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Author SHA1 Message Date
Steve Sakoman
2c05660b21 build-appliance-image: Update to kirkstone head revision
(From OE-Core rev: 2ed3f8b938579dbbb804e04c45a968cc57761db7)

Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
2025-12-12 08:54:41 -08:00
Steve Sakoman
cb1206dd84 poky.conf: bump version for 4.0.32
(From meta-yocto rev: 77b40877c179ea3ce5c37c7ba1831e9c0e289266)

Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
2025-12-12 08:49:37 -08:00
Peter Marko
33d90091be libmicrohttpd: disable experimental code by default
Introduce new packageconfig to explicitly avoid compilation of
experimental code. Note that the code was not compiled by default also
before this patch, this now makes it explicit and makes it possible to
check for the flags in cve-check code.

This is less intrusive change than a patch removing the code which was
rejected in patch review.

This will solve CVE-2025-59777 and CVE-2025-62689 as the vulnerable code
is not compiled by default.
Set appropriate CVE status for these CVEs based on new packageconfig.

(From OE-Core rev: 1d8e646aebe75b8ede51d4de9e0003a822992a33)

Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
2025-12-12 08:49:37 -08:00
Hitendra Prajapati
9f461395a8 openssh: fix CVE-2025-61984
ssh in OpenSSH before 10.1 allows control characters in usernames that
originate from certain possibly untrusted sources, potentially leading
to code execution when a ProxyCommand is used. The untrusted sources
are the command line and %-sequence expansion of a configuration file.

Note:
openssh does not support variable expansion until 10.0, so backport
adapts for this.

Reference:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-61984

Upstream-Status: Backport from 35d5917652

(From OE-Core rev: 7ca0c7a4d17c707658669e255689ecd4183c7e9b)

Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
2025-12-12 08:49:37 -08:00
Peter Marko
0002d5d082 libpng: patch CVE-2025-66293
Pick patches per nvd report [1] and github advisory [2].

[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-66293
[2] https://github.com/pnggroup/libpng/security/advisories/GHSA-9mpm-9pxh-mg4f

(From OE-Core rev: c33ebd0882288a962c089b423cc2468a7c84c2e7)

Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
2025-12-12 08:49:37 -08:00
Hitendra Prajapati
db73f23fc2 libxml2: Security fix for CVE-2025-7425
CVE-2025-7425
libxslt: heap-use-after-free in xmlFreeID caused by `atype` corruption

Origin: https://launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/libxml2/2.9.14+dfsg-1.3ubuntu3.6
Ref : https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2025-7425

Upstream-Status: Backport from https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libxslt/-/issues/140
(From OE-Core rev: cf260bef4495186662b74b8324d01efcfc2121fd)

Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
2025-12-12 08:49:36 -08:00
Gyorgy Sarvari
40701465df systemd-bootchart: update SRC_URI branch
The branch was renamed from master to main.

(From OE-Core rev: 80c7fd87fd95a79c6eb5f41b95cf70ccc70d9615)

Signed-off-by: Gyorgy Sarvari <skandigraun@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
2025-12-05 06:56:34 -08:00
Archana Polampalli
ba9338d810 go: fix CVE-2025-61724
The Reader.ReadResponse function constructs a response string through repeated
string concatenation of lines. When the number of lines in a response is large,
this can cause excessive CPU consumption.

(From OE-Core rev: 188dbac037809d6e8f0e1667f563fea997ea04b8)

Signed-off-by: Archana Polampalli <archana.polampalli@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
2025-12-05 06:56:34 -08:00
Archana Polampalli
46c836aefa go: fix CVE-2025-61723
The processing time for parsing some invalid inputs scales non-linearly with
respect to the size of the input. This affects programs which parse untrusted PEM inputs.

(From OE-Core rev: cfafebef95330e531ab7bb590e5fb566dd5a3dce)

Signed-off-by: Archana Polampalli <archana.polampalli@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
2025-12-05 06:56:34 -08:00
Archana Polampalli
5f8155aefa go: fix CVE-2025-58189
When Conn.Handshake fails during ALPN negotiation the error contains attacker controlled
information (the ALPN protocols sent by the client) which is not escaped.

(From OE-Core rev: b3f055df67cf345c9a17c5c1c874c778d538ba9e)

Signed-off-by: Archana Polampalli <archana.polampalli@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
2025-12-05 06:56:34 -08:00
Archana Polampalli
dd0a2c2470 go: fix CVE-2025-58187
Due to the design of the name constraint checking algorithm, the processing time
of some inputs scale non-linearly with respect to the size of the certificate.
This affects programs which validate arbitrary certificate chains.

(From OE-Core rev: cea9fcf1b21b1b35b88986b676d712ab8ffa9d67)

Signed-off-by: Archana Polampalli <archana.polampalli@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
2025-12-05 06:56:34 -08:00
Peter Marko
c5794d82b0 libpng: patch CVE-2025-65018
Pick commits per NVD report.

(From OE-Core rev: c46f841cdc8f7c1b0cce7da8fb587f65320a2163)

Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
2025-12-05 06:56:34 -08:00
Peter Marko
169ca8debf libpng: patch CVE-2025-64720
Pick commit per NVD report.

(From OE-Core rev: 9694df176a13eeac174c7da2bcf8243969dbcda6)

Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
2025-12-05 06:56:34 -08:00
Peter Marko
5d27e8f05d libpng: patch CVE-2025-64506
Pick commit per NVD report.

(From OE-Core rev: eb4af9b4cea963b650be217d33bc12f560ed84a6)

Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
2025-12-05 06:56:34 -08:00
Peter Marko
d492537188 libpng: patch CVE-2025-64505
Pick commit per NVD report.
Add two patches to apply it cleanly.

(From OE-Core rev: 1470546924765d134c83b50e62974f048614b121)

Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
2025-12-05 06:56:34 -08:00
Peter Marko
052e4214aa gnutls: patch CVE-2025-9820
This CVE is announced under [1].
Pick commit which mentions this CVE per [2].

[1] https://www.gnutls.org/security-new.html#GNUTLS-SA-2025-11-18
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2025-9820

(From OE-Core rev: 946f776b6f7ceacf76a643c5776b0efedb000efd)

Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
2025-12-05 06:56:34 -08:00
Gyorgy Sarvari
c76f44b1da flac: patch seeking bug
While working on audiofile recipe from meta-oe, a test that is using flac
to convert a flac file failed with this particular version of the recipe.

Bisecting the issue pointed to a code snippet that later was modifed with the
patch that is introduced here: in version 1.3.4 there is a bug with seeking
in flac files, returning incorrect pointers.

This backported patch fixes this (and fixes the ptest also, that triggered this).

(From OE-Core rev: ceef3cde9b761b7b5de6f7b6b1fb8e99663af9ca)

Signed-off-by: Gyorgy Sarvari <skandigraun@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
2025-12-01 06:50:49 -08:00
Peter Marko
088d1497d5 libarchive: patch CVE-2025-60753
Pick patch from [3] marked in [2] mentioned in [1].

[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-60753
[2] https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/issues/2725
[3] https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/pull/2787

(From OE-Core rev: e3e9dd59a32541b36d6c1036b8f83af52bef92cd)

Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
2025-12-01 06:50:49 -08:00
Peter Marko
22f8da4818 libarchive: patch 3.8.3 security issue 2
Pick patch [2] as listed in [1].

[1] https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/releases/tag/v3.8.3
[2] https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/pull/2768

(From OE-Core rev: 332f07635ccb4965a001f6536620c9d0b1a9c056)

Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
2025-12-01 06:50:49 -08:00
Peter Marko
4030876db9 libarchive: patch 3.8.3 security issue 1
Pick patch [2] as listed in [1].
To apply it cleanly, add three additional patches from branch patch/3.8.

[1] https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/releases/tag/v3.8.3
[2] https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/pull/2753

(From OE-Core rev: 201eed780c73335c9278db17fe39fb453e16af08)

Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
2025-12-01 06:50:49 -08:00
Praveen Kumar
c6234dce63 python3: fix CVE-2025-6075
If the value passed to os.path.expandvars() is user-controlled a
performance degradation is possible when expanding environment variables.

Reference:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-6075

Upstream-patch:
892747b4cf

(From OE-Core rev: 9a7f33d85355ffbe382aa175c04c64541e77b441)

Signed-off-by: Praveen Kumar <praveen.kumar@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
2025-12-01 06:50:49 -08:00
Divya Chellam
6639c7b295 ruby: fix CVE-2024-41123
REXML is an XML toolkit for Ruby. The REXML gem before 3.3.2 has some DoS
vulnerabilities when it parses an XML that has many specific characters
such as whitespace character, `>]` and `]>`. The REXML gem 3.3.3 or later
include the patches to fix these vulnerabilities.

Reference:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-41123

Upstream-patches:
2c39c91a65
4444a04ece
ebc3e85bfa
6cac15d458
e2546e6eca

(From OE-Core rev: 6b2a2e689a69deef6098f6c266542234e46fb24b)

Signed-off-by: Divya Chellam <divya.chellam@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
2025-12-01 06:50:49 -08:00
Divya Chellam
7c4bd642e4 ruby: fix CVE-2024-39908
REXML is an XML toolkit for Ruby. The REXML gem before 3.3.1 has some
DoS vulnerabilities when it parses an XML that has many specific characters
such as `<`, `0` and `%>`. If you need to parse untrusted XMLs, you many be
impacted to these vulnerabilities. The REXML gem 3.3.2 or later include the
patches to fix these vulnerabilities. Users are advised to upgrade. Users
unable to upgrade should avoid parsing untrusted XML strings.

Reference:
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2024-39908

Upstream-patches:
f1df7d13b3
d146162e9a
b5bf109a59
b8a5f4cd5c
0af55fa49d
c1b64c174e
9f1415a261
c33ea49810
a79ac8b4b4
67efb5951e
1f1e6e9b40
910e5a2b48

(From OE-Core rev: 6e0b70843422cd7cdb25a9e1520dd64bf701fea6)

Signed-off-by: Divya Chellam <divya.chellam@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
2025-12-01 06:50:49 -08:00
Divya Chellam
f58483837c ruby: fix CVE-2024-35176
REXML is an XML toolkit for Ruby. The REXML gem before 3.2.6 has a
denial of service vulnerability when it parses an XML that has many
`<`s in an attribute value. Those who need to parse untrusted XMLs
may be impacted to this vulnerability. The REXML gem 3.2.7 or later
include the patch to fix this vulnerability. As a workaround, don't
parse untrusted XMLs.

Reference:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-35176

Upstream-patch:
4325835f92

(From OE-Core rev: a89fcaf0c3ac2afd95e836bc1356832296135696)

Signed-off-by: Divya Chellam <divya.chellam@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
2025-12-01 06:50:49 -08:00
Vijay Anusuri
cdc78fd36f python3-idna: Fix CVE-2024-3651
import patch from debian to fix
  CVE-2024-3651

Upstream-Status: Backport [import from debian 3.3-1+deb12u1
Upstream commit
5beb28b9dd]

(From OE-Core rev: 7359d3cdf2210e81a26d8712769f7e23bfbc1bb7)

Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
2025-12-01 06:50:49 -08:00
Richard Purdie
36165cce68 oe-build-perf-report: relax metadata matching rules
As the poky repository is no longer used, measurements are indexed using
the oe-core commit. But as bitbake, oe-core and meta-yocto are now
retrieved from separate gits, while measuring performances for a given branch
at some time interval, we can get the same commit for oe-core but
different ones for bitbake or meta-yocto. As a consequence, metadata
associated with the same index (oe-core commit) might differ.

To work around this, relax the equality checks for commit, commit_time
and commit_count since they might no longer match.

Ideally we'd group them into separate results but for now, treat them
as being the same.

[Based on work from Mathieu Dubois-Briand but fixed differently]
(From OE-Core rev: ff72b41a3f0bf1820405b8782f0d125cd10e3406)

Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit e7dc42e30c76bf0fbb4d3cc019bbec675bac55fa)
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
2025-11-24 06:57:39 -08:00
Gyorgy Sarvari
9734a91472 musl: patch CVE-2025-26519
Details: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-26519

Pick the patches that are attached to the musl advisory:
https://www.openwall.com/lists/musl/2025/02/13/1

(From OE-Core rev: e1c1b4b5100e08b63a2e6e5ff608f79e7b202649)

Signed-off-by: Gyorgy Sarvari <skandigraun@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
2025-11-24 06:57:39 -08:00
Vijay Anusuri
42d2a2e8cd xwayland: Fix for CVE-2025-62231
Upstream-Status: Backport from 3baad99f9c

(From OE-Core rev: 24a1574d6f61a45ce104ab6ee01697df2575fd51)

Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
2025-11-24 06:57:39 -08:00
Vijay Anusuri
940e5e75b9 xwayland: Fix for CVE-2025-62230
Upstream-Status: Backport from
865089ca70
& 87fe255393

(From OE-Core rev: a481fe0dcca8213eca845d5f1fdde3f0d15c8aed)

Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
2025-11-24 06:57:39 -08:00
Vijay Anusuri
3d559d269a xwayland: Fix for CVE-2025-62229
Upstream-Status: Backport from 5a4286b13f

(From OE-Core rev: 5c6a07f215e00392b1831ed89ac0f8180823e124)

Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
2025-11-24 06:57:39 -08:00
Soumya Sambu
36037789d2 elfutils: Fix CVE-2025-1377
A vulnerability, which was classified as problematic, has been found in GNU elfutils
0.192. This issue affects the function gelf_getsymshndx of the file strip.c of the
component eu-strip. The manipulation leads to denial of service. The attack needs to
be approached locally. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used.
The identifier of the patch is fbf1df9ca286de3323ae541973b08449f8d03aba. It is
recommended to apply a patch to fix this issue.

Reference:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-1377

Upstream patch:
https://sourceware.org/git/?p=elfutils.git;a=commit;h=fbf1df9ca286de3323ae541973b08449f8d03aba

(From OE-Core rev: e4e8392e688ceb0d8e68fe48118383c031178b5e)

Signed-off-by: Soumya Sambu <soumya.sambu@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
2025-11-24 06:57:39 -08:00
Soumya Sambu
7dd51aea98 elfutils: Fix CVE-2025-1376
A vulnerability classified as problematic was found in GNU elfutils 0.192. This
vulnerability affects the function elf_strptr in the library /libelf/elf_strptr.c
of the component eu-strip. The manipulation leads to denial of service. It is
possible to launch the attack on the local host. The complexity of an attack is
rather high. The exploitation appears to be difficult. The exploit has been
disclosed to the public and may be used. The name of the patch is
b16f441cca0a4841050e3215a9f120a6d8aea918. It is recommended to apply a patch to
fix this issue.

Reference:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-1376

Upstream patch:
https://sourceware.org/git/?p=elfutils.git;a=commit;h=b16f441cca0a4841050e3215a9f120a6d8aea918

(From OE-Core rev: 1126e5c1e63b876499c78ac403d1327645edf1c7)

Signed-off-by: Soumya Sambu <soumya.sambu@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
2025-11-24 06:57:39 -08:00
Lee Chee Yang
851a3f0c55 migration-guides: add release notes for 4.0.31
(From yocto-docs rev: 4b9df539fa06fb19ed8b51ef2d46e5c56779de81)

Signed-off-by: Lee Chee Yang <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Antonin Godard <antonin.godard@bootlin.com>
(cherry picked from commit 992d0725e8b4fdcdc2e9a101ce51ebef94a00112)
Signed-off-by: Antonin Godard <antonin.godard@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
2025-11-19 08:21:24 -08:00
Ross Burton
dacb67f70f documentation: link to the Releases page on yoctoproject.org instead of wiki
We have a machine-generated Releases page[1] which is preferable to the
wiki.

[1] https://www.yoctoproject.org/development/releases/

(From yocto-docs rev: 492619059cbbe2d1ebc347c3e86072f32d7d064a)

Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Antonin Godard <antonin.godard@bootlin.com>
(cherry picked from commit 46a9172fd17aa518028e35b8c874e74889079094)
Signed-off-by: Antonin Godard <antonin.godard@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
2025-11-19 08:21:24 -08:00
Quentin Schulz
232e8ebe3c overview-manual: migrate to SVG + fix typo
The original PNG had a typo (YP-Comptible instead of YP-Compatible).

Instead of patching a PNG, let's migrate to an SVG with the typo already
fixed.

[AG: fix conflicts]

Reported-by: Robert P. J. Day <rpjday@crashcourse.ca>
(From yocto-docs rev: bb9887a98bb64ebaa23b772fd0f3c22f13e996e7)

Signed-off-by: Quentin Schulz <quentin.schulz@cherry.de>
Signed-off-by: Antonin Godard <antonin.godard@bootlin.com>
(cherry picked from commit 9f3c2a9113b329f7efdd22d3b3fbe272a44bc654)
Signed-off-by: Antonin Godard <antonin.godard@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
2025-11-19 08:21:24 -08:00
Quentin Schulz
41c16e82e9 dev-manual: debugging: use bitbake-getvar in Viewing Variable Values section
We should recommend using bitbake-getvar command wherever possible as
its output is much less confusing and overwhelming than bitbake -e.

Unfortunately, bitbake-getvar currently doesn't list Python tasks or
functions, unlike bitbake -e, so keep the latter for some corner cases.

[AG: Moroever -> Moreover typo fix]

(From yocto-docs rev: 382c8eee275eb4773d4e2183f5fe19837a6a3b0b)

Signed-off-by: Quentin Schulz <quentin.schulz@cherry.de>
Signed-off-by: Antonin Godard <antonin.godard@bootlin.com>
(cherry picked from commit 41e4e05369c4e028c679749b7b62434327927a09)
Signed-off-by: Antonin Godard <antonin.godard@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
2025-11-19 08:21:24 -08:00
Quentin Schulz
cab0ee97d8 ref-manual: variables: migrate the OVERRIDES note to bitbake-getvar
Wherever possible, we should use bitbake-getvar as it's the recommended
tool so let's do that.

(From yocto-docs rev: 7981bc2bd09b2d618563710474525febabaf6103)

Signed-off-by: Quentin Schulz <quentin.schulz@cherry.de>
Signed-off-by: Antonin Godard <antonin.godard@bootlin.com>
(cherry picked from commit 2293a3f2767895e9fb5c3e8f3ec11bb4951a7127)
Signed-off-by: Antonin Godard <antonin.godard@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
2025-11-19 08:21:24 -08:00
Quentin Schulz
d54b15eba1 kernel-dev: common: migrate bitbake -e to bitbake-getvar
It's recommended to use bitbake-getvar for a few releases now so let's
use that instead of bitbake -e.

While at it, use a cross-reference for "OpenEmbedded Build System".

(From yocto-docs rev: 7f6dc007a888784a678859690dbfddd5a1fe28a0)

Signed-off-by: Quentin Schulz <quentin.schulz@cherry.de>
Signed-off-by: Antonin Godard <antonin.godard@bootlin.com>
(cherry picked from commit 54585646d8220f8de1ba2c7246cb3f2fcbc59583)
Signed-off-by: Antonin Godard <antonin.godard@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
2025-11-19 08:21:24 -08:00
Walter Werner SCHNEIDER
2943f88d88 kernel-dev: add disable config example
Makes it more clear that the configuration fragment can also be used to
disable a configuration.

(From yocto-docs rev: c4bfc16b2e13444547342204a6f75fd1cf343533)

Signed-off-by: Walter Werner SCHNEIDER <contact@schnwalter.eu>
Signed-off-by: Antonin Godard <antonin.godard@bootlin.com>
(cherry picked from commit d38ef467081ee73bf23f240ace54b849a3a87612)
Signed-off-by: Antonin Godard <antonin.godard@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
2025-11-19 08:21:24 -08:00
Robert P. J. Day
9479971ef9 dev-manual/new-recipe.rst: typo, "whith" -> "which"
Fix typo "whith", should be "which".

(From yocto-docs rev: 1a54d05d8bd5484e17cbc060fc57fd2f7afb683f)

Signed-off-by: Robert P. J. Day <rpjday@crashcourse.ca>
Signed-off-by: Antonin Godard <antonin.godard@bootlin.com>
(cherry picked from commit f98b25f7f7522cf223beb001cabef870d6dd8c10)
Signed-off-by: Antonin Godard <antonin.godard@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
2025-11-19 08:21:24 -08:00
Robert P. J. Day
2cf2a95adb dev-manual/new-recipe.rst: replace 'bitbake -e' with 'bitbake-getvar'
Replace the legacy call to 'bitbake -e' to get the value of a recipe's
variable with the newer call to 'bitbake-getvar'.

(From yocto-docs rev: d7ef362307daf2e8d9b62ec895e080654abfef8b)

Signed-off-by: Robert P. J. Day <rpjday@crashcourse.ca>
Reviewed-by: Quentin Schulz <quentin.schulz@cherry.de>
Signed-off-by: Antonin Godard <antonin.godard@bootlin.com>
(cherry picked from commit ed7c0766ef5f13b90943a69e64f8e8713d05e864)
Signed-off-by: Antonin Godard <antonin.godard@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
2025-11-19 08:21:24 -08:00
Robert P. J. Day
bababfb854 dev-manual/layers.rst: document "bitbake-layers show-machines"
The "show-machines" subcommand is not mentioned in the docs; add it.

[AG: fix conflicts]

(From yocto-docs rev: 09bbdc6bc5f9ae77f120185d1324f1166ac1f9d5)

Signed-off-by: Robert P. J. Day <Crpjday@crashcourse.ca>
Signed-off-by: Antonin Godard <antonin.godard@bootlin.com>
(cherry picked from commit b4320cdc4df08c59a24d5247b3895dd602554fa0)
Signed-off-by: Antonin Godard <antonin.godard@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
2025-11-19 08:21:24 -08:00
Robert P. J. Day
6f01aae51d dev-manual/new-recipe.rst: update "recipetool -h" output
Update the output of "recipetool -h" to include the missing "edit"
subcommand.

(From yocto-docs rev: 2a85eab0c51a78ab00168e23274d479cf3aedb24)

Signed-off-by: Robert P. J. Day <rpjday@crashcourse.ca>
Signed-off-by: Antonin Godard <antonin.godard@bootlin.com>
(cherry picked from commit 092d688349b0b6bb10ae6fbbab7d82801964daf5)
Signed-off-by: Antonin Godard <antonin.godard@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
2025-11-19 08:21:24 -08:00
Alexander Kanavin
33d61e50c1 goarch.bbclass: do not leak TUNE_FEATURES into crosssdk task signatures
The default assignments look like this:
TARGET_GO386 = "${@go_map_386(d.getVar('TARGET_ARCH'), d.getVar('TUNE_FEATURES'), d)}"

TUNE_FEATURES is a target-specific variable, and so should be used
only for target builds. The change is similar to what is already done
for native packages.

(From OE-Core rev: cfff8e968257c44880caa3605e158764ed5c6a2a)

(From OE-Core rev: 8aad87c12a809d790175b9848f5802d0a28eecac)

Signed-off-by: Alexander Kanavin <alex@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Dubois-Briand <mathieu.dubois-briand@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
2025-11-19 08:21:24 -08:00
Gyorgy Sarvari
9cc35e0f6d babeltrace2: fetch with https protocol
The source doesn't support the default "git" protocol anymore for
anonymous download, causing fetching failures.

(From OE-Core rev: 4351a427b2ec270ea5e4c698fe4c213036c1241b)

Signed-off-by: Gyorgy Sarvari <skandigraun@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
2025-11-19 08:21:24 -08:00
Alexander Kanavin
a916d3a38a xf86-video-intel: correct SRC_URI as freedesktop anongit is down
(From OE-Core rev: 04037a14e1431c4a51f5d51885974732a6108368)

(From OE-Core rev: e2c288a92f06af82559cf33db6c988b9dbc8b7ea)

Signed-off-by: Alexander Kanavin <alex@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9649bec517)
Signed-off-by: Gyorgy Sarvari <skandigraun@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
2025-11-19 08:21:24 -08:00
Gyorgy Sarvari
b0c11efc8f efibootmgr: update SRC_URI branch
master branch was renamed to main

(From OE-Core rev: 2c5b195e974ac54610d7b50c014752875004b0b9)

Signed-off-by: Gyorgy Sarvari <skandigraun@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
2025-11-19 08:21:24 -08:00
Soumya Sambu
478f5eaa61 python3-urllib3: Upgrade 1.26.18 -> 1.26.20
Includes fix for CVE-2024-37891

Changelog:
----------
https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/blob/1.26.20/CHANGES.rst

(From OE-Core rev: 2e805113fe0488224f05524360eeff729dd12d91)

Signed-off-by: Soumya Sambu <soumya.sambu@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
2025-11-19 08:21:24 -08:00
Vijay Anusuri
748f958fd3 xserver-xorg: Fix for CVE-2025-62231
Upstream-Status: Backport from 3baad99f9c

(From OE-Core rev: 05fe08caa0d4bd30510b496a300731a9754f24b8)

Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
2025-11-19 08:21:24 -08:00
Vijay Anusuri
73e3da5d44 xserver-xorg: Fix for CVE-2025-62230
Upstream-Status: Backport from
865089ca70
& 87fe255393

(From OE-Core rev: 215d63fd22b40148625215aac5c4e7f2629f5814)

Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
2025-11-19 08:21:24 -08:00
Vijay Anusuri
6b397fb207 xserver-xorg: Fix for CVE-2025-62229
Upstream-Status: Backport from 5a4286b13f

(From OE-Core rev: d1d0955ad41827f9c75ae726e7c725d2f82b6d18)

Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
2025-11-19 08:21:24 -08:00
Saquib Iltaf
6ab506f474 rust-cross-canadian: Ignore CVE-2024-43402
Ignore CVE-2024-43402 as its not applicable.

CVEs are specific to Microsoft Windows.

(From OE-Core rev: 3044ae9e6e84faada8c1425238e9e9c3060b1a3a)

Signed-off-by: Saquib Iltaf <saquib.iltaf@kpit.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
2025-11-19 08:21:24 -08:00
Peter Marko
809b3e9113 curl: ignore CVE-2025-10966
Per [1] this CVE applies only when wolfssl backed is used.
8.17.0 removed WolfSSL support completely.

[1] https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2025-10966.html

(From OE-Core rev: 41c4735658e9ba5322bd06ef50aa3a1edb1f7fd8)

Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
2025-11-19 08:21:24 -08:00
Jason Schonberg
e2d947b1cc Don't use ftp.gnome.org
http://ftp.gnome.org/pub/gnome redirects to https://download.gnome.org

 bitbake.conf defines ${GNOME_MIRROR} to be https://download.gnome.org/sources/

(From OE-Core rev: 1e1993b72f2b6109ce3d0ef950553b74b2b37b27)

Signed-off-by: Jason Schonberg <schonm@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
2025-11-06 07:14:05 -08:00
Praveen Kumar
1dd6d90744 bind: upgrade 9.18.33 -> 9.18.41
This upgrade fixes
CVE-2025-8677,CVE-2025-40778 and CVE-2025-40780.

Changelog
==========
https://downloads.isc.org/isc/bind9/9.18.41/doc/arm/html/changelog.html

(From OE-Core rev: deca51264991a2f6c6e450f8fa8b4a233280b700)

Signed-off-by: Praveen Kumar <praveen.kumar@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
2025-11-06 07:14:05 -08:00
Hitendra Prajapati
8641f0fec9 go: fix CVE-2024-24783
Upstream-Status: Backport be5b52bea6

(From OE-Core rev: b7d89fae22b317199b8f72978712075078a17005)

Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
2025-11-06 07:14:05 -08:00
Peter Marko
484d31c23d binutils: patch CVE-2025-11413
Pick commit per NVD CVE report.

Note that there were two patches for this, first [1] and then [2].
The second patch moved the original patch to different location.
Cherry-pick of second patch is successful leaving out the code removing
the code from first location, so the patch attached here is not
identical to the upstream commit but is identical to applying both and
merging them to a single patch.

[1] https://sourceware.org/git/?p=binutils-gdb.git;a=commitdiff;h=1108620d7a521f1c85d2f629031ce0fbae14e331
[2] https://sourceware.org/git/?p=binutils-gdb.git;a=commitdiff;h=72efdf166aa0ed72ecc69fc2349af6591a7a19c0

(From OE-Core rev: 98df728e6136d04af0f4922b7ffbeffb704de395)

(From OE-Core rev: 8d1a830c713a299f67fc512ed8bc0be21be4b9f0)

Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Dubois-Briand <mathieu.dubois-briand@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
2025-11-06 07:14:05 -08:00
Peter Marko
aaf9219788 binutils: patch CVE-2025-11412
Pick commit per NVD CVE report.

(From OE-Core rev: 6b94ff6c584a31d2b1e06d1e1dc19392d759b4b7)

(From OE-Core rev: 9130f3471f4814979cfdfa66ca118929f240cb30)

Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Dubois-Briand <mathieu.dubois-briand@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
2025-11-06 07:14:05 -08:00
Peter Marko
d152607f64 wpa-supplicant: patch CVE-2025-24912
Pick patches as listed in NVD CVE report.

Note that Debian lists one of the patches as introducing the
vulnerability. This is against what the original report [1] says.
Also the commit messages provide hints that the first patch fixes this
issue and second is fixing problem with the first patch.

[1] https://jvn.jp/en/jp/JVN19358384/

(From OE-Core rev: d0907754e0b44c5e41242bc1603278f86101fa31)

Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
2025-11-06 07:14:05 -08:00
Archana Polampalli
0de012f0f6 openssh: fix CVE-2025-61985
ssh in OpenSSH before 10.1 allows the '\0' character in an ssh:// URI, potentially
leading to code execution when a ProxyCommand is used.

(From OE-Core rev: 5170bd2f8a63bcc310667a327ea2ab96c783c4f6)

Signed-off-by: Archana Polampalli <archana.polampalli@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
2025-11-06 07:14:05 -08:00
Hongxu Jia
c4200e606c u-boot: fix CVE-2024-42040
Backport a patch [1] from upstrem to fix CVE-2024-42040 [2]

[1] 81e5708cc2
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-42040

(From OE-Core rev: f5b980ade1e952a181cb51d60268942095627c0d)

Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
2025-11-06 07:14:05 -08:00
111 changed files with 9090 additions and 74 deletions

View File

@@ -656,8 +656,8 @@ backported to a stable branch unless the bug in question does not affect the
master branch or the fix on the master branch is unsuitable for backporting.
The list of stable branches along with the status and maintainer for each
branch can be obtained from the
:yocto_wiki:`Releases wiki page </Releases>`.
branch can be obtained from the :yocto_home:`Releases </development/releases/>`
page.
.. note::

View File

@@ -111,17 +111,17 @@ occurred in your project. Perhaps an attempt to :ref:`modify a variable
<bitbake-user-manual/bitbake-user-manual-metadata:modifying existing
variables>` did not work out as expected.
BitBake's ``-e`` option is used to display variable values after
parsing. The following command displays the variable values after the
configuration files (i.e. ``local.conf``, ``bblayers.conf``,
BitBake's ``bitbake-getvar`` command is used to display variable values after
parsing. The following command displays the variable value for :term:`OVERRIDES`
after the configuration files (i.e. ``local.conf``, ``bblayers.conf``,
``bitbake.conf`` and so forth) have been parsed::
$ bitbake -e
$ bitbake-getvar OVERRIDES
The following command displays variable values after a specific recipe has
been parsed. The variables include those from the configuration as well::
The following command displays the value of :term:`PV` after a specific recipe
has been parsed::
$ bitbake -e recipename
$ bitbake-getvar -r recipename PV
.. note::
@@ -135,19 +135,25 @@ been parsed. The variables include those from the configuration as well::
the recipe datastore, which means that variables set within one task
will not be visible to other tasks.
In the output of ``bitbake -e``, each variable is preceded by a
description of how the variable got its value, including temporary
values that were later overridden. This description also includes
variable flags (varflags) set on the variable. The output can be very
In the output of ``bitbake-getvar``, the line containing the value of the
variable is preceded by a description of how the variable got its value,
including temporary values that were later overridden. This description also
includes variable flags (varflags) set on the variable. The output can be very
helpful during debugging.
Variables that are exported to the environment are preceded by
``export`` in the output of ``bitbake -e``. See the following example::
``export`` in the output of ``bitbake-getvar``. See the following example::
export CC="i586-poky-linux-gcc -m32 -march=i586 --sysroot=/home/ulf/poky/build/tmp/sysroots/qemux86"
In addition to variable values, the output of the ``bitbake -e`` and
``bitbake -e`` recipe commands includes the following information:
Shell functions and tasks can also be inspected with the same mechanism::
$ bitbake-getvar -r recipename do_install
For Python functions and tasks, ``bitbake -e recipename`` can be used instead.
Moreover, the output of the ``bitbake -e`` and ``bitbake -e`` recipe commands
includes the following information:
- The output starts with a tree listing all configuration files and
classes included globally, recursively listing the files they include

View File

@@ -123,10 +123,9 @@ Follow these general steps to create your layer without using tools:
Lists all layers on which this layer depends (if any).
- :term:`LAYERSERIES_COMPAT`:
Lists the :yocto_wiki:`Yocto Project </Releases>`
releases for which the current version is compatible. This
variable is a good way to indicate if your particular layer is
current.
Lists the :yocto_home:`Yocto Project releases </development/releases/>`
for which the current version is compatible. This variable is a good
way to indicate if your particular layer is current.
.. note::
@@ -822,6 +821,8 @@ The following list describes the available commands:
- ``create-layer``: Creates a basic layer.
- ``show-machines``: Lists the machines available in the currently configured layers.
Creating a General Layer Using the ``bitbake-layers`` Script
============================================================

View File

@@ -83,19 +83,20 @@ command::
OpenEmbedded recipe tool
options:
-d, --debug Enable debug output
-q, --quiet Print only errors
--color COLOR Colorize output (where COLOR is auto, always, never)
-h, --help show this help message and exit
-d, --debug Enable debug output
-q, --quiet Print only errors
--color COLOR Colorize output (where COLOR is auto, always, never)
-h, --help show this help message and exit
subcommands:
create Create a new recipe
newappend Create a bbappend for the specified target in the specified
layer
setvar Set a variable within a recipe
appendfile Create/update a bbappend to replace a target file
appendsrcfiles Create/update a bbappend to add or replace source files
appendsrcfile Create/update a bbappend to add or replace a source file
newappend Create a bbappend for the specified target in the specified layer
create Create a new recipe
setvar Set a variable within a recipe
appendfile Create/update a bbappend to replace a target file
appendsrcfiles Create/update a bbappend to add or replace source files
appendsrcfile Create/update a bbappend to add or replace a source file
edit Edit the recipe and appends for the specified target. This obeys $VISUAL if set,
otherwise $EDITOR, otherwise vi.
Use recipetool <subcommand> --help to get help on a specific command
Running ``recipetool create -o OUTFILE`` creates the base recipe and
@@ -218,9 +219,9 @@ compilation and packaging files, and so forth.
The path to the per-recipe temporary work directory depends on the
context in which it is being built. The quickest way to find this path
is to have BitBake return it by running the following::
is to use the ``bitbake-getvar`` utility::
$ bitbake -e basename | grep ^WORKDIR=
$ bitbake-getvar -r basename WORKDIR
As an example, assume a Source Directory
top-level folder named ``poky``, a default :term:`Build Directory` at
@@ -438,7 +439,7 @@ Licensing
=========
Your recipe needs to define variables related to the license
under whith the software is distributed. See the
under which the software is distributed. See the
:ref:`contributor-guide/recipe-style-guide:recipe license fields`
section in the Contributor Guide for details.

