build-appliance-image: Update to kirkstone head revision

(From OE-Core rev: 2ed3f8b938579dbbb804e04c45a968cc57761db7)

Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>

documentation/contributor-guide/submit-changes.rst

@@ -123,110 +123,116 @@ to add the upgraded version.
 
       $ git commit -s file1 file2 dir1 dir2 ...
 
-   To include **a**\ ll staged files::
+   To include all staged files::
 
       $ git commit -sa
 
-   -  The ``-s`` option of ``git commit`` adds a "Signed-off-by:" line
-      to your commit message. There is the same requirement for contributing
-      to the Linux kernel. Adding such a line signifies that you, the
-      submitter, have agreed to the `Developer's Certificate of Origin 1.1
-      <https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/submitting-patches.html#sign-your-work-the-developer-s-certificate-of-origin>`__
-      as follows:
+   #.  The ``-s`` option of ``git commit`` adds a "Signed-off-by:" line
+       to your commit message. There is the same requirement for contributing
+       to the Linux kernel. Adding such a line signifies that you, the
+       submitter, have agreed to the `Developer's Certificate of Origin 1.1
+       <https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/submitting-patches.html#sign-your-work-the-developer-s-certificate-of-origin>`__
+       as follows:
 
-      .. code-block:: none
+       .. code-block:: none
 
-         Developer's Certificate of Origin 1.1
+          Developer's Certificate of Origin 1.1
 
-         By making a contribution to this project, I certify that:
+          By making a contribution to this project, I certify that:
 
-         (a) The contribution was created in whole or in part by me and I
-             have the right to submit it under the open source license
-             indicated in the file; or
+          (a) The contribution was created in whole or in part by me and I
+              have the right to submit it under the open source license
+              indicated in the file; or
 
-         (b) The contribution is based upon previous work that, to the best
-             of my knowledge, is covered under an appropriate open source
-             license and I have the right under that license to submit that
-             work with modifications, whether created in whole or in part
-             by me, under the same open source license (unless I am
-             permitted to submit under a different license), as indicated
-             in the file; or
+          (b) The contribution is based upon previous work that, to the best
+              of my knowledge, is covered under an appropriate open source
+              license and I have the right under that license to submit that
+              work with modifications, whether created in whole or in part
+              by me, under the same open source license (unless I am
+              permitted to submit under a different license), as indicated
+              in the file; or
 
-         (c) The contribution was provided directly to me by some other
-             person who certified (a), (b) or (c) and I have not modified
-             it.
+          (c) The contribution was provided directly to me by some other
+              person who certified (a), (b) or (c) and I have not modified
+              it.
 
-         (d) I understand and agree that this project and the contribution
-             are public and that a record of the contribution (including all
-             personal information I submit with it, including my sign-off) is
-             maintained indefinitely and may be redistributed consistent with
-             this project or the open source license(s) involved.
+          (d) I understand and agree that this project and the contribution
+              are public and that a record of the contribution (including all
+              personal information I submit with it, including my sign-off) is
+              maintained indefinitely and may be redistributed consistent with
+              this project or the open source license(s) involved.
 
