build-appliance-image: Update to dunfell head revision

(From OE-Core rev: b49b0a3dd74c24f3a011c9c0b5cf8f6530956cfa)

Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>

bitbake/lib/bb/__init__.py

@@ -15,6 +15,13 @@ import sys
 if sys.version_info < (3, 5, 0):
     raise RuntimeError("Sorry, python 3.5.0 or later is required for this version of bitbake")
 
+if sys.version_info < (3, 10, 0):
+    # With python 3.8 and 3.9, we see errors of "libgcc_s.so.1 must be installed for pthread_cancel to work"
+    # https://stackoverflow.com/questions/64797838/libgcc-s-so-1-must-be-installed-for-pthread-cancel-to-work
+    # https://bugs.ams1.psf.io/issue42888
+    # so ensure libgcc_s is loaded early on
+    import ctypes
+    libgcc_s = ctypes.CDLL('libgcc_s.so.1')
 
 class BBHandledException(Exception):
     """

bitbake/lib/bb/data.py

@@ -301,6 +301,7 @@ def build_dependencies(key, keys, shelldeps, varflagsexcl, d):
                 value += "\n_remove of %s" % r
                 deps |= r2.references
                 deps = deps | (keys & r2.execs)
+                value = handle_contains(value, r2.contains, d)
             return value
 
         if "vardepvalue" in varflags:

bitbake/lib/bb/tests/codeparser.py

@@ -412,6 +412,32 @@ esac
         # Check final value
         self.assertEqual(self.d.getVar('ANOTHERVAR').split(), ['anothervalue', 'yetanothervalue', 'lastone'])
 
+    def test_contains_vardeps_override_operators(self):
+        # Check override operators handle dependencies correctly with the contains functionality
+        expr_plain = 'testval'
+        expr_prepend = '${@bb.utils.filter("TESTVAR1", "testval1", d)} '
+        expr_append = ' ${@bb.utils.filter("TESTVAR2", "testval2", d)}'
+        expr_remove = '${@bb.utils.contains("TESTVAR3", "no-testval", "testval", "", d)}'
+        # Check dependencies
+        self.d.setVar('ANOTHERVAR', expr_plain)
+        self.d.prependVar('ANOTHERVAR', expr_prepend)
+        self.d.appendVar('ANOTHERVAR', expr_append)
+        self.d.setVar('ANOTHERVAR:remove', expr_remove)
+        self.d.setVar('TESTVAR1', 'blah')
+        self.d.setVar('TESTVAR2', 'testval2')
+        self.d.setVar('TESTVAR3', 'no-testval')
+        deps, values = bb.data.build_dependencies("ANOTHERVAR", set(self.d.keys()), set(), set(), self.d)
+        self.assertEqual(sorted(values.splitlines()),
+                         sorted([
+                          expr_prepend + expr_plain + expr_append,
+                          '_remove of ' + expr_remove,
+                          'TESTVAR1{testval1} = Unset',
+                          'TESTVAR2{testval2} = Set',
+                          'TESTVAR3{no-testval} = Set',
+                          ]))
+        # Check final value
+        self.assertEqual(self.d.getVar('ANOTHERVAR').split(), ['testval2'])
+
     #Currently no wildcard support
     #def test_vardeps_wildcards(self):
     #    self.d.setVar("oe_libinstall", "echo test")

bitbake/lib/bblayers/layerindex.py

@@ -206,6 +206,7 @@ class LayerIndexPlugin(ActionPlugin):
 """
         args.show_only = True
         args.ignore = []
+        args.shallow = True
         self.do_layerindex_fetch(args)
 
     def register_commands(self, sp):

bitbake/lib/toaster/toastergui/api.py

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ import os
 import re
 import logging
 import json
-import subprocess
+import glob
 from collections import Counter
 
 from orm.models import Project, ProjectTarget, Build, Layer_Version
@@ -227,20 +227,18 @@ class XhrSetDefaultImageUrl(View):
 #    same logical name
 #  * Each project that uses a layer will have its own
 #    LayerVersion and Project Layer for it
-#  * During the Paroject delete process, when the last
+#  * During the Project delete process, when the last
 #    LayerVersion for a 'local_source_dir' layer is deleted
 #    then the Layer record is deleted to remove orphans
 #
 
 def scan_layer_content(layer,layer_version):
     # if this is a local layer directory, we can immediately scan its content
-    if layer.local_source_dir:
+    if os.path.isdir(layer.local_source_dir):
         try:
             # recipes-*/*/*.bb
-            cmd = '%s %s' % ('ls', os.path.join(layer.local_source_dir,'recipes-*/*/*.bb'))
-            recipes_list = subprocess.Popen(cmd, shell=True, stdout=subprocess.PIPE,stderr=subprocess.STDOUT).stdout.read()
-            recipes_list = recipes_list.decode("utf-8").strip()
-            if recipes_list and 'No such' not in recipes_list:
+            recipes_list = glob.glob(os.path.join(layer.local_source_dir, 'recipes-*/*/*.bb'))
+            for recipe in recipes_list:
                 for recipe in recipes_list.split('\n'):
                     recipe_path = recipe[recipe.rfind('recipes-'):]
                     recipe_name = recipe[recipe.rfind('/')+1:].replace('.bb','')
@@ -260,6 +258,9 @@ def scan_layer_content(layer,layer_version):
 
         except Exception as e:
             logger.warning("ERROR:scan_layer_content: %s" % e)
+    else:
+        logger.warning("ERROR: wrong path given")
+        raise KeyError("local_source_dir")
 
 class XhrLayer(View):
     """ Delete, Get, Add and Update Layer information
@@ -456,15 +457,18 @@ class XhrLayer(View):
                              'layerdetailurl':
                              layer_dep.get_detailspage_url(project.pk)})
 
-            # Scan the layer's content and update components
-            scan_layer_content(layer,layer_version)
+            # Only scan_layer_content if layer is local
+            if layer_data.get('local_source_dir', None):
+                # Scan the layer's content and update components
+                scan_layer_content(layer,layer_version)
 
         except Layer_Version.DoesNotExist:
             return error_response("layer-dep-not-found")
         except Project.DoesNotExist:
             return error_response("project-not-found")
-        except KeyError:
-            return error_response("incorrect-parameters")
+        except KeyError as e:
+            _log("KeyError: %s" % e)
+            return error_response(f"incorrect-parameters")
 
         return JsonResponse({'error': "ok",
                              'imported_layer': {

documentation/dev-manual/dev-manual-common-tasks.rst

@@ -8652,6 +8652,8 @@ In order to run tests, you need to do the following:
          -  Be sure to use an absolute path when calling this script
             with sudo.
 
+         -  Ensure that your host has the package ``iptables`` installed.
+
          -  The package recipe ``qemu-helper-native`` is required to run
             this script. Build the package using the following command:
             ::

documentation/dev-manual/dev-manual-start.rst

@@ -659,7 +659,7 @@ Follow these steps to locate and download a particular tarball:
 Using the Downloads Page
 ------------------------
 
-The :yocto_home:`Yocto Project Website <>` uses a "DOWNLOADS" page
+The :yocto_home:`Yocto Project Website <>` uses a "RELEASES" page
 from which you can locate and download tarballs of any Yocto Project
 release. Rather than Git repositories, these files represent snapshot
 tarballs similar to the tarballs located in the Index of Releases
@@ -676,12 +676,13 @@ Releases <#accessing-index-of-releases>`__" section.
 1. *Go to the Yocto Project Website:* Open The
    :yocto_home:`Yocto Project Website <>` in your browser.
 
-2. *Get to the Downloads Area:* Select the "DOWNLOADS" item from the
-   pull-down "SOFTWARE" tab menu near the top of the page.
+#. *Get to the Downloads Area:* Select the "RELEASES" item from the
+   pull-down "DEVELOPMENT" tab menu near the top of the page.
 
-3. *Select a Yocto Project Release:* Use the menu next to "RELEASE" to
-   display and choose a recent or past supported Yocto Project release
-   (e.g. &DISTRO_NAME_NO_CAP;, &DISTRO_NAME_NO_CAP_MINUS_ONE;, and so forth).
+#. *Select a Yocto Project Release:* On the top of the "RELEASE" page currently
+   supported releases are displayed, further down past supported Yocto Project
+   releases are visible. The "Download" links in the rows of the table there
+   will lead to the download tarballs for the release.
 
    .. note::
 
@@ -691,9 +692,9 @@ Releases <#accessing-index-of-releases>`__" section.
    You can use the "RELEASE ARCHIVE" link to reveal a menu of all Yocto
    Project releases.
 
-4. *Download Tools or Board Support Packages (BSPs):* From the
-   "DOWNLOADS" page, you can download tools or BSPs as well. Just scroll
-   down the page and look for what you need.
+#. *Download Tools or Board Support Packages (BSPs):* Next to the tarballs you
+   will find download tools or BSPs as well. Just select a Yocto Project
+   release and look for what you need.
 
 Accessing Nightly Builds
 ------------------------

documentation/poky.yaml

@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
-DISTRO : "3.1.30"
+DISTRO : "3.1.32"
 DISTRO_NAME_NO_CAP : "dunfell"
 DISTRO_NAME : "Dunfell"
 DISTRO_NAME_NO_CAP_MINUS_ONE : "zeus"
-YOCTO_DOC_VERSION : "3.1.30"
+YOCTO_DOC_VERSION : "3.1.32"
 YOCTO_DOC_VERSION_MINUS_ONE : "3.0.4"
-DISTRO_REL_TAG : "yocto-3.1.30"
-DOCCONF_VERSION : "3.1.30"
+DISTRO_REL_TAG : "yocto-3.1.32"
+DOCCONF_VERSION : "3.1.32"
 BITBAKE_SERIES : "1.46"
-POKYVERSION : "23.0.30"
+POKYVERSION : "23.0.32"
 YOCTO_POKY : "poky-&DISTRO_NAME_NO_CAP;-&POKYVERSION;"
 YOCTO_DL_URL : "https://downloads.yoctoproject.org"
 YOCTO_AB_URL : "https://autobuilder.yoctoproject.org"

documentation/ref-manual/ref-classes.rst

@@ -1315,16 +1315,6 @@ The following list shows the tests you can list with the ``WARN_QA`` and
    automatically get these versions. Consequently, you should only need
    to explicitly add dependencies to binary driver recipes.
 
-.. _ref-classes-insserv:
-
-``insserv.bbclass``
-===================
-
-The ``insserv`` class uses the ``insserv`` utility to update the order
-of symbolic links in ``/etc/rc?.d/`` within an image based on
-dependencies specified by LSB headers in the ``init.d`` scripts
-themselves.
-
 .. _ref-classes-kernel:
 
 ``kernel.bbclass``

documentation/ref-manual/ref-release-process.rst

@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ consists of the following pieces:
    piece of software. The test allows the packages to be be run within a
    target image.
 
--  ``oe-selftest``: Tests combination BitBake invocations. These tests
+-  ``oe-selftest``: Tests combinations of BitBake invocations. These tests
    operate outside the OpenEmbedded build system itself. The
    ``oe-selftest`` can run all tests by default or can run selected
    tests or test suites.

documentation/ref-manual/ref-system-requirements.rst

@@ -37,25 +37,21 @@ Supported Linux Distributions
 Currently, the &DISTRO; release ("&DISTRO_NAME;") of the Yocto Project is
 supported on the following distributions:
 
-
 -  Ubuntu 20.04 (LTS)
 
 -  Ubuntu 22.04 (LTS)
 
--  Fedora 37
+-  Fedora 38
 
 -  Debian GNU/Linux 11.x (Bullseye)
 
--  AlmaLinux 8.8
+-  AlmaLinux 8
 
-The following distribution versions are still tested (being listed
-in :term:`SANITY_TESTED_DISTROS`), even though the organizations
-publishing them no longer make updates publicly available:
+The following distribution versions are still tested even though the
+organizations publishing them no longer make updates publicly available:
 
 -  Ubuntu 18.04 (LTS)
 
--  OpenSUSE Leap 15.3
-
 Finally, here are the distribution versions which were previously
 tested on former revisions of "&DISTRO_NAME;", but no longer are:
 
@@ -81,6 +77,8 @@ tested on former revisions of "&DISTRO_NAME;", but no longer are:
 
 -  Fedora 36
 
+-  Fedora 37
+
 -  CentOS 7.x
 
 -  CentOS 8.x
@@ -95,9 +93,7 @@ tested on former revisions of "&DISTRO_NAME;", but no longer are:
 
 -  OpenSUSE Leap 15.2
 
--  AlmaLinux 8.5
-
--  AlmaLinux 8.7
+-  OpenSUSE Leap 15.3
 
 .. note::
 

meta-poky/conf/distro/poky.conf

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 DISTRO = "poky"
 DISTRO_NAME = "Poky (Yocto Project Reference Distro)"
-DISTRO_VERSION = "3.1.30"
+DISTRO_VERSION = "3.1.32"
 DISTRO_CODENAME = "dunfell"
 SDK_VENDOR = "-pokysdk"
 SDK_VERSION = "${@d.getVar('DISTRO_VERSION').replace('snapshot-${DATE}', 'snapshot')}"

meta/classes/testimage.bbclass

@@ -99,30 +99,9 @@ TESTIMAGE_DUMP_DIR ?= "${LOG_DIR}/runtime-hostdump/"
 TESTIMAGE_UPDATE_VARS ?= "DL_DIR WORKDIR DEPLOY_DIR"
 
 testimage_dump_target () {
-    top -bn1
-    ps
-    free
-    df
-    # The next command will export the default gateway IP
-    export DEFAULT_GATEWAY=$(ip route | awk '/default/ { print $3}')
-    ping -c3 $DEFAULT_GATEWAY
-    dmesg
-    netstat -an
-    ip address
-    # Next command will dump logs from /var/log/
-    find /var/log/ -type f 2>/dev/null -exec echo "====================" \; -exec echo {} \; -exec echo "====================" \; -exec cat {} \; -exec echo "" \;
 }
 
 testimage_dump_host () {
-    top -bn1
-    iostat -x -z -N -d -p ALL 20 2
-    ps -ef
-    free
-    df
-    memstat
-    dmesg
-    ip -s link
-    netstat -an
 }
 
 python do_testimage() {

meta/lib/oe/sstatesig.py

@@ -480,8 +480,10 @@ def OEOuthashBasic(path, sigfile, task, d):
     if "package_write_" in task or task == "package_qa":
         include_owners = False
     include_timestamps = False
+    include_root = True
     if task == "package":
         include_timestamps = d.getVar('BUILD_REPRODUCIBLE_BINARIES') == '1'
+        include_root = False
     extra_content = d.getVar('HASHEQUIV_HASH_VERSION')
 
     try:
@@ -592,7 +594,8 @@ def OEOuthashBasic(path, sigfile, task, d):
                 update_hash("\n")
 
             # Process this directory and all its child files
-            process(root)
+            if include_root or root != ".":
+                process(root)
             for f in files:
                 if f == 'fixmepath':
                     continue

meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5.inc

@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${KERNELORG_MIRROR}/linux/bluetooth/bluez-${PV}.tar.xz \
            file://CVE-2022-0204.patch \
            file://CVE-2022-39176.patch \
            file://CVE-2022-3637.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-45866.patch \
            "
 S = "${WORKDIR}/bluez-${PV}"
 

meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5/CVE-2023-45866.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+From 25a471a83e02e1effb15d5a488b3f0085eaeb675 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
+Date: Tue, 10 Oct 2023 13:03:12 -0700
+Subject: input.conf: Change default of ClassicBondedOnly
+
+This changes the default of ClassicBondedOnly since defaulting to false
+is not inline with HID specification which mandates the of Security Mode
+4:
+
+BLUETOOTH SPECIFICATION Page 84 of 123
+Human Interface Device (HID) Profile:
+
+5.4.3.4.2 Security Modes
+Bluetooth HID Hosts shall use Security Mode 4 when interoperating with
+Bluetooth HID devices that are compliant to the Bluetooth Core
+Specification v2.1+EDR[6].
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/bluetooth/bluez.git/commit/?id=25a471a83e02e1effb15d5a488b3f0085eaeb675]
+CVE: CVE-2023-45866
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+---
+ profiles/input/device.c   | 2 +-
+ profiles/input/input.conf | 2 +-
+ 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/profiles/input/device.c b/profiles/input/device.c
+index 375314e..0236488 100644
+--- a/profiles/input/device.c
++++ b/profiles/input/device.c
+@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ struct input_device {
+ 
+ static int idle_timeout = 0;
+ static bool uhid_enabled = false;
+-static bool classic_bonded_only = false;
++static bool classic_bonded_only = true;
+ 
+ void input_set_idle_timeout(int timeout)
+ {
+diff --git a/profiles/input/input.conf b/profiles/input/input.conf
+index 4c70bc5..d8645f3 100644
+--- a/profiles/input/input.conf
++++ b/profiles/input/input.conf
+@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
+ # platforms may want to make sure that input connections only come from bonded
+ # device connections. Several older mice have been known for not supporting
+ # pairing/encryption.
+-# Defaults to false to maximize device compatibility.
++# Defaults to true for security.
+ #ClassicBondedOnly=true
+ 
+ # LE upgrade security
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-48795.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,468 @@
+(modified to not remove ssh_packet_read_expect(), to add to
+KexAlgorithms in sshd.c and sshconnect2.c as this version pre-dates
+kex_proposal_populate_entries(), replace debug*_f() with debug*(),
+error*_f() with error*(), and fatal_f() with fatal())
+
+Backport of:
+
+From 1edb00c58f8a6875fad6a497aa2bacf37f9e6cd5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2023 14:45:17 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] upstream: implement "strict key exchange" in ssh and sshd
+
+This adds a protocol extension to improve the integrity of the SSH
+transport protocol, particular in and around the initial key exchange
+(KEX) phase.
+
+Full details of the extension are in the PROTOCOL file.
+
+with markus@
+
+OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2a66ac962f0a630d7945fee54004ed9e9c439f14
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [import from ubuntu https://git.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/openssh/tree/debian/patches/CVE-2023-48795.patch?h=ubuntu/focal-security
+Upstream commit https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/1edb00c58f8a6875fad6a497aa2bacf37f9e6cd5]
+CVE: CVE-2023-48795
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ PROTOCOL      | 26 +++++++++++++++++
+ kex.c         | 68 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
+ kex.h         |  1 +
+ packet.c      | 78 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
+ sshconnect2.c | 14 +++------
+ sshd.c        |  7 +++--
+ 6 files changed, 146 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/PROTOCOL b/PROTOCOL
+index f75c1c0..89bddfe 100644
+--- a/PROTOCOL
++++ b/PROTOCOL
+@@ -102,6 +102,32 @@ OpenSSH supports the use of ECDH in Curve25519 for key exchange as
+ described at:
+ http://git.libssh.org/users/aris/libssh.git/plain/doc/curve25519-sha256@libssh.org.txt?h=curve25519
+ 
++1.9 transport: strict key exchange extension
++
++OpenSSH supports a number of transport-layer hardening measures under
++a "strict KEX" feature. This feature is signalled similarly to the
++RFC8308 ext-info feature: by including a additional algorithm in the
++initiial SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT kex_algorithms field. The client may append
++"kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com" to its kex_algorithms and the server
++may append "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com". These pseudo-algorithms
++are only valid in the initial SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT and MUST be ignored
++if they are present in subsequent SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT packets.
++
++When an endpoint that supports this extension observes this algorithm
++name in a peer's KEXINIT packet, it MUST make the following changes to
++the the protocol:
++
++a) During initial KEX, terminate the connection if any unexpected or
++   out-of-sequence packet is received. This includes terminating the
++   connection if the first packet received is not SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT.
++   Unexpected packets for the purpose of strict KEX include messages
++   that are otherwise valid at any time during the connection such as
++   SSH2_MSG_DEBUG and SSH2_MSG_IGNORE.
++b) After sending or receiving a SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS message, reset the
++   packet sequence number to zero. This behaviour persists for the
++   duration of the connection (i.e. not just the first
++   SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS).
++
+ 2. Connection protocol changes
+ 
+ 2.1. connection: Channel write close extension "eow@openssh.com"
+diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
+index ce85f04..3129a4e 100644
+--- a/kex.c
++++ b/kex.c
+@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@
+ #include "digest.h"
+ 
+ /* prototype */
+-static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *);
++static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *, uint32_t seq);
+ static int kex_input_newkeys(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+ 
+ static const char *proposal_names[PROPOSAL_MAX] = {
+@@ -173,6 +173,18 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
+ 	return 1;
+ }
+ 
++/* returns non-zero if proposal contains any algorithm from algs */
++static int
++has_any_alg(const char *proposal, const char *algs)
++{
++	char *cp;
++
++	if ((cp = match_list(proposal, algs, NULL)) == NULL)
++		return 0;
++	free(cp);
++	return 1;
++}
++
+ /*
+  * Concatenate algorithm names, avoiding duplicates in the process.
+  * Caller must free returned string.
+@@ -180,7 +192,7 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
+ char *
+ kex_names_cat(const char *a, const char *b)
+ {
+-	char *ret = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *cp, *p, *m;
++	char *ret = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *cp, *p;
+ 	size_t len;
+ 
+ 	if (a == NULL || *a == '\0')
+@@ -197,10 +209,8 @@ kex_names_cat(const char *a, const char *b)
+ 	}
+ 	strlcpy(ret, a, len);
+ 	for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0'; (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
+-		if ((m = match_list(ret, p, NULL)) != NULL) {
+-			free(m);
++		if (has_any_alg(ret, p))
+ 			continue; /* Algorithm already present */
+-		}
+ 		if (strlcat(ret, ",", len) >= len ||
+ 		    strlcat(ret, p, len) >= len) {
+ 			free(tmp);
+@@ -409,7 +419,12 @@ kex_protocol_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ {
+ 	int r;
+ 
+-	error("kex protocol error: type %d seq %u", type, seq);
++	/* If in strict mode, any unexpected message is an error */
++	if ((ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) && ssh->kex->kex_strict) {
++		ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "strict KEX violation: "
++		    "unexpected packet type %u (seqnr %u)", type, seq);
++	}
++	error("type %u seq %u", type, seq);
+ 	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, seq)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+@@ -481,6 +496,11 @@ kex_input_ext_info(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, &kex_protocol_error);
+ 	if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &ninfo)) != 0)
+ 		return r;
++	if (ninfo >= 1024) {
++		error("SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO with too many entries, expected "
++		    "<=1024, received %u", ninfo);
++		return dispatch_protocol_error(type, seq, ssh);
++	}
+ 	for (i = 0; i < ninfo; i++) {
+ 		if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &name, NULL)) != 0)
+ 			return r;
+@@ -581,7 +601,7 @@ kex_input_kexinit(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 		error("%s: no hex", __func__);
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ 	}
+-	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, NULL);
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_protocol_error);
+ 	ptr = sshpkt_ptr(ssh, &dlen);
+ 	if ((r = sshbuf_put(kex->peer, ptr, dlen)) != 0)
+ 		return r;
+@@ -617,7 +637,7 @@ kex_input_kexinit(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	if (!(kex->flags & KEX_INIT_SENT))
+ 		if ((r = kex_send_kexinit(ssh)) != 0)
+ 			return r;
+-	if ((r = kex_choose_conf(ssh)) != 0)
++	if ((r = kex_choose_conf(ssh, seq)) != 0)
+ 		return r;
+ 
+ 	if (kex->kex_type < KEX_MAX && kex->kex[kex->kex_type] != NULL)
+@@ -880,7 +900,13 @@ proposals_match(char *my[PROPOSAL_MAX], char *peer[PROPOSAL_MAX])
+ }
+ 
+ static int
+-kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
++kexalgs_contains(char **peer, const char *ext)
++{
++	return has_any_alg(peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], ext);
++}
++
++static int
++kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh, uint32_t seq)
+ {
+ 	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+ 	struct newkeys *newkeys;
+@@ -905,13 +931,23 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 		sprop=peer;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	/* Check whether client supports ext_info_c */
+-	if (kex->server && (kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL)) {
+-		char *ext;
+-
+-		ext = match_list("ext-info-c", peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], NULL);
+-		kex->ext_info_c = (ext != NULL);
+-		free(ext);
++	/* Check whether peer supports ext_info/kex_strict */
++	if ((kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) != 0) {
++		if (kex->server) {
++			kex->ext_info_c = kexalgs_contains(peer, "ext-info-c");
++			kex->kex_strict = kexalgs_contains(peer,
++			    "kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com");
++		} else {
++			kex->kex_strict = kexalgs_contains(peer,
++			    "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com");
++		}
++		if (kex->kex_strict) {
++			debug3("will use strict KEX ordering");
++			if (seq != 0)
++				ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh,
++				    "strict KEX violation: "
++				    "KEXINIT was not the first packet");
++		}
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* Algorithm Negotiation */
+diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h
+index a5ae6ac..cae38f7 100644
+--- a/kex.h
++++ b/kex.h
+@@ -145,6 +145,7 @@ struct kex {
+ 	u_int	kex_type;
+ 	char	*server_sig_algs;
+ 	int	ext_info_c;
++	int	kex_strict;
+ 	struct sshbuf *my;
+ 	struct sshbuf *peer;
+ 	struct sshbuf *client_version;
+diff --git a/packet.c b/packet.c
+index 6d3e917..43139f9 100644
+--- a/packet.c
++++ b/packet.c
+@@ -1203,8 +1203,13 @@ ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	sshbuf_dump(state->output, stderr);
+ #endif
+ 	/* increment sequence number for outgoing packets */
+-	if (++state->p_send.seqnr == 0)
++	if (++state->p_send.seqnr == 0) {
++		if ((ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) != 0) {
++			ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "outgoing sequence number "
++			    "wrapped during initial key exchange");
++		}
+ 		logit("outgoing seqnr wraps around");
++	}
+ 	if (++state->p_send.packets == 0)
+ 		if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY))
+ 			return SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY;
+@@ -1212,6 +1217,11 @@ ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	state->p_send.bytes += len;
+ 	sshbuf_reset(state->outgoing_packet);
+ 
++	if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS && ssh->kex->kex_strict) {
++		debug("resetting send seqnr %u", state->p_send.seqnr);
++		state->p_send.seqnr = 0;
++	}
++
+ 	if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS)
+ 		r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_OUT);
+ 	else if (type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS && state->server_side)
+@@ -1345,8 +1355,7 @@ ssh_packet_read_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
+ 	/* Stay in the loop until we have received a complete packet. */
+ 	for (;;) {
+ 		/* Try to read a packet from the buffer. */
+-		r = ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(ssh, typep, seqnr_p);
+-		if (r != 0)
++		if ((r = ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(ssh, typep, seqnr_p)) != 0)
+ 			break;
+ 		/* If we got a packet, return it. */
+ 		if (*typep != SSH_MSG_NONE)
+@@ -1633,10 +1642,16 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll2(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
+ 		if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, mac->mac_len)) != 0)
+ 			goto out;
+ 	}
++
+ 	if (seqnr_p != NULL)
+ 		*seqnr_p = state->p_read.seqnr;
+-	if (++state->p_read.seqnr == 0)
++	if (++state->p_read.seqnr == 0) {
++		if ((ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) != 0) {
++			ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "incoming sequence number "
++			    "wrapped during initial key exchange");
++		}
+ 		logit("incoming seqnr wraps around");
++	}
+ 	if (++state->p_read.packets == 0)
+ 		if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY))
+ 			return SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY;
+@@ -1702,6 +1717,10 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll2(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
+ #endif
+ 	/* reset for next packet */
+ 	state->packlen = 0;
++	if (*typep == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS && ssh->kex->kex_strict) {
++		debug("resetting read seqnr %u", state->p_read.seqnr);
++		state->p_read.seqnr = 0;
++	}
+ 
+ 	/* do we need to rekey? */
+ 	if (ssh_packet_need_rekeying(ssh, 0)) {
+@@ -1726,10 +1745,39 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
+ 		r = ssh_packet_read_poll2(ssh, typep, seqnr_p);
+ 		if (r != 0)
+ 			return r;
+-		if (*typep) {
+-			state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0;
+-			DBG(debug("received packet type %d", *typep));
++		if (*typep == 0) {
++			/* no message ready */
++			return 0;
++		}
++		state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0;
++		DBG(debug("received packet type %d", *typep));
++
++		/* Always process disconnect messages */
++		if (*typep == SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT) {
++			if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &reason)) != 0 ||
++			    (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0)
++				return r;
++			/* Ignore normal client exit notifications */
++			do_log2(ssh->state->server_side &&
++			    reason == SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION ?
++			    SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
++			    "Received disconnect from %s port %d:"
++			    "%u: %.400s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
++			    ssh_remote_port(ssh), reason, msg);
++			free(msg);
++			return SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED;
+ 		}
++
++		/*
++		 * Do not implicitly handle any messages here during initial
++		 * KEX when in strict mode. They will be need to be allowed
++		 * explicitly by the KEX dispatch table or they will generate
++		 * protocol errors.
++		 */
++		if (ssh->kex != NULL &&
++		    (ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) && ssh->kex->kex_strict)
++			return 0;
++		/* Implicitly handle transport-level messages */
+ 		switch (*typep) {
+ 		case SSH2_MSG_IGNORE:
+ 			debug3("Received SSH2_MSG_IGNORE");
+@@ -1744,19 +1792,6 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
+ 			debug("Remote: %.900s", msg);
+ 			free(msg);
+ 			break;
+-		case SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT:
+-			if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &reason)) != 0 ||
+-			    (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0)
+-				return r;
+-			/* Ignore normal client exit notifications */
+-			do_log2(ssh->state->server_side &&
+-			    reason == SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION ?
+-			    SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
+-			    "Received disconnect from %s port %d:"
+-			    "%u: %.400s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+-			    ssh_remote_port(ssh), reason, msg);
+-			free(msg);
+-			return SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED;
+ 		case SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED:
+ 			if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &seqnr)) != 0)
+ 				return r;
+@@ -2235,6 +2270,7 @@ kex_to_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct kex *kex)
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->hostkey_type)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->hostkey_nid)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->kex_type)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->kex_strict)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->my)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->peer)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->client_version)) != 0 ||
+@@ -2397,6 +2433,7 @@ kex_from_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct kex **kexp)
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, (u_int *)&kex->hostkey_type)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, (u_int *)&kex->hostkey_nid)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->kex_type)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->kex_strict)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->my)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->peer)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->client_version)) != 0 ||
+@@ -2724,6 +2761,7 @@ sshpkt_disconnect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt,...)
+ 	vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
+ 	va_end(args);
+ 
++	debug2("sending SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT: %s", buf);
+ 	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, buf)) != 0 ||
+diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
+index 5df9477..617ed9f 100644
+--- a/sshconnect2.c
++++ b/sshconnect2.c
+@@ -218,7 +218,8 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
+ 		fatal("%s: kex_assemble_namelist", __func__);
+ 	free(all_key);
+ 
+-	if ((s = kex_names_cat(options.kex_algorithms, "ext-info-c")) == NULL)
++	if ((s = kex_names_cat(options.kex_algorithms,
++	    "ext-info-c,kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com")) == NULL)
+ 		fatal("%s: kex_names_cat", __func__);
+ 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(s);
+ 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
+@@ -343,7 +344,6 @@ struct cauthmethod {
+ };
+ 
+ static int input_userauth_service_accept(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+-static int input_userauth_ext_info(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+ static int input_userauth_success(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+ static int input_userauth_failure(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+ static int input_userauth_banner(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+@@ -460,7 +460,7 @@ ssh_userauth2(struct ssh *ssh, const char *local_user,
+ 
+ 	ssh->authctxt = &authctxt;
+ 	ssh_dispatch_init(ssh, &input_userauth_error);
+-	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, &input_userauth_ext_info);
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, kex_input_ext_info);
+ 	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT, &input_userauth_service_accept);
+ 	ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &authctxt.success);	/* loop until success */
+ 	pubkey_cleanup(ssh);
+@@ -505,13 +505,6 @@ input_userauth_service_accept(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	return r;
+ }
+ 
+-/* ARGSUSED */
+-static int
+-input_userauth_ext_info(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, struct ssh *ssh)
+-{
+-	return kex_input_ext_info(type, seqnr, ssh);
+-}
+-
+ void
+ userauth(struct ssh *ssh, char *authlist)
+ {
+@@ -593,6 +586,7 @@ input_userauth_success(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	free(authctxt->methoddata);
+ 	authctxt->methoddata = NULL;
+ 	authctxt->success = 1;			/* break out */
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, dispatch_protocol_error);
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
+index 60b2aaf..ffea38c 100644
+--- a/sshd.c
++++ b/sshd.c
+@@ -2323,11 +2323,13 @@ static void
+ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
+ {
+ 	char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_SERVER };
++	char *s;
+ 	struct kex *kex;
+ 	int r;
+ 
+-	myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(
+-	    options.kex_algorithms);
++	if ((s = kex_names_cat(options.kex_algorithms, "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com")) == NULL)
++		fatal("kex_names_cat");
++	myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(s);
+ 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = compat_cipher_proposal(
+ 	    options.ciphers);
+ 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = compat_cipher_proposal(
+@@ -2382,6 +2384,7 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	packet_send();
+ 	packet_write_wait();
+ #endif
++	free(s);
+ 	debug("KEX done");
+ }
+ 
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-51385.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+From 7ef3787c84b6b524501211b11a26c742f829af1a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2023 14:47:44 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] upstream: ban user/hostnames with most shell metacharacters
+
+This makes ssh(1) refuse user or host names provided on the
+commandline that contain most shell metacharacters.
+
+Some programs that invoke ssh(1) using untrusted data do not filter
+metacharacters in arguments they supply. This could create
+interactions with user-specified ProxyCommand and other directives
+that allow shell injection attacks to occur.
+
+It's a mistake to invoke ssh(1) with arbitrary untrusted arguments,
+but getting this stuff right can be tricky, so this should prevent
+most obvious ways of creating risky situations. It however is not
+and cannot be perfect: ssh(1) has no practical way of interpreting
+what shell quoting rules are in use and how they interact with the
+user's specified ProxyCommand.
+
+To allow configurations that use strange user or hostnames to
+continue to work, this strictness is applied only to names coming
+from the commandline. Names specified using User or Hostname
+directives in ssh_config(5) are not affected.
+
+feedback/ok millert@ markus@ dtucker@ deraadt@
+
+OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3b487348b5964f3e77b6b4d3da4c3b439e94b2d9
+
+CVE: CVE-2023-51385
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/7ef3787c84b6b524501211b11a26c742f829af1a]
+Signed-off-by: Ranjitsinh Rathod <ranjitsinh.rathod@kpit.com>
+Comment: Hunks refreshed to apply cleanly
+
+---
+ ssh.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
+index 35c48e62d18..48d93ddf2a9 100644
+--- a/ssh.c
++++ b/ssh.c
+@@ -583,6 +583,41 @@ set_addrinfo_port(struct addrinfo *addrs
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
++static int
++valid_hostname(const char *s)
++{
++	size_t i;
++
++	if (*s == '-')
++		return 0;
++	for (i = 0; s[i] != 0; i++) {
++		if (strchr("'`\"$\\;&<>|(){}", s[i]) != NULL ||
++		    isspace((u_char)s[i]) || iscntrl((u_char)s[i]))
++			return 0;
++	}
++	return 1;
++}
++
++static int
++valid_ruser(const char *s)
++{
++	size_t i;
++
++	if (*s == '-')
++		return 0;
++	for (i = 0; s[i] != 0; i++) {
++		if (strchr("'`\";&<>|(){}", s[i]) != NULL)
++			return 0;
++		/* Disallow '-' after whitespace */
++		if (isspace((u_char)s[i]) && s[i + 1] == '-')
++			return 0;
++		/* Disallow \ in last position */
++		if (s[i] == '\\' && s[i + 1] == '\0')
++			return 0;
++	}
++	return 1;
++}
++
+ /*
+  * Main program for the ssh client.
+  */
+@@ -1069,6 +1104,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	if (!host)
+ 		usage();
+ 
++	if (!valid_hostname(host))
++		fatal("hostname contains invalid characters");
++	if (options.user != NULL && !valid_ruser(options.user))
++		fatal("remote username contains invalid characters");
+ 	host_arg = xstrdup(host);
+ 
+ 	/* Initialize the command to execute on remote host. */

meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_8.2p1.bb

@@ -39,6 +39,8 @@ SRC_URI = "http://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-${PV}.tar
            file://CVE-2023-38408-10.patch \
            file://CVE-2023-38408-11.patch \
            file://CVE-2023-38408-12.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-48795.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-51385.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "3076e6413e8dbe56d33848c1054ac091"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "43925151e6cf6cee1450190c0e9af4dc36b41c12737619edff8bcebdff64e671"

meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc/CVE-2023-4813.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,986 @@
+From 1c37b8022e8763fedbb3f79c02e05c6acfe5a215 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Siddhesh Poyarekar <siddhesh@sourceware.org>
+Date: Thu, 17 Mar 2022 11:44:34 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] Simplify allocations and fix merge and continue actions [BZ
+ #28931]
+
+Allocations for address tuples is currently a bit confusing because of
+the pointer chasing through PAT, making it hard to observe the sequence
+in which allocations have been made.  Narrow scope of the pointer
+chasing through PAT so that it is only used where necessary.
+
+This also tightens actions behaviour with the hosts database in
+getaddrinfo to comply with the manual text.  The "continue" action
+discards previous results and the "merge" action results in an immedate
+lookup failure.  Consequently, chaining of allocations across modules is
+no longer necessary, thus opening up cleanup opportunities.
+
+A test has been added that checks some combinations to ensure that they
+work correctly.
+
+Resolves: BZ #28931
+
+CVE: CVE-2023-4813
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=commitdiff;h=1c37b8022e8763fedbb3f79c02e05c6acfe5a215]
+Comments: Hunks refreshed
+
+Signed-off-by: Siddhesh Poyarekar <siddhesh@sourceware.org>
+Reviewed-by: DJ Delorie <dj@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Bhabu Bindu <bhabu.bindu@kpit.com>
+---
+ nss/Makefile                               |   1 +
+ nss/tst-nss-gai-actions.c                  | 149 ++++++
+ nss/tst-nss-gai-actions.root/etc/host.conf |   1 +
+ nss/tst-nss-gai-actions.root/etc/hosts     | 508 +++++++++++++++++++++
+ sysdeps/posix/getaddrinfo.c                | 143 +++---
+ 5 files changed, 750 insertions(+), 52 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 nss/tst-nss-gai-actions.c
+ create mode 100644 nss/tst-nss-gai-actions.root/etc/host.conf
+ create mode 100644 nss/tst-nss-gai-actions.root/etc/hosts
+
+diff --git a/nss/Makefile b/nss/Makefile
+index 42a59535cb..d8b06b44fb 100644
+--- a/nss/Makefile
++++ b/nss/Makefile
+@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@
+ 
+ tests-container = \
+ 			  tst-nss-test3 \
++			  tst-nss-gai-actions \
+ 			  tst-nss-files-hosts-long \
+ 			  tst-nss-db-endpwent \
+ 			  tst-nss-db-endgrent
+diff --git a/nss/tst-nss-gai-actions.c b/nss/tst-nss-gai-actions.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000..efca6cd183
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/nss/tst-nss-gai-actions.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
++/* Test continue and merge NSS actions for getaddrinfo.
++   Copyright The GNU Toolchain Authors.
++   This file is part of the GNU C Library.
++
++   The GNU C Library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
++   modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
++   License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
++   version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
++
++   The GNU C Library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
++   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
++   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
++   Lesser General Public License for more details.
++
++   You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
++   License along with the GNU C Library; if not, see
++   <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.  */
++
++#include <dlfcn.h>
++#include <gnu/lib-names.h>
++#include <nss.h>
++#include <stdio.h>
++#include <stdlib.h>
++#include <string.h>
++
++#include <support/check.h>
++#include <support/format_nss.h>
++#include <support/support.h>
++#include <support/xstdio.h>
++#include <support/xunistd.h>
++
++enum
++{
++  ACTION_MERGE = 0,
++  ACTION_CONTINUE,
++};
++
++static const char *
++family_str (int family)
++{
++  switch (family)
++    {
++    case AF_UNSPEC:
++      return "AF_UNSPEC";
++    case AF_INET:
++      return "AF_INET";
++    default:
++      __builtin_unreachable ();
++    }
++}
++
++static const char *
++action_str (int action)
++{
++  switch (action)
++    {
++    case ACTION_MERGE:
++      return "merge";
++    case ACTION_CONTINUE:
++      return "continue";
++    default:
++      __builtin_unreachable ();
++    }
++}
++
++static void
++do_one_test (int action, int family, bool canon)
++{
++  struct addrinfo hints =
++    {
++      .ai_family = family,
++    };
++
++  struct addrinfo *ai;
++
++  if (canon)
++    hints.ai_flags = AI_CANONNAME;
++
++  printf ("***** Testing \"files [SUCCESS=%s] files\" for family %s, %s\n",
++	  action_str (action), family_str (family),
++	  canon ? "AI_CANONNAME" : "");
++
++  int ret = getaddrinfo ("example.org", "80", &hints, &ai);
++
++  switch (action)
++    {
++    case ACTION_MERGE:
++      if (ret == 0)
++	{
++	  char *formatted = support_format_addrinfo (ai, ret);
++
++	  printf ("merge unexpectedly succeeded:\n %s\n", formatted);
++	  support_record_failure ();
++	  free (formatted);
++	}
++      else
++	return;
++    case ACTION_CONTINUE:
++	{
++	  char *formatted = support_format_addrinfo (ai, ret);
++
++	  /* Verify that the result appears exactly once.  */
++	  const char *expected = "address: STREAM/TCP 192.0.0.1 80\n"
++	    "address: DGRAM/UDP 192.0.0.1 80\n"
++	    "address: RAW/IP 192.0.0.1 80\n";
++
++	  const char *contains = strstr (formatted, expected);
++	  const char *contains2 = NULL;
++
++	  if (contains != NULL)
++	    contains2 = strstr (contains + strlen (expected), expected);
++
++	  if (contains == NULL || contains2 != NULL)
++	    {
++	      printf ("continue failed:\n%s\n", formatted);
++	      support_record_failure ();
++	    }
++
++	  free (formatted);
++	  break;
++	}
++    default:
++      __builtin_unreachable ();
++    }
++}
++
++static void
++do_one_test_set (int action)
++{
++  char buf[32];
++
++  snprintf (buf, sizeof (buf), "files [SUCCESS=%s] files",
++	    action_str (action));
++  __nss_configure_lookup ("hosts", buf);
++
++  do_one_test (action, AF_UNSPEC, false);
++  do_one_test (action, AF_INET, false);
++  do_one_test (action, AF_INET, true);
++}
++
++static int
++do_test (void)
++{
++  do_one_test_set (ACTION_CONTINUE);
++  do_one_test_set (ACTION_MERGE);
++  return 0;
++}
++
++#include <support/test-driver.c>
+diff --git a/nss/tst-nss-gai-actions.root/etc/host.conf b/nss/tst-nss-gai-actions.root/etc/host.conf
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000..d1a59f73a9
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/nss/tst-nss-gai-actions.root/etc/host.conf
+@@ -0,0 +1 @@
++multi on
+diff --git a/nss/tst-nss-gai-actions.root/etc/hosts b/nss/tst-nss-gai-actions.root/etc/hosts
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000..50ce9774dc
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/nss/tst-nss-gai-actions.root/etc/hosts
+@@ -0,0 +1,508 @@
++192.0.0.1	example.org
++192.0.0.2	example.org
++192.0.0.3	example.org
++192.0.0.4	example.org
++192.0.0.5	example.org
++192.0.0.6	example.org
++192.0.0.7	example.org
++192.0.0.8	example.org
++192.0.0.9	example.org
++192.0.0.10	example.org
++192.0.0.11	example.org
++192.0.0.12	example.org
++192.0.0.13	example.org
++192.0.0.14	example.org
++192.0.0.15	example.org
++192.0.0.16	example.org
++192.0.0.17	example.org
++192.0.0.18	example.org
++192.0.0.19	example.org
++192.0.0.20	example.org
++192.0.0.21	example.org
++192.0.0.22	example.org
++192.0.0.23	example.org
++192.0.0.24	example.org
++192.0.0.25	example.org
++192.0.0.26	example.org
++192.0.0.27	example.org
++192.0.0.28	example.org
++192.0.0.29	example.org
++192.0.0.30	example.org
++192.0.0.31	example.org
++192.0.0.32	example.org
++192.0.0.33	example.org
++192.0.0.34	example.org
++192.0.0.35	example.org
++192.0.0.36	example.org
++192.0.0.37	example.org
++192.0.0.38	example.org
++192.0.0.39	example.org
++192.0.0.40	example.org
++192.0.0.41	example.org
++192.0.0.42	example.org
++192.0.0.43	example.org
++192.0.0.44	example.org
++192.0.0.45	example.org
++192.0.0.46	example.org
++192.0.0.47	example.org
++192.0.0.48	example.org
++192.0.0.49	example.org
++192.0.0.50	example.org
++192.0.0.51	example.org
++192.0.0.52	example.org
++192.0.0.53	example.org
++192.0.0.54	example.org
++192.0.0.55	example.org
++192.0.0.56	example.org
++192.0.0.57	example.org
++192.0.0.58	example.org
++192.0.0.59	example.org
++192.0.0.60	example.org
++192.0.0.61	example.org
++192.0.0.62	example.org
++192.0.0.63	example.org
++192.0.0.64	example.org
++192.0.0.65	example.org
++192.0.0.66	example.org
++192.0.0.67	example.org
++192.0.0.68	example.org
++192.0.0.69	example.org
++192.0.0.70	example.org
++192.0.0.71	example.org
++192.0.0.72	example.org
++192.0.0.73	example.org
++192.0.0.74	example.org
++192.0.0.75	example.org
++192.0.0.76	example.org
++192.0.0.77	example.org
++192.0.0.78	example.org
++192.0.0.79	example.org
++192.0.0.80	example.org
++192.0.0.81	example.org
++192.0.0.82	example.org
++192.0.0.83	example.org
++192.0.0.84	example.org
++192.0.0.85	example.org
++192.0.0.86	example.org
++192.0.0.87	example.org
++192.0.0.88	example.org
++192.0.0.89	example.org
++192.0.0.90	example.org
++192.0.0.91	example.org
++192.0.0.92	example.org
++192.0.0.93	example.org
++192.0.0.94	example.org
++192.0.0.95	example.org
++192.0.0.96	example.org
++192.0.0.97	example.org
++192.0.0.98	example.org
++192.0.0.99	example.org
++192.0.0.100	example.org
++192.0.0.101	example.org
++192.0.0.102	example.org
++192.0.0.103	example.org
++192.0.0.104	example.org
++192.0.0.105	example.org
++192.0.0.106	example.org
++192.0.0.107	example.org
++192.0.0.108	example.org
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++192.0.0.110	example.org
++192.0.0.111	example.org
++192.0.0.112	example.org
++192.0.0.113	example.org
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++192.0.0.115	example.org
++192.0.0.116	example.org
++192.0.0.117	example.org
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++192.0.0.119	example.org
++192.0.0.120	example.org
++192.0.0.121	example.org
++192.0.0.122	example.org
++192.0.0.123	example.org
++192.0.0.124	example.org
++192.0.0.125	example.org
++192.0.0.126	example.org
++192.0.0.127	example.org
++192.0.0.128	example.org
++192.0.0.129	example.org
++192.0.0.130	example.org
++192.0.0.131	example.org
++192.0.0.132	example.org
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++192.0.0.134	example.org
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++192.0.0.136	example.org
++192.0.0.137	example.org
++192.0.0.138	example.org
++192.0.0.139	example.org
++192.0.0.140	example.org
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++192.0.0.164	example.org
++192.0.0.165	example.org
++192.0.0.166	example.org
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++192.0.0.168	example.org
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++192.0.0.200	example.org
++192.0.0.201	example.org
++192.0.0.202	example.org
++192.0.0.203	example.org
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++192.0.0.221	example.org
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++192.0.0.245	example.org
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++192.0.0.254	example.org
++192.0.1.1	example.org
++192.0.1.2	example.org
++192.0.1.3	example.org
++192.0.1.4	example.org
++192.0.1.5	example.org
++192.0.1.6	example.org
++192.0.1.7	example.org
++192.0.1.8	example.org
++192.0.1.9	example.org
++192.0.1.10	example.org
++192.0.1.11	example.org
++192.0.1.12	example.org
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++192.0.1.15	example.org
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++192.0.1.19	example.org
++192.0.1.20	example.org
++192.0.1.21	example.org
++192.0.1.22	example.org
++192.0.1.23	example.org
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++192.0.1.25	example.org
++192.0.1.26	example.org
++192.0.1.27	example.org
++192.0.1.28	example.org
++192.0.1.29	example.org
++192.0.1.30	example.org
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++192.0.1.32	example.org
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++192.0.1.36	example.org
++192.0.1.37	example.org
++192.0.1.38	example.org
++192.0.1.39	example.org
++192.0.1.40	example.org
++192.0.1.41	example.org
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++192.0.1.48	example.org
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++192.0.1.51	example.org
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++192.0.1.55	example.org
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++192.0.1.80	example.org
++192.0.1.81	example.org
++192.0.1.82	example.org
++192.0.1.83	example.org
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++192.0.1.90	example.org
++192.0.1.91	example.org
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++192.0.1.93	example.org
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++192.0.1.102	example.org
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++192.0.1.134	example.org
++192.0.1.135	example.org
++192.0.1.136	example.org
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++192.0.1.155	example.org
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++192.0.1.234	example.org
++192.0.1.235	example.org
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++192.0.1.238	example.org
++192.0.1.239	example.org
++192.0.1.240	example.org
++192.0.1.241	example.org
++192.0.1.242	example.org
++192.0.1.243	example.org
++192.0.1.244	example.org
++192.0.1.245	example.org
++192.0.1.246	example.org
++192.0.1.247	example.org
++192.0.1.248	example.org
++192.0.1.249	example.org
++192.0.1.250	example.org
++192.0.1.251	example.org
++192.0.1.252	example.org
++192.0.1.253	example.org
++192.0.1.254	example.org
+diff --git a/sysdeps/posix/getaddrinfo.c b/sysdeps/posix/getaddrinfo.c
+index 18dccd5924..3d9bea60c6 100644
+--- a/sysdeps/posix/getaddrinfo.c
++++ b/sysdeps/posix/getaddrinfo.c
+@@ -458,11 +458,6 @@ gaih_inet (const char *name, const struct gaih_service *service,
+ 
+   if (name != NULL)
+     {
+-      at = alloca_account (sizeof (struct gaih_addrtuple), alloca_used);
+-      at->family = AF_UNSPEC;
+-      at->scopeid = 0;
+-      at->next = NULL;
+-
+       if (req->ai_flags & AI_IDN)
+ 	{
+ 	  char *out;
+@@ -473,13 +468,21 @@ gaih_inet (const char *name, const struct gaih_service *service,
+ 	  malloc_name = true;
+ 	}
+ 
+-      if (__inet_aton_exact (name, (struct in_addr *) at->addr) != 0)
++      uint32_t addr[4];
++      if (__inet_aton_exact (name, (struct in_addr *) addr) != 0)
+ 	{
++	  at = alloca_account (sizeof (struct gaih_addrtuple), alloca_used);
++	  at->scopeid = 0;
++	  at->next = NULL;
++
+ 	  if (req->ai_family == AF_UNSPEC || req->ai_family == AF_INET)
+-	    at->family = AF_INET;
++	    {
++	      memcpy (at->addr, addr, sizeof (at->addr));
++	      at->family = AF_INET;
++	    }
+ 	  else if (req->ai_family == AF_INET6 && (req->ai_flags & AI_V4MAPPED))
+ 	    {
+-	      at->addr[3] = at->addr[0];
++	      at->addr[3] = addr[0];
+ 	      at->addr[2] = htonl (0xffff);
+ 	      at->addr[1] = 0;
+ 	      at->addr[0] = 0;
+@@ -505,49 +505,62 @@
+ 
+ 	  if (req->ai_flags & AI_CANONNAME)
+ 	    canon = name;
++
++	  goto process_list;
+ 	}
+-      else if (at->family == AF_UNSPEC)
++
++      char *scope_delim = strchr (name, SCOPE_DELIMITER);
++      int e;
++
++      if (scope_delim == NULL)
++	e = inet_pton (AF_INET6, name, addr);
++      else
++	e = __inet_pton_length (AF_INET6, name, scope_delim - name, addr);
++
++      if (e > 0)
+ 	{
+-	  char *scope_delim = strchr (name, SCOPE_DELIMITER);
+-	  int e;
+-	  if (scope_delim == NULL)
+-	    e = inet_pton (AF_INET6, name, at->addr);
++	  at = alloca_account (sizeof (struct gaih_addrtuple),
++			       alloca_used);
++	  at->scopeid = 0;
++	  at->next = NULL;
++
++	  if (req->ai_family == AF_UNSPEC || req->ai_family == AF_INET6)
++	    {
++	      memcpy (at->addr, addr, sizeof (at->addr));
++	      at->family = AF_INET6;
++	    }
++	  else if (req->ai_family == AF_INET
++		   && IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED (addr))
++	    {
++	      at->addr[0] = addr[3];
++	      at->addr[1] = addr[1];
++	      at->addr[2] = addr[2];
++	      at->addr[3] = addr[3];
++	      at->family = AF_INET;
++	    }
+ 	  else
+-	    e = __inet_pton_length (AF_INET6, name, scope_delim - name,
+-				    at->addr);
+-	  if (e > 0)
+ 	    {
+-	      if (req->ai_family == AF_UNSPEC || req->ai_family == AF_INET6)
+-		at->family = AF_INET6;
+-	      else if (req->ai_family == AF_INET
+-		       && IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED (at->addr))
+-		{
+-		  at->addr[0] = at->addr[3];
+-		  at->family = AF_INET;
+-		}
+-	      else
+-		{
+-		  result = -EAI_ADDRFAMILY;
+-		  goto free_and_return;
+-		}
+-
+-	      if (scope_delim != NULL
+-		  && __inet6_scopeid_pton ((struct in6_addr *) at->addr,
+-					   scope_delim + 1,
+-					   &at->scopeid) != 0)
+-		{
+-		  result = -EAI_NONAME;
+-		  goto free_and_return;
+-		}
++	      result = -EAI_ADDRFAMILY;
++	      goto free_and_return;
++	    }
+ 
+-	      if (req->ai_flags & AI_CANONNAME)
+-		canon = name;
++	  if (scope_delim != NULL
++	      && __inet6_scopeid_pton ((struct in6_addr *) at->addr,
++				       scope_delim + 1,
++				       &at->scopeid) != 0)
++	    {
++	      result = -EAI_NONAME;
++	      goto free_and_return;
+ 	    }
++
++	  if (req->ai_flags & AI_CANONNAME)
++	    canon = name;
++
++	  goto process_list;
+ 	}
+ 
+-      if (at->family == AF_UNSPEC && (req->ai_flags & AI_NUMERICHOST) == 0)
++      if ((req->ai_flags & AI_NUMERICHOST) == 0)
+ 	{
+-	  struct gaih_addrtuple **pat = &at;
+ 	  int no_data = 0;
+ 	  int no_inet6_data = 0;
+ 	  service_user *nip;
+@@ -543,6 +559,7 @@ gaih_inet (const char *name, const struct gaih_service *service,
+ 	  enum nss_status status = NSS_STATUS_UNAVAIL;
+ 	  int no_more;
+ 	  struct resolv_context *res_ctx = NULL;
++	  bool do_merge = false;
+ 
+ 	  /* If we do not have to look for IPv6 addresses or the canonical
+ 	     name, use the simple, old functions, which do not support
+@@ -579,7 +596,7 @@ gaih_inet (const char *name, const struct gaih_service *service,
+ 			  result = -EAI_MEMORY;
+ 			  goto free_and_return;
+ 			}
+-		      *pat = addrmem;
++		      at = addrmem;
+ 		    }
+ 		  else
+ 		    {
+@@ -632,6 +649,8 @@ gaih_inet (const char *name, const struct gaih_service *service,
+ 		    }
+ 
+ 		  struct gaih_addrtuple *addrfree = addrmem;
++		  struct gaih_addrtuple **pat = &at;
++
+ 		  for (int i = 0; i < air->naddrs; ++i)
+ 		    {
+ 		      socklen_t size = (air->family[i] == AF_INET
+@@ -695,12 +714,6 @@ gaih_inet (const char *name, const struct gaih_service *service,
+ 
+ 		  free (air);
+ 
+-		  if (at->family == AF_UNSPEC)
+-		    {
+-		      result = -EAI_NONAME;
+-		      goto free_and_return;
+-		    }
+-
+ 		  goto process_list;
+ 		}
+ 	      else if (err == 0)
+@@ -750,6 +763,22 @@
+ 
+ 	  while (!no_more)
+ 	    {
++	      /* Always start afresh; continue should discard previous results
++		 and the hosts database does not support merge.  */
++	      at = NULL;
++	      free (canonbuf);
++	      free (addrmem);
++	      canon = canonbuf = NULL;
++	      addrmem = NULL;
++	      got_ipv6 = false;
++
++	      if (do_merge)
++		{
++		  __set_h_errno (NETDB_INTERNAL);
++		  __set_errno (EBUSY);
++		  break;
++		}
++
+ 	      no_data = 0;
+ 	      nss_gethostbyname4_r fct4 = NULL;
+ 
+@@ -744,12 +773,14 @@ gaih_inet (const char *name, const struct gaih_service *service,
+ 		{
+ 		  while (1)
+ 		    {
+-		      status = DL_CALL_FCT (fct4, (name, pat,
++		      status = DL_CALL_FCT (fct4, (name, &at,
+ 						   tmpbuf->data, tmpbuf->length,
+ 						   &errno, &h_errno,
+ 						   NULL));
+ 		      if (status == NSS_STATUS_SUCCESS)
+ 			break;
++		      /* gethostbyname4_r may write into AT, so reset it.  */
++		      at = NULL;
+ 		      if (status != NSS_STATUS_TRYAGAIN
+ 			  || errno != ERANGE || h_errno != NETDB_INTERNAL)
+ 			{
+@@ -774,7 +805,9 @@ gaih_inet (const char *name, const struct gaih_service *service,
+ 		      no_data = 1;
+ 
+ 		      if ((req->ai_flags & AI_CANONNAME) != 0 && canon == NULL)
+-			canon = (*pat)->name;
++			canon = at->name;
++
++		      struct gaih_addrtuple **pat = &at;
+ 
+ 		      while (*pat != NULL)
+ 			{
+@@ -826,6 +859,8 @@ gaih_inet (const char *name, const struct gaih_service *service,
+ 
+ 		  if (fct != NULL)
+ 		    {
++		      struct gaih_addrtuple **pat = &at;
++
+ 		      if (req->ai_family == AF_INET6
+ 			  || req->ai_family == AF_UNSPEC)
+ 			{
+@@ -917,6 +946,10 @@
+ 	      if (nss_next_action (nip, status) == NSS_ACTION_RETURN)
+ 		break;
+ 
++	      /* The hosts database does not support MERGE.  */
++	      if (nss_next_action (nip, status) == NSS_ACTION_MERGE)
++		do_merge = true;
++
+ 	      if (nip->next == NULL)
+ 		no_more = -1;
+ 	      else
+@@ -930,7 +969,7 @@ gaih_inet (const char *name, const struct gaih_service *service,
+ 	}
+ 
+     process_list:
+-      if (at->family == AF_UNSPEC)
++      if (at == NULL)
+ 	{
+ 	  result = -EAI_NONAME;
+ 	  goto free_and_return;
+-- 
+2.39.3

meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc_2.31.bb

@@ -88,6 +88,7 @@ SRC_URI =  "${GLIBC_GIT_URI};branch=${SRCBRANCH};name=glibc \
            file://0037-Avoid-deadlock-between-pthread_create-and-ctors.patch \
            file://CVE-2023-0687.patch \
            file://CVE-2023-4911.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-4813.patch \
            "
 S = "${WORKDIR}/git"
 B = "${WORKDIR}/build-${TARGET_SYS}"

meta/recipes-core/images/build-appliance-image_15.0.0.bb

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ IMAGE_FSTYPES = "wic.vmdk"
 
 inherit core-image setuptools3
 
-SRCREV ?= "b86bf0103c5d5ee04012473b80353e3da1f9e67f"
+SRCREV ?= "593cbdf6c3d340b5408e699bc33f5ac419297104"
 SRC_URI = "git://git.yoctoproject.org/poky;branch=dunfell \
            file://Yocto_Build_Appliance.vmx \
            file://Yocto_Build_Appliance.vmxf \

meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2021-3516.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+From 1358d157d0bd83be1dfe356a69213df9fac0b539 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Nick Wellnhofer <wellnhofer@aevum.de>
+Date: Wed, 21 Apr 2021 13:23:27 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix use-after-free with `xmllint --html --push`
+
+Call htmlCtxtUseOptions to make sure that names aren't stored in
+dictionaries.
+
+Note that this issue only affects xmllint using the HTML push parser.
+
+Fixes #230.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libxml2/-/commit/1358d157d0bd83be1dfe356a69213df9fac0b539]
+CVE: CVE-2021-3516
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ xmllint.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/xmllint.c b/xmllint.c
+index 6ca1bf54d..dbef273a8 100644
+--- a/xmllint.c
++++ b/xmllint.c
+@@ -2213,7 +2213,7 @@ static void parseAndPrintFile(char *filename, xmlParserCtxtPtr rectxt) {
+             if (res > 0) {
+                 ctxt = htmlCreatePushParserCtxt(NULL, NULL,
+                             chars, res, filename, XML_CHAR_ENCODING_NONE);
+-                xmlCtxtUseOptions(ctxt, options);
++                htmlCtxtUseOptions(ctxt, options);
+                 while ((res = fread(chars, 1, pushsize, f)) > 0) {
+                     htmlParseChunk(ctxt, chars, res, 0);
+                 }
+-- 
+GitLab
+

meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2023-45322-1.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+From a22bd982bf10291deea8ba0c61bf75b898c604ce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Nick Wellnhofer <wellnhofer@aevum.de>
+Date: Wed, 2 Nov 2022 15:44:42 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] malloc-fail: Fix memory leak in xmlStaticCopyNodeList
+
+Found with libFuzzer, see #344.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libxml2/-/commit/a22bd982bf10291deea8ba0c61bf75b898c604ce]
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ tree.c | 7 +++++--
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/tree.c b/tree.c
+index 507869efe..647288ce3 100644
+--- a/tree.c
++++ b/tree.c
+@@ -4461,7 +4461,7 @@ xmlStaticCopyNodeList(xmlNodePtr node, xmlDocPtr doc, xmlNodePtr parent) {
+ 	    }
+ 	    if (doc->intSubset == NULL) {
+ 		q = (xmlNodePtr) xmlCopyDtd( (xmlDtdPtr) node );
+-		if (q == NULL) return(NULL);
++		if (q == NULL) goto error;
+ 		q->doc = doc;
+ 		q->parent = parent;
+ 		doc->intSubset = (xmlDtdPtr) q;
+@@ -4473,7 +4473,7 @@ xmlStaticCopyNodeList(xmlNodePtr node, xmlDocPtr doc, xmlNodePtr parent) {
+ 	} else
+ #endif /* LIBXML_TREE_ENABLED */
+ 	    q = xmlStaticCopyNode(node, doc, parent, 1);
+-	if (q == NULL) return(NULL);
++	if (q == NULL) goto error;
+ 	if (ret == NULL) {
+ 	    q->prev = NULL;
+ 	    ret = p = q;
+@@ -4486,6 +4486,9 @@ xmlStaticCopyNodeList(xmlNodePtr node, xmlDocPtr doc, xmlNodePtr parent) {
+ 	node = node->next;
+     }
+     return(ret);
++error:
++    xmlFreeNodeList(ret);
++    return(NULL);
+ }
+ 
+ /**
+-- 
+GitLab
+

meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2023-45322-2.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+From d39f78069dff496ec865c73aa44d7110e429bce9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Nick Wellnhofer <wellnhofer@aevum.de>
+Date: Wed, 23 Aug 2023 20:24:24 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] tree: Fix copying of DTDs
+
+- Don't create multiple DTD nodes.
+- Fix UAF if malloc fails.
+- Skip DTD nodes if tree module is disabled.
+
+Fixes #583.
+
+CVE: CVE-2023-45322
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libxml2/-/commit/d39f78069dff496ec865c73aa44d7110e429bce9]
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ tree.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++---------------
+ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/tree.c b/tree.c
+index 6c8a875b9..02c1b5791 100644
+--- a/tree.c
++++ b/tree.c
+@@ -4471,29 +4471,28 @@ xmlNodePtr
+ xmlStaticCopyNodeList(xmlNodePtr node, xmlDocPtr doc, xmlNodePtr parent) {
+     xmlNodePtr ret = NULL;
+     xmlNodePtr p = NULL,q;
++    xmlDtdPtr newSubset = NULL;
+ 
+     while (node != NULL) {
+-#ifdef LIBXML_TREE_ENABLED
+ 	if (node->type == XML_DTD_NODE ) {
+-	    if (doc == NULL) {
++#ifdef LIBXML_TREE_ENABLED
++	    if ((doc == NULL) || (doc->intSubset != NULL)) {
+ 		node = node->next;
+ 		continue;
+ 	    }
+-	    if (doc->intSubset == NULL) {
+-		q = (xmlNodePtr) xmlCopyDtd( (xmlDtdPtr) node );
+-		if (q == NULL) goto error;
+-		q->doc = doc;
+-		q->parent = parent;
+-		doc->intSubset = (xmlDtdPtr) q;
+-		xmlAddChild(parent, q);
+-	    } else {
+-		q = (xmlNodePtr) doc->intSubset;
+-		xmlAddChild(parent, q);
+-	    }
+-	} else
++            q = (xmlNodePtr) xmlCopyDtd( (xmlDtdPtr) node );
++            if (q == NULL) goto error;
++            q->doc = doc;
++            q->parent = parent;
++            newSubset = (xmlDtdPtr) q;
++#else
++            node = node->next;
++            continue;
+ #endif /* LIBXML_TREE_ENABLED */
++	} else {
+ 	    q = xmlStaticCopyNode(node, doc, parent, 1);
+-	if (q == NULL) goto error;
++	    if (q == NULL) goto error;
++        }
+ 	if (ret == NULL) {
+ 	    q->prev = NULL;
+ 	    ret = p = q;
+@@ -4505,6 +4504,8 @@ xmlStaticCopyNodeList(xmlNodePtr node, xmlDocPtr doc, xmlNodePtr parent) {
+ 	}
+ 	node = node->next;
+     }
++    if (newSubset != NULL)
++        doc->intSubset = newSubset;
+     return(ret);
+ error:
+     xmlFreeNodeList(ret);
+-- 
+GitLab
+

meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2_2.9.10.bb

@@ -41,6 +41,9 @@ SRC_URI += "http://www.w3.org/XML/Test/xmlts20080827.tar.gz;subdir=${BP};name=te
            file://CVE-2023-39615-pre.patch \
            file://CVE-2023-39615-0001.patch \
            file://CVE-2023-39615-0002.patch \
+           file://CVE-2021-3516.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-45322-1.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-45322-2.patch \
            "
 
 SRC_URI[archive.sha256sum] = "593b7b751dd18c2d6abcd0c4bcb29efc203d0b4373a6df98e3a455ea74ae2813"

meta/recipes-core/meta/cve-update-nvd2-native.bb

@@ -26,8 +26,8 @@ NVDCVE_API_KEY ?= ""
 # Use a negative value to skip the update
 CVE_DB_UPDATE_INTERVAL ?= "86400"
 
-# Timeout for blocking socket operations, such as the connection attempt.
-CVE_SOCKET_TIMEOUT ?= "60"
+# Number of attmepts for each http query to nvd server before giving up
+CVE_DB_UPDATE_ATTEMPTS ?= "5"
 
 CVE_DB_TEMP_FILE ?= "${CVE_CHECK_DB_DIR}/temp_nvdcve_2.db"
 
@@ -114,7 +114,10 @@ def cleanup_db_download(db_file, db_tmp_file):
     if os.path.exists(db_tmp_file):
         os.remove(db_tmp_file)
 
-def nvd_request_next(url, api_key, args):
+def nvd_request_wait(attempt, min_wait):
+    return min ( ( (2 * attempt) + min_wait ) , 30)
+
+def nvd_request_next(url, attempts, api_key, args, min_wait):
     """
     Request next part of the NVD dabase
     """
@@ -130,7 +133,7 @@ def nvd_request_next(url, api_key, args):
         request.add_header("apiKey", api_key)
     bb.note("Requesting %s" % request.full_url)
 
-    for attempt in range(5):
+    for attempt in range(attempts):
         try:
             r = urllib.request.urlopen(request)
 