View File

@@ -44,10 +44,10 @@ See the
documentation for details regarding the policies and maintenance of stable
branches.
The :yocto_wiki:`Releases page </Releases>` contains a list
of all releases of the Yocto Project. Versions in gray are no longer actively
maintained with security patches, but well-tested patches may still be accepted
for them for significant issues.
The :yocto_home:`Releases </development/releases/>` page contains a list of all
releases of the Yocto Project, grouped into current and previous releases.
Previous releases are no longer actively maintained with security patches, but
well-tested patches may still be accepted for them for significant issues.
Security-related discussions at the Yocto Project
-------------------------------------------------

View File

@@ -676,7 +676,7 @@ described in the ":ref:`dev-manual/start:accessing index of releases`" section.
.. note::
For a "map" of Yocto Project releases to version numbers, see the
:yocto_wiki:`Releases </Releases>` wiki page.
:yocto_home:`Releases </development/releases/>` page.
You can use the "RELEASE ARCHIVE" link to reveal a menu of all Yocto
Project releases.

View File

@@ -1272,10 +1272,12 @@ appear in the ``.config`` file, which is in the :term:`Build Directory`.
It is simple to create a configuration fragment. One method is to use
shell commands. For example, issuing the following from the shell
creates a configuration fragment file named ``my_smp.cfg`` that enables
multi-processor support within the kernel::
creates a configuration fragment file named ``my_changes.cfg`` that enables
multi-processor support within the kernel and disables the FPGA
Configuration Framework::
$ echo "CONFIG_SMP=y" >> my_smp.cfg
$ echo "CONFIG_SMP=y" >> my_changes.cfg
$ echo "# CONFIG_FPGA is not set" >> my_changes.cfg
.. note::
@@ -1512,15 +1514,13 @@ Expanding Variables
===================
Sometimes it is helpful to determine what a variable expands to during a
build. You can examine the values of variables by examining the
output of the ``bitbake -e`` command. The output is long and is more
easily managed in a text file, which allows for easy searches::
build. You can examine the value of a variable by running the ``bitbake-getvar``
command::
$ bitbake -e virtual/kernel > some_text_file
$ bitbake-getvar -r virtual/kernel VARIABLE
Within the text file, you can see
exactly how each variable is expanded and used by the OpenEmbedded build
system.
The output of the command explains exactly how the variable is expanded and used
by the :term:`OpenEmbedded Build System`.
Working with a "Dirty" Kernel Version String
============================================

View File

@@ -37,3 +37,4 @@ Release 4.0 (kirkstone)
release-notes-4.0.28
release-notes-4.0.29
release-notes-4.0.30
release-notes-4.0.31

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@@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
Release notes for Yocto-4.0.31 (Kirkstone)
------------------------------------------
Security Fixes in Yocto-4.0.31
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
- binutils: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-8225`, :cve_nist:`2025-11081`, :cve_nist:`2025-11082` and
:cve_nist:`2025-11083`
- busybox: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-46394`
- cmake: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-9301`
- curl: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-9086`
- ffmpeg: Ignore :cve_nist:`2023-6603`
- ffmpeg: mark :cve_nist:`2023-6601` as Fixed
- ghostscript: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-59798`, :cve_nist:`2025-59799` and :cve_nist:`2025-59800`
- git: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-48386`
- glib-networking: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-60018` and :cve_nist:`2025-60019`
- go: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-47906` and :cve_nist:`2025-47907`
- grub2: Fix :cve_nist:`2024-56738`
- grub: Ignore :cve_nist:`2024-2312`
- gstreamer1.0-plugins-bad: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-3887`
- gstreamer1.0: Ignore :cve_nist:`2025-2759`, :cve_nist:`2025-3887`, :cve_nist:`2025-47183`,
:cve_nist:`2025-47219`, :cve_nist:`2025-47806`, :cve_nist:`2025-47807` and :cve_nist:`2025-47808`
- python3-jinja2: Fix :cve_nist:`2024-56201`, :cve_nist:`2024-56326` and :cve_nist:`2025-27516`
- libxml2: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-9714`
- libxslt: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-7424`
- lz4: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-62813`
- openssl: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-9230` and :cve_nist:`2025-9232`
- pulseaudio: Ignore :cve_nist:`2024-11586`
- python3: Fix :cve_nist:`2024-6345`, :cve_nist:`2025-47273` and :cve_nist:`2025-59375`
- qemu: Fix :cve_nist:`2024-8354`
- tiff: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-8961`, :cve_nist:`2025-9165` and :cve_nist:`2025-9900`
- vim: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-9389`
Fixes in Yocto-4.0.31
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
- build-appliance-image: Update to kirkstone head revision
- poky.conf: bump version for 4.0.31
- ref-manual/classes.rst: document the relative_symlinks class
- ref-manual/classes.rst: gettext: extend the documentation of the class
- ref-manual/variables.rst: document the CCACHE_DISABLE, UNINATIVE_CHECKSUM, UNINATIVE_URL, USE_NLS,
REQUIRED_COMBINED_FEATURES, REQUIRED_IMAGE_FEATURES, :term:`REQUIRED_MACHINE_FEATURES` variable
- ref-manual/variables.rst: fix :term:`LAYERDEPENDS` description
- dev-manual, test-manual: Update autobuilder output links
- ref-manual/classes.rst: extend the uninative class documentation
- python3: upgrade to 3.10.19
- linux-yocto/5.15: update to v5.15.194
- glibc: : PTHREAD_COND_INITIALIZER compatibility with pre-2.41 versions (bug 32786)
- glibc: nptl Use all of g1_start and g_signals
- glibc: nptl rename __condvar_quiesce_and_switch_g1
- glibc: nptl Fix indentation
- glibc: nptl Use a single loop in pthread_cond_wait instaed of a nested loop
- glibc: Remove g_refs from condition variables
- glibc: nptl Remove unnecessary quadruple check in pthread_cond_wait
- glibc: nptl Remove unnecessary catch-all-wake in condvar group switch
- glibc: nptl Update comments and indentation for new condvar implementation
- glibc: pthreads NPTL lost wakeup fix 2
- glibc: Remove partial BZ#25847 backport patches
- vulnerabilities: update nvdcve file name
- migration-guides: add release notes for 4.0.30
- oeqa/sdk/cases/buildcpio.py: use gnu mirror instead of main server
- selftest/cases/meta_ide.py: use use gnu mirror instead of main server
- conf/bitbake.conf: use gnu mirror instead of main server
- p11-kit: backport fix for handle :term:`USE_NLS` from master
- systemd: backport fix for handle :term:`USE_NLS` from master
- glibc: stable 2.35 branch updates
- openssl: upgrade to 3.0.18
- scripts/install-buildtools: Update to 4.0.30
- ref-manual/variables.rst: fix the description of :term:`STAGING_DIR`
- ref-manual/structure: document the auto.conf file
- dev-manual/building.rst: add note about externalsrc variables absolute paths
- ref-manual/variables.rst: fix the description of :term:`KBUILD_DEFCONFIG`
- kernel-dev/common.rst: fix the in-tree defconfig description
- test-manual/yocto-project-compatible.rst: fix a typo
- contributor-guide: submit-changes: make "Crediting contributors" part of "Commit your changes"
- contributor-guide: submit-changes: number instruction list in commit your changes
- contributor-guide: submit-changes: reword commit message instructions
- contributor-guide: submit-changes: make the Cc tag follow kernel guidelines
- contributor-guide: submit-changes: align :term:`CC` tag description
- contributor-guide: submit-changes: clarify example with Yocto bug ID
- contributor-guide: submit-changes: fix improper bold string
- libhandy: update git branch name
- python3-jinja2: upgrade to 3.1.6
- vim: upgrade to 9.1.1683
Known Issues in Yocto-4.0.31
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
- N/A
Contributors to Yocto-4.0.31
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
- Adam Blank
- Aleksandar Nikolic
- Antonin Godard
- Archana Polampalli
- AshishKumar Mishra
- Bruce Ashfield
- Deepesh Varatharajan
- Divya Chellam
- Gyorgy Sarvari
- Hitendra Prajapati
- João Marcos Costa
- Lee Chee Yang
- Paul Barker
- Peter Marko
- Praveen Kumar
- Quentin Schulz
- Rajeshkumar Ramasamy
- Saravanan
- Soumya Sambu
- Steve Sakoman
- Sunil Dora
- Talel BELHAJ SALEM
- Theo GAIGE
- Vijay Anusuri
- Yash Shinde
- Yogita Urade
Repositories / Downloads for Yocto-4.0.31
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
yocto-docs
- Repository Location: :yocto_git:`/yocto-docs`
- Branch: :yocto_git:`kirkstone </yocto-docs/log/?h=kirkstone>`
- Tag: :yocto_git:`yocto-4.0.31 </yocto-docs/log/?h=yocto-4.0.31>`
- Git Revision: :yocto_git:`073f3bca4c374b03398317e7f445d2440a287741 </yocto-docs/commit/?id=073f3bca4c374b03398317e7f445d2440a287741>`
- Release Artefact: yocto-docs-073f3bca4c374b03398317e7f445d2440a287741
- sha: 3bfde9b6ad310dd42817509b67f61cd69552f74b2bc5011bd20788fe96d6823b
- Download Locations:
https://downloads.yoctoproject.org/releases/yocto/yocto-4.0.31/yocto-docs-073f3bca4c374b03398317e7f445d2440a287741.tar.bz2
https://mirrors.edge.kernel.org/yocto/yocto/yocto-4.0.31/yocto-docs-073f3bca4c374b03398317e7f445d2440a287741.tar.bz2
poky
- Repository Location: :yocto_git:`/poky`
- Branch: :yocto_git:`kirkstone </poky/log/?h=kirkstone>`
- Tag: :yocto_git:`yocto-4.0.31 </poky/log/?h=yocto-4.0.31>`
- Git Revision: :yocto_git:`04b39e5b7eb19498215d85c88a5fffb460fea1eb </poky/commit/?id=04b39e5b7eb19498215d85c88a5fffb460fea1eb>`
- Release Artefact: poky-04b39e5b7eb19498215d85c88a5fffb460fea1eb
- sha: 0ca18ab1ed25c0d77412ba30dbb03d74811756c7c2fe2401940f848a5e734930
- Download Locations:
https://downloads.yoctoproject.org/releases/yocto/yocto-4.0.31/poky-04b39e5b7eb19498215d85c88a5fffb460fea1eb.tar.bz2
https://mirrors.edge.kernel.org/yocto/yocto/yocto-4.0.31/poky-04b39e5b7eb19498215d85c88a5fffb460fea1eb.tar.bz2
openembedded-core
- Repository Location: :oe_git:`/openembedded-core`
- Branch: :oe_git:`kirkstone </openembedded-core/log/?h=kirkstone>`
- Tag: :oe_git:`yocto-4.0.31 </openembedded-core/log/?h=yocto-4.0.31>`
- Git Revision: :oe_git:`99204008786f659ab03538cd2ae2fd23ed4164c5 </openembedded-core/commit/?id=99204008786f659ab03538cd2ae2fd23ed4164c5>`
- Release Artefact: oecore-99204008786f659ab03538cd2ae2fd23ed4164c5
- sha: aa97bf826ad217b3a5278b4ad60bef4d194f0f1ff617677cf2323d3cc4897687
- Download Locations:
https://downloads.yoctoproject.org/releases/yocto/yocto-4.0.31/oecore-99204008786f659ab03538cd2ae2fd23ed4164c5.tar.bz2
https://mirrors.edge.kernel.org/yocto/yocto/yocto-4.0.31/oecore-99204008786f659ab03538cd2ae2fd23ed4164c5.tar.bz2
meta-yocto
- Repository Location: :yocto_git:`/meta-yocto`
- Branch: :yocto_git:`kirkstone </meta-yocto/log/?h=kirkstone>`
- Tag: :yocto_git:`yocto-4.0.31 </meta-yocto/log/?h=yocto-4.0.31>`
- Git Revision: :yocto_git:`3b2df00345b46479237fe0218675a818249f891c </meta-yocto/commit/?id=3b2df00345b46479237fe0218675a818249f891c>`
- Release Artefact: meta-yocto-3b2df00345b46479237fe0218675a818249f891c
- sha: 630e99e0f515bab8a316b2e32aff1352b4404f15aa087e8821b84093596a08ce
- Download Locations:
https://downloads.yoctoproject.org/releases/yocto/yocto-4.0.31/meta-yocto-3b2df00345b46479237fe0218675a818249f891c.tar.bz2
https://mirrors.edge.kernel.org/yocto/yocto/yocto-4.0.31/meta-yocto-3b2df00345b46479237fe0218675a818249f891c.tar.bz2
meta-mingw
- Repository Location: :yocto_git:`/meta-mingw`
- Branch: :yocto_git:`kirkstone </meta-mingw/log/?h=kirkstone>`
- Tag: :yocto_git:`yocto-4.0.31 </meta-mingw/log/?h=yocto-4.0.31>`
- Git Revision: :yocto_git:`87c22abb1f11be430caf4372e6b833dc7d77564e </meta-mingw/commit/?id=87c22abb1f11be430caf4372e6b833dc7d77564e>`
- Release Artefact: meta-mingw-87c22abb1f11be430caf4372e6b833dc7d77564e
- sha: f0bc4873e2e0319fb9d6d6ab9b98eb3f89664d4339a167d2db6a787dd12bc1a8
- Download Locations:
https://downloads.yoctoproject.org/releases/yocto/yocto-4.0.31/meta-mingw-87c22abb1f11be430caf4372e6b833dc7d77564e.tar.bz2
https://mirrors.edge.kernel.org/yocto/yocto/yocto-4.0.31/meta-mingw-87c22abb1f11be430caf4372e6b833dc7d77564e.tar.bz2
meta-gplv2
- Repository Location: :yocto_git:`/meta-gplv2`
- Branch: :yocto_git:`kirkstone </meta-gplv2/log/?h=kirkstone>`
- Tag: :yocto_git:`yocto-4.0.31 </meta-gplv2/log/?h=yocto-4.0.31>`
- Git Revision: :yocto_git:`d2f8b5cdb285b72a4ed93450f6703ca27aa42e8a </meta-gplv2/commit/?id=d2f8b5cdb285b72a4ed93450f6703ca27aa42e8a>`
- Release Artefact: meta-gplv2-d2f8b5cdb285b72a4ed93450f6703ca27aa42e8a
- sha: c386f59f8a672747dc3d0be1d4234b6039273d0e57933eb87caa20f56b9cca6d
- Download Locations:
https://downloads.yoctoproject.org/releases/yocto/yocto-4.0.31/meta-gplv2-d2f8b5cdb285b72a4ed93450f6703ca27aa42e8a.tar.bz2
https://mirrors.edge.kernel.org/yocto/yocto/yocto-4.0.31/meta-gplv2-d2f8b5cdb285b72a4ed93450f6703ca27aa42e8a.tar.bz2
bitbake
- Repository Location: :oe_git:`/bitbake`
- Branch: :oe_git:`2.0 </bitbake/log/?h=2.0>`
- Tag: :oe_git:`yocto-4.0.31 </bitbake/log/?h=yocto-4.0.31>`
- Git Revision: :oe_git:`8e2d1f8de055549b2101614d85454fcd1d0f94b2 </bitbake/commit/?id=8e2d1f8de055549b2101614d85454fcd1d0f94b2>`
- Release Artefact: bitbake-8e2d1f8de055549b2101614d85454fcd1d0f94b2
- sha: fad4e7699bae62082118e89785324b031b0af0743064caee87c91ba28549afb0
- Download Locations:
https://downloads.yoctoproject.org/releases/yocto/yocto-4.0.31/bitbake-8e2d1f8de055549b2101614d85454fcd1d0f94b2.tar.bz2
https://mirrors.edge.kernel.org/yocto/yocto/yocto-4.0.31/bitbake-8e2d1f8de055549b2101614d85454fcd1d0f94b2.tar.bz2

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transform="scale(0.99784993,1.0021547)"
inkscape:label="oe-text"><tspan
sodipodi:role="line"
id="tspan13"
style="font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;font-stretch:normal;font-size:3.01677px;font-family:'Liberation Sans';-inkscape-font-specification:'Liberation Sans, Normal';font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;stroke-width:0"
x="40.36692"
y="160.98824">Open Source Build Engine</tspan><tspan
sodipodi:role="line"
style="font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;font-stretch:normal;font-size:3.01677px;font-family:'Liberation Sans';-inkscape-font-specification:'Liberation Sans, Normal';font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;stroke-width:0"
x="40.36692"
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id="tspan14">and YP-Compatible Metadata</tspan><tspan
sodipodi:role="line"
style="font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;font-stretch:normal;font-size:3.01677px;font-family:'Liberation Sans';-inkscape-font-specification:'Liberation Sans, Normal';font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;stroke-width:0"
x="40.36692"
y="168.53017"
id="tspan15">for Embedded Linux</tspan></text></g></svg>

After

Width:  |  Height:  |  Size: 12 KiB

View File

@@ -23,8 +23,8 @@ comes to delivering embedded software stacks. The project allows
software customizations and build interchange for multiple hardware
platforms as well as software stacks that can be maintained and scaled.
.. image:: figures/key-dev-elements.png
:align: center
.. image:: svg/key-dev-elements.*
:width: 100%
For further introductory information on the Yocto Project, you might be
interested in this

View File

@@ -62,7 +62,8 @@ codename are likely to be compatible and thus work together.
Releases are given a nominal release version as well but the codename is
used in repositories for this reason. You can find information on Yocto
Project releases and codenames at :yocto_wiki:`/Releases`.
Project releases and codenames in the :yocto_home:`Releases page
</development/releases/>`.
Our :doc:`/migration-guides/index` detail how to migrate from one release of
the Yocto Project to the next.

View File

@@ -5549,8 +5549,8 @@ system and gives an overview of their function and contents.
.. note::
An easy way to see what overrides apply is to search for :term:`OVERRIDES`
in the output of the ``bitbake -e`` command. See the
An easy way to see what overrides apply is to run the command
``bitbake-getvar -r myrecipe OVERRIDES``. See the
":ref:`dev-manual/debugging:viewing variable values`" section in the Yocto
Project Development Tasks Manual for more information.

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
DISTRO = "poky"
DISTRO_NAME = "Poky (Yocto Project Reference Distro)"
#DISTRO_VERSION = "3.4+snapshot-${METADATA_REVISION}"
DISTRO_VERSION = "4.0.31"
DISTRO_VERSION = "4.0.32"
DISTRO_CODENAME = "kirkstone"
SDK_VENDOR = "-pokysdk"
SDK_VERSION = "${@d.getVar('DISTRO_VERSION').replace('snapshot-${METADATA_REVISION}', 'snapshot')}"

View File

@@ -18,6 +18,9 @@ TARGET_GOMIPS = "${@go_map_mips(d.getVar('TARGET_ARCH'), d.getVar('TUNE_FEATURES
TARGET_GOARM:class-native = "7"
TARGET_GO386:class-native = "sse2"
TARGET_GOMIPS:class-native = "hardfloat"
TARGET_GOARM:class-crosssdk = "7"
TARGET_GO386:class-crosssdk = "sse2"
TARGET_GOMIPS:class-crosssdk = "hardfloat"
TARGET_GOTUPLE = "${TARGET_GOOS}_${TARGET_GOARCH}"
GO_BUILD_BINDIR = "${@['bin/${HOST_GOTUPLE}','bin'][d.getVar('BUILD_GOTUPLE') == d.getVar('HOST_GOTUPLE')]}"

View File

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ DEPENDS = "efivar popt"
COMPATIBLE_HOST = "(i.86|x86_64|arm|aarch64).*-linux"
SRC_URI = "git://github.com/rhinstaller/efibootmgr.git;protocol=https;branch=master \
SRC_URI = "git://github.com/rhinstaller/efibootmgr.git;protocol=https;branch=main \
file://0001-remove-extra-decl.patch \
file://97668ae0bce776a36ea2001dea63d376be8274ac.patch \
file://0001-src-make-compatible-with-efivar-38.patch \

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
From 1406fc918977bba4dac0af5e22e63a5553aa6aff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Paul HENRYS <paul.henrys_ext@softathome.com>
Date: Thu, 9 Oct 2025 17:43:28 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] net: bootp: Prevent buffer overflow to avoid leaking the RAM
content
CVE-2024-42040 describes a possible buffer overflow when calling
bootp_process_vendor() in bootp_handler() since the total length
of the packet is passed to bootp_process_vendor() without being
reduced to len-(offsetof(struct bootp_hdr,bp_vend)+4).
The packet length is also checked against its minimum size to avoid
reading data from struct bootp_hdr outside of the packet length.
Signed-off-by: Paul HENRYS <paul.henrys_ext@softathome.com>
Signed-off-by: Philippe Reynes <philippe.reynes@softathome.com>
CVE: CVE-2024-42040
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://source.denx.de/u-boot/u-boot/-/commit/81e5708cc2c865df606e49aed5415adb2a662171]
Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com>
---
net/bootp.c | 11 ++++++++++-
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/bootp.c b/net/bootp.c
index 68002909634..843180d296c 100644
--- a/net/bootp.c
+++ b/net/bootp.c
@@ -362,6 +362,14 @@ static void bootp_handler(uchar *pkt, unsigned dest, struct in_addr sip,
debug("got BOOTP packet (src=%d, dst=%d, len=%d want_len=%zu)\n",
src, dest, len, sizeof(struct bootp_hdr));
+ /* Check the minimum size of a BOOTP packet is respected.
+ * A BOOTP packet is between 300 bytes and 576 bytes big
+ */
+ if (len < offsetof(struct bootp_hdr, bp_vend) + 64) {
+ printf("Error: got an invalid BOOTP packet (len=%u)\n", len);
+ return;
+ }
+
bp = (struct bootp_hdr *)pkt;
/* Filter out pkts we don't want */
@@ -379,7 +387,8 @@ static void bootp_handler(uchar *pkt, unsigned dest, struct in_addr sip,
/* Retrieve extended information (we must parse the vendor area) */
if (net_read_u32((u32 *)&bp->bp_vend[0]) == htonl(BOOTP_VENDOR_MAGIC))
- bootp_process_vendor((uchar *)&bp->bp_vend[4], len);
+ bootp_process_vendor((uchar *)&bp->bp_vend[4], len -
+ (offsetof(struct bootp_hdr, bp_vend) + 4));
net_set_timeout_handler(0, (thand_f *)0);
bootstage_mark_name(BOOTSTAGE_ID_BOOTP_STOP, "bootp_stop");
--
2.49.0

View File

@@ -14,7 +14,9 @@ PE = "1"
# repo during parse
SRCREV = "d637294e264adfeb29f390dfc393106fd4d41b17"
SRC_URI = "git://source.denx.de/u-boot/u-boot.git;protocol=https;branch=master"
SRC_URI = "git://source.denx.de/u-boot/u-boot.git;protocol=https;branch=master \
file://CVE-2024-42040.patch \
"
S = "${WORKDIR}/git"
B = "${WORKDIR}/build"

View File

@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://ftp.isc.org/isc/bind9/${PV}/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.xz \
file://0001-avoid-start-failure-with-bind-user.patch \
"
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "fb373fac5ebbc41c645160afd5a9fb451918f6c0e69ab1d9474154e2b515de40"
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "6ddc1d981511c4da0b203b0513af131e5d15e5f1c261145736fe1f35dd1fe79d"
UPSTREAM_CHECK_URI = "https://ftp.isc.org/isc/bind9/"
# follow the ESV versions divisible by 2

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
From 35d5917652106aede47621bb3f64044604164043 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
Date: Thu, 4 Sep 2025 00:29:09 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] upstream: Improve rules for %-expansion of username.
Usernames passed on the commandline will no longer be subject to
% expansion. Some tools invoke ssh with connection information
(i.e. usernames and host names) supplied from untrusted sources.
These may contain % expansion sequences which could yield
unexpected results.
Since openssh-9.6, all usernames have been subject to validity
checking. This change tightens the validity checks by refusing
usernames that include control characters (again, these can cause
surprises when supplied adversarially).
This change also relaxes the validity checks in one small way:
usernames supplied via the configuration file as literals (i.e.
include no % expansion characters) are not subject to these
validity checks. This allows usernames that contain arbitrary
characters to be used, but only via configuration files. This
is done on the basis that ssh's configuration is trusted.
Pointed out by David Leadbeater, ok deraadt@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e2f0c871fbe664aba30607321575e7c7fc798362
CVE: CVE-2025-61984
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/35d5917652106aede47621bb3f64044604164043]
Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
---
ssh.c | 11 +++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
index 82ed15f..d4e2040 100644
--- a/ssh.c
+++ b/ssh.c
@@ -634,6 +634,8 @@ valid_ruser(const char *s)
if (*s == '-')
return 0;
for (i = 0; s[i] != 0; i++) {
+ if (iscntrl((u_char)s[i]))
+ return 0;
if (strchr("'`\";&<>|(){}", s[i]) != NULL)
return 0;
/* Disallow '-' after whitespace */
@@ -655,6 +657,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
struct ssh *ssh = NULL;
int i, r, opt, exit_status, use_syslog, direct, timeout_ms;
int was_addr, config_test = 0, opt_terminated = 0, want_final_pass = 0;
+ int user_on_commandline = 0, user_was_default = 0, user_expanded = 0;
char *p, *cp, *line, *argv0, *logfile, *host_arg;
char cname[NI_MAXHOST], thishost[NI_MAXHOST];
struct stat st;
@@ -995,8 +998,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
}
break;
case 'l':
- if (options.user == NULL)
+ if (options.user == NULL) {
options.user = optarg;
+ user_on_commandline = 1;
+ }
break;
case 'L':
@@ -1099,6 +1104,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
if (options.user == NULL) {
options.user = tuser;
tuser = NULL;
+ user_on_commandline = 1;
}
free(tuser);
if (options.port == -1 && tport != -1)
@@ -1113,6 +1119,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
if (options.user == NULL) {
options.user = p;
p = NULL;
+ user_on_commandline = 1;
}
*cp++ = '\0';
host = xstrdup(cp);
@@ -1265,8 +1272,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
if (fill_default_options(&options) != 0)
cleanup_exit(255);
- if (options.user == NULL)
+ if (options.user == NULL) {
+ user_was_default = 1;
options.user = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
+ }
/*
* If ProxyJump option specified, then construct a ProxyCommand now.
--
2.50.1

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
From 54928cb9eaa7143ff17f463efa7ed3109afdbf30 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
Date: Thu, 4 Sep 2025 00:30:06 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] upstream: don't allow \0 characters in url-encoded strings.
Suggested by David Leadbeater, ok deraadt@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c92196cef0f970ceabc1e8007a80b01e9b7cd49c
CVE: CVE-2025-61985
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/43b3bff47bb029f2299bacb6a36057981b39fdb0]
Signed-off-by: Archana Polampalli <archana.polampalli@windriver.com>
---
misc.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/misc.c b/misc.c
index 6135b15..3d133b5 100644
--- a/misc.c
+++ b/misc.c
@@ -934,9 +934,10 @@ urldecode(const char *src)
*dst++ = ' ';
break;
case '%':
+ /* note: don't allow \0 characters */
if (!isxdigit((unsigned char)src[1]) ||
!isxdigit((unsigned char)src[2]) ||
- (ch = hexchar(src + 1)) == -1) {
+ (ch = hexchar(src + 1)) == -1 || ch == 0) {
free(ret);
return NULL;
}
--
2.40.0

View File

@@ -39,6 +39,8 @@ SRC_URI = "http://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-${PV}.tar
file://CVE-2024-6387.patch \
file://CVE-2025-26465.patch \
file://CVE-2025-32728.patch \
file://CVE-2025-61985.patch \
file://CVE-2025-61984.patch \
"
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "fd497654b7ab1686dac672fb83dfb4ba4096e8b5ffcdaccd262380ae58bec5e7"

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
From 726432d7622cc0088ac353d073b59628b590ea44 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Date: Sat, 25 Jan 2025 11:21:16 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] RADIUS: Drop pending request only when accepting the response
The case of an invalid authenticator in a RADIUS response could imply
that the response is not from the correct RADIUS server and as such,
such a response should be discarded without changing internal state for
the pending request. The case of an unknown response (RADIUS_RX_UNKNOWN)
is somewhat more complex since it could have been indicated before
validating the authenticator. In any case, it seems better to change the
state for the pending request only when we have fully accepted the
response.
Allowing the internal state of pending RADIUS request to change based on
responses that are not fully validation could have allow at least a
theoretical DoS attack if an attacker were to have means for injecting
RADIUS messages to the network using the IP address of the real RADIUS
server and being able to do so more quickly than the real server and
with the matching identifier from the request header (i.e., either by
flooding 256 responses quickly or by having means to capture the RADIUS
request). These should not really be realistic options in a properly
protected deployment, but nevertheless it is good to be more careful in
processing RADIUS responses.
Remove a pending RADIUS request from the internal list only when having
fully accepted a matching RADIUS response, i.e., after one of the
registered handlers has confirmed that the authenticator is valid and
processing of the response has succeeded.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
CVE: CVE-2025-24912
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/?id=726432d7622cc0088ac353d073b59628b590ea44]
Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
---
src/radius/radius_client.c | 15 +++++++--------
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/radius/radius_client.c b/src/radius/radius_client.c
index 2a7f36170..7909b29a7 100644
--- a/src/radius/radius_client.c
+++ b/src/radius/radius_client.c
@@ -922,13 +922,6 @@ static void radius_client_receive(int sock, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx)
roundtrip / 100, roundtrip % 100);
rconf->round_trip_time = roundtrip;
- /* Remove ACKed RADIUS packet from retransmit list */
- if (prev_req)
- prev_req->next = req->next;
- else
- radius->msgs = req->next;
- radius->num_msgs--;
-
for (i = 0; i < num_handlers; i++) {
RadiusRxResult res;
res = handlers[i].handler(msg, req->msg, req->shared_secret,
@@ -939,6 +932,13 @@ static void radius_client_receive(int sock, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx)
radius_msg_free(msg);
/* fall through */
case RADIUS_RX_QUEUED:
+ /* Remove ACKed RADIUS packet from retransmit list */
+ if (prev_req)
+ prev_req->next = req->next;
+ else
+ radius->msgs = req->next;
+ radius->num_msgs--;
+
radius_client_msg_free(req);
return;
case RADIUS_RX_INVALID_AUTHENTICATOR:
@@ -960,7 +960,6 @@ static void radius_client_receive(int sock, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx)
msg_type, hdr->code, hdr->identifier,
invalid_authenticator ? " [INVALID AUTHENTICATOR]" :
"");
- radius_client_msg_free(req);
fail:
radius_msg_free(msg);

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
From 339a334551ca911187cc870f4f97ef08e11db109 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Date: Wed, 5 Feb 2025 19:23:39 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] RADIUS: Fix pending request dropping
A recent change to this moved the place where the processed RADIUS
request was removed from the pending list to happen after the message
handler had been called. This did not take into account possibility of
the handler adding a new pending request in the list and the prev_req
pointer not necessarily pointing to the correct entry anymore. As such,
some of the pending requests could have been lost and that would result
in not being able to process responses to those requests and also, to a
memory leak.
Fix this by determining prev_req at the point when the pending request
is being removed, i.e., after the handler function has already added a
new entry.
Fixes: 726432d7622c ("RADIUS: Drop pending request only when accepting the response")
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
CVE: CVE-2025-24912
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/?id=339a334551ca911187cc870f4f97ef08e11db109]
Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
---
src/radius/radius_client.c | 10 +++++++---
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/radius/radius_client.c b/src/radius/radius_client.c
index 7909b29a7..d4faa7936 100644
--- a/src/radius/radius_client.c
+++ b/src/radius/radius_client.c
@@ -824,7 +824,7 @@ static void radius_client_receive(int sock, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx)
struct radius_hdr *hdr;
struct radius_rx_handler *handlers;
size_t num_handlers, i;
- struct radius_msg_list *req, *prev_req;
+ struct radius_msg_list *req, *prev_req, *r;
struct os_reltime now;
struct hostapd_radius_server *rconf;
int invalid_authenticator = 0;
@@ -887,7 +887,6 @@ static void radius_client_receive(int sock, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx)
break;
}
- prev_req = NULL;
req = radius->msgs;
while (req) {
/* TODO: also match by src addr:port of the packet when using
@@ -899,7 +898,6 @@ static void radius_client_receive(int sock, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx)
hdr->identifier)
break;
- prev_req = req;
req = req->next;
}
@@ -933,6 +931,12 @@ static void radius_client_receive(int sock, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx)
/* fall through */
case RADIUS_RX_QUEUED:
/* Remove ACKed RADIUS packet from retransmit list */
+ prev_req = NULL;
+ for (r = radius->msgs; r; r = r->next) {
+ if (r == req)
+ break;
+ prev_req = r;
+ }
if (prev_req)
prev_req->next = req->next;
else