-   -  Provide a single-line summary of the change and, if more
-      explanation is needed, provide more detail in the body of the
-      commit. This summary is typically viewable in the "shortlist" of
-      changes. Thus, providing something short and descriptive that
-      gives the reader a summary of the change is useful when viewing a
-      list of many commits. You should prefix this short description
-      with the recipe name (if changing a recipe), or else with the
-      short form path to the file being changed.
+   #.  Provide a single-line summary of the change and, if more
+       explanation is needed, provide more detail in the description of the
+       commit. This summary is typically viewable in the "shortlist" of
+       changes. Thus, providing something short and descriptive that
+       gives the reader a summary of the change is useful when viewing a
+       list of many commits. You should prefix this short description
+       with the recipe name (if changing a recipe), or else with the
+       short form path to the file being changed.
+
+       .. note::
+
+          To find a suitable prefix for the commit summary, a good idea
+          is to look for prefixes used in previous commits touching the
+          same files or directories::
+
+             git log --oneline <paths>
+
+   #.  For the commit description, provide detailed information
+       that describes what you changed, why you made the change, and the
+       approach you used. It might also be helpful if you mention how you
+       tested the change. Provide as much detail as you can in the commit
+       description.
+
+       .. note::
+
+          If the single line summary is enough to describe a simple
+          change, the commit description can be left empty.
+
+   #.  If the change addresses a specific bug or issue that is associated
+       with a bug-tracking ID, include a reference to that ID in the body of the
+       commit message. For example, the Yocto Project uses a
+       specific convention for bug references --- any commit that addresses
+       a specific bug should use the following form for the body of the commit
+       message. Be sure to use the actual bug-tracking ID from
+       Bugzilla for bug-id::
+
+          single-line summary of change
+
+          Fixes [YOCTO #bug-id]
+
+          detailed description of change
+
+   #. If other people participated in this patch, add some tags to the commit
+      description to credit other contributors to the change:
+
+      -  ``Reported-by``: name and email of a person reporting a bug
+         that your commit is trying to fix. This is a good practice
+         to encourage people to go on reporting bugs and let them
+         know that their reports are taken into account.
+
+      -  ``Suggested-by``: name and email of a person to credit for the
+         idea of making the change.
+
+      -  ``Tested-by``, ``Reviewed-by``: name and email for people having
+         tested your changes or reviewed their code. These fields are
+         usually added by the maintainer accepting a patch, or by
+         yourself if you submitted your patches to early reviewers,
+         or are submitting an unmodified patch again as part of a
+         new iteration of your patch series.
+
+      -  ``Cc``: name and email of people you want to send a copy
+         of your changes to. This field will be used by ``git send-email``.
+
+      See `more guidance about using such tags
+      <https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/submitting-patches.html#using-reported-by-tested-by-reviewed-by-suggested-by-and-fixes>`__
+      in the Linux kernel documentation.
 
       .. note::
 
-         To find a suitable prefix for the commit summary, a good idea
-         is to look for prefixes used in previous commits touching the
-         same files or directories::
-
-            git log --oneline <paths>
-
-   -  For the body of the commit message, provide detailed information
-      that describes what you changed, why you made the change, and the
-      approach you used. It might also be helpful if you mention how you
-      tested the change. Provide as much detail as you can in the body
-      of the commit message.
-
-      .. note::
-
-         If the single line summary is enough to describe a simple
-         change, the body of the commit message can be left empty.
-
-   -  If the change addresses a specific bug or issue that is associated
-      with a bug-tracking ID, include a reference to that ID in your
-      detailed description. For example, the Yocto Project uses a
-      specific convention for bug references --- any commit that addresses
-      a specific bug should use the following form for the detailed
-      description. Be sure to use the actual bug-tracking ID from
-      Bugzilla for bug-id::
-
-         Fixes [YOCTO #bug-id]
-
-         detailed description of change
-
-#. *Crediting contributors:* By using the ``git commit --amend`` command,
-   you can add some tags to the commit description to credit other contributors
-   to the change:
-
-   -  ``Reported-by``: name and email of a person reporting a bug
-      that your commit is trying to fix. This is a good practice
-      to encourage people to go on reporting bugs and let them
-      know that their reports are taken into account.
-
-   -  ``Suggested-by``: name and email of a person to credit for the
-      idea of making the change.
-
-   -  ``Tested-by``, ``Reviewed-by``: name and email for people having
-      tested your changes or reviewed their code. These fields are
-      usually added by the maintainer accepting a patch, or by
-      yourself if you submitted your patches to early reviewers,
-      or are submitting an unmodified patch again as part of a
-      new iteration of your patch series.
-
-   -  ``CC:`` Name and email of people you want to send a copy
-      of your changes to. This field will be used by ``git send-email``.
-
-   See `more guidance about using such tags
-   <https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/submitting-patches.html#using-reported-by-tested-by-reviewed-by-suggested-by-and-fixes>`__
-   in the Linux kernel documentation.
+         One can amend an existing git commit message to add missing tags for
+         contributors with the ``git commit --amend`` command.
 
