRC_URI_append_libc-musl = " file://0002-resolve-musl-does-not-implement-res_ninit.patch"

meta/recipes-connectivity/dhcp/dhcp/CVE-2022-2928.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+From 8a5d739eea10ee6e193f053b1662142d5657cbc6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+Date: Thu, 6 Oct 2022 09:39:18 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2022-2928
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://downloads.isc.org/isc/dhcp/4.4.3-P1/patches/]
+CVE: CVE-2022-2928
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+---
+ common/options.c               |  7 +++++
+ common/tests/option_unittest.c | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 61 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/common/options.c b/common/options.c
+index a7ed84c..4e53bb4 100644
+--- a/common/options.c
++++ b/common/options.c
+@@ -4452,6 +4452,8 @@ add_option(struct option_state *options,
+ 	if (!option_cache_allocate(&oc, MDL)) {
+ 		log_error("No memory for option cache adding %s (option %d).",
+ 			  option->name, option_num);
++		/* Get rid of reference created during hash lookup. */
++		option_dereference(&option, MDL);
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -4463,6 +4465,8 @@ add_option(struct option_state *options,
+ 			     MDL)) {
+ 		log_error("No memory for constant data adding %s (option %d).",
+ 			  option->name, option_num);
++		/* Get rid of reference created during hash lookup. */
++		option_dereference(&option, MDL);
+ 		option_cache_dereference(&oc, MDL);
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+@@ -4471,6 +4475,9 @@ add_option(struct option_state *options,
+ 	save_option(&dhcp_universe, options, oc);
+ 	option_cache_dereference(&oc, MDL);
+ 
++	/* Get rid of reference created during hash lookup. */
++	option_dereference(&option, MDL);
++
+ 	return 1;
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/common/tests/option_unittest.c b/common/tests/option_unittest.c
+index cd52cfb..690704d 100644
+--- a/common/tests/option_unittest.c
++++ b/common/tests/option_unittest.c
+@@ -130,6 +130,59 @@ ATF_TC_BODY(pretty_print_option, tc)
+ }
+ 
+ 
++ATF_TC(add_option_ref_cnt);
++
++ATF_TC_HEAD(add_option_ref_cnt, tc)
++{
++    atf_tc_set_md_var(tc, "descr",
++        "Verify add_option() does not leak option ref counts.");
++}
++
++ATF_TC_BODY(add_option_ref_cnt, tc)
++{
++    struct option_state *options = NULL;
++    struct option *option = NULL;
++    unsigned int cid_code = DHO_DHCP_CLIENT_IDENTIFIER;
++    char *cid_str = "1234";
++    int refcnt_before = 0;
++
++    // Look up the option we're going to add.
++    initialize_common_option_spaces();
++    if (!option_code_hash_lookup(&option, dhcp_universe.code_hash,
++                                 &cid_code, 0, MDL)) {
++        atf_tc_fail("cannot find option definition?");
++    }
++
++    // Get the option's reference count before we call add_options.
++    refcnt_before = option->refcnt;
++
++    // Allocate a option_state to which to add an option.
++    if (!option_state_allocate(&options, MDL)) {
++	    atf_tc_fail("cannot allocat options state");
++    }
++
++    // Call add_option() to add the option to the option state.
++    if (!add_option(options, cid_code, cid_str, strlen(cid_str))) {
++	    atf_tc_fail("add_option returned 0");
++    }
++
++    // Verify that calling add_option() only adds 1 to the option ref count.
++    if (option->refcnt != (refcnt_before + 1)) {
++        atf_tc_fail("after add_option(), count is wrong, before %d, after: %d",
++                    refcnt_before, option->refcnt);
++    }
++
++    // Derefrence the option_state, this should reduce the ref count to
++    // it's starting value.
++    option_state_dereference(&options, MDL);
++
++    // Verify that dereferencing option_state restores option ref count.
++    if (option->refcnt != refcnt_before) {
++        atf_tc_fail("after state deref, count is wrong, before %d, after: %d",
++                    refcnt_before, option->refcnt);
++    }
++}
++
+ /* This macro defines main() method that will call specified
+    test cases. tp and simple_test_case names can be whatever you want
+    as long as it is a valid variable identifier. */
+@@ -137,6 +190,7 @@ ATF_TP_ADD_TCS(tp)
+ {
+     ATF_TP_ADD_TC(tp, option_refcnt);
+     ATF_TP_ADD_TC(tp, pretty_print_option);
++    ATF_TP_ADD_TC(tp, add_option_ref_cnt);
+ 
+     return (atf_no_error());
+ }
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-connectivity/dhcp/dhcp/CVE-2022-2929.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+From 5c959166ebee7605e2048de573f2475b4d731ff7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+Date: Thu, 6 Oct 2022 09:42:59 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2022-2929
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://downloads.isc.org/isc/dhcp/4.4.3-P1/patches/]
+CVE: CVE-2022-2929
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+---
+ common/options.c | 8 ++++----
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/common/options.c b/common/options.c
+index 4e53bb4..28800fc 100644
+--- a/common/options.c
++++ b/common/options.c
+@@ -454,16 +454,16 @@ int fqdn_universe_decode (struct option_state *options,
+ 		while (s < &bp -> data[0] + length + 2) {
+ 			len = *s;
+ 			if (len > 63) {
+-				log_info ("fancy bits in fqdn option");
+-				return 0;
++				log_info ("label length exceeds 63 in fqdn option");
++				goto bad;
+ 			}
+ 			if (len == 0) {
+ 				terminated = 1;
+ 				break;
+ 			}
+ 			if (s + len > &bp -> data [0] + length + 3) {
+-				log_info ("fqdn tag longer than buffer");
+-				return 0;
++				log_info ("fqdn label longer than buffer");
++				goto bad;
+ 			}
+ 
+ 			if (first_len == 0) {
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-connectivity/dhcp/dhcp_4.4.2.bb

@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ SRC_URI += "file://0001-define-macro-_PATH_DHCPD_CONF-and-_PATH_DHCLIENT_CON.pat
             file://0013-fixup_use_libbind.patch \
             file://0001-workaround-busybox-limitation-in-linux-dhclient-script.patch \
             file://CVE-2021-25217.patch \
+            file://CVE-2022-2928.patch \
+            file://CVE-2022-2929.patch \
 "
 
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "2afdaf8498dc1edaf3012efdd589b3e1"

meta/recipes-connectivity/inetutils/inetutils/CVE-2022-39028.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+From eaae65aac967f9628787dca4a2501ca860bb6598 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Minjae Kim <flowergom@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 26 Sep 2022 22:05:07 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] telnetd: Handle early IAC EC or IAC EL receipt
+
+Fix telnetd crash if the first two bytes of a new connection
+are 0xff 0xf7 (IAC EC) or 0xff 0xf8 (IAC EL).
+
+The problem was reported in:
+<https://pierrekim.github.io/blog/2022-08-24-2-byte-dos-freebsd-netbsd-telnetd-netkit-telnetd-inetutils-telnetd-kerberos-telnetd.html>.
+
+* NEWS: Mention fix.
+* telnetd/state.c (telrcv): Handle zero slctab[SLC_EC].sptr and
+zero slctab[SLC_EL].sptr.
+
+CVE: CVE-2022-39028
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/inetutils.git/commit/?id=fae8263e467380483c28513c0e5fac143e46f94f]
+Signed-off-by: Minjae Kim<flowergom@gmail.com>
+---
+ telnetd/state.c | 12 +++++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/telnetd/state.c b/telnetd/state.c
+index 2184bca..7948503 100644
+--- a/telnetd/state.c
++++ b/telnetd/state.c
+@@ -314,15 +314,21 @@ telrcv (void)
+ 	    case EC:
+ 	    case EL:
+ 	      {
+-		cc_t ch;
++		cc_t ch = (cc_t) (_POSIX_VDISABLE);
+ 
+ 		DEBUG (debug_options, 1, printoption ("td: recv IAC", c));
+ 		ptyflush ();	/* half-hearted */
+ 		init_termbuf ();
+ 		if (c == EC)
+-		  ch = *slctab[SLC_EC].sptr;
++		{
++		  if (slctab[SLC_EC].sptr)
++		    ch = *slctab[SLC_EC].sptr;
++		}
+ 		else
+-		  ch = *slctab[SLC_EL].sptr;
++		{
++		  if (slctab[SLC_EL].sptr)
++		    ch = *slctab[SLC_EL].sptr;
++		}
+ 		if (ch != (cc_t) (_POSIX_VDISABLE))
+ 		  pty_output_byte ((unsigned char) ch);
+ 		break;
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-connectivity/inetutils/inetutils_1.9.4.bb

@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/inetutils/inetutils-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://0001-rcp-fix-to-work-with-large-files.patch \
            file://fix-buffer-fortify-tfpt.patch \
            file://CVE-2021-40491.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-39028.patch \
 "
 
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "04852c26c47cc8c6b825f2b74f191f52"

meta/recipes-connectivity/mobile-broadband-provider-info/mobile-broadband-provider-info_git.bb

@@ -5,8 +5,8 @@ SECTION = "network"
 LICENSE = "PD"
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=87964579b2a8ece4bc6744d2dc9a8b04"
 