View File

@@ -43,6 +43,8 @@ SRC_URI = "http://w1.fi/releases/wpa_supplicant-${PV}.tar.gz \
file://CVE-2022-37660-0003.patch \
file://CVE-2022-37660-0004.patch \
file://CVE-2022-37660-0005.patch \
file://CVE-2025-24912-01.patch \
file://CVE-2025-24912-02.patch \
"
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "20df7ae5154b3830355f8ab4269123a87affdea59fe74fe9292a91d0d7e17b2f"

View File

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ IMAGE_FSTYPES = "wic.vmdk wic.vhd wic.vhdx"
inherit core-image setuptools3
SRCREV ?= "8d5cd4a310e1807e841b25aaa46261dc24cea1eb"
SRCREV ?= "cb1206dd8460f2701df03b1e9224825bad23a90e"
SRC_URI = "git://git.yoctoproject.org/poky;branch=kirkstone \
file://Yocto_Build_Appliance.vmx \
file://Yocto_Build_Appliance.vmxf \

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,802 @@
From 87786d6200ae1f5ac98d21f04d451e17ff25a216 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Kilzer <ddkilzer@apple.com>
Reviewed-By: Aron Xu <aron@debian.org>
Date: Mon, 23 Jun 2025 14:41:56 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] libxslt: heap-use-after-free in xmlFreeID caused by `atype`
corruption
* include/libxml/tree.h:
(XML_ATTR_CLEAR_ATYPE): Add.
(XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE): Add.
(XML_ATTR_SET_ATYPE): Add.
(XML_NODE_ADD_EXTRA): Add.
(XML_NODE_CLEAR_EXTRA): Add.
(XML_NODE_GET_EXTRA): Add.
(XML_NODE_SET_EXTRA): Add.
(XML_DOC_ADD_PROPERTIES): Add.
(XML_DOC_CLEAR_PROPERTIES): Add.
(XML_DOC_GET_PROPERTIES): Add.
(XML_DOC_SET_PROPERTIES): Add.
- Add macros for accessing fields with upper bits that may be set by
libxslt.
* HTMLparser.c:
(htmlNewDocNoDtD):
* SAX2.c:
(xmlSAX2StartDocument):
(xmlSAX2EndDocument):
* parser.c:
(xmlParseEntityDecl):
(xmlParseExternalSubset):
(xmlParseReference):
(xmlCtxtParseDtd):
* runxmlconf.c:
(xmlconfTestInvalid):
(xmlconfTestValid):
* tree.c:
(xmlNewDoc):
(xmlFreeProp):
(xmlNodeSetDoc):
(xmlSetNsProp):
(xmlDOMWrapAdoptBranch):
* valid.c:
(xmlFreeID):
(xmlAddIDInternal):
(xmlValidateAttributeValueInternal):
(xmlValidateOneAttribute):
(xmlValidateRef):
* xmlreader.c:
(xmlTextReaderStartElement):
(xmlTextReaderStartElementNs):
(xmlTextReaderValidateEntity):
(xmlTextReaderRead):
(xmlTextReaderNext):
(xmlTextReaderIsEmptyElement):
(xmlTextReaderPreserve):
* xmlschemas.c:
(xmlSchemaPValAttrNodeID):
* xmlschemastypes.c:
(xmlSchemaValAtomicType):
- Adopt macros by renaming the struct fields, recompiling and fixing
compiler failures, then changing the struct field names back.
Origin: https://launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/libxml2/2.9.14+dfsg-1.3ubuntu3.6
Ref : https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2025-7425
CVE: CVE-2025-7425
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libxslt/-/issues/140]
Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
---
HTMLparser.c | 1 +
SAX2.c | 6 ++--
include/libxml/tree.h | 14 ++++++++-
parser.c | 8 ++---
runxmlconf.c | 4 +--
tree.c | 20 ++++++-------
valid.c | 68 +++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
xmlreader.c | 30 +++++++++----------
xmlschemas.c | 4 +--
xmlschemastypes.c | 12 ++++----
10 files changed, 90 insertions(+), 77 deletions(-)
diff --git a/HTMLparser.c b/HTMLparser.c
index e720bb2..1307f71 100644
--- a/HTMLparser.c
+++ b/HTMLparser.c
@@ -2514,6 +2514,7 @@ htmlNewDocNoDtD(const xmlChar *URI, const xmlChar *ExternalID) {
cur->refs = NULL;
cur->_private = NULL;
cur->charset = XML_CHAR_ENCODING_UTF8;
+ XML_DOC_SET_PROPERTIES(cur, XML_DOC_HTML | XML_DOC_USERBUILT);
cur->properties = XML_DOC_HTML | XML_DOC_USERBUILT;
if ((ExternalID != NULL) ||
(URI != NULL))
diff --git a/SAX2.c b/SAX2.c
index f7c77c2..0d8e84a 100644
--- a/SAX2.c
+++ b/SAX2.c
@@ -970,7 +970,7 @@ xmlSAX2StartDocument(void *ctx)
xmlSAX2ErrMemory(ctxt, "xmlSAX2StartDocument");
return;
}
- ctxt->myDoc->properties = XML_DOC_HTML;
+ XML_DOC_SET_PROPERTIES(ctxt->myDoc, XML_DOC_HTML);
ctxt->myDoc->parseFlags = ctxt->options;
#else
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
@@ -983,9 +983,9 @@ xmlSAX2StartDocument(void *ctx)
} else {
doc = ctxt->myDoc = xmlNewDoc(ctxt->version);
if (doc != NULL) {
- doc->properties = 0;
+ XML_DOC_CLEAR_PROPERTIES(doc);
if (ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_OLD10)
- doc->properties |= XML_DOC_OLD10;
+ XML_DOC_ADD_PROPERTIES(doc, XML_DOC_OLD10);
doc->parseFlags = ctxt->options;
if (ctxt->encoding != NULL)
doc->encoding = xmlStrdup(ctxt->encoding);
diff --git a/include/libxml/tree.h b/include/libxml/tree.h
index 1e79be9..61178b2 100644
--- a/include/libxml/tree.h
+++ b/include/libxml/tree.h
@@ -365,7 +365,6 @@ struct _xmlElement {
#endif
};
-
/**
* XML_LOCAL_NAMESPACE:
*
@@ -446,6 +445,10 @@ struct _xmlAttr {
void *psvi; /* for type/PSVI information */
};
+#define XML_ATTR_CLEAR_ATYPE(attr) (((attr)->atype) = 0)
+#define XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(attr) (((attr)->atype) & ~(15U << 27))
+#define XML_ATTR_SET_ATYPE(attr, type) ((attr)->atype = ((((attr)->atype) & (15U << 27)) | ((type) & ~(15U << 27))))
+
/**
* xmlID:
*
@@ -507,6 +510,11 @@ struct _xmlNode {
unsigned short extra; /* extra data for XPath/XSLT */
};
+#define XML_NODE_ADD_EXTRA(node, type) ((node)->extra |= ((type) & ~(15U << 12)))
+#define XML_NODE_CLEAR_EXTRA(node) (((node)->extra) = 0)
+#define XML_NODE_GET_EXTRA(node) (((node)->extra) & ~(15U << 12))
+#define XML_NODE_SET_EXTRA(node, type) ((node)->extra = ((((node)->extra) & (15U << 12)) | ((type) & ~(15U << 12))))
+
/**
* XML_GET_CONTENT:
*
@@ -585,6 +593,10 @@ struct _xmlDoc {
set at the end of parsing */
};
+#define XML_DOC_ADD_PROPERTIES(doc, type) ((doc)->properties |= ((type) & ~(15U << 27)))
+#define XML_DOC_CLEAR_PROPERTIES(doc) (((doc)->properties) = 0)
+#define XML_DOC_GET_PROPERTIES(doc) (((doc)->properties) & ~(15U << 27))
+#define XML_DOC_SET_PROPERTIES(doc, type) ((doc)->properties = ((((doc)->properties) & (15U << 27)) | ((type) & ~(15U << 27))))
typedef struct _xmlDOMWrapCtxt xmlDOMWrapCtxt;
typedef xmlDOMWrapCtxt *xmlDOMWrapCtxtPtr;
diff --git a/parser.c b/parser.c
index 738dbee..772d883 100644
--- a/parser.c
+++ b/parser.c
@@ -5523,7 +5523,7 @@ xmlParseEntityDecl(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, "New Doc failed");
return;
}
- ctxt->myDoc->properties = XML_DOC_INTERNAL;
+ XML_DOC_SET_PROPERTIES(ctxt->myDoc, XML_DOC_INTERNAL);
}
if (ctxt->myDoc->intSubset == NULL)
ctxt->myDoc->intSubset = xmlNewDtd(ctxt->myDoc,
@@ -5594,7 +5594,7 @@ xmlParseEntityDecl(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, "New Doc failed");
return;
}
- ctxt->myDoc->properties = XML_DOC_INTERNAL;
+ XML_DOC_SET_PROPERTIES(ctxt->myDoc, XML_DOC_INTERNAL);
}
if (ctxt->myDoc->intSubset == NULL)
@@ -7035,7 +7035,7 @@ xmlParseExternalSubset(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, const xmlChar *ExternalID,
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, "New Doc failed");
return;
}
- ctxt->myDoc->properties = XML_DOC_INTERNAL;
+ XML_DOC_SET_PROPERTIES(ctxt->myDoc, XML_DOC_INTERNAL);
}
if ((ctxt->myDoc != NULL) && (ctxt->myDoc->intSubset == NULL))
xmlCreateIntSubset(ctxt->myDoc, NULL, ExternalID, SystemID);
@@ -7419,7 +7419,7 @@ xmlParseReference(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
(nw != NULL) &&
(nw->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE) &&
(nw->children == NULL))
- nw->extra = 1;
+ XML_NODE_SET_EXTRA(nw, 1);
break;
}
diff --git a/runxmlconf.c b/runxmlconf.c
index f43fdd3..82b7241 100644
--- a/runxmlconf.c
+++ b/runxmlconf.c
@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ xmlconfTestInvalid(const char *id, const char *filename, int options) {
id, filename);
} else {
/* invalidity should be reported both in the context and in the document */
- if ((ctxt->valid != 0) || (doc->properties & XML_DOC_DTDVALID)) {
+ if ((ctxt->valid != 0) || (XML_DOC_GET_PROPERTIES(doc) & XML_DOC_DTDVALID)) {
test_log("test %s : %s failed to detect invalid document\n",
id, filename);
nb_errors++;
@@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ xmlconfTestValid(const char *id, const char *filename, int options) {
ret = 0;
} else {
/* validity should be reported both in the context and in the document */
- if ((ctxt->valid == 0) || ((doc->properties & XML_DOC_DTDVALID) == 0)) {
+ if ((ctxt->valid == 0) || ((XML_DOC_GET_PROPERTIES(doc) & XML_DOC_DTDVALID) == 0)) {
test_log("test %s : %s failed to validate a valid document\n",
id, filename);
nb_errors++;
diff --git a/tree.c b/tree.c
index cdf863c..3bac0b8 100644
--- a/tree.c
+++ b/tree.c
@@ -1192,7 +1192,7 @@ xmlNewDoc(const xmlChar *version) {
cur->compression = -1; /* not initialized */
cur->doc = cur;
cur->parseFlags = 0;
- cur->properties = XML_DOC_USERBUILT;
+ XML_DOC_SET_PROPERTIES(cur, XML_DOC_USERBUILT);
/*
* The in memory encoding is always UTF8
* This field will never change and would
@@ -2119,7 +2119,7 @@ xmlFreeProp(xmlAttrPtr cur) {
xmlDeregisterNodeDefaultValue((xmlNodePtr)cur);
/* Check for ID removal -> leading to invalid references ! */
- if ((cur->doc != NULL) && (cur->atype == XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID)) {
+ if ((cur->doc != NULL) && (XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(cur) == XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID)) {
xmlRemoveID(cur->doc, cur);
}
if (cur->children != NULL) xmlFreeNodeList(cur->children);
@@ -2838,7 +2838,7 @@ xmlSetTreeDoc(xmlNodePtr tree, xmlDocPtr doc) {
if(tree->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE) {
prop = tree->properties;
while (prop != NULL) {
- if (prop->atype == XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID) {
+ if (XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(prop) == XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID) {
xmlRemoveID(tree->doc, prop);
}
@@ -6953,9 +6953,9 @@ xmlSetNsProp(xmlNodePtr node, xmlNsPtr ns, const xmlChar *name,
/*
* Modify the attribute's value.
*/
- if (prop->atype == XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID) {
+ if (XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(prop) == XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID) {
xmlRemoveID(node->doc, prop);
- prop->atype = XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID;
+ XML_ATTR_SET_ATYPE(prop, XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID);
}
if (prop->children != NULL)
xmlFreeNodeList(prop->children);
@@ -6975,7 +6975,7 @@ xmlSetNsProp(xmlNodePtr node, xmlNsPtr ns, const xmlChar *name,
tmp = tmp->next;
}
}
- if (prop->atype == XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID)
+ if (XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(prop) == XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID)
xmlAddID(NULL, node->doc, value, prop);
return(prop);
}
@@ -9252,7 +9252,7 @@ ns_end:
if (cur->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE) {
cur->psvi = NULL;
cur->line = 0;
- cur->extra = 0;
+ XML_NODE_CLEAR_EXTRA(cur);
/*
* Walk attributes.
*/
@@ -9268,11 +9268,11 @@ ns_end:
* Attributes.
*/
if ((sourceDoc != NULL) &&
- (((xmlAttrPtr) cur)->atype == XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID))
+ (XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE((xmlAttrPtr) cur) == XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID))
{
xmlRemoveID(sourceDoc, (xmlAttrPtr) cur);
}
- ((xmlAttrPtr) cur)->atype = 0;
+ XML_ATTR_CLEAR_ATYPE((xmlAttrPtr) cur);
((xmlAttrPtr) cur)->psvi = NULL;
}
break;
@@ -9992,7 +9992,7 @@ xmlDOMWrapAdoptAttr(xmlDOMWrapCtxtPtr ctxt,
}
XML_TREE_ADOPT_STR(attr->name);
- attr->atype = 0;
+ XML_ATTR_CLEAR_ATYPE(attr);
attr->psvi = NULL;
/*
* Walk content.
diff --git a/valid.c b/valid.c
index 36a0435..8e76cfa 100644
--- a/valid.c
+++ b/valid.c
@@ -1906,7 +1906,7 @@ xmlScanIDAttributeDecl(xmlValidCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlElementPtr elem, int err) {
if (elem == NULL) return(0);
cur = elem->attributes;
while (cur != NULL) {
- if (cur->atype == XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID) {
+ if (XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(cur) == XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID) {
ret ++;
if ((ret > 1) && (err))
xmlErrValidNode(ctxt, (xmlNodePtr) elem, XML_DTD_MULTIPLE_ID,
@@ -2279,7 +2279,7 @@ xmlDumpAttributeDecl(xmlBufferPtr buf, xmlAttributePtr attr) {
xmlBufferWriteChar(buf, ":");
}
xmlBufferWriteCHAR(buf, attr->name);
- switch (attr->atype) {
+ switch (XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(attr)) {
case XML_ATTRIBUTE_CDATA:
xmlBufferWriteChar(buf, " CDATA");
break;
@@ -2758,7 +2758,7 @@ xmlAddID(xmlValidCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlDocPtr doc, const xmlChar *value,
return(NULL);
}
if (attr != NULL)
- attr->atype = XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID;
+ XML_ATTR_SET_ATYPE(attr, XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID);
return(ret);
}
@@ -2837,7 +2837,7 @@ xmlIsID(xmlDocPtr doc, xmlNodePtr elem, xmlAttrPtr attr) {
if ((fullelemname != felem) && (fullelemname != elem->name))
xmlFree(fullelemname);
- if ((attrDecl != NULL) && (attrDecl->atype == XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID))
+ if ((attrDecl != NULL) && (XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(attrDecl) == XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID))
return(1);
}
return(0);
@@ -2878,7 +2878,7 @@ xmlRemoveID(xmlDocPtr doc, xmlAttrPtr attr) {
xmlHashRemoveEntry(table, ID, xmlFreeIDTableEntry);
xmlFree(ID);
- attr->atype = 0;
+ XML_ATTR_CLEAR_ATYPE(attr);
return(0);
}
@@ -3157,8 +3157,8 @@ xmlIsRef(xmlDocPtr doc, xmlNodePtr elem, xmlAttrPtr attr) {
elem->name, attr->name);
if ((attrDecl != NULL) &&
- (attrDecl->atype == XML_ATTRIBUTE_IDREF ||
- attrDecl->atype == XML_ATTRIBUTE_IDREFS))
+ (XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(attrDecl) == XML_ATTRIBUTE_IDREF ||
+ XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(attrDecl) == XML_ATTRIBUTE_IDREFS))
return(1);
}
return(0);
@@ -3532,7 +3532,7 @@ xmlIsMixedElement(xmlDocPtr doc, const xmlChar *name) {
static int
xmlIsDocNameStartChar(xmlDocPtr doc, int c) {
- if ((doc == NULL) || (doc->properties & XML_DOC_OLD10) == 0) {
+ if ((doc == NULL) || (XML_DOC_GET_PROPERTIES(doc) & XML_DOC_OLD10) == 0) {
/*
* Use the new checks of production [4] [4a] amd [5] of the
* Update 5 of XML-1.0
@@ -3562,7 +3562,7 @@ xmlIsDocNameStartChar(xmlDocPtr doc, int c) {
static int
xmlIsDocNameChar(xmlDocPtr doc, int c) {
- if ((doc == NULL) || (doc->properties & XML_DOC_OLD10) == 0) {
+ if ((doc == NULL) || (XML_DOC_GET_PROPERTIES(doc) & XML_DOC_OLD10) == 0) {
/*
* Use the new checks of production [4] [4a] amd [5] of the
* Update 5 of XML-1.0
@@ -4112,7 +4112,7 @@ xmlValidCtxtNormalizeAttributeValue(xmlValidCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlDocPtr doc,
if (attrDecl == NULL)
return(NULL);
- if (attrDecl->atype == XML_ATTRIBUTE_CDATA)
+ if (XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(attrDecl) == XML_ATTRIBUTE_CDATA)
return(NULL);
ret = xmlStrdup(value);
@@ -4174,7 +4174,7 @@ xmlValidNormalizeAttributeValue(xmlDocPtr doc, xmlNodePtr elem,
if (attrDecl == NULL)
return(NULL);
- if (attrDecl->atype == XML_ATTRIBUTE_CDATA)
+ if (XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(attrDecl) == XML_ATTRIBUTE_CDATA)
return(NULL);
ret = xmlStrdup(value);
@@ -4189,7 +4189,7 @@ xmlValidateAttributeIdCallback(void *payload, void *data,
const xmlChar *name ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED) {
xmlAttributePtr attr = (xmlAttributePtr) payload;
int *count = (int *) data;
- if (attr->atype == XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID) (*count)++;
+ if (XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(attr) == XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID) (*count)++;
}
/**
@@ -4221,7 +4221,7 @@ xmlValidateAttributeDecl(xmlValidCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlDocPtr doc,
/* Attribute Default Legal */
/* Enumeration */
if (attr->defaultValue != NULL) {
- val = xmlValidateAttributeValueInternal(doc, attr->atype,
+ val = xmlValidateAttributeValueInternal(doc, XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(attr),
attr->defaultValue);
if (val == 0) {
xmlErrValidNode(ctxt, (xmlNodePtr) attr, XML_DTD_ATTRIBUTE_DEFAULT,
@@ -4232,7 +4232,7 @@ xmlValidateAttributeDecl(xmlValidCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlDocPtr doc,
}
/* ID Attribute Default */
- if ((attr->atype == XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID)&&
+ if ((XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(attr) == XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID)&&
(attr->def != XML_ATTRIBUTE_IMPLIED) &&
(attr->def != XML_ATTRIBUTE_REQUIRED)) {
xmlErrValidNode(ctxt, (xmlNodePtr) attr, XML_DTD_ID_FIXED,
@@ -4242,7 +4242,7 @@ xmlValidateAttributeDecl(xmlValidCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlDocPtr doc,
}
/* One ID per Element Type */
- if (attr->atype == XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID) {
+ if (XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(attr) == XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID) {
int nbId;
/* the trick is that we parse DtD as their own internal subset */
@@ -4501,9 +4501,9 @@ xmlValidateOneAttribute(xmlValidCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlDocPtr doc,
attr->name, elem->name, NULL);
return(0);
}
- attr->atype = attrDecl->atype;
+ XML_ATTR_SET_ATYPE(attr, attrDecl->atype);
- val = xmlValidateAttributeValueInternal(doc, attrDecl->atype, value);
+ val = xmlValidateAttributeValueInternal(doc, XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(attrDecl), value);
if (val == 0) {
xmlErrValidNode(ctxt, elem, XML_DTD_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE,
"Syntax of value for attribute %s of %s is not valid\n",
@@ -4522,19 +4522,19 @@ xmlValidateOneAttribute(xmlValidCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlDocPtr doc,
}
/* Validity Constraint: ID uniqueness */
- if (attrDecl->atype == XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID) {
+ if (XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(attrDecl) == XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID) {
if (xmlAddID(ctxt, doc, value, attr) == NULL)
ret = 0;
}
- if ((attrDecl->atype == XML_ATTRIBUTE_IDREF) ||
- (attrDecl->atype == XML_ATTRIBUTE_IDREFS)) {
+ if ((XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(attrDecl) == XML_ATTRIBUTE_IDREF) ||
+ (XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(attrDecl) == XML_ATTRIBUTE_IDREFS)) {
if (xmlAddRef(ctxt, doc, value, attr) == NULL)
ret = 0;
}
/* Validity Constraint: Notation Attributes */
- if (attrDecl->atype == XML_ATTRIBUTE_NOTATION) {
+ if (XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(attrDecl) == XML_ATTRIBUTE_NOTATION) {
xmlEnumerationPtr tree = attrDecl->tree;
xmlNotationPtr nota;
@@ -4564,7 +4564,7 @@ xmlValidateOneAttribute(xmlValidCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlDocPtr doc,
}
/* Validity Constraint: Enumeration */
- if (attrDecl->atype == XML_ATTRIBUTE_ENUMERATION) {
+ if (XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(attrDecl) == XML_ATTRIBUTE_ENUMERATION) {
xmlEnumerationPtr tree = attrDecl->tree;
while (tree != NULL) {
if (xmlStrEqual(tree->name, value)) break;
@@ -4589,7 +4589,7 @@ xmlValidateOneAttribute(xmlValidCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlDocPtr doc,
/* Extra check for the attribute value */
ret &= xmlValidateAttributeValue2(ctxt, doc, attr->name,
- attrDecl->atype, value);
+ XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(attrDecl), value);
return(ret);
}
@@ -4688,7 +4688,7 @@ xmlNodePtr elem, const xmlChar *prefix, xmlNsPtr ns, const xmlChar *value) {
return(0);
}
- val = xmlValidateAttributeValueInternal(doc, attrDecl->atype, value);
+ val = xmlValidateAttributeValueInternal(doc, XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(attrDecl), value);
if (val == 0) {
if (ns->prefix != NULL) {
xmlErrValidNode(ctxt, elem, XML_DTD_INVALID_DEFAULT,
@@ -4738,7 +4738,7 @@ xmlNodePtr elem, const xmlChar *prefix, xmlNsPtr ns, const xmlChar *value) {
#endif
/* Validity Constraint: Notation Attributes */
- if (attrDecl->atype == XML_ATTRIBUTE_NOTATION) {
+ if (XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(attrDecl) == XML_ATTRIBUTE_NOTATION) {
xmlEnumerationPtr tree = attrDecl->tree;
xmlNotationPtr nota;
@@ -4780,7 +4780,7 @@ xmlNodePtr elem, const xmlChar *prefix, xmlNsPtr ns, const xmlChar *value) {
}
/* Validity Constraint: Enumeration */
- if (attrDecl->atype == XML_ATTRIBUTE_ENUMERATION) {
+ if (XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(attrDecl) == XML_ATTRIBUTE_ENUMERATION) {
xmlEnumerationPtr tree = attrDecl->tree;
while (tree != NULL) {
if (xmlStrEqual(tree->name, value)) break;
@@ -4818,10 +4818,10 @@ xmlNodePtr elem, const xmlChar *prefix, xmlNsPtr ns, const xmlChar *value) {
/* Extra check for the attribute value */
if (ns->prefix != NULL) {
ret &= xmlValidateAttributeValue2(ctxt, doc, ns->prefix,
- attrDecl->atype, value);
+ XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(attrDecl), value);
} else {
ret &= xmlValidateAttributeValue2(ctxt, doc, BAD_CAST "xmlns",
- attrDecl->atype, value);
+ XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(attrDecl), value);
}
return(ret);
@@ -6574,7 +6574,7 @@ xmlValidateRef(xmlRefPtr ref, xmlValidCtxtPtr ctxt,
while (IS_BLANK_CH(*cur)) cur++;
}
xmlFree(dup);
- } else if (attr->atype == XML_ATTRIBUTE_IDREF) {
+ } else if (XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(attr) == XML_ATTRIBUTE_IDREF) {
id = xmlGetID(ctxt->doc, name);
if (id == NULL) {
xmlErrValidNode(ctxt, attr->parent, XML_DTD_UNKNOWN_ID,
@@ -6582,7 +6582,7 @@ xmlValidateRef(xmlRefPtr ref, xmlValidCtxtPtr ctxt,
attr->name, name, NULL);
ctxt->valid = 0;
}
- } else if (attr->atype == XML_ATTRIBUTE_IDREFS) {
+ } else if (XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(attr) == XML_ATTRIBUTE_IDREFS) {
xmlChar *dup, *str = NULL, *cur, save;
dup = xmlStrdup(name);
@@ -6782,7 +6782,7 @@ xmlValidateAttributeCallback(void *payload, void *data,
if (cur == NULL)
return;
- switch (cur->atype) {
+ switch (XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(cur)) {
case XML_ATTRIBUTE_CDATA:
case XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID:
case XML_ATTRIBUTE_IDREF :
@@ -6797,7 +6797,7 @@ xmlValidateAttributeCallback(void *payload, void *data,
if (cur->defaultValue != NULL) {
ret = xmlValidateAttributeValue2(ctxt, ctxt->doc, cur->name,
- cur->atype, cur->defaultValue);
+ XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(cur), cur->defaultValue);
if ((ret == 0) && (ctxt->valid == 1))
ctxt->valid = 0;
}
@@ -6805,14 +6805,14 @@ xmlValidateAttributeCallback(void *payload, void *data,
xmlEnumerationPtr tree = cur->tree;
while (tree != NULL) {
ret = xmlValidateAttributeValue2(ctxt, ctxt->doc,
- cur->name, cur->atype, tree->name);
+ cur->name, XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(cur), tree->name);
if ((ret == 0) && (ctxt->valid == 1))
ctxt->valid = 0;
tree = tree->next;
}
}
}
- if (cur->atype == XML_ATTRIBUTE_NOTATION) {
+ if (XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(cur) == XML_ATTRIBUTE_NOTATION) {
doc = cur->doc;
if (cur->elem == NULL) {
xmlErrValid(ctxt, XML_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
diff --git a/xmlreader.c b/xmlreader.c
index 67ff2cd..2a1a66a 100644
--- a/xmlreader.c
+++ b/xmlreader.c
@@ -753,7 +753,7 @@ xmlTextReaderStartElement(void *ctx, const xmlChar *fullname,
if ((ctxt->node != NULL) && (ctxt->input != NULL) &&
(ctxt->input->cur != NULL) && (ctxt->input->cur[0] == '/') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[1] == '>'))
- ctxt->node->extra = NODE_IS_EMPTY;
+ XML_NODE_SET_EXTRA(ctxt->node, NODE_IS_EMPTY);
}
if (reader != NULL)
reader->state = XML_TEXTREADER_ELEMENT;
@@ -818,7 +818,7 @@ xmlTextReaderStartElementNs(void *ctx,
if ((ctxt->node != NULL) && (ctxt->input != NULL) &&
(ctxt->input->cur != NULL) && (ctxt->input->cur[0] == '/') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[1] == '>'))
- ctxt->node->extra = NODE_IS_EMPTY;
+ XML_NODE_SET_EXTRA(ctxt->node, NODE_IS_EMPTY);
}
if (reader != NULL)
reader->state = XML_TEXTREADER_ELEMENT;
@@ -1216,7 +1216,7 @@ skip_children:
xmlNodePtr tmp;
if (reader->entNr == 0) {
while ((tmp = node->last) != NULL) {
- if ((tmp->extra & NODE_IS_PRESERVED) == 0) {
+ if ((XML_NODE_GET_EXTRA(tmp) & NODE_IS_PRESERVED) == 0) {
xmlUnlinkNode(tmp);
xmlTextReaderFreeNode(reader, tmp);
} else
@@ -1467,7 +1467,7 @@ get_next_node:
if ((oldstate == XML_TEXTREADER_ELEMENT) &&
(reader->node->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE) &&
(reader->node->children == NULL) &&
- ((reader->node->extra & NODE_IS_EMPTY) == 0)
+ ((XML_NODE_GET_EXTRA(reader->node) & NODE_IS_EMPTY) == 0)
#ifdef LIBXML_XINCLUDE_ENABLED
&& (reader->in_xinclude <= 0)
#endif
@@ -1481,7 +1481,7 @@ get_next_node:
xmlTextReaderValidatePop(reader);
#endif /* LIBXML_REGEXP_ENABLED */
if ((reader->preserves > 0) &&
- (reader->node->extra & NODE_IS_SPRESERVED))
+ (XML_NODE_GET_EXTRA(reader->node) & NODE_IS_SPRESERVED))
reader->preserves--;
reader->node = reader->node->next;
reader->state = XML_TEXTREADER_ELEMENT;
@@ -1497,7 +1497,7 @@ get_next_node:
(reader->node->prev != NULL) &&
(reader->node->prev->type != XML_DTD_NODE)) {
xmlNodePtr tmp = reader->node->prev;
- if ((tmp->extra & NODE_IS_PRESERVED) == 0) {
+ if ((XML_NODE_GET_EXTRA(tmp) & NODE_IS_PRESERVED) == 0) {
if (oldnode == tmp)
oldnode = NULL;
xmlUnlinkNode(tmp);
@@ -1510,7 +1510,7 @@ get_next_node:
if ((oldstate == XML_TEXTREADER_ELEMENT) &&
(reader->node->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE) &&
(reader->node->children == NULL) &&
- ((reader->node->extra & NODE_IS_EMPTY) == 0)) {;
+ ((XML_NODE_GET_EXTRA(reader->node) & NODE_IS_EMPTY) == 0)) {;
reader->state = XML_TEXTREADER_END;
goto node_found;
}
@@ -1519,7 +1519,7 @@ get_next_node:
xmlTextReaderValidatePop(reader);
#endif /* LIBXML_REGEXP_ENABLED */
if ((reader->preserves > 0) &&
- (reader->node->extra & NODE_IS_SPRESERVED))
+ (XML_NODE_GET_EXTRA(reader->node) & NODE_IS_SPRESERVED))
reader->preserves--;
reader->node = reader->node->parent;
if ((reader->node == NULL) ||
@@ -1546,7 +1546,7 @@ get_next_node:
#endif
(reader->entNr == 0) &&
(oldnode->type != XML_DTD_NODE) &&
- ((oldnode->extra & NODE_IS_PRESERVED) == 0)) {
+ ((XML_NODE_GET_EXTRA(oldnode) & NODE_IS_PRESERVED) == 0)) {
xmlUnlinkNode(oldnode);
xmlTextReaderFreeNode(reader, oldnode);
}
@@ -1559,7 +1559,7 @@ get_next_node:
#endif
(reader->entNr == 0) &&
(reader->node->last != NULL) &&
- ((reader->node->last->extra & NODE_IS_PRESERVED) == 0)) {
+ ((XML_NODE_GET_EXTRA(reader->node->last) & NODE_IS_PRESERVED) == 0)) {
xmlNodePtr tmp = reader->node->last;
xmlUnlinkNode(tmp);
xmlTextReaderFreeNode(reader, tmp);
@@ -1741,7 +1741,7 @@ xmlTextReaderNext(xmlTextReaderPtr reader) {
return(xmlTextReaderRead(reader));
if (reader->state == XML_TEXTREADER_END || reader->state == XML_TEXTREADER_BACKTRACK)
return(xmlTextReaderRead(reader));
- if (cur->extra & NODE_IS_EMPTY)
+ if (XML_NODE_GET_EXTRA(cur) & NODE_IS_EMPTY)
return(xmlTextReaderRead(reader));
do {
ret = xmlTextReaderRead(reader);
@@ -3167,7 +3167,7 @@ xmlTextReaderIsEmptyElement(xmlTextReaderPtr reader) {
if (reader->in_xinclude > 0)
return(1);
#endif
- return((reader->node->extra & NODE_IS_EMPTY) != 0);
+ return((XML_NODE_GET_EXTRA(reader->node) & NODE_IS_EMPTY) != 0);
}
/**
@@ -4035,15 +4035,15 @@ xmlTextReaderPreserve(xmlTextReaderPtr reader) {
return(NULL);
if ((cur->type != XML_DOCUMENT_NODE) && (cur->type != XML_DTD_NODE)) {
- cur->extra |= NODE_IS_PRESERVED;
- cur->extra |= NODE_IS_SPRESERVED;
+ XML_NODE_ADD_EXTRA(cur, NODE_IS_PRESERVED);
+ XML_NODE_ADD_EXTRA(cur, NODE_IS_SPRESERVED);
}
reader->preserves++;
parent = cur->parent;;
while (parent != NULL) {
if (parent->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE)
- parent->extra |= NODE_IS_PRESERVED;
+ XML_NODE_ADD_EXTRA(parent, NODE_IS_PRESERVED);
parent = parent->parent;
}
return(cur);
diff --git a/xmlschemas.c b/xmlschemas.c
index a2dd6cf..2e6c349 100644
--- a/xmlschemas.c
+++ b/xmlschemas.c
@@ -6024,7 +6024,7 @@ xmlSchemaPValAttrNodeID(xmlSchemaParserCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlAttrPtr attr)
/*
* NOTE: the IDness might have already be declared in the DTD
*/
- if (attr->atype != XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID) {
+ if (XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(attr) != XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID) {
xmlIDPtr res;
xmlChar *strip;
@@ -6047,7 +6047,7 @@ xmlSchemaPValAttrNodeID(xmlSchemaParserCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlAttrPtr attr)
NULL, NULL, "Duplicate value '%s' of simple "
"type 'xs:ID'", value, NULL);
} else
- attr->atype = XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID;
+ XML_ATTR_SET_ATYPE(attr, XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID);
}
} else if (ret > 0) {
ret = XML_SCHEMAP_S4S_ATTR_INVALID_VALUE;
diff --git a/xmlschemastypes.c b/xmlschemastypes.c
index af31be5..d40da49 100644
--- a/xmlschemastypes.c
+++ b/xmlschemastypes.c
@@ -2867,7 +2867,7 @@ xmlSchemaValAtomicType(xmlSchemaTypePtr type, const xmlChar * value,
/*
* NOTE: the IDness might have already be declared in the DTD
*/
- if (attr->atype != XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID) {
+ if (XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(attr) != XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID) {
xmlIDPtr res;
xmlChar *strip;
@@ -2880,7 +2880,7 @@ xmlSchemaValAtomicType(xmlSchemaTypePtr type, const xmlChar * value,
if (res == NULL) {
ret = 2;
} else {
- attr->atype = XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID;
+ XML_ATTR_SET_ATYPE(attr, XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID);
}
}
}
@@ -2905,7 +2905,7 @@ xmlSchemaValAtomicType(xmlSchemaTypePtr type, const xmlChar * value,
xmlFree(strip);
} else
xmlAddRef(NULL, node->doc, value, attr);
- attr->atype = XML_ATTRIBUTE_IDREF;
+ XML_ATTR_SET_ATYPE(attr, XML_ATTRIBUTE_IDREF);
}
goto done;
case XML_SCHEMAS_IDREFS:
@@ -2919,7 +2919,7 @@ xmlSchemaValAtomicType(xmlSchemaTypePtr type, const xmlChar * value,
(node->type == XML_ATTRIBUTE_NODE)) {
xmlAttrPtr attr = (xmlAttrPtr) node;
- attr->atype = XML_ATTRIBUTE_IDREFS;
+ XML_ATTR_SET_ATYPE(attr, XML_ATTRIBUTE_IDREFS);
}
goto done;
case XML_SCHEMAS_ENTITY:{
@@ -2950,7 +2950,7 @@ xmlSchemaValAtomicType(xmlSchemaTypePtr type, const xmlChar * value,
(node->type == XML_ATTRIBUTE_NODE)) {
xmlAttrPtr attr = (xmlAttrPtr) node;
- attr->atype = XML_ATTRIBUTE_ENTITY;
+ XML_ATTR_SET_ATYPE(attr, XML_ATTRIBUTE_ENTITY);
}
goto done;
}
@@ -2967,7 +2967,7 @@ xmlSchemaValAtomicType(xmlSchemaTypePtr type, const xmlChar * value,
(node->type == XML_ATTRIBUTE_NODE)) {
xmlAttrPtr attr = (xmlAttrPtr) node;
- attr->atype = XML_ATTRIBUTE_ENTITIES;
+ XML_ATTR_SET_ATYPE(attr, XML_ATTRIBUTE_ENTITIES);
}
goto done;
case XML_SCHEMAS_NOTATION:{
--
2.50.1