@@ -143,8 +146,10 @@ def nvd_request_next(url, api_key, args):
             r.close()
 
         except Exception as e:
-            bb.note("CVE database: received error (%s), retrying" % (e))
-            time.sleep(6)
+            wait_time = nvd_request_wait(attempt, min_wait)
+            bb.note("CVE database: received error (%s)" % (e))
+            bb.note("CVE database: retrying download after %d seconds. attempted (%d/%d)" % (wait_time, attempt+1, attempts))
+            time.sleep(wait_time)
             pass
         else:
             return raw_data
@@ -186,10 +191,16 @@ def update_db_file(db_tmp_file, d, database_time):
         index = 0
         url = d.getVar("NVDCVE_URL")
         api_key = d.getVar("NVDCVE_API_KEY") or None
+        attempts = int(d.getVar("CVE_DB_UPDATE_ATTEMPTS"))
+
+        # Recommended by NVD
+        wait_time = 6
+        if api_key:
+            wait_time = 2
 
         while True:
             req_args['startIndex'] = index
-            raw_data = nvd_request_next(url, api_key, req_args)
+            raw_data = nvd_request_next(url, attempts, api_key, req_args, wait_time)
             if raw_data is None:
                 # We haven't managed to download data
                 return False
@@ -209,7 +220,7 @@ def update_db_file(db_tmp_file, d, database_time):
                break
 
             # Recommended by NVD
-            time.sleep(6)
+            time.sleep(wait_time)
 
         # Update success, set the date to cve_check file.
         cve_f.write('CVE database update : %s\n\n' % datetime.date.today())

meta/recipes-core/ncurses/files/CVE-2023-29491.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+Backport of:
+
+Author: Sven Joachim <svenjoac@gmx.de>
+Description: Change the --disable-root-environ configure option behavior
+ By default, the --disable-root-environ option forbids program run by
+ the superuser to load custom terminfo entries.  This patch changes
+ that to only restrict programs running with elevated privileges,
+ matching the behavior of the --disable-setuid-environ option
+ introduced in the 20230423 upstream patchlevel.
+Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=1034372#29
+Bug: https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/bug-ncurses/2023-04/msg00018.html
+Forwarded: not-needed
+Last-Update: 2023-05-01
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://launchpad.net/ubuntu/+archive/primary/+sourcefiles/ncurses/6.2-0ubuntu2.1/ncurses_6.2-0ubuntu2.1.debian.tar.xz]
+CVE: CVE-2023-29491
+Signed-off-by: Virendra Thakur <virendrak@kpit.com>
+
+---
+ ncurses/tinfo/access.c |    2 --
+ 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/ncurses/tinfo/access.c
++++ b/ncurses/tinfo/access.c
+@@ -178,15 +178,16 @@ _nc_is_file_path(const char *path)
+ NCURSES_EXPORT(int)
+ _nc_env_access(void)
+ {
++    int result = TRUE;
++
+ #if HAVE_ISSETUGID
+     if (issetugid())
+-	return FALSE;
++	result = FALSE;
+ #elif HAVE_GETEUID && HAVE_GETEGID
+     if (getuid() != geteuid()
+ 	|| getgid() != getegid())
+-	return FALSE;
++	result = FALSE;
+ #endif
+-    /* ...finally, disallow root */
+-    return (getuid() != ROOT_UID) && (geteuid() != ROOT_UID);
++    return result;
+ }
+ #endif

meta/recipes-core/ncurses/ncurses_6.2.bb

@@ -5,11 +5,12 @@ SRC_URI += "file://0001-tic-hang.patch \
            file://0003-gen-pkgconfig.in-Do-not-include-LDFLAGS-in-generated.patch \
            file://CVE-2021-39537.patch \
            file://CVE-2022-29458.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-29491.patch \
            "
 # commit id corresponds to the revision in package version
 SRCREV = "a669013cd5e9d6434e5301348ea51baf306c93c4"
 S = "${WORKDIR}/git"
-EXTRA_OECONF += "--with-abi-version=5"
+EXTRA_OECONF += "--with-abi-version=5 --disable-root-environ"
 UPSTREAM_CHECK_GITTAGREGEX = "(?P<pver>\d+(\.\d+)+(\+\d+)*)"
 
 # This is needed when using patchlevel versions like 6.1+20181013

meta/recipes-core/zlib/zlib_1.2.11.bb

@@ -53,3 +53,6 @@ do_install_append_class-target() {
 }
 
 BBCLASSEXTEND = "native nativesdk"
+
+# this CVE is for cloudflare zlib
+CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2023-6992"

meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils-2.34.inc

@@ -55,5 +55,12 @@ SRC_URI = "\
      file://CVE-2022-38533.patch \
      file://CVE-2023-25588.patch \
      file://CVE-2021-46174.patch \
+     file://CVE-2023-25584.patch \
+     file://CVE-2022-47007.patch \
+     file://CVE-2022-47008.patch \
+     file://CVE-2022-47010.patch \
+     file://CVE-2022-47011.patch \
+     file://CVE-2022-48063.patch \
+     file://CVE-2022-47695.patch \
 "
 S  = "${WORKDIR}/git"

meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/CVE-2022-47007.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+From 0ebc886149c22aceaf8ed74267821a59ca9d03eb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alan Modra <amodra@gmail.com>
+Date: Fri, 17 Jun 2022 09:00:41 +0930
+Subject: [PATCH] PR29254, memory leak in stab_demangle_v3_arg
+
+	PR 29254
+	* stabs.c (stab_demangle_v3_arg): Free dt on failure path.
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://sourceware.org/git/?p=binutils-gdb.git;a=commitdiff_plain;h=0ebc886149c22aceaf8ed74267821a59ca9d03eb]
+CVE: CVE-2022-47007
+Signed-off-by: Virendra Thakur <virendrak@kpit.com>
+Comment: Patch refreshed based on codebase.
+---
+ binutils/stabs.c | 5 ++++-
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/binutils/stabs.c b/binutils/stabs.c
+index 2b5241637c1..796ff85b86a 100644
+--- a/binutils/stabs.c
++++ b/binutils/stabs.c
+@@ -5476,7 +5476,10 @@
+ 					  dc->u.s_binary.right,
+ 					  &varargs);
+ 	if (pargs == NULL)
+-	  return NULL;
++         {
++           free (dt);
++           return NULL;
++         }
+ 
+ 	return debug_make_function_type (dhandle, dt, pargs, varargs);
+       }
+

meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/CVE-2022-47008.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+From d6e1d48c83b165c129cb0aa78905f7ca80a1f682 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alan Modra <amodra@gmail.com>
+Date: Fri, 17 Jun 2022 09:13:38 +0930
+Subject: [PATCH] PR29255, memory leak in make_tempdir
+
+	PR 29255
+	* bucomm.c (make_tempdir, make_tempname): Free template on all
+	failure paths.
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://sourceware.org/git/?p=binutils-gdb.git;a=commitdiff_plain;h=d6e1d48c83b165c129cb0aa78905f7ca80a1f682]
+CVE: CVE-2022-47008
+Signed-off-by: Virendra Thakur <virendrak@kpit.com>
+Comment: Patch refreshed based on codebase.
+---
+ binutils/bucomm.c | 20 +++++++++++---------
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/binutils/bucomm.c b/binutils/bucomm.c
+index fdc2209df9c..4395cb9f7f5 100644
+--- a/binutils/bucomm.c
++++ b/binutils/bucomm.c
+@@ -542,8 +542,9 @@
+ #else
+   tmpname = mktemp (tmpname);
+   if (tmpname == NULL)
+-    return NULL;
+-  fd = open (tmpname, O_RDWR | O_CREAT | O_EXCL, 0600);
++    fd = -1;
++  else
++    fd = open (tmpname, O_RDWR | O_CREAT | O_EXCL, 0600);
+ #endif
+   if (fd == -1)
+     {
+@@ -561,22 +562,23 @@
+ make_tempdir (const char *filename)
+ {
+   char *tmpname = template_in_dir (filename);
++  char *ret;
+ 
+ #ifdef HAVE_MKDTEMP
+-  return mkdtemp (tmpname);
++  ret = mkdtemp (tmpname);
+ #else
+-  tmpname = mktemp (tmpname);
+-  if (tmpname == NULL)
+-    return NULL;
++  ret = mktemp (tmpname);
+ #if defined (_WIN32) && !defined (__CYGWIN32__)
+   if (mkdir (tmpname) != 0)
+-    return NULL;
++    ret = NULL;
+ #else
+   if (mkdir (tmpname, 0700) != 0)
+-    return NULL;
++    ret = NULL;
+ #endif
+-  return tmpname;
+ #endif
++  if (ret == NULL)
++    free (tmpname);
++  return ret;
+ }
+ 
+ /* Parse a string into a VMA, with a fatal error if it can't be
+

meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/CVE-2022-47010.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+From 0d02e70b197c786f26175b9a73f94e01d14abdab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alan Modra <amodra@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 20 Jun 2022 10:39:31 +0930
+Subject: [PATCH] PR29262, memory leak in pr_function_type
+
+	PR 29262
+	* prdbg.c (pr_function_type): Free "s" on failure path.
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://sourceware.org/git/?p=binutils-gdb.git;a=commitdiff_plain;h=0d02e70b197c786f26175b9a73f94e01d14abdab]
+CVE: CVE-2022-47010
+Signed-off-by: Virendra Thakur <virendrak@kpit.com>
+Comment: Patch refreshed based on codebase.
+---
+ binutils/prdbg.c | 7 ++-----
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/binutils/prdbg.c b/binutils/prdbg.c
+index c1e41628d26..bb42a5b6c2d 100644
+--- a/binutils/prdbg.c
++++ b/binutils/prdbg.c
+@@ -778,12 +778,9 @@
+ 
+   strcat (s, ")");
+ 
+-  if (! substitute_type (info, s))
+-    return FALSE;
+-
++  bfd_boolean ret = substitute_type (info, s);
+   free (s);
+-
+-  return TRUE;
++  return ret;
+ }
+ 
+ /* Turn the top type on the stack into a reference to that type.  */

meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/CVE-2022-47011.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+From 8a24927bc8dbf6beac2000593b21235c3796dc35 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alan Modra <amodra@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 20 Jun 2022 10:39:13 +0930
+Subject: [PATCH] PR29261, memory leak in parse_stab_struct_fields
+
+	PR 29261
+	* stabs.c (parse_stab_struct_fields): Free "fields" on failure path.
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://sourceware.org/git/?p=binutils-gdb.git;a=commitdiff_plain;h=8a24927bc8dbf6beac2000593b21235c3796dc35]
+CVE: CVE-2022-47011
+Signed-off-by: Virendra Thakur <virendrak@kpit.com>
+Comment: Patch refreshed based on codebase.
+---
+ binutils/stabs.c | 5 ++++-
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/binutils/stabs.c b/binutils/stabs.c
+index 796ff85b86a..bf3f578cbcc 100644
+--- a/binutils/stabs.c
++++ b/binutils/stabs.c
+@@ -2368,7 +2368,10 @@
+ 
+       if (! parse_stab_one_struct_field (dhandle, info, pp, p, fields + c,
+ 					 staticsp, p_end))
+-	return FALSE;
++       {
++         free (fields);
++         return FALSE;
++       }
+ 
+       ++c;
+     }

meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/CVE-2022-47695.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+From 3d3af4ba39e892b1c544d667ca241846bc3df386 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alan Modra <amodra@gmail.com>
+Date: Sun, 4 Dec 2022 22:15:40 +1030
+Subject: [PATCH] PR29846, segmentation fault in objdump.c compare_symbols
+
+Fixes a fuzzed object file problem where plt relocs were manipulated
+in such a way that two synthetic symbols were generated at the same
+plt location.  Won't occur in real object files.
+
+	PR 29846
+	PR 20337
+	* objdump.c (compare_symbols): Test symbol flags to exclude
+	section and synthetic symbols before attempting to check flavour.
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://sourceware.org/git/?p=binutils-gdb.git;a=commitdiff;h=3d3af4ba39e892b1c544d667ca241846bc3df386]
+CVE: CVE-2022-47695
+Signed-off-by: Virendra Thakur <virendrak@kpit.com>
+Comment: Patch refreshed based on codebase.
+---
+ binutils/objdump.c | 23 ++++++++++-------------
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/binutils/objdump.c b/binutils/objdump.c
+index e8481b2d928..d95c8b68bf0 100644
+--- a/binutils/objdump.c
++++ b/binutils/objdump.c
+@@ -935,20 +935,17 @@
+ 	return 1;
+     }
+ 
+-  if (bfd_get_flavour (bfd_asymbol_bfd (a)) == bfd_target_elf_flavour
++  /* Sort larger size ELF symbols before smaller.  See PR20337.  */
++  bfd_vma asz = 0;
++  if ((a->flags & (BSF_SECTION_SYM | BSF_SYNTHETIC)) == 0
++      && bfd_get_flavour (bfd_asymbol_bfd (a)) == bfd_target_elf_flavour)
++    asz = ((elf_symbol_type *) a)->internal_elf_sym.st_size;
++  bfd_vma bsz = 0;
++  if ((b->flags & (BSF_SECTION_SYM | BSF_SYNTHETIC)) == 0
+       && bfd_get_flavour (bfd_asymbol_bfd (b)) == bfd_target_elf_flavour)
+-    {
+-      bfd_vma asz, bsz;
+-
+-      asz = 0;
+-      if ((a->flags & (BSF_SECTION_SYM | BSF_SYNTHETIC)) == 0)
+-	asz = ((elf_symbol_type *) a)->internal_elf_sym.st_size;
+-      bsz = 0;
+-      if ((b->flags & (BSF_SECTION_SYM | BSF_SYNTHETIC)) == 0)
+-	bsz = ((elf_symbol_type *) b)->internal_elf_sym.st_size;
+-      if (asz != bsz)
+-	return asz > bsz ? -1 : 1;
+-    }
++    bsz = ((elf_symbol_type *) b)->internal_elf_sym.st_size;
++  if (asz != bsz)
++    return asz > bsz ? -1 : 1;
+ 
+   /* Symbols that start with '.' might be section names, so sort them
+      after symbols that don't start with '.'.  */
+

meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/CVE-2022-48063.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+From 75393a2d54bcc40053e5262a3de9d70c5ebfbbfd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Nick Clifton <nickc@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 21 Dec 2022 11:51:23 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix an attempt to allocate an unreasonably large amount of
+ memory when parsing a corrupt ELF file.
+
+	PR  29924
+	* objdump.c (load_specific_debug_section): Check for excessively
+	large sections.
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://sourceware.org/git/gitweb.cgi?p=binutils-gdb.git;h=75393a2d54bcc40053e5262a3de9d70c5ebfbbfd]
+CVE: CVE-2022-48063
+Signed-off-by: Virendra Thakur <virendrak@kpit.com>
+Comment: Patch refreshed based on codebase.
+---
+ binutils/ChangeLog | 6 ++++++
+ binutils/objdump.c | 4 +++-
+ 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/binutils/ChangeLog b/binutils/ChangeLog
+index e7f918d3f65..020e09f3700 100644
+--- a/binutils/ChangeLog
++++ b/binutils/ChangeLog
+@@ -1,3 +1,9 @@
++2022-12-21  Nick Clifton  <nickc@redhat.com>
++
++	PR  29924
++	* objdump.c (load_specific_debug_section): Check for excessively
++	large sections.
++
+ 2021-02-11  Alan Modra  <amodra@gmail.com>
+ 
+ 	   PR 27290
+
+diff --git a/binutils/objdump.c b/binutils/objdump.c
+index d51abbe3858..2eb02de0e76 100644
+--- a/binutils/objdump.c
++++ b/binutils/objdump.c
+@@ -3479,7 +3479,9 @@
+   section->size = bfd_section_size (sec);
+   /* PR 24360: On 32-bit hosts sizeof (size_t) < sizeof (bfd_size_type). */
+   alloced = amt = section->size + 1;
+-  if (alloced != amt || alloced == 0)
++  if (alloced != amt
++      || alloced == 0
++      || (bfd_get_size (abfd) != 0 && alloced >= bfd_get_size (abfd)))
+     {
+       section->start = NULL;
+       free_debug_section (debug);
+

meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/CVE-2023-25584.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,530 @@
+CVE: CVE-2023-25584
+Upstream-Status: Backport [ import from ubuntu http://archive.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/pool/main/b/binutils/binutils_2.34-6ubuntu1.7.debian.tar.xz  upstream  https://sourceware.org/git/gitweb.cgi?p=binutils-gdb.git;h=77c225bdeb410cf60da804879ad41622f5f1aa44 ]
+Signed-off-by: Lee Chee Yang <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
+
+[Ubuntu note: this is backport of the original patch, no major changes just
+ fix this patch for this release]
+From 77c225bdeb410cf60da804879ad41622f5f1aa44 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alan Modra <amodra@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 12 Dec 2022 18:28:49 +1030
+Subject: [PATCH] Lack of bounds checking in vms-alpha.c parse_module
+
+	PR 29873
+	PR 29874
+	PR 29875
+	PR 29876
+	PR 29877
+	PR 29878
+	PR 29879
+	PR 29880
+	PR 29881
+	PR 29882
+	PR 29883
+	PR 29884
+	PR 29885
+	PR 29886
+	PR 29887
+	PR 29888
+	PR 29889
+	PR 29890
+	PR 29891
+	* vms-alpha.c (parse_module): Make length param bfd_size_type.
+	Delete length == -1 checks.  Sanity check record_length.
+	Sanity check DST__K_MODBEG, DST__K_RTNBEG, DST__K_RTNEND lengths.
+	Sanity check DST__K_SOURCE and DST__K_LINE_NUM elements
+	before accessing.
+	(build_module_list): Pass dst_section size to parse_module.
+---
+ bfd/vms-alpha.c | 213 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
+ 1 file changed, 168 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-)
+
+--- binutils-2.34.orig/bfd/vms-alpha.c
++++ binutils-2.34/bfd/vms-alpha.c
+@@ -4267,7 +4267,7 @@ new_module (bfd *abfd)
+ 
+ static void
+ parse_module (bfd *abfd, struct module *module, unsigned char *ptr,
+-	      int length)
++	      bfd_size_type length)
+ {
+   unsigned char *maxptr = ptr + length;
+   unsigned char *src_ptr, *pcl_ptr;
+@@ -4284,7 +4284,7 @@ parse_module (bfd *abfd, struct module *
+   curr_line = (struct lineinfo *) bfd_zalloc (abfd, sizeof (struct lineinfo));
+   module->line_table = curr_line;
+ 
+-  while (length == -1 || ptr < maxptr)
++  while (ptr < maxptr)
+     {
+       /* The first byte is not counted in the recorded length.  */
+       int rec_length = bfd_getl16 (ptr) + 1;
+@@ -4292,15 +4292,19 @@ parse_module (bfd *abfd, struct module *
+ 
+       vms_debug2 ((2, "DST record: leng %d, type %d\n", rec_length, rec_type));
+ 
+-      if (length == -1 && rec_type == DST__K_MODEND)
++      if (rec_length > maxptr - ptr)
++	break;
++      if (rec_type == DST__K_MODEND)
+ 	break;
+ 
+       switch (rec_type)
+ 	{
+ 	case DST__K_MODBEG:
++	  if (rec_length <= DST_S_B_MODBEG_NAME)
++	    break;
+ 	  module->name
+ 	    = _bfd_vms_save_counted_string (abfd, ptr + DST_S_B_MODBEG_NAME,
+-					    maxptr - (ptr + DST_S_B_MODBEG_NAME));
++					    rec_length - DST_S_B_MODBEG_NAME);
+ 
+ 	  curr_pc = 0;
+ 	  prev_pc = 0;
+@@ -4314,11 +4318,13 @@ parse_module (bfd *abfd, struct module *
+ 	  break;
+ 
+ 	case DST__K_RTNBEG:
++	  if (rec_length <= DST_S_B_RTNBEG_NAME)
++	    break;
+ 	  funcinfo = (struct funcinfo *)
+ 	    bfd_zalloc (abfd, sizeof (struct funcinfo));
+ 	  funcinfo->name
+ 	    = _bfd_vms_save_counted_string (abfd, ptr + DST_S_B_RTNBEG_NAME,
+-					    maxptr - (ptr + DST_S_B_RTNBEG_NAME));
++					    rec_length - DST_S_B_RTNBEG_NAME);
+ 	  funcinfo->low = bfd_getl32 (ptr + DST_S_L_RTNBEG_ADDRESS);
+ 	  funcinfo->next = module->func_table;
+ 	  module->func_table = funcinfo;
+@@ -4328,6 +4334,8 @@ parse_module (bfd *abfd, struct module *
+ 	  break;
+ 
+ 	case DST__K_RTNEND:
++	  if (rec_length < DST_S_L_RTNEND_SIZE + 4)
++	    break;
+ 	  module->func_table->high = module->func_table->low
+ 	    + bfd_getl32 (ptr + DST_S_L_RTNEND_SIZE) - 1;
+ 
+@@ -4358,13 +4366,66 @@ parse_module (bfd *abfd, struct module *
+ 
+ 	  vms_debug2 ((3, "source info\n"));
+ 
+-	  while (src_ptr < ptr + rec_length)
++	  while (src_ptr - ptr < rec_length)
+ 	    {
+ 	      int cmd = src_ptr[0], cmd_length, data;
+ 
+ 	      switch (cmd)
+ 		{
+ 		case DST__K_SRC_DECLFILE:
++		  if (src_ptr - ptr + DST_S_B_SRC_DF_LENGTH >= rec_length)
++		    cmd_length = 0x10000;
++		  else
++		    cmd_length = src_ptr[DST_S_B_SRC_DF_LENGTH] + 2;
++		  break;
++
++		case DST__K_SRC_DEFLINES_B:
++		  cmd_length = 2;
++		  break;
++
++		case DST__K_SRC_DEFLINES_W:
++		  cmd_length = 3;
++		  break;
++
++		case DST__K_SRC_INCRLNUM_B:
++		  cmd_length = 2;
++		  break;
++
++		case DST__K_SRC_SETFILE:
++		  cmd_length = 3;
++		  break;
++
++		case DST__K_SRC_SETLNUM_L:
++		  cmd_length = 5;
++		  break;
++
++		case DST__K_SRC_SETLNUM_W:
++		  cmd_length = 3;
++		  break;
++
++		case DST__K_SRC_SETREC_L:
++		  cmd_length = 5;
++		  break;
++
++		case DST__K_SRC_SETREC_W:
++		  cmd_length = 3;
++		  break;
++
++		case DST__K_SRC_FORMFEED:
++		  cmd_length = 1;
++		  break;
++
++		default:
++		  cmd_length = 2;
++		  break;
++		}
++
++	      if (src_ptr - ptr + cmd_length > rec_length)
++		break;
++
++	      switch (cmd)
++		{
++		case DST__K_SRC_DECLFILE:
+ 		  {
+ 		    unsigned int fileid
+ 		      = bfd_getl16 (src_ptr + DST_S_W_SRC_DF_FILEID);
+@@ -4384,7 +4445,6 @@ parse_module (bfd *abfd, struct module *
+ 
+ 		    module->file_table [fileid].name = filename;
+ 		    module->file_table [fileid].srec = 1;
+-		    cmd_length = src_ptr[DST_S_B_SRC_DF_LENGTH] + 2;
+ 		    vms_debug2 ((4, "DST_S_C_SRC_DECLFILE: %d, %s\n",
+ 				 fileid, module->file_table [fileid].name));
+ 		  }
+@@ -4401,7 +4461,6 @@ parse_module (bfd *abfd, struct module *
+ 		  srec->sfile = curr_srec->sfile;
+ 		  curr_srec->next = srec;
+ 		  curr_srec = srec;
+-		  cmd_length = 2;
+ 		  vms_debug2 ((4, "DST_S_C_SRC_DEFLINES_B: %d\n", data));
+ 		  break;
+ 
+@@ -4416,14 +4475,12 @@ parse_module (bfd *abfd, struct module *
+ 		  srec->sfile = curr_srec->sfile;
+ 		  curr_srec->next = srec;
+ 		  curr_srec = srec;
+-		  cmd_length = 3;
+ 		  vms_debug2 ((4, "DST_S_C_SRC_DEFLINES_W: %d\n", data));
+ 		  break;
+ 
+ 		case DST__K_SRC_INCRLNUM_B:
+ 		  data = src_ptr[DST_S_B_SRC_UNSBYTE];
+ 		  curr_srec->line += data;
+-		  cmd_length = 2;
+ 		  vms_debug2 ((4, "DST_S_C_SRC_INCRLNUM_B: %d\n", data));
+ 		  break;
+ 
+@@ -4431,21 +4488,18 @@ parse_module (bfd *abfd, struct module *
+ 		  data = bfd_getl16 (src_ptr + DST_S_W_SRC_UNSWORD);
+ 		  curr_srec->sfile = data;
+ 		  curr_srec->srec = module->file_table[data].srec;
+-		  cmd_length = 3;
+ 		  vms_debug2 ((4, "DST_S_C_SRC_SETFILE: %d\n", data));
+ 		  break;
+ 
+ 		case DST__K_SRC_SETLNUM_L:
+ 		  data = bfd_getl32 (src_ptr + DST_S_L_SRC_UNSLONG);
+ 		  curr_srec->line = data;
+-		  cmd_length = 5;
+ 		  vms_debug2 ((4, "DST_S_C_SRC_SETLNUM_L: %d\n", data));
+ 		  break;
+ 
+ 		case DST__K_SRC_SETLNUM_W:
+ 		  data = bfd_getl16 (src_ptr + DST_S_W_SRC_UNSWORD);
+ 		  curr_srec->line = data;
+-		  cmd_length = 3;
+ 		  vms_debug2 ((4, "DST_S_C_SRC_SETLNUM_W: %d\n", data));
+ 		  break;
+ 
+@@ -4453,7 +4507,6 @@ parse_module (bfd *abfd, struct module *
+ 		  data = bfd_getl32 (src_ptr + DST_S_L_SRC_UNSLONG);
+ 		  curr_srec->srec = data;
+ 		  module->file_table[curr_srec->sfile].srec = data;
+-		  cmd_length = 5;
+ 		  vms_debug2 ((4, "DST_S_C_SRC_SETREC_L: %d\n", data));
+ 		  break;
+ 
+@@ -4461,19 +4514,16 @@ parse_module (bfd *abfd, struct module *
+ 		  data = bfd_getl16 (src_ptr + DST_S_W_SRC_UNSWORD);
+ 		  curr_srec->srec = data;
+ 		  module->file_table[curr_srec->sfile].srec = data;
+-		  cmd_length = 3;
+ 		  vms_debug2 ((4, "DST_S_C_SRC_SETREC_W: %d\n", data));
+ 		  break;
+ 
+ 		case DST__K_SRC_FORMFEED:
+-		  cmd_length = 1;
+ 		  vms_debug2 ((4, "DST_S_C_SRC_FORMFEED\n"));
+ 		  break;
+ 
+ 		default:
+ 		  _bfd_error_handler (_("unknown source command %d"),
+ 				      cmd);
+-		  cmd_length = 2;
+ 		  break;
+ 		}
+ 
+@@ -4486,7 +4536,7 @@ parse_module (bfd *abfd, struct module *
+ 
+ 	  vms_debug2 ((3, "line info\n"));
+ 
+-	  while (pcl_ptr < ptr + rec_length)
++	  while (pcl_ptr - ptr < rec_length)
+ 	    {
+ 	      /* The command byte is signed so we must sign-extend it.  */
+ 	      int cmd = ((signed char *)pcl_ptr)[0], cmd_length, data;
+@@ -4494,10 +4544,106 @@ parse_module (bfd *abfd, struct module *
+ 	      switch (cmd)
+ 		{
+ 		case DST__K_DELTA_PC_W:
++		  cmd_length = 3;
++		  break;
++
++		case DST__K_DELTA_PC_L:
++		  cmd_length = 5;
++		  break;
++
++		case DST__K_INCR_LINUM:
++		  cmd_length = 2;
++		  break;
++
++		case DST__K_INCR_LINUM_W:
++		  cmd_length = 3;
++		  break;
++
++		case DST__K_INCR_LINUM_L:
++		  cmd_length = 5;
++		  break;
++
++		case DST__K_SET_LINUM_INCR:
++		  cmd_length = 2;
++		  break;
++
++		case DST__K_SET_LINUM_INCR_W:
++		  cmd_length = 3;
++		  break;
++
++		case DST__K_RESET_LINUM_INCR:
++		  cmd_length = 1;
++		  break;
++
++		case DST__K_BEG_STMT_MODE:
++		  cmd_length = 1;
++		  break;
++
++		case DST__K_END_STMT_MODE:
++		  cmd_length = 1;
++		  break;
++
++		case DST__K_SET_LINUM_B:
++		  cmd_length = 2;
++		  break;
++
++		case DST__K_SET_LINUM:
++		  cmd_length = 3;
++		  break;
++
++		case DST__K_SET_LINUM_L:
++		  cmd_length = 5;
++		  break;
++
++		case DST__K_SET_PC:
++		  cmd_length = 2;
++		  break;
++
++		case DST__K_SET_PC_W:
++		  cmd_length = 3;
++		  break;
++
++		case DST__K_SET_PC_L:
++		  cmd_length = 5;
++		  break;
++
++		case DST__K_SET_STMTNUM:
++		  cmd_length = 2;
++		  break;
++
++		case DST__K_TERM:
++		  cmd_length = 2;
++		  break;
++
++		case DST__K_TERM_W:
++		  cmd_length = 3;
++		  break;
++
++		case DST__K_TERM_L:
++		  cmd_length = 5;
++		  break;
++
++		case DST__K_SET_ABS_PC:
++		  cmd_length = 5;
++		  break;
++
++		default:
++		  if (cmd <= 0)
++		    cmd_length = 1;
++		  else
++		    cmd_length = 2;
++		  break;
++		}
++
++	      if (pcl_ptr - ptr + cmd_length > rec_length)
++		break;
++
++	      switch (cmd)
++		{
++		case DST__K_DELTA_PC_W:
+ 		  data = bfd_getl16 (pcl_ptr + DST_S_W_PCLINE_UNSWORD);
+ 		  curr_pc += data;
+ 		  curr_linenum += 1;
+-		  cmd_length = 3;
+ 		  vms_debug2 ((4, "DST__K_DELTA_PC_W: %d\n", data));
+ 		  break;
+ 
+@@ -4505,131 +4651,111 @@ parse_module (bfd *abfd, struct module *
+ 		  data = bfd_getl32 (pcl_ptr + DST_S_L_PCLINE_UNSLONG);
+ 		  curr_pc += data;
+ 		  curr_linenum += 1;
+-		  cmd_length = 5;
+ 		  vms_debug2 ((4, "DST__K_DELTA_PC_L: %d\n", data));
+ 		  break;
+ 
+ 		case DST__K_INCR_LINUM:
+ 		  data = pcl_ptr[DST_S_B_PCLINE_UNSBYTE];
+ 		  curr_linenum += data;
+-		  cmd_length = 2;
+ 		  vms_debug2 ((4, "DST__K_INCR_LINUM: %d\n", data));
+ 		  break;
+ 
+ 		case DST__K_INCR_LINUM_W:
+ 		  data = bfd_getl16 (pcl_ptr + DST_S_W_PCLINE_UNSWORD);
+ 		  curr_linenum += data;
+-		  cmd_length = 3;
+ 		  vms_debug2 ((4, "DST__K_INCR_LINUM_W: %d\n", data));
+ 		  break;
+ 
+ 		case DST__K_INCR_LINUM_L:
+ 		  data = bfd_getl32 (pcl_ptr + DST_S_L_PCLINE_UNSLONG);
+ 		  curr_linenum += data;
+-		  cmd_length = 5;
+ 		  vms_debug2 ((4, "DST__K_INCR_LINUM_L: %d\n", data));
+ 		  break;
+ 
+ 		case DST__K_SET_LINUM_INCR:
+ 		  _bfd_error_handler
+ 		    (_("%s not implemented"), "DST__K_SET_LINUM_INCR");
+-		  cmd_length = 2;
+ 		  break;
+ 
+ 		case DST__K_SET_LINUM_INCR_W:
+ 		  _bfd_error_handler
+ 		    (_("%s not implemented"), "DST__K_SET_LINUM_INCR_W");
+-		  cmd_length = 3;
+ 		  break;
+ 
+ 		case DST__K_RESET_LINUM_INCR:
+ 		  _bfd_error_handler
+ 		    (_("%s not implemented"), "DST__K_RESET_LINUM_INCR");
+-		  cmd_length = 1;
+ 		  break;
+ 
+ 		case DST__K_BEG_STMT_MODE:
+ 		  _bfd_error_handler
+ 		    (_("%s not implemented"), "DST__K_BEG_STMT_MODE");
+-		  cmd_length = 1;
+ 		  break;
+ 
+ 		case DST__K_END_STMT_MODE:
+ 		  _bfd_error_handler
+ 		    (_("%s not implemented"), "DST__K_END_STMT_MODE");
+-		  cmd_length = 1;
+ 		  break;
+ 
+ 		case DST__K_SET_LINUM_B:
+ 		  data = pcl_ptr[DST_S_B_PCLINE_UNSBYTE];
+ 		  curr_linenum = data;
+-		  cmd_length = 2;
+ 		  vms_debug2 ((4, "DST__K_SET_LINUM_B: %d\n", data));
+ 		  break;
+ 
+ 		case DST__K_SET_LINUM:
+ 		  data = bfd_getl16 (pcl_ptr + DST_S_W_PCLINE_UNSWORD);
+ 		  curr_linenum = data;
+-		  cmd_length = 3;
+ 		  vms_debug2 ((4, "DST__K_SET_LINE_NUM: %d\n", data));
+ 		  break;
+ 
+ 		case DST__K_SET_LINUM_L:
+ 		  data = bfd_getl32 (pcl_ptr + DST_S_L_PCLINE_UNSLONG);
+ 		  curr_linenum = data;
+-		  cmd_length = 5;
+ 		  vms_debug2 ((4, "DST__K_SET_LINUM_L: %d\n", data));
+ 		  break;
+ 
+ 		case DST__K_SET_PC:
+ 		  _bfd_error_handler
+ 		    (_("%s not implemented"), "DST__K_SET_PC");
+-		  cmd_length = 2;
+ 		  break;
+ 
+ 		case DST__K_SET_PC_W:
+ 		  _bfd_error_handler
+ 		    (_("%s not implemented"), "DST__K_SET_PC_W");
+-		  cmd_length = 3;
+ 		  break;
+ 
+ 		case DST__K_SET_PC_L:
+ 		  _bfd_error_handler
+ 		    (_("%s not implemented"), "DST__K_SET_PC_L");
+-		  cmd_length = 5;
+ 		  break;
+ 
+ 		case DST__K_SET_STMTNUM:
+ 		  _bfd_error_handler
+ 		    (_("%s not implemented"), "DST__K_SET_STMTNUM");
+-		  cmd_length = 2;
+ 		  break;
+ 
+ 		case DST__K_TERM:
+ 		  data = pcl_ptr[DST_S_B_PCLINE_UNSBYTE];
+ 		  curr_pc += data;
+-		  cmd_length = 2;
+ 		  vms_debug2 ((4, "DST__K_TERM: %d\n", data));
+ 		  break;
+ 
+ 		case DST__K_TERM_W:
+ 		  data = bfd_getl16 (pcl_ptr + DST_S_W_PCLINE_UNSWORD);
+ 		  curr_pc += data;
+-		  cmd_length = 3;
+ 		  vms_debug2 ((4, "DST__K_TERM_W: %d\n", data));
+ 		  break;
+ 
+ 		case DST__K_TERM_L:
+ 		  data = bfd_getl32 (pcl_ptr + DST_S_L_PCLINE_UNSLONG);
+ 		  curr_pc += data;
+-		  cmd_length = 5;
+ 		  vms_debug2 ((4, "DST__K_TERM_L: %d\n", data));
+ 		  break;
+ 
+ 		case DST__K_SET_ABS_PC:
+ 		  data = bfd_getl32 (pcl_ptr + DST_S_L_PCLINE_UNSLONG);
+ 		  curr_pc = data;
+-		  cmd_length = 5;
+ 		  vms_debug2 ((4, "DST__K_SET_ABS_PC: 0x%x\n", data));
+ 		  break;
+ 
+@@ -4638,15 +4764,11 @@ parse_module (bfd *abfd, struct module *
+ 		    {
+ 		      curr_pc -= cmd;
+ 		      curr_linenum += 1;
+-		      cmd_length = 1;
+ 		      vms_debug2 ((4, "bump pc to 0x%lx and line to %d\n",
+ 				   (unsigned long)curr_pc, curr_linenum));
+ 		    }
+ 		  else
+-		    {
+-		      _bfd_error_handler (_("unknown line command %d"), cmd);
+-		      cmd_length = 2;
+-		    }
++		    _bfd_error_handler (_("unknown line command %d"), cmd);
+ 		  break;
+ 		}
+ 
+@@ -4778,7 +4900,7 @@ build_module_list (bfd *abfd)
+ 	return NULL;
+ 
+       module = new_module (abfd);
+-      parse_module (abfd, module, PRIV (dst_section)->contents, -1);
++      parse_module (abfd, module, PRIV (dst_section)->contents, PRIV (dst_section)->size);
+       list = module;
+     }
+ 

meta/recipes-devtools/cmake/cmake/OEToolchainConfig.cmake

@@ -19,3 +19,6 @@ file( GLOB toolchain_config_files "${CMAKE_TOOLCHAIN_FILE}.d/*.cmake" )
 foreach(config ${toolchain_config_files})
     include(${config})
 endforeach()
+
+unset(CMAKE_C_IMPLICIT_INCLUDE_DIRECTORIES)
+unset(CMAKE_CXX_IMPLICIT_INCLUDE_DIRECTORIES)

meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/gcc-shared-source.inc

@@ -9,3 +9,6 @@ SRC_URI = ""
 
 do_configure[depends] += "gcc-source-${PV}:do_preconfigure"
 do_populate_lic[depends] += "gcc-source-${PV}:do_unpack"
+
+# patch is available via gcc-source recipe
+CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2023-4039"

meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.14.inc

@@ -71,7 +71,8 @@ SRC_URI += "\
     file://CVE-2023-29402.patch \
     file://CVE-2023-29404.patch \
     file://CVE-2023-29400.patch \
-    file://CVE-2023-29406.patch \
+    file://CVE-2023-29406-1.patch \
+    file://CVE-2023-29406-2.patch \
     file://CVE-2023-29409.patch \
     file://CVE-2022-41725-pre1.patch \
     file://CVE-2022-41725-pre2.patch \
@@ -82,6 +83,11 @@ SRC_URI += "\
     file://CVE-2023-24536_3.patch \
     file://CVE-2023-39318.patch \
     file://CVE-2023-39319.patch \
+    file://CVE-2023-39326.patch \
+    file://CVE-2023-45287-pre1.patch \
+    file://CVE-2023-45287-pre2.patch \
+    file://CVE-2023-45287-pre3.patch \
+    file://CVE-2023-45287.patch \
 "
 