-SRCREV = "3d5c8d0f7e0264768a2c000d0fd4b4d4a991e041"
-PV = "20220511"
+SRCREV = "22a5de3ef637990ce03141f786fbdb327e9c5a3f"
+PV = "20221107"
 PE = "1"
 
 SRC_URI = "git://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/mobile-broadband-provider-info.git;protocol=https;branch=main"

meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_8.2p1.bb

@@ -60,6 +60,13 @@ CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2008-3844"
 # https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2016-20012
 CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2016-20012"
 
+# As per debian, the issue is fixed by a feature called "agent restriction" in openssh 8.9
+# Urgency is unimportant as per debian, Hence this CVE is whitelisting.
+# https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2021-36368
+# https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3316#c2
+# https://docs.ssh-mitm.at/trivialauth.html
+CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2021-36368"
+
 PAM_SRC_URI = "file://sshd"
 
 inherit manpages useradd update-rc.d update-alternatives systemd
@@ -183,12 +190,17 @@ FILES_${PN}-sftp-server = "${libexecdir}/sftp-server"
 FILES_${PN}-misc = "${bindir}/ssh* ${libexecdir}/ssh*"
 FILES_${PN}-keygen = "${bindir}/ssh-keygen"
 
-RDEPENDS_${PN} += "${PN}-scp ${PN}-ssh ${PN}-sshd ${PN}-keygen"
+RDEPENDS_${PN} += "${PN}-scp ${PN}-ssh ${PN}-sshd ${PN}-keygen ${PN}-sftp-server"
 RDEPENDS_${PN}-sshd += "${PN}-keygen ${@bb.utils.contains('DISTRO_FEATURES', 'pam', 'pam-plugin-keyinit pam-plugin-loginuid', '', d)}"
 RRECOMMENDS_${PN}-sshd_append_class-target = "\
     ${@bb.utils.filter('PACKAGECONFIG', 'rng-tools', d)} \
 "
 
+# break dependency on base package for -dev package
+# otherwise SDK fails to build as the main openssh and dropbear packages
+# conflict with each other
+RDEPENDS:${PN}-dev = ""
+
 # gdb would make attach-ptrace test pass rather than skip but not worth the build dependencies
 RDEPENDS_${PN}-ptest += "${PN}-sftp ${PN}-misc ${PN}-sftp-server make sed sudo coreutils"
 

meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/770aea88c3888cc5cb3ebc94ffcef706c68bc1d2.patch

@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
-From 770aea88c3888cc5cb3ebc94ffcef706c68bc1d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
-Date: Wed, 1 Jun 2022 12:06:33 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] Update expired SCT issuer certificate
-
-Fixes #15179
-
-Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
-Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18444)
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-[Fixes ptest failures in OE-Core]
----
- test/certs/embeddedSCTs1_issuer.pem | 30 ++++++++++++++---------------
- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/test/certs/embeddedSCTs1_issuer.pem b/test/certs/embeddedSCTs1_issuer.pem
-index 1fa449d5a098..6aa9455f09ed 100644
---- a/test/certs/embeddedSCTs1_issuer.pem
-+++ b/test/certs/embeddedSCTs1_issuer.pem
-@@ -1,18 +1,18 @@
- -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
--MIIC0DCCAjmgAwIBAgIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADBVMQswCQYDVQQGEwJHQjEk
-+MIIC0jCCAjugAwIBAgIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADBVMQswCQYDVQQGEwJHQjEk
- MCIGA1UEChMbQ2VydGlmaWNhdGUgVHJhbnNwYXJlbmN5IENBMQ4wDAYDVQQIEwVX
--YWxlczEQMA4GA1UEBxMHRXJ3IFdlbjAeFw0xMjA2MDEwMDAwMDBaFw0yMjA2MDEw
--MDAwMDBaMFUxCzAJBgNVBAYTAkdCMSQwIgYDVQQKExtDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSBUcmFu
--c3BhcmVuY3kgQ0ExDjAMBgNVBAgTBVdhbGVzMRAwDgYDVQQHEwdFcncgV2VuMIGf
--MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDVimhTYhCicRmTbneDIRgcKkATxtB7
--jHbrkVfT0PtLO1FuzsvRyY2RxS90P6tjXVUJnNE6uvMa5UFEJFGnTHgW8iQ8+EjP
--KDHM5nugSlojgZ88ujfmJNnDvbKZuDnd/iYx0ss6hPx7srXFL8/BT/9Ab1zURmnL
--svfP34b7arnRsQIDAQABo4GvMIGsMB0GA1UdDgQWBBRfnYgNyHPmVNT4DdjmsMEk
--tEfDVTB9BgNVHSMEdjB0gBRfnYgNyHPmVNT4DdjmsMEktEfDVaFZpFcwVTELMAkG
--A1UEBhMCR0IxJDAiBgNVBAoTG0NlcnRpZmljYXRlIFRyYW5zcGFyZW5jeSBDQTEO
--MAwGA1UECBMFV2FsZXMxEDAOBgNVBAcTB0VydyBXZW6CAQAwDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB
--/zANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFAAOBgQAGCMxKbWTyIF4UbASydvkrDvqUpdryOvw4BmBt
--OZDQoeojPUApV2lGOwRmYef6HReZFSCa6i4Kd1F2QRIn18ADB8dHDmFYT9czQiRy
--f1HWkLxHqd81TbD26yWVXeGJPE3VICskovPkQNJ0tU4b03YmnKliibduyqQQkOFP
--OwqULg==
-+YWxlczEQMA4GA1UEBxMHRXJ3IFdlbjAgFw0yMjA2MDExMDM4MDJaGA8yMTIyMDUw
-+ODEwMzgwMlowVTELMAkGA1UEBhMCR0IxJDAiBgNVBAoTG0NlcnRpZmljYXRlIFRy
-+YW5zcGFyZW5jeSBDQTEOMAwGA1UECBMFV2FsZXMxEDAOBgNVBAcTB0VydyBXZW4w
-+gZ8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADgY0AMIGJAoGBANWKaFNiEKJxGZNud4MhGBwqQBPG
-+0HuMduuRV9PQ+0s7UW7Oy9HJjZHFL3Q/q2NdVQmc0Tq68xrlQUQkUadMeBbyJDz4
-+SM8oMczme6BKWiOBnzy6N+Yk2cO9spm4Od3+JjHSyzqE/HuytcUvz8FP/0BvXNRG
-+acuy98/fhvtqudGxAgMBAAGjga8wgawwHQYDVR0OBBYEFF+diA3Ic+ZU1PgN2Oaw
-+wSS0R8NVMH0GA1UdIwR2MHSAFF+diA3Ic+ZU1PgN2OawwSS0R8NVoVmkVzBVMQsw
-+CQYDVQQGEwJHQjEkMCIGA1UEChMbQ2VydGlmaWNhdGUgVHJhbnNwYXJlbmN5IENB
-+MQ4wDAYDVQQIEwVXYWxlczEQMA4GA1UEBxMHRXJ3IFdlboIBADAMBgNVHRMEBTAD
-+AQH/MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4GBAD0aYh9OkFYfXV7kBfhrtD0PJG2U47OV/1qq
-++uFpqB0S1WO06eJT0pzYf1ebUcxjBkajbJZm/FHT85VthZ1lFHsky87aFD8XlJCo
-+2IOhKOkvvWKPUdFLoO/ZVXqEVKkcsS1eXK1glFvb07eJZya3JVG0KdMhV2YoDg6c
-+Doud4XrO
- -----END CERTIFICATE-----

meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.1.1s.bb

@@ -18,14 +18,13 @@ SRC_URI = "http://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://afalg.patch \
            file://reproducible.patch \
            file://reproducibility.patch \
-           file://770aea88c3888cc5cb3ebc94ffcef706c68bc1d2.patch \
            "
 
 SRC_URI_append_class-nativesdk = " \
            file://environment.d-openssl.sh \
            "
 