View File

@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ SRC_URI += "http://www.w3.org/XML/Test/xmlts20080827.tar;subdir=${BP};name=testt
file://CVE-2025-49794-CVE-2025-49796.patch \
file://CVE-2025-6170.patch \
file://CVE-2025-9714.patch \
file://CVE-2025-7425.patch \
"
SRC_URI[archive.sha256sum] = "60d74a257d1ccec0475e749cba2f21559e48139efba6ff28224357c7c798dfee"

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
From 345d2a053c32f3443dbfdd313f49346ce30b92f8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Rich Felker <dalias@aerifal.cx>
Date: Wed, 19 Nov 2025 13:23:38 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] iconv: fix erroneous input validation in EUC-KR decoder
as a result of incorrect bounds checking on the lead byte being
decoded, certain invalid inputs which should produce an encoding
error, such as "\xc8\x41", instead produced out-of-bounds loads from
the ksc table.
in a worst case, the loaded value may not be a valid unicode scalar
value, in which case, if the output encoding was UTF-8, wctomb would
return (size_t)-1, causing an overflow in the output pointer and
remaining buffer size which could clobber memory outside of the output
buffer.
bug report was submitted in private by Nick Wellnhofer on account of
potential security implications.
CVE: CVE-2025-26519
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.musl-libc.org/cgit/musl/commit/?id=e5adcd97b5196e29991b524237381a0202a60659]
Signed-off-by: Gyorgy Sarvari <skandigraun@gmail.com>
---
src/locale/iconv.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/locale/iconv.c b/src/locale/iconv.c
index 3047c27b..1fb66bc8 100644
--- a/src/locale/iconv.c
+++ b/src/locale/iconv.c
@@ -495,7 +495,7 @@ size_t iconv(iconv_t cd, char **restrict in, size_t *restrict inb, char **restri
if (c >= 93 || d >= 94) {
c += (0xa1-0x81);
d += 0xa1;
- if (c >= 93 || c>=0xc6-0x81 && d>0x52)
+ if (c > 0xc6-0x81 || c==0xc6-0x81 && d>0x52)
goto ilseq;
if (d-'A'<26) d = d-'A';
else if (d-'a'<26) d = d-'a'+26;

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
From b81230050f6c3348038fe470d260028824b9a9e5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Rich Felker <dalias@aerifal.cx>
Date: Wed, 19 Nov 2025 13:27:15 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] iconv: harden UTF-8 output code path against input decoder
bugs
the UTF-8 output code was written assuming an invariant that iconv's
decoders only emit valid Unicode Scalar Values which wctomb can encode
successfully, thereby always returning a value between 1 and 4.
if this invariant is not satisfied, wctomb returns (size_t)-1, and the
subsequent adjustments to the output buffer pointer and remaining
output byte count overflow, moving the output position backwards,
potentially past the beginning of the buffer, without storing any
bytes.
CVE: CVE-2025-26519
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.musl-libc.org/cgit/musl/commit/?id=c47ad25ea3b484e10326f933e927c0bc8cded3da]
Signed-off-by: Gyorgy Sarvari <skandigraun@gmail.com>
---
src/locale/iconv.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/locale/iconv.c b/src/locale/iconv.c
index 1fb66bc8..fb1d3217 100644
--- a/src/locale/iconv.c
+++ b/src/locale/iconv.c
@@ -538,6 +538,10 @@ size_t iconv(iconv_t cd, char **restrict in, size_t *restrict inb, char **restri
if (*outb < k) goto toobig;
memcpy(*out, tmp, k);
} else k = wctomb_utf8(*out, c);
+ /* This failure condition should be unreachable, but
+ * is included to prevent decoder bugs from translating
+ * into advancement outside the output buffer range. */
+ if (k>4) goto ilseq;
*out += k;
*outb -= k;
break;

View File

@@ -15,7 +15,9 @@ PV = "${BASEVER}+git${SRCPV}"
SRC_URI = "git://git.musl-libc.org/musl;branch=master \
file://0001-Make-dynamic-linker-a-relative-symlink-to-libc.patch \
file://0002-ldso-Use-syslibdir-and-libdir-as-default-pathes-to-l.patch \
"
file://CVE-2025-26519-1.patch \
file://CVE-2025-26519-2.patch \
"
S = "${WORKDIR}/git"

View File

@@ -84,5 +84,7 @@ SRC_URI = "\
file://0045-CVE-2025-11083.patch \
file://0046-CVE-2025-11081.patch \
file://0047-CVE-2025-8225.patch \
file://CVE-2025-11412.patch \
file://CVE-2025-11413.patch \
"
S = "${WORKDIR}/git"

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
From 047435dd988a3975d40c6626a8f739a0b2e154bc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alan Modra <amodra@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 25 Sep 2025 08:22:24 +0930
Subject: [PATCH] PR 33452 SEGV in bfd_elf_gc_record_vtentry
Limit addends on vtentry relocs, otherwise ld might attempt to
allocate a stupidly large array. This also fixes the expression
overflow leading to pr33452. A vtable of 33M entries on a 64-bit
host is surely large enough, especially considering that VTINHERIT
and VTENTRY relocations are to support -fvtable-gc that disappeared
from gcc over 20 years ago.
PR ld/33452
* elflink.c (bfd_elf_gc_record_vtentry): Sanity check addend.
CVE: CVE-2025-11412
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://sourceware.org/git/gitweb.cgi?p=binutils-gdb.git;h=047435dd988a3975d40c6626a8f739a0b2e154bc]
Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
---
bfd/elflink.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/bfd/elflink.c b/bfd/elflink.c
index 54f0d6e957e..0a0456177c2 100644
--- a/bfd/elflink.c
+++ b/bfd/elflink.c
@@ -14407,7 +14407,7 @@ bfd_elf_gc_record_vtentry (bfd *abfd, asection *sec,
const struct elf_backend_data *bed = get_elf_backend_data (abfd);
unsigned int log_file_align = bed->s->log_file_align;
- if (!h)
+ if (!h || addend > 1u << 28)
{
/* xgettext:c-format */
_bfd_error_handler (_("%pB: section '%pA': corrupt VTENTRY entry"),

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
From 72efdf166aa0ed72ecc69fc2349af6591a7a19c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alan Modra <amodra@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 25 Sep 2025 10:41:32 +0930
Subject: [PATCH] Re: elf: Disallow the empty global symbol name
sparc64-linux-gnu +FAIL: selective2
sparc64-linux-gnu +FAIL: selective3
PR ld/33456
* elflink.c (elf_link_add_object_symbols): Move new check later
to give the backend add_symbol_hook a chance to remove symbols
with empty names.
CVE: CVE-2025-11413
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://sourceware.org/git/gitweb.cgi?p=binutils-gdb.git;h=72efdf166aa0ed72ecc69fc2349af6591a7a19c0]
Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
---
bfd/elflink.c | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
diff --git a/bfd/elflink.c b/bfd/elflink.c
index 0a0456177c2..5c8b822e36a 100644
--- a/bfd/elflink.c
+++ b/bfd/elflink.c
@@ -4931,6 +4931,13 @@ elf_link_add_object_symbols (bfd *abfd, struct bfd_link_info *info)
continue;
}
+ if (name[0] == '\0')
+ {
+ _bfd_error_handler (_("%pB: corrupt symbol table"), abfd);
+ bfd_set_error (bfd_error_bad_value);
+ goto error_free_vers;
+ }
+
/* Sanity check that all possibilities were handled. */
if (sec == NULL)
abort ();

View File

@@ -25,6 +25,8 @@ SRC_URI = "https://sourceware.org/elfutils/ftp/${PV}/${BP}.tar.bz2 \
file://0001-debuginfod-debuginfod-client.c-use-long-for-cache-ti.patch \
file://CVE-2025-1352.patch \
file://CVE-2025-1372.patch \
file://CVE-2025-1376.patch \
file://CVE-2025-1377.patch \
"
SRC_URI:append:libc-musl = " \
file://0003-musl-utils.patch \

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
From b16f441cca0a4841050e3215a9f120a6d8aea918 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mark Wielaard <mark@klomp.org>
Date: Thu, 13 Feb 2025 00:02:32 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] libelf: Handle elf_strptr on section without any data
In the unlikely situation that elf_strptr was called on a section with
sh_size already set, but that doesn't have any data yet we could crash
trying to verify the string to return.
This could happen for example when a new section was created with
elf_newscn, but no data having been added yet.
* libelf/elf_strptr.c (elf_strptr): Check strscn->rawdata_base
is not NULL.
https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=32672
Signed-off-by: Mark Wielaard <mark@klomp.org>
CVE: CVE-2025-1376
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://sourceware.org/git/?p=elfutils.git;a=commit;h=b16f441cca0a4841050e3215a9f120a6d8aea918]
Signed-off-by: Soumya Sambu <soumya.sambu@windriver.com>
---
libelf/elf_strptr.c | 10 +++++++---
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/libelf/elf_strptr.c b/libelf/elf_strptr.c
index c5a94f8..7be7f5e 100644
--- a/libelf/elf_strptr.c
+++ b/libelf/elf_strptr.c
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
/* Return string pointer from string section.
Copyright (C) 1998-2002, 2004, 2008, 2009, 2015 Red Hat, Inc.
+ Copyright (C) 2025 Mark J. Wielaard <mark@klomp.org>
This file is part of elfutils.
Contributed by Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>, 1998.
@@ -183,9 +184,12 @@ elf_strptr (Elf *elf, size_t idx, size_t offset)
// initialized yet (when data_read is zero). So we cannot just
// look at the rawdata.d.d_size.
- /* Make sure the string is NUL terminated. Start from the end,
- which very likely is a NUL char. */
- if (likely (validate_str (strscn->rawdata_base, offset, sh_size)))
+ /* First check there actually is any data. This could be a new
+ section which hasn't had any data set yet. Then make sure
+ the string is at a valid offset and NUL terminated. */
+ if (unlikely (strscn->rawdata_base == NULL))
+ __libelf_seterrno (ELF_E_INVALID_SECTION);
+ else if (likely (validate_str (strscn->rawdata_base, offset, sh_size)))
result = &strscn->rawdata_base[offset];
else
__libelf_seterrno (ELF_E_INVALID_INDEX);
--
2.40.0

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
From fbf1df9ca286de3323ae541973b08449f8d03aba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mark Wielaard <mark@klomp.org>
Date: Thu, 13 Feb 2025 14:59:34 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] strip: Verify symbol table is a real symbol table
We didn't check the symbol table referenced from the relocation table
was a real symbol table. This could cause a crash if that section
happened to be an SHT_NOBITS section without any data. Fix this by
adding an explicit check.
* src/strip.c (INTERNAL_ERROR_MSG): New macro that takes a
message string to display.
(INTERNAL_ERROR): Use INTERNAL_ERROR_MSG with elf_errmsg (-1).
(remove_debug_relocations): Check the sh_link referenced
section is real and isn't a SHT_NOBITS section.
https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=32673
Signed-off-by: Mark Wielaard <mark@klomp.org>
CVE: CVE-2025-1377
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://sourceware.org/git/?p=elfutils.git;a=commit;h=fbf1df9ca286de3323ae541973b08449f8d03aba]
Signed-off-by: Soumya Sambu <soumya.sambu@windriver.com>
---
src/strip.c | 13 ++++++++++---
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/strip.c b/src/strip.c
index d5b753d..0cfd8c8 100644
--- a/src/strip.c
+++ b/src/strip.c
@@ -127,13 +127,14 @@ static char *tmp_debug_fname = NULL;
/* Close debug file descriptor, if opened. And remove temporary debug file. */
static void cleanup_debug (void);
-#define INTERNAL_ERROR(fname) \
+#define INTERNAL_ERROR_MSG(fname, msg) \
do { \
cleanup_debug (); \
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, _("%s: INTERNAL ERROR %d (%s): %s"), \
- fname, __LINE__, PACKAGE_VERSION, elf_errmsg (-1)); \
+ fname, __LINE__, PACKAGE_VERSION, msg); \
} while (0)
+#define INTERNAL_ERROR(fname) INTERNAL_ERROR_MSG(fname, elf_errmsg (-1))
/* Name of the output file. */
static const char *output_fname;
@@ -632,7 +633,13 @@ remove_debug_relocations (Ebl *ebl, Elf *elf, GElf_Ehdr *ehdr,
resolve relocation symbol indexes. */
Elf64_Word symt = shdr->sh_link;
Elf_Data *symdata, *xndxdata;
- Elf_Scn * symscn = elf_getscn (elf, symt);
+ Elf_Scn *symscn = elf_getscn (elf, symt);GElf_Shdr symshdr_mem;
+ GElf_Shdr *symshdr = gelf_getshdr (symscn, &symshdr_mem);
+ if (symshdr == NULL)
+ INTERNAL_ERROR (fname);
+ if (symshdr->sh_type == SHT_NOBITS)
+ INTERNAL_ERROR_MSG (fname, "NOBITS section");
+
symdata = elf_getdata (symscn, NULL);
xndxdata = get_xndxdata (elf, symscn);
if (symdata == NULL)
--
2.40.0

View File

@@ -68,6 +68,11 @@ SRC_URI = "https://golang.org/dl/go${PV}.src.tar.gz;name=main \
file://CVE-2025-47907-pre-0002.patch \
file://CVE-2025-47907.patch \
file://CVE-2025-47906.patch \
file://CVE-2024-24783.patch \
file://CVE-2025-58187.patch \
file://CVE-2025-58189.patch \
file://CVE-2025-61723.patch \
file://CVE-2025-61724.patch \
"
SRC_URI[main.sha256sum] = "a1a48b23afb206f95e7bbaa9b898d965f90826f6f1d1fc0c1d784ada0cd300fd"

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,349 @@
From f334417e71f8b078ad64035bddb6df7f8910da6c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Neal Patel <nealpatel@google.com>
Date: Mon, 15 Sep 2025 16:31:22 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] crypto/x509: improve domain name verification
Don't use domainToReverseLabels to check if domain names are valid,
since it is not particularly performant, and can contribute to DoS
vectors. Instead just iterate over the name and enforce the properties
we care about.
This also enforces that DNS names, both in SANs and name constraints,
are valid. We previously allowed invalid SANs, because some
intermediates had these weird names (see #23995), but there are
currently no trusted intermediates that have this property, and since we
target the web PKI, supporting this particular case is not a high
priority.
Thank you to Jakub Ciolek for reporting this issue.
Fixes CVE-2025-58187
For #75681
Fixes #75714
Change-Id: I6ebce847dcbe5fc63ef2f9a74f53f11c4c56d3d1
Reviewed-on: https://go-internal-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/2820
Reviewed-by: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <bracewell@google.com>
Reviewed-on: https://go-internal-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/2982
Reviewed-by: Nicholas Husin <husin@google.com>
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/709839
Auto-Submit: Michael Pratt <mpratt@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Carlos Amedee <carlos@golang.org>
TryBot-Bypass: Michael Pratt <mpratt@google.com>
CVE: CVE-2025-58187
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/golang/go/commit/f334417e71f8b078ad64035bddb6df7f8910da6c]
Signed-off-by: Archana Polampalli <archana.polampalli@windriver.com>
---
src/crypto/x509/name_constraints_test.go | 66 ++------------------
src/crypto/x509/parser.go | 77 ++++++++++++++----------
src/crypto/x509/parser_test.go | 43 +++++++++++++
src/crypto/x509/verify.go | 1 +
4 files changed, 95 insertions(+), 92 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/crypto/x509/name_constraints_test.go b/src/crypto/x509/name_constraints_test.go
index c59a7dc..d4f7d41 100644
--- a/src/crypto/x509/name_constraints_test.go
+++ b/src/crypto/x509/name_constraints_test.go
@@ -1452,63 +1452,7 @@ var nameConstraintsTests = []nameConstraintsTest{
requestedEKUs: []ExtKeyUsage{ExtKeyUsageServerAuth},
},
- // An invalid DNS SAN should be detected only at validation time so
- // that we can process CA certificates in the wild that have invalid SANs.
- // See https://github.com/golang/go/issues/23995
-
- // #77: an invalid DNS or mail SAN will not be detected if name constraint
- // checking is not triggered.
- {
- roots: make([]constraintsSpec, 1),
- intermediates: [][]constraintsSpec{
- {
- {},
- },
- },
- leaf: leafSpec{
- sans: []string{"dns:this is invalid", "email:this @ is invalid"},
- },
- },
-
- // #78: an invalid DNS SAN will be detected if any name constraint checking
- // is triggered.
- {
- roots: []constraintsSpec{
- {
- bad: []string{"uri:"},
- },
- },
- intermediates: [][]constraintsSpec{
- {
- {},
- },
- },
- leaf: leafSpec{
- sans: []string{"dns:this is invalid"},
- },
- expectedError: "cannot parse dnsName",
- },
-
- // #79: an invalid email SAN will be detected if any name constraint
- // checking is triggered.
- {
- roots: []constraintsSpec{
- {
- bad: []string{"uri:"},
- },
- },
- intermediates: [][]constraintsSpec{
- {
- {},
- },
- },
- leaf: leafSpec{
- sans: []string{"email:this @ is invalid"},
- },
- expectedError: "cannot parse rfc822Name",
- },
-
- // #80: if several EKUs are requested, satisfying any of them is sufficient.
+ // #77: if several EKUs are requested, satisfying any of them is sufficient.
{
roots: make([]constraintsSpec, 1),
intermediates: [][]constraintsSpec{
@@ -1523,7 +1467,7 @@ var nameConstraintsTests = []nameConstraintsTest{
requestedEKUs: []ExtKeyUsage{ExtKeyUsageClientAuth, ExtKeyUsageEmailProtection},
},
- // #81: EKUs that are not asserted in VerifyOpts are not required to be
+ // #78: EKUs that are not asserted in VerifyOpts are not required to be
// nested.
{
roots: make([]constraintsSpec, 1),
@@ -1542,7 +1486,7 @@ var nameConstraintsTests = []nameConstraintsTest{
},
},
- // #82: a certificate without SANs and CN is accepted in a constrained chain.
+ // #79: a certificate without SANs and CN is accepted in a constrained chain.
{
roots: []constraintsSpec{
{
@@ -1559,7 +1503,7 @@ var nameConstraintsTests = []nameConstraintsTest{
},
},
- // #83: a certificate without SANs and with a CN that does not parse as a
+ // #80: a certificate without SANs and with a CN that does not parse as a
// hostname is accepted in a constrained chain.
{
roots: []constraintsSpec{
@@ -1578,7 +1522,7 @@ var nameConstraintsTests = []nameConstraintsTest{
},
},
- // #84: a certificate with SANs and CN is accepted in a constrained chain.
+ // #81: a certificate with SANs and CN is accepted in a constrained chain.
{
roots: []constraintsSpec{
{
diff --git a/src/crypto/x509/parser.go b/src/crypto/x509/parser.go
index 635e74b..0788210 100644
--- a/src/crypto/x509/parser.go
+++ b/src/crypto/x509/parser.go
@@ -391,10 +391,14 @@ func parseSANExtension(der cryptobyte.String) (dnsNames, emailAddresses []string
if err := isIA5String(email); err != nil {
return errors.New("x509: SAN rfc822Name is malformed")
}
+ parsed, ok := parseRFC2821Mailbox(email)
+ if !ok || (ok && !domainNameValid(parsed.domain, false)) {
+ return errors.New("x509: SAN rfc822Name is malformed")
+ }
emailAddresses = append(emailAddresses, email)
case nameTypeDNS:
name := string(data)
- if err := isIA5String(name); err != nil {
+ if err := isIA5String(name); err != nil || (err == nil && !domainNameValid(name, false)) {
return errors.New("x509: SAN dNSName is malformed")
}
dnsNames = append(dnsNames, string(name))
@@ -404,14 +408,9 @@ func parseSANExtension(der cryptobyte.String) (dnsNames, emailAddresses []string
return errors.New("x509: SAN uniformResourceIdentifier is malformed")
}
uri, err := url.Parse(uriStr)
- if err != nil {
+ if err != nil || (err == nil && uri.Host != "" && !domainNameValid(uri.Host, false)) {
return fmt.Errorf("x509: cannot parse URI %q: %s", uriStr, err)
}
- if len(uri.Host) > 0 {
- if _, ok := domainToReverseLabels(uri.Host); !ok {
- return fmt.Errorf("x509: cannot parse URI %q: invalid domain", uriStr)
- }
- }
uris = append(uris, uri)
case nameTypeIP:
switch len(data) {
@@ -551,15 +550,7 @@ func parseNameConstraintsExtension(out *Certificate, e pkix.Extension) (unhandle
return nil, nil, nil, nil, errors.New("x509: invalid constraint value: " + err.Error())
}
- trimmedDomain := domain
- if len(trimmedDomain) > 0 && trimmedDomain[0] == '.' {
- // constraints can have a leading
- // period to exclude the domain
- // itself, but that's not valid in a
- // normal domain name.
- trimmedDomain = trimmedDomain[1:]
- }
- if _, ok := domainToReverseLabels(trimmedDomain); !ok {
+ if !domainNameValid(domain, true) {
return nil, nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("x509: failed to parse dnsName constraint %q", domain)
}
dnsNames = append(dnsNames, domain)
@@ -600,12 +591,7 @@ func parseNameConstraintsExtension(out *Certificate, e pkix.Extension) (unhandle
return nil, nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("x509: failed to parse rfc822Name constraint %q", constraint)
}
} else {
- // Otherwise it's a domain name.
- domain := constraint
- if len(domain) > 0 && domain[0] == '.' {
- domain = domain[1:]
- }
- if _, ok := domainToReverseLabels(domain); !ok {
+ if !domainNameValid(constraint, true) {
return nil, nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("x509: failed to parse rfc822Name constraint %q", constraint)
}
}
@@ -621,15 +607,7 @@ func parseNameConstraintsExtension(out *Certificate, e pkix.Extension) (unhandle
return nil, nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("x509: failed to parse URI constraint %q: cannot be IP address", domain)
}
- trimmedDomain := domain
- if len(trimmedDomain) > 0 && trimmedDomain[0] == '.' {
- // constraints can have a leading
- // period to exclude the domain itself,
- // but that's not valid in a normal
- // domain name.
- trimmedDomain = trimmedDomain[1:]
- }
- if _, ok := domainToReverseLabels(trimmedDomain); !ok {
+ if !domainNameValid(domain, true) {
return nil, nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("x509: failed to parse URI constraint %q", domain)
}
uriDomains = append(uriDomains, domain)
@@ -1011,3 +989,40 @@ func ParseCertificates(der []byte) ([]*Certificate, error) {
}
return certs, nil
}
+
+// domainNameValid does minimal domain name validity checking. In particular it
+// enforces the following properties:
+// - names cannot have the trailing period
+// - names can only have a leading period if constraint is true
+// - names must be <= 253 characters
+// - names cannot have empty labels
+// - names cannot labels that are longer than 63 characters
+//
+// Note that this does not enforce the LDH requirements for domain names.
+func domainNameValid(s string, constraint bool) bool {
+ if len(s) == 0 && constraint {
+ return true
+ }
+ if len(s) == 0 || (!constraint && s[0] == '.') || s[len(s)-1] == '.' || len(s) > 253 {
+ return false
+ }
+ lastDot := -1
+ if constraint && s[0] == '.' {
+ s = s[1:]
+ }
+
+ for i := 0; i <= len(s); i++ {
+ if i == len(s) || s[i] == '.' {
+ labelLen := i
+ if lastDot >= 0 {
+ labelLen -= lastDot + 1
+ }
+ if labelLen == 0 || labelLen > 63 {
+ return false
+ }
+ lastDot = i
+ }
+ }
+
+ return true
+}
diff --git a/src/crypto/x509/parser_test.go b/src/crypto/x509/parser_test.go
index d7cf7ea..95ed116 100644
--- a/src/crypto/x509/parser_test.go
+++ b/src/crypto/x509/parser_test.go
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ package x509
import (
"encoding/asn1"
+ "strings"
"testing"
cryptobyte_asn1 "golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte/asn1"
@@ -100,3 +101,45 @@ func TestParseASN1String(t *testing.T) {
})
}
}
+
+func TestDomainNameValid(t *testing.T) {
+ for _, tc := range []struct {
+ name string
+ dnsName string
+ constraint bool
+ valid bool
+ }{
+ {"empty name, name", "", false, false},
+ {"empty name, constraint", "", true, true},
+ {"empty label, name", "a..a", false, false},
+ {"empty label, constraint", "a..a", true, false},
+ {"period, name", ".", false, false},
+ {"period, constraint", ".", true, false}, // TODO(roland): not entirely clear if this is a valid constraint (require at least one label?)
+ {"valid, name", "a.b.c", false, true},
+ {"valid, constraint", "a.b.c", true, true},
+ {"leading period, name", ".a.b.c", false, false},
+ {"leading period, constraint", ".a.b.c", true, true},
+ {"trailing period, name", "a.", false, false},
+ {"trailing period, constraint", "a.", true, false},
+ {"bare label, name", "a", false, true},
+ {"bare label, constraint", "a", true, true},
+ {"254 char label, name", strings.Repeat("a.a", 84) + "aaa", false, false},
+ {"254 char label, constraint", strings.Repeat("a.a", 84) + "aaa", true, false},
+ {"253 char label, name", strings.Repeat("a.a", 84) + "aa", false, false},
+ {"253 char label, constraint", strings.Repeat("a.a", 84) + "aa", true, false},
+ {"64 char single label, name", strings.Repeat("a", 64), false, false},
+ {"64 char single label, constraint", strings.Repeat("a", 64), true, false},
+ {"63 char single label, name", strings.Repeat("a", 63), false, true},
+ {"63 char single label, constraint", strings.Repeat("a", 63), true, true},
+ {"64 char label, name", "a." + strings.Repeat("a", 64), false, false},
+ {"64 char label, constraint", "a." + strings.Repeat("a", 64), true, false},
+ {"63 char label, name", "a." + strings.Repeat("a", 63), false, true},
+ {"63 char label, constraint", "a." + strings.Repeat("a", 63), true, true},
+ } {
+ t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+ if tc.valid != domainNameValid(tc.dnsName, tc.constraint) {
+ t.Errorf("domainNameValid(%q, %t) = %v; want %v", tc.dnsName, tc.constraint, !tc.valid, tc.valid)
+ }
+ })
+ }
+}
diff --git a/src/crypto/x509/verify.go b/src/crypto/x509/verify.go
index 3e95808..fb2f4b2 100644
--- a/src/crypto/x509/verify.go
+++ b/src/crypto/x509/verify.go
@@ -357,6 +357,7 @@ func parseRFC2821Mailbox(in string) (mailbox rfc2821Mailbox, ok bool) {
// domainToReverseLabels converts a textual domain name like foo.example.com to
// the list of labels in reverse order, e.g. ["com", "example", "foo"].
func domainToReverseLabels(domain string) (reverseLabels []string, ok bool) {
+ reverseLabels = make([]string, 0, strings.Count(domain, ".")+1)
for len(domain) > 0 {
if i := strings.LastIndexByte(domain, '.'); i == -1 {
reverseLabels = append(reverseLabels, domain)
--
2.40.0

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
From 2e1e356e33b9c792a9643749a7626a1789197bb9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Date: Mon, 29 Sep 2025 10:11:56 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] crypto/tls: quote protocols in ALPN error message
Quote the protocols sent by the client when returning the ALPN
negotiation error message.
Fixes CVE-2025-58189
Updates #75652
Fixes #75660
Change-Id: Ie7b3a1ed0b6efcc1705b71f0f1e8417126661330
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/707776
Auto-Submit: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Neal Patel <nealpatel@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Nicholas Husin <nsh@golang.org>
Auto-Submit: Nicholas Husin <nsh@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Nicholas Husin <husin@google.com>
TryBot-Bypass: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel McCarney <daniel@binaryparadox.net>
(cherry picked from commit 4e9006a716533fe1c7ee08df02dfc73078f7dc19)
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/708096
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Reviewed-by: Carlos Amedee <carlos@golang.org>
CVE: CVE-2025-58189
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/golang/go/commit/2e1e356e33b9c792a9643749a7626a1789197bb9]
Signed-off-by: Archana Polampalli <archana.polampalli@windriver.com>
---
src/crypto/tls/handshake_server.go | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/crypto/tls/handshake_server.go b/src/crypto/tls/handshake_server.go
index 4e84aa9..17b6891 100644
--- a/src/crypto/tls/handshake_server.go
+++ b/src/crypto/tls/handshake_server.go
@@ -312,7 +312,7 @@ func negotiateALPN(serverProtos, clientProtos []string, quic bool) (string, erro
if http11fallback {
return "", nil
}
- return "", fmt.Errorf("tls: client requested unsupported application protocols (%s)", clientProtos)
+ return "", fmt.Errorf("tls: client requested unsupported application protocols (%q)", clientProtos)
}
// supportsECDHE returns whether ECDHE key exchanges can be used with this
--
2.40.0