 Test your changes
 -----------------
@@ -650,8 +656,8 @@ backported to a stable branch unless the bug in question does not affect the
 master branch or the fix on the master branch is unsuitable for backporting.
 
 The list of stable branches along with the status and maintainer for each
-branch can be obtained from the
-:yocto_wiki:`Releases wiki page </Releases>`.
+branch can be obtained from the :yocto_home:`Releases </development/releases/>`
+page.
 
 .. note::
 

documentation/dev-manual/building.rst

@@ -909,6 +909,11 @@ to point to that directory::
 
    EXTERNALSRC_BUILD:pn-myrecipe = "path-to-your-source-tree"
 
+.. note::
+
+   The values of :term:`EXTERNALSRC` and :term:`EXTERNALSRC_BUILD`
+   must be absolute paths.
+
 Replicating a Build Offline
 ===========================
 

documentation/dev-manual/debugging.rst

@@ -111,17 +111,17 @@ occurred in your project. Perhaps an attempt to :ref:`modify a variable
 <bitbake-user-manual/bitbake-user-manual-metadata:modifying existing
 variables>` did not work out as expected.
 
-BitBake's ``-e`` option is used to display variable values after
-parsing. The following command displays the variable values after the
-configuration files (i.e. ``local.conf``, ``bblayers.conf``,
+BitBake's ``bitbake-getvar`` command is used to display variable values after
+parsing. The following command displays the variable value for :term:`OVERRIDES`
+after the configuration files (i.e. ``local.conf``, ``bblayers.conf``,
 ``bitbake.conf`` and so forth) have been parsed::
 
-   $ bitbake -e
+   $ bitbake-getvar OVERRIDES
 
-The following command displays variable values after a specific recipe has
-been parsed. The variables include those from the configuration as well::
+The following command displays the value of :term:`PV` after a specific recipe
+has been parsed::
 
-   $ bitbake -e recipename
+   $ bitbake-getvar -r recipename PV
 
 .. note::
 
@@ -135,19 +135,25 @@ been parsed. The variables include those from the configuration as well::
    the recipe datastore, which means that variables set within one task
    will not be visible to other tasks.
 
-In the output of ``bitbake -e``, each variable is preceded by a
-description of how the variable got its value, including temporary
-values that were later overridden. This description also includes
-variable flags (varflags) set on the variable. The output can be very
+In the output of ``bitbake-getvar``, the line containing the value of the
+variable is preceded by a description of how the variable got its value,
+including temporary values that were later overridden. This description also
+includes variable flags (varflags) set on the variable. The output can be very
 helpful during debugging.
 
 Variables that are exported to the environment are preceded by
-``export`` in the output of ``bitbake -e``. See the following example::
+``export`` in the output of ``bitbake-getvar``. See the following example::
 
    export CC="i586-poky-linux-gcc -m32 -march=i586 --sysroot=/home/ulf/poky/build/tmp/sysroots/qemux86"
 
-In addition to variable values, the output of the ``bitbake -e`` and
-``bitbake -e`` recipe commands includes the following information:
+Shell functions and tasks can also be inspected with the same mechanism::
+
+   $ bitbake-getvar -r recipename do_install
+
+For Python functions and tasks, ``bitbake -e recipename`` can be used instead.
+
+Moreover, the output of the ``bitbake -e`` and ``bitbake -e`` recipe commands
+includes the following information:
 
 -  The output starts with a tree listing all configuration files and
    classes included globally, recursively listing the files they include

documentation/dev-manual/layers.rst

@@ -123,10 +123,9 @@ Follow these general steps to create your layer without using tools:
       Lists all layers on which this layer depends (if any).
 