 SRC_URI_append_libc-musl = " file://0009-ld-replace-glibc-dynamic-linker-with-musl.patch"

meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.14/CVE-2023-29406-2.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+From c08a5fa413a34111c9a37fd9e545de27ab0978b1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
+Date: Wed, 19 Jul 2023 10:30:46 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] [release-branch.go1.19] net/http: permit requests with
+ invalid Host headers
+
+Historically, the Transport has silently truncated invalid
+Host headers at the first '/' or ' ' character. CL 506996 changed
+this behavior to reject invalid Host headers entirely.
+Unfortunately, Docker appears to rely on the previous behavior.
+
+When sending a HTTP/1 request with an invalid Host, send an empty
+Host header. This is safer than truncation: If you care about the
+Host, then you should get the one you set; if you don't care,
+then an empty Host should be fine.
+
+Continue to fully validate Host headers sent to a proxy,
+since proxies generally can't productively forward requests
+without a Host.
+
+For #60374
+Fixes #61431
+Fixes #61825
+
+Change-Id: If170c7dd860aa20eb58fe32990fc93af832742b6
+Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/511155
+TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
+Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
+Run-TryBot: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
+(cherry picked from commit b9153f6ef338baee5fe02a867c8fbc83a8b29dd1)
+Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/518855
+Auto-Submit: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@google.com>
+Run-TryBot: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
+Reviewed-by: Russ Cox <rsc@golang.org>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/golang/go/commit/c08a5fa413a34111c9a37fd9e545de27ab0978b1]
+CVE: CVE-2023-29406
+Signed-off-by: Ming Liu <liu.ming50@gmail.com>
+---
+ src/net/http/request.go      | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ src/net/http/request_test.go | 17 ++++++++++++-----
+ 2 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/net/http/request.go b/src/net/http/request.go
+index 3100037386..91cb8a66b9 100644
+--- a/src/net/http/request.go
++++ b/src/net/http/request.go
+@@ -582,8 +582,29 @@ func (r *Request) write(w io.Writer, usingProxy bool, extraHeaders Header, waitF
+ 	if err != nil {
+ 		return err
+ 	}
++	// Validate that the Host header is a valid header in general,
++	// but don't validate the host itself. This is sufficient to avoid
++	// header or request smuggling via the Host field.
++	// The server can (and will, if it's a net/http server) reject
++	// the request if it doesn't consider the host valid.
+ 	if !httpguts.ValidHostHeader(host) {
+-		return errors.New("http: invalid Host header")
++		// Historically, we would truncate the Host header after '/' or ' '.
++		// Some users have relied on this truncation to convert a network
++		// address such as Unix domain socket path into a valid, ignored
++		// Host header (see https://go.dev/issue/61431).
++		//
++		// We don't preserve the truncation, because sending an altered
++		// header field opens a smuggling vector. Instead, zero out the
++		// Host header entirely if it isn't valid. (An empty Host is valid;
++		// see RFC 9112 Section 3.2.)
++		//
++		// Return an error if we're sending to a proxy, since the proxy
++		// probably can't do anything useful with an empty Host header.
++		if !usingProxy {
++			host = ""
++		} else {
++			return errors.New("http: invalid Host header")
++		}
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	// According to RFC 6874, an HTTP client, proxy, or other
+diff --git a/src/net/http/request_test.go b/src/net/http/request_test.go
+index fddc85d6a9..dd1e2dc2a1 100644
+--- a/src/net/http/request_test.go
++++ b/src/net/http/request_test.go
+@@ -770,16 +770,23 @@ func TestRequestWriteBufferedWriter(t *testing.T) {
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
+-func TestRequestBadHost(t *testing.T) {
++func TestRequestBadHostHeader(t *testing.T) {
+ 	got := []string{}
+ 	req, err := NewRequest("GET", "http://foo/after", nil)
+ 	if err != nil {
+ 		t.Fatal(err)
+ 	}
+-	req.Host = "foo.com with spaces"
+-	req.URL.Host = "foo.com with spaces"
+-	if err := req.Write(logWrites{t, &got}); err == nil {
+-		t.Errorf("Writing request with invalid Host: succeded, want error")
++	req.Host = "foo.com\nnewline"
++	req.URL.Host = "foo.com\nnewline"
++	req.Write(logWrites{t, &got})
++	want := []string{
++		"GET /after HTTP/1.1\r\n",
++		"Host: \r\n",
++		"User-Agent: " + DefaultUserAgent + "\r\n",
++		"\r\n",
++	}
++	if !reflect.DeepEqual(got, want) {
++		t.Errorf("Writes = %q\n  Want = %q", got, want)
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
+-- 
+2.34.1
+

meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.14/CVE-2023-39326.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
+From 6446af942e2e2b161c4ec1b60d9703a2b55dc4dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
+Date: Tue, 7 Nov 2023 10:47:56 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH] [release-branch.go1.20] net/http: limit chunked data overhead
+
+The chunked transfer encoding adds some overhead to
+the content transferred. When writing one byte per
+chunk, for example, there are five bytes of overhead
+per byte of data transferred: "1\r\nX\r\n" to send "X".
+
+Chunks may include "chunk extensions",
+which we skip over and do not use.
+For example: "1;chunk extension here\r\nX\r\n".
+
+A malicious sender can use chunk extensions to add
+about 4k of overhead per byte of data.
+(The maximum chunk header line size we will accept.)
+
+Track the amount of overhead read in chunked data,
+and produce an error if it seems excessive.
+
+Updates #64433
+Fixes #64434
+Fixes CVE-2023-39326
+
+Change-Id: I40f8d70eb6f9575fb43f506eb19132ccedafcf39
+Reviewed-on: https://team-review.git.corp.google.com/c/golang/go-private/+/2076135
+Reviewed-by: Tatiana Bradley <tatianabradley@google.com>
+Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <bracewell@google.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 3473ae72ee66c60744665a24b2fde143e8964d4f)
+Reviewed-on: https://team-review.git.corp.google.com/c/golang/go-private/+/2095407
+Run-TryBot: Roland Shoemaker <bracewell@google.com>
+TryBot-Result: Security TryBots <security-trybots@go-security-trybots.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
+Reviewed-by: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
+Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/547355
+Reviewed-by: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@google.com>
+LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/golang/go/commit/6446af942e2e2b161c4ec1b60d9703a2b55dc4dd]
+CVE: CVE-2023-39326
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ src/net/http/internal/chunked.go      | 36 +++++++++++++---
+ src/net/http/internal/chunked_test.go | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 89 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/net/http/internal/chunked.go b/src/net/http/internal/chunked.go
+index f06e572..ddbaacb 100644
+--- a/src/net/http/internal/chunked.go
++++ b/src/net/http/internal/chunked.go
+@@ -39,7 +39,8 @@ type chunkedReader struct {
+ 	n        uint64 // unread bytes in chunk
+ 	err      error
+ 	buf      [2]byte
+-	checkEnd bool // whether need to check for \r\n chunk footer
++	checkEnd bool  // whether need to check for \r\n chunk footer
++	excess   int64 // "excessive" chunk overhead, for malicious sender detection
+ }
+ 
+ func (cr *chunkedReader) beginChunk() {
+@@ -49,10 +50,38 @@ func (cr *chunkedReader) beginChunk() {
+ 	if cr.err != nil {
+ 		return
+ 	}
++	cr.excess += int64(len(line)) + 2 // header, plus \r\n after the chunk data
++	line = trimTrailingWhitespace(line)
++	line, cr.err = removeChunkExtension(line)
++	if cr.err != nil {
++		return
++	}
+ 	cr.n, cr.err = parseHexUint(line)
+ 	if cr.err != nil {
+ 		return
+ 	}
++	// A sender who sends one byte per chunk will send 5 bytes of overhead
++	// for every byte of data. ("1\r\nX\r\n" to send "X".)
++	// We want to allow this, since streaming a byte at a time can be legitimate.
++	//
++	// A sender can use chunk extensions to add arbitrary amounts of additional
++	// data per byte read. ("1;very long extension\r\nX\r\n" to send "X".)
++	// We don't want to disallow extensions (although we discard them),
++	// but we also don't want to allow a sender to reduce the signal/noise ratio
++	// arbitrarily.
++	//
++	// We track the amount of excess overhead read,
++	// and produce an error if it grows too large.
++	//
++	// Currently, we say that we're willing to accept 16 bytes of overhead per chunk,
++	// plus twice the amount of real data in the chunk.
++	cr.excess -= 16 + (2 * int64(cr.n))
++	if cr.excess < 0 {
++		cr.excess = 0
++	}
++	if cr.excess > 16*1024 {
++		cr.err = errors.New("chunked encoding contains too much non-data")
++	}
+ 	if cr.n == 0 {
+ 		cr.err = io.EOF
+ 	}
+@@ -133,11 +162,6 @@ func readChunkLine(b *bufio.Reader) ([]byte, error) {
+ 	if len(p) >= maxLineLength {
+ 		return nil, ErrLineTooLong
+ 	}
+-	p = trimTrailingWhitespace(p)
+-	p, err = removeChunkExtension(p)
+-	if err != nil {
+-		return nil, err
+-	}
+ 	return p, nil
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/src/net/http/internal/chunked_test.go b/src/net/http/internal/chunked_test.go
+index d067165..b20747d 100644
+--- a/src/net/http/internal/chunked_test.go
++++ b/src/net/http/internal/chunked_test.go
+@@ -212,3 +212,62 @@ func TestChunkReadPartial(t *testing.T) {
+ 	}
+ 
+ }
++
++func TestChunkReaderTooMuchOverhead(t *testing.T) {
++	// If the sender is sending 100x as many chunk header bytes as chunk data,
++	// we should reject the stream at some point.
++	chunk := []byte("1;")
++	for i := 0; i < 100; i++ {
++		chunk = append(chunk, 'a') // chunk extension
++	}
++	chunk = append(chunk, "\r\nX\r\n"...)
++	const bodylen = 1 << 20
++	r := NewChunkedReader(&funcReader{f: func(i int) ([]byte, error) {
++		if i < bodylen {
++			return chunk, nil
++		}
++		return []byte("0\r\n"), nil
++	}})
++	_, err := io.ReadAll(r)
++	if err == nil {
++		t.Fatalf("successfully read body with excessive overhead; want error")
++	}
++}
++
++func TestChunkReaderByteAtATime(t *testing.T) {
++	// Sending one byte per chunk should not trip the excess-overhead detection.
++	const bodylen = 1 << 20
++	r := NewChunkedReader(&funcReader{f: func(i int) ([]byte, error) {
++		if i < bodylen {
++			return []byte("1\r\nX\r\n"), nil
++		}
++		return []byte("0\r\n"), nil
++	}})
++	got, err := io.ReadAll(r)
++	if err != nil {
++		t.Errorf("unexpected error: %v", err)
++	}
++	if len(got) != bodylen {
++		t.Errorf("read %v bytes, want %v", len(got), bodylen)
++	}
++}
++
++type funcReader struct {
++	f   func(iteration int) ([]byte, error)
++	i   int
++	b   []byte
++	err error
++}
++
++func (r *funcReader) Read(p []byte) (n int, err error) {
++	if len(r.b) == 0 && r.err == nil {
++		r.b, r.err = r.f(r.i)
++		r.i++
++	}
++	n = copy(p, r.b)
++	r.b = r.b[n:]
++	if len(r.b) > 0 {
++		return n, nil
++	}
++	return n, r.err
++}
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.14/CVE-2023-45287-pre1.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,393 @@
+From 9baafabac9a84813a336f068862207d2bb06d255 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
+Date: Wed, 1 Apr 2020 17:25:40 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] crypto/rsa: refactor RSA-PSS signing and verification
+
+Cleaned up for readability and consistency.
+
+There is one tiny behavioral change: when PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash is
+used and both hash and opts.Hash were set, hash.Size() was used for the
+salt length instead of opts.Hash.Size(). That's clearly wrong because
+opts.Hash is documented to override hash.
+
+Change-Id: I3e25dad933961eac827c6d2e3bbfe45fc5a6fb0e
+Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/226937
+Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
+TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
+Reviewed-by: Katie Hockman <katie@golang.org>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/golang/go/commit/9baafabac9a84813a336f068862207d2bb06d255]
+CVE: CVE-2023-45287 #Dependency Patch1
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ src/crypto/rsa/pss.go | 173 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
+ src/crypto/rsa/rsa.go |   9 ++-
+ 2 files changed, 96 insertions(+), 86 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/crypto/rsa/pss.go b/src/crypto/rsa/pss.go
+index 3ff0c2f4d0076..f9844d87329a8 100644
+--- a/src/crypto/rsa/pss.go
++++ b/src/crypto/rsa/pss.go
+@@ -4,9 +4,7 @@
+ 
+ package rsa
+ 
+-// This file implements the PSS signature scheme [1].
+-//
+-// [1] https://www.emc.com/collateral/white-papers/h11300-pkcs-1v2-2-rsa-cryptography-standard-wp.pdf
++// This file implements the RSASSA-PSS signature scheme according to RFC 8017.
+ 
+ import (
+ 	"bytes"
+@@ -17,8 +15,22 @@ import (
+ 	"math/big"
+ )
+ 
++// Per RFC 8017, Section 9.1
++//
++//     EM = MGF1 xor DB || H( 8*0x00 || mHash || salt ) || 0xbc
++//
++// where
++//
++//     DB = PS || 0x01 || salt
++//
++// and PS can be empty so
++//
++//     emLen = dbLen + hLen + 1 = psLen + sLen + hLen + 2
++//
++
+ func emsaPSSEncode(mHash []byte, emBits int, salt []byte, hash hash.Hash) ([]byte, error) {
+-	// See [1], section 9.1.1
++	// See RFC 8017, Section 9.1.1.
++
+ 	hLen := hash.Size()
+ 	sLen := len(salt)
+ 	emLen := (emBits + 7) / 8
+@@ -30,7 +42,7 @@ func emsaPSSEncode(mHash []byte, emBits int, salt []byte, hash hash.Hash) ([]byt
+ 	// 2.  Let mHash = Hash(M), an octet string of length hLen.
+ 
+ 	if len(mHash) != hLen {
+-		return nil, errors.New("crypto/rsa: input must be hashed message")
++		return nil, errors.New("crypto/rsa: input must be hashed with given hash")
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	// 3.  If emLen < hLen + sLen + 2, output "encoding error" and stop.
+@@ -40,8 +52,9 @@ func emsaPSSEncode(mHash []byte, emBits int, salt []byte, hash hash.Hash) ([]byt
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	em := make([]byte, emLen)
+-	db := em[:emLen-sLen-hLen-2+1+sLen]
+-	h := em[emLen-sLen-hLen-2+1+sLen : emLen-1]
++	psLen := emLen - sLen - hLen - 2
++	db := em[:psLen+1+sLen]
++	h := em[psLen+1+sLen : emLen-1]
+ 
+ 	// 4.  Generate a random octet string salt of length sLen; if sLen = 0,
+ 	//     then salt is the empty string.
+@@ -69,8 +82,8 @@ func emsaPSSEncode(mHash []byte, emBits int, salt []byte, hash hash.Hash) ([]byt
+ 	// 8.  Let DB = PS || 0x01 || salt; DB is an octet string of length
+ 	//     emLen - hLen - 1.
+ 
+-	db[emLen-sLen-hLen-2] = 0x01
+-	copy(db[emLen-sLen-hLen-1:], salt)
++	db[psLen] = 0x01
++	copy(db[psLen+1:], salt)
+ 
+ 	// 9.  Let dbMask = MGF(H, emLen - hLen - 1).
+ 	//
+@@ -81,47 +94,57 @@ func emsaPSSEncode(mHash []byte, emBits int, salt []byte, hash hash.Hash) ([]byt
+ 	// 11. Set the leftmost 8 * emLen - emBits bits of the leftmost octet in
+ 	//     maskedDB to zero.
+ 
+-	db[0] &= (0xFF >> uint(8*emLen-emBits))
++	db[0] &= 0xff >> (8*emLen - emBits)
+ 
+ 	// 12. Let EM = maskedDB || H || 0xbc.
+-	em[emLen-1] = 0xBC
++	em[emLen-1] = 0xbc
+ 
+ 	// 13. Output EM.
+ 	return em, nil
+ }
+ 
+ func emsaPSSVerify(mHash, em []byte, emBits, sLen int, hash hash.Hash) error {
++	// See RFC 8017, Section 9.1.2.
++
++	hLen := hash.Size()
++	if sLen == PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash {
++		sLen = hLen
++	}
++	emLen := (emBits + 7) / 8
++	if emLen != len(em) {
++		return errors.New("rsa: internal error: inconsistent length")
++	}
++
+ 	// 1.  If the length of M is greater than the input limitation for the
+ 	//     hash function (2^61 - 1 octets for SHA-1), output "inconsistent"
+ 	//     and stop.
+ 	//
+ 	// 2.  Let mHash = Hash(M), an octet string of length hLen.
+-	hLen := hash.Size()
+ 	if hLen != len(mHash) {
+ 		return ErrVerification
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	// 3.  If emLen < hLen + sLen + 2, output "inconsistent" and stop.
+-	emLen := (emBits + 7) / 8
+ 	if emLen < hLen+sLen+2 {
+ 		return ErrVerification
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	// 4.  If the rightmost octet of EM does not have hexadecimal value
+ 	//     0xbc, output "inconsistent" and stop.
+-	if em[len(em)-1] != 0xBC {
++	if em[emLen-1] != 0xbc {
+ 		return ErrVerification
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	// 5.  Let maskedDB be the leftmost emLen - hLen - 1 octets of EM, and
+ 	//     let H be the next hLen octets.
+ 	db := em[:emLen-hLen-1]
+-	h := em[emLen-hLen-1 : len(em)-1]
++	h := em[emLen-hLen-1 : emLen-1]
+ 
+ 	// 6.  If the leftmost 8 * emLen - emBits bits of the leftmost octet in
+ 	//     maskedDB are not all equal to zero, output "inconsistent" and
+ 	//     stop.
+-	if em[0]&(0xFF<<uint(8-(8*emLen-emBits))) != 0 {
++	var bitMask byte = 0xff >> (8*emLen - emBits)
++	if em[0] & ^bitMask != 0 {
+ 		return ErrVerification
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -132,37 +155,30 @@ func emsaPSSVerify(mHash, em []byte, emBits, sLen int, hash hash.Hash) error {
+ 
+ 	// 9.  Set the leftmost 8 * emLen - emBits bits of the leftmost octet in DB
+ 	//     to zero.
+-	db[0] &= (0xFF >> uint(8*emLen-emBits))
++	db[0] &= bitMask
+ 
++	// If we don't know the salt length, look for the 0x01 delimiter.
+ 	if sLen == PSSSaltLengthAuto {
+-	FindSaltLength:
+-		for sLen = emLen - (hLen + 2); sLen >= 0; sLen-- {
+-			switch db[emLen-hLen-sLen-2] {
+-			case 1:
+-				break FindSaltLength
+-			case 0:
+-				continue
+-			default:
+-				return ErrVerification
+-			}
+-		}
+-		if sLen < 0 {
++		psLen := bytes.IndexByte(db, 0x01)
++		if psLen < 0 {
+ 			return ErrVerification
+ 		}
+-	} else {
+-		// 10. If the emLen - hLen - sLen - 2 leftmost octets of DB are not zero
+-		//     or if the octet at position emLen - hLen - sLen - 1 (the leftmost
+-		//     position is "position 1") does not have hexadecimal value 0x01,
+-		//     output "inconsistent" and stop.
+-		for _, e := range db[:emLen-hLen-sLen-2] {
+-			if e != 0x00 {
+-				return ErrVerification
+-			}
+-		}
+-		if db[emLen-hLen-sLen-2] != 0x01 {
++		sLen = len(db) - psLen - 1
++	}
++
++	// 10. If the emLen - hLen - sLen - 2 leftmost octets of DB are not zero
++	//     or if the octet at position emLen - hLen - sLen - 1 (the leftmost
++	//     position is "position 1") does not have hexadecimal value 0x01,
++	//     output "inconsistent" and stop.
++	psLen := emLen - hLen - sLen - 2
++	for _, e := range db[:psLen] {
++		if e != 0x00 {
+ 			return ErrVerification
+ 		}
+ 	}
++	if db[psLen] != 0x01 {
++		return ErrVerification
++	}
+ 
+ 	// 11.  Let salt be the last sLen octets of DB.
+ 	salt := db[len(db)-sLen:]
+@@ -181,19 +197,19 @@ func emsaPSSVerify(mHash, em []byte, emBits, sLen int, hash hash.Hash) error {
+ 	h0 := hash.Sum(nil)
+ 
+ 	// 14. If H = H', output "consistent." Otherwise, output "inconsistent."
+-	if !bytes.Equal(h0, h) {
++	if !bytes.Equal(h0, h) { // TODO: constant time?
+ 		return ErrVerification
+ 	}
+ 	return nil
+ }
+ 
+-// signPSSWithSalt calculates the signature of hashed using PSS [1] with specified salt.
++// signPSSWithSalt calculates the signature of hashed using PSS with specified salt.
+ // Note that hashed must be the result of hashing the input message using the
+ // given hash function. salt is a random sequence of bytes whose length will be
+ // later used to verify the signature.
+ func signPSSWithSalt(rand io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, hash crypto.Hash, hashed, salt []byte) (s []byte, err error) {
+-	nBits := priv.N.BitLen()
+-	em, err := emsaPSSEncode(hashed, nBits-1, salt, hash.New())
++	emBits := priv.N.BitLen() - 1
++	em, err := emsaPSSEncode(hashed, emBits, salt, hash.New())
+ 	if err != nil {
+ 		return
+ 	}
+@@ -202,7 +218,7 @@ func signPSSWithSalt(rand io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, hash crypto.Hash, hashed,
+ 	if err != nil {
+ 		return
+ 	}
+-	s = make([]byte, (nBits+7)/8)
++	s = make([]byte, priv.Size())
+ 	copyWithLeftPad(s, c.Bytes())
+ 	return
+ }
+@@ -223,16 +239,15 @@ type PSSOptions struct {
+ 	// PSSSaltLength constants.
+ 	SaltLength int
+ 
+-	// Hash, if not zero, overrides the hash function passed to SignPSS.
+-	// This is the only way to specify the hash function when using the
+-	// crypto.Signer interface.
++	// Hash is the hash function used to generate the message digest. If not
++	// zero, it overrides the hash function passed to SignPSS. It's required
++	// when using PrivateKey.Sign.
+ 	Hash crypto.Hash
+ }
+ 
+-// HashFunc returns pssOpts.Hash so that PSSOptions implements
+-// crypto.SignerOpts.
+-func (pssOpts *PSSOptions) HashFunc() crypto.Hash {
+-	return pssOpts.Hash
++// HashFunc returns opts.Hash so that PSSOptions implements crypto.SignerOpts.
++func (opts *PSSOptions) HashFunc() crypto.Hash {
++	return opts.Hash
+ }
+ 
+ func (opts *PSSOptions) saltLength() int {
+@@ -242,56 +257,50 @@ func (opts *PSSOptions) saltLength() int {
+ 	return opts.SaltLength
+ }
+ 
+-// SignPSS calculates the signature of hashed using RSASSA-PSS [1].
+-// Note that hashed must be the result of hashing the input message using the
+-// given hash function. The opts argument may be nil, in which case sensible
+-// defaults are used.
+-func SignPSS(rand io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, hash crypto.Hash, hashed []byte, opts *PSSOptions) ([]byte, error) {
++// SignPSS calculates the signature of digest using PSS.
++//
++// digest must be the result of hashing the input message using the given hash
++// function. The opts argument may be nil, in which case sensible defaults are
++// used. If opts.Hash is set, it overrides hash.
++func SignPSS(rand io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, hash crypto.Hash, digest []byte, opts *PSSOptions) ([]byte, error) {
++	if opts != nil && opts.Hash != 0 {
++		hash = opts.Hash
++	}
++
+ 	saltLength := opts.saltLength()
+ 	switch saltLength {
+ 	case PSSSaltLengthAuto:
+-		saltLength = (priv.N.BitLen()+7)/8 - 2 - hash.Size()
++		saltLength = priv.Size() - 2 - hash.Size()
+ 	case PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash:
+ 		saltLength = hash.Size()
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if opts != nil && opts.Hash != 0 {
+-		hash = opts.Hash
+-	}
+-
+ 	salt := make([]byte, saltLength)
+ 	if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand, salt); err != nil {
+ 		return nil, err
+ 	}
+-	return signPSSWithSalt(rand, priv, hash, hashed, salt)
++	return signPSSWithSalt(rand, priv, hash, digest, salt)
+ }
+ 
+ // VerifyPSS verifies a PSS signature.
+-// hashed is the result of hashing the input message using the given hash
+-// function and sig is the signature. A valid signature is indicated by
+-// returning a nil error. The opts argument may be nil, in which case sensible
+-// defaults are used.
+-func VerifyPSS(pub *PublicKey, hash crypto.Hash, hashed []byte, sig []byte, opts *PSSOptions) error {
+-	return verifyPSS(pub, hash, hashed, sig, opts.saltLength())
+-}
+-
+-// verifyPSS verifies a PSS signature with the given salt length.
+-func verifyPSS(pub *PublicKey, hash crypto.Hash, hashed []byte, sig []byte, saltLen int) error {
+-	nBits := pub.N.BitLen()
+-	if len(sig) != (nBits+7)/8 {
++//
++// A valid signature is indicated by returning a nil error. digest must be the
++// result of hashing the input message using the given hash function. The opts
++// argument may be nil, in which case sensible defaults are used. opts.Hash is
++// ignored.
++func VerifyPSS(pub *PublicKey, hash crypto.Hash, digest []byte, sig []byte, opts *PSSOptions) error {
++	if len(sig) != pub.Size() {
+ 		return ErrVerification
+ 	}
+ 	s := new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig)
+ 	m := encrypt(new(big.Int), pub, s)
+-	emBits := nBits - 1
++	emBits := pub.N.BitLen() - 1
+ 	emLen := (emBits + 7) / 8
+-	if emLen < len(m.Bytes()) {
++	emBytes := m.Bytes()
++	if emLen < len(emBytes) {
+ 		return ErrVerification
+ 	}
+ 	em := make([]byte, emLen)
+-	copyWithLeftPad(em, m.Bytes())
+-	if saltLen == PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash {
+-		saltLen = hash.Size()
+-	}
+-	return emsaPSSVerify(hashed, em, emBits, saltLen, hash.New())
++	copyWithLeftPad(em, emBytes)
++	return emsaPSSVerify(digest, em, emBits, opts.saltLength(), hash.New())
+ }
+diff --git a/src/crypto/rsa/rsa.go b/src/crypto/rsa/rsa.go
+index 5a42990640164..b4bfa13defbdf 100644
+--- a/src/crypto/rsa/rsa.go
++++ b/src/crypto/rsa/rsa.go
+@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
+ // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+ // license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+ 
+-// Package rsa implements RSA encryption as specified in PKCS#1.
++// Package rsa implements RSA encryption as specified in PKCS#1 and RFC 8017.
+ //
+ // RSA is a single, fundamental operation that is used in this package to
+ // implement either public-key encryption or public-key signatures.
+@@ -10,13 +10,13 @@
+ // The original specification for encryption and signatures with RSA is PKCS#1
+ // and the terms "RSA encryption" and "RSA signatures" by default refer to
+ // PKCS#1 version 1.5. However, that specification has flaws and new designs
+-// should use version two, usually called by just OAEP and PSS, where
++// should use version 2, usually called by just OAEP and PSS, where
+ // possible.
+ //
+ // Two sets of interfaces are included in this package. When a more abstract
+ // interface isn't necessary, there are functions for encrypting/decrypting
+ // with v1.5/OAEP and signing/verifying with v1.5/PSS. If one needs to abstract
+-// over the public-key primitive, the PrivateKey struct implements the
++// over the public key primitive, the PrivateKey type implements the
+ // Decrypter and Signer interfaces from the crypto package.
+ //
+ // The RSA operations in this package are not implemented using constant-time algorithms.
+@@ -111,7 +111,8 @@ func (priv *PrivateKey) Public() crypto.PublicKey {
+ 
+ // Sign signs digest with priv, reading randomness from rand. If opts is a
+ // *PSSOptions then the PSS algorithm will be used, otherwise PKCS#1 v1.5 will
+-// be used.
++// be used. digest must be the result of hashing the input message using
++// opts.HashFunc().
+ //
+ // This method implements crypto.Signer, which is an interface to support keys
+ // where the private part is kept in, for example, a hardware module. Common

meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.14/CVE-2023-45287-pre2.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,401 @@
+From c9d5f60eaa4450ccf1ce878d55b4c6a12843f2f3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
+Date: Mon, 27 Apr 2020 21:52:38 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] math/big: add (*Int).FillBytes
+
+Replaced almost every use of Bytes with FillBytes.
+
+Note that the approved proposal was for
+
+    func (*Int) FillBytes(buf []byte)
+
+while this implements
+
+    func (*Int) FillBytes(buf []byte) []byte
+
+because the latter was far nicer to use in all callsites.
+
+Fixes #35833
+
+Change-Id: Ia912df123e5d79b763845312ea3d9a8051343c0a
+Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/230397
+Reviewed-by: Robert Griesemer <gri@golang.org>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/golang/go/commit/c9d5f60eaa4450ccf1ce878d55b4c6a12843f2f3]
+CVE: CVE-2023-45287 #Dependency Patch2
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ src/crypto/elliptic/elliptic.go | 13 ++++----
+ src/crypto/rsa/pkcs1v15.go      | 20 +++---------
+ src/crypto/rsa/pss.go           | 17 +++++------
+ src/crypto/rsa/rsa.go           | 32 +++----------------
+ src/crypto/tls/key_schedule.go  |  7 ++---
+ src/crypto/x509/sec1.go         |  7 ++---
+ src/math/big/int.go             | 15 +++++++++
+ src/math/big/int_test.go        | 54 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ src/math/big/nat.go             | 15 ++++++---
+ 9 files changed, 106 insertions(+), 74 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/crypto/elliptic/elliptic.go b/src/crypto/elliptic/elliptic.go
+index e2f71cdb63bab..bd5168c5fd842 100644
+--- a/src/crypto/elliptic/elliptic.go
++++ b/src/crypto/elliptic/elliptic.go
+@@ -277,7 +277,7 @@ var mask = []byte{0xff, 0x1, 0x3, 0x7, 0xf, 0x1f, 0x3f, 0x7f}
+ func GenerateKey(curve Curve, rand io.Reader) (priv []byte, x, y *big.Int, err error) {
+ 	N := curve.Params().N
+ 	bitSize := N.BitLen()
+-	byteLen := (bitSize + 7) >> 3
++	byteLen := (bitSize + 7) / 8
+ 	priv = make([]byte, byteLen)
+ 
+ 	for x == nil {
+@@ -304,15 +304,14 @@ func GenerateKey(curve Curve, rand io.Reader) (priv []byte, x, y *big.Int, err e
+ 
+ // Marshal converts a point into the uncompressed form specified in section 4.3.6 of ANSI X9.62.
+ func Marshal(curve Curve, x, y *big.Int) []byte {
+-	byteLen := (curve.Params().BitSize + 7) >> 3
++	byteLen := (curve.Params().BitSize + 7) / 8
+ 
+ 	ret := make([]byte, 1+2*byteLen)
+ 	ret[0] = 4 // uncompressed point
+ 
+-	xBytes := x.Bytes()
+-	copy(ret[1+byteLen-len(xBytes):], xBytes)
+-	yBytes := y.Bytes()
+-	copy(ret[1+2*byteLen-len(yBytes):], yBytes)
++	x.FillBytes(ret[1 : 1+byteLen])
++	y.FillBytes(ret[1+byteLen : 1+2*byteLen])
++
+ 	return ret
+ }
+ 
+@@ -320,7 +319,7 @@ func Marshal(curve Curve, x, y *big.Int) []byte {
+ // It is an error if the point is not in uncompressed form or is not on the curve.
+ // On error, x = nil.
+ func Unmarshal(curve Curve, data []byte) (x, y *big.Int) {
+-	byteLen := (curve.Params().BitSize + 7) >> 3
++	byteLen := (curve.Params().BitSize + 7) / 8
+ 	if len(data) != 1+2*byteLen {
+ 		return
+ 	}
+diff --git a/src/crypto/rsa/pkcs1v15.go b/src/crypto/rsa/pkcs1v15.go
+index 499242ffc5b57..3208119ae1ff4 100644
+--- a/src/crypto/rsa/pkcs1v15.go
++++ b/src/crypto/rsa/pkcs1v15.go
+@@ -61,8 +61,7 @@ func EncryptPKCS1v15(rand io.Reader, pub *PublicKey, msg []byte) ([]byte, error)
+ 	m := new(big.Int).SetBytes(em)
+ 	c := encrypt(new(big.Int), pub, m)
+ 
+-	copyWithLeftPad(em, c.Bytes())
+-	return em, nil
++	return c.FillBytes(em), nil
+ }
+ 
+ // DecryptPKCS1v15 decrypts a plaintext using RSA and the padding scheme from PKCS#1 v1.5.
+@@ -150,7 +149,7 @@ func decryptPKCS1v15(rand io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, ciphertext []byte) (valid
+ 		return
+ 	}
+ 
+-	em = leftPad(m.Bytes(), k)
++	em = m.FillBytes(make([]byte, k))
+ 	firstByteIsZero := subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(em[0], 0)
+ 	secondByteIsTwo := subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(em[1], 2)
+ 
+@@ -256,8 +255,7 @@ func SignPKCS1v15(rand io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, hash crypto.Hash, hashed []b
+ 		return nil, err
+ 	}
+ 
+-	copyWithLeftPad(em, c.Bytes())
+-	return em, nil
++	return c.FillBytes(em), nil
+ }
+ 
+ // VerifyPKCS1v15 verifies an RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature.
+@@ -286,7 +284,7 @@ func VerifyPKCS1v15(pub *PublicKey, hash crypto.Hash, hashed []byte, sig []byte)
+ 
+ 	c := new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig)
+ 	m := encrypt(new(big.Int), pub, c)
+-	em := leftPad(m.Bytes(), k)
++	em := m.FillBytes(make([]byte, k))
+ 	// EM = 0x00 || 0x01 || PS || 0x00 || T
+ 
+ 	ok := subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(em[0], 0)
+@@ -323,13 +321,3 @@ func pkcs1v15HashInfo(hash crypto.Hash, inLen int) (hashLen int, prefix []byte,
+ 	}
+ 	return
+ }
+-
+-// copyWithLeftPad copies src to the end of dest, padding with zero bytes as
+-// needed.
+-func copyWithLeftPad(dest, src []byte) {
+-	numPaddingBytes := len(dest) - len(src)
+-	for i := 0; i < numPaddingBytes; i++ {
+-		dest[i] = 0
+-	}
+-	copy(dest[numPaddingBytes:], src)
+-}
+diff --git a/src/crypto/rsa/pss.go b/src/crypto/rsa/pss.go
+index f9844d87329a8..b2adbedb28fa8 100644
+--- a/src/crypto/rsa/pss.go
++++ b/src/crypto/rsa/pss.go
+@@ -207,20 +207,19 @@ func emsaPSSVerify(mHash, em []byte, emBits, sLen int, hash hash.Hash) error {
+ // Note that hashed must be the result of hashing the input message using the
+ // given hash function. salt is a random sequence of bytes whose length will be
+ // later used to verify the signature.
+-func signPSSWithSalt(rand io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, hash crypto.Hash, hashed, salt []byte) (s []byte, err error) {
++func signPSSWithSalt(rand io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, hash crypto.Hash, hashed, salt []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+ 	emBits := priv.N.BitLen() - 1
+ 	em, err := emsaPSSEncode(hashed, emBits, salt, hash.New())
+ 	if err != nil {
+-		return
++		return nil, err
+ 	}
+ 	m := new(big.Int).SetBytes(em)
+ 	c, err := decryptAndCheck(rand, priv, m)
+ 	if err != nil {
+-		return
++		return nil, err
+ 	}
+-	s = make([]byte, priv.Size())
+-	copyWithLeftPad(s, c.Bytes())
+-	return
++	s := make([]byte, priv.Size())
++	return c.FillBytes(s), nil
+ }
+ 
+ const (
+@@ -296,11 +295,9 @@ func VerifyPSS(pub *PublicKey, hash crypto.Hash, digest []byte, sig []byte, opts
+ 	m := encrypt(new(big.Int), pub, s)
+ 	emBits := pub.N.BitLen() - 1
+ 	emLen := (emBits + 7) / 8
+-	emBytes := m.Bytes()
+-	if emLen < len(emBytes) {
++	if m.BitLen() > emLen*8 {
+ 		return ErrVerification
+ 	}
+-	em := make([]byte, emLen)
+-	copyWithLeftPad(em, emBytes)
++	em := m.FillBytes(make([]byte, emLen))
+ 	return emsaPSSVerify(digest, em, emBits, opts.saltLength(), hash.New())
+ }
+diff --git a/src/crypto/rsa/rsa.go b/src/crypto/rsa/rsa.go
+index b4bfa13defbdf..28eb5926c1a54 100644
+--- a/src/crypto/rsa/rsa.go
++++ b/src/crypto/rsa/rsa.go
+@@ -416,16 +416,9 @@ func EncryptOAEP(hash hash.Hash, random io.Reader, pub *PublicKey, msg []byte, l
+ 	m := new(big.Int)
+ 	m.SetBytes(em)
+ 	c := encrypt(new(big.Int), pub, m)
+-	out := c.Bytes()
+ 
+-	if len(out) < k {
+-		// If the output is too small, we need to left-pad with zeros.
+-		t := make([]byte, k)
+-		copy(t[k-len(out):], out)
+-		out = t
+-	}
+-
+-	return out, nil
++	out := make([]byte, k)
++	return c.FillBytes(out), nil
+ }
+ 
+ // ErrDecryption represents a failure to decrypt a message.
+@@ -597,12 +590,9 @@ func DecryptOAEP(hash hash.Hash, random io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, ciphertext
+ 	lHash := hash.Sum(nil)
+ 	hash.Reset()
+ 
+-	// Converting the plaintext number to bytes will strip any
+-	// leading zeros so we may have to left pad. We do this unconditionally
+-	// to avoid leaking timing information. (Although we still probably
+-	// leak the number of leading zeros. It's not clear that we can do
+-	// anything about this.)
+-	em := leftPad(m.Bytes(), k)
++	// We probably leak the number of leading zeros.
++	// It's not clear that we can do anything about this.
++	em := m.FillBytes(make([]byte, k))
+ 
+ 	firstByteIsZero := subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(em[0], 0)
+ 
+@@ -643,15 +633,3 @@ func DecryptOAEP(hash hash.Hash, random io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, ciphertext
+ 
+ 	return rest[index+1:], nil
+ }
+-
+-// leftPad returns a new slice of length size. The contents of input are right
+-// aligned in the new slice.
+-func leftPad(input []byte, size int) (out []byte) {
+-	n := len(input)
+-	if n > size {
+-		n = size
+-	}
+-	out = make([]byte, size)
+-	copy(out[len(out)-n:], input)
+-	return
+-}
+diff --git a/src/crypto/tls/key_schedule.go b/src/crypto/tls/key_schedule.go
+index 2aab323202f7d..314016979afb8 100644
+--- a/src/crypto/tls/key_schedule.go
++++ b/src/crypto/tls/key_schedule.go
+@@ -173,11 +173,8 @@ func (p *nistParameters) SharedKey(peerPublicKey []byte) []byte {
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	xShared, _ := curve.ScalarMult(x, y, p.privateKey)
+-	sharedKey := make([]byte, (curve.Params().BitSize+7)>>3)
+-	xBytes := xShared.Bytes()
+-	copy(sharedKey[len(sharedKey)-len(xBytes):], xBytes)
+-
+-	return sharedKey
++	sharedKey := make([]byte, (curve.Params().BitSize+7)/8)
++	return xShared.FillBytes(sharedKey)
+ }
+ 
+ type x25519Parameters struct {
+diff --git a/src/crypto/x509/sec1.go b/src/crypto/x509/sec1.go
+index 0bfb90cd5464a..52c108ff1d624 100644
+--- a/src/crypto/x509/sec1.go
++++ b/src/crypto/x509/sec1.go
+@@ -52,13 +52,10 @@ func MarshalECPrivateKey(key *ecdsa.PrivateKey) ([]byte, error) {
+ // marshalECPrivateKey marshals an EC private key into ASN.1, DER format and
+ // sets the curve ID to the given OID, or omits it if OID is nil.
+ func marshalECPrivateKeyWithOID(key *ecdsa.PrivateKey, oid asn1.ObjectIdentifier) ([]byte, error) {
+-	privateKeyBytes := key.D.Bytes()
+-	paddedPrivateKey := make([]byte, (key.Curve.Params().N.BitLen()+7)/8)
+-	copy(paddedPrivateKey[len(paddedPrivateKey)-len(privateKeyBytes):], privateKeyBytes)
+-
++	privateKey := make([]byte, (key.Curve.Params().N.BitLen()+7)/8)
+ 	return asn1.Marshal(ecPrivateKey{
+ 		Version:       1,
+-		PrivateKey:    paddedPrivateKey,
++		PrivateKey:    key.D.FillBytes(privateKey),
+ 		NamedCurveOID: oid,
+ 		PublicKey:     asn1.BitString{Bytes: elliptic.Marshal(key.Curve, key.X, key.Y)},
+ 	})
+diff --git a/src/math/big/int.go b/src/math/big/int.go
+index 8816cf5266cc4..65f32487b58c0 100644
+--- a/src/math/big/int.go
++++ b/src/math/big/int.go
+@@ -447,11 +447,26 @@ func (z *Int) SetBytes(buf []byte) *Int {
+ }
+ 
+ // Bytes returns the absolute value of x as a big-endian byte slice.
++//
++// To use a fixed length slice, or a preallocated one, use FillBytes.
+ func (x *Int) Bytes() []byte {
+ 	buf := make([]byte, len(x.abs)*_S)
+ 	return buf[x.abs.bytes(buf):]
+ }
+ 
++// FillBytes sets buf to the absolute value of x, storing it as a zero-extended
++// big-endian byte slice, and returns buf.
++//
++// If the absolute value of x doesn't fit in buf, FillBytes will panic.
++func (x *Int) FillBytes(buf []byte) []byte {
++	// Clear whole buffer. (This gets optimized into a memclr.)
++	for i := range buf {
++		buf[i] = 0
++	}
++	x.abs.bytes(buf)
++	return buf
++}
++
+ // BitLen returns the length of the absolute value of x in bits.
+ // The bit length of 0 is 0.
+ func (x *Int) BitLen() int {
+diff --git a/src/math/big/int_test.go b/src/math/big/int_test.go
+index e3a1587b3f0ad..3c8557323a032 100644
+--- a/src/math/big/int_test.go
++++ b/src/math/big/int_test.go
+@@ -1840,3 +1840,57 @@ func BenchmarkDiv(b *testing.B) {
+ 		})
+ 	}
+ }
++
++func TestFillBytes(t *testing.T) {
++	checkResult := func(t *testing.T, buf []byte, want *Int) {
++		t.Helper()
++		got := new(Int).SetBytes(buf)
++		if got.CmpAbs(want) != 0 {
++			t.Errorf("got 0x%x, want 0x%x: %x", got, want, buf)
++		}
++	}
++	panics := func(f func()) (panic bool) {
++		defer func() { panic = recover() != nil }()
++		f()
++		return
++	}
++
++	for _, n := range []string{
++		"0",
++		"1000",
++		"0xffffffff",
++		"-0xffffffff",
++		"0xffffffffffffffff",
++		"0x10000000000000000",
++		"0xabababababababababababababababababababababababababa",
++		"0xffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff",
++	} {
++		t.Run(n, func(t *testing.T) {
++			t.Logf(n)
++			x, ok := new(Int).SetString(n, 0)
++			if !ok {
++				panic("invalid test entry")
++			}
++
++			// Perfectly sized buffer.
++			byteLen := (x.BitLen() + 7) / 8
++			buf := make([]byte, byteLen)
++			checkResult(t, x.FillBytes(buf), x)
++
++			// Way larger, checking all bytes get zeroed.
++			buf = make([]byte, 100)
++			for i := range buf {
++				buf[i] = 0xff
++			}
++			checkResult(t, x.FillBytes(buf), x)
++
++			// Too small.
++			if byteLen > 0 {
++				buf = make([]byte, byteLen-1)
++				if !panics(func() { x.FillBytes(buf) }) {
++					t.Errorf("expected panic for small buffer and value %x", x)
++				}
++			}
++		})
++	}
++}
+diff --git a/src/math/big/nat.go b/src/math/big/nat.go
+index c31ec5156b81d..6a3989bf9d82b 100644
+--- a/src/math/big/nat.go
++++ b/src/math/big/nat.go
+@@ -1476,19 +1476,26 @@ func (z nat) expNNMontgomery(x, y, m nat) nat {
+ }
+ 
+ // bytes writes the value of z into buf using big-endian encoding.
+-// len(buf) must be >= len(z)*_S. The value of z is encoded in the
+-// slice buf[i:]. The number i of unused bytes at the beginning of
+-// buf is returned as result.
++// The value of z is encoded in the slice buf[i:]. If the value of z
++// cannot be represented in buf, bytes panics. The number i of unused
++// bytes at the beginning of buf is returned as result.
+ func (z nat) bytes(buf []byte) (i int) {
+ 	i = len(buf)
+ 	for _, d := range z {
+ 		for j := 0; j < _S; j++ {
+ 			i--
+-			buf[i] = byte(d)
++			if i >= 0 {
++				buf[i] = byte(d)
++			} else if byte(d) != 0 {
++				panic("math/big: buffer too small to fit value")
++			}
+ 			d >>= 8
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 
++	if i < 0 {
++		i = 0
++	}
+ 	for i < len(buf) && buf[i] == 0 {
+ 		i++
+ 	}

meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.14/CVE-2023-45287-pre3.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+From 8f676144ad7b7c91adb0c6e1ec89aaa6283c6807 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Himanshu Kishna Srivastava <28himanshu@gmail.com>
+Date: Tue, 16 Mar 2021 22:37:46 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] crypto/rsa: fix salt length calculation with
+ PSSSaltLengthAuto
+
+When PSSSaltLength is set, the maximum salt length must equal:
+
+    (modulus_key_size - 1 + 7)/8 - hash_length - 2
+and for example, with a 4096 bit modulus key, and a SHA-1 hash,
+it should be:
+
+     (4096 -1 + 7)/8 - 20 - 2 = 490
+Previously we'd encounter this error:
+
+     crypto/rsa: key size too small for PSS signature
+
+Fixes #42741
+
+Change-Id: I18bb82c41c511d564b3f4c443f4b3a38ab010ac5
+Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/302230
+Reviewed-by: Emmanuel Odeke <emmanuel@orijtech.com>
+Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
+Trust: Emmanuel Odeke <emmanuel@orijtech.com>
+Run-TryBot: Emmanuel Odeke <emmanuel@orijtech.com>
+TryBot-Result: Go Bot <gobot@golang.org>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/golang/go/commit/8f676144ad7b7c91adb0c6e1ec89aaa6283c6807]
+CVE: CVE-2023-45287 #Dependency Patch3
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ src/crypto/rsa/pss.go      |  2 +-
+ src/crypto/rsa/pss_test.go | 20 +++++++++++++++++++-
+ 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/crypto/rsa/pss.go b/src/crypto/rsa/pss.go
+index b2adbedb28fa8..814522de8181f 100644
+--- a/src/crypto/rsa/pss.go
++++ b/src/crypto/rsa/pss.go
+@@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ func SignPSS(rand io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, hash crypto.Hash, digest []byte,
+ 	saltLength := opts.saltLength()
+ 	switch saltLength {
+ 	case PSSSaltLengthAuto:
+-		saltLength = priv.Size() - 2 - hash.Size()
++		saltLength = (priv.N.BitLen()-1+7)/8 - 2 - hash.Size()
+ 	case PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash:
+ 		saltLength = hash.Size()
+ 	}
+diff --git a/src/crypto/rsa/pss_test.go b/src/crypto/rsa/pss_test.go
+index dfa8d8bb5ad02..c3a6d468497cd 100644
+--- a/src/crypto/rsa/pss_test.go
++++ b/src/crypto/rsa/pss_test.go
+@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ import (
+ 	_ "crypto/md5"
+ 	"crypto/rand"
+ 	"crypto/sha1"
+-	_ "crypto/sha256"
++	"crypto/sha256"
+ 	"encoding/hex"
+ 	"math/big"
+ 	"os"
+@@ -233,6 +233,24 @@ func TestPSSSigning(t *testing.T) {
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
++func TestSignWithPSSSaltLengthAuto(t *testing.T) {
++	key, err := GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 513)
++	if err != nil {
++		t.Fatal(err)
++	}
++	digest := sha256.Sum256([]byte("message"))
++	signature, err := key.Sign(rand.Reader, digest[:], &PSSOptions{
++		SaltLength: PSSSaltLengthAuto,
++		Hash:       crypto.SHA256,
++	})
++	if err != nil {
++		t.Fatal(err)
++	}
++	if len(signature) == 0 {
++		t.Fatal("empty signature returned")
++	}
++}
++
+ func bigFromHex(hex string) *big.Int {
+ 	n, ok := new(big.Int).SetString(hex, 16)
+ 	if !ok {

meta/recipes-devtools/opkg/opkg/0001-file_util.c-fix-possible-bad-memory-access-in-file_r.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+From 8b45a3c4cab95382beea1ecdddeb2e4a9ed14aba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
+Date: Wed, 1 Apr 2020 21:47:40 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 001/104] file_util.c: fix possible bad memory access in
+ file_read_line_alloc()
+
+In the case of a zero length string being returned by fgets(), the condition
+checking for a trailing new line would perform a bad memory access outside
+of `buf`. This might happen when line with a leading null byte is read.
+
+Avoid this case by checking that the string has a length of at least one
+byte. Also change the unsigned int types to size_t to store length values
+while we're at it.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/ndmsystems/opkg/commit/8b45a3c4cab95382beea1ecdddeb2e4a9ed14aba]
+
+Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
+Signed-off-by: Alejandro del Castillo <alejandro.delcastillo@ni.com>
+Signed-off-by: virendra thakur <virendrak@kpit.com>
+---
+ libopkg/file_util.c | 7 ++-----
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/libopkg/file_util.c b/libopkg/file_util.c
+index fbed7b4..ee9f59d 100644
+--- a/libopkg/file_util.c
++++ b/libopkg/file_util.c
+@@ -127,17 +127,14 @@ char *file_readlink_alloc(const char *file_name)
+ */
+ char *file_read_line_alloc(FILE * fp)
+ {
++    size_t buf_len, line_size;
+     char buf[BUFSIZ];
+-    unsigned int buf_len;
+     char *line = NULL;
+-    unsigned int line_size = 0;
+     int got_nl = 0;
+ 
+-    buf[0] = '\0';
+-
+     while (fgets(buf, BUFSIZ, fp)) {
+         buf_len = strlen(buf);
+-        if (buf[buf_len - 1] == '\n') {
++        if (buf_len > 0 && buf[buf_len - 1] == '\n') {
+             buf_len--;
+             buf[buf_len] = '\0';
+             got_nl = 1;
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-devtools/opkg/opkg_0.4.2.bb

@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://downloads.yoctoproject.org/releases/${BPN}/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.gz
            file://opkg.conf \
            file://0001-opkg_conf-create-opkg.lock-in-run-instead-of-var-run.patch \
            file://sourcedateepoch.patch \
+           file://0001-file_util.c-fix-possible-bad-memory-access-in-file_r.patch \
            file://run-ptest \
 "
 

meta/recipes-devtools/perl/files/CVE-2023-31484.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+CVE: CVE-2023-31484
+Upstream-Status: Backport [  import from Ubuntu  perl_5.30.0-9ubuntu0.5
+upstream  https://github.com/andk/cpanpm/commit/9c98370287f4e709924aee7c58ef21c85289a7f0 ]
+Signed-off-by: Lee Chee Yang <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
+
+From 9c98370287f4e709924aee7c58ef21c85289a7f0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stig Palmquist <git@stig.io>
+Date: Tue, 28 Feb 2023 11:54:06 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Add verify_SSL=>1 to HTTP::Tiny to verify https server
+ identity
+
+---
+ lib/CPAN/HTTP/Client.pm | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/cpan/CPAN/lib/CPAN/HTTP/Client.pm b/cpan/CPAN/lib/CPAN/HTTP/Client.pm
+index 4fc792c26..a616fee20 100644
+--- a/cpan/CPAN/lib/CPAN/HTTP/Client.pm
++++ b/cpan/CPAN/lib/CPAN/HTTP/Client.pm
+@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ sub mirror {
+ 
+     my $want_proxy = $self->_want_proxy($uri);
+     my $http = HTTP::Tiny->new(
++        verify_SSL => 1,
+         $want_proxy ? (proxy => $self->{proxy}) : ()
+     );
+ 

meta/recipes-devtools/perl/files/CVE-2023-47038.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+as per https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2023-47100 , CVE-2023-47100 is duplicate of CVE-2023-47038
+CVE: CVE-2023-47038 CVE-2023-47100
+Upstream-Status: Backport [ import from ubuntu perl_5.30.0-9ubuntu0.5 
+upstream https://github.com/Perl/perl5/commit/12c313ce49b36160a7ca2e9b07ad5bd92ee4a010 ]
+Signed-off-by: Lee Chee Yang <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
+
+Backport of:
+
+From 12c313ce49b36160a7ca2e9b07ad5bd92ee4a010 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Karl Williamson <khw@cpan.org>
+Date: Sat, 9 Sep 2023 11:59:09 -0600
+Subject: [PATCH 1/2] Fix read/write past buffer end: perl-security#140
+
+A package name may be specified in a \p{...} regular expression
+construct.  If unspecified, "utf8::" is assumed, which is the package
+all official Unicode properties are in.  By specifying a different
+package, one can create a user-defined property with the same
+unqualified name as a Unicode one.  Such a property is defined by a sub
+whose name begins with "Is" or "In", and if the sub wishes to refer to
+an official Unicode property, it must explicitly specify the "utf8::".
+S_parse_uniprop_string() is used to parse the interior of both \p{} and
+the user-defined sub lines.
+
+In S_parse_uniprop_string(), it parses the input "name" parameter,
+creating a modified copy, "lookup_name", malloc'ed with the same size as
+"name".  The modifications are essentially to create a canonicalized
+version of the input, with such things as extraneous white-space
+stripped off.  I found it convenient to strip off the package specifier
+"utf8::".  To to so, the code simply pretends "lookup_name" begins just
+after the "utf8::", and adjusts various other values to compensate.
+However, it missed the adjustment of one required one.
+
+This is only a problem when the property name begins with "perl" and
+isn't "perlspace" nor "perlword".  All such ones are undocumented
+internal properties.
+
+What happens in this case is that the input is reparsed with slightly
+different rules in effect as to what is legal versus illegal.  The
+problem is that "lookup_name" no longer is pointing to its initial
+value, but "name" is.  Thus the space allocated for filling "lookup_name"
+is now shorter than "name", and as this shortened "lookup_name" is
+filled by copying suitable portions of "name", the write can be to
+unallocated space.
+
+The solution is to skip the "utf8::" when reparsing "name".  Then both
+"lookup_name" and "name" are effectively shortened by the same amount,
+and there is no going off the end.
+
+This commit also does white-space adjustment so that things align
+vertically for readability.
+
+This can be easily backported to earlier Perl releases.
+---
+ regcomp.c           | 17 +++++++++++------
+ t/re/pat_advanced.t |  8 ++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/regcomp.c
++++ b/regcomp.c
+@@ -22606,7 +22606,7 @@ Perl_parse_uniprop_string(pTHX_
+      * compile perl to know about them) */
+     bool is_nv_type = FALSE;
+ 
+-    unsigned int i, j = 0;
++    unsigned int i = 0, i_zero = 0, j = 0;
+     int equals_pos = -1;    /* Where the '=' is found, or negative if none */
+     int slash_pos  = -1;    /* Where the '/' is found, or negative if none */
+     int table_index = 0;    /* The entry number for this property in the table
+@@ -22717,9 +22717,13 @@ Perl_parse_uniprop_string(pTHX_
+      * all of them are considered to be for that package.  For the purposes of
+      * parsing the rest of the property, strip it off */
+     if (non_pkg_begin == STRLENs("utf8::") && memBEGINPs(name, name_len, "utf8::")) {
+-        lookup_name +=  STRLENs("utf8::");
+-        j -=  STRLENs("utf8::");
+-        equals_pos -=  STRLENs("utf8::");
++        lookup_name += STRLENs("utf8::");
++        j           -= STRLENs("utf8::");
++        equals_pos  -= STRLENs("utf8::");
++        i_zero       = STRLENs("utf8::");   /* When resetting 'i' to reparse
++                                               from the beginning, it has to be
++                                               set past what we're stripping
++                                               off */
+     }
+ 
+     /* Here, we are either done with the whole property name, if it was simple;
+@@ -22997,7 +23001,8 @@ Perl_parse_uniprop_string(pTHX_
+ 
+             /* We set the inputs back to 0 and the code below will reparse,
+              * using strict */
+-            i = j = 0;
++            i = i_zero;
++            j = 0;
+         }
+     }
+ 
+@@ -23018,7 +23023,7 @@ Perl_parse_uniprop_string(pTHX_
+          * separates two digits */
+         if (cur == '_') {
+             if (    stricter
+-                && (     i == 0 || (int) i == equals_pos || i == name_len- 1
++                && (   i == i_zero || (int) i == equals_pos || i == name_len- 1
+                     || ! isDIGIT_A(name[i-1]) || ! isDIGIT_A(name[i+1])))
+             {
+                 lookup_name[j++] = '_';
+--- a/t/re/pat_advanced.t
++++ b/t/re/pat_advanced.t
+@@ -2524,6 +2524,14 @@ EOF
+                       "", {}, "*COMMIT caused positioning beyond EOS");
+     }
+ 
++    {   # perl-security#140, read/write past buffer end
++        fresh_perl_like('qr/\p{utf8::perl x}/',
++                        qr/Illegal user-defined property name "utf8::perl x" in regex/,
++                        {}, "perl-security#140");
++        fresh_perl_is('qr/\p{utf8::_perl_surrogate}/', "",
++                        {}, "perl-security#140");
++    }
++
+ 
+     # !!! NOTE that tests that aren't at all likely to crash perl should go
+     # a ways above, above these last ones.  There's a comment there that, like

meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl_5.30.1.bb

@@ -29,6 +29,8 @@ SRC_URI = "https://www.cpan.org/src/5.0/perl-${PV}.tar.gz;name=perl \
            file://CVE-2020-10878_1.patch \
            file://CVE-2020-10878_2.patch \
            file://CVE-2020-12723.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-31484.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-47038.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI_append_class-native = " \
            file://perl-configpm-switch.patch \
@@ -44,6 +46,10 @@ SRC_URI[perl-cross.sha256sum] = "edce0b0c2f725e2db3f203d6d8e9f3f7161256f5d159055
 
 S = "${WORKDIR}/perl-${PV}"
 
+# This is windows only issue.
+# https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2023-47039
+CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2023-47039"
+
 inherit upstream-version-is-even update-alternatives
 
 DEPENDS += "zlib virtual/crypt"

meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc

@@ -141,6 +141,9 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.qemu.org/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.xz \
            file://CVE-2023-3354.patch \
 	   file://CVE-2023-3180.patch \
            file://CVE-2020-24165.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-5088.patch \
+           file://9pfs-local-ignore-O_NOATIME-if-we-don-t-have-permiss.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-2861.patch \
            "
 UPSTREAM_CHECK_REGEX = "qemu-(?P<pver>\d+(\.\d+)+)\.tar"
 

meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/0012-fix-libcap-header-issue-on-some-distro.patch

@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com>
  1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
 
 diff --git a/fsdev/virtfs-proxy-helper.c b/fsdev/virtfs-proxy-helper.c
-index 6f132c5f..8329950c 100644
+index 300c9765..2823db7d 100644
 --- a/fsdev/virtfs-proxy-helper.c
 +++ b/fsdev/virtfs-proxy-helper.c
 @@ -13,7 +13,6 @@
@@ -71,9 +71,9 @@ index 6f132c5f..8329950c 100644
  #include <sys/fsuid.h>
  #include <sys/vfs.h>
  #include <sys/ioctl.h>
-@@ -27,7 +26,11 @@
- #include "9p-iov-marshal.h"
+@@ -28,7 +27,11 @@
  #include "hw/9pfs/9p-proxy.h"
+ #include "hw/9pfs/9p-util.h"
  #include "fsdev/9p-iov-marshal.h"
 -
 +/*
@@ -84,3 +84,6 @@ index 6f132c5f..8329950c 100644
  #define PROGNAME "virtfs-proxy-helper"
  