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,221 @@
From 74d4d836b91318a8764b94bc2b4b66ff599eb5f2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Roland Shoemaker <bracewell@google.com>
Date: Tue, 30 Sep 2025 11:16:56 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] encoding/pem: make Decode complexity linear Because Decode
scanned the input first for the first BEGIN line, and then the first END
line, the complexity of Decode is quadratic. If the input contained a large
number of BEGINs and then a single END right at the end of the input, we
would find the first BEGIN, and then scan the entire input for the END, and
fail to parse the block, so move onto the next BEGIN, scan the entire input
for the END, etc.
Instead, look for the first END in the input, and then the first BEGIN
that precedes the found END. We then process the bytes between the BEGIN
and END, and move onto the bytes after the END for further processing.
This gives us linear complexity.
Fixes CVE-2025-61723
For #75676
Fixes #75708
Change-Id: I813c4f63e78bca4054226c53e13865c781564ccf
Reviewed-on: https://go-internal-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/2921
Reviewed-by: Nicholas Husin <husin@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
Reviewed-on: https://go-internal-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/2986
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/709842
TryBot-Bypass: Michael Pratt <mpratt@google.com>
Auto-Submit: Michael Pratt <mpratt@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Carlos Amedee <carlos@golang.org>
CVE: CVE-2025-61723
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/golang/go/commit/74d4d836b91318a8764b94bc2b4b66ff599eb5f2]
Signed-off-by: Archana Polampalli <archana.polampalli@windriver.com>
---
src/encoding/pem/pem.go | 67 +++++++++++++++++++-----------------
src/encoding/pem/pem_test.go | 13 +++----
2 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/encoding/pem/pem.go b/src/encoding/pem/pem.go
index 1bee1c1..01bed75 100644
--- a/src/encoding/pem/pem.go
+++ b/src/encoding/pem/pem.go
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ type Block struct {
// line bytes. The remainder of the byte array (also not including the new line
// bytes) is also returned and this will always be smaller than the original
// argument.
-func getLine(data []byte) (line, rest []byte) {
+func getLine(data []byte) (line, rest []byte, consumed int) {
i := bytes.IndexByte(data, '\n')
var j int
if i < 0 {
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ func getLine(data []byte) (line, rest []byte) {
i--
}
}
- return bytes.TrimRight(data[0:i], " \t"), data[j:]
+ return bytes.TrimRight(data[0:i], " \t"), data[j:], j
}
// removeSpacesAndTabs returns a copy of its input with all spaces and tabs
@@ -88,19 +88,29 @@ func Decode(data []byte) (p *Block, rest []byte) {
// the byte array, we'll accept the start string without it.
rest = data
for {
- if bytes.HasPrefix(rest, pemStart[1:]) {
- rest = rest[len(pemStart)-1:]
- } else if i := bytes.Index(rest, pemStart); i >= 0 {
- rest = rest[i+len(pemStart) : len(rest)]
- } else {
+ // Find the first END line, and then find the last BEGIN line before
+ // the end line. This lets us skip any repeated BEGIN lines that don't
+ // have a matching END.
+ endIndex := bytes.Index(rest, pemEnd)
+ if endIndex < 0 {
return nil, data
}
-
+ endTrailerIndex := endIndex + len(pemEnd)
+ beginIndex := bytes.LastIndex(rest[:endIndex], pemStart[1:])
+ if beginIndex < 0 || beginIndex > 0 && rest[beginIndex-1] != '\n' {
+ return nil, data
+ }
+ rest = rest[beginIndex+len(pemStart)-1:]
+ endIndex -= beginIndex + len(pemStart) - 1
+ endTrailerIndex -= beginIndex + len(pemStart) - 1
var typeLine []byte
- typeLine, rest = getLine(rest)
+ var consumed int
+ typeLine, rest, consumed = getLine(rest)
if !bytes.HasSuffix(typeLine, pemEndOfLine) {
continue
}
+ endIndex -= consumed
+ endTrailerIndex -= consumed
typeLine = typeLine[0 : len(typeLine)-len(pemEndOfLine)]
p = &Block{
@@ -114,7 +124,7 @@ func Decode(data []byte) (p *Block, rest []byte) {
if len(rest) == 0 {
return nil, data
}
- line, next := getLine(rest)
+ line, next, consumed := getLine(rest)
i := bytes.IndexByte(line, ':')
if i == -1 {
@@ -127,21 +137,13 @@ func Decode(data []byte) (p *Block, rest []byte) {
val = bytes.TrimSpace(val)
p.Headers[string(key)] = string(val)
rest = next
+ endIndex -= consumed
+ endTrailerIndex -= consumed
}
- var endIndex, endTrailerIndex int
-
- // If there were no headers, the END line might occur
- // immediately, without a leading newline.
- if len(p.Headers) == 0 && bytes.HasPrefix(rest, pemEnd[1:]) {
- endIndex = 0
- endTrailerIndex = len(pemEnd) - 1
- } else {
- endIndex = bytes.Index(rest, pemEnd)
- endTrailerIndex = endIndex + len(pemEnd)
- }
-
- if endIndex < 0 {
+ // If there were headers, there must be a newline between the headers
+ // and the END line, so endIndex should be >= 0.
+ if len(p.Headers) > 0 && endIndex < 0 {
continue
}
@@ -161,21 +163,24 @@ func Decode(data []byte) (p *Block, rest []byte) {
}
// The line must end with only whitespace.
- if s, _ := getLine(restOfEndLine); len(s) != 0 {
+ if s, _, _ := getLine(restOfEndLine); len(s) != 0 {
continue
}
- base64Data := removeSpacesAndTabs(rest[:endIndex])
- p.Bytes = make([]byte, base64.StdEncoding.DecodedLen(len(base64Data)))
- n, err := base64.StdEncoding.Decode(p.Bytes, base64Data)
- if err != nil {
- continue
+ p.Bytes = []byte{}
+ if endIndex > 0 {
+ base64Data := removeSpacesAndTabs(rest[:endIndex])
+ p.Bytes = make([]byte, base64.StdEncoding.DecodedLen(len(base64Data)))
+ n, err := base64.StdEncoding.Decode(p.Bytes, base64Data)
+ if err != nil {
+ continue
+ }
+ p.Bytes = p.Bytes[:n]
}
- p.Bytes = p.Bytes[:n]
// the -1 is because we might have only matched pemEnd without the
// leading newline if the PEM block was empty.
- _, rest = getLine(rest[endIndex+len(pemEnd)-1:])
+ _, rest, _ = getLine(rest[endIndex+len(pemEnd)-1:])
return p, rest
}
}
diff --git a/src/encoding/pem/pem_test.go b/src/encoding/pem/pem_test.go
index c94b5ca..a326f9b 100644
--- a/src/encoding/pem/pem_test.go
+++ b/src/encoding/pem/pem_test.go
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ var getLineTests = []GetLineTest{
func TestGetLine(t *testing.T) {
for i, test := range getLineTests {
- x, y := getLine([]byte(test.in))
+ x, y, _ := getLine([]byte(test.in))
if string(x) != test.out1 || string(y) != test.out2 {
t.Errorf("#%d got:%+v,%+v want:%s,%s", i, x, y, test.out1, test.out2)
}
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ func TestDecode(t *testing.T) {
if !reflect.DeepEqual(result, certificate) {
t.Errorf("#0 got:%#v want:%#v", result, certificate)
}
+
result, remainder = Decode(remainder)
if !reflect.DeepEqual(result, privateKey) {
t.Errorf("#1 got:%#v want:%#v", result, privateKey)
@@ -68,7 +69,7 @@ func TestDecode(t *testing.T) {
}
result, remainder = Decode(remainder)
- if result == nil || result.Type != "HEADERS" || len(result.Headers) != 1 {
+ if result == nil || result.Type != "VALID HEADERS" || len(result.Headers) != 1 {
t.Errorf("#5 expected single header block but got :%v", result)
}
@@ -381,15 +382,15 @@ ZWAaUoVtWIQ52aKS0p19G99hhb+IVANC4akkdHV4SP8i7MVNZhfUmg==
# This shouldn't be recognised because of the missing newline after the
headers.
------BEGIN HEADERS-----
+-----BEGIN INVALID HEADERS-----
Header: 1
------END HEADERS-----
+-----END INVALID HEADERS-----
# This should be valid, however.
------BEGIN HEADERS-----
+-----BEGIN VALID HEADERS-----
Header: 1
------END HEADERS-----`)
+-----END VALID HEADERS-----`)
var certificate = &Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE",
Headers: map[string]string{},
--
2.40.0

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
From a402f4ad285514f5f3db90516d72047d591b307a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
Date: Tue, 30 Sep 2025 15:11:16 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] net/textproto: avoid quadratic complexity in
Reader.ReadResponse Reader.ReadResponse constructed a response string from
repeated string concatenation, permitting a malicious sender to cause
excessive memory allocation and CPU consumption by sending a response
consisting of many short lines.
Use a strings.Builder to construct the string instead.
Thanks to Jakub Ciolek for reporting this issue.
Fixes CVE-2025-61724
For #75716
Fixes #75717
Change-Id: I1a98ce85a21b830cb25799f9ac9333a67400d736
Reviewed-on: https://go-internal-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/2940
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <bracewell@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Nicholas Husin <husin@google.com>
Reviewed-on: https://go-internal-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/2980
Reviewed-by: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/709837
Reviewed-by: Carlos Amedee <carlos@golang.org>
TryBot-Bypass: Michael Pratt <mpratt@google.com>
Auto-Submit: Michael Pratt <mpratt@google.com>
CVE: CVE-2025-61724
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/golang/go/commit/a402f4ad285514f5f3db90516d72047d591b307a]
Signed-off-by: Archana Polampalli <archana.polampalli@windriver.com>
---
src/net/textproto/reader.go | 11 ++++++++---
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/net/textproto/reader.go b/src/net/textproto/reader.go
index 3ac4d4d..a996257 100644
--- a/src/net/textproto/reader.go
+++ b/src/net/textproto/reader.go
@@ -288,8 +288,10 @@ func (r *Reader) ReadCodeLine(expectCode int) (code int, message string, err err
// An expectCode <= 0 disables the check of the status code.
//
func (r *Reader) ReadResponse(expectCode int) (code int, message string, err error) {
- code, continued, message, err := r.readCodeLine(expectCode)
+ code, continued, first, err := r.readCodeLine(expectCode)
multi := continued
+ var messageBuilder strings.Builder
+ messageBuilder.WriteString(first)
for continued {
line, err := r.ReadLine()
if err != nil {
@@ -300,12 +302,15 @@ func (r *Reader) ReadResponse(expectCode int) (code int, message string, err err
var moreMessage string
code2, continued, moreMessage, err = parseCodeLine(line, 0)
if err != nil || code2 != code {
- message += "\n" + strings.TrimRight(line, "\r\n")
+ messageBuilder.WriteByte('\n')
+ messageBuilder.WriteString(strings.TrimRight(line, "\r\n"))
continued = true
continue
}
- message += "\n" + moreMessage
+ messageBuilder.WriteByte('\n')
+ messageBuilder.WriteString(moreMessage)
}
+ message = messageBuilder.String()
if err != nil && multi && message != "" {
// replace one line error message with all lines (full message)
err = &Error{code, message}
--
2.40.0

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
From be5b52bea674190ef7de272664be6c7ae93ec5a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Roland Shoemaker <bracewell@google.com>
Date: Thu, 18 Jan 2024 12:51:13 -0800
Subject: [PATCH] [release-branch.go1.21] crypto/x509: make sure pub key is
non-nil before interface conversion
alreadyInChain assumes all keys fit a interface which contains the
Equal method (which they do), but this ignores that certificates may
have a nil key when PublicKeyAlgorithm is UnknownPublicKeyAlgorithm. In
this case alreadyInChain panics.
Check that the key is non-nil as part of considerCandidate (we are never
going to build a chain containing UnknownPublicKeyAlgorithm anyway).
For #65390
Fixes #65392
Fixes CVE-2024-24783
Change-Id: Ibdccc0a487e3368b6812be35daad2512220243f3
Reviewed-on: https://team-review.git.corp.google.com/c/golang/go-private/+/2137282
Reviewed-by: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
Run-TryBot: Roland Shoemaker <bracewell@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Tatiana Bradley <tatianabradley@google.com>
Reviewed-on: https://team-review.git.corp.google.com/c/golang/go-private/+/2173774
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <bracewell@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Carlos Amedee <amedee@google.com>
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/569238
Auto-Submit: Michael Knyszek <mknyszek@google.com>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Reviewed-by: Carlos Amedee <carlos@golang.org>
CVE: CVE-2024-24783
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/golang/go/commit/be5b52bea674190ef7de272664be6c7ae93ec5a0]
Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
---
src/crypto/x509/verify.go | 3 +++
src/crypto/x509/verify_test.go | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 22 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/crypto/x509/verify.go b/src/crypto/x509/verify.go
index 9ef1146..3e95808 100644
--- a/src/crypto/x509/verify.go
+++ b/src/crypto/x509/verify.go
@@ -819,6 +819,9 @@ func (c *Certificate) buildChains(cache map[*Certificate][][]*Certificate, curre
)
considerCandidate := func(certType int, candidate *Certificate) {
+ if candidate.PublicKey == nil {
+ return
+ }
for _, cert := range currentChain {
if cert.Equal(candidate) {
return
diff --git a/src/crypto/x509/verify_test.go b/src/crypto/x509/verify_test.go
index 9954a67..9da39ca 100644
--- a/src/crypto/x509/verify_test.go
+++ b/src/crypto/x509/verify_test.go
@@ -1968,3 +1968,22 @@ func TestSystemRootsErrorUnwrap(t *testing.T) {
t.Error("errors.Is failed, wanted success")
}
}
+
+func TestVerifyNilPubKey(t *testing.T) {
+ c := &Certificate{
+ RawIssuer: []byte{1, 2, 3},
+ AuthorityKeyId: []byte{1, 2, 3},
+ }
+ opts := &VerifyOptions{}
+ opts.Roots = NewCertPool()
+ r := &Certificate{
+ RawSubject: []byte{1, 2, 3},
+ SubjectKeyId: []byte{1, 2, 3},
+ }
+ opts.Roots.AddCert(r)
+
+ _, err := c.buildChains(nil, []*Certificate{r}, nil, opts)
+ if _, ok := err.(UnknownAuthorityError); !ok {
+ t.Fatalf("buildChains returned unexpected error, got: %v, want %v", err, UnknownAuthorityError{})
+ }
+}
--
2.50.1

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE.md;md5=239668a7c6066d9e0c5382e9c8c6c0e1"
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "9d643ff0a55b762d5cdb124b8eaa99c66322e2157b69160bc32796e824360e6d"
SRC_URI += " file://CVE-2024-3651.patch"
inherit pypi setuptools3
# Remove bundled egg-info

View File

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ DEPENDS += "python3 glib-2.0"
SRCNAME="pygobject"
SRC_URI = " \
http://ftp.gnome.org/pub/GNOME/sources/${SRCNAME}/${@gnome_verdir("${PV}")}/${SRCNAME}-${PV}.tar.xz \
${GNOME_MIRROR}/${SRCNAME}/${@gnome_verdir("${PV}")}/${SRCNAME}-${PV}.tar.xz \
file://0001-Do-not-build-tests.patch \
"
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "9b12616e32cfc792f9dc841d9c472a41a35b85ba67d3a6eb427e307a6fe4367b"

View File

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ HOMEPAGE = "https://github.com/shazow/urllib3"
LICENSE = "MIT"
LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE.txt;md5=c2823cb995439c984fd62a973d79815c"
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f8ecc1bba5667413457c529ab955bf8c67b45db799d159066261719e328580a0"
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "40c2dc0c681e47eb8f90e7e27bf6ff7df2e677421fd46756da1161c39ca70d32"
inherit pypi setuptools3

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,364 @@
From 892747b4cf0f95ba8beb51c0d0658bfaa381ebca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Łukasz Langa <lukasz@langa.pl>
Date: Fri, 31 Oct 2025 17:51:32 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] gh-136065: Fix quadratic complexity in os.path.expandvars()
(GH-134952) (GH-140851)
(cherry picked from commit f029e8db626ddc6e3a3beea4eff511a71aaceb5c)
Co-authored-by: Serhiy Storchaka <storchaka@gmail.com>
CVE: CVE-2025-6075
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/python/cpython/commit/892747b4cf0f95ba8beb51c0d0658bfaa381ebca]
Signed-off-by: Praveen Kumar <praveen.kumar@windriver.com>
---
Lib/ntpath.py | 126 ++++++------------
Lib/posixpath.py | 43 +++---
Lib/test/test_genericpath.py | 14 ++
Lib/test/test_ntpath.py | 20 ++-
...-05-30-22-33-27.gh-issue-136065.bu337o.rst | 1 +
5 files changed, 93 insertions(+), 111 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2025-05-30-22-33-27.gh-issue-136065.bu337o.rst
diff --git a/Lib/ntpath.py b/Lib/ntpath.py
index 9b0cca4..bd2b4e2 100644
--- a/Lib/ntpath.py
+++ b/Lib/ntpath.py
@@ -374,17 +374,23 @@ def expanduser(path):
# XXX With COMMAND.COM you can use any characters in a variable name,
# XXX except '^|<>='.
+_varpattern = r"'[^']*'?|%(%|[^%]*%?)|\$(\$|[-\w]+|\{[^}]*\}?)"
+_varsub = None
+_varsubb = None
+
def expandvars(path):
"""Expand shell variables of the forms $var, ${var} and %var%.
Unknown variables are left unchanged."""
path = os.fspath(path)
+ global _varsub, _varsubb
if isinstance(path, bytes):
if b'$' not in path and b'%' not in path:
return path
- import string
- varchars = bytes(string.ascii_letters + string.digits + '_-', 'ascii')
- quote = b'\''
+ if not _varsubb:
+ import re
+ _varsubb = re.compile(_varpattern.encode(), re.ASCII).sub
+ sub = _varsubb
percent = b'%'
brace = b'{'
rbrace = b'}'
@@ -393,94 +399,44 @@ def expandvars(path):
else:
if '$' not in path and '%' not in path:
return path
- import string
- varchars = string.ascii_letters + string.digits + '_-'
- quote = '\''
+ if not _varsub:
+ import re
+ _varsub = re.compile(_varpattern, re.ASCII).sub
+ sub = _varsub
percent = '%'
brace = '{'
rbrace = '}'
dollar = '$'
environ = os.environ
- res = path[:0]
- index = 0
- pathlen = len(path)
- while index < pathlen:
- c = path[index:index+1]
- if c == quote: # no expansion within single quotes
- path = path[index + 1:]
- pathlen = len(path)
- try:
- index = path.index(c)
- res += c + path[:index + 1]
- except ValueError:
- res += c + path
- index = pathlen - 1
- elif c == percent: # variable or '%'
- if path[index + 1:index + 2] == percent:
- res += c
- index += 1
- else:
- path = path[index+1:]
- pathlen = len(path)
- try:
- index = path.index(percent)
- except ValueError:
- res += percent + path
- index = pathlen - 1
- else:
- var = path[:index]
- try:
- if environ is None:
- value = os.fsencode(os.environ[os.fsdecode(var)])
- else:
- value = environ[var]
- except KeyError:
- value = percent + var + percent
- res += value
- elif c == dollar: # variable or '$$'
- if path[index + 1:index + 2] == dollar:
- res += c
- index += 1
- elif path[index + 1:index + 2] == brace:
- path = path[index+2:]
- pathlen = len(path)
- try:
- index = path.index(rbrace)
- except ValueError:
- res += dollar + brace + path
- index = pathlen - 1
- else:
- var = path[:index]
- try:
- if environ is None:
- value = os.fsencode(os.environ[os.fsdecode(var)])
- else:
- value = environ[var]
- except KeyError:
- value = dollar + brace + var + rbrace
- res += value
- else:
- var = path[:0]
- index += 1
- c = path[index:index + 1]
- while c and c in varchars:
- var += c
- index += 1
- c = path[index:index + 1]
- try:
- if environ is None:
- value = os.fsencode(os.environ[os.fsdecode(var)])
- else:
- value = environ[var]
- except KeyError:
- value = dollar + var
- res += value
- if c:
- index -= 1
+
+ def repl(m):
+ lastindex = m.lastindex
+ if lastindex is None:
+ return m[0]
+ name = m[lastindex]
+ if lastindex == 1:
+ if name == percent:
+ return name
+ if not name.endswith(percent):
+ return m[0]
+ name = name[:-1]
else:
- res += c
- index += 1
- return res
+ if name == dollar:
+ return name
+ if name.startswith(brace):
+ if not name.endswith(rbrace):
+ return m[0]
+ name = name[1:-1]
+
+ try:
+ if environ is None:
+ return os.fsencode(os.environ[os.fsdecode(name)])
+ else:
+ return environ[name]
+ except KeyError:
+ return m[0]
+
+ return sub(repl, path)
# Normalize a path, e.g. A//B, A/./B and A/foo/../B all become A\B.
diff --git a/Lib/posixpath.py b/Lib/posixpath.py
index b8dd563..75020ee 100644
--- a/Lib/posixpath.py
+++ b/Lib/posixpath.py
@@ -279,42 +279,41 @@ def expanduser(path):
# This expands the forms $variable and ${variable} only.
# Non-existent variables are left unchanged.
-_varprog = None
-_varprogb = None
+_varpattern = r'\$(\w+|\{[^}]*\}?)'
+_varsub = None
+_varsubb = None
def expandvars(path):
"""Expand shell variables of form $var and ${var}. Unknown variables
are left unchanged."""
path = os.fspath(path)
- global _varprog, _varprogb
+ global _varsub, _varsubb
if isinstance(path, bytes):
if b'$' not in path:
return path
- if not _varprogb:
+ if not _varsubb:
import re
- _varprogb = re.compile(br'\$(\w+|\{[^}]*\})', re.ASCII)
- search = _varprogb.search
+ _varsubb = re.compile(_varpattern.encode(), re.ASCII).sub
+ sub = _varsubb
start = b'{'
end = b'}'
environ = getattr(os, 'environb', None)
else:
if '$' not in path:
return path
- if not _varprog:
+ if not _varsub:
import re
- _varprog = re.compile(r'\$(\w+|\{[^}]*\})', re.ASCII)
- search = _varprog.search
+ _varsub = re.compile(_varpattern, re.ASCII).sub
+ sub = _varsub
start = '{'
end = '}'
environ = os.environ
- i = 0
- while True:
- m = search(path, i)
- if not m:
- break
- i, j = m.span(0)
- name = m.group(1)
- if name.startswith(start) and name.endswith(end):
+
+ def repl(m):
+ name = m[1]
+ if name.startswith(start):
+ if not name.endswith(end):
+ return m[0]
name = name[1:-1]
try:
if environ is None:
@@ -322,13 +321,11 @@ def expandvars(path):
else:
value = environ[name]
except KeyError:
- i = j
+ return m[0]
else:
- tail = path[j:]
- path = path[:i] + value
- i = len(path)
- path += tail
- return path
+ return value
+
+ return sub(repl, path)
# Normalize a path, e.g. A//B, A/./B and A/foo/../B all become A/B.
diff --git a/Lib/test/test_genericpath.py b/Lib/test/test_genericpath.py
index 1ff7f75..b0a1326 100644
--- a/Lib/test/test_genericpath.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_genericpath.py
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import os
import sys
import unittest
import warnings
+from test import support
from test.support import os_helper
from test.support import warnings_helper
from test.support.script_helper import assert_python_ok
@@ -430,6 +431,19 @@ class CommonTest(GenericTest):
os.fsencode('$bar%s bar' % nonascii))
check(b'$spam}bar', os.fsencode('%s}bar' % nonascii))
+ @support.requires_resource('cpu')
+ def test_expandvars_large(self):
+ expandvars = self.pathmodule.expandvars
+ with os_helper.EnvironmentVarGuard() as env:
+ env.clear()
+ env["A"] = "B"
+ n = 100_000
+ self.assertEqual(expandvars('$A'*n), 'B'*n)
+ self.assertEqual(expandvars('${A}'*n), 'B'*n)
+ self.assertEqual(expandvars('$A!'*n), 'B!'*n)
+ self.assertEqual(expandvars('${A}A'*n), 'BA'*n)
+ self.assertEqual(expandvars('${'*10*n), '${'*10*n)
+
def test_abspath(self):
self.assertIn("foo", self.pathmodule.abspath("foo"))
with warnings.catch_warnings():
diff --git a/Lib/test/test_ntpath.py b/Lib/test/test_ntpath.py
index f790f77..161e57d 100644
--- a/Lib/test/test_ntpath.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_ntpath.py
@@ -5,8 +5,8 @@ import sys
import unittest
import warnings
from ntpath import ALLOW_MISSING
+from test import support
from test.support import os_helper
-from test.support import TestFailed
from test.support.os_helper import FakePath
from test import test_genericpath
from tempfile import TemporaryFile
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ def tester(fn, wantResult):
fn = fn.replace("\\", "\\\\")
gotResult = eval(fn)
if wantResult != gotResult and _norm(wantResult) != _norm(gotResult):
- raise TestFailed("%s should return: %s but returned: %s" \
+ raise support.TestFailed("%s should return: %s but returned: %s" \
%(str(fn), str(wantResult), str(gotResult)))
# then with bytes
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ def tester(fn, wantResult):
warnings.simplefilter("ignore", DeprecationWarning)
gotResult = eval(fn)
if _norm(wantResult) != _norm(gotResult):
- raise TestFailed("%s should return: %s but returned: %s" \
+ raise support.TestFailed("%s should return: %s but returned: %s" \
%(str(fn), str(wantResult), repr(gotResult)))
@@ -689,6 +689,19 @@ class TestNtpath(NtpathTestCase):
check('%spam%bar', '%sbar' % nonascii)
check('%{}%bar'.format(nonascii), 'ham%sbar' % nonascii)
+ @support.requires_resource('cpu')
+ def test_expandvars_large(self):
+ expandvars = ntpath.expandvars
+ with os_helper.EnvironmentVarGuard() as env:
+ env.clear()
+ env["A"] = "B"
+ n = 100_000
+ self.assertEqual(expandvars('%A%'*n), 'B'*n)
+ self.assertEqual(expandvars('%A%A'*n), 'BA'*n)
+ self.assertEqual(expandvars("''"*n + '%%'), "''"*n + '%')
+ self.assertEqual(expandvars("%%"*n), "%"*n)
+ self.assertEqual(expandvars("$$"*n), "$"*n)
+
def test_expanduser(self):
tester('ntpath.expanduser("test")', 'test')
@@ -923,6 +936,7 @@ class TestNtpath(NtpathTestCase):
self.assertIsInstance(b_final_path, bytes)
self.assertGreater(len(b_final_path), 0)
+
class NtCommonTest(test_genericpath.CommonTest, unittest.TestCase):
pathmodule = ntpath
attributes = ['relpath']
diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2025-05-30-22-33-27.gh-issue-136065.bu337o.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2025-05-30-22-33-27.gh-issue-136065.bu337o.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1d152bb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2025-05-30-22-33-27.gh-issue-136065.bu337o.rst
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Fix quadratic complexity in :func:`os.path.expandvars`.
--
2.40.0

View File

@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://www.python.org/ftp/python/${PV}/Python-${PV}.tar.xz \
file://0001-Avoid-shebang-overflow-on-python-config.py.patch \
file://0001-test_storlines-skip-due-to-load-variability.patch \
file://0001-gh-107811-tarfile-treat-overflow-in-UID-GID-as-failu.patch \
file://CVE-2025-6075.patch \
"
SRC_URI:append:class-native = " \

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
From 4325835f92f3f142ebd91a3fdba4e1f1ab7f1cfb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Nobuyoshi Nakada <nobu@ruby-lang.org>
Date: Thu, 16 May 2024 11:26:51 +0900
Subject: [PATCH] Read quoted attributes in chunks (#126)
CVE: CVE-2024-35176
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/ruby/rexml/commit/4325835f92f3f142ebd91a3fdba4e1f1ab7f1cfb]
Signed-off-by: Divya Chellam <divya.chellam@windriver.com>
---
.../lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb | 20 ++++++-------
.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/source.rb | 29 +++++++++++++++----
2 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb b/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb
index b97beb3..eab942d 100644
--- a/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb
+++ b/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb
@@ -675,17 +675,17 @@ module REXML
message = "Missing attribute equal: <#{name}>"
raise REXML::ParseException.new(message, @source)
end
- unless match = @source.match(/(['"])(.*?)\1\s*/um, true)
- if match = @source.match(/(['"])/, true)
- message =
- "Missing attribute value end quote: <#{name}>: <#{match[1]}>"
- raise REXML::ParseException.new(message, @source)
- else
- message = "Missing attribute value start quote: <#{name}>"
- raise REXML::ParseException.new(message, @source)
- end
+ unless match = @source.match(/(['"])/, true)
+ message = "Missing attribute value start quote: <#{name}>"
+ raise REXML::ParseException.new(message, @source)
+ end
+ quote = match[1]
+ value = @source.read_until(quote)
+ unless value.chomp!(quote)
+ message = "Missing attribute value end quote: <#{name}>: <#{quote}>"
+ raise REXML::ParseException.new(message, @source)
end
- value = match[2]
+ @source.match(/\s*/um, true)
if prefix == "xmlns"
if local_part == "xml"
if value != "http://www.w3.org/XML/1998/namespace"
diff --git a/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/source.rb b/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/source.rb
index 4111d1d..7132147 100644
--- a/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/source.rb
+++ b/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/source.rb
@@ -65,7 +65,11 @@ module REXML
encoding_updated
end
- def read
+ def read(term = nil)
+ end
+
+ def read_until(term)
+ @scanner.scan_until(Regexp.union(term)) or @scanner.rest
end
def match(pattern, cons=false)
@@ -151,9 +155,9 @@ module REXML
end
end
- def read
+ def read(term = nil)
begin
- @scanner << readline
+ @scanner << readline(term)
true
rescue Exception, NameError
@source = nil
@@ -161,6 +165,21 @@ module REXML
end
end
+ def read_until(term)
+ pattern = Regexp.union(term)
+ data = []
+ begin
+ until str = @scanner.scan_until(pattern)
+ @scanner << readline(term)
+ end
+ rescue EOFError
+ @scanner.rest
+ else
+ read if @scanner.eos? and !@source.eof?
+ str
+ end
+ end
+
def match( pattern, cons=false )
read if @scanner.eos? && @source
while true
@@ -205,8 +224,8 @@ module REXML
end
private
- def readline
- str = @source.readline(@line_break)
+ def readline(term = nil)
+ str = @source.readline(term || @line_break)
if @pending_buffer
if str.nil?
str = @pending_buffer
--
2.40.0

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
From f1df7d13b3e57a5e059273d2f0870163c08d7420 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sutou Kouhei <kou@clear-code.com>
Date: Mon, 20 May 2024 12:17:27 +0900
Subject: [PATCH] Add support for old strscan
Fix GH-132
If we support old strscan, users can also use strscan installed as a
default gem.
Reported by Adam. Thanks!!!
CVE: CVE-2024-39908
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/ruby/rexml/commit/f1df7d13b3e57a5e059273d2f0870163c08d7420]
Signed-off-by: Divya Chellam <divya.chellam@windriver.com>
---
.../gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb | 11 +++++++++++
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
diff --git a/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb b/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb
index eab942d..8ea8b43 100644
--- a/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb
+++ b/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb
@@ -7,6 +7,17 @@ require "strscan"
module REXML
module Parsers
+ if StringScanner::Version < "3.0.8"
+ module StringScannerCaptures
+ refine StringScanner do
+ def captures
+ values_at(*(1...size))
+ end
+ end
+ end
+ using StringScannerCaptures
+ end
+
# = Using the Pull Parser
# <em>This API is experimental, and subject to change.</em>
# parser = PullParser.new( "<a>text<b att='val'/>txet</a>" )
--
2.40.0

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
From d146162e9a61574499d10428bc0065754cd26601 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: NAITOH Jun <naitoh@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 4 Mar 2024 05:24:53 +0900
Subject: [PATCH] Remove `Source#string=` method (#117)
We want to just change scan pointer.
https://github.com/ruby/rexml/pull/114#discussion_r1501773803
> I want to just change scan pointer (`StringScanner#pos=`) instead of
changing `@scanner.string`.
CVE: CVE-2024-39908
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/ruby/rexml/commit/d146162e9a61574499d10428bc0065754cd26601]
Signed-off-by: Divya Chellam <divya.chellam@windriver.com>
---
.../lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb | 19 +++++++++++--------
.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/source.rb | 8 ++++++--
2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb b/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb
index 8ea8b43..81415a8 100644
--- a/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb
+++ b/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb
@@ -231,8 +231,9 @@ module REXML
#STDERR.puts @source.encoding
#STDERR.puts "BUFFER = #{@source.buffer.inspect}"
if @document_status == nil
+ start_position = @source.position
if @source.match("<?", true)
- return process_instruction
+ return process_instruction(start_position)
elsif @source.match("<!", true)
if @source.match("--", true)
return [ :comment, @source.match(/(.*?)-->/um, true)[1] ]
@@ -244,7 +245,7 @@ module REXML
else
message = "#{base_error_message}: invalid name"
end
- @source.string = "<!DOCTYPE" + @source.buffer
+ @source.position = start_position
raise REXML::ParseException.new(message, @source)
end
name = parse_name(base_error_message)
@@ -285,6 +286,7 @@ module REXML
end
if @document_status == :in_doctype
@source.match(/\s*/um, true) # skip spaces
+ start_position = @source.position
if @source.match("<!", true)
if @source.match("ELEMENT", true)
md = @source.match(/(.*?)>/um, true)
@@ -344,7 +346,7 @@ module REXML
else
message = "#{base_error_message}: invalid name"
end
- @source.string = " <!NOTATION" + @source.buffer
+ @source.position = start_position
raise REXML::ParseException.new(message, @source)
end
name = parse_name(base_error_message)
@@ -374,6 +376,7 @@ module REXML
@source.match(/\s*/um, true)
end
begin
+ start_position = @source.position
if @source.match("<", true)
if @source.match("/", true)
@namespaces_restore_stack.pop
@@ -386,7 +389,7 @@ module REXML
if md.nil? or last_tag != md[1]
message = "Missing end tag for '#{last_tag}'"
message += " (got '#{md[1]}')" if md
- @source.string = "</" + @source.buffer if md.nil?
+ @source.position = start_position if md.nil?
raise REXML::ParseException.new(message, @source)
end
return [ :end_element, last_tag ]
@@ -410,12 +413,12 @@ module REXML
raise REXML::ParseException.new( "Declarations can only occur "+
"in the doctype declaration.", @source)
elsif @source.match("?", true)
- return process_instruction
+ return process_instruction(start_position)
else
# Get the next tag
md = @source.match(TAG_PATTERN, true)
unless md
- @source.string = "<" + @source.buffer
+ @source.position = start_position
raise REXML::ParseException.new("malformed XML: missing tag start", @source)
end
tag = md[1]
@@ -641,11 +644,11 @@ module REXML
end
end
- def process_instruction
+ def process_instruction(start_position)
match_data = @source.match(INSTRUCTION_END, true)
unless match_data
message = "Invalid processing instruction node"
- @source.string = "<?" + @source.buffer
+ @source.position = start_position
raise REXML::ParseException.new(message, @source)
end
if @document_status.nil? and match_data[1] == "xml"
diff --git a/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/source.rb b/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/source.rb
index 7132147..b20cc4f 100644
--- a/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/source.rb
+++ b/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/source.rb
@@ -80,8 +80,12 @@ module REXML
end
end
- def string=(string)
- @scanner.string = string
+ def position
+ @scanner.pos
+ end
+
+ def position=(pos)
+ @scanner.pos = pos
end
# @return true if the Source is exhausted
--
2.40.0