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "9384a2b0570dd80358841464677115df785edb941c71211f75076d72fe6b438f"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "c5ac01e760ee6ff0dab61d6b2bbd30146724d063eb322180c6f18a6f74e4b6aa"
 
 inherit lib_package multilib_header multilib_script ptest
 MULTILIB_SCRIPTS = "${PN}-bin:${bindir}/c_rehash"

meta/recipes-connectivity/ppp/ppp/CVE-2022-4603.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+From 2aeb41a9a3a43b11b1e46628d0bf98197ff9f141 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
+Date: Thu, 29 Dec 2022 18:00:20 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] pppdump: Avoid out-of-range access to packet buffer
+
+This fixes a potential vulnerability where data is written to spkt.buf
+and rpkt.buf without a check on the array index.  To fix this, we
+check the array index (pkt->cnt) before storing the byte or
+incrementing the count.  This also means we no longer have a potential
+signed integer overflow on the increment of pkt->cnt.
+
+Fortunately, pppdump is not used in the normal process of setting up a
+PPP connection, is not installed setuid-root, and is not invoked
+automatically in any scenario that I am aware of.
+
+Ustream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/ppp-project/ppp/commit/a75fb7b198eed50d769c80c36629f38346882cbf]
+CVE: CVE-2022-4603
+Signed-off-by:Minjae Kim <flowergom@gmail.com>
+---
+ pppdump/pppdump.c | 7 ++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/pppdump/pppdump.c b/pppdump/pppdump.c
+index 87c2e8f..dec4def 100644
+--- a/pppdump/pppdump.c
++++ b/pppdump/pppdump.c
+@@ -296,6 +296,10 @@ dumpppp(f)
+ 			    printf("%s aborted packet:\n     ", dir);
+ 			    q = "    ";
+ 			}
++			if (pkt->cnt >= sizeof(pkt->buf)) {
++			    printf("%s over-long packet truncated:\n     ", dir);
++			    q = "    ";
++			}
+ 			nb = pkt->cnt;
+ 			p = pkt->buf;
+ 			pkt->cnt = 0;
+@@ -399,7 +403,8 @@ dumpppp(f)
+ 			c ^= 0x20;
+ 			pkt->esc = 0;
+ 		    }
+-		    pkt->buf[pkt->cnt++] = c;
++		    if (pkt->cnt < sizeof(pkt->buf))
++			    pkt->buf[pkt->cnt++] = c;
+ 		    break;
+ 		}
+ 	    }
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-connectivity/ppp/ppp_2.4.7.bb

@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.samba.org/pub/${BPN}/${BP}.tar.gz \
            file://0001-ppp-Remove-unneeded-include.patch \
            file://ppp-2.4.7-DES-openssl.patch \
            file://0001-pppd-Fix-bounds-check-in-EAP-code.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-4603.patch \
 "
 
 SRC_URI_append_libc-musl = "\

meta/recipes-core/coreutils/coreutils_8.31.bb

@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ PACKAGECONFIG_class-nativesdk ??= "xattr"
 PACKAGECONFIG[acl] = "--enable-acl,--disable-acl,acl,"
 PACKAGECONFIG[xattr] = "--enable-xattr,--disable-xattr,attr,"
 PACKAGECONFIG[single-binary] = "--enable-single-binary,--disable-single-binary,,"
+PACKAGECONFIG[openssl] = "--with-openssl=yes,--with-openssl=no,openssl"
 
 # [ df mktemp nice printenv base64 gets a special treatment and is not included in this
 bindir_progs = "arch basename chcon cksum comm csplit cut dir dircolors dirname du \

meta/recipes-core/dbus/dbus.inc

@@ -10,8 +10,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://dbus.freedesktop.org/releases/dbus/dbus-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://clear-guid_from_server-if-send_negotiate_unix_f.patch \
 "
 
-SRC_URI[md5sum] = "dfe8a71f412e0b53be26ed4fbfdc91c4"
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f77620140ecb4cdc67f37fb444f8a6bea70b5b6461f12f1cbe2cec60fa7de5fe"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "bc42d196c1756ac520d61bf3ccd6f42013617def45dd1e591a6091abf51dca38"
 
 EXTRA_OECONF = "--disable-xml-docs \
                 --disable-doxygen-docs \

meta/recipes-core/dropbear/dropbear.inc

@@ -12,6 +12,11 @@ DEPENDS = "zlib virtual/crypt"
 RPROVIDES_${PN} = "ssh sshd"
 RCONFLICTS_${PN} = "openssh-sshd openssh"
 
+# break dependency on base package for -dev package
+# otherwise SDK fails to build as the main openssh and dropbear packages
+# conflict with each other
+RDEPENDS:${PN}-dev = ""
+
 DEPENDS += "${@bb.utils.contains('DISTRO_FEATURES', 'pam', 'libpam', '', d)}"
 
 SRC_URI = "http://matt.ucc.asn.au/dropbear/releases/dropbear-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
@@ -24,6 +29,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://matt.ucc.asn.au/dropbear/releases/dropbear-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
            ${@bb.utils.contains('DISTRO_FEATURES', 'pam', '${PAM_SRC_URI}', '', d)} \
            ${@bb.utils.contains('PACKAGECONFIG', 'disable-weak-ciphers', 'file://dropbear-disable-weak-ciphers.patch', '', d)} \
            file://CVE-2020-36254.patch \
+           file://CVE-2021-36369.patch \
            "
 
 PAM_SRC_URI = "file://0005-dropbear-enable-pam.patch \

meta/recipes-core/dropbear/dropbear/CVE-2021-36369.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
+From e10dec82930863e487b22978d3df107274f366b2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Manfred Kaiser <37737811+manfred-kaiser@users.noreply.github.com>
+Date: Thu, 19 Aug 2021 17:37:14 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] added option to disable trivial auth methods (#128)
+
+* added option to disable trivial auth methods
+
+* rename argument to match with other ssh clients
+
+* fixed trivial auth detection for pubkeys
+
+[https://github.com/mkj/dropbear/pull/128]
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+CVE: CVE-2021-36369
+Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
+
+---
+ cli-auth.c         | 3 +++
+ cli-authinteract.c | 1 +
+ cli-authpasswd.c   | 2 +-
+ cli-authpubkey.c   | 1 +
+ cli-runopts.c      | 7 +++++++
+ cli-session.c      | 1 +
+ runopts.h          | 1 +
+ session.h          | 1 +
+ 8 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/cli-auth.c b/cli-auth.c
+index 2e509e5..6f04495 100644
+--- a/cli-auth.c
++++ b/cli-auth.c
+@@ -267,6 +267,9 @@ void recv_msg_userauth_success() {
+ 	if DROPBEAR_CLI_IMMEDIATE_AUTH is set */
+ 
+ 	TRACE(("received msg_userauth_success"))
++	if (cli_opts.disable_trivial_auth && cli_ses.is_trivial_auth) {
++		dropbear_exit("trivial authentication not allowed");
++	}
+ 	/* Note: in delayed-zlib mode, setting authdone here 
+ 	 * will enable compression in the transport layer */
+ 	ses.authstate.authdone = 1;
+diff --git a/cli-authinteract.c b/cli-authinteract.c
+index e1cc9a1..f7128ee 100644
+--- a/cli-authinteract.c
++++ b/cli-authinteract.c
+@@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ void recv_msg_userauth_info_request() {
+ 	m_free(instruction);
+ 
+ 	for (i = 0; i < num_prompts; i++) {
++		cli_ses.is_trivial_auth = 0;
+ 		unsigned int response_len = 0;
+ 		prompt = buf_getstring(ses.payload, NULL);
+ 		cleantext(prompt);
+diff --git a/cli-authpasswd.c b/cli-authpasswd.c
+index 00fdd8b..a24d43e 100644
+--- a/cli-authpasswd.c
++++ b/cli-authpasswd.c
+@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ void cli_auth_password() {
+ 
+ 	encrypt_packet();
+ 	m_burn(password, strlen(password));
+-
++	cli_ses.is_trivial_auth = 0;
+ 	TRACE(("leave cli_auth_password"))
+ }
+ #endif	/* DROPBEAR_CLI_PASSWORD_AUTH */
+diff --git a/cli-authpubkey.c b/cli-authpubkey.c
+index 7cee164..7da1a04 100644
+--- a/cli-authpubkey.c
++++ b/cli-authpubkey.c
+@@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ static void send_msg_userauth_pubkey(sign_key *key, int type, int realsign) {
+ 		buf_putbytes(sigbuf, ses.writepayload->data, ses.writepayload->len);
+ 		cli_buf_put_sign(ses.writepayload, key, type, sigbuf);
+ 		buf_free(sigbuf); /* Nothing confidential in the buffer */
++		cli_ses.is_trivial_auth = 0;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	encrypt_packet();
+diff --git a/cli-runopts.c b/cli-runopts.c
+index 7d1fffe..6bf8b8e 100644
+--- a/cli-runopts.c
++++ b/cli-runopts.c
+@@ -152,6 +152,7 @@ void cli_getopts(int argc, char ** argv) {
+ #if DROPBEAR_CLI_ANYTCPFWD
+ 	cli_opts.exit_on_fwd_failure = 0;
+ #endif
++	cli_opts.disable_trivial_auth = 0;
+ #if DROPBEAR_CLI_LOCALTCPFWD
+ 	cli_opts.localfwds = list_new();
+ 	opts.listen_fwd_all = 0;
+@@ -888,6 +889,7 @@ static void add_extendedopt(const char* origstr) {
+ #if DROPBEAR_CLI_ANYTCPFWD
+ 			"\tExitOnForwardFailure\n"
+ #endif
++			"\tDisableTrivialAuth\n"
+ #ifndef DISABLE_SYSLOG
+ 			"\tUseSyslog\n"
+ #endif
+@@ -915,5 +917,10 @@ static void add_extendedopt(const char* origstr) {
+ 		return;
+ 	}
+ 
++	if (match_extendedopt(&optstr, "DisableTrivialAuth") == DROPBEAR_SUCCESS) {
++		cli_opts.disable_trivial_auth = parse_flag_value(optstr);
++		return;
++	}
++
+ 	dropbear_log(LOG_WARNING, "Ignoring unknown configuration option '%s'", origstr);
+ }
+diff --git a/cli-session.c b/cli-session.c
+index 56dd4af..73ef0db 100644
+--- a/cli-session.c
++++ b/cli-session.c
+@@ -164,6 +164,7 @@ static void cli_session_init(pid_t proxy_cmd_pid) {
+ 	/* Auth */
+ 	cli_ses.lastprivkey = NULL;
+ 	cli_ses.lastauthtype = 0;
++	cli_ses.is_trivial_auth = 1;
+ 
+ 	/* For printing "remote host closed" for the user */
+ 	ses.remoteclosed = cli_remoteclosed;
+diff --git a/runopts.h b/runopts.h
+index 31eae1f..8519626 100644
+--- a/runopts.h
++++ b/runopts.h
+@@ -154,6 +154,7 @@ typedef struct cli_runopts {
+ #if DROPBEAR_CLI_ANYTCPFWD
+ 	int exit_on_fwd_failure;
+ #endif
++	int disable_trivial_auth;
+ #if DROPBEAR_CLI_REMOTETCPFWD
+ 	m_list * remotefwds;
+ #endif
+diff --git a/session.h b/session.h
+index 0f77055..8676054 100644
+--- a/session.h
++++ b/session.h
+@@ -287,6 +287,7 @@ struct clientsession {
+ 
+ 	int lastauthtype; /* either AUTH_TYPE_PUBKEY or AUTH_TYPE_PASSWORD,
+ 						 for the last type of auth we tried */
++	int is_trivial_auth;
+ 	int ignore_next_auth_response;
+ #if DROPBEAR_CLI_INTERACT_AUTH
+ 	int auth_interact_failed; /* flag whether interactive auth can still

meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2022-40674.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+From 4a32da87e931ba54393d465bb77c40b5c33d343b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Rhodri James <rhodri@wildebeest.org.uk>
+Date: Wed, 17 Aug 2022 18:26:18 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Ensure raw tagnames are safe exiting internalEntityParser
+
+It is possible to concoct a situation in which parsing is
+suspended while substituting in an internal entity, so that
+XML_ResumeParser directly uses internalEntityProcessor as
+its processor.  If the subsequent parse includes some unclosed
+tags, this will return without calling storeRawNames to ensure
+that the raw versions of the tag names are stored in memory other
+than the parse buffer itself.  If the parse buffer is then changed
+or reallocated (for example if processing a file line by line),
+badness will ensue.
+
+This patch ensures storeRawNames is always called when needed
+after calling doContent.  The earlier call do doContent does
+not need the same protection; it only deals with entity
+substitution, which cannot leave unbalanced tags, and in any
+case the raw names will be pointing into the stored entity
+value not the parse buffer.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/libexpat/libexpat/commit/4a32da87e931ba54393d465bb77c40b5c33d343b]
+CVE: CVE-2022-40674
+Signed-off-by: Virendra Thakur <virendrak@kpit.com>
+---
+ expat/lib/xmlparse.c | 13 +++++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+Index: expat/lib/xmlparse.c
+===================================================================
+--- a/lib/xmlparse.c
++++ b/lib/xmlparse.c
+@@ -5657,10 +5657,15 @@ internalEntityProcessor(XML_Parser parse
+   {
+     parser->m_processor = contentProcessor;
+     /* see externalEntityContentProcessor vs contentProcessor */
+-    return doContent(parser, parser->m_parentParser ? 1 : 0, parser->m_encoding,
+-                     s, end, nextPtr,
+-                     (XML_Bool)! parser->m_parsingStatus.finalBuffer,
+-                     XML_ACCOUNT_DIRECT);
++    result = doContent(parser, parser->m_parentParser ? 1 : 0,
++                       parser->m_encoding, s, end, nextPtr,
++                       (XML_Bool)! parser->m_parsingStatus.finalBuffer,
++                       XML_ACCOUNT_DIRECT);
++    if (result == XML_ERROR_NONE) {
++      if (! storeRawNames(parser))
++        return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
++    }
++    return result;
+   }
+ }
+ 

meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2022-43680.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+From 5290462a7ea1278a8d5c0d5b2860d4e244f997e4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sebastian Pipping <sebastian@pipping.org>
+Date: Tue, 20 Sep 2022 02:44:34 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] lib: Fix overeager DTD destruction in
+ XML_ExternalEntityParserCreate
+
+CVE: CVE-2022-43680
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/libexpat/libexpat/commit/5290462a7ea1278a8d5c0d5b2860d4e244f997e4.patch]
+Signed-off-by: Ranjitsinh Rathod <ranjitsinh.rathod@kpit.com>
+Comments: Hunk refreshed
+---
+ lib/xmlparse.c | 8 ++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/lib/xmlparse.c b/lib/xmlparse.c
+index aacd6e7fc..57bf103cc 100644
+--- a/lib/xmlparse.c
++++ b/lib/xmlparse.c
+@@ -1035,6 +1035,14 @@ parserCreate(const XML_Char *encodingNam
+   parserInit(parser, encodingName);
+ 
+   if (encodingName && ! parser->m_protocolEncodingName) {
++    if (dtd) {
++      // We need to stop the upcoming call to XML_ParserFree from happily
++      // destroying parser->m_dtd because the DTD is shared with the parent
++      // parser and the only guard that keeps XML_ParserFree from destroying
++      // parser->m_dtd is parser->m_isParamEntity but it will be set to
++      // XML_TRUE only later in XML_ExternalEntityParserCreate (or not at all).
++      parser->m_dtd = NULL;
++    }
+     XML_ParserFree(parser);
+     return NULL;
+   }

meta/recipes-core/expat/expat_2.2.9.bb

@@ -20,6 +20,8 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/libexpat/libexpat.git;protocol=https;branch=master \
            file://CVE-2022-25314.patch \
            file://CVE-2022-25315.patch \
            file://libtool-tag.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-40674.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-43680.patch \
          "
 
 SRCREV = "a7bc26b69768f7fb24f0c7976fae24b157b85b13"

meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc-version.inc

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 SRCBRANCH ?= "release/2.31/master"
 PV = "2.31+git${SRCPV}"
-SRCREV_glibc ?= "3ef8be9b89ef98300951741f381eb79126ac029f"
+SRCREV_glibc ?= "d4b75594574ab8a9c2c41209cd8c62aac76b5a04"
 SRCREV_localedef ?= "cd9f958c4c94a638fa7b2b4e21627364f1a1a655"
 
 GLIBC_GIT_URI ?= "git://sourceware.org/git/glibc.git"

meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc/CVE-2021-33574_1.patch

@@ -11,14 +11,10 @@ CVE: CVE-2021-33574 patch#1
 Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
 
 ---
- NEWS                                |  4 ++++
- sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/mq_notify.c | 15 ++++++++++-----
- 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
-
-Index: git/NEWS
-===================================================================
---- git.orig/NEWS
-+++ git/NEWS
+diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS
+index 8a20d3c4e3..be489243ac 100644
+--- a/NEWS
++++ b/NEWS
 @@ -7,6 +7,10 @@ using `glibc' in the "product" field.
  
  Version 2.31.1
@@ -28,12 +24,12 @@ Index: git/NEWS
 +  attribute with a non-default affinity mask.
 +
  The following bugs are resolved with this release:
+   [14231] stdio-common tests memory requirements
    [19519] iconv(1) with -c option hangs on illegal multi-byte sequences
-     (CVE-2016-10228)
-Index: git/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/mq_notify.c
-===================================================================
---- git.orig/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/mq_notify.c
-+++ git/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/mq_notify.c
+diff --git a/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/mq_notify.c b/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/mq_notify.c
+index f288bac477..dd47f0b777 100644
+--- a/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/mq_notify.c
++++ b/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/mq_notify.c
 @@ -135,8 +135,11 @@ helper_thread (void *arg)
  	    (void) __pthread_barrier_wait (&notify_barrier);
  	}
@@ -48,7 +44,7 @@ Index: git/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/mq_notify.c
      }
    return NULL;
  }
-@@ -257,8 +260,7 @@ mq_notify (mqd_t mqdes, const struct sig
+@@ -257,8 +260,7 @@ mq_notify (mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent *notification)
        if (data.attr == NULL)
  	return -1;
  
@@ -58,7 +54,7 @@ Index: git/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/mq_notify.c
      }
  
    /* Construct the new request.  */
-@@ -272,7 +274,10 @@ mq_notify (mqd_t mqdes, const struct sig
+@@ -272,7 +274,10 @@ mq_notify (mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent *notification)
  
    /* If it failed, free the allocated memory.  */
    if (__glibc_unlikely (retval != 0))

meta/recipes-core/images/build-appliance-image_15.0.0.bb

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ IMAGE_FSTYPES = "wic.vmdk"
 
 inherit core-image setuptools3
 
-SRCREV ?= "8a7fd5f633a2b72185501d4c4a8a51ed1fc7cea1"
+SRCREV ?= "f1292a552f33a329ff27bbdea4c90250908d6301"
 SRC_URI = "git://git.yoctoproject.org/poky;branch=dunfell \
            file://Yocto_Build_Appliance.vmx \
            file://Yocto_Build_Appliance.vmxf \

meta/recipes-core/initrdscripts/initramfs-framework/finish

@@ -14,6 +14,15 @@ finish_run() {
 
 		info "Switching root to '$ROOTFS_DIR'..."
 