  #ifndef XFS_SUPER_MAGIC
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/9pfs-local-ignore-O_NOATIME-if-we-don-t-have-permiss.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+From a5804fcf7b22fc7d1f9ec794dd284c7d504bd16b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
+Date: Thu, 14 May 2020 08:06:43 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] 9pfs: local: ignore O_NOATIME if we don't have permissions
+
+QEMU's local 9pfs server passes through O_NOATIME from the client. If
+the QEMU process doesn't have permissions to use O_NOATIME (namely, it
+does not own the file nor have the CAP_FOWNER capability), the open will
+fail. This causes issues when from the client's point of view, it
+believes it has permissions to use O_NOATIME (e.g., a process running as
+root in the virtual machine). Additionally, overlayfs on Linux opens
+files on the lower layer using O_NOATIME, so in this case a 9pfs mount
+can't be used as a lower layer for overlayfs (cf.
+https://github.com/osandov/drgn/blob/dabfe1971951701da13863dbe6d8a1d172ad9650/vmtest/onoatimehack.c
+and https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs/issues/54509).
+
+Luckily, O_NOATIME is effectively a hint, and is often ignored by, e.g.,
+network filesystems. open(2) notes that O_NOATIME "may not be effective
+on all filesystems. One example is NFS, where the server maintains the
+access time." This means that we can honor it when possible but fall
+back to ignoring it.
+
+Acked-by: Christian Schoenebeck <qemu_oss@crudebyte.com>
+Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
+Message-Id: <e9bee604e8df528584693a4ec474ded6295ce8ad.1587149256.git.osandov@fb.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/a5804fcf7b22fc7d1f9ec794dd284c7d504bd16b]
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ hw/9pfs/9p-util.h | 13 +++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p-util.h b/hw/9pfs/9p-util.h
+index 79ed6b233e5..546f46dc7dc 100644
+--- a/hw/9pfs/9p-util.h
++++ b/hw/9pfs/9p-util.h
+@@ -37,9 +37,22 @@ static inline int openat_file(int dirfd, const char *name, int flags,
+ {
+     int fd, serrno, ret;
+ 
++again:
+     fd = openat(dirfd, name, flags | O_NOFOLLOW | O_NOCTTY | O_NONBLOCK,
+                 mode);
+     if (fd == -1) {
++        if (errno == EPERM && (flags & O_NOATIME)) {
++            /*
++             * The client passed O_NOATIME but we lack permissions to honor it.
++             * Rather than failing the open, fall back without O_NOATIME. This
++             * doesn't break the semantics on the client side, as the Linux
++             * open(2) man page notes that O_NOATIME "may not be effective on
++             * all filesystems". In particular, NFS and other network
++             * filesystems ignore it entirely.
++             */
++            flags &= ~O_NOATIME;
++            goto again;
++        }
+         return -1;
+     }
+ 
+-- 
+GitLab
+

meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2023-2861.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
+From f6b0de53fb87ddefed348a39284c8e2f28dc4eda Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Christian Schoenebeck <qemu_oss@crudebyte.com>
+Date: Wed, 7 Jun 2023 18:29:33 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] 9pfs: prevent opening special files (CVE-2023-2861)
+
+The 9p protocol does not specifically define how server shall behave when
+client tries to open a special file, however from security POV it does
+make sense for 9p server to prohibit opening any special file on host side
+in general. A sane Linux 9p client for instance would never attempt to
+open a special file on host side, it would always handle those exclusively
+on its guest side. A malicious client however could potentially escape
+from the exported 9p tree by creating and opening a device file on host
+side.
+
+With QEMU this could only be exploited in the following unsafe setups:
+
+  - Running QEMU binary as root AND 9p 'local' fs driver AND 'passthrough'
+    security model.
+
+or
+
+  - Using 9p 'proxy' fs driver (which is running its helper daemon as
+    root).
+
+These setups were already discouraged for safety reasons before,
+however for obvious reasons we are now tightening behaviour on this.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2023-2861
+Reported-by: Yanwu Shen <ywsPlz@gmail.com>
+Reported-by: Jietao Xiao <shawtao1125@gmail.com>
+Reported-by: Jinku Li <jkli@xidian.edu.cn>
+Reported-by: Wenbo Shen <shenwenbo@zju.edu.cn>
+Signed-off-by: Christian Schoenebeck <qemu_oss@crudebyte.com>
+Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+Reviewed-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
+Message-Id: <E1q6w7r-0000Q0-NM@lizzy.crudebyte.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/f6b0de53fb87ddefed348a39284c8e2f28dc4eda]
+CVE: CVE-2023-2861
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ fsdev/virtfs-proxy-helper.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++--
+ hw/9pfs/9p-util.h           | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/fsdev/virtfs-proxy-helper.c b/fsdev/virtfs-proxy-helper.c
+index 6f132c5f..300c9765 100644
+--- a/fsdev/virtfs-proxy-helper.c
++++ b/fsdev/virtfs-proxy-helper.c
+@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
+ #include "qemu/xattr.h"
+ #include "9p-iov-marshal.h"
+ #include "hw/9pfs/9p-proxy.h"
++#include "hw/9pfs/9p-util.h"
+ #include "fsdev/9p-iov-marshal.h"
+ 
+ #define PROGNAME "virtfs-proxy-helper"
+@@ -350,6 +351,28 @@ static void resetugid(int suid, int sgid)
+     }
+ }
+ 
++/*
++ * Open regular file or directory. Attempts to open any special file are
++ * rejected.
++ *
++ * returns file descriptor or -1 on error
++ */
++static int open_regular(const char *pathname, int flags, mode_t mode)
++{
++    int fd;
++
++    fd = open(pathname, flags, mode);
++    if (fd < 0) {
++	return fd;
++    }
++
++    if (close_if_special_file(fd) < 0) {
++	return -1;
++    }
++
++    return fd;
++}
++
+ /*
+  * send response in two parts
+  * 1) ProxyHeader
+@@ -694,7 +717,7 @@ static int do_create(struct iovec *iovec)
+     if (ret < 0) {
+         goto unmarshal_err_out;
+     }
+-    ret = open(path.data, flags, mode);
++    ret = open_regular(path.data, flags, mode);
+     if (ret < 0) {
+         ret = -errno;
+     }
+@@ -719,7 +742,7 @@ static int do_open(struct iovec *iovec)
+     if (ret < 0) {
+         goto err_out;
+     }
+-    ret = open(path.data, flags);
++    ret = open_regular(path.data, flags, 0);
+     if (ret < 0) {
+         ret = -errno;
+     }
+diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p-util.h b/hw/9pfs/9p-util.h
+index 546f46dc..79fdd2a3 100644
+--- a/hw/9pfs/9p-util.h
++++ b/hw/9pfs/9p-util.h
+@@ -13,12 +13,16 @@
+ #ifndef QEMU_9P_UTIL_H
+ #define QEMU_9P_UTIL_H
+ 
++#include "qemu/error-report.h"
++
+ #ifdef O_PATH
+ #define O_PATH_9P_UTIL O_PATH
+ #else
+ #define O_PATH_9P_UTIL 0
+ #endif
+ 
++#define qemu_fstat      fstat
++
+ static inline void close_preserve_errno(int fd)
+ {
+     int serrno = errno;
+@@ -26,6 +30,38 @@ static inline void close_preserve_errno(int fd)
+     errno = serrno;
+ }
+ 
++/**
++ * close_if_special_file() - Close @fd if neither regular file nor directory.
++ *
++ * @fd: file descriptor of open file
++ * Return: 0 on regular file or directory, -1 otherwise
++ *
++ * CVE-2023-2861: Prohibit opening any special file directly on host
++ * (especially device files), as a compromised client could potentially gain
++ * access outside exported tree under certain, unsafe setups. We expect
++ * client to handle I/O on special files exclusively on guest side.
++ */
++static inline int close_if_special_file(int fd)
++{
++    struct stat stbuf;
++
++    if (qemu_fstat(fd, &stbuf) < 0) {
++	close_preserve_errno(fd);
++	return -1;
++    }
++    if (!S_ISREG(stbuf.st_mode) && !S_ISDIR(stbuf.st_mode)) {
++	error_report_once(
++	    "9p: broken or compromised client detected; attempt to open "
++	    "special file (i.e. neither regular file, nor directory)"
++	);
++	close(fd);
++	errno = ENXIO;
++	return -1;
++    }
++
++    return 0;
++}
++
+ static inline int openat_dir(int dirfd, const char *name)
+ {
+     return openat(dirfd, name,
+@@ -56,6 +92,10 @@ again:
+         return -1;
+     }
+ 
++    if (close_if_special_file(fd) < 0) {
++	return -1;
++    }
++
+     serrno = errno;
+     /* O_NONBLOCK was only needed to open the file. Let's drop it. We don't
+      * do that with O_PATH since fcntl(F_SETFL) isn't supported, and openat()
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2023-5088.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+From 7d7512019fc40c577e2bdd61f114f31a9eb84a8e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Fiona Ebner <f.ebner@proxmox.com>
+Date: Wed, 6 Sep 2023 15:09:21 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] hw/ide: reset: cancel async DMA operation before resetting
+ state
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+If there is a pending DMA operation during ide_bus_reset(), the fact
+that the IDEState is already reset before the operation is canceled
+can be problematic. In particular, ide_dma_cb() might be called and
+then use the reset IDEState which contains the signature after the
+reset. When used to construct the IO operation this leads to
+ide_get_sector() returning 0 and nsector being 1. This is particularly
+bad, because a write command will thus destroy the first sector which
+often contains a partition table or similar.
+
+Traces showing the unsolicited write happening with IDEState
+0x5595af6949d0 being used after reset:
+
+> ahci_port_write ahci(0x5595af6923f0)[0]: port write [reg:PxSCTL] @ 0x2c: 0x00000300
+> ahci_reset_port ahci(0x5595af6923f0)[0]: reset port
+> ide_reset IDEstate 0x5595af6949d0
+> ide_reset IDEstate 0x5595af694da8
+> ide_bus_reset_aio aio_cancel
+> dma_aio_cancel dbs=0x7f64600089a0
+> dma_blk_cb dbs=0x7f64600089a0 ret=0
+> dma_complete dbs=0x7f64600089a0 ret=0 cb=0x5595acd40b30
+> ahci_populate_sglist ahci(0x5595af6923f0)[0]
+> ahci_dma_prepare_buf ahci(0x5595af6923f0)[0]: prepare buf limit=512 prepared=512
+> ide_dma_cb IDEState 0x5595af6949d0; sector_num=0 n=1 cmd=DMA WRITE
+> dma_blk_io dbs=0x7f6420802010 bs=0x5595ae2c6c30 offset=0 to_dev=1
+> dma_blk_cb dbs=0x7f6420802010 ret=0
+
+> (gdb) p *qiov
+> $11 = {iov = 0x7f647c76d840, niov = 1, {{nalloc = 1, local_iov = {iov_base = 0x0,
+>       iov_len = 512}}, {__pad = "\001\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000",
+>       size = 512}}}
+> (gdb) bt
+> #0  blk_aio_pwritev (blk=0x5595ae2c6c30, offset=0, qiov=0x7f6420802070, flags=0,
+>     cb=0x5595ace6f0b0 <dma_blk_cb>, opaque=0x7f6420802010)
+>     at ../block/block-backend.c:1682
+> #1  0x00005595ace6f185 in dma_blk_cb (opaque=0x7f6420802010, ret=<optimized out>)
+>     at ../softmmu/dma-helpers.c:179
+> #2  0x00005595ace6f778 in dma_blk_io (ctx=0x5595ae0609f0,
+>     sg=sg@entry=0x5595af694d00, offset=offset@entry=0, align=align@entry=512,
+>     io_func=io_func@entry=0x5595ace6ee30 <dma_blk_write_io_func>,
+>     io_func_opaque=io_func_opaque@entry=0x5595ae2c6c30,
+>     cb=0x5595acd40b30 <ide_dma_cb>, opaque=0x5595af6949d0,
+>     dir=DMA_DIRECTION_TO_DEVICE) at ../softmmu/dma-helpers.c:244
+> #3  0x00005595ace6f90a in dma_blk_write (blk=0x5595ae2c6c30,
+>     sg=sg@entry=0x5595af694d00, offset=offset@entry=0, align=align@entry=512,
+>     cb=cb@entry=0x5595acd40b30 <ide_dma_cb>, opaque=opaque@entry=0x5595af6949d0)
+>     at ../softmmu/dma-helpers.c:280
+> #4  0x00005595acd40e18 in ide_dma_cb (opaque=0x5595af6949d0, ret=<optimized out>)
+>     at ../hw/ide/core.c:953
+> #5  0x00005595ace6f319 in dma_complete (ret=0, dbs=0x7f64600089a0)
+>     at ../softmmu/dma-helpers.c:107
+> #6  dma_blk_cb (opaque=0x7f64600089a0, ret=0) at ../softmmu/dma-helpers.c:127
+> #7  0x00005595ad12227d in blk_aio_complete (acb=0x7f6460005b10)
+>     at ../block/block-backend.c:1527
+> #8  blk_aio_complete (acb=0x7f6460005b10) at ../block/block-backend.c:1524
+> #9  blk_aio_write_entry (opaque=0x7f6460005b10) at ../block/block-backend.c:1594
+> #10 0x00005595ad258cfb in coroutine_trampoline (i0=<optimized out>,
+>     i1=<optimized out>) at ../util/coroutine-ucontext.c:177
+
+Signed-off-by: Fiona Ebner <f.ebner@proxmox.com>
+Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org>
+Tested-by: simon.rowe@nutanix.com
+Message-ID: <20230906130922.142845-1-f.ebner@proxmox.com>
+Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/7d7512019fc40c577e2bdd61f114f31a9eb84a8e]
+CVE: CVE-2023-5088
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ hw/ide/core.c | 14 +++++++-------
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/ide/core.c b/hw/ide/core.c
+index b5e0dcd29b2..63ba665f3d2 100644
+--- a/hw/ide/core.c
++++ b/hw/ide/core.c
+@@ -2515,19 +2515,19 @@ static void ide_dummy_transfer_stop(IDEState *s)
+ 
+ void ide_bus_reset(IDEBus *bus)
+ {
+-    bus->unit = 0;
+-    bus->cmd = 0;
+-    ide_reset(&bus->ifs[0]);
+-    ide_reset(&bus->ifs[1]);
+-    ide_clear_hob(bus);
+-
+-    /* pending async DMA */
++    /* pending async DMA - needs the IDEState before it is reset */
+     if (bus->dma->aiocb) {
+         trace_ide_bus_reset_aio();
+         blk_aio_cancel(bus->dma->aiocb);
+         bus->dma->aiocb = NULL;
+     }
+ 
++    bus->unit = 0;
++    bus->cmd = 0;
++    ide_reset(&bus->ifs[0]);
++    ide_reset(&bus->ifs[1]);
++    ide_clear_hob(bus);
++
+     /* reset dma provider too */
+     if (bus->dma->ops->reset) {
+         bus->dma->ops->reset(bus->dma);
+-- 
+GitLab
+

meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/0001-Fix-relative-when-copying-an-absolute-path.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+From fabef23bea6e9963c06e218586fda1a823e3c6bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Wayne Davison <wayne@opencoder.net>
+Date: Mon, 8 Aug 2022 21:30:21 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix --relative when copying an absolute path.
+
+CVE: CVE-2022-29154
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/WayneD/rsync/commit/fabef23bea6e9963c06e218586fda1a823e3c6bf]
+Signed-off-by: Matthias Schmitz <matthias.schmitz@port4949.net>
+---
+ exclude.c | 4 +++-
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/exclude.c b/exclude.c
+index 2394023f..ba5ca5a3 100644
+--- a/exclude.c
++++ b/exclude.c
+@@ -434,8 +434,10 @@ void add_implied_include(const char *arg)
+ 				*p++ = *cp++;
+ 				break;
+ 			  case '/':
+-				if (p[-1] == '/') /* This is safe because of the initial slash. */
++				if (p[-1] == '/') { /* This is safe because of the initial slash. */
++					cp++;
+ 					break;
++				}
+ 				if (relative_paths) {
+ 					filter_rule const *ent;
+ 					int found = 0;
+-- 
+2.39.2
+

meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.1.3.bb

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.samba.org/pub/${BPN}/src/${BP}.tar.gz \
            file://CVE-2016-9842.patch \
            file://CVE-2016-9843.patch \
            file://CVE-2022-29154.patch \
+           file://0001-Fix-relative-when-copying-an-absolute-path.patch \
 "
 
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "1581a588fde9d89f6bc6201e8129afaf"

meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript/CVE-2020-36773.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+From 8c7bd787defa071c96289b7da9397f673fddb874 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ken Sharp <ken.sharp@artifex.com>
+Date: Wed, 20 May 2020 16:02:07 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] txtwrite - address memory problems
+
+Bug #702229 " txtwrite: use after free in 9.51 on some files (regression from 9.50)"
+Also bug #702346 and the earlier report #701877.
+
+The problems occur because its possible for a single character code in
+a PDF file to map to more than a single Unicode code point. In the case
+of the file for 701877 the character code maps to 'f' and 'i' (it is an
+fi ligature).
+
+The code should deal with this, but we need to ensure we are using the
+correct index. In addition, if we do get more Unicode code points than
+we expected, we need to set the widths of the 'extra' code points to
+zero (we only want to consider the width of the original character).
+
+This does mean increasing the size of the Widths array to cater for
+the possibility of more entries on output than there were on input.
+
+While working on it I noticed that the Unicode remapping on little-
+endian machines was reversing the order of the Unicode values, when
+there was more than a single code point returned, so fixed that at
+the same time.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;h=8c7bd787defa071c96289b7da9397f673fddb874]
+CVE: CVE-2020-36773
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ devices/vector/gdevtxtw.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++----------
+ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/devices/vector/gdevtxtw.c b/devices/vector/gdevtxtw.c
+index 87f9355..bddce5a 100644
+--- a/devices/vector/gdevtxtw.c
++++ b/devices/vector/gdevtxtw.c
+@@ -1812,11 +1812,11 @@ static int get_unicode(textw_text_enum_t *penum, gs_font *font, gs_glyph glyph,
+ #else
+         b = (char *)Buffer;
+         u = (char *)unicode;
+-        while (l >= 0) {
+-            *b++ = *(u + l);
+-            l--;
+-        }
+ 
++	for (l=0;l<length;l+=2, u+=2){
++	    *b++ = *(u+1);
++	    *b++ = *u;
++	}
+ #endif
+         gs_free_object(penum->dev->memory, unicode, "free temporary unicode buffer");
+         return length / sizeof(short);
+@@ -1963,7 +1963,7 @@ txtwrite_process_plain_text(gs_text_enum_t *pte)
+                           &penum->text_state->matrix, &wanted);
+         pte->returned.total_width.x += wanted.x;
+         pte->returned.total_width.y += wanted.y;
+-        penum->Widths[pte->index - 1] = wanted.x;
++        penum->Widths[penum->TextBufferIndex] = wanted.x;
+ 
+         if (pte->text.operation & TEXT_ADD_TO_ALL_WIDTHS) {
+             gs_point tpt;
+@@ -1984,8 +1984,14 @@ txtwrite_process_plain_text(gs_text_enum_t *pte)
+         pte->returned.total_width.x += dpt.x;
+         pte->returned.total_width.y += dpt.y;
+ 
+-        penum->TextBufferIndex += get_unicode(penum, (gs_font *)pte->orig_font, glyph, ch, &penum->TextBuffer[penum->TextBufferIndex]);
+-        penum->Widths[pte->index - 1] += dpt.x;
++	penum->Widths[penum->TextBufferIndex] += dpt.x;
++	code = get_unicode(penum, (gs_font *)pte->orig_font, glyph, ch, &penum->TextBuffer[penum->TextBufferIndex]);
++	/* If a single text code returned multiple Unicode values, then we need to set the
++	 * 'extra' code points' widths to 0.
++	 */
++	if (code > 1)
++	    memset(&penum->Widths[penum->TextBufferIndex + 1], 0x00, (code - 1) * sizeof(float));
++	penum->TextBufferIndex += code;
+     }
+     return 0;
+ }
+@@ -2123,7 +2129,7 @@ txt_add_fragment(gx_device_txtwrite_t *tdev, textw_text_enum_t *penum)
+     if (!penum->text_state->Widths)
+         return gs_note_error(gs_error_VMerror);
+     memset(penum->text_state->Widths, 0x00, penum->TextBufferIndex * sizeof(float));
+-    memcpy(penum->text_state->Widths, penum->Widths, penum->text.size * sizeof(float));
++    memcpy(penum->text_state->Widths, penum->Widths, penum->TextBufferIndex * sizeof(float));
+ 
+     unsorted_entry->Unicode_Text = (unsigned short *)gs_malloc(tdev->memory->stable_memory,
+         penum->TextBufferIndex, sizeof(unsigned short), "txtwrite alloc sorted text buffer");
+@@ -2136,7 +2142,7 @@ txt_add_fragment(gx_device_txtwrite_t *tdev, textw_text_enum_t *penum)
+     if (!unsorted_entry->Widths)
+         return gs_note_error(gs_error_VMerror);
+     memset(unsorted_entry->Widths, 0x00, penum->TextBufferIndex * sizeof(float));
+-    memcpy(unsorted_entry->Widths, penum->Widths, penum->text.size * sizeof(float));
++    memcpy(unsorted_entry->Widths, penum->Widths, penum->TextBufferIndex * sizeof(float));
+ 
+     unsorted_entry->FontName = (char *)gs_malloc(tdev->memory->stable_memory,
+         (strlen(penum->text_state->FontName) + 1), sizeof(unsigned char), "txtwrite alloc sorted text buffer");
+@@ -2192,7 +2198,7 @@ textw_text_process(gs_text_enum_t *pte)
+         if (!penum->TextBuffer)
+             return gs_note_error(gs_error_VMerror);
+         penum->Widths = (float *)gs_malloc(tdev->memory->stable_memory,
+-            pte->text.size, sizeof(float), "txtwrite temporary widths array");
++            pte->text.size * 4, sizeof(float), "txtwrite temporary widths array");
+         if (!penum->Widths)
+             return gs_note_error(gs_error_VMerror);
+     }
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript_9.52.bb

@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ SRC_URI_BASE = "https://github.com/ArtifexSoftware/ghostpdl-downloads/releases/d
                 file://CVE-2023-36664-1.patch \
                 file://CVE-2023-36664-2.patch \
                 file://CVE-2023-43115.patch \
+                file://CVE-2020-36773.patch \
 "
 
 SRC_URI = "${SRC_URI_BASE} \

meta/recipes-extended/less/less/CVE-2022-48624.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+From c6ac6de49698be84d264a0c4c0c40bb870b10144 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mark Nudelman <markn@greenwoodsoftware.com>
+Date: Sat, 25 Jun 2022 11:54:43 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] Shell-quote filenames when invoking LESSCLOSE.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/gwsw/less/commit/c6ac6de49698be84d264a0c4c0c40bb870b10144]
+CVE: CVE-2022-48624
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ filename.c | 10 ++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/filename.c b/filename.c
+index 5824e385..dff20c08 100644
+--- a/filename.c
++++ b/filename.c
+@@ -972,6 +972,8 @@ close_altfile(altfilename, filename)
+ {
+ #if HAVE_POPEN
+ 	char *lessclose;
++	char *qfilename;
++	char *qaltfilename;
+ 	FILE *fd;
+ 	char *cmd;
+ 	int len;
+@@ -986,9 +988,13 @@ close_altfile(altfilename, filename)
+ 		error("LESSCLOSE ignored; must contain no more than 2 %%s", NULL_PARG);
+ 		return;
+ 	}
+-	len = (int) (strlen(lessclose) + strlen(filename) + strlen(altfilename) + 2);
++	qfilename = shell_quote(filename);
++	qaltfilename = shell_quote(altfilename);
++	len = (int) (strlen(lessclose) + strlen(qfilename) + strlen(qaltfilename) + 2);
+ 	cmd = (char *) ecalloc(len, sizeof(char));
+-	SNPRINTF2(cmd, len, lessclose, filename, altfilename);
++	SNPRINTF2(cmd, len, lessclose, qfilename, qaltfilename);
++	free(qaltfilename);
++	free(qfilename);
+ 	fd = shellcmd(cmd);
+ 	free(cmd);
+ 	if (fd != NULL)

meta/recipes-extended/less/less_551.bb

@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=d32239bcb673463ab874e80d47fae504 \
 DEPENDS = "ncurses"
 
 SRC_URI = "http://www.greenwoodsoftware.com/${BPN}/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.gz \
+           file://CVE-2022-48624.patch \
 	  "
 
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "4ad4408b06d7a6626a055cb453f36819"

meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/CVE-2024-22365.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+From 031bb5a5d0d950253b68138b498dc93be69a64cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matthias Gerstner <matthias.gerstner@suse.de>
+Date: Wed, 27 Dec 2023 14:01:59 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] pam_namespace: protect_dir(): use O_DIRECTORY to prevent
+ local DoS situations
+
+Without O_DIRECTORY the path crawling logic is subject to e.g. FIFOs
+being placed in user controlled directories, causing the PAM module to
+block indefinitely during `openat()`.
+
+Pass O_DIRECTORY to cause the `openat()` to fail if the path does not
+refer to a directory.
+
+With this the check whether the final path element is a directory
+becomes unnecessary, drop it.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/linux-pam/linux-pam/commit/031bb5a5d0d950253b68138b498dc93be69a64cb]
+CVE: CVE-2024-22365
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c | 18 +-----------------
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 17 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c b/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c
+index 2528cff86..f72d67189 100644
+--- a/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c
++++ b/modules/pam_namespace/pam_namespace.c
+@@ -1201,7 +1201,7 @@ static int protect_dir(const char *path, mode_t mode, int do_mkdir,
+ 	int dfd = AT_FDCWD;
+ 	int dfd_next;
+ 	int save_errno;
+-	int flags = O_RDONLY;
++	int flags = O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY;
+ 	int rv = -1;
+ 	struct stat st;
+ 
+@@ -1255,22 +1255,6 @@ static int protect_dir(const char *path, mode_t mode, int do_mkdir,
+ 		rv = openat(dfd, dir, flags);
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if (rv != -1) {
+-		if (fstat(rv, &st) != 0) {
+-			save_errno = errno;
+-			close(rv);
+-			rv = -1;
+-			errno = save_errno;
+-			goto error;
+-		}
+-		if (!S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) {
+-			close(rv);
+-			errno = ENOTDIR;
+-			rv = -1;
+-			goto error;
+-		}
+-	}
+-
+ 	if (flags & O_NOFOLLOW) {
+ 		/* we are inside user-owned dir - protect */
+ 		if (protect_mount(rv, p, idata) == -1) {

meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam_1.3.1.bb

@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://github.com/linux-pam/linux-pam/releases/download/v${PV}/Linux
            file://pam-security-abstract-securetty-handling.patch \
            file://pam-unix-nullok-secure.patch \
            file://crypt_configure.patch \
+           file://CVE-2024-22365.patch \
           "
 
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "558ff53b0fc0563ca97f79e911822165"

meta/recipes-extended/timezone/timezone.inc

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ SECTION = "base"
 LICENSE = "PD & BSD-3-Clause"
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE;md5=c679c9d6b02bc2757b3eaf8f53c43fba"
 
-PV = "2023c"
+PV = "2024a"
 
 SRC_URI =" http://www.iana.org/time-zones/repository/releases/tzcode${PV}.tar.gz;name=tzcode \
            http://www.iana.org/time-zones/repository/releases/tzdata${PV}.tar.gz;name=tzdata \
@@ -14,5 +14,5 @@ SRC_URI =" http://www.iana.org/time-zones/repository/releases/tzcode${PV}.tar.gz
 
 UPSTREAM_CHECK_URI = "http://www.iana.org/time-zones"
 
-SRC_URI[tzcode.sha256sum] = "46d17f2bb19ad73290f03a203006152e0fa0d7b11e5b71467c4a823811b214e7"
-SRC_URI[tzdata.sha256sum] = "3f510b5d1b4ae9bb38e485aa302a776b317fb3637bdb6404c4adf7b6cadd965c"
+SRC_URI[tzcode.sha256sum] = "80072894adff5a458f1d143e16e4ca1d8b2a122c9c5399da482cb68cba6a1ff8"
+SRC_URI[tzdata.sha256sum] = "0d0434459acbd2059a7a8da1f3304a84a86591f6ed69c6248fffa502b6edffe3"

meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2023-6377.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+From 0c1a93d319558fe3ab2d94f51d174b4f93810afd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Date: Tue, 28 Nov 2023 15:19:04 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] Xi: allocate enough XkbActions for our buttons
+
+button->xkb_acts is supposed to be an array sufficiently large for all
+our buttons, not just a single XkbActions struct. Allocating
+insufficient memory here means when we memcpy() later in
+XkbSetDeviceInfo we write into memory that wasn't ours to begin with,
+leading to the usual security ooopsiedaisies.
+
+CVE-2023-6377, ZDI-CAN-22412, ZDI-CAN-22413
+
+This vulnerability was discovered by:
+Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/commit/0c1a93d319558fe3ab2d94f51d174b4f93810afd]
+CVE: CVE-2023-6377
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ Xi/exevents.c | 12 ++++++------
+ dix/devices.c | 10 ++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/Xi/exevents.c b/Xi/exevents.c
+index dcd4efb3bc..54ea11a938 100644
+--- a/Xi/exevents.c
++++ b/Xi/exevents.c
+@@ -611,13 +611,13 @@ DeepCopyPointerClasses(DeviceIntPtr from, DeviceIntPtr to)
+         }
+ 
+         if (from->button->xkb_acts) {
+-            if (!to->button->xkb_acts) {
+-                to->button->xkb_acts = calloc(1, sizeof(XkbAction));
+-                if (!to->button->xkb_acts)
+-                    FatalError("[Xi] not enough memory for xkb_acts.\n");
+-            }
++            size_t maxbuttons = max(to->button->numButtons, from->button->numButtons);
++            to->button->xkb_acts = xnfreallocarray(to->button->xkb_acts,
++                                                   maxbuttons,
++                                                   sizeof(XkbAction));
++            memset(to->button->xkb_acts, 0, maxbuttons * sizeof(XkbAction));
+             memcpy(to->button->xkb_acts, from->button->xkb_acts,
+-                   sizeof(XkbAction));
++                   from->button->numButtons * sizeof(XkbAction));
+         }
+         else {
+             free(to->button->xkb_acts);
+diff --git a/dix/devices.c b/dix/devices.c
+index b063128df0..3f3224d626 100644
+--- a/dix/devices.c
++++ b/dix/devices.c
+@@ -2539,6 +2539,8 @@ RecalculateMasterButtons(DeviceIntPtr slave)
+ 
+     if (master->button && master->button->numButtons != maxbuttons) {
+         int i;
++        int last_num_buttons = master->button->numButtons;
++
+         DeviceChangedEvent event = {
+             .header = ET_Internal,
+             .type = ET_DeviceChanged,
+@@ -2549,6 +2551,14 @@ RecalculateMasterButtons(DeviceIntPtr slave)
+         };
+ 
+         master->button->numButtons = maxbuttons;
++        if (last_num_buttons < maxbuttons) {
++            master->button->xkb_acts = xnfreallocarray(master->button->xkb_acts,
++                                                       maxbuttons,
++                                                       sizeof(XkbAction));
++            memset(&master->button->xkb_acts[last_num_buttons],
++                   0,
++                   (maxbuttons - last_num_buttons) * sizeof(XkbAction));
++        }
+ 
+         memcpy(&event.buttons.names, master->button->labels, maxbuttons *
+                sizeof(Atom));
+-- 
+GitLab
+

meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2023-6478.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+From 14f480010a93ff962fef66a16412fafff81ad632 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Date: Mon, 27 Nov 2023 16:27:49 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] randr: avoid integer truncation in length check of
+ ProcRRChange*Property
+
+Affected are ProcRRChangeProviderProperty and ProcRRChangeOutputProperty.
+See also xserver@8f454b79 where this same bug was fixed for the core
+protocol and XI.
+
+This fixes an OOB read and the resulting information disclosure.
+
+Length calculation for the request was clipped to a 32-bit integer. With
+the correct stuff->nUnits value the expected request size was
+truncated, passing the REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE check.
+
+The server then proceeded with reading at least stuff->num_items bytes
+(depending on stuff->format) from the request and stuffing whatever it
+finds into the property. In the process it would also allocate at least
+stuff->nUnits bytes, i.e. 4GB.
+
+CVE-2023-6478, ZDI-CAN-22561
+
+This vulnerability was discovered by:
+Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/commit/14f480010a93ff962fef66a16412fafff81ad632]
+CVE: CVE-2023-6478
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ randr/rrproperty.c         | 2 +-
+ randr/rrproviderproperty.c | 2 +-
+ 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/randr/rrproperty.c b/randr/rrproperty.c
+index 25469f57b2..c4fef8a1f6 100644
+--- a/randr/rrproperty.c
++++ b/randr/rrproperty.c
+@@ -530,7 +530,7 @@ ProcRRChangeOutputProperty(ClientPtr client)
+     char format, mode;
+     unsigned long len;
+     int sizeInBytes;
+-    int totalSize;
++    uint64_t totalSize;
+     int err;
+ 
+     REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRRChangeOutputPropertyReq);
+diff --git a/randr/rrproviderproperty.c b/randr/rrproviderproperty.c
+index b79c17f9bf..90c5a9a933 100644
+--- a/randr/rrproviderproperty.c
++++ b/randr/rrproviderproperty.c
+@@ -498,7 +498,7 @@ ProcRRChangeProviderProperty(ClientPtr client)
+     char format, mode;
+     unsigned long len;
+     int sizeInBytes;
+-    int totalSize;
++    uint64_t totalSize;
+     int err;
+ 
+     REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRRChangeProviderPropertyReq);
+-- 
+GitLab
+

meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2023-6816.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+From 9e2ecb2af8302dedc49cb6a63ebe063c58a9e7e3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Date: Thu, 14 Dec 2023 11:29:49 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] dix: allocate enough space for logical button maps
+
+Both DeviceFocusEvent and the XIQueryPointer reply contain a bit for
+each logical button currently down. Since buttons can be arbitrarily mapped
+to anything up to 255 make sure we have enough bits for the maximum mapping.
+
+CVE-2023-6816, ZDI-CAN-22664, ZDI-CAN-22665
+
+This vulnerability was discovered by:
+Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/commit/9e2ecb2af8302dedc49cb6a63ebe063c58a9e7e3]
+CVE: CVE-2023-6816
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ Xi/xiquerypointer.c | 3 +--
+ dix/enterleave.c    | 5 +++--
+ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/Xi/xiquerypointer.c b/Xi/xiquerypointer.c
+index 5b77b1a444..2b05ac5f39 100644
+--- a/Xi/xiquerypointer.c
++++ b/Xi/xiquerypointer.c
+@@ -149,8 +149,7 @@ ProcXIQueryPointer(ClientPtr client)
+     if (pDev->button) {
+         int i;
+ 
+-        rep.buttons_len =
+-            bytes_to_int32(bits_to_bytes(pDev->button->numButtons));
++        rep.buttons_len = bytes_to_int32(bits_to_bytes(256)); /* button map up to 255 */
+         rep.length += rep.buttons_len;
+         buttons = calloc(rep.buttons_len, 4);
+         if (!buttons)
+diff --git a/dix/enterleave.c b/dix/enterleave.c
+index 867ec74363..ded8679d76 100644
+--- a/dix/enterleave.c
++++ b/dix/enterleave.c
+@@ -784,8 +784,9 @@ DeviceFocusEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, int type, int mode, int detail,
+ 
+     mouse = IsFloating(dev) ? dev : GetMaster(dev, MASTER_POINTER);
+ 
+-    /* XI 2 event */
+-    btlen = (mouse->button) ? bits_to_bytes(mouse->button->numButtons) : 0;
++    /* XI 2 event contains the logical button map - maps are CARD8
++     * so we need 256 bits for the possibly maximum mapping */
++    btlen = (mouse->button) ? bits_to_bytes(256) : 0;
+     btlen = bytes_to_int32(btlen);
+     len = sizeof(xXIFocusInEvent) + btlen * 4;
+ 
+-- 
+GitLab
+

meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2024-0229-1.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+From ece23be888a93b741aa1209d1dbf64636109d6a5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2023 14:27:50 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] dix: Allocate sufficient xEvents for our DeviceStateNotify
+
+If a device has both a button class and a key class and numButtons is
+zero, we can get an OOB write due to event under-allocation.
+
+This function seems to assume a device has either keys or buttons, not
+both. It has two virtually identical code paths, both of which assume
+they're applying to the first event in the sequence.
+
+A device with both a key and button class triggered a logic bug - only
+one xEvent was allocated but the deviceStateNotify pointer was pushed on
+once per type. So effectively this logic code:
+
+   int count = 1;
+   if (button && nbuttons > 32) count++;
+   if (key && nbuttons > 0) count++;
+   if (key && nkeys > 32) count++; // this is basically always true
+   // count is at 2 for our keys + zero button device
+
+   ev = alloc(count * sizeof(xEvent));
+   FixDeviceStateNotify(ev);
+   if (button)
+     FixDeviceStateNotify(ev++);
+   if (key)
+     FixDeviceStateNotify(ev++);   // santa drops into the wrong chimney here
+
+If the device has more than 3 valuators, the OOB is pushed back - we're
+off by one so it will happen when the last deviceValuator event is
+written instead.
+
+Fix this by allocating the maximum number of events we may allocate.
+Note that the current behavior is not protocol-correct anyway, this
+patch fixes only the allocation issue.
+
+Note that this issue does not trigger if the device has at least one
+button. While the server does not prevent a button class with zero
+buttons, it is very unlikely.
+
+CVE-2024-0229, ZDI-CAN-22678
+
+This vulnerability was discovered by:
+Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/commit/ece23be888a93b741aa1209d1dbf64636109d6a5]
+CVE: CVE-2024-0229
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ dix/enterleave.c | 6 +++---
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/dix/enterleave.c b/dix/enterleave.c
+index ded8679d76..17964b00a4 100644
+--- a/dix/enterleave.c
++++ b/dix/enterleave.c
+@@ -675,7 +675,8 @@ static void
+ DeliverStateNotifyEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win)
+ {
+     int evcount = 1;
+-    deviceStateNotify *ev, *sev;
++    deviceStateNotify sev[6 + (MAX_VALUATORS + 2)/3];
++    deviceStateNotify *ev;
+     deviceKeyStateNotify *kev;
+     deviceButtonStateNotify *bev;
+ 
+@@ -714,7 +715,7 @@ DeliverStateNotifyEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win)
+         }
+     }
+ 
+-    sev = ev = xallocarray(evcount, sizeof(xEvent));
++    ev = sev;
+     FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev, NULL, NULL, NULL, first);
+ 
+     if (b != NULL) {
+@@ -770,7 +771,6 @@ DeliverStateNotifyEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win)
+ 
+     DeliverEventsToWindow(dev, win, (xEvent *) sev, evcount,
+                           DeviceStateNotifyMask, NullGrab);
+-    free(sev);
+ }
+ 
+ void
+-- 
+GitLab
+

meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2024-0229-2.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,221 @@
+From 219c54b8a3337456ce5270ded6a67bcde53553d5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2023 12:26:20 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] dix: fix DeviceStateNotify event calculation
+
+The previous code only made sense if one considers buttons and keys to
+be mutually exclusive on a device. That is not necessarily true, causing
+a number of issues.
+
+This function allocates and fills in the number of xEvents we need to
+send the device state down the wire.  This is split across multiple
+32-byte devices including one deviceStateNotify event and optional
+deviceKeyStateNotify, deviceButtonStateNotify and (possibly multiple)
+deviceValuator events.
+
+The previous behavior would instead compose a sequence
+of [state, buttonstate, state, keystate, valuator...]. This is not
+protocol correct, and on top of that made the code extremely convoluted.
+
+Fix this by streamlining: add both button and key into the deviceStateNotify
+and then append the key state and button state, followed by the
+valuators. Finally, the deviceValuator events contain up to 6 valuators
+per event but we only ever sent through 3 at a time. Let's double that
+troughput.
+
+CVE-2024-0229, ZDI-CAN-22678
+
+This vulnerability was discovered by:
+Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/commit/219c54b8a3337456ce5270ded6a67bcde53553d5]
+CVE: CVE-2024-0229
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ dix/enterleave.c | 121 ++++++++++++++++++++---------------------------
+ 1 file changed, 52 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/dix/enterleave.c b/dix/enterleave.c
+index 17964b00a4..7b7ba1098b 100644
+--- a/dix/enterleave.c
++++ b/dix/enterleave.c
+@@ -615,9 +615,15 @@ FixDeviceValuator(DeviceIntPtr dev, deviceValuator * ev, ValuatorClassPtr v,
+ 
+     ev->type = DeviceValuator;
+     ev->deviceid = dev->id;
+-    ev->num_valuators = nval < 3 ? nval : 3;
++    ev->num_valuators = nval < 6 ? nval : 6;
+     ev->first_valuator = first;
+     switch (ev->num_valuators) {
++    case 6:
++        ev->valuator2 = v->axisVal[first + 5];
++    case 5:
++        ev->valuator2 = v->axisVal[first + 4];
++    case 4:
++        ev->valuator2 = v->axisVal[first + 3];
+     case 3:
+         ev->valuator2 = v->axisVal[first + 2];
+     case 2:
+@@ -626,7 +632,6 @@ FixDeviceValuator(DeviceIntPtr dev, deviceValuator * ev, ValuatorClassPtr v,
+         ev->valuator0 = v->axisVal[first];
+         break;
+     }
+-    first += ev->num_valuators;
+ }
+ 
+ static void
+@@ -646,7 +651,7 @@ FixDeviceStateNotify(DeviceIntPtr dev, deviceStateNotify * ev, KeyClassPtr k,
+         ev->num_buttons = b->numButtons;
+         memcpy((char *) ev->buttons, (char *) b->down, 4);
+     }
+-    else if (k) {
++    if (k) {
+         ev->classes_reported |= (1 << KeyClass);
+         ev->num_keys = k->xkbInfo->desc->max_key_code -
+             k->xkbInfo->desc->min_key_code;
+@@ -670,15 +675,26 @@ FixDeviceStateNotify(DeviceIntPtr dev, deviceStateNotify * ev, KeyClassPtr k,
+     }
+ }
+ 
+-
++/**
++ * The device state notify event is split across multiple 32-byte events.
++ * The first one contains the first 32 button state bits, the first 32
++ * key state bits, and the first 3 valuator values.
++ *
++ * If a device has more than that, the server sends out:
++ * - one deviceButtonStateNotify for buttons 32 and above
++ * - one deviceKeyStateNotify for keys 32 and above
++ * - one deviceValuator event per 6 valuators above valuator 4
++ *
++ * All events but the last one have the deviceid binary ORed with MORE_EVENTS,
++ */
+ static void
+ DeliverStateNotifyEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win)
+ {
++    /* deviceStateNotify, deviceKeyStateNotify, deviceButtonStateNotify
++     * and one deviceValuator for each 6 valuators */
++    deviceStateNotify sev[3 + (MAX_VALUATORS + 6)/6];
+     int evcount = 1;
+-    deviceStateNotify sev[6 + (MAX_VALUATORS + 2)/3];
+-    deviceStateNotify *ev;
+-    deviceKeyStateNotify *kev;
+-    deviceButtonStateNotify *bev;
++    deviceStateNotify *ev = sev;
+ 
+     KeyClassPtr k;
+     ButtonClassPtr b;
+@@ -691,82 +707,49 @@ DeliverStateNotifyEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win)
+ 
+     if ((b = dev->button) != NULL) {
+         nbuttons = b->numButtons;
+-        if (nbuttons > 32)
++        if (nbuttons > 32) /* first 32 are encoded in deviceStateNotify */
+             evcount++;
+     }
+     if ((k = dev->key) != NULL) {
+         nkeys = k->xkbInfo->desc->max_key_code - k->xkbInfo->desc->min_key_code;
+-        if (nkeys > 32)
++        if (nkeys > 32) /* first 32 are encoded in deviceStateNotify */
+             evcount++;
+-        if (nbuttons > 0) {
+-            evcount++;
+-        }
+     }
+     if ((v = dev->valuator) != NULL) {
+         nval = v->numAxes;
+-
+-        if (nval > 3)
+-            evcount++;
+-        if (nval > 6) {
+-            if (!(k && b))
+-                evcount++;
+-            if (nval > 9)
+-                evcount += ((nval - 7) / 3);
+-        }
++        /* first three are encoded in deviceStateNotify, then
++         * it's 6 per deviceValuator event */
++        evcount += ((nval - 3) + 6)/6;
+     }
+ 
+-    ev = sev;
+-    FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev, NULL, NULL, NULL, first);
+-
+-    if (b != NULL) {
+-        FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev++, NULL, b, v, first);
+-        first += 3;
+-        nval -= 3;
+-        if (nbuttons > 32) {
+-            (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS;
+-            bev = (deviceButtonStateNotify *) ev++;
+-            bev->type = DeviceButtonStateNotify;
+-            bev->deviceid = dev->id;
+-            memcpy((char *) &bev->buttons[4], (char *) &b->down[4],
+-                   DOWN_LENGTH - 4);
+-        }
+-        if (nval > 0) {
+-            (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS;
+-            FixDeviceValuator(dev, (deviceValuator *) ev++, v, first);
+-            first += 3;
+-            nval -= 3;
+-        }
++    BUG_RETURN(evcount <= ARRAY_SIZE(sev));
++
++    FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev, k, b, v, first);
++
++    if (b != NULL && nbuttons > 32) {
++        deviceButtonStateNotify *bev = (deviceButtonStateNotify *) ++ev;
++        (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS;
++        bev->type = DeviceButtonStateNotify;
++        bev->deviceid = dev->id;
++        memcpy((char *) &bev->buttons[4], (char *) &b->down[4],
++               DOWN_LENGTH - 4);
+     }
+ 
+-    if (k != NULL) {
+-        FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev++, k, NULL, v, first);
+-        first += 3;
+-        nval -= 3;
+-        if (nkeys > 32) {
+-            (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS;
+-            kev = (deviceKeyStateNotify *) ev++;
+-            kev->type = DeviceKeyStateNotify;
+-            kev->deviceid = dev->id;
+-            memmove((char *) &kev->keys[0], (char *) &k->down[4], 28);
+-        }
+-        if (nval > 0) {
+-            (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS;
+-            FixDeviceValuator(dev, (deviceValuator *) ev++, v, first);
+-            first += 3;
+-            nval -= 3;
+-        }
++    if (k != NULL && nkeys > 32) {
++        deviceKeyStateNotify *kev = (deviceKeyStateNotify *) ++ev;
++        (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS;
++        kev->type = DeviceKeyStateNotify;
++        kev->deviceid = dev->id;
++        memmove((char *) &kev->keys[0], (char *) &k->down[4], 28);
+     }
+ 
++    first = 3;
++    nval -= 3;
+     while (nval > 0) {
+-        FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev++, NULL, NULL, v, first);
+-        first += 3;
+-        nval -= 3;
+-        if (nval > 0) {
+-            (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS;
+-            FixDeviceValuator(dev, (deviceValuator *) ev++, v, first);
+-            first += 3;
+-            nval -= 3;
+-        }
++        ev->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS;
++        FixDeviceValuator(dev, (deviceValuator *) ++ev, v, first);
++        first += 6;
++        nval -= 6;
+     }
+ 
+     DeliverEventsToWindow(dev, win, (xEvent *) sev, evcount,
+-- 
+GitLab
+

meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2024-0229-3.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+From df3c65706eb169d5938df0052059f3e0d5981b74 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Date: Thu, 21 Dec 2023 13:48:10 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] Xi: when creating a new ButtonClass, set the number of
+ buttons
+
+There's a racy sequence where a master device may copy the button class
+from the slave, without ever initializing numButtons. This leads to a
+device with zero buttons but a button class which is invalid.
+
+Let's copy the numButtons value from the source - by definition if we
+don't have a button class yet we do not have any other slave devices
+with more than this number of buttons anyway.
+
+CVE-2024-0229, ZDI-CAN-22678
+
+This vulnerability was discovered by:
+Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/commit/df3c65706eb169d5938df0052059f3e0d5981b74]
+CVE: CVE-2024-0229
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ Xi/exevents.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/Xi/exevents.c b/Xi/exevents.c
+index 54ea11a938..e161714682 100644
+--- a/Xi/exevents.c
++++ b/Xi/exevents.c
+@@ -605,6 +605,7 @@ DeepCopyPointerClasses(DeviceIntPtr from, DeviceIntPtr to)
+                 to->button = calloc(1, sizeof(ButtonClassRec));
+                 if (!to->button)
+                     FatalError("[Xi] no memory for class shift.\n");
++                to->button->numButtons = from->button->numButtons;
+             }
+             else
+                 classes->button = NULL;
+-- 
+GitLab
+

meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2024-0229-4.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+From 37539cb0bfe4ed96d4499bf371e6b1a474a740fe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Date: Thu, 21 Dec 2023 14:10:11 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] Xi: require a pointer and keyboard device for
+ XIAttachToMaster
+
+If we remove a master device and specify which other master devices
+attached slaves should be returned to, enforce that those two are
+indeeed a pointer and a keyboard.
+
+Otherwise we can try to attach the keyboards to pointers and vice versa,
+leading to possible crashes later.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/commit/37539cb0bfe4ed96d4499bf371e6b1a474a740fe]
+CVE: CVE-2024-0229
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ Xi/xichangehierarchy.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c b/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c
+index 504defe566..d2d985848d 100644
+--- a/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c
++++ b/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c
+@@ -270,7 +270,7 @@ remove_master(ClientPtr client, xXIRemoveMasterInfo * r, int flags[MAXDEVICES])
+         if (rc != Success)
+             goto unwind;
+ 
+-        if (!IsMaster(newptr)) {
++        if (!IsMaster(newptr) || !IsPointerDevice(newptr)) {
+             client->errorValue = r->return_pointer;
+             rc = BadDevice;
+             goto unwind;
+@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ remove_master(ClientPtr client, xXIRemoveMasterInfo * r, int flags[MAXDEVICES])
+         if (rc != Success)
+             goto unwind;
+ 
+-        if (!IsMaster(newkeybd)) {
++        if (!IsMaster(newkeybd) || !IsKeyboardDevice(newkeybd)) {
+             client->errorValue = r->return_keyboard;
+             rc = BadDevice;
+             goto unwind;
+-- 
+GitLab
+

meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2024-0408.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+From e5e8586a12a3ec915673edffa10dc8fe5e15dac3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 6 Dec 2023 12:09:41 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] glx: Call XACE hooks on the GLX buffer
+
+The XSELINUX code will label resources at creation by checking the
+access mode. When the access mode is DixCreateAccess, it will call the
+function to label the new resource SELinuxLabelResource().
+
+However, GLX buffers do not go through the XACE hooks when created,
+hence leaving the resource actually unlabeled.
+
+When, later, the client tries to create another resource using that
+drawable (like a GC for example), the XSELINUX code would try to use
+the security ID of that object which has never been labeled, get a NULL
+pointer and crash when checking whether the requested permissions are
+granted for subject security ID.
+
+To avoid the issue, make sure to call the XACE hooks when creating the
+GLX buffers.
+
+Credit goes to Donn Seeley <donn@xmission.com> for providing the patch.
+
+CVE-2024-0408
+
+Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
+Acked-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/commit/e5e8586a12a3ec915673edffa10dc8fe5e15dac3]
+CVE: CVE-2024-0408
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ glx/glxcmds.c | 8 ++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/glx/glxcmds.c b/glx/glxcmds.c
+index fc26a2e345..1e46d0c723 100644
+--- a/glx/glxcmds.c
++++ b/glx/glxcmds.c
+@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@
+ #include "indirect_util.h"
+ #include "protocol-versions.h"
+ #include "glxvndabi.h"
++#include "xace.h"
+ 
+ static char GLXServerVendorName[] = "SGI";
+ 
+@@ -1392,6 +1393,13 @@ DoCreatePbuffer(ClientPtr client, int screenNum, XID fbconfigId,
+     if (!pPixmap)
+         return BadAlloc;
+ 
++    err = XaceHook(XACE_RESOURCE_ACCESS, client, glxDrawableId, RT_PIXMAP,
++                   pPixmap, RT_NONE, NULL, DixCreateAccess);
++    if (err != Success) {
++        (*pGlxScreen->pScreen->DestroyPixmap) (pPixmap);
++        return err;
++    }
++
+     /* Assign the pixmap the same id as the pbuffer and add it as a
+      * resource so it and the DRI2 drawable will be reclaimed when the
+      * pbuffer is destroyed. */
+-- 
+GitLab
+

meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2024-0409.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+From 2ef0f1116c65d5cb06d7b6d83f8a1aea702c94f7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 6 Dec 2023 11:51:56 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] ephyr,xwayland: Use the proper private key for cursor
+
+The cursor in DIX is actually split in two parts, the cursor itself and
+the cursor bits, each with their own devPrivates.
+
+The cursor itself includes the cursor bits, meaning that the cursor bits
+devPrivates in within structure of the cursor.
+
+Both Xephyr and Xwayland were using the private key for the cursor bits
+to store the data for the cursor, and when using XSELINUX which comes
+with its own special devPrivates, the data stored in that cursor bits'
+devPrivates would interfere with the XSELINUX devPrivates data and the
+SELINUX security ID would point to some other unrelated data, causing a
+crash in the XSELINUX code when trying to (re)use the security ID.
+
+CVE-2024-0409
+
+Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/commit/2ef0f1116c65d5cb06d7b6d83f8a1aea702c94f7]
+CVE: CVE-2024-0409
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ hw/kdrive/ephyr/ephyrcursor.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/kdrive/ephyr/ephyrcursor.c b/hw/kdrive/ephyr/ephyrcursor.c
+index f991899..3f192d0 100644
+--- a/hw/kdrive/ephyr/ephyrcursor.c
++++ b/hw/kdrive/ephyr/ephyrcursor.c
+@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ miPointerSpriteFuncRec EphyrPointerSpriteFuncs = {
+ Bool
+ ephyrCursorInit(ScreenPtr screen)
+ {
+-    if (!dixRegisterPrivateKey(&ephyrCursorPrivateKey, PRIVATE_CURSOR_BITS,
++    if (!dixRegisterPrivateKey(&ephyrCursorPrivateKey, PRIVATE_CURSOR,
+                                sizeof(ephyrCursorRec)))
+         return FALSE;
+ 
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2024-21885.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+From 4a5e9b1895627d40d26045bd0b7ef3dce503cbd1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Date: Thu, 4 Jan 2024 10:01:24 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] Xi: flush hierarchy events after adding/removing master
+ devices
+
+The `XISendDeviceHierarchyEvent()` function allocates space to store up
+to `MAXDEVICES` (256) `xXIHierarchyInfo` structures in `info`.
+
+If a device with a given ID was removed and a new device with the same
+ID added both in the same operation, the single device ID will lead to
+two info structures being written to `info`.
+
+Since this case can occur for every device ID at once, a total of two
+times `MAXDEVICES` info structures might be written to the allocation.
+
+To avoid it, once one add/remove master is processed, send out the
+device hierarchy event for the current state and continue. That event
+thus only ever has exactly one of either added/removed in it (and
+optionally slave attached/detached).
+
+CVE-2024-21885, ZDI-CAN-22744
+
+This vulnerability was discovered by:
+Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/commit/4a5e9b1895627d40d26045bd0b7ef3dce503cbd1]
+CVE: CVE-2024-21885
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ Xi/xichangehierarchy.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c b/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c
+index d2d985848d..72d00451e3 100644
+--- a/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c
++++ b/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c
+@@ -416,6 +416,11 @@ ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client)
+     size_t len;			/* length of data remaining in request */
+     int rc = Success;
+     int flags[MAXDEVICES] = { 0 };
++    enum {
++        NO_CHANGE,
++        FLUSH,
++        CHANGED,
++    } changes = NO_CHANGE;
+ 
+     REQUEST(xXIChangeHierarchyReq);
+     REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xXIChangeHierarchyReq);
+@@ -465,8 +470,9 @@ ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client)
+             rc = add_master(client, c, flags);
+             if (rc != Success)
+                 goto unwind;
+-        }
++            changes = FLUSH;
+             break;
++        }
+         case XIRemoveMaster:
+         {
+             xXIRemoveMasterInfo *r = (xXIRemoveMasterInfo *) any;
+@@ -475,8 +481,9 @@ ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client)
+             rc = remove_master(client, r, flags);
+             if (rc != Success)
+                 goto unwind;
+-        }
++            changes = FLUSH;
+             break;
++        }
+         case XIDetachSlave:
+         {
+             xXIDetachSlaveInfo *c = (xXIDetachSlaveInfo *) any;
+@@ -485,8 +492,9 @@ ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client)
+             rc = detach_slave(client, c, flags);
+             if (rc != Success)
+                 goto unwind;
+-        }
++            changes = CHANGED;
+             break;
++        }
+         case XIAttachSlave:
+         {
+             xXIAttachSlaveInfo *c = (xXIAttachSlaveInfo *) any;
+@@ -495,16 +503,25 @@ ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client)
+             rc = attach_slave(client, c, flags);
+             if (rc != Success)
+                 goto unwind;
++            changes = CHANGED;
++            break;
+         }
++        default:
+             break;
+         }
+ 
++        if (changes == FLUSH) {
++            XISendDeviceHierarchyEvent(flags);
++            memset(flags, 0, sizeof(flags));
++            changes = NO_CHANGE;
++        }
++
+         len -= any->length * 4;
+         any = (xXIAnyHierarchyChangeInfo *) ((char *) any + any->length * 4);
+     }
+ 
+  unwind:
+-
+-    XISendDeviceHierarchyEvent(flags);
++    if (changes != NO_CHANGE)
++        XISendDeviceHierarchyEvent(flags);
+     return rc;
+ }
+-- 
+GitLab
+

meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2024-21886-1.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+From bc1fdbe46559dd947674375946bbef54dd0ce36b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Jos=C3=A9=20Exp=C3=B3sito?= <jexposit@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 22 Dec 2023 18:28:31 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Xi: do not keep linked list pointer during recursion
+
+The `DisableDevice()` function is called whenever an enabled device
+is disabled and it moves the device from the `inputInfo.devices` linked
+list to the `inputInfo.off_devices` linked list.
+
+However, its link/unlink operation has an issue during the recursive
+call to `DisableDevice()` due to the `prev` pointer pointing to a
+removed device.
+
+This issue leads to a length mismatch between the total number of
+devices and the number of device in the list, leading to a heap
+overflow and, possibly, to local privilege escalation.
+
+Simplify the code that checked whether the device passed to
+`DisableDevice()` was in `inputInfo.devices` or not and find the
+previous device after the recursion.
+
+CVE-2024-21886, ZDI-CAN-22840
+
+This vulnerability was discovered by:
+Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/commit/bc1fdbe46559dd947674375946bbef54dd0ce36b]
+CVE: CVE-2024-21886
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ dix/devices.c | 15 ++++++++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/dix/devices.c b/dix/devices.c
+index dca98c8d1b..389d28a23c 100644
+--- a/dix/devices.c
++++ b/dix/devices.c
+@@ -453,14 +453,20 @@ DisableDevice(DeviceIntPtr dev, BOOL sendevent)
+ {
+     DeviceIntPtr *prev, other;
+     BOOL enabled;
++    BOOL dev_in_devices_list = FALSE;
+     int flags[MAXDEVICES] = { 0 };
+ 
+     if (!dev->enabled)
+         return TRUE;
+ 
+-    for (prev = &inputInfo.devices;
+-         *prev && (*prev != dev); prev = &(*prev)->next);
+-    if (*prev != dev)
++    for (other = inputInfo.devices; other; other = other->next) {
++        if (other == dev) {
++            dev_in_devices_list = TRUE;
++            break;
++        }
++    }
++
++    if (!dev_in_devices_list)
+         return FALSE;
+ 
+     TouchEndPhysicallyActiveTouches(dev);
+@@ -511,6 +517,9 @@ DisableDevice(DeviceIntPtr dev, BOOL sendevent)
+     LeaveWindow(dev);
+     SetFocusOut(dev);
+ 
++    for (prev = &inputInfo.devices;
++         *prev && (*prev != dev); prev = &(*prev)->next);
++
+     *prev = dev->next;
+     dev->next = inputInfo.off_devices;
+     inputInfo.off_devices = dev;
+-- 
+GitLab
+

meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2024-21886-2.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+From 26769aa71fcbe0a8403b7fb13b7c9010cc07c3a8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Date: Fri, 5 Jan 2024 09:40:27 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] dix: when disabling a master, float disabled slaved devices
+ too
+
+Disabling a master device floats all slave devices but we didn't do this
+to already-disabled slave devices. As a result those devices kept their
+reference to the master device resulting in access to already freed
+memory if the master device was removed before the corresponding slave
+device.
+
+And to match this behavior, also forcibly reset that pointer during
+CloseDownDevices().
+
+Related to CVE-2024-21886, ZDI-CAN-22840
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/commit/26769aa71fcbe0a8403b7fb13b7c9010cc07c3a8]
+CVE: CVE-2024-21886
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ dix/devices.c | 12 ++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/dix/devices.c b/dix/devices.c
+index 389d28a23c..84a6406d13 100644
+--- a/dix/devices.c
++++ b/dix/devices.c
+@@ -483,6 +483,13 @@ DisableDevice(DeviceIntPtr dev, BOOL sendevent)
+                 flags[other->id] |= XISlaveDetached;
+             }
+         }
++
++        for (other = inputInfo.off_devices; other; other = other->next) {
++            if (!IsMaster(other) && GetMaster(other, MASTER_ATTACHED) == dev) {
++                AttachDevice(NULL, other, NULL);
++                flags[other->id] |= XISlaveDetached;
++            }
++        }
+     }
+     else {
+         for (other = inputInfo.devices; other; other = other->next) {
+@@ -1088,6 +1095,11 @@ CloseDownDevices(void)
+             dev->master = NULL;
+     }
+ 
++    for (dev = inputInfo.off_devices; dev; dev = dev->next) {
++        if (!IsMaster(dev) && !IsFloating(dev))
++            dev->master = NULL;
++    }
++
+     CloseDeviceList(&inputInfo.devices);
+     CloseDeviceList(&inputInfo.off_devices);
+ 
+-- 
+GitLab
+

meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg_1.20.14.bb

@@ -18,6 +18,18 @@ SRC_URI += "file://0001-xf86pciBus.c-use-Intel-ddx-only-for-pre-gen4-hardwar.pat
            file://CVE-2023-1393.patch \
            file://CVE-2023-5367.patch \
            file://CVE-2023-5380.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-6377.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-6478.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-6816.patch \
+           file://CVE-2024-0229-1.patch \
+           file://CVE-2024-0229-2.patch \
+           file://CVE-2024-0229-3.patch \
+           file://CVE-2024-0229-4.patch \
+           file://CVE-2024-21885.patch \
+           file://CVE-2024-21886-1.patch \
+           file://CVE-2024-21886-2.patch \
+           file://CVE-2024-0408.patch \
+           file://CVE-2024-0409.patch \
 "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "453fc86aac8c629b3a5b77e8dcca30bf"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "54b199c9280ff8bf0f73a54a759645bd0eeeda7255d1c99310d5b7595f3ac066"

meta/recipes-kernel/linux-firmware/linux-firmware_20231030.bb

@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENCE.Abilis;md5=b5ee3f410780e56711ad48eadc22b8bc \
                     "
 # WHENCE checksum is defined separately to ease overriding it if
 # class-devupstream is selected.
-WHENCE_CHKSUM  = "41f9a48bf27971b126a36f9344594dcd"
+WHENCE_CHKSUM  = "ceb5248746d24d165b603e71b288cf75"
 
 # These are not common licenses, set NO_GENERIC_LICENSE for them
 # so that the license files will be copied from fetched source
@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ SRC_URI:class-devupstream = "git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/firmw
 # Pin this to the 20220509 release, override this in local.conf
 SRCREV:class-devupstream ?= "b19cbdca78ab2adfd210c91be15a22568e8b8cae"
 
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "88d46c543847ee3b03404d4941d91c92974690ee1f6fdcbee9cef3e5f97db688"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "c98d200fc4a3120de1a594713ce34e135819dff23e883a4ed387863ba25679c7"
 
 inherit allarch
 

meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion_5.4.inc

@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
 
 # Auto-generated CVE metadata, DO NOT EDIT BY HAND.
-# Generated at 2023-12-05 04:45:42.561193 for version 5.4.262
+# Generated at 2024-02-21 03:40:25.997343 for version 5.4.268
 
 python check_kernel_cve_status_version() {
-    this_version = "5.4.262"
+    this_version = "5.4.268"
     kernel_version = d.getVar("LINUX_VERSION")
     if kernel_version != this_version:
         bb.warn("Kernel CVE status needs updating: generated for %s but kernel is %s" % (this_version, kernel_version))
@@ -5281,6 +5281,12 @@ CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2021-3348"
 # cpe-stable-backport: Backported in 5.4.139
 CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2021-33624"
 
+# fixed-version: Fixed after version 5.4rc1
+CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2021-33630"
+
+# cpe-stable-backport: Backported in 5.4.240
+CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2021-33631"
+
 # cpe-stable-backport: Backported in 5.4.205
 CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2021-33655"
 
@@ -5810,7 +5816,8 @@ CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2022-1419"
 # cpe-stable-backport: Backported in 5.4.208
 CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2022-1462"
 
-# CVE-2022-1508 needs backporting (fixed from 5.15rc1)
+# fixed-version: only affects 5.11rc1 onwards
+CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2022-1508"
 
 # fixed-version: only affects 5.7rc5 onwards
 CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2022-1516"
@@ -6356,7 +6363,7 @@ CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2022-3635"
 # fixed-version: only affects 5.19 onwards
 CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2022-3640"
 
-# CVE-2022-36402 has no known resolution
+# CVE-2022-36402 needs backporting (fixed from 6.5)
 
 # CVE-2022-3642 has no known resolution
 
@@ -6585,6 +6592,9 @@ CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2022-48425"
 # fixed-version: only affects 5.15rc1 onwards
 CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2022-48502"
 
+# cpe-stable-backport: Backported in 5.4.196
+CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2022-48619"
+
 # fixed-version: Fixed after version 5.0rc1
 CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2023-0030"
 
@@ -6702,6 +6712,8 @@ CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2023-1382"
 # cpe-stable-backport: Backported in 5.4.92
 CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2023-1390"
 
+# CVE-2023-1476 has no known resolution
+
 # cpe-stable-backport: Backported in 5.4.232
 CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2023-1513"
 
@@ -6873,7 +6885,8 @@ CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2023-23559"
 # fixed-version: only affects 5.10rc1 onwards
 CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2023-23586"
 
-# CVE-2023-2430 needs backporting (fixed from 6.2rc5)
+# fixed-version: only affects 5.18rc1 onwards
+CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2023-2430"
 
 # cpe-stable-backport: Backported in 5.4.240
 CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2023-2483"
@@ -7303,7 +7316,8 @@ CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2023-45871"
 # fixed-version: only affects 6.5rc1 onwards
 CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2023-45898"
 
-# CVE-2023-4610 needs backporting (fixed from 6.4)
+# fixed-version: only affects 6.4rc1 onwards
+CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2023-4610"
 
 # fixed-version: only affects 6.4rc1 onwards
 CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2023-4611"
@@ -7313,32 +7327,62 @@ CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2023-4611"
 # cpe-stable-backport: Backported in 5.4.257
 CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2023-4623"
 
+# cpe-stable-backport: Backported in 5.4.259
+CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2023-46343"
+
 # fixed-version: only affects 5.10rc1 onwards
 CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2023-46813"
 
-# CVE-2023-46862 needs backporting (fixed from 6.6)
+# cpe-stable-backport: Backported in 5.4.268
+CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2023-46838"
+
+# fixed-version: only affects 5.10rc1 onwards
+CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2023-46862"
 
 # CVE-2023-47233 has no known resolution
 
-# CVE-2023-4732 needs backporting (fixed from 5.14rc1)
+# fixed-version: only affects 5.7rc1 onwards
+CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2023-4732"
 
 # CVE-2023-4881 needs backporting (fixed from 6.6rc1)
 
 # cpe-stable-backport: Backported in 5.4.257
 CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2023-4921"
 
+# CVE-2023-50431 needs backporting (fixed from 6.8rc1)
+
 # fixed-version: only affects 6.0rc1 onwards
 CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2023-5090"
 
+# cpe-stable-backport: Backported in 5.4.255
+CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2023-51042"
+
+# cpe-stable-backport: Backported in 5.4.251
+CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2023-51043"
+
 # fixed-version: only affects 5.13rc1 onwards
 CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2023-5158"
 
+# CVE-2023-51779 needs backporting (fixed from 6.7rc7)
+
 # cpe-stable-backport: Backported in 5.4.260
 CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2023-5178"
 
+# cpe-stable-backport: Backported in 5.4.265
+CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2023-51780"
+
+# cpe-stable-backport: Backported in 5.4.265
+CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2023-51781"
+
+# cpe-stable-backport: Backported in 5.4.265
+CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2023-51782"
+
 # fixed-version: only affects 5.9rc1 onwards
 CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2023-5197"
 
+# cpe-stable-backport: Backported in 5.4.267
+CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2023-52340"
+
 # fixed-version: only affects 6.1rc1 onwards
 CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2023-5345"
 
@@ -7348,17 +7392,150 @@ CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2023-5633"
 # cpe-stable-backport: Backported in 5.4.259
 CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2023-5717"
 
-# CVE-2023-5972 needs backporting (fixed from 6.6rc7)
+# fixed-version: only affects 6.2rc1 onwards
+CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2023-5972"
 
-# CVE-2023-6039 needs backporting (fixed from 6.5rc5)
+# fixed-version: only affects 5.15rc1 onwards
+CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2023-6039"
+
+# cpe-stable-backport: Backported in 5.4.267
+CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2023-6040"
 
 # fixed-version: only affects 6.6rc3 onwards
 CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2023-6111"
 
-# CVE-2023-6121 needs backporting (fixed from 6.7rc3)
+# cpe-stable-backport: Backported in 5.4.263
+CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2023-6121"
 
 # fixed-version: only affects 5.7rc7 onwards
 CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2023-6176"
 
+# fixed-version: only affects 6.6rc1 onwards
+CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2023-6200"
+
 # CVE-2023-6238 has no known resolution
 
+# CVE-2023-6240 has no known resolution
+
+# CVE-2023-6270 has no known resolution
+
+# CVE-2023-6356 has no known resolution
+
+# fixed-version: only affects 6.1rc1 onwards
+CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2023-6531"
+
+# CVE-2023-6535 has no known resolution
+
+# CVE-2023-6536 has no known resolution
+
+# CVE-2023-6546 needs backporting (fixed from 6.5rc7)
+
+# CVE-2023-6560 needs backporting (fixed from 6.7rc4)
+
+# cpe-stable-backport: Backported in 5.4.266
+CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2023-6606"
+
+# CVE-2023-6610 needs backporting (fixed from 6.7rc7)
+
+# fixed-version: only affects 5.11rc1 onwards
+CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2023-6622"
+
+# fixed-version: only affects 6.7rc1 onwards
+CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2023-6679"
+
+# fixed-version: only affects 5.6rc1 onwards
+CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2023-6817"
+
+# cpe-stable-backport: Backported in 5.4.268
+CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2023-6915"
+
+# cpe-stable-backport: Backported in 5.4.264
+CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2023-6931"
+
+# cpe-stable-backport: Backported in 5.4.263
+CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2023-6932"
+
+# CVE-2023-7042 has no known resolution
+
+# cpe-stable-backport: Backported in 5.4.235
+CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2023-7192"
+
+# fixed-version: only affects 6.5rc6 onwards
+CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2024-0193"
+
+# CVE-2024-0340 needs backporting (fixed from 6.4rc6)
+
+# fixed-version: only affects 6.2rc1 onwards
+CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2024-0443"
+
+# fixed-version: only affects 5.15rc1 onwards
+CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2024-0562"
+
+# CVE-2024-0564 has no known resolution
+
+# CVE-2024-0565 needs backporting (fixed from 6.7rc6)
+
+# fixed-version: only affects 6.4rc1 onwards
+CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2024-0582"
+
+# cpe-stable-backport: Backported in 5.4.263
+CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2024-0584"
+
+# CVE-2024-0607 needs backporting (fixed from 6.7rc2)
+
+# fixed-version: only affects 5.13rc1 onwards
+CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2024-0639"
+
+# fixed-version: only affects 5.5rc1 onwards
+CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2024-0641"
+
+# cpe-stable-backport: Backported in 5.4.267
+CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2024-0646"
+
+# cpe-stable-backport: Backported in 5.4.243
+CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2024-0775"
+
+# CVE-2024-0841 has no known resolution
+
+# fixed-version: only affects 5.13rc1 onwards
+CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2024-1085"
+
+# CVE-2024-1086 needs backporting (fixed from 6.8rc2)
+
+# CVE-2024-1312 needs backporting (fixed from 6.5rc4)
+
+# CVE-2024-21803 has no known resolution
+
+# CVE-2024-22099 has no known resolution
+
+# CVE-2024-22386 has no known resolution
+
+# fixed-version: only affects 5.15rc1 onwards
+CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2024-22705"
+
+# CVE-2024-23196 has no known resolution
+
+# CVE-2024-23307 has no known resolution
+
+# CVE-2024-23848 has no known resolution
+
+# CVE-2024-23849 needs backporting (fixed from 6.8rc2)
+
+# CVE-2024-23850 has no known resolution
+
+# CVE-2024-23851 has no known resolution
+
+# CVE-2024-24855 has no known resolution
+
+# CVE-2024-24857 has no known resolution
+
+# CVE-2024-24858 has no known resolution
+
+# CVE-2024-24859 has no known resolution
+
+# CVE-2024-24860 has no known resolution
+
+# CVE-2024-24861 has no known resolution
+
+# CVE-2024-24864 has no known resolution
+

meta/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto-rt_5.4.bb

@@ -11,13 +11,13 @@ python () {
         raise bb.parse.SkipRecipe("Set PREFERRED_PROVIDER_virtual/kernel to linux-yocto-rt to enable it")
 }
 