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
From b5bf109a599ea733663150e99c09eb44046b41dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Hiroya Fujinami <make.just.on@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 13 Jun 2024 15:12:32 +0900
Subject: [PATCH] Add a "malformed comment" check for top-level comments (#145)
This check was missing. Therefore, `REXML::Document.new("<!--")` raised
the ``undefined method `[]' for nil`` error, for example.
This PR also adds tests for "malformed comment" checks.
---------
Co-authored-by: Sutou Kouhei <kou@cozmixng.org>
CVE: CVE-2024-39908
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/ruby/rexml/commit/b5bf109a599ea733663150e99c09eb44046b41dd]
Signed-off-by: Divya Chellam <divya.chellam@windriver.com>
---
.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb | 9 ++++++++-
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb b/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb
index 81415a8..49c313c 100644
--- a/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb
+++ b/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb
@@ -236,7 +236,14 @@ module REXML
return process_instruction(start_position)
elsif @source.match("<!", true)
if @source.match("--", true)
- return [ :comment, @source.match(/(.*?)-->/um, true)[1] ]
+ md = @source.match(/(.*?)-->/um, true)
+ if md.nil?
+ raise REXML::ParseException.new("Unclosed comment", @source)
+ end
+ if /--|-\z/.match?(md[1])
+ raise REXML::ParseException.new("Malformed comment", @source)
+ end
+ return [ :comment, md[1] ]
elsif @source.match("DOCTYPE", true)
base_error_message = "Malformed DOCTYPE"
unless @source.match(/\s+/um, true)
--
2.40.0

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
From b8a5f4cd5c8fe29c65d7a00e67170223d9d2b50e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Watson <watson1978@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 16 Jul 2024 10:48:53 +0900
Subject: [PATCH] Fix performance issue caused by using repeated `>` characters
inside `<?xml` (#170)
A `<` is treated as a string delimiter.
In certain cases, if `<` is used in succession, read and match are
repeated, which slows down the process. Therefore, the following is used
to read ahead to a specific part of the string in advance.
CVE: CVE-2024-39908
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/ruby/rexml/commit/b8a5f4cd5c8fe29c65d7a00e67170223d9d2b50e]
Signed-off-by: Divya Chellam <divya.chellam@windriver.com>
---
.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb | 3 ++-
.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/source.rb | 6 +++---
2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb b/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb
index 49c313c..767e134 100644
--- a/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb
+++ b/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb
@@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ module REXML
module Private
INSTRUCTION_END = /#{NAME}(\s+.*?)?\?>/um
+ INSTRUCTION_TERM = "?>"
TAG_PATTERN = /((?>#{QNAME_STR}))\s*/um
CLOSE_PATTERN = /(#{QNAME_STR})\s*>/um
ATTLISTDECL_END = /\s+#{NAME}(?:#{ATTDEF})*\s*>/um
@@ -652,7 +653,7 @@ module REXML
end
def process_instruction(start_position)
- match_data = @source.match(INSTRUCTION_END, true)
+ match_data = @source.match(Private::INSTRUCTION_END, true, term: Private::INSTRUCTION_TERM)
unless match_data
message = "Invalid processing instruction node"
@source.position = start_position
diff --git a/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/source.rb b/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/source.rb
index b20cc4f..08a035c 100644
--- a/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/source.rb
+++ b/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/source.rb
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ module REXML
@scanner.scan_until(Regexp.union(term)) or @scanner.rest
end
- def match(pattern, cons=false)
+ def match(pattern, cons=false, term: nil)
if cons
@scanner.scan(pattern).nil? ? nil : @scanner
else
@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ module REXML
end
end
- def match( pattern, cons=false )
+ def match( pattern, cons=false, term: nil )
read if @scanner.eos? && @source
while true
if cons
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ module REXML
break if md
return nil if pattern.is_a?(String) && pattern.bytesize <= @scanner.rest_size
return nil if @source.nil?
- return nil unless read
+ return nil unless read(term)
end
md.nil? ? nil : @scanner
--
2.40.0

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
From 0af55fa49d4c9369f90f239a9571edab800ed36e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Watson <watson1978@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 16 Jul 2024 10:57:39 +0900
Subject: [PATCH] Fix ReDoS caused by very large character references using
repeated 0s (#169)
This patch will fix the ReDoS that is caused by large string of 0s on a
character reference (like `&#00000000...`).
This is occurred in Ruby 3.1 or earlier.
CVE: CVE-2024-39908
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/ruby/rexml/commit/0af55fa49d4c9369f90f239a9571edab800ed36e]
Signed-off-by: Divya Chellam <divya.chellam@windriver.com>
---
.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/text.rb | 48 +++++++++++++++-------
1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/text.rb b/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/text.rb
index 050b09c..0957d70 100644
--- a/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/text.rb
+++ b/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/text.rb
@@ -151,25 +151,45 @@ module REXML
end
end
- # context sensitive
- string.scan(pattern) do
- if $1[-1] != ?;
- raise "Illegal character #{$1.inspect} in raw string #{string.inspect}"
- elsif $1[0] == ?&
- if $5 and $5[0] == ?#
- case ($5[1] == ?x ? $5[2..-1].to_i(16) : $5[1..-1].to_i)
- when *VALID_CHAR
+ pos = 0
+ while (index = string.index(/<|&/, pos))
+ if string[index] == "<"
+ raise "Illegal character \"#{string[index]}\" in raw string #{string.inspect}"
+ end
+
+ unless (end_index = string.index(/[^\s];/, index + 1))
+ raise "Illegal character \"#{string[index]}\" in raw string #{string.inspect}"
+ end
+
+ value = string[(index + 1)..end_index]
+ if /\s/.match?(value)
+ raise "Illegal character \"#{string[index]}\" in raw string #{string.inspect}"
+ end
+
+ if value[0] == "#"
+ character_reference = value[1..-1]
+
+ unless (/\A(\d+|x[0-9a-fA-F]+)\z/.match?(character_reference))
+ if character_reference[0] == "x" || character_reference[-1] == "x"
+ raise "Illegal character \"#{string[index]}\" in raw string #{string.inspect}"
else
- raise "Illegal character #{$1.inspect} in raw string #{string.inspect}"
+ raise "Illegal character #{string.inspect} in raw string #{string.inspect}"
end
- # FIXME: below can't work but this needs API change.
- # elsif @parent and $3 and !SUBSTITUTES.include?($1)
- # if !doctype or !doctype.entities.has_key?($3)
- # raise "Undeclared entity '#{$1}' in raw string \"#{string}\""
- # end
end
+
+ case (character_reference[0] == "x" ? character_reference[1..-1].to_i(16) : character_reference[0..-1].to_i)
+ when *VALID_CHAR
+ else
+ raise "Illegal character #{string.inspect} in raw string #{string.inspect}"
+ end
+ elsif !(/\A#{Entity::NAME}\z/um.match?(value))
+ raise "Illegal character \"#{string[index]}\" in raw string #{string.inspect}"
end
+
+ pos = end_index + 1
end
+
+ string
end
def node_type
--
2.40.0

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
From c1b64c174ec2e8ca2174c51332670e3be30c865f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Watson <watson1978@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 16 Jul 2024 10:57:50 +0900
Subject: [PATCH] Fix performance issue caused by using repeated `>` characters
inside comments (#171)
A `<` is treated as a string delimiter.
In certain cases, if `<` is used in succession, read and match are
repeated, which slows down the process. Therefore, the following is used
to read ahead to a specific part of the string in advance.
CVE: CVE-2024-39908
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/ruby/rexml/commit/c1b64c174ec2e8ca2174c51332670e3be30c865f]
Signed-off-by: Divya Chellam <divya.chellam@windriver.com>
---
.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb b/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb
index 767e134..81753ad 100644
--- a/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb
+++ b/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb
@@ -126,6 +126,7 @@ module REXML
module Private
INSTRUCTION_END = /#{NAME}(\s+.*?)?\?>/um
INSTRUCTION_TERM = "?>"
+ COMMENT_TERM = "-->"
TAG_PATTERN = /((?>#{QNAME_STR}))\s*/um
CLOSE_PATTERN = /(#{QNAME_STR})\s*>/um
ATTLISTDECL_END = /\s+#{NAME}(?:#{ATTDEF})*\s*>/um
@@ -237,7 +238,7 @@ module REXML
return process_instruction(start_position)
elsif @source.match("<!", true)
if @source.match("--", true)
- md = @source.match(/(.*?)-->/um, true)
+ md = @source.match(/(.*?)-->/um, true, term: Private::COMMENT_TERM)
if md.nil?
raise REXML::ParseException.new("Unclosed comment", @source)
end
--
2.40.0

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
From 9f1415a2616c77cad44a176eee90e8457b4774b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Watson <watson1978@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 16 Jul 2024 11:04:40 +0900
Subject: [PATCH] Fix performance issue caused by using repeated `>` characters
inside `CDATA [ PAYLOAD ]` (#172)
A `<` is treated as a string delimiter.
In certain cases, if `<` is used in succession, read and match are
repeated, which slows down the process. Therefore, the following is used
to read ahead to a specific part of the string in advance.
CVE: CVE-2024-39908
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/ruby/rexml/commit/9f1415a2616c77cad44a176eee90e8457b4774b6]
Signed-off-by: Divya Chellam <divya.chellam@windriver.com>
---
.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb b/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb
index 81753ad..c907f8c 100644
--- a/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb
+++ b/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb
@@ -127,6 +127,7 @@ module REXML
INSTRUCTION_END = /#{NAME}(\s+.*?)?\?>/um
INSTRUCTION_TERM = "?>"
COMMENT_TERM = "-->"
+ CDATA_TERM = "]]>"
TAG_PATTERN = /((?>#{QNAME_STR}))\s*/um
CLOSE_PATTERN = /(#{QNAME_STR})\s*>/um
ATTLISTDECL_END = /\s+#{NAME}(?:#{ATTDEF})*\s*>/um
@@ -416,7 +417,7 @@ module REXML
return [ :comment, md[1] ] if md
else
- md = @source.match(/\[CDATA\[(.*?)\]\]>/um, true)
+ md = @source.match(/\[CDATA\[(.*?)\]\]>/um, true, term: Private::CDATA_TERM)
return [ :cdata, md[1] ] if md
end
raise REXML::ParseException.new( "Declarations can only occur "+
--
2.40.0

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
From c33ea498102be65082940e8b7d6d31cb2c6e6ee2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Watson <watson1978@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 16 Jul 2024 11:11:17 +0900
Subject: [PATCH] Fix performance issue caused by using repeated `>` characters
after ` <!DOCTYPE name` (#173)
A `<` is treated as a string delimiter.
In certain cases, if `<` is used in succession, read and match are
repeated, which slows down the process. Therefore, the following is used
to read ahead to a specific part of the string in advance.
CVE: CVE-2024-39908
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/ruby/rexml/commit/c33ea498102be65082940e8b7d6d31cb2c6e6ee2]
Signed-off-by: Divya Chellam <divya.chellam@windriver.com>
---
.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb b/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb
index c907f8c..5391e0a 100644
--- a/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb
+++ b/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb
@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ module REXML
INSTRUCTION_TERM = "?>"
COMMENT_TERM = "-->"
CDATA_TERM = "]]>"
+ DOCTYPE_TERM = "]>"
TAG_PATTERN = /((?>#{QNAME_STR}))\s*/um
CLOSE_PATTERN = /(#{QNAME_STR})\s*>/um
ATTLISTDECL_END = /\s+#{NAME}(?:#{ATTDEF})*\s*>/um
@@ -375,7 +376,7 @@ module REXML
end
return [ :comment, md[1] ] if md
end
- elsif match = @source.match(/(%.*?;)\s*/um, true)
+ elsif match = @source.match(/(%.*?;)\s*/um, true, term: Private::DOCTYPE_TERM)
return [ :externalentity, match[1] ]
elsif @source.match(/\]\s*>/um, true)
@document_status = :after_doctype
--
2.40.0

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
From a79ac8b4b42a9efabe33a0be31bd82d33fd50347 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Watson <watson1978@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 16 Jul 2024 11:18:11 +0900
Subject: [PATCH] Fix performance issue caused by using repeated `>` characters
inside `<!DOCTYPE root [<!-- PAYLOAD -->]>` (#174)
A `<` is treated as a string delimiter.
In certain cases, if `<` is used in succession, read and match are
repeated, which slows down the process. Therefore, the following is used
to read ahead to a specific part of the string in advance.
CVE: CVE-2024-39908
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/ruby/rexml/commit/a79ac8b4b42a9efabe33a0be31bd82d33fd50347]
Signed-off-by: Divya Chellam <divya.chellam@windriver.com>
---
.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb b/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb
index 5391e0a..c22b632 100644
--- a/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb
+++ b/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb
@@ -369,7 +369,7 @@ module REXML
raise REXML::ParseException.new(message, @source)
end
return [:notationdecl, name, *id]
- elsif md = @source.match(/--(.*?)-->/um, true)
+ elsif md = @source.match(/--(.*?)-->/um, true, term: Private::COMMENT_TERM)
case md[1]
when /--/, /-\z/
raise REXML::ParseException.new("Malformed comment", @source)
--
2.40.0

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
From 67efb5951ed09dbb575c375b130a1e469f437d1f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Watson <watson1978@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 16 Jul 2024 11:26:57 +0900
Subject: [PATCH] Fix performance issue caused by using repeated `>` characters
inside `<!DOCTYPE name [<!ENTITY>]>` (#175)
A `<` is treated as a string delimiter.
In certain cases, if `<` is used in succession, read and match are
repeated, which slows down the process. Therefore, the following is used
to read ahead to a specific part of the string in advance.
CVE: CVE-2024-39908
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/ruby/rexml/commit/67efb5951ed09dbb575c375b130a1e469f437d1f]
Signed-off-by: Divya Chellam <divya.chellam@windriver.com>
---
.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb | 8 ++++++--
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb b/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb
index c22b632..c4de254 100644
--- a/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb
+++ b/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb
@@ -124,11 +124,15 @@ module REXML
}
module Private
- INSTRUCTION_END = /#{NAME}(\s+.*?)?\?>/um
+ # Terminal requires two or more letters.
INSTRUCTION_TERM = "?>"
COMMENT_TERM = "-->"
CDATA_TERM = "]]>"
DOCTYPE_TERM = "]>"
+ # Read to the end of DOCTYPE because there is no proper ENTITY termination
+ ENTITY_TERM = DOCTYPE_TERM
+
+ INSTRUCTION_END = /#{NAME}(\s+.*?)?\?>/um
TAG_PATTERN = /((?>#{QNAME_STR}))\s*/um
CLOSE_PATTERN = /(#{QNAME_STR})\s*>/um
ATTLISTDECL_END = /\s+#{NAME}(?:#{ATTDEF})*\s*>/um
@@ -304,7 +308,7 @@ module REXML
raise REXML::ParseException.new( "Bad ELEMENT declaration!", @source ) if md.nil?
return [ :elementdecl, "<!ELEMENT" + md[1] ]
elsif @source.match("ENTITY", true)
- match = [:entitydecl, *@source.match(ENTITYDECL_PATTERN, true).captures.compact]
+ match = [:entitydecl, *@source.match(Private::ENTITYDECL_PATTERN, true, term: Private::ENTITY_TERM).captures.compact]
ref = false
if match[1] == '%'
ref = true
--
2.40.0

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
From 1f1e6e9b40bf339894e843dfd679c2fb1a5ddbf2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Watson <watson1978@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 16 Jul 2024 11:35:41 +0900
Subject: [PATCH] Fix ReDoS by using repeated space characters inside
`<!DOCTYPE name [<!ATTLIST>]>` (#176)
Fix performance by removing unnecessary spaces.
This is occurred in Ruby 3.1 or earlier.
CVE: CVE-2024-39908
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/ruby/rexml/commit/1f1e6e9b40bf339894e843dfd679c2fb1a5ddbf2]
Signed-off-by: Divya Chellam <divya.chellam@windriver.com>
---
.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb b/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb
index c4de254..a9b1b44 100644
--- a/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb
+++ b/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb
@@ -340,7 +340,7 @@ module REXML
contents = md[0]
pairs = {}
- values = md[0].scan( ATTDEF_RE )
+ values = md[0].strip.scan( ATTDEF_RE )
values.each do |attdef|
unless attdef[3] == "#IMPLIED"
attdef.compact!
--
2.40.0

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
From 910e5a2b487cb5a30989884a39f9cad2cc499cfc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Watson <watson1978@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 16 Jul 2024 11:36:05 +0900
Subject: [PATCH] Fix performance issue caused by using repeated `>` characters
inside `<xml><!-- --></xml>` (#177)
A `<` is treated as a string delimiter.
In certain cases, if `<` is used in succession, read and match are
repeated, which slows down the process. Therefore, the following is used
to read ahead to a specific part of the string in advance.
CVE: CVE-2024-39908
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/ruby/rexml/commit/910e5a2b487cb5a30989884a39f9cad2cc499cfc]
Signed-off-by: Divya Chellam <divya.chellam@windriver.com>
---
.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb b/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb
index a9b1b44..4864ba1 100644
--- a/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb
+++ b/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb
@@ -413,7 +413,7 @@ module REXML
#STDERR.puts "SOURCE BUFFER = #{source.buffer}, #{source.buffer.size}"
raise REXML::ParseException.new("Malformed node", @source) unless md
if md[0][0] == ?-
- md = @source.match(/--(.*?)-->/um, true)
+ md = @source.match(/--(.*?)-->/um, true, term: Private::COMMENT_TERM)
case md[1]
when /--/, /-\z/
--
2.40.0

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
From 2c39c91a65d69357cfbc35dd8079b3606d86bb70 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Watson <watson1978@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 19 Jul 2024 17:15:15 +0900
Subject: [PATCH] Fix method scope in test in order to invoke the tests
properly and fix exception message (#182)
This PR includes following two fixes.
1. The `test_empty` and `test_linear_performance_gt` were defined as
private method. Seems that test-unit runner does not invoke private
methods even if the methods have `test_` prefix.
2. When parse malformed entity declaration, the exception might have the
message about `NoMethodError`. The proper exception message will be
contained by this fix.
CVE: CVE-2024-41123
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/ruby/rexml/commit/2c39c91a65d69357cfbc35dd8079b3606d86bb70]
Signed-off-by: Divya Chellam <divya.chellam@windriver.com>
---
.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb | 6 +++++-
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb b/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb
index 4864ba1..451fbf8 100644
--- a/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb
+++ b/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb
@@ -308,7 +308,11 @@ module REXML
raise REXML::ParseException.new( "Bad ELEMENT declaration!", @source ) if md.nil?
return [ :elementdecl, "<!ELEMENT" + md[1] ]
elsif @source.match("ENTITY", true)
- match = [:entitydecl, *@source.match(Private::ENTITYDECL_PATTERN, true, term: Private::ENTITY_TERM).captures.compact]
+ match_data = @source.match(Private::ENTITYDECL_PATTERN, true, term: Private::ENTITY_TERM)
+ unless match_data
+ raise REXML::ParseException.new("Malformed entity declaration", @source)
+ end
+ match = [:entitydecl, *match_data.captures.compact]
ref = false
if match[1] == '%'
ref = true
--
2.40.0

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
From 4444a04ece4c02a7bd51e8c75623f22dc12d882b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sutou Kouhei <kou@clear-code.com>
Date: Sun, 2 Jun 2024 16:59:16 +0900
Subject: [PATCH] Add missing encode for custom term
CVE: CVE-2024-41123
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/ruby/rexml/commit/4444a04ece4c02a7bd51e8c75623f22dc12d882b]
Signed-off-by: Divya Chellam <divya.chellam@windriver.com>
---
.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/source.rb | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/source.rb b/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/source.rb
index 08a035c..7be430a 100644
--- a/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/source.rb
+++ b/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/source.rb
@@ -160,6 +160,7 @@ module REXML
end
def read(term = nil)
+ term = encode(term) if term
begin
@scanner << readline(term)
true
@@ -171,6 +172,7 @@ module REXML
def read_until(term)
pattern = Regexp.union(term)
+ term = encode(term)
data = []
begin
until str = @scanner.scan_until(pattern)
--
2.40.0

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
From ebc3e85bfa2796fb4922c1932760bec8390ff87c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: NAITOH Jun <naitoh@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 8 Jul 2024 05:54:06 +0900
Subject: [PATCH] Add position check for XML declaration (#162)
XML declaration must be the first item.
https://www.w3.org/TR/2006/REC-xml11-20060816/#document
```
[1] document ::= ( prolog element Misc* ) - ( Char* RestrictedChar Char* )
```
https://www.w3.org/TR/2006/REC-xml11-20060816/#NT-prolog
```
[22] prolog ::= XMLDecl Misc* (doctypedecl Misc*)?
```
https://www.w3.org/TR/2006/REC-xml11-20060816/#NT-XMLDecl
```
[23] XMLDecl ::= '<?xml' VersionInfo EncodingDecl? SDDecl? S? '?>'
```
See: https://github.com/ruby/rexml/pull/161#discussion_r1666118193
CVE: CVE-2024-41123
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/ruby/rexml/commit/ebc3e85bfa2796fb4922c1932760bec8390ff87c]
Signed-off-by: Divya Chellam <divya.chellam@windriver.com>
---
.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb | 5 ++++-
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb b/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb
index 451fbf8..71fce99 100644
--- a/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb
+++ b/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb
@@ -670,7 +670,10 @@ module REXML
@source.position = start_position
raise REXML::ParseException.new(message, @source)
end
- if @document_status.nil? and match_data[1] == "xml"
+ if match_data[1] == "xml"
+ if @document_status
+ raise ParseException.new("Malformed XML: XML declaration is not at the start", @source)
+ end
content = match_data[2]
version = VERSION.match(content)
version = version[1] unless version.nil?
--
2.40.0

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
From 6cac15d45864c8d70904baa5cbfcc97181000960 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: tomoya ishida <tomoyapenguin@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 1 Aug 2024 09:21:19 +0900
Subject: [PATCH] Fix source.match performance without specifying term string
(#186)
Performance problem of `source.match(regexp)` was recently fixed by
specifying terminator string. However, I think maintaining appropriate
terminator string for a regexp is hard.
I propose solving this performance issue by increasing bytes to read in
each iteration.
CVE: CVE-2024-41123
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/ruby/rexml/commit/6cac15d45864c8d70904baa5cbfcc97181000960]
Signed-off-by: Divya Chellam <divya.chellam@windriver.com>
---
.../lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb | 22 ++++++------------
.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/source.rb | 23 +++++++++++++++----
2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
diff --git a/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb b/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb
index 71fce99..c1a22b8 100644
--- a/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb
+++ b/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb
@@ -124,14 +124,6 @@ module REXML
}
module Private
- # Terminal requires two or more letters.
- INSTRUCTION_TERM = "?>"
- COMMENT_TERM = "-->"
- CDATA_TERM = "]]>"
- DOCTYPE_TERM = "]>"
- # Read to the end of DOCTYPE because there is no proper ENTITY termination
- ENTITY_TERM = DOCTYPE_TERM
-
INSTRUCTION_END = /#{NAME}(\s+.*?)?\?>/um
TAG_PATTERN = /((?>#{QNAME_STR}))\s*/um
CLOSE_PATTERN = /(#{QNAME_STR})\s*>/um
@@ -244,7 +236,7 @@ module REXML
return process_instruction(start_position)
elsif @source.match("<!", true)
if @source.match("--", true)
- md = @source.match(/(.*?)-->/um, true, term: Private::COMMENT_TERM)
+ md = @source.match(/(.*?)-->/um, true)
if md.nil?
raise REXML::ParseException.new("Unclosed comment", @source)
end
@@ -308,7 +300,7 @@ module REXML
raise REXML::ParseException.new( "Bad ELEMENT declaration!", @source ) if md.nil?
return [ :elementdecl, "<!ELEMENT" + md[1] ]
elsif @source.match("ENTITY", true)
- match_data = @source.match(Private::ENTITYDECL_PATTERN, true, term: Private::ENTITY_TERM)
+ match_data = @source.match(Private::ENTITYDECL_PATTERN, true)
unless match_data
raise REXML::ParseException.new("Malformed entity declaration", @source)
end
@@ -377,14 +369,14 @@ module REXML
raise REXML::ParseException.new(message, @source)
end
return [:notationdecl, name, *id]
- elsif md = @source.match(/--(.*?)-->/um, true, term: Private::COMMENT_TERM)
+ elsif md = @source.match(/--(.*?)-->/um, true)
case md[1]
when /--/, /-\z/
raise REXML::ParseException.new("Malformed comment", @source)
end
return [ :comment, md[1] ] if md
end
- elsif match = @source.match(/(%.*?;)\s*/um, true, term: Private::DOCTYPE_TERM)
+ elsif match = @source.match(/(%.*?;)\s*/um, true)
return [ :externalentity, match[1] ]
elsif @source.match(/\]\s*>/um, true)
@document_status = :after_doctype
@@ -417,7 +409,7 @@ module REXML
#STDERR.puts "SOURCE BUFFER = #{source.buffer}, #{source.buffer.size}"
raise REXML::ParseException.new("Malformed node", @source) unless md
if md[0][0] == ?-
- md = @source.match(/--(.*?)-->/um, true, term: Private::COMMENT_TERM)
+ md = @source.match(/--(.*?)-->/um, true)
case md[1]
when /--/, /-\z/
@@ -426,7 +418,7 @@ module REXML
return [ :comment, md[1] ] if md
else
- md = @source.match(/\[CDATA\[(.*?)\]\]>/um, true, term: Private::CDATA_TERM)
+ md = @source.match(/\[CDATA\[(.*?)\]\]>/um, true)
return [ :cdata, md[1] ] if md
end
raise REXML::ParseException.new( "Declarations can only occur "+
@@ -664,7 +656,7 @@ module REXML
end
def process_instruction(start_position)
- match_data = @source.match(Private::INSTRUCTION_END, true, term: Private::INSTRUCTION_TERM)
+ match_data = @source.match(Private::INSTRUCTION_END, true)
unless match_data
message = "Invalid processing instruction node"
@source.position = start_position
diff --git a/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/source.rb b/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/source.rb
index 7be430a..7c05cb5 100644
--- a/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/source.rb
+++ b/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/source.rb
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ module REXML
@scanner.scan_until(Regexp.union(term)) or @scanner.rest
end
- def match(pattern, cons=false, term: nil)
+ def match(pattern, cons=false)
if cons
@scanner.scan(pattern).nil? ? nil : @scanner
else
@@ -159,10 +159,20 @@ module REXML
end
end
- def read(term = nil)
+ def read(term = nil, min_bytes = 1)
term = encode(term) if term
begin
- @scanner << readline(term)
+ str = readline(term)
+ @scanner << str
+ read_bytes = str.bytesize
+ begin
+ while read_bytes < min_bytes
+ str = readline(term)
+ @scanner << str
+ read_bytes += str.bytesize
+ end
+ rescue IOError
+ end
true
rescue Exception, NameError
@source = nil
@@ -186,7 +196,9 @@ module REXML
end
end
- def match( pattern, cons=false, term: nil )
+ def match( pattern, cons=false )
+ # To avoid performance issue, we need to increase bytes to read per scan
+ min_bytes = 1
read if @scanner.eos? && @source
while true
if cons
@@ -197,7 +209,8 @@ module REXML
break if md
return nil if pattern.is_a?(String) && pattern.bytesize <= @scanner.rest_size
return nil if @source.nil?
- return nil unless read(term)
+ return nil unless read(nil, min_bytes)
+ min_bytes *= 2
end
md.nil? ? nil : @scanner
--
2.40.0

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
From e2546e6ecade16b04c9ee528e5be8509fe16c2d6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sutou Kouhei <kou@clear-code.com>
Date: Thu, 1 Aug 2024 11:23:43 +0900
Subject: [PATCH] parse pi: improve invalid case detection
CVE: CVE-2024-41123
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/ruby/rexml/commit/e2546e6ecade16b04c9ee528e5be8509fe16c2d6]
Signed-off-by: Divya Chellam <divya.chellam@windriver.com>
---
.../lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb | 35 +++++++++++--------
1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb b/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb
index c1a22b8..0ece9b5 100644
--- a/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb
+++ b/.bundle/gems/rexml-3.2.5/lib/rexml/parsers/baseparser.rb
@@ -124,11 +124,10 @@ module REXML
}
module Private
- INSTRUCTION_END = /#{NAME}(\s+.*?)?\?>/um
TAG_PATTERN = /((?>#{QNAME_STR}))\s*/um
CLOSE_PATTERN = /(#{QNAME_STR})\s*>/um
ATTLISTDECL_END = /\s+#{NAME}(?:#{ATTDEF})*\s*>/um
- NAME_PATTERN = /\s*#{NAME}/um
+ NAME_PATTERN = /#{NAME}/um
GEDECL_PATTERN = "\\s+#{NAME}\\s+#{ENTITYDEF}\\s*>"
PEDECL_PATTERN = "\\s+(%)\\s+#{NAME}\\s+#{PEDEF}\\s*>"
ENTITYDECL_PATTERN = /(?:#{GEDECL_PATTERN})|(?:#{PEDECL_PATTERN})/um
@@ -233,7 +232,7 @@ module REXML
if @document_status == nil
start_position = @source.position
if @source.match("<?", true)
- return process_instruction(start_position)
+ return process_instruction
elsif @source.match("<!", true)
if @source.match("--", true)
md = @source.match(/(.*?)-->/um, true)
@@ -424,7 +423,7 @@ module REXML
raise REXML::ParseException.new( "Declarations can only occur "+
"in the doctype declaration.", @source)
elsif @source.match("?", true)
- return process_instruction(start_position)
+ return process_instruction
else
# Get the next tag
md = @source.match(TAG_PATTERN, true)
@@ -579,14 +578,14 @@ module REXML
def parse_name(base_error_message)
md = @source.match(NAME_PATTERN, true)
unless md
- if @source.match(/\s*\S/um)
+ if @source.match(/\S/um)
message = "#{base_error_message}: invalid name"
else
message = "#{base_error_message}: name is missing"
end
raise REXML::ParseException.new(message, @source)
end
- md[1]
+ md[0]
end
def parse_id(base_error_message,
@@ -655,18 +654,24 @@ module REXML
end
end
- def process_instruction(start_position)
- match_data = @source.match(Private::INSTRUCTION_END, true)
- unless match_data
- message = "Invalid processing instruction node"
- @source.position = start_position
- raise REXML::ParseException.new(message, @source)
+ def process_instruction
+ name = parse_name("Malformed XML: Invalid processing instruction node")
+ if @source.match(/\s+/um, true)
+ match_data = @source.match(/(.*?)\?>/um, true)
+ unless match_data
+ raise ParseException.new("Malformed XML: Unclosed processing instruction", @source)
+ end
+ content = match_data[1]
+ else
+ content = nil
+ unless @source.match("?>", true)
+ raise ParseException.new("Malformed XML: Unclosed processing instruction", @source)
+ end
end
- if match_data[1] == "xml"
+ if name == "xml"
if @document_status
raise ParseException.new("Malformed XML: XML declaration is not at the start", @source)
end
- content = match_data[2]
version = VERSION.match(content)
version = version[1] unless version.nil?
encoding = ENCODING.match(content)
@@ -681,7 +686,7 @@ module REXML
standalone = standalone[1] unless standalone.nil?
return [ :xmldecl, version, encoding, standalone ]
end
- [:processing_instruction, match_data[1], match_data[2]]
+ [:processing_instruction, name, content]
end
def parse_attributes(prefixes)
--
2.40.0

View File

@@ -53,6 +53,24 @@ SRC_URI = "http://cache.ruby-lang.org/pub/ruby/${SHRT_VER}/ruby-${PV}.tar.gz \
file://CVE-2024-43398-0003.patch \
file://CVE-2025-27221-0001.patch \
file://CVE-2025-27221-0002.patch \
file://CVE-2024-35176.patch \
file://CVE-2024-39908-0001.patch \
file://CVE-2024-39908-0002.patch \
file://CVE-2024-39908-0003.patch \
file://CVE-2024-39908-0004.patch \
file://CVE-2024-39908-0005.patch \
file://CVE-2024-39908-0006.patch \
file://CVE-2024-39908-0007.patch \
file://CVE-2024-39908-0008.patch \
file://CVE-2024-39908-0009.patch \
file://CVE-2024-39908-0010.patch \
file://CVE-2024-39908-0011.patch \
file://CVE-2024-39908-0012.patch \
file://CVE-2024-41123-0001.patch \
file://CVE-2024-41123-0002.patch \
file://CVE-2024-41123-0003.patch \
file://CVE-2024-41123-0004.patch \
file://CVE-2024-41123-0005.patch \
"
UPSTREAM_CHECK_URI = "https://www.ruby-lang.org/en/downloads/"

View File

@@ -76,3 +76,5 @@ SUMMARY:${RUSTLIB_HOST_PN} = "Rust cross canadian libaries for ${HOST_SYS}"
SUMMARY:${RUSTLIB_SRC_PN} = "Rust standard library sources for cross canadian toolchain"
SUMMARY:${PN} = "Rust crost canadian compiler"
# These CVEs are specific to Microsoft Windows
CVE_CHECK_IGNORE += "CVE-2024-43402"

View File

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ LICENSE = "LGPL-2.1-only & GPL-2.0-only"
LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE.LGPL2.1;md5=4fbd65380cdd255951079008b364516c \
file://LICENSE.GPL2;md5=751419260aa954499f7abaabaa882bbe"
SRC_URI = "git://github.com/systemd/systemd-bootchart.git;protocol=https;branch=master \
SRC_URI = "git://github.com/systemd/systemd-bootchart.git;protocol=https;branch=main \
file://0001-architecture-Recognise-RISCV-32-RISCV-64.patch \
file://mips64.patch \
file://no_lto.patch \

View File

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=fbc093901857fcd118f065f900982c24"
SHRT_VER = "${@d.getVar('PV').split('.')[0]}.${@d.getVar('PV').split('.')[1]}"
SRC_URI = "http://ftp.gnome.org/pub/GNOME/sources/${BPN}/${SHRT_VER}/${BP}.tar.xz"
SRC_URI = "${GNOME_MIRROR}/${BPN}/${SHRT_VER}/${BP}.tar.xz"
inherit autotools pkgconfig upstream-version-is-even
FILES:${PN} += "${datadir}/${BPN}-${SHRT_VER}/vapi ${libdir}/${BPN}-${SHRT_VER}/"