+		debug "Moving basic mounts onto rootfs"
+		for dir in `awk '/\/dev.* \/run\/media/{print $2}' /proc/mounts`; do
+			# Parse any OCT or HEX encoded chars such as spaces
+			# in the mount points to actual ASCII chars
+			dir=`printf $dir`
+			mkdir -p "${ROOTFS_DIR}/media/${dir##*/}"
+			mount -n --move "$dir" "${ROOTFS_DIR}/media/${dir##*/}"
+		done
+
 		debug "Moving /dev, /proc and /sys onto rootfs..."
 		mount --move /dev $ROOTFS_DIR/dev
 		mount --move /proc $ROOTFS_DIR/proc

meta/recipes-core/initscripts/initscripts_1.0.bb

@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ do_install () {
 	update-rc.d -r ${D} rmnologin.sh start 99 2 3 4 5 .
 	update-rc.d -r ${D} sendsigs start 20 0 6 .
 	update-rc.d -r ${D} urandom start 38 S 0 6 .
-	update-rc.d -r ${D} umountnfs.sh start 31 0 1 6 .
+	update-rc.d -r ${D} umountnfs.sh stop 31 0 1 6 .
 	update-rc.d -r ${D} umountfs start 40 0 6 .
 	update-rc.d -r ${D} reboot start 90 6 .
 	update-rc.d -r ${D} halt start 90 0 .

meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/0001-Port-gentest.py-to-Python-3.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,813 @@
+From b5125000917810731bc28055c0445d571121f80e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Nick Wellnhofer <wellnhofer@aevum.de>
+Date: Thu, 21 Apr 2022 00:45:58 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Port gentest.py to Python 3
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libxml2/-/commit/343fc1421cdae097fa6c4cffeb1a065a40be6bbb]
+
+* fixes:
+
+make[1]: 'testReader' is up to date.
+  File "../libxml2-2.9.10/gentest.py", line 11
+    print "libxml2 python bindings not available, skipping testapi.c generation"
+          ^
+SyntaxError: Missing parentheses in call to 'print'. Did you mean print("libxml2 python bindings not available, skipping testapi.c generation")?
+make[1]: [Makefile:2078: testapi.c] Error 1 (ignored)
+
+...
+
+make[1]: 'testReader' is up to date.
+  File "../libxml2-2.9.10/gentest.py", line 271
+    return 1
+           ^
+TabError: inconsistent use of tabs and spaces in indentation
+make[1]: [Makefile:2078: testapi.c] Error 1 (ignored)
+
+...
+
+aarch64-oe-linux-gcc: error: testapi.c: No such file or directory
+aarch64-oe-linux-gcc: fatal error: no input files
+compilation terminated.
+make[1]: *** [Makefile:1275: testapi.o] Error 1
+
+But there is still a bit mystery why it worked before, because check-am
+calls gentest.py with $(PYTHON), so it ignores the shebang in the script
+and libxml2 is using python3native (through python3targetconfig.bbclass)
+so something like:
+
+libxml2/2.9.10-r0/recipe-sysroot-native/usr/bin/python3-native/python3 gentest.py
+
+But that still fails (now without SyntaxError) with:
+libxml2 python bindings not available, skipping testapi.c generation
+
+because we don't have dependency on libxml2-native (to provide libxml2
+python bindings form python3native) and exported PYTHON_SITE_PACKAGES
+might be useless (e.g. /usr/lib/python3.8/site-packages on Ubuntu-22.10
+which uses python 3.10 and there is no site-packages with libxml2)
+
+Signed-off-by: Martin Jansa <Martin.Jansa@gmail.com>
+---
+ gentest.py | 421 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------------
+ 1 file changed, 209 insertions(+), 212 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/gentest.py b/gentest.py
+index b763300..0756706 100755
+--- a/gentest.py
++++ b/gentest.py
+@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ import string
+ try:
+     import libxml2
+ except:
+-    print "libxml2 python bindings not available, skipping testapi.c generation"
++    print("libxml2 python bindings not available, skipping testapi.c generation")
+     sys.exit(0)
+ 
+ if len(sys.argv) > 1:
+@@ -227,7 +227,7 @@ extra_post_call = {
+           if (old != NULL) {
+               xmlUnlinkNode(old);
+               xmlFreeNode(old) ; old = NULL ; }
+-	  ret_val = NULL;""",
++\t  ret_val = NULL;""",
+    "xmlTextMerge": 
+        """if ((first != NULL) && (first->type != XML_TEXT_NODE)) {
+               xmlUnlinkNode(second);
+@@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ extra_post_call = {
+        """if ((ret_val != NULL) && (ret_val != ncname) &&
+               (ret_val != prefix) && (ret_val != memory))
+               xmlFree(ret_val);
+-	  ret_val = NULL;""",
++\t  ret_val = NULL;""",
+    "xmlNewDocElementContent":
+        """xmlFreeDocElementContent(doc, ret_val); ret_val = NULL;""",
+    "xmlDictReference": "xmlDictFree(dict);",
+@@ -268,29 +268,29 @@ modules = []
+ def is_skipped_module(name):
+     for mod in skipped_modules:
+         if mod == name:
+-	    return 1
++            return 1
+     return 0
+ 
+ def is_skipped_function(name):
+     for fun in skipped_functions:
+         if fun == name:
+-	    return 1
++            return 1
+     # Do not test destructors
+-    if string.find(name, 'Free') != -1:
++    if name.find('Free') != -1:
+         return 1
+     return 0
+ 
+ def is_skipped_memcheck(name):
+     for fun in skipped_memcheck:
+         if fun == name:
+-	    return 1
++            return 1
+     return 0
+ 
+ missing_types = {}
+ def add_missing_type(name, func):
+     try:
+         list = missing_types[name]
+-	list.append(func)
++        list.append(func)
+     except:
+         missing_types[name] = [func]
+ 
+@@ -310,7 +310,7 @@ def add_missing_functions(name, module):
+     missing_functions_nr = missing_functions_nr + 1
+     try:
+         list = missing_functions[module]
+-	list.append(name)
++        list.append(name)
+     except:
+         missing_functions[module] = [name]
+ 
+@@ -319,45 +319,45 @@ def add_missing_functions(name, module):
+ #
+ 
+ def type_convert(str, name, info, module, function, pos):
+-#    res = string.replace(str, "    ", " ")
+-#    res = string.replace(str, "   ", " ")
+-#    res = string.replace(str, "  ", " ")
+-    res = string.replace(str, " *", "_ptr")
+-#    res = string.replace(str, "*", "_ptr")
+-    res = string.replace(res, " ", "_")
++#    res = str.replace("    ", " ")
++#    res = str.replace("   ", " ")
++#    res = str.replace("  ", " ")
++    res = str.replace(" *", "_ptr")
++#    res = str.replace("*", "_ptr")
++    res = res.replace(" ", "_")
+     if res == 'const_char_ptr':
+-        if string.find(name, "file") != -1 or \
+-           string.find(name, "uri") != -1 or \
+-           string.find(name, "URI") != -1 or \
+-           string.find(info, "filename") != -1 or \
+-           string.find(info, "URI") != -1 or \
+-           string.find(info, "URL") != -1:
+-	    if string.find(function, "Save") != -1 or \
+-	       string.find(function, "Create") != -1 or \
+-	       string.find(function, "Write") != -1 or \
+-	       string.find(function, "Fetch") != -1:
+-	        return('fileoutput')
+-	    return('filepath')
++        if name.find("file") != -1 or \
++           name.find("uri") != -1 or \
++           name.find("URI") != -1 or \
++           info.find("filename") != -1 or \
++           info.find("URI") != -1 or \
++           info.find("URL") != -1:
++            if function.find("Save") != -1 or \
++               function.find("Create") != -1 or \
++               function.find("Write") != -1 or \
++               function.find("Fetch") != -1:
++                return('fileoutput')
++            return('filepath')
+     if res == 'void_ptr':
+         if module == 'nanoftp' and name == 'ctx':
+-	    return('xmlNanoFTPCtxtPtr')
++            return('xmlNanoFTPCtxtPtr')
+         if function == 'xmlNanoFTPNewCtxt' or \
+-	   function == 'xmlNanoFTPConnectTo' or \
+-	   function == 'xmlNanoFTPOpen':
+-	    return('xmlNanoFTPCtxtPtr')
++           function == 'xmlNanoFTPConnectTo' or \
++           function == 'xmlNanoFTPOpen':
++            return('xmlNanoFTPCtxtPtr')
+         if module == 'nanohttp' and name == 'ctx':
+-	    return('xmlNanoHTTPCtxtPtr')
+-	if function == 'xmlNanoHTTPMethod' or \
+-	   function == 'xmlNanoHTTPMethodRedir' or \
+-	   function == 'xmlNanoHTTPOpen' or \
+-	   function == 'xmlNanoHTTPOpenRedir':
+-	    return('xmlNanoHTTPCtxtPtr');
++            return('xmlNanoHTTPCtxtPtr')
++        if function == 'xmlNanoHTTPMethod' or \
++           function == 'xmlNanoHTTPMethodRedir' or \
++           function == 'xmlNanoHTTPOpen' or \
++           function == 'xmlNanoHTTPOpenRedir':
++            return('xmlNanoHTTPCtxtPtr');
+         if function == 'xmlIOHTTPOpen':
+-	    return('xmlNanoHTTPCtxtPtr')
+-	if string.find(name, "data") != -1:
+-	    return('userdata')
+-	if string.find(name, "user") != -1:
+-	    return('userdata')
++            return('xmlNanoHTTPCtxtPtr')
++        if name.find("data") != -1:
++            return('userdata')
++        if name.find("user") != -1:
++            return('userdata')
+     if res == 'xmlDoc_ptr':
+         res = 'xmlDocPtr'
+     if res == 'xmlNode_ptr':
+@@ -366,18 +366,18 @@ def type_convert(str, name, info, module, function, pos):
+         res = 'xmlDictPtr'
+     if res == 'xmlNodePtr' and pos != 0:
+         if (function == 'xmlAddChild' and pos == 2) or \
+-	   (function == 'xmlAddChildList' and pos == 2) or \
++           (function == 'xmlAddChildList' and pos == 2) or \
+            (function == 'xmlAddNextSibling' and pos == 2) or \
+            (function == 'xmlAddSibling' and pos == 2) or \
+            (function == 'xmlDocSetRootElement' and pos == 2) or \
+            (function == 'xmlReplaceNode' and pos == 2) or \
+            (function == 'xmlTextMerge') or \
+-	   (function == 'xmlAddPrevSibling' and pos == 2):
+-	    return('xmlNodePtr_in');
++           (function == 'xmlAddPrevSibling' and pos == 2):
++            return('xmlNodePtr_in');
+     if res == 'const xmlBufferPtr':
+         res = 'xmlBufferPtr'
+     if res == 'xmlChar_ptr' and name == 'name' and \
+-       string.find(function, "EatName") != -1:
++       function.find("EatName") != -1:
+         return('eaten_name')
+     if res == 'void_ptr*':
+         res = 'void_ptr_ptr'
+@@ -393,7 +393,7 @@ def type_convert(str, name, info, module, function, pos):
+         res = 'debug_FILE_ptr';
+     if res == 'int' and name == 'options':
+         if module == 'parser' or module == 'xmlreader':
+-	    res = 'parseroptions'
++            res = 'parseroptions'
+ 
+     return res
+ 
+@@ -402,28 +402,28 @@ known_param_types = []
+ def is_known_param_type(name):
+     for type in known_param_types:
+         if type == name:
+-	    return 1
++            return 1
+     return name[-3:] == 'Ptr' or name[-4:] == '_ptr'
+ 
+ def generate_param_type(name, rtype):
+     global test
+     for type in known_param_types:
+         if type == name:
+-	    return
++            return
+     for type in generated_param_types:
+         if type == name:
+-	    return
++            return
+ 
+     if name[-3:] == 'Ptr' or name[-4:] == '_ptr':
+         if rtype[0:6] == 'const ':
+-	    crtype = rtype[6:]
+-	else:
+-	    crtype = rtype
++            crtype = rtype[6:]
++        else:
++            crtype = rtype
+ 
+         define = 0
+-	if modules_defines.has_key(module):
+-	    test.write("#ifdef %s\n" % (modules_defines[module]))
+-	    define = 1
++        if module in modules_defines:
++            test.write("#ifdef %s\n" % (modules_defines[module]))
++            define = 1
+         test.write("""
+ #define gen_nb_%s 1
+ static %s gen_%s(int no ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, int nr ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED) {
+@@ -433,7 +433,7 @@ static void des_%s(int no ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, %s val ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, int nr ATTR
+ }
+ """ % (name, crtype, name, name, rtype))
+         if define == 1:
+-	    test.write("#endif\n\n")
++            test.write("#endif\n\n")
+         add_generated_param_type(name)
+ 
+ #
+@@ -445,7 +445,7 @@ known_return_types = []
+ def is_known_return_type(name):
+     for type in known_return_types:
+         if type == name:
+-	    return 1
++            return 1
+     return 0
+ 
+ #
+@@ -471,7 +471,7 @@ def compare_and_save():
+         try:
+             os.system("rm testapi.c; mv testapi.c.new testapi.c")
+         except:
+-	    os.system("mv testapi.c.new testapi.c")
++            os.system("mv testapi.c.new testapi.c")
+         print("Updated testapi.c")
+     else:
+         print("Generated testapi.c is identical")
+@@ -481,17 +481,17 @@ while line != "":
+     if line == "/* CUT HERE: everything below that line is generated */\n":
+         break;
+     if line[0:15] == "#define gen_nb_":
+-        type = string.split(line[15:])[0]
+-	known_param_types.append(type)
++        type = line[15:].split()[0]
++        known_param_types.append(type)
+     if line[0:19] == "static void desret_":
+-        type = string.split(line[19:], '(')[0]
+-	known_return_types.append(type)
++        type = line[19:].split('(')[0]
++        known_return_types.append(type)
+     test.write(line)
+     line = input.readline()
+ input.close()
+ 
+ if line == "":
+-    print "Could not find the CUT marker in testapi.c skipping generation"
++    print("Could not find the CUT marker in testapi.c skipping generation")
+     test.close()
+     sys.exit(0)
+ 
+@@ -505,7 +505,7 @@ test.write("/* CUT HERE: everything below that line is generated */\n")
+ #
+ doc = libxml2.readFile(srcPref + 'doc/libxml2-api.xml', None, 0)
+ if doc == None:
+-    print "Failed to load doc/libxml2-api.xml"
++    print("Failed to load doc/libxml2-api.xml")
+     sys.exit(1)
+ ctxt = doc.xpathNewContext()
+ 
+@@ -519,9 +519,9 @@ for arg in args:
+     mod = arg.xpathEval('string(../@file)')
+     func = arg.xpathEval('string(../@name)')
+     if (mod not in skipped_modules) and (func not in skipped_functions):
+-	type = arg.xpathEval('string(@type)')
+-	if not argtypes.has_key(type):
+-	    argtypes[type] = func
++        type = arg.xpathEval('string(@type)')
++        if type not in argtypes:
++            argtypes[type] = func
+ 
+ # similarly for return types
+ rettypes = {}
+@@ -531,8 +531,8 @@ for ret in rets:
+     func = ret.xpathEval('string(../@name)')
+     if (mod not in skipped_modules) and (func not in skipped_functions):
+         type = ret.xpathEval('string(@type)')
+-	if not rettypes.has_key(type):
+-	    rettypes[type] = func
++        if type not in rettypes:
++            rettypes[type] = func
+ 
+ #
+ # Generate constructors and return type handling for all enums
+@@ -549,49 +549,49 @@ for enum in enums:
+         continue;
+     define = 0
+ 
+-    if argtypes.has_key(name) and is_known_param_type(name) == 0:
+-	values = ctxt.xpathEval("/api/symbols/enum[@type='%s']" % name)
+-	i = 0
+-	vals = []
+-	for value in values:
+-	    vname = value.xpathEval('string(@name)')
+-	    if vname == None:
+-		continue;
+-	    i = i + 1
+-	    if i >= 5:
+-		break;
+-	    vals.append(vname)
+-	if vals == []:
+-	    print "Didn't find any value for enum %s" % (name)
+-	    continue
+-	if modules_defines.has_key(module):
+-	    test.write("#ifdef %s\n" % (modules_defines[module]))
+-	    define = 1
+-	test.write("#define gen_nb_%s %d\n" % (name, len(vals)))
+-	test.write("""static %s gen_%s(int no, int nr ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED) {\n""" %
+-	           (name, name))
+-	i = 1
+-	for value in vals:
+-	    test.write("    if (no == %d) return(%s);\n" % (i, value))
+-	    i = i + 1
+-	test.write("""    return(0);
++    if (name in argtypes) and is_known_param_type(name) == 0:
++        values = ctxt.xpathEval("/api/symbols/enum[@type='%s']" % name)