-SRCREV_machine ?= "43d5f7eb85acc21ec87ec45b2cae127dad8bf7a4"
-SRCREV_meta ?= "34f54c16ac6ef29441f95dd3b932729f01008999"
+SRCREV_machine ?= "1a529c784c773e07e2e7a743cf92d99d5f64b175"
+SRCREV_meta ?= "c841eec84cf56e6b837f12a359c35c5dfb26da5f"
 
 SRC_URI = "git://git.yoctoproject.org/linux-yocto.git;branch=${KBRANCH};name=machine \
            git://git.yoctoproject.org/yocto-kernel-cache;type=kmeta;name=meta;branch=yocto-5.4;destsuffix=${KMETA}"
 
-LINUX_VERSION ?= "5.4.262"
+LINUX_VERSION ?= "5.4.268"
 
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=bbea815ee2795b2f4230826c0c6b8814"
 

meta/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto-tiny_5.4.bb

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ KCONFIG_MODE = "--allnoconfig"
 
 require recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto.inc
 
-LINUX_VERSION ?= "5.4.262"
+LINUX_VERSION ?= "5.4.268"
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=bbea815ee2795b2f4230826c0c6b8814"
 
 DEPENDS += "${@bb.utils.contains('ARCH', 'x86', 'elfutils-native', '', d)}"
@@ -15,9 +15,9 @@ DEPENDS += "openssl-native util-linux-native"
 KMETA = "kernel-meta"
 KCONF_BSP_AUDIT_LEVEL = "2"
 
-SRCREV_machine_qemuarm ?= "7c33fa232f43e9059395bd30e23ef3c16359ba11"
-SRCREV_machine ?= "42abef1facd8bc8d1f51470493f08d87d0862f8e"
-SRCREV_meta ?= "34f54c16ac6ef29441f95dd3b932729f01008999"
+SRCREV_machine_qemuarm ?= "19870769466f545dbfacc448a212acb0dd1324a4"
+SRCREV_machine ?= "b0ebc762e3ecbc4f0338456767a5901fce805155"
+SRCREV_meta ?= "c841eec84cf56e6b837f12a359c35c5dfb26da5f"
 
 PV = "${LINUX_VERSION}+git${SRCPV}"
 

meta/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto_5.4.bb

@@ -13,16 +13,16 @@ KBRANCH_qemux86  ?= "v5.4/standard/base"
 KBRANCH_qemux86-64 ?= "v5.4/standard/base"
 KBRANCH_qemumips64 ?= "v5.4/standard/mti-malta64"
 
-SRCREV_machine_qemuarm ?= "76b8ef2c7ecb7cf484e0eff4d509ec57c310d06e"
-SRCREV_machine_qemuarm64 ?= "23b9912a979d98708f3adc8312af42eb9049c1d6"
-SRCREV_machine_qemumips ?= "2e266704c46066c80821a491ad6f42c930e00d5d"
-SRCREV_machine_qemuppc ?= "2343a888a77678d4440032d22327f753d1a90cdb"
-SRCREV_machine_qemuriscv64 ?= "dbf9e2bf8e764643b8ec4c236fbab73228413a33"
-SRCREV_machine_qemux86 ?= "dbf9e2bf8e764643b8ec4c236fbab73228413a33"
-SRCREV_machine_qemux86-64 ?= "dbf9e2bf8e764643b8ec4c236fbab73228413a33"
-SRCREV_machine_qemumips64 ?= "73d9e7eaf1161e5deb6d3fbfdefb07fc5fd87d3f"
-SRCREV_machine ?= "dbf9e2bf8e764643b8ec4c236fbab73228413a33"
-SRCREV_meta ?= "34f54c16ac6ef29441f95dd3b932729f01008999"
+SRCREV_machine_qemuarm ?= "a1fa03030adf951abcd2fc5c44f6133352e452da"
+SRCREV_machine_qemuarm64 ?= "31006b756f0b4b686b0fe4fad0f122ad427756de"
+SRCREV_machine_qemumips ?= "199be2c0b3869c13ea32737a316e51eca1a3cd6f"
+SRCREV_machine_qemuppc ?= "f1575e20066e5f61c363e7fccdcdf8b8ae23a8f3"
+SRCREV_machine_qemuriscv64 ?= "698e12267b8f334a5f6a2024e4b9b1f8a95a05ac"
+SRCREV_machine_qemux86 ?= "698e12267b8f334a5f6a2024e4b9b1f8a95a05ac"
+SRCREV_machine_qemux86-64 ?= "698e12267b8f334a5f6a2024e4b9b1f8a95a05ac"
+SRCREV_machine_qemumips64 ?= "a9c1d19cd3d1d0df846cd419cd75cf59995f89eb"
+SRCREV_machine ?= "698e12267b8f334a5f6a2024e4b9b1f8a95a05ac"
+SRCREV_meta ?= "c841eec84cf56e6b837f12a359c35c5dfb26da5f"
 
 # remap qemuarm to qemuarma15 for the 5.4 kernel
 # KMACHINE_qemuarm ?= "qemuarma15"
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ SRC_URI = "git://git.yoctoproject.org/linux-yocto.git;name=machine;branch=${KBRA
            git://git.yoctoproject.org/yocto-kernel-cache;type=kmeta;name=meta;branch=yocto-5.4;destsuffix=${KMETA}"
 
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=bbea815ee2795b2f4230826c0c6b8814"
-LINUX_VERSION ?= "5.4.262"
+LINUX_VERSION ?= "5.4.268"
 
 DEPENDS += "${@bb.utils.contains('ARCH', 'x86', 'elfutils-native', '', d)}"
 DEPENDS += "openssl-native util-linux-native"

meta/recipes-kernel/systemtap/systemtap/0001-gcc12-c-compatibility-re-tweak-for-rhel6-use-functio.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+From f199d1982ef8a6c6d5c06c082d057b8793bcc6aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Serhei Makarov <serhei@serhei.io>
+Date: Fri, 21 Jan 2022 18:21:46 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH] gcc12 c++ compatibility re-tweak for rhel6: use function
+ pointer instead of lambdas instead of ptr_fun<>
+
+Saving 2 lines in ltrim/rtrim is probably not a good reason to drop
+compatibility with the RHEL6 system compiler.  Actually declaring a
+named function and passing the function pointer is compatible with
+everything.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://sourceware.org/git/?p=systemtap.git;a=commit;h=f199d1982ef8a6c6d5c06c082d057b8793bcc6aa]
+Signed-off-by: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
+---
+ util.cxx | 13 ++++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/util.cxx
++++ b/util.cxx
+@@ -1757,21 +1757,24 @@ flush_to_stream (const string &fname, os
+   return 1; // Failure
+ }
+ 
++int
++not_isspace(unsigned char c)
++{
++  return !std::isspace(c);
++}
++
+ // trim from start (in place)
+ void
+ ltrim(std::string &s)
+ {
+-  s.erase(s.begin(),
+-	  std::find_if(s.begin(), s.end(),
+-		       std::not1(std::ptr_fun<int, int>(std::isspace))));
++  s.erase(s.begin(), std::find_if(s.begin(), s.end(), not_isspace));
+ }
+ 
+ // trim from end (in place)
+ void
+ rtrim(std::string &s)
+ {
+-  s.erase(std::find_if(s.rbegin(), s.rend(),
+-	  std::not1(std::ptr_fun<int, int>(std::isspace))).base(), s.end());
++  s.erase(std::find_if(s.rbegin(), s.rend(), not_isspace).base(), s.end());
+ }
+ 
+ // trim from both ends (in place)

meta/recipes-kernel/systemtap/systemtap_git.bb

@@ -6,7 +6,9 @@ HOMEPAGE = "https://sourceware.org/systemtap/"
 
 require systemtap_git.inc
 
-SRC_URI += "file://0001-improve-reproducibility-for-c-compiling.patch"
+SRC_URI += "file://0001-improve-reproducibility-for-c-compiling.patch \
+            file://0001-gcc12-c-compatibility-re-tweak-for-rhel6-use-functio.patch \
+           "
 
 DEPENDS = "elfutils"
 

meta/recipes-multimedia/flac/files/CVE-2021-0561.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+From e1575e4a7c5157cbf4e4a16dbd39b74f7174c7be Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Neelkamal Semwal <neelkamal.semwal@ittiam.com>
+Date: Fri, 18 Dec 2020 22:28:36 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] libFlac: Exit at EOS in verify mode
+
+When verify mode is enabled, once decoder flags end of stream,
+encode processing is considered complete.
+
+CVE-2021-0561
+
+Signed-off-by: Ralph Giles <giles@thaumas.net>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/xiph/flac/commit/e1575e4a7c5157cbf4e4a16dbd39b74f7174c7be]
+CVE: CVE-2021-0561
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ src/libFLAC/stream_encoder.c | 4 +++-
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/libFLAC/stream_encoder.c b/src/libFLAC/stream_encoder.c
+index 4c91247fe8..7109802c27 100644
+--- a/src/libFLAC/stream_encoder.c
++++ b/src/libFLAC/stream_encoder.c
+@@ -2610,7 +2610,9 @@ FLAC__bool write_bitbuffer_(FLAC__StreamEncoder *encoder, uint32_t samples, FLAC
+ 			encoder->private_->verify.needs_magic_hack = true;
+ 		}
+ 		else {
+-			if(!FLAC__stream_decoder_process_single(encoder->private_->verify.decoder)) {
++			if(!FLAC__stream_decoder_process_single(encoder->private_->verify.decoder)
++			    || (!is_last_block
++				    && (FLAC__stream_encoder_get_verify_decoder_state(encoder) == FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_END_OF_STREAM))) {
+ 				FLAC__bitwriter_release_buffer(encoder->private_->frame);
+ 				FLAC__bitwriter_clear(encoder->private_->frame);
+ 				if(encoder->protected_->state != FLAC__STREAM_ENCODER_VERIFY_MISMATCH_IN_AUDIO_DATA)

meta/recipes-multimedia/flac/flac_1.3.3.bb

@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ DEPENDS = "libogg"
 
 SRC_URI = "http://downloads.xiph.org/releases/flac/${BP}.tar.xz \
            file://CVE-2020-22219.patch \
+           file://CVE-2021-0561.patch \
 "
 
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "26703ed2858c1fc9ffc05136d13daa69"

meta/recipes-multimedia/libsndfile/libsndfile1/CVE-2021-4156.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+From ced91d7b971be6173b604154c39279ce90ad87cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: yuan <ssspeed00@gmail.com>
+Date: Tue, 20 Apr 2021 16:16:32 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] flac: Fix improper buffer reusing (#732)
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/libsndfile/libsndfile/commit/ced91d7b971be6173b604154c39279ce90ad87cc]
+CVE: CVE-2021-4156
+Signed-off-by: Vivek Kumbhar <vkumbhar@mvista.com>
+---
+ src/flac.c | 4 ++++
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/flac.c b/src/flac.c
+index 0be82ac..4fa5cfa 100644
+--- a/src/flac.c
++++ b/src/flac.c
+@@ -952,7 +952,11 @@ flac_read_loop (SF_PRIVATE *psf, unsigned len)
+	/* Decode some more. */
+	while (pflac->pos < pflac->len)
+	{	if (FLAC__stream_decoder_process_single (pflac->fsd) == 0)
++		{	psf_log_printf (psf, "FLAC__stream_decoder_process_single returned false\n") ;
++			/* Current frame is busted, so NULL the pointer. */
++			pflac->frame = NULL ;
+			break ;
++			} ;
+		state = FLAC__stream_decoder_get_state (pflac->fsd) ;
+		if (state >= FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_END_OF_STREAM)
+		{	psf_log_printf (psf, "FLAC__stream_decoder_get_state returned %s\n", FLAC__StreamDecoderStateString [state]) ;
+--
+2.40.1

meta/recipes-multimedia/libsndfile/libsndfile1_1.0.28.bb

@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://www.mega-nerd.com/libsndfile/files/libsndfile-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://CVE-2021-3246_1.patch \
            file://CVE-2021-3246_2.patch \
            file://CVE-2022-33065.patch \
+           file://CVE-2021-4156.patch \
            "
 
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "646b5f98ce89ac60cdb060fcd398247c"

meta/recipes-multimedia/libtiff/files/CVE-2023-6228.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+From 1e7d217a323eac701b134afc4ae39b6bdfdbc96a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Su_Laus <sulau@freenet.de>
+Date: Sat, 9 Sep 2023 15:45:47 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Check also if codec of input image is available,
+ independently from codec check of output image and return with error if not.
+ Fixes #606.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/libtiff/libtiff/-/commit/1e7d217a323eac701b134afc4ae39b6bdfdbc96a]
+CVE: CVE-2023-6228
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ tools/tiffcp.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/tools/tiffcp.c b/tools/tiffcp.c
+index 007bd05..d2f7b66 100644
+--- a/tools/tiffcp.c
++++ b/tools/tiffcp.c
+@@ -628,6 +628,8 @@ tiffcp(TIFF* in, TIFF* out)
+ 	else
+ 		CopyField(TIFFTAG_COMPRESSION, compression);
+ 	TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(in, TIFFTAG_COMPRESSION, &input_compression);
++	if (!TIFFIsCODECConfigured(input_compression))
++	    return FALSE;
+ 	TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(in, TIFFTAG_PHOTOMETRIC, &input_photometric);
+ 	if (input_compression == COMPRESSION_JPEG) {
+ 		/* Force conversion to RGB */
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-multimedia/libtiff/tiff_4.1.0.bb

@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://download.osgeo.org/libtiff/tiff-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://CVE-2023-40745.patch \
            file://CVE-2023-41175.patch \
            file://CVE-2022-40090.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-6228.patch \
           "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "2165e7aba557463acc0664e71a3ed424"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "5d29f32517dadb6dbcd1255ea5bbc93a2b54b94fbf83653b4d65c7d6775b8634"

meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-46218.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+CVE: CVE-2023-46218
+Upstream-Status: Backport [ import from ubuntu http://archive.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/pool/main/c/curl/curl_7.68.0-1ubuntu2.21.debian.tar.xz  upstream https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/2b0994c29a721c91c57  ]
+Signed-off-by: Lee Chee Yang <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
+
+Backport of:
+
+From 2b0994c29a721c91c572cff7808c572a24d251eb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Thu, 23 Nov 2023 08:15:47 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] cookie: lowercase the domain names before PSL checks
+
+Reported-by: Harry Sintonen
+
+Closes #12387
+---
+ lib/cookie.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++--------
+ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/lib/cookie.c
++++ b/lib/cookie.c
+@@ -967,15 +967,23 @@ Curl_cookie_add(struct Curl_easy *data,
+ #ifdef USE_LIBPSL
+   /* Check if the domain is a Public Suffix and if yes, ignore the cookie. */
+   if(domain && co->domain && !isip(co->domain)) {
+-    const psl_ctx_t *psl = Curl_psl_use(data);
+-    int acceptable;
+-
+-    if(psl) {
+-      acceptable = psl_is_cookie_domain_acceptable(psl, domain, co->domain);
+-      Curl_psl_release(data);
++    bool acceptable = FALSE;
++    char lcase[256];
++    char lcookie[256];
++    size_t dlen = strlen(domain);
++    size_t clen = strlen(co->domain);
++    if((dlen < sizeof(lcase)) && (clen < sizeof(lcookie))) {
++      const psl_ctx_t *psl = Curl_psl_use(data);
++      if(psl) {
++        /* the PSL check requires lowercase domain name and pattern */
++        Curl_strntolower(lcase, domain, dlen + 1);
++        Curl_strntolower(lcookie, co->domain, clen + 1);
++        acceptable = psl_is_cookie_domain_acceptable(psl, lcase, lcookie);
++        Curl_psl_release(data);
++      }
++      else
++        acceptable = !bad_domain(domain);
+     }
+-    else
+-      acceptable = !bad_domain(domain);
+ 
+     if(!acceptable) {
+       infof(data, "cookie '%s' dropped, domain '%s' must not "

meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_7.69.1.bb

@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://curl.haxx.se/download/curl-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
            file://CVE-2023-38546.patch \
            file://CVE-2023-28321.patch \
            file://CVE-2023-28322.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-46218.patch \
 "
 
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "ec5fc263f898a3dfef08e805f1ecca42"
@@ -71,6 +72,9 @@ CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST = "CVE-2021-22922 CVE-2021-22923 CVE-2021-22926 CVE-2021-229
 # This CVE issue affects Windows only Hence whitelisting this CVE
 CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2021-22897"
 
+# This CVE reports that apple had to upgrade curl because of other already reported CVEs
+CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2023-42915"
+
 inherit autotools pkgconfig binconfig multilib_header
 
 PACKAGECONFIG ??= "${@bb.utils.filter('DISTRO_FEATURES', 'ipv6', d)} gnutls libidn proxy threaded-resolver verbose zlib"

meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2023-5981.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,206 @@
+Backport of:
+
+From 29d6298d0b04cfff970b993915db71ba3f580b6d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
+Date: Mon, 23 Oct 2023 09:26:57 +0900
+Subject: [PATCH] auth/rsa_psk: side-step potential side-channel
+
+This removes branching that depends on secret data, porting changes
+for regular RSA key exchange from
+4804febddc2ed958e5ae774de2a8f85edeeff538 and
+80a6ce8ddb02477cd724cd5b2944791aaddb702a.  This also removes the
+allow_wrong_pms as it was used sorely to control debug output
+depending on the branching.
+
+Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://launchpad.net/ubuntu/+archive/primary/+sourcefiles/gnutls28/3.6.13-2ubuntu1.9/gnutls28_3.6.13-2ubuntu1.9.debian.tar.xz
+Upstream-Commit: https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/-/commit/29d6298d0b04cfff970b993915db71ba3f580b6d]
+CVE: CVE-2023-5981
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ lib/auth/rsa.c     |  2 +-
+ lib/auth/rsa_psk.c | 90 ++++++++++++++++++----------------------------
+ lib/gnutls_int.h   |  4 ---
+ lib/priority.c     |  1 -
+ 4 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 62 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/lib/auth/rsa.c
++++ b/lib/auth/rsa.c
+@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ proc_rsa_client_kx(gnutls_session_t sess
+ 				     session->key.key.size);
+ 	/* After this point, any conditional on failure that cause differences
+ 	 * in execution may create a timing or cache access pattern side
+-	 * channel that can be used as an oracle, so treat very carefully */
++	 * channel that can be used as an oracle, so tread carefully */
+ 
+ 	/* Error handling logic:
+ 	 * In case decryption fails then don't inform the peer. Just use the
+--- a/lib/auth/rsa_psk.c
++++ b/lib/auth/rsa_psk.c
+@@ -264,14 +264,13 @@ _gnutls_proc_rsa_psk_client_kx(gnutls_se
+ {
+ 	gnutls_datum_t username;
+ 	psk_auth_info_t info;
+-	gnutls_datum_t plaintext;
+ 	gnutls_datum_t ciphertext;
+ 	gnutls_datum_t pwd_psk = { NULL, 0 };
+ 	int ret, dsize;
+-	int randomize_key = 0;
+ 	ssize_t data_size = _data_size;
+ 	gnutls_psk_server_credentials_t cred;
+ 	gnutls_datum_t premaster_secret = { NULL, 0 };
++	volatile uint8_t ver_maj, ver_min;
+ 
+ 	cred = (gnutls_psk_server_credentials_t)
+ 	    _gnutls_get_cred(session, GNUTLS_CRD_PSK);
+@@ -327,71 +326,47 @@ _gnutls_proc_rsa_psk_client_kx(gnutls_se
+ 	}
+ 	ciphertext.size = dsize;
+ 
+-	ret =
+-	    gnutls_privkey_decrypt_data(session->internals.selected_key, 0,
+-					&ciphertext, &plaintext);
+-	if (ret < 0 || plaintext.size != GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE) {
+-		/* In case decryption fails then don't inform
+-		 * the peer. Just use a random key. (in order to avoid
+-		 * attack against pkcs-1 formatting).
+-		 */
+-		gnutls_assert();
+-		_gnutls_debug_log
+-		    ("auth_rsa_psk: Possible PKCS #1 format attack\n");
+-		if (ret >= 0) {
+-			gnutls_free(plaintext.data);
+-		}
+-		randomize_key = 1;
+-	} else {
+-		/* If the secret was properly formatted, then
+-		 * check the version number.
+-		 */
+-		if (_gnutls_get_adv_version_major(session) !=
+-		    plaintext.data[0]
+-		    || (session->internals.allow_wrong_pms == 0
+-			&& _gnutls_get_adv_version_minor(session) !=
+-			plaintext.data[1])) {
+-			/* No error is returned here, if the version number check
+-			 * fails. We proceed normally.
+-			 * That is to defend against the attack described in the paper
+-			 * "Attacking RSA-based sessions in SSL/TLS" by Vlastimil Klima,
+-			 * Ondej Pokorny and Tomas Rosa.
+-			 */
+-			gnutls_assert();
+-			_gnutls_debug_log
+-			    ("auth_rsa: Possible PKCS #1 version check format attack\n");
+-		}
+-	}
++	ver_maj = _gnutls_get_adv_version_major(session);
++	ver_min = _gnutls_get_adv_version_minor(session);
+ 
++	premaster_secret.data = gnutls_malloc(GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE);
++	if (premaster_secret.data == NULL) {
++		gnutls_assert();
++		return GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR;
++	}
++	premaster_secret.size = GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE;
+ 
+-	if (randomize_key != 0) {
+-		premaster_secret.size = GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE;
+-		premaster_secret.data =
+-		    gnutls_malloc(premaster_secret.size);
+-		if (premaster_secret.data == NULL) {
+-			gnutls_assert();
+-			return GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR;
+-		}
+-
+-		/* we do not need strong random numbers here.
+-		 */
+-		ret = gnutls_rnd(GNUTLS_RND_NONCE, premaster_secret.data,
+-				  premaster_secret.size);
+-		if (ret < 0) {
+-			gnutls_assert();
+-			goto cleanup;
+-		}
+-	} else {
+-		premaster_secret.data = plaintext.data;
+-		premaster_secret.size = plaintext.size;
++	/* Fallback value when decryption fails. Needs to be unpredictable. */
++	ret = gnutls_rnd(GNUTLS_RND_NONCE, premaster_secret.data,
++			 premaster_secret.size);
++	if (ret < 0) {
++		gnutls_assert();
++		goto cleanup;
+ 	}
+ 
++	gnutls_privkey_decrypt_data2(session->internals.selected_key, 0,
++				     &ciphertext, premaster_secret.data,
++				     premaster_secret.size);
++	/* After this point, any conditional on failure that cause differences
++	 * in execution may create a timing or cache access pattern side
++	 * channel that can be used as an oracle, so tread carefully */
++
++	/* Error handling logic:
++	 * In case decryption fails then don't inform the peer. Just use the
++	 * random key previously generated. (in order to avoid attack against
++	 * pkcs-1 formatting).
++	 *
++	 * If we get version mismatches no error is returned either. We
++	 * proceed normally. This is to defend against the attack described
++	 * in the paper "Attacking RSA-based sessions in SSL/TLS" by
++	 * Vlastimil Klima, Ondej Pokorny and Tomas Rosa.
++	 */
++
+ 	/* This is here to avoid the version check attack
+ 	 * discussed above.
+ 	 */
+-
+-	premaster_secret.data[0] = _gnutls_get_adv_version_major(session);
+-	premaster_secret.data[1] = _gnutls_get_adv_version_minor(session);
++	premaster_secret.data[0] = ver_maj;
++	premaster_secret.data[1] = ver_min;
+ 
+ 	/* find the key of this username
+ 	 */
+--- a/lib/gnutls_int.h
++++ b/lib/gnutls_int.h
+@@ -989,7 +989,6 @@ struct gnutls_priority_st {
+ 	bool _no_etm;
+ 	bool _no_ext_master_secret;
+ 	bool _allow_key_usage_violation;
+-	bool _allow_wrong_pms;
+ 	bool _dumbfw;
+ 	unsigned int _dh_prime_bits;	/* old (deprecated) variable */
+ 
+@@ -1007,7 +1006,6 @@ struct gnutls_priority_st {
+ 	      (x)->no_etm = 1; \
+ 	      (x)->no_ext_master_secret = 1; \
+ 	      (x)->allow_key_usage_violation = 1; \
+-	      (x)->allow_wrong_pms = 1; \
+ 	      (x)->dumbfw = 1
+ 
+ #define ENABLE_PRIO_COMPAT(x) \
+@@ -1016,7 +1014,6 @@ struct gnutls_priority_st {
+ 	      (x)->_no_etm = 1; \
+ 	      (x)->_no_ext_master_secret = 1; \
+ 	      (x)->_allow_key_usage_violation = 1; \
+-	      (x)->_allow_wrong_pms = 1; \
+ 	      (x)->_dumbfw = 1
+ 
+ /* DH and RSA parameters types.
+@@ -1141,7 +1138,6 @@ typedef struct {
+ 	bool no_etm;
+ 	bool no_ext_master_secret;
+ 	bool allow_key_usage_violation;
+-	bool allow_wrong_pms;
+ 	bool dumbfw;
+ 
+ 	/* old (deprecated) variable. This is used for both srp_prime_bits
+--- a/lib/priority.c
++++ b/lib/priority.c
+@@ -681,7 +681,6 @@ gnutls_priority_set(gnutls_session_t ses
+ 	COPY_TO_INTERNALS(no_etm);
+ 	COPY_TO_INTERNALS(no_ext_master_secret);
+ 	COPY_TO_INTERNALS(allow_key_usage_violation);
+-	COPY_TO_INTERNALS(allow_wrong_pms);
+ 	COPY_TO_INTERNALS(dumbfw);
+ 	COPY_TO_INTERNALS(dh_prime_bits);
+ 

meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2024-0553.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+From 40dbbd8de499668590e8af51a15799fbc430595e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
+Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2024 19:13:17 +0900
+Subject: [PATCH] rsa-psk: minimize branching after decryption
+
+This moves any non-trivial code between gnutls_privkey_decrypt_data2
+and the function return in _gnutls_proc_rsa_psk_client_kx up until the
+decryption.  This also avoids an extra memcpy to session->key.key.
+
+Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/-/commit/40dbbd8de499668590e8af51a15799fbc430595e]
+CVE: CVE-2024-0553
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ lib/auth/rsa_psk.c | 68 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
+ 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/auth/rsa_psk.c b/lib/auth/rsa_psk.c
+index 93c2dc9..c6cfb92 100644
+--- a/lib/auth/rsa_psk.c
++++ b/lib/auth/rsa_psk.c
+@@ -269,7 +269,6 @@ _gnutls_proc_rsa_psk_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
+ 	int ret, dsize;
+ 	ssize_t data_size = _data_size;
+ 	gnutls_psk_server_credentials_t cred;
+-	gnutls_datum_t premaster_secret = { NULL, 0 };
+ 	volatile uint8_t ver_maj, ver_min;
+ 
+ 	cred = (gnutls_psk_server_credentials_t)
+@@ -329,24 +328,48 @@ _gnutls_proc_rsa_psk_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
+ 	ver_maj = _gnutls_get_adv_version_major(session);
+ 	ver_min = _gnutls_get_adv_version_minor(session);
+ 
+-	premaster_secret.data = gnutls_malloc(GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE);
+-	if (premaster_secret.data == NULL) {
++	/* Find the key of this username. A random value will be
++	 * filled in if the key is not found.
++	 */
++	ret = _gnutls_psk_pwd_find_entry(session, info->username,
++			                 strlen(info->username), &pwd_psk);
++	if (ret < 0)
++		return gnutls_assert_val(ret);
++
++	/* Allocate memory for premaster secret, and fill in the
++	 * fields except the decryption result.
++	 */
++	session->key.key.size = 2 + GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE + 2 + pwd_psk.size;
++	session->key.key.data = gnutls_malloc(session->key.key.size);
++	if (session->key.key.data == NULL) {
+ 		gnutls_assert();
++		_gnutls_free_key_datum(&pwd_psk);
++		/* No need to zeroize, as the secret is not copied in yet */
++		_gnutls_free_datum(&session->key.key);
+ 		return GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR;
+ 	}
+-	premaster_secret.size = GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE;
+ 
+ 	/* Fallback value when decryption fails. Needs to be unpredictable. */
+-	ret = gnutls_rnd(GNUTLS_RND_NONCE, premaster_secret.data,
+-			 premaster_secret.size);
++	ret = gnutls_rnd(GNUTLS_RND_NONCE, session->key.key.data + 2,
++			 GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE);
+ 	if (ret < 0) {
+ 		gnutls_assert();
+-		goto cleanup;
++		_gnutls_free_key_datum(&pwd_psk);
++		/* No need to zeroize, as the secret is not copied in yet */
++		_gnutls_free_datum(&session->key.key);
++		return ret;
+ 	}
+ 
++	_gnutls_write_uint16(GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE, session->key.key.data);
++	_gnutls_write_uint16(pwd_psk.size,
++			     &session->key.key.data[2 + GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE]);
++	memcpy(&session->key.key.data[2 + GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE + 2], pwd_psk.data,
++	       pwd_psk.size);
++	_gnutls_free_key_datum(&pwd_psk);
++
+ 	gnutls_privkey_decrypt_data2(session->internals.selected_key, 0,
+-				     &ciphertext, premaster_secret.data,
+-				     premaster_secret.size);
++				     &ciphertext, session->key.key.data + 2,
++				     GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE);
+ 	/* After this point, any conditional on failure that cause differences
+ 	 * in execution may create a timing or cache access pattern side
+ 	 * channel that can be used as an oracle, so tread carefully */
+@@ -365,31 +388,10 @@ _gnutls_proc_rsa_psk_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
+ 	/* This is here to avoid the version check attack
+ 	 * discussed above.
+ 	 */
+-	premaster_secret.data[0] = ver_maj;
+-	premaster_secret.data[1] = ver_min;
++	session->key.key.data[2] = ver_maj;
++	session->key.key.data[3] = ver_min;
+ 
+-	/* find the key of this username
+-	 */
+-	ret =
+-	    _gnutls_psk_pwd_find_entry(session, info->username, strlen(info->username), &pwd_psk);
+-	if (ret < 0) {
+-		gnutls_assert();
+-		goto cleanup;
+-	}
+-
+-	ret =
+-	    set_rsa_psk_session_key(session, &pwd_psk, &premaster_secret);
+-	if (ret < 0) {
+-		gnutls_assert();
+-		goto cleanup;
+-	}
+-
+-	ret = 0;
+-      cleanup:
+-	_gnutls_free_key_datum(&pwd_psk);
+-	_gnutls_free_temp_key_datum(&premaster_secret);
+-
+-	return ret;
++	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+ static int
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls_3.6.14.bb

@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@ SRC_URI = "https://www.gnupg.org/ftp/gcrypt/gnutls/v${SHRT_VER}/gnutls-${PV}.tar
            file://CVE-2022-2509.patch \
            file://CVE-2021-4209.patch \
            file://CVE-2023-0361.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-5981.patch \
+           file://CVE-2024-0553.patch \
 "
 
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "5630751adec7025b8ef955af4d141d00d252a985769f51b4059e5affa3d39d63"

meta/recipes-support/sqlite/files/CVE-2023-7104.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+From eab426c5fba69d2c77023939f72b4ad446834e3c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: dan <Dan Kennedy>
+Date: Thu, 7 Sep 2023 13:53:09 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix a buffer overread in the sessions extension that could occur when processing a corrupt changeset.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://sqlite.org/src/info/0e4e7a05c4204b47]
+CVE: CVE-2023-7104
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ sqlite3.c | 18 +++++++++++-------
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/sqlite3.c b/sqlite3.c
+index 972ef18..c645ac8 100644
+--- a/sqlite3.c
++++ b/sqlite3.c
+@@ -203301,15 +203301,19 @@ static int sessionReadRecord(
+         }
+       }
+       if( eType==SQLITE_INTEGER || eType==SQLITE_FLOAT ){
+-        sqlite3_int64 v = sessionGetI64(aVal);
+-        if( eType==SQLITE_INTEGER ){
+-          sqlite3VdbeMemSetInt64(apOut[i], v);
++	if( (pIn->nData-pIn->iNext)<8 ){
++	  rc = SQLITE_CORRUPT_BKPT;
+         }else{
+-          double d;
+-          memcpy(&d, &v, 8);
+-          sqlite3VdbeMemSetDouble(apOut[i], d);
++	  sqlite3_int64 v = sessionGetI64(aVal);
++	  if( eType==SQLITE_INTEGER ){
++	    sqlite3VdbeMemSetInt64(apOut[i], v);
++	  }else{
++	    double d;
++	    memcpy(&d, &v, 8);
++	    sqlite3VdbeMemSetDouble(apOut[i], d);
++	  }
++	  pIn->iNext += 8;
+         }
+-        pIn->iNext += 8;
+       }
+     }
+   }
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-support/sqlite/sqlite3_3.31.1.bb

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://www.sqlite.org/2020/sqlite-autoconf-${SQLITE_PV}.tar.gz \
            file://CVE-2020-35525.patch \
            file://CVE-2020-35527.patch \
            file://CVE-2021-20223.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-7104.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "2d0a553534c521504e3ac3ad3b90f125"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "62284efebc05a76f909c580ffa5c008a7d22a1287285d68b7825a2b6b51949ae"