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
From 2e73ea3a7db1c3c743c28a0d2dd0456a43e96b96 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sam Bingner <sam@bingner.com>
Date: Fri, 5 Jul 2024 09:34:43 -1000
Subject: [PATCH] Fix max path-length metadata writing (#2243)
Previous code added `.XXXXXX` to the end of the filename to write the
mac metadata. This is a problem if the filename is at or near the
filesystem max path length. This reuses the same code used by
create_tempdatafork to ensure that the filename is not too long.
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/2e73ea3a7db1c3c743c28a0d2dd0456a43e96b96]
Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
---
libarchive/archive_write_disk_posix.c | 3 +--
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/libarchive/archive_write_disk_posix.c b/libarchive/archive_write_disk_posix.c
index bac906d2..098a8fe4 100644
--- a/libarchive/archive_write_disk_posix.c
+++ b/libarchive/archive_write_disk_posix.c
@@ -4331,8 +4331,7 @@ set_mac_metadata(struct archive_write_disk *a, const char *pathname,
* silly dance of writing the data to disk just so that
* copyfile() can read it back in again. */
archive_string_init(&tmp);
- archive_strcpy(&tmp, pathname);
- archive_strcat(&tmp, ".XXXXXX");
+ archive_strcpy(&tmp, "tar.mmd.XXXXXX");
fd = mkstemp(tmp.s);
if (fd < 0) {

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
From 53d2bc4f89fcbd7414b92bd242f6cdc901941f55 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tim Kientzle <kientzle@acm.org>
Date: Sat, 16 Aug 2025 10:27:11 -0600
Subject: [PATCH] Merge pull request #2696 from al3xtjames/mkstemp
Fix mkstemp path in setup_mac_metadata
(cherry picked from commit 892f33145093d1c9b962b6521a6480dfea66ae00)
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/53d2bc4f89fcbd7414b92bd242f6cdc901941f55]
Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
---
libarchive/archive_read_disk_entry_from_file.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_disk_entry_from_file.c b/libarchive/archive_read_disk_entry_from_file.c
index 19d04977..87389642 100644
--- a/libarchive/archive_read_disk_entry_from_file.c
+++ b/libarchive/archive_read_disk_entry_from_file.c
@@ -365,7 +365,7 @@ setup_mac_metadata(struct archive_read_disk *a,
tempdir = _PATH_TMP;
archive_string_init(&tempfile);
archive_strcpy(&tempfile, tempdir);
- archive_strcat(&tempfile, "tar.md.XXXXXX");
+ archive_strcat(&tempfile, "/tar.md.XXXXXX");
tempfd = mkstemp(tempfile.s);
if (tempfd < 0) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, errno,

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,183 @@
From 82e31ba4a9afcce0c7c19e591ccd8653196d84a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tim Kientzle <kientzle@acm.org>
Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2025 10:57:18 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] Merge pull request #2749 from KlaraSystems/des/tempdir
Unify temporary directory handling
(cherry picked from commit d207d816d065c79dc2cb992008c3ba9721c6a276)
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/82e31ba4a9afcce0c7c19e591ccd8653196d84a0]
Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
---
CMakeLists.txt | 6 ++-
configure.ac | 4 +-
libarchive/archive_private.h | 1 +
.../archive_read_disk_entry_from_file.c | 14 +++----
libarchive/archive_read_disk_posix.c | 3 --
libarchive/archive_util.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++---
6 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff --git a/CMakeLists.txt b/CMakeLists.txt
index f44adc77..fc9aca4e 100644
--- a/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -1357,14 +1357,18 @@ CHECK_FUNCTION_EXISTS_GLIBC(ftruncate HAVE_FTRUNCATE)
CHECK_FUNCTION_EXISTS_GLIBC(futimens HAVE_FUTIMENS)
CHECK_FUNCTION_EXISTS_GLIBC(futimes HAVE_FUTIMES)
CHECK_FUNCTION_EXISTS_GLIBC(futimesat HAVE_FUTIMESAT)
+CHECK_FUNCTION_EXISTS_GLIBC(getegid HAVE_GETEGID)
CHECK_FUNCTION_EXISTS_GLIBC(geteuid HAVE_GETEUID)
CHECK_FUNCTION_EXISTS_GLIBC(getgrgid_r HAVE_GETGRGID_R)
CHECK_FUNCTION_EXISTS_GLIBC(getgrnam_r HAVE_GETGRNAM_R)
+CHECK_FUNCTION_EXISTS_GLIBC(getpid HAVE_GETPID)
CHECK_FUNCTION_EXISTS_GLIBC(getpwnam_r HAVE_GETPWNAM_R)
CHECK_FUNCTION_EXISTS_GLIBC(getpwuid_r HAVE_GETPWUID_R)
-CHECK_FUNCTION_EXISTS_GLIBC(getpid HAVE_GETPID)
+CHECK_FUNCTION_EXISTS_GLIBC(getresgid HAVE_GETRESGID)
+CHECK_FUNCTION_EXISTS_GLIBC(getresuid HAVE_GETRESUID)
CHECK_FUNCTION_EXISTS_GLIBC(getvfsbyname HAVE_GETVFSBYNAME)
CHECK_FUNCTION_EXISTS_GLIBC(gmtime_r HAVE_GMTIME_R)
+CHECK_FUNCTION_EXISTS_GLIBC(issetugid HAVE_ISSETUGID)
CHECK_FUNCTION_EXISTS_GLIBC(lchflags HAVE_LCHFLAGS)
CHECK_FUNCTION_EXISTS_GLIBC(lchmod HAVE_LCHMOD)
CHECK_FUNCTION_EXISTS_GLIBC(lchown HAVE_LCHOWN)
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index aae0f381..a1a8f380 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -677,7 +677,9 @@ AC_CHECK_FUNCS([fchdir fchflags fchmod fchown fcntl fdopendir fork])
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([fstat fstatat fstatfs fstatvfs ftruncate])
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([futimens futimes futimesat])
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([geteuid getpid getgrgid_r getgrnam_r])
-AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getpwnam_r getpwuid_r getvfsbyname gmtime_r])
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getgrgid_r getgrnam_r getpwnam_r getpwuid_r])
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getvfsbyname gmtime_r])
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS([issetugid])
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([lchflags lchmod lchown link linkat localtime_r lstat lutimes])
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([mbrtowc memmove memset])
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([mkdir mkfifo mknod mkstemp])
diff --git a/libarchive/archive_private.h b/libarchive/archive_private.h
index 050fc63c..3a926c68 100644
--- a/libarchive/archive_private.h
+++ b/libarchive/archive_private.h
@@ -156,6 +156,7 @@ int __archive_check_magic(struct archive *, unsigned int magic,
void __archive_errx(int retvalue, const char *msg) __LA_DEAD;
void __archive_ensure_cloexec_flag(int fd);
+int __archive_get_tempdir(struct archive_string *);
int __archive_mktemp(const char *tmpdir);
#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(__CYGWIN__)
int __archive_mkstemp(wchar_t *template);
diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_disk_entry_from_file.c b/libarchive/archive_read_disk_entry_from_file.c
index 87389642..42af4034 100644
--- a/libarchive/archive_read_disk_entry_from_file.c
+++ b/libarchive/archive_read_disk_entry_from_file.c
@@ -339,7 +339,7 @@ setup_mac_metadata(struct archive_read_disk *a,
int ret = ARCHIVE_OK;
void *buff = NULL;
int have_attrs;
- const char *name, *tempdir;
+ const char *name;
struct archive_string tempfile;
(void)fd; /* UNUSED */
@@ -358,14 +358,12 @@ setup_mac_metadata(struct archive_read_disk *a,
if (have_attrs == 0)
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
- tempdir = NULL;
- if (issetugid() == 0)
- tempdir = getenv("TMPDIR");
- if (tempdir == NULL)
- tempdir = _PATH_TMP;
archive_string_init(&tempfile);
- archive_strcpy(&tempfile, tempdir);
- archive_strcat(&tempfile, "/tar.md.XXXXXX");
+ if (__archive_get_tempdir(&tempfile) != ARCHIVE_OK) {
+ ret = ARCHIVE_WARN;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ archive_strcat(&tempfile, "tar.md.XXXXXX");
tempfd = mkstemp(tempfile.s);
if (tempfd < 0) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, errno,
diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_disk_posix.c b/libarchive/archive_read_disk_posix.c
index ba0046d7..54a8e661 100644
--- a/libarchive/archive_read_disk_posix.c
+++ b/libarchive/archive_read_disk_posix.c
@@ -1579,9 +1579,6 @@ setup_current_filesystem(struct archive_read_disk *a)
# endif
#endif
int r, xr = 0;
-#if !defined(HAVE_STRUCT_STATFS_F_NAMEMAX)
- long nm;
-#endif
t->current_filesystem->synthetic = -1;
t->current_filesystem->remote = -1;
diff --git a/libarchive/archive_util.c b/libarchive/archive_util.c
index 900abd0c..d048bbc9 100644
--- a/libarchive/archive_util.c
+++ b/libarchive/archive_util.c
@@ -395,11 +395,39 @@ __archive_mkstemp(wchar_t *template)
#else
static int
-get_tempdir(struct archive_string *temppath)
+__archive_issetugid(void)
{
- const char *tmp;
+#ifdef HAVE_ISSETUGID
+ return (issetugid());
+#elif HAVE_GETRESUID
+ uid_t ruid, euid, suid;
+ gid_t rgid, egid, sgid;
+ if (getresuid(&ruid, &euid, &suid) != 0)
+ return (-1);
+ if (ruid != euid || ruid != suid)
+ return (1);
+ if (getresgid(&ruid, &egid, &sgid) != 0)
+ return (-1);
+ if (rgid != egid || rgid != sgid)
+ return (1);
+#elif HAVE_GETEUID
+ if (geteuid() != getuid())
+ return (1);
+#if HAVE_GETEGID
+ if (getegid() != getgid())
+ return (1);
+#endif
+#endif
+ return (0);
+}
- tmp = getenv("TMPDIR");
+int
+__archive_get_tempdir(struct archive_string *temppath)
+{
+ const char *tmp = NULL;
+
+ if (__archive_issetugid() == 0)
+ tmp = getenv("TMPDIR");
if (tmp == NULL)
#ifdef _PATH_TMP
tmp = _PATH_TMP;
@@ -426,7 +454,7 @@ __archive_mktemp(const char *tmpdir)
archive_string_init(&temp_name);
if (tmpdir == NULL) {
- if (get_tempdir(&temp_name) != ARCHIVE_OK)
+ if (__archive_get_tempdir(&temp_name) != ARCHIVE_OK)
goto exit_tmpfile;
} else {
archive_strcpy(&temp_name, tmpdir);
@@ -487,7 +515,7 @@ __archive_mktempx(const char *tmpdir, char *template)
if (template == NULL) {
archive_string_init(&temp_name);
if (tmpdir == NULL) {
- if (get_tempdir(&temp_name) != ARCHIVE_OK)
+ if (__archive_get_tempdir(&temp_name) != ARCHIVE_OK)
goto exit_tmpfile;
} else
archive_strcpy(&temp_name, tmpdir);

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
From c3593848067cea3b41bc11eec15f391318675cb4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tim Kientzle <kientzle@acm.org>
Date: Tue, 28 Oct 2025 17:13:18 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] Merge pull request #2753 from KlaraSystems/des/temp-files
Create temporary files in the target directory
(cherry picked from commit d2e861769c25470427656b36a14b535f17d47d03)
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/c3593848067cea3b41bc11eec15f391318675cb4]
Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
---
.../archive_read_disk_entry_from_file.c | 10 ++---
libarchive/archive_string.c | 20 ++++++++++
libarchive/archive_string.h | 4 ++
libarchive/archive_write_disk_posix.c | 20 ++++++----
libarchive/test/test_archive_string.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++
5 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_disk_entry_from_file.c b/libarchive/archive_read_disk_entry_from_file.c
index 42af4034..121af198 100644
--- a/libarchive/archive_read_disk_entry_from_file.c
+++ b/libarchive/archive_read_disk_entry_from_file.c
@@ -359,12 +359,10 @@ setup_mac_metadata(struct archive_read_disk *a,
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
archive_string_init(&tempfile);
- if (__archive_get_tempdir(&tempfile) != ARCHIVE_OK) {
- ret = ARCHIVE_WARN;
- goto cleanup;
- }
- archive_strcat(&tempfile, "tar.md.XXXXXX");
- tempfd = mkstemp(tempfile.s);
+ archive_strcpy(&tempfile, name);
+ archive_string_dirname(&tempfile);
+ archive_strcat(&tempfile, "/tar.XXXXXXXX");
+ tempfd = __archive_mkstemp(tempfile.s);
if (tempfd < 0) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, errno,
"Could not open extended attribute file");
diff --git a/libarchive/archive_string.c b/libarchive/archive_string.c
index 3bb97833..740308b6 100644
--- a/libarchive/archive_string.c
+++ b/libarchive/archive_string.c
@@ -2012,6 +2012,26 @@ archive_strncat_l(struct archive_string *as, const void *_p, size_t n,
return (r);
}
+struct archive_string *
+archive_string_dirname(struct archive_string *as)
+{
+ /* strip trailing separators */
+ while (as->length > 1 && as->s[as->length - 1] == '/')
+ as->length--;
+ /* strip final component */
+ while (as->length > 0 && as->s[as->length - 1] != '/')
+ as->length--;
+ /* empty path -> cwd */
+ if (as->length == 0)
+ return (archive_strcat(as, "."));
+ /* strip separator(s) */
+ while (as->length > 1 && as->s[as->length - 1] == '/')
+ as->length--;
+ /* terminate */
+ as->s[as->length] = '\0';
+ return (as);
+}
+
#if HAVE_ICONV
/*
diff --git a/libarchive/archive_string.h b/libarchive/archive_string.h
index e8987867..d5f5c03a 100644
--- a/libarchive/archive_string.h
+++ b/libarchive/archive_string.h
@@ -195,6 +195,10 @@ void archive_string_vsprintf(struct archive_string *, const char *,
void archive_string_sprintf(struct archive_string *, const char *, ...)
__LA_PRINTF(2, 3);
+/* Equivalent to dirname(3) */
+struct archive_string *
+archive_string_dirname(struct archive_string *);
+
/* Translates from MBS to Unicode. */
/* Returns non-zero if conversion failed in any way. */
int archive_wstring_append_from_mbs(struct archive_wstring *dest,
diff --git a/libarchive/archive_write_disk_posix.c b/libarchive/archive_write_disk_posix.c
index 6fcf3929..cd256203 100644
--- a/libarchive/archive_write_disk_posix.c
+++ b/libarchive/archive_write_disk_posix.c
@@ -412,12 +412,14 @@ static ssize_t _archive_write_disk_data_block(struct archive *, const void *,
static int
la_mktemp(struct archive_write_disk *a)
{
+ struct archive_string *tmp = &a->_tmpname_data;
int oerrno, fd;
mode_t mode;
- archive_string_empty(&a->_tmpname_data);
- archive_string_sprintf(&a->_tmpname_data, "%s.XXXXXX", a->name);
- a->tmpname = a->_tmpname_data.s;
+ archive_strcpy(tmp, a->name);
+ archive_string_dirname(tmp);
+ archive_strcat(tmp, "/tar.XXXXXXXX");
+ a->tmpname = tmp->s;
fd = __archive_mkstemp(a->tmpname);
if (fd == -1)
@@ -4251,8 +4253,10 @@ create_tempdatafork(struct archive_write_disk *a, const char *pathname)
int tmpfd;
archive_string_init(&tmpdatafork);
- archive_strcpy(&tmpdatafork, "tar.md.XXXXXX");
- tmpfd = mkstemp(tmpdatafork.s);
+ archive_strcpy(&tmpdatafork, pathname);
+ archive_string_dirname(&tmpdatafork);
+ archive_strcat(&tmpdatafork, "/tar.XXXXXXXX");
+ tmpfd = __archive_mkstemp(tmpdatafork.s);
if (tmpfd < 0) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, errno,
"Failed to mkstemp");
@@ -4331,8 +4335,10 @@ set_mac_metadata(struct archive_write_disk *a, const char *pathname,
* silly dance of writing the data to disk just so that
* copyfile() can read it back in again. */
archive_string_init(&tmp);
- archive_strcpy(&tmp, "tar.mmd.XXXXXX");
- fd = mkstemp(tmp.s);
+ archive_strcpy(&tmp, pathname);
+ archive_string_dirname(&tmp);
+ archive_strcat(&tmp, "/tar.XXXXXXXX");
+ fd = __archive_mkstemp(tmp.s);
if (fd < 0) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, errno,
diff --git a/libarchive/test/test_archive_string.c b/libarchive/test/test_archive_string.c
index 30f7a800..bf822c0d 100644
--- a/libarchive/test/test_archive_string.c
+++ b/libarchive/test/test_archive_string.c
@@ -354,6 +354,43 @@ test_archive_string_sprintf(void)
archive_string_free(&s);
}
+static void
+test_archive_string_dirname(void)
+{
+ static struct pair { const char *str, *exp; } pairs[] = {
+ { "", "." },
+ { "/", "/" },
+ { "//", "/" },
+ { "///", "/" },
+ { "./", "." },
+ { ".", "." },
+ { "..", "." },
+ { "foo", "." },
+ { "foo/", "." },
+ { "foo//", "." },
+ { "foo/bar", "foo" },
+ { "foo/bar/", "foo" },
+ { "foo/bar//", "foo" },
+ { "foo//bar", "foo" },
+ { "foo//bar/", "foo" },
+ { "foo//bar//", "foo" },
+ { "/foo", "/" },
+ { "//foo", "/" },
+ { "//foo/", "/" },
+ { "//foo//", "/" },
+ { 0 },
+ };
+ struct pair *pair;
+ struct archive_string s;
+
+ archive_string_init(&s);
+ for (pair = pairs; pair->str; pair++) {
+ archive_strcpy(&s, pair->str);
+ archive_string_dirname(&s);
+ assertEqualString(pair->exp, s.s);
+ }
+}
+
DEFINE_TEST(test_archive_string)
{
test_archive_string_ensure();
@@ -365,6 +402,7 @@ DEFINE_TEST(test_archive_string)
test_archive_string_concat();
test_archive_string_copy();
test_archive_string_sprintf();
+ test_archive_string_dirname();
}
static const char *strings[] =

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
From 82b57a9740aa6d084edcf4592a3b8e49f63dec98 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tim Kientzle <kientzle@acm.org>
Date: Fri, 31 Oct 2025 22:07:19 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] Merge pull request #2768 from Commandoss/master
Fix for an out-of-bounds buffer overrun when using p[H_LEVEL_OFFSET]
(cherry picked from commit ce614c65246158bcb0dc1f9c1dce5a5af65f9827)
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/82b57a9740aa6d084edcf4592a3b8e49f63dec98]
Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
---
libarchive/archive_read_support_format_lha.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_lha.c b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_lha.c
index 2a84ad9d..abf8b879 100644
--- a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_lha.c
+++ b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_lha.c
@@ -690,7 +690,7 @@ archive_read_format_lha_read_header(struct archive_read *a,
* a pathname and a symlink has '\' character, a directory
* separator in DOS/Windows. So we should convert it to '/'.
*/
- if (p[H_LEVEL_OFFSET] == 0)
+ if (lha->level == 0)
lha_replace_path_separator(lha, entry);
archive_entry_set_mode(entry, lha->mode);

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
From 3150539edb18690c2c5f81c37fd2d3a35c69ace5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?ARJANEN=20Lo=C3=AFc=20Jean=20David?= <ljd@luigiscorner.mu>
Date: Fri, 14 Nov 2025 20:34:48 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Fix bsdtar zero-length pattern issue.
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Uses the sed-like way (and Java-like, and .Net-like, and Javascript-like…) to fix this issue of advancing the string to be processed by one if the match is zero-length.
Fixes libarchive/libarchive#2725 and solves libarchive/libarchive#2438.
CVE: CVE-2025-60753
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/3150539edb18690c2c5f81c37fd2d3a35c69ace5]
Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
---
tar/subst.c | 19 ++++++++++++-------
tar/test/test_option_s.c | 8 +++++++-
2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tar/subst.c b/tar/subst.c
index 9747abb9..902a4d64 100644
--- a/tar/subst.c
+++ b/tar/subst.c
@@ -237,7 +237,9 @@ apply_substitution(struct bsdtar *bsdtar, const char *name, char **result,
continue;
}
- while (1) {
+ char isEnd = 0;
+ do {
+ isEnd = *name == '\0';
if (regexec(&rule->re, name, 10, matches, 0))
break;
@@ -291,12 +293,15 @@ apply_substitution(struct bsdtar *bsdtar, const char *name, char **result,
}
realloc_strcat(result, rule->result + j);
-
- name += matches[0].rm_eo;
-
- if (!rule->global)
- break;
- }
+ if (matches[0].rm_eo > 0) {
+ name += matches[0].rm_eo;
+ } else {
+ // We skip a character because the match is 0-length
+ // so we need to add it to the output
+ realloc_strncat(result, name, 1);
+ name += 1;
+ }
+ } while (rule->global && !isEnd); // Testing one step after because sed et al. run 0-length patterns a last time on the empty string at the end
}
if (got_match)
diff --git a/tar/test/test_option_s.c b/tar/test/test_option_s.c
index 564793b9..90b4c471 100644
--- a/tar/test/test_option_s.c
+++ b/tar/test/test_option_s.c
@@ -61,7 +61,13 @@ DEFINE_TEST(test_option_s)
systemf("%s -cf test1_2.tar -s /d1/d2/ in/d1/foo", testprog);
systemf("%s -xf test1_2.tar -C test1", testprog);
assertFileContents("foo", 3, "test1/in/d2/foo");
-
+ systemf("%s -cf test1_3.tar -s /o/#/g in/d1/foo", testprog);
+ systemf("%s -xf test1_3.tar -C test1", testprog);
+ assertFileContents("foo", 3, "test1/in/d1/f##");
+ // For the 0-length pattern check, remember that "test1/" isn't part of the string affected by the regexp
+ systemf("%s -cf test1_4.tar -s /f*/\\<~\\>/g in/d1/foo", testprog);
+ systemf("%s -xf test1_4.tar -C test1", testprog);
+ assertFileContents("foo", 3, "test1/<>i<>n<>/<>d<>1<>/<f><>o<>o<>");
/*
* Test 2: Basic substitution when extracting archive.
*/

View File

@@ -43,6 +43,12 @@ SRC_URI = "http://libarchive.org/downloads/libarchive-${PV}.tar.gz \
file://0001-Improve-lseek-handling-2564.patch \
file://CVE-2025-5918-01.patch \
file://CVE-2025-5918-02.patch \
file://0001-Fix-max-path-length-metadata-writing-2243.patch \
file://0001-Merge-pull-request-2696-from-al3xtjames-mkstemp.patch \
file://0001-Merge-pull-request-2749-from-KlaraSystems-des-tempdi.patch \
file://0001-Merge-pull-request-2753-from-KlaraSystems-des-temp-f.patch \
file://0001-Merge-pull-request-2768-from-Commandoss-master.patch \
file://CVE-2025-60753.patch \
"
UPSTREAM_CHECK_URI = "http://libarchive.org/"

View File

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ require gtk+3.inc
MAJ_VER = "${@oe.utils.trim_version("${PV}", 2)}"
SRC_URI = "http://ftp.gnome.org/pub/gnome/sources/gtk+/${MAJ_VER}/gtk+-${PV}.tar.xz \
SRC_URI = "${GNOME_MIRROR}/gtk+/${MAJ_VER}/gtk+-${PV}.tar.xz \
file://0002-Do-not-try-to-initialize-GL-without-libGL.patch \
file://0003-Add-disable-opengl-configure-option.patch \
file://link_fribidi.patch \

View File

@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ GIR_MESON_DISABLE_FLAG = 'disabled'
GTKDOC_MESON_OPTION = "gtk_doc"
UPSTREAM_CHECK_URI = "http://ftp.gnome.org/pub/GNOME/sources/libgudev/"
UPSTREAM_CHECK_URI = "${GNOME_MIRROR}/libgudev/"
UPSTREAM_CHECK_REGEX = "(?P<pver>(\d+))"
# This isn't a GNOME-style version do gnome_verdir fails. Just return the

View File

@@ -13,8 +13,7 @@ SRCREV = "31486f40f8e8f8923ca0799aea84b58799754564"
PV = "2.99.917+git${SRCPV}"
S = "${WORKDIR}/git"
SRC_URI = "git://anongit.freedesktop.org/xorg/driver/xf86-video-intel;branch=master \
"
SRC_URI = "git://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/driver/xf86-video-intel.git;protocol=https;branch=master"
UPSTREAM_CHECK_GITTAGREGEX = "(?P<pver>\d+(\.\d+)+)"

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
From 5a4286b13f631b66c20f5bc8db7b68211dcbd1d0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 2 Jul 2025 09:46:22 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] present: Fix use-after-free in present_create_notifies()
Using the Present extension, if an error occurs while processing and
adding the notifications after presenting a pixmap, the function
present_create_notifies() will clean up and remove the notifications
it added.
However, there are two different code paths that can lead to an error
creating the notify, one being before the notify is being added to the
list, and another one after the notify is added.
When the error occurs before it's been added, it removes the elements up
to the last added element, instead of the actual number of elements
which were added.
As a result, in case of error, as with an invalid window for example, it
leaves a dangling pointer to the last element, leading to a use after
free case later:
| Invalid write of size 8
| at 0x5361D5: present_clear_window_notifies (present_notify.c:42)
| by 0x534A56: present_destroy_window (present_screen.c:107)
| by 0x41E441: xwl_destroy_window (xwayland-window.c:1959)
| by 0x4F9EC9: compDestroyWindow (compwindow.c:622)
| by 0x51EAC4: damageDestroyWindow (damage.c:1592)
| by 0x4FDC29: DbeDestroyWindow (dbe.c:1291)
| by 0x4EAC55: FreeWindowResources (window.c:1023)
| by 0x4EAF59: DeleteWindow (window.c:1091)
| by 0x4DE59A: doFreeResource (resource.c:890)
| by 0x4DEFB2: FreeClientResources (resource.c:1156)
| by 0x4A9AFB: CloseDownClient (dispatch.c:3567)
| by 0x5DCC78: ClientReady (connection.c:603)
| Address 0x16126200 is 16 bytes inside a block of size 2,048 free'd
| at 0x4841E43: free (vg_replace_malloc.c:989)
| by 0x5363DD: present_destroy_notifies (present_notify.c:111)
| by 0x53638D: present_create_notifies (present_notify.c:100)
| by 0x5368E9: proc_present_pixmap_common (present_request.c:164)
| by 0x536A7D: proc_present_pixmap (present_request.c:189)
| by 0x536FA9: proc_present_dispatch (present_request.c:337)
| by 0x4A1E4E: Dispatch (dispatch.c:561)
| by 0x4B00F1: dix_main (main.c:284)
| by 0x42879D: main (stubmain.c:34)
| Block was alloc'd at
| at 0x48463F3: calloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:1675)
| by 0x5362A1: present_create_notifies (present_notify.c:81)
| by 0x5368E9: proc_present_pixmap_common (present_request.c:164)
| by 0x536A7D: proc_present_pixmap (present_request.c:189)
| by 0x536FA9: proc_present_dispatch (present_request.c:337)
| by 0x4A1E4E: Dispatch (dispatch.c:561)
| by 0x4B00F1: dix_main (main.c:284)
| by 0x42879D: main (stubmain.c:34)
To fix the issue, count and remove the actual number of notify elements
added in case of error.
CVE-2025-62229, ZDI-CAN-27238
This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/2086>
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/commit/5a4286b13f631b66c20f5bc8db7b68211dcbd1d0]
CVE: CVE-2025-62229
Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
---
present/present_notify.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/present/present_notify.c b/present/present_notify.c
index 7d19d9cfe1..fe84d1f070 100644
--- a/present/present_notify.c
+++ b/present/present_notify.c
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ present_create_notifies(ClientPtr client, int num_notifies, xPresentNotify *x_no
if (status != Success)
goto bail;
- added = i;
+ added++;
}
return Success;
--
GitLab

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@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
From 865089ca70840c0f13a61df135f7b44a9782a175 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Sep 2025 15:55:06 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] xkb: Make the RT_XKBCLIENT resource private
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Currently, the resource in only available to the xkb.c source file.
In preparation for the next commit, to be able to free the resources
from XkbRemoveResourceClient(), make that variable private instead.
This is related to:
CVE-2025-62230, ZDI-CAN-27545
This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michel Dänzer <mdaenzer@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 99790a2c9205a52fbbec01f21a92c9b7f4ed1d8f)
Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/2087>
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/commit/865089ca70840c0f13a61df135f7b44a9782a175]
CVE: CVE-2025-62230
Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
---
include/xkbsrv.h | 2 ++
xkb/xkb.c | 2 +-
2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/include/xkbsrv.h b/include/xkbsrv.h
index fbb5427e1c..b2766277cf 100644
--- a/include/xkbsrv.h
+++ b/include/xkbsrv.h
@@ -58,6 +58,8 @@ THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
#include "inputstr.h"
#include "events.h"
+extern RESTYPE RT_XKBCLIENT;
+
typedef struct _XkbInterest {
DeviceIntPtr dev;
ClientPtr client;
diff --git a/xkb/xkb.c b/xkb/xkb.c
index 5131bfcdf7..26d965d482 100644
--- a/xkb/xkb.c
+++ b/xkb/xkb.c
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ int XkbKeyboardErrorCode;
CARD32 xkbDebugFlags = 0;
static CARD32 xkbDebugCtrls = 0;
-static RESTYPE RT_XKBCLIENT;
+RESTYPE RT_XKBCLIENT = 0;
/***====================================================================***/
--
GitLab

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@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
From 87fe2553937a99fd914ad0cde999376a3adc3839 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Sep 2025 15:58:57 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] xkb: Free the XKB resource when freeing XkbInterest
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
XkbRemoveResourceClient() would free the XkbInterest data associated
with the device, but not the resource associated with it.
As a result, when the client terminates, the resource delete function
gets called and accesses already freed memory:
| Invalid read of size 8
| at 0x5BC0C0: XkbRemoveResourceClient (xkbEvents.c:1047)
| by 0x5B3391: XkbClientGone (xkb.c:7094)
| by 0x4DF138: doFreeResource (resource.c:890)
| by 0x4DFB50: FreeClientResources (resource.c:1156)
| by 0x4A9A59: CloseDownClient (dispatch.c:3550)
| by 0x5E0A53: ClientReady (connection.c:601)
| by 0x5E4FEF: ospoll_wait (ospoll.c:657)
| by 0x5DC834: WaitForSomething (WaitFor.c:206)
| by 0x4A1BA5: Dispatch (dispatch.c:491)
| by 0x4B0070: dix_main (main.c:277)
| by 0x4285E7: main (stubmain.c:34)
| Address 0x1893e278 is 184 bytes inside a block of size 928 free'd
| at 0x4842E43: free (vg_replace_malloc.c:989)
| by 0x49C1A6: CloseDevice (devices.c:1067)
| by 0x49C522: CloseOneDevice (devices.c:1193)
| by 0x49C6E4: RemoveDevice (devices.c:1244)
| by 0x5873D4: remove_master (xichangehierarchy.c:348)
| by 0x587921: ProcXIChangeHierarchy (xichangehierarchy.c:504)
| by 0x579BF1: ProcIDispatch (extinit.c:390)
| by 0x4A1D85: Dispatch (dispatch.c:551)
| by 0x4B0070: dix_main (main.c:277)
| by 0x4285E7: main (stubmain.c:34)
| Block was alloc'd at
| at 0x48473F3: calloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:1675)
| by 0x49A118: AddInputDevice (devices.c:262)
| by 0x4A0E58: AllocDevicePair (devices.c:2846)
| by 0x5866EE: add_master (xichangehierarchy.c:153)
| by 0x5878C2: ProcXIChangeHierarchy (xichangehierarchy.c:493)
| by 0x579BF1: ProcIDispatch (extinit.c:390)
| by 0x4A1D85: Dispatch (dispatch.c:551)
| by 0x4B0070: dix_main (main.c:277)
| by 0x4285E7: main (stubmain.c:34)
To avoid that issue, make sure to free the resources when freeing the
device XkbInterest data.
CVE-2025-62230, ZDI-CAN-27545
This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michel Dänzer <mdaenzer@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 10c94238bdad17c11707e0bdaaa3a9cd54c504be)
Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/2087>
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/commit/87fe2553937a99fd914ad0cde999376a3adc3839]
CVE: CVE-2025-62230
Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
---
xkb/xkbEvents.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/xkb/xkbEvents.c b/xkb/xkbEvents.c
index 0bbd661867..3d04ecf0c4 100644
--- a/xkb/xkbEvents.c
+++ b/xkb/xkbEvents.c
@@ -1056,6 +1056,7 @@ XkbRemoveResourceClient(DevicePtr inDev, XID id)
autoCtrls = interest->autoCtrls;
autoValues = interest->autoCtrlValues;
client = interest->client;
+ FreeResource(interest->resource, RT_XKBCLIENT);
free(interest);
found = TRUE;
}
@@ -1067,6 +1068,7 @@ XkbRemoveResourceClient(DevicePtr inDev, XID id)
autoCtrls = victim->autoCtrls;
autoValues = victim->autoCtrlValues;
client = victim->client;
+ FreeResource(victim->resource, RT_XKBCLIENT);
free(victim);
found = TRUE;
}
--
GitLab