++        i = 0
++        vals = []
++        for value in values:
++            vname = value.xpathEval('string(@name)')
++            if vname == None:
++                continue;
++            i = i + 1
++            if i >= 5:
++                break;
++            vals.append(vname)
++        if vals == []:
++            print("Didn't find any value for enum %s" % (name))
++            continue
++        if module in modules_defines:
++            test.write("#ifdef %s\n" % (modules_defines[module]))
++            define = 1
++        test.write("#define gen_nb_%s %d\n" % (name, len(vals)))
++        test.write("""static %s gen_%s(int no, int nr ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED) {\n""" %
++                   (name, name))
++        i = 1
++        for value in vals:
++            test.write("    if (no == %d) return(%s);\n" % (i, value))
++            i = i + 1
++        test.write("""    return(0);
+ }
+ 
+ static void des_%s(int no ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, %s val ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, int nr ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED) {
+ }
+ 
+ """ % (name, name));
+-	known_param_types.append(name)
++        known_param_types.append(name)
+ 
+     if (is_known_return_type(name) == 0) and (name in rettypes):
+-	if define == 0 and modules_defines.has_key(module):
+-	    test.write("#ifdef %s\n" % (modules_defines[module]))
+-	    define = 1
++        if define == 0 and (module in modules_defines):
++            test.write("#ifdef %s\n" % (modules_defines[module]))
++            define = 1
+         test.write("""static void desret_%s(%s val ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED) {
+ }
+ 
+ """ % (name, name))
+-	known_return_types.append(name)
++        known_return_types.append(name)
+     if define == 1:
+         test.write("#endif\n\n")
+ 
+@@ -615,9 +615,9 @@ for file in headers:
+     # do not test deprecated APIs
+     #
+     desc = file.xpathEval('string(description)')
+-    if string.find(desc, 'DEPRECATED') != -1:
+-        print "Skipping deprecated interface %s" % name
+-	continue;
++    if desc.find('DEPRECATED') != -1:
++        print("Skipping deprecated interface %s" % name)
++        continue;
+ 
+     test.write("#include <libxml/%s.h>\n" % name)
+     modules.append(name)
+@@ -679,7 +679,7 @@ def generate_test(module, node):
+     # and store the informations for the generation
+     #
+     try:
+-	args = node.xpathEval("arg")
++        args = node.xpathEval("arg")
+     except:
+         args = []
+     t_args = []
+@@ -687,37 +687,37 @@ def generate_test(module, node):
+     for arg in args:
+         n = n + 1
+         rtype = arg.xpathEval("string(@type)")
+-	if rtype == 'void':
+-	    break;
+-	info = arg.xpathEval("string(@info)")
+-	nam = arg.xpathEval("string(@name)")
++        if rtype == 'void':
++            break;
++        info = arg.xpathEval("string(@info)")
++        nam = arg.xpathEval("string(@name)")
+         type = type_convert(rtype, nam, info, module, name, n)
+-	if is_known_param_type(type) == 0:
+-	    add_missing_type(type, name);
+-	    no_gen = 1
++        if is_known_param_type(type) == 0:
++            add_missing_type(type, name);
++            no_gen = 1
+         if (type[-3:] == 'Ptr' or type[-4:] == '_ptr') and \
+-	    rtype[0:6] == 'const ':
+-	    crtype = rtype[6:]
+-	else:
+-	    crtype = rtype
+-	t_args.append((nam, type, rtype, crtype, info))
++            rtype[0:6] == 'const ':
++            crtype = rtype[6:]
++        else:
++            crtype = rtype
++        t_args.append((nam, type, rtype, crtype, info))
+     
+     try:
+-	rets = node.xpathEval("return")
++        rets = node.xpathEval("return")
+     except:
+         rets = []
+     t_ret = None
+     for ret in rets:
+         rtype = ret.xpathEval("string(@type)")
+-	info = ret.xpathEval("string(@info)")
++        info = ret.xpathEval("string(@info)")
+         type = type_convert(rtype, 'return', info, module, name, 0)
+-	if rtype == 'void':
+-	    break
+-	if is_known_return_type(type) == 0:
+-	    add_missing_type(type, name);
+-	    no_gen = 1
+-	t_ret = (type, rtype, info)
+-	break
++        if rtype == 'void':
++            break
++        if is_known_return_type(type) == 0:
++            add_missing_type(type, name);
++            no_gen = 1
++        t_ret = (type, rtype, info)
++        break
+ 
+     if no_gen == 0:
+         for t_arg in t_args:
+@@ -733,7 +733,7 @@ test_%s(void) {
+ 
+     if no_gen == 1:
+         add_missing_functions(name, module)
+-	test.write("""
++        test.write("""
+     /* missing type support */
+     return(test_ret);
+ }
+@@ -742,22 +742,22 @@ test_%s(void) {
+         return
+ 
+     try:
+-	conds = node.xpathEval("cond")
+-	for cond in conds:
+-	    test.write("#if %s\n" % (cond.get_content()))
+-	    nb_cond = nb_cond + 1
++        conds = node.xpathEval("cond")
++        for cond in conds:
++            test.write("#if %s\n" % (cond.get_content()))
++            nb_cond = nb_cond + 1
+     except:
+         pass
+ 
+     define = 0
+-    if function_defines.has_key(name):
++    if name in function_defines:
+         test.write("#ifdef %s\n" % (function_defines[name]))
+-	define = 1
++        define = 1
+     
+     # Declare the memory usage counter
+     no_mem = is_skipped_memcheck(name)
+     if no_mem == 0:
+-	test.write("    int mem_base;\n");
++        test.write("    int mem_base;\n");
+ 
+     # Declare the return value
+     if t_ret != None:
+@@ -766,29 +766,29 @@ test_%s(void) {
+     # Declare the arguments
+     for arg in t_args:
+         (nam, type, rtype, crtype, info) = arg;
+-	# add declaration
+-	test.write("    %s %s; /* %s */\n" % (crtype, nam, info))
+-	test.write("    int n_%s;\n" % (nam))
++        # add declaration
++        test.write("    %s %s; /* %s */\n" % (crtype, nam, info))
++        test.write("    int n_%s;\n" % (nam))
+     test.write("\n")
+ 
+     # Cascade loop on of each argument list of values
+     for arg in t_args:
+         (nam, type, rtype, crtype, info) = arg;
+-	#
+-	test.write("    for (n_%s = 0;n_%s < gen_nb_%s;n_%s++) {\n" % (
+-	           nam, nam, type, nam))
++        #
++        test.write("    for (n_%s = 0;n_%s < gen_nb_%s;n_%s++) {\n" % (
++                   nam, nam, type, nam))
+     
+     # log the memory usage
+     if no_mem == 0:
+-	test.write("        mem_base = xmlMemBlocks();\n");
++        test.write("        mem_base = xmlMemBlocks();\n");
+ 
+     # prepare the call
+     i = 0;
+     for arg in t_args:
+         (nam, type, rtype, crtype, info) = arg;
+-	#
+-	test.write("        %s = gen_%s(n_%s, %d);\n" % (nam, type, nam, i))
+-	i = i + 1;
++        #
++        test.write("        %s = gen_%s(n_%s, %d);\n" % (nam, type, nam, i))
++        i = i + 1;
+ 
+     # add checks to avoid out-of-bounds array access
+     i = 0;
+@@ -797,7 +797,7 @@ test_%s(void) {
+         # assume that "size", "len", and "start" parameters apply to either
+         # the nearest preceding or following char pointer
+         if type == "int" and (nam == "size" or nam == "len" or nam == "start"):
+-            for j in range(i - 1, -1, -1) + range(i + 1, len(t_args)):
++            for j in (*range(i - 1, -1, -1), *range(i + 1, len(t_args))):
+                 (bnam, btype) = t_args[j][:2]
+                 if btype == "const_char_ptr" or btype == "const_xmlChar_ptr":
+                     test.write(
+@@ -806,42 +806,42 @@ test_%s(void) {
+                         "            continue;\n"
+                         % (bnam, nam, bnam))
+                     break
+-	i = i + 1;
++        i = i + 1;
+ 
+     # do the call, and clanup the result
+-    if extra_pre_call.has_key(name):
+-	test.write("        %s\n"% (extra_pre_call[name]))
++    if name in extra_pre_call:
++        test.write("        %s\n"% (extra_pre_call[name]))
+     if t_ret != None:
+-	test.write("\n        ret_val = %s(" % (name))
+-	need = 0
+-	for arg in t_args:
+-	    (nam, type, rtype, crtype, info) = arg
+-	    if need:
+-	        test.write(", ")
+-	    else:
+-	        need = 1
+-	    if rtype != crtype:
+-	        test.write("(%s)" % rtype)
+-	    test.write("%s" % nam);
+-	test.write(");\n")
+-	if extra_post_call.has_key(name):
+-	    test.write("        %s\n"% (extra_post_call[name]))
+-	test.write("        desret_%s(ret_val);\n" % t_ret[0])
++        test.write("\n        ret_val = %s(" % (name))
++        need = 0
++        for arg in t_args:
++            (nam, type, rtype, crtype, info) = arg
++            if need:
++                test.write(", ")
++            else:
++                need = 1
++            if rtype != crtype:
++                test.write("(%s)" % rtype)
++            test.write("%s" % nam);
++        test.write(");\n")
++        if name in extra_post_call:
++            test.write("        %s\n"% (extra_post_call[name]))
++        test.write("        desret_%s(ret_val);\n" % t_ret[0])
+     else:
+-	test.write("\n        %s(" % (name));
+-	need = 0;
+-	for arg in t_args:
+-	    (nam, type, rtype, crtype, info) = arg;
+-	    if need:
+-	        test.write(", ")
+-	    else:
+-	        need = 1
+-	    if rtype != crtype:
+-	        test.write("(%s)" % rtype)
+-	    test.write("%s" % nam)
+-	test.write(");\n")
+-	if extra_post_call.has_key(name):
+-	    test.write("        %s\n"% (extra_post_call[name]))
++        test.write("\n        %s(" % (name));
++        need = 0;
++        for arg in t_args:
++            (nam, type, rtype, crtype, info) = arg;
++            if need:
++                test.write(", ")
++            else:
++                need = 1
++            if rtype != crtype:
++                test.write("(%s)" % rtype)
++            test.write("%s" % nam)
++        test.write(");\n")
++        if name in extra_post_call:
++            test.write("        %s\n"% (extra_post_call[name]))
+ 
+     test.write("        call_tests++;\n");
+ 
+@@ -849,32 +849,32 @@ test_%s(void) {
+     i = 0;
+     for arg in t_args:
+         (nam, type, rtype, crtype, info) = arg;
+-	# This is a hack to prevent generating a destructor for the
+-	# 'input' argument in xmlTextReaderSetup.  There should be
+-	# a better, more generic way to do this!
+-	if string.find(info, 'destroy') == -1:
+-	    test.write("        des_%s(n_%s, " % (type, nam))
+-	    if rtype != crtype:
+-	        test.write("(%s)" % rtype)
+-	    test.write("%s, %d);\n" % (nam, i))
+-	i = i + 1;
++        # This is a hack to prevent generating a destructor for the
++        # 'input' argument in xmlTextReaderSetup.  There should be
++        # a better, more generic way to do this!
++        if info.find('destroy') == -1:
++            test.write("        des_%s(n_%s, " % (type, nam))
++            if rtype != crtype:
++                test.write("(%s)" % rtype)
++            test.write("%s, %d);\n" % (nam, i))
++        i = i + 1;
+ 
+     test.write("        xmlResetLastError();\n");
+     # Check the memory usage
+     if no_mem == 0:
+-	test.write("""        if (mem_base != xmlMemBlocks()) {
++        test.write("""        if (mem_base != xmlMemBlocks()) {
+             printf("Leak of %%d blocks found in %s",
+-	           xmlMemBlocks() - mem_base);
+-	    test_ret++;
++\t           xmlMemBlocks() - mem_base);
++\t    test_ret++;
+ """ % (name));
+-	for arg in t_args:
+-	    (nam, type, rtype, crtype, info) = arg;
+-	    test.write("""            printf(" %%d", n_%s);\n""" % (nam))
+-	test.write("""            printf("\\n");\n""")
+-	test.write("        }\n")
++        for arg in t_args:
++            (nam, type, rtype, crtype, info) = arg;
++            test.write("""            printf(" %%d", n_%s);\n""" % (nam))
++        test.write("""            printf("\\n");\n""")
++        test.write("        }\n")
+ 
+     for arg in t_args:
+-	test.write("    }\n")
++        test.write("    }\n")
+ 
+     test.write("    function_tests++;\n")
+     #
+@@ -882,7 +882,7 @@ test_%s(void) {
+     #
+     while nb_cond > 0:
+         test.write("#endif\n")
+-	nb_cond = nb_cond -1
++        nb_cond = nb_cond -1
+     if define == 1:
+         test.write("#endif\n")
+ 
+@@ -900,10 +900,10 @@ test_%s(void) {
+ for module in modules:
+     # gather all the functions exported by that module
+     try:
+-	functions = ctxt.xpathEval("/api/symbols/function[@file='%s']" % (module))
++        functions = ctxt.xpathEval("/api/symbols/function[@file='%s']" % (module))
+     except:
+-        print "Failed to gather functions from module %s" % (module)
+-	continue;
++        print("Failed to gather functions from module %s" % (module))
++        continue;
+ 
+     # iterate over all functions in the module generating the test
+     i = 0
+@@ -923,14 +923,14 @@ test_%s(void) {
+     # iterate over all functions in the module generating the call
+     for function in functions:
+         name = function.xpathEval('string(@name)')
+-	if is_skipped_function(name):
+-	    continue
+-	test.write("    test_ret += test_%s();\n" % (name))
++        if is_skipped_function(name):
++            continue
++        test.write("    test_ret += test_%s();\n" % (name))
+ 
+     # footer
+     test.write("""
+     if (test_ret != 0)
+-	printf("Module %s: %%d errors\\n", test_ret);
++\tprintf("Module %s: %%d errors\\n", test_ret);
+     return(test_ret);
+ }
+ """ % (module))
+@@ -948,7 +948,7 @@ test.write("""    return(0);
+ }
+ """);
+ 
+-print "Generated test for %d modules and %d functions" %(len(modules), nb_tests)
++print("Generated test for %d modules and %d functions" %(len(modules), nb_tests))
+ 
+ compare_and_save()
+ 
+@@ -960,11 +960,8 @@ for missing in missing_types.keys():
+     n = len(missing_types[missing])
+     missing_list.append((n, missing))
+ 
+-def compare_missing(a, b):
+-    return b[0] - a[0]
+-
+-missing_list.sort(compare_missing)
+-print "Missing support for %d functions and %d types see missing.lst" % (missing_functions_nr, len(missing_list))
++missing_list.sort(key=lambda a: a[0])
++print("Missing support for %d functions and %d types see missing.lst" % (missing_functions_nr, len(missing_list)))
+ lst = open("missing.lst", "w")
+ lst.write("Missing support for %d types" % (len(missing_list)))
+ lst.write("\n")
+@@ -974,9 +971,9 @@ for miss in missing_list:
+     for n in missing_types[miss[1]]:
+         i = i + 1
+         if i > 5:
+-	    lst.write(" ...")
+-	    break
+-	lst.write(" %s" % (n))
++            lst.write(" ...")
++            break
++        lst.write(" %s" % (n))
+     lst.write("\n")
+ lst.write("\n")
+ lst.write("\n")

meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2016-3709.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+From c1ba6f54d32b707ca6d91cb3257ce9de82876b6f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Nick Wellnhofer <wellnhofer@aevum.de>
+Date: Sat, 15 Aug 2020 18:32:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Revert "Do not URI escape in server side includes"
+
+This reverts commit 960f0e275616cadc29671a218d7fb9b69eb35588.
+
+This commit introduced
+
+- an infinite loop, found by OSS-Fuzz, which could be easily fixed.
+- an algorithm with quadratic runtime
+- a security issue, see
+  https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=769760
+
+A better approach is to add an option not to escape URLs at all
+which libxml2 should have possibly done in the first place.
+
+CVE: CVE-2016-3709
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/GNOME/libxml2/commit/c1ba6f54d32b707ca6d91cb3257ce9de82876b6f]
+Signed-off-by: Pawan Badganchi <Pawan.Badganchi@kpit.com>
+---
+ HTMLtree.c | 49 +++++++++++--------------------------------------
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/HTMLtree.c b/HTMLtree.c
+index 8d236bb35..cdb7f86a6 100644
+--- a/HTMLtree.c
++++ b/HTMLtree.c
+@@ -706,49 +706,22 @@ htmlAttrDumpOutput(xmlOutputBufferPtr buf, xmlDocPtr doc, xmlAttrPtr cur,
+ 		 (!xmlStrcasecmp(cur->name, BAD_CAST "src")) ||
+ 		 ((!xmlStrcasecmp(cur->name, BAD_CAST "name")) &&
+ 		  (!xmlStrcasecmp(cur->parent->name, BAD_CAST "a"))))) {
++		xmlChar *escaped;
+ 		xmlChar *tmp = value;
+-		/* xmlURIEscapeStr() escapes '"' so it can be safely used. */
+-		xmlBufCCat(buf->buffer, "\"");
+
+ 		while (IS_BLANK_CH(*tmp)) tmp++;
+
+-		/* URI Escape everything, except server side includes. */
+-		for ( ; ; ) {
+-		    xmlChar *escaped;
+-		    xmlChar endChar;
+-		    xmlChar *end = NULL;
+-		    xmlChar *start = (xmlChar *)xmlStrstr(tmp, BAD_CAST "<!--");
+-		    if (start != NULL) {
+-			end = (xmlChar *)xmlStrstr(tmp, BAD_CAST "-->");
+-			if (end != NULL) {
+-			    *start = '\0';
+-			}
+-		    }
+-
+-		    /* Escape the whole string, or until start (set to '\0'). */
+-		    escaped = xmlURIEscapeStr(tmp, BAD_CAST"@/:=?;#%&,+");
+-		    if (escaped != NULL) {
+-		        xmlBufCat(buf->buffer, escaped);
+-		        xmlFree(escaped);
+-		    } else {
+-		        xmlBufCat(buf->buffer, tmp);
+-		    }
+-
+-		    if (end == NULL) { /* Everything has been written. */
+-			break;
+-		    }
+-
+-		    /* Do not escape anything within server side includes. */
+-		    *start = '<'; /* Restore the first character of "<!--". */
+-		    end += 3; /* strlen("-->") */
+-		    endChar = *end;
+-		    *end = '\0';
+-		    xmlBufCat(buf->buffer, start);
+-		    *end = endChar;
+-		    tmp = end;
++		/*
++		 * the < and > have already been escaped at the entity level
++		 * And doing so here breaks server side includes
++		 */
++		escaped = xmlURIEscapeStr(tmp, BAD_CAST"@/:=?;#%&,+<>");
++		if (escaped != NULL) {
++		    xmlBufWriteQuotedString(buf->buffer, escaped);
++		    xmlFree(escaped);
++		} else {
++		    xmlBufWriteQuotedString(buf->buffer, value);
+ 		}
+-
+-		xmlBufCCat(buf->buffer, "\"");
+ 	    } else {
+ 		xmlBufWriteQuotedString(buf->buffer, value);
+ 	    }