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
From 3baad99f9c15028ed8c3e3d8408e5ec35db155aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Sep 2025 16:30:29 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] xkb: Prevent overflow in XkbSetCompatMap()
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
The XkbCompatMap structure stores its "num_si" and "size_si" fields
using an unsigned short.
However, the function _XkbSetCompatMap() will store the sum of the
input data "firstSI" and "nSI" in both XkbCompatMap's "num_si" and
"size_si" without first checking if the sum overflows the maximum
unsigned short value, leading to a possible overflow.
To avoid the issue, check whether the sum does not exceed the maximum
unsigned short value, or return a "BadValue" error otherwise.
CVE-2025-62231, ZDI-CAN-27560
This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michel Dänzer <mdaenzer@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 475d9f49acd0e55bc0b089ed77f732ad18585470)
Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/2087>
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/commit/3baad99f9c15028ed8c3e3d8408e5ec35db155aa]
CVE: CVE-2025-62231
Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
---
xkb/xkb.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/xkb/xkb.c b/xkb/xkb.c
index 26d965d482..137d70da27 100644
--- a/xkb/xkb.c
+++ b/xkb/xkb.c
@@ -2992,6 +2992,8 @@ _XkbSetCompatMap(ClientPtr client, DeviceIntPtr dev,
XkbSymInterpretPtr sym;
unsigned int skipped = 0;
+ if ((unsigned) (req->firstSI + req->nSI) > USHRT_MAX)
+ return BadValue;
if ((unsigned) (req->firstSI + req->nSI) > compat->size_si) {
compat->num_si = compat->size_si = req->firstSI + req->nSI;
compat->sym_interpret = reallocarray(compat->sym_interpret,
--
GitLab

View File

@@ -44,6 +44,10 @@ SRC_URI += "file://0001-xf86pciBus.c-use-Intel-ddx-only-for-pre-gen4-hardwar.pat
file://CVE-2025-49179.patch \
file://CVE-2025-49180-1.patch \
file://CVE-2025-49180-2.patch \
file://CVE-2025-62229.patch \
file://CVE-2025-62230-1.patch \
file://CVE-2025-62230-2.patch \
file://CVE-2025-62231.patch \
"
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "38aadb735650c8024ee25211c190bf8aad844c5f59632761ab1ef4c4d5aeb152"

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
From 5a4286b13f631b66c20f5bc8db7b68211dcbd1d0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 2 Jul 2025 09:46:22 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] present: Fix use-after-free in present_create_notifies()
Using the Present extension, if an error occurs while processing and
adding the notifications after presenting a pixmap, the function
present_create_notifies() will clean up and remove the notifications
it added.
However, there are two different code paths that can lead to an error
creating the notify, one being before the notify is being added to the
list, and another one after the notify is added.
When the error occurs before it's been added, it removes the elements up
to the last added element, instead of the actual number of elements
which were added.
As a result, in case of error, as with an invalid window for example, it
leaves a dangling pointer to the last element, leading to a use after
free case later:
| Invalid write of size 8
| at 0x5361D5: present_clear_window_notifies (present_notify.c:42)
| by 0x534A56: present_destroy_window (present_screen.c:107)
| by 0x41E441: xwl_destroy_window (xwayland-window.c:1959)
| by 0x4F9EC9: compDestroyWindow (compwindow.c:622)
| by 0x51EAC4: damageDestroyWindow (damage.c:1592)
| by 0x4FDC29: DbeDestroyWindow (dbe.c:1291)
| by 0x4EAC55: FreeWindowResources (window.c:1023)
| by 0x4EAF59: DeleteWindow (window.c:1091)
| by 0x4DE59A: doFreeResource (resource.c:890)
| by 0x4DEFB2: FreeClientResources (resource.c:1156)
| by 0x4A9AFB: CloseDownClient (dispatch.c:3567)
| by 0x5DCC78: ClientReady (connection.c:603)
| Address 0x16126200 is 16 bytes inside a block of size 2,048 free'd
| at 0x4841E43: free (vg_replace_malloc.c:989)
| by 0x5363DD: present_destroy_notifies (present_notify.c:111)
| by 0x53638D: present_create_notifies (present_notify.c:100)
| by 0x5368E9: proc_present_pixmap_common (present_request.c:164)
| by 0x536A7D: proc_present_pixmap (present_request.c:189)
| by 0x536FA9: proc_present_dispatch (present_request.c:337)
| by 0x4A1E4E: Dispatch (dispatch.c:561)
| by 0x4B00F1: dix_main (main.c:284)
| by 0x42879D: main (stubmain.c:34)
| Block was alloc'd at
| at 0x48463F3: calloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:1675)
| by 0x5362A1: present_create_notifies (present_notify.c:81)
| by 0x5368E9: proc_present_pixmap_common (present_request.c:164)
| by 0x536A7D: proc_present_pixmap (present_request.c:189)
| by 0x536FA9: proc_present_dispatch (present_request.c:337)
| by 0x4A1E4E: Dispatch (dispatch.c:561)
| by 0x4B00F1: dix_main (main.c:284)
| by 0x42879D: main (stubmain.c:34)
To fix the issue, count and remove the actual number of notify elements
added in case of error.
CVE-2025-62229, ZDI-CAN-27238
This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/2086>
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/commit/5a4286b13f631b66c20f5bc8db7b68211dcbd1d0]
CVE: CVE-2025-62229
Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
---
present/present_notify.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/present/present_notify.c b/present/present_notify.c
index 7d19d9cfe1..fe84d1f070 100644
--- a/present/present_notify.c
+++ b/present/present_notify.c
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ present_create_notifies(ClientPtr client, int num_notifies, xPresentNotify *x_no
if (status != Success)
goto bail;
- added = i;
+ added++;
}
return Success;
--
GitLab

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
From 865089ca70840c0f13a61df135f7b44a9782a175 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Sep 2025 15:55:06 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] xkb: Make the RT_XKBCLIENT resource private
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Currently, the resource in only available to the xkb.c source file.
In preparation for the next commit, to be able to free the resources
from XkbRemoveResourceClient(), make that variable private instead.
This is related to:
CVE-2025-62230, ZDI-CAN-27545
This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michel Dänzer <mdaenzer@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 99790a2c9205a52fbbec01f21a92c9b7f4ed1d8f)
Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/2087>
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/commit/865089ca70840c0f13a61df135f7b44a9782a175]
CVE: CVE-2025-62230
Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
---
include/xkbsrv.h | 2 ++
xkb/xkb.c | 2 +-
2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/include/xkbsrv.h b/include/xkbsrv.h
index fbb5427e1c..b2766277cf 100644
--- a/include/xkbsrv.h
+++ b/include/xkbsrv.h
@@ -58,6 +58,8 @@ THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
#include "inputstr.h"
#include "events.h"
+extern RESTYPE RT_XKBCLIENT;
+
typedef struct _XkbInterest {
DeviceIntPtr dev;
ClientPtr client;
diff --git a/xkb/xkb.c b/xkb/xkb.c
index 5131bfcdf7..26d965d482 100644
--- a/xkb/xkb.c
+++ b/xkb/xkb.c
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ int XkbKeyboardErrorCode;
CARD32 xkbDebugFlags = 0;
static CARD32 xkbDebugCtrls = 0;
-static RESTYPE RT_XKBCLIENT;
+RESTYPE RT_XKBCLIENT = 0;
/***====================================================================***/
--
GitLab

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
From 87fe2553937a99fd914ad0cde999376a3adc3839 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Sep 2025 15:58:57 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] xkb: Free the XKB resource when freeing XkbInterest
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
XkbRemoveResourceClient() would free the XkbInterest data associated
with the device, but not the resource associated with it.
As a result, when the client terminates, the resource delete function
gets called and accesses already freed memory:
| Invalid read of size 8
| at 0x5BC0C0: XkbRemoveResourceClient (xkbEvents.c:1047)
| by 0x5B3391: XkbClientGone (xkb.c:7094)
| by 0x4DF138: doFreeResource (resource.c:890)
| by 0x4DFB50: FreeClientResources (resource.c:1156)
| by 0x4A9A59: CloseDownClient (dispatch.c:3550)
| by 0x5E0A53: ClientReady (connection.c:601)
| by 0x5E4FEF: ospoll_wait (ospoll.c:657)
| by 0x5DC834: WaitForSomething (WaitFor.c:206)
| by 0x4A1BA5: Dispatch (dispatch.c:491)
| by 0x4B0070: dix_main (main.c:277)
| by 0x4285E7: main (stubmain.c:34)
| Address 0x1893e278 is 184 bytes inside a block of size 928 free'd
| at 0x4842E43: free (vg_replace_malloc.c:989)
| by 0x49C1A6: CloseDevice (devices.c:1067)
| by 0x49C522: CloseOneDevice (devices.c:1193)
| by 0x49C6E4: RemoveDevice (devices.c:1244)
| by 0x5873D4: remove_master (xichangehierarchy.c:348)
| by 0x587921: ProcXIChangeHierarchy (xichangehierarchy.c:504)
| by 0x579BF1: ProcIDispatch (extinit.c:390)
| by 0x4A1D85: Dispatch (dispatch.c:551)
| by 0x4B0070: dix_main (main.c:277)
| by 0x4285E7: main (stubmain.c:34)
| Block was alloc'd at
| at 0x48473F3: calloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:1675)
| by 0x49A118: AddInputDevice (devices.c:262)
| by 0x4A0E58: AllocDevicePair (devices.c:2846)
| by 0x5866EE: add_master (xichangehierarchy.c:153)
| by 0x5878C2: ProcXIChangeHierarchy (xichangehierarchy.c:493)
| by 0x579BF1: ProcIDispatch (extinit.c:390)
| by 0x4A1D85: Dispatch (dispatch.c:551)
| by 0x4B0070: dix_main (main.c:277)
| by 0x4285E7: main (stubmain.c:34)
To avoid that issue, make sure to free the resources when freeing the
device XkbInterest data.
CVE-2025-62230, ZDI-CAN-27545
This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michel Dänzer <mdaenzer@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 10c94238bdad17c11707e0bdaaa3a9cd54c504be)
Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/2087>
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/commit/87fe2553937a99fd914ad0cde999376a3adc3839]
CVE: CVE-2025-62230
Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
---
xkb/xkbEvents.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/xkb/xkbEvents.c b/xkb/xkbEvents.c
index 0bbd661867..3d04ecf0c4 100644
--- a/xkb/xkbEvents.c
+++ b/xkb/xkbEvents.c
@@ -1056,6 +1056,7 @@ XkbRemoveResourceClient(DevicePtr inDev, XID id)
autoCtrls = interest->autoCtrls;
autoValues = interest->autoCtrlValues;
client = interest->client;
+ FreeResource(interest->resource, RT_XKBCLIENT);
free(interest);
found = TRUE;
}
@@ -1067,6 +1068,7 @@ XkbRemoveResourceClient(DevicePtr inDev, XID id)
autoCtrls = victim->autoCtrls;
autoValues = victim->autoCtrlValues;
client = victim->client;
+ FreeResource(victim->resource, RT_XKBCLIENT);
free(victim);
found = TRUE;
}
--
GitLab

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
From 3baad99f9c15028ed8c3e3d8408e5ec35db155aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Sep 2025 16:30:29 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] xkb: Prevent overflow in XkbSetCompatMap()
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
The XkbCompatMap structure stores its "num_si" and "size_si" fields
using an unsigned short.
However, the function _XkbSetCompatMap() will store the sum of the
input data "firstSI" and "nSI" in both XkbCompatMap's "num_si" and
"size_si" without first checking if the sum overflows the maximum
unsigned short value, leading to a possible overflow.
To avoid the issue, check whether the sum does not exceed the maximum
unsigned short value, or return a "BadValue" error otherwise.
CVE-2025-62231, ZDI-CAN-27560
This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michel Dänzer <mdaenzer@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 475d9f49acd0e55bc0b089ed77f732ad18585470)
Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/2087>
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/commit/3baad99f9c15028ed8c3e3d8408e5ec35db155aa]
CVE: CVE-2025-62231
Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
---
xkb/xkb.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/xkb/xkb.c b/xkb/xkb.c
index 26d965d482..137d70da27 100644
--- a/xkb/xkb.c
+++ b/xkb/xkb.c
@@ -2992,6 +2992,8 @@ _XkbSetCompatMap(ClientPtr client, DeviceIntPtr dev,
XkbSymInterpretPtr sym;
unsigned int skipped = 0;
+ if ((unsigned) (req->firstSI + req->nSI) > USHRT_MAX)
+ return BadValue;
if ((unsigned) (req->firstSI + req->nSI) > compat->size_si) {
compat->num_si = compat->size_si = req->firstSI + req->nSI;
compat->sym_interpret = reallocarray(compat->sym_interpret,
--
GitLab

View File

@@ -50,6 +50,10 @@ SRC_URI = "https://www.x.org/archive/individual/xserver/xwayland-${PV}.tar.xz \
file://CVE-2025-49178.patch \
file://CVE-2025-49179.patch \
file://CVE-2025-49180.patch \
file://CVE-2025-62229.patch \
file://CVE-2025-62230-1.patch \
file://CVE-2025-62230-2.patch \
file://CVE-2025-62231.patch \
"
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "d11eeee73290b88ea8da42a7d9350dedfaba856ce4ae44e58c045ad9ecaa2f73"

View File

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE;md5=a6a458c13f18385b7bc5069a6d7b176e"
DEPENDS = "glib-2.0 util-linux popt bison-native flex-native"
SRC_URI = "git://git.efficios.com/babeltrace.git;branch=stable-2.0 \
SRC_URI = "git://git.efficios.com/babeltrace.git;branch=stable-2.0;protocol=https \
file://run-ptest \
file://0001-tests-do-not-run-test-applications-from-.libs.patch \
file://0001-Make-manpages-multilib-identical.patch \

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
From 1817916388cd8180f4411e6d0eb89a8c6916dce6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Martijn van Beurden <mvanb1@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 25 Apr 2022 20:29:57 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Fix seeking bug
Commit 159cd6c introduced a bug that only triggered upon seeking
from the start of a headerless FLAC file to the first frame (so
really not a seek at all). Furthermore that commit did nothing
else in any other circumstance. This commit fixes that, by both
fixing the problem and the behaviour the commit mentioned earlier
meant to introduce.
Co-authored-by: Robert Kausch <robert.kausch@freac.org>
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/xiph/flac/commit/7e785eb9a84f9147246eb2b0e5e35ec01db5a815]
Signed-off-by: Gyorgy Sarvari <skandigraun@gmail.com>
---
src/libFLAC/stream_decoder.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/libFLAC/stream_decoder.c b/src/libFLAC/stream_decoder.c
index ef6da44..bc78645 100644
--- a/src/libFLAC/stream_decoder.c
+++ b/src/libFLAC/stream_decoder.c
@@ -3077,7 +3077,8 @@ FLAC__bool seek_to_absolute_sample_(FLAC__StreamDecoder *decoder, FLAC__uint64 s
upper_bound = stream_length;
upper_bound_sample = total_samples > 0 ? total_samples : target_sample /*estimate it*/;
- if(decoder->protected_->state == FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_READ_FRAME) {
+ if(decoder->protected_->state == FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_SEARCH_FOR_FRAME_SYNC &&
+ decoder->private_->samples_decoded != 0) {
if(target_sample < decoder->private_->samples_decoded) {
if(FLAC__stream_decoder_get_decode_position(decoder, &upper_bound))
upper_bound_sample = decoder->private_->samples_decoded;

View File

@@ -16,7 +16,8 @@ DEPENDS = "libogg"
SRC_URI = "http://downloads.xiph.org/releases/flac/${BP}.tar.xz \
file://CVE-2020-22219.patch \
"
file://0001-Fix-seeking-bug.patch \
"
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "8ff0607e75a322dd7cd6ec48f4f225471404ae2730d0ea945127b1355155e737"

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
From 0fa3c0f698c2ca618a0fa44e10a822678df85373 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Cosmin Truta <ctruta@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 21:53:24 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] chore: Clean up the spurious uses of `sizeof(png_byte)`; fix
the manual
By definition, `sizeof(png_byte)` is 1.
Remove all the occurences of `sizeof(png_byte)` from the code, and fix
a related typo in the libpng manual.
Also update the main .editorconfig file to reflect the fixing expected
by a FIXME note.
CVE: CVE-2025-64505
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/pnggroup/libpng/commit/0fa3c0f698c2ca618a0fa44e10a822678df85373]
Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
---
libpng-manual.txt | 4 ++--
libpng.3 | 4 ++--
pngrtran.c | 17 +++++++----------
3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/libpng-manual.txt b/libpng-manual.txt
index eb24ef483..d2918ce31 100644
--- a/libpng-manual.txt
+++ b/libpng-manual.txt
@@ -1180,11 +1180,11 @@ where row_pointers is an array of pointers to the pixel data for each row:
If you know your image size and pixel size ahead of time, you can allocate
row_pointers prior to calling png_read_png() with
- if (height > PNG_UINT_32_MAX/(sizeof (png_byte)))
+ if (height > PNG_UINT_32_MAX / (sizeof (png_bytep)))
png_error (png_ptr,
"Image is too tall to process in memory");
- if (width > PNG_UINT_32_MAX/pixel_size)
+ if (width > PNG_UINT_32_MAX / pixel_size)
png_error (png_ptr,
"Image is too wide to process in memory");
diff --git a/libpng.3 b/libpng.3
index 57d06f2db..8875b219a 100644
--- a/libpng.3
+++ b/libpng.3
@@ -1699,11 +1699,11 @@ where row_pointers is an array of pointers to the pixel data for each row:
If you know your image size and pixel size ahead of time, you can allocate
row_pointers prior to calling png_read_png() with
- if (height > PNG_UINT_32_MAX/(sizeof (png_byte)))
+ if (height > PNG_UINT_32_MAX / (sizeof (png_bytep)))
png_error (png_ptr,
"Image is too tall to process in memory");
- if (width > PNG_UINT_32_MAX/pixel_size)
+ if (width > PNG_UINT_32_MAX / pixel_size)
png_error (png_ptr,
"Image is too wide to process in memory");
diff --git a/pngrtran.c b/pngrtran.c
index 74cca476b..041f9306c 100644
--- a/pngrtran.c
+++ b/pngrtran.c
@@ -441,7 +441,7 @@ png_set_quantize(png_structrp png_ptr, png_colorp palette,
int i;
png_ptr->quantize_index = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr,
- (png_alloc_size_t)((png_uint_32)num_palette * (sizeof (png_byte))));
+ (png_alloc_size_t)num_palette);
for (i = 0; i < num_palette; i++)
png_ptr->quantize_index[i] = (png_byte)i;
}
@@ -458,7 +458,7 @@ png_set_quantize(png_structrp png_ptr, png_colorp palette,
/* Initialize an array to sort colors */
png_ptr->quantize_sort = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr,
- (png_alloc_size_t)((png_uint_32)num_palette * (sizeof (png_byte))));
+ (png_alloc_size_t)num_palette);
/* Initialize the quantize_sort array */
for (i = 0; i < num_palette; i++)
@@ -592,11 +592,9 @@ png_set_quantize(png_structrp png_ptr, png_colorp palette,
/* Initialize palette index arrays */
png_ptr->index_to_palette = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr,
- (png_alloc_size_t)((png_uint_32)num_palette *
- (sizeof (png_byte))));
+ (png_alloc_size_t)num_palette);
png_ptr->palette_to_index = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr,
- (png_alloc_size_t)((png_uint_32)num_palette *
- (sizeof (png_byte))));
+ (png_alloc_size_t)num_palette);
/* Initialize the sort array */
for (i = 0; i < num_palette; i++)
@@ -761,12 +759,11 @@ png_set_quantize(png_structrp png_ptr, png_colorp palette,
size_t num_entries = ((size_t)1 << total_bits);
png_ptr->palette_lookup = (png_bytep)png_calloc(png_ptr,
- (png_alloc_size_t)(num_entries * (sizeof (png_byte))));
+ (png_alloc_size_t)(num_entries));
- distance = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr, (png_alloc_size_t)(num_entries *
- (sizeof (png_byte))));
+ distance = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr, (png_alloc_size_t)num_entries);
- memset(distance, 0xff, num_entries * (sizeof (png_byte)));
+ memset(distance, 0xff, num_entries);
for (i = 0; i < num_palette; i++)
{

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
From ea094764f3436e3c6524622724c2d342a3eff235 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Cosmin Truta <ctruta@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 8 Nov 2025 17:16:59 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Fix a memory leak in function `png_set_quantize`; refactor
Release the previously-allocated array `quantize_index` before
reallocating it. This avoids leaking memory when the function
`png_set_quantize` is called multiple times on the same `png_struct`.
This function assumed single-call usage, but fuzzing revealed that
repeated calls would overwrite the pointers without freeing the
original allocations, leaking 256 bytes per call for `quantize_index`
and additional memory for `quantize_sort` when histogram-based
quantization is used.
Also remove the array `quantize_sort` from the list of `png_struct`
members and make it a local variable. This array is initialized,
used and released exclusively inside the function `png_set_quantize`.
Reported-by: Samsung-PENTEST <Samsung-PENTEST@users.noreply.github.com>
Analyzed-by: degrigis <degrigis@users.noreply.github.com>
Reviewed-by: John Bowler <jbowler@acm.org>
CVE: CVE-2025-64505
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/pnggroup/libpng/commit/ea094764f3436e3c6524622724c2d342a3eff235]
Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
---
pngrtran.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
pngstruct.h | 1 -
2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
diff --git a/pngrtran.c b/pngrtran.c
index 1809db704..4632dd521 100644
--- a/pngrtran.c
+++ b/pngrtran.c
@@ -440,6 +440,12 @@ png_set_quantize(png_structrp png_ptr, png_colorp palette,
{
int i;
+ /* Initialize the array to index colors.
+ *
+ * Be careful to avoid leaking memory. Applications are allowed to call
+ * this function more than once per png_struct.
+ */
+ png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->quantize_index);
png_ptr->quantize_index = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr,
(png_alloc_size_t)num_palette);
for (i = 0; i < num_palette; i++)
@@ -454,15 +460,14 @@ png_set_quantize(png_structrp png_ptr, png_colorp palette,
* Perhaps not the best solution, but good enough.
*/
- int i;
+ png_bytep quantize_sort;
+ int i, j;
- /* Initialize an array to sort colors */
- png_ptr->quantize_sort = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr,
+ /* Initialize the local array to sort colors. */
+ quantize_sort = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr,
(png_alloc_size_t)num_palette);
-
- /* Initialize the quantize_sort array */
for (i = 0; i < num_palette; i++)
- png_ptr->quantize_sort[i] = (png_byte)i;
+ quantize_sort[i] = (png_byte)i;
/* Find the least used palette entries by starting a
* bubble sort, and running it until we have sorted
@@ -474,19 +479,18 @@ png_set_quantize(png_structrp png_ptr, png_colorp palette,
for (i = num_palette - 1; i >= maximum_colors; i--)
{
int done; /* To stop early if the list is pre-sorted */
- int j;
done = 1;
for (j = 0; j < i; j++)
{
- if (histogram[png_ptr->quantize_sort[j]]
- < histogram[png_ptr->quantize_sort[j + 1]])
+ if (histogram[quantize_sort[j]]
+ < histogram[quantize_sort[j + 1]])
{
png_byte t;
- t = png_ptr->quantize_sort[j];
- png_ptr->quantize_sort[j] = png_ptr->quantize_sort[j + 1];
- png_ptr->quantize_sort[j + 1] = t;
+ t = quantize_sort[j];
+ quantize_sort[j] = quantize_sort[j + 1];
+ quantize_sort[j + 1] = t;
done = 0;
}
}
@@ -498,18 +502,18 @@ png_set_quantize(png_structrp png_ptr, png_colorp palette,
/* Swap the palette around, and set up a table, if necessary */
if (full_quantize != 0)
{
- int j = num_palette;
+ j = num_palette;
/* Put all the useful colors within the max, but don't
* move the others.
*/
for (i = 0; i < maximum_colors; i++)
{
- if ((int)png_ptr->quantize_sort[i] >= maximum_colors)
+ if ((int)quantize_sort[i] >= maximum_colors)
{
do
j--;
- while ((int)png_ptr->quantize_sort[j] >= maximum_colors);
+ while ((int)quantize_sort[j] >= maximum_colors);
palette[i] = palette[j];
}
@@ -517,7 +521,7 @@ png_set_quantize(png_structrp png_ptr, png_colorp palette,
}
else
{
- int j = num_palette;
+ j = num_palette;
/* Move all the used colors inside the max limit, and
* develop a translation table.
@@ -525,13 +529,13 @@ png_set_quantize(png_structrp png_ptr, png_colorp palette,
for (i = 0; i < maximum_colors; i++)
{
/* Only move the colors we need to */
- if ((int)png_ptr->quantize_sort[i] >= maximum_colors)
+ if ((int)quantize_sort[i] >= maximum_colors)
{
png_color tmp_color;
do
j--;
- while ((int)png_ptr->quantize_sort[j] >= maximum_colors);
+ while ((int)quantize_sort[j] >= maximum_colors);
tmp_color = palette[j];
palette[j] = palette[i];
@@ -569,8 +573,7 @@ png_set_quantize(png_structrp png_ptr, png_colorp palette,
}
}
}
- png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->quantize_sort);
- png_ptr->quantize_sort = NULL;
+ png_free(png_ptr, quantize_sort);
}
else
{
diff --git a/pngstruct.h b/pngstruct.h
index 084422bc1..fe5fa0415 100644
--- a/pngstruct.h
+++ b/pngstruct.h
@@ -413,7 +413,6 @@ struct png_struct_def
#ifdef PNG_READ_QUANTIZE_SUPPORTED
/* The following three members were added at version 1.0.14 and 1.2.4 */
- png_bytep quantize_sort; /* working sort array */
png_bytep index_to_palette; /* where the original index currently is
in the palette */
png_bytep palette_to_index; /* which original index points to this

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
From 6a528eb5fd0dd7f6de1c39d30de0e41473431c37 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Cosmin Truta <ctruta@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 8 Nov 2025 23:58:26 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Fix a buffer overflow in `png_do_quantize`
Allocate the quantize_index array to PNG_MAX_PALETTE_LENGTH (256 bytes)
instead of num_palette bytes. This approach matches the allocation
pattern for `palette[]`, `trans_alpha[]` and `riffled_palette[]` which
were similarly oversized in libpng 1.2.1 to prevent buffer overflows
from malformed PNG files with out-of-range palette indices.
Out-of-range palette indices `index >= num_palette` will now read
identity-mapped values from the `quantize_index` array (where index N
maps to palette entry N). This prevents undefined behavior while
avoiding runtime bounds checking overhead in the performance-critical
pixel processing loop.
Reported-by: Samsung-PENTEST <Samsung-PENTEST@users.noreply.github.com>
Analyzed-by: degrigis <degrigis@users.noreply.github.com>
CVE: CVE-2025-64505
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/pnggroup/libpng/commit/6a528eb5fd0dd7f6de1c39d30de0e41473431c37]
Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
---
pngrtran.c | 8 ++++++--
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/pngrtran.c b/pngrtran.c
index 4632dd521..9c2475fde 100644
--- a/pngrtran.c
+++ b/pngrtran.c
@@ -441,14 +441,18 @@ png_set_quantize(png_structrp png_ptr, png_colorp palette,
int i;
/* Initialize the array to index colors.
+ *
+ * Ensure quantize_index can fit 256 elements (PNG_MAX_PALETTE_LENGTH)
+ * rather than num_palette elements. This is to prevent buffer overflows
+ * caused by malformed PNG files with out-of-range palette indices.
*
* Be careful to avoid leaking memory. Applications are allowed to call
* this function more than once per png_struct.
*/
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->quantize_index);
png_ptr->quantize_index = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr,
- (png_alloc_size_t)num_palette);
- for (i = 0; i < num_palette; i++)
+ PNG_MAX_PALETTE_LENGTH);
+ for (i = 0; i < PNG_MAX_PALETTE_LENGTH; i++)
png_ptr->quantize_index[i] = (png_byte)i;
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
From 2bd84c019c300b78e811743fbcddb67c9d9bf821 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Cosmin Truta <ctruta@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 7 Nov 2025 22:40:05 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Fix a heap buffer overflow in `png_write_image_8bit`
The condition guarding the pre-transform path incorrectly allowed 8-bit
input data to enter `png_write_image_8bit` which expects 16-bit input.
This caused out-of-bounds reads when processing 8-bit grayscale+alpha
images (GitHub #688), or 8-bit RGB or RGB+alpha images (GitHub #746),
with the `convert_to_8bit` flag set (an invalid combination that should
bypass the pre-transform path).
The second part of the condition, i.e.
colormap == 0 && convert_to_8bit != 0
failed to verify that input was 16-bit, i.e.
linear != 0
contradicting the comment "This only applies when the input is 16-bit".
The fix consists in restructuring the condition to ensure both the
`alpha` path and the `convert_to_8bit` path require linear (16-bit)
input. The corrected condition, i.e.
linear != 0 && (alpha != 0 || display->convert_to_8bit != 0)
matches the expectation of the `png_write_image_8bit` function and
prevents treating 8-bit buffers as 16-bit data.
Reported-by: Samsung-PENTEST <Samsung-PENTEST@users.noreply.github.com>
Reported-by: weijinjinnihao <weijinjinnihao@users.noreply.github.com>
Analyzed-by: degrigis <degrigis@users.noreply.github.com>
Reviewed-by: John Bowler <jbowler@acm.org>
CVE: CVE-2025-64506
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/pnggroup/libpng/commit/2bd84c019c300b78e811743fbcddb67c9d9bf821]
Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
---
pngwrite.c | 3 +--
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/pngwrite.c b/pngwrite.c
index 35a5d17b6..83148960e 100644
--- a/pngwrite.c
+++ b/pngwrite.c
@@ -2129,8 +2129,7 @@ png_image_write_main(png_voidp argument)
* before it is written. This only applies when the input is 16-bit and
* either there is an alpha channel or it is converted to 8-bit.
*/
- if ((linear != 0 && alpha != 0 ) ||
- (colormap == 0 && display->convert_to_8bit != 0))
+ if (linear != 0 && (alpha != 0 || display->convert_to_8bit != 0))
{
png_bytep row = png_voidcast(png_bytep, png_malloc(png_ptr,
png_get_rowbytes(png_ptr, info_ptr)));

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
From 08da33b4c88cfcd36e5a706558a8d7e0e4773643 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Cosmin Truta <ctruta@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 12 Nov 2025 13:46:23 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Fix a buffer overflow in `png_init_read_transformations`
The palette compositing code in `png_init_read_transformations` was
incorrectly applying background compositing when PNG_FLAG_OPTIMIZE_ALPHA
was set. This violated the premultiplied alpha invariant
`component <= alpha` expected by `png_image_read_composite`, causing
values that exceeded the valid range for the PNG_sRGB_FROM_LINEAR lookup
tables.
When PNG_ALPHA_OPTIMIZED is active, palette entries should contain pure
premultiplied RGB values without background compositing. The background
compositing must happen later in `png_image_read_composite` where the
actual background color from the PNG file is available.
The fix consists in introducing conditional behavior based on
PNG_FLAG_OPTIMIZE_ALPHA: when set, the code performs only
premultiplication using the formula `component * alpha + 127) / 255`
with proper gamma correction. When not set, the original background
compositing calculation based on the `png_composite` macro is preserved.
This prevents buffer overflows in `png_image_read_composite` where
out-of-range premultiplied values would cause out-of-bounds array access
in `png_sRGB_base[]` and `png_sRGB_delta[]`.
Reported-by: Samsung-PENTEST <Samsung-PENTEST@users.noreply.github.com>
Analyzed-by: John Bowler <jbowler@acm.org>
CVE: CVE-2025-64720
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/pnggroup/libpng/commit/08da33b4c88cfcd36e5a706558a8d7e0e4773643]
Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
---
pngrtran.c | 52 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
1 file changed, 42 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/pngrtran.c b/pngrtran.c
index 548780030..2f5202255 100644
--- a/pngrtran.c
+++ b/pngrtran.c
@@ -1698,19 +1698,51 @@ png_init_read_transformations(png_structrp png_ptr)
}
else /* if (png_ptr->trans_alpha[i] != 0xff) */
{
- png_byte v, w;
+ if ((png_ptr->flags & PNG_FLAG_OPTIMIZE_ALPHA) != 0)
+ {
+ /* Premultiply only:
+ * component = round((component * alpha) / 255)
+ */
+ png_uint_32 component;
- v = png_ptr->gamma_to_1[palette[i].red];
- png_composite(w, v, png_ptr->trans_alpha[i], back_1.red);
- palette[i].red = png_ptr->gamma_from_1[w];
+ component = png_ptr->gamma_to_1[palette[i].red];
+ component =
+ (component * png_ptr->trans_alpha[i] + 128) / 255;
+ palette[i].red = png_ptr->gamma_from_1[component];
- v = png_ptr->gamma_to_1[palette[i].green];
- png_composite(w, v, png_ptr->trans_alpha[i], back_1.green);
- palette[i].green = png_ptr->gamma_from_1[w];
+ component = png_ptr->gamma_to_1[palette[i].green];
+ component =
+ (component * png_ptr->trans_alpha[i] + 128) / 255;
+ palette[i].green = png_ptr->gamma_from_1[component];
- v = png_ptr->gamma_to_1[palette[i].blue];
- png_composite(w, v, png_ptr->trans_alpha[i], back_1.blue);
- palette[i].blue = png_ptr->gamma_from_1[w];
+ component = png_ptr->gamma_to_1[palette[i].blue];
+ component =
+ (component * png_ptr->trans_alpha[i] + 128) / 255;
+ palette[i].blue = png_ptr->gamma_from_1[component];
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* Composite with background color:
+ * component =
+ * alpha * component + (1 - alpha) * background
+ */
+ png_byte v, w;
+
+ v = png_ptr->gamma_to_1[palette[i].red];
+ png_composite(w, v,
+ png_ptr->trans_alpha[i], back_1.red);
+ palette[i].red = png_ptr->gamma_from_1[w];
+
+ v = png_ptr->gamma_to_1[palette[i].green];
+ png_composite(w, v,
+ png_ptr->trans_alpha[i], back_1.green);
+ palette[i].green = png_ptr->gamma_from_1[w];
+
+ v = png_ptr->gamma_to_1[palette[i].blue];
+ png_composite(w, v,
+ png_ptr->trans_alpha[i], back_1.blue);
+ palette[i].blue = png_ptr->gamma_from_1[w];
+ }
}
}
else

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