    -  :term:`LAYERSERIES_COMPAT`:
-      Lists the :yocto_wiki:`Yocto Project </Releases>`
-      releases for which the current version is compatible. This
-      variable is a good way to indicate if your particular layer is
-      current.
+      Lists the :yocto_home:`Yocto Project releases </development/releases/>`
+      for which the current version is compatible. This variable is a good
+      way to indicate if your particular layer is current.
 
 
    .. note::
@@ -822,6 +821,8 @@ The following list describes the available commands:
 
 -  ``create-layer``: Creates a basic layer.
 
+-  ``show-machines``: Lists the machines available in the currently configured layers.
+
 Creating a General Layer Using the ``bitbake-layers`` Script
 ============================================================
 

documentation/dev-manual/new-recipe.rst

@@ -83,19 +83,20 @@ command::
    OpenEmbedded recipe tool
 
    options:
-     -d, --debug     Enable debug output
-     -q, --quiet     Print only errors
-     --color COLOR   Colorize output (where COLOR is auto, always, never)
-     -h, --help      show this help message and exit
+     -d, --debug       Enable debug output
+     -q, --quiet       Print only errors
+     --color COLOR     Colorize output (where COLOR is auto, always, never)
+     -h, --help        show this help message and exit
 
    subcommands:
-     create          Create a new recipe
-     newappend       Create a bbappend for the specified target in the specified
-                       layer
-     setvar          Set a variable within a recipe
-     appendfile      Create/update a bbappend to replace a target file
-     appendsrcfiles  Create/update a bbappend to add or replace source files
-     appendsrcfile   Create/update a bbappend to add or replace a source file
+     newappend         Create a bbappend for the specified target in the specified layer
+     create            Create a new recipe
+     setvar            Set a variable within a recipe
+     appendfile        Create/update a bbappend to replace a target file
+     appendsrcfiles    Create/update a bbappend to add or replace source files
+     appendsrcfile     Create/update a bbappend to add or replace a source file
+     edit              Edit the recipe and appends for the specified target. This obeys $VISUAL if set,
+                       otherwise $EDITOR, otherwise vi.
    Use recipetool <subcommand> --help to get help on a specific command
 
 Running ``recipetool create -o OUTFILE`` creates the base recipe and
@@ -218,9 +219,9 @@ compilation and packaging files, and so forth.
 
 The path to the per-recipe temporary work directory depends on the
 context in which it is being built. The quickest way to find this path
-is to have BitBake return it by running the following::
+is to use the ``bitbake-getvar`` utility::
 
-   $ bitbake -e basename | grep ^WORKDIR=
+   $ bitbake-getvar -r basename WORKDIR
 
 As an example, assume a Source Directory
 top-level folder named ``poky``, a default :term:`Build Directory` at
@@ -438,7 +439,7 @@ Licensing
 =========
 
 Your recipe needs to define variables related to the license
-under whith the software is distributed. See the
+under which the software is distributed. See the
 :ref:`contributor-guide/recipe-style-guide:recipe license fields`
 section in the Contributor Guide for details.
 

documentation/dev-manual/security-subjects.rst

@@ -44,27 +44,32 @@ See the
 documentation for details regarding the policies and maintenance of stable
 branches.
 
-The :yocto_wiki:`Releases page </Releases>` contains a list
-of all releases of the Yocto Project. Versions in gray are no longer actively
-maintained with security patches, but well-tested patches may still be accepted
-for them for significant issues.
+The :yocto_home:`Releases </development/releases/>` page contains a list of all
+releases of the Yocto Project, grouped into current and previous releases.
+Previous releases are no longer actively maintained with security patches, but
+well-tested patches may still be accepted for them for significant issues.
 
 Security-related discussions at the Yocto Project
 -------------------------------------------------
 
-We have set up two security-related mailing lists:
+We have set up two security-related emails/mailing lists:
 
-  -  Public List: yocto [dash] security [at] yoctoproject[dot] org
+  -  Public Mailing List: yocto [dash] security [at] yoctoproject[dot] org
 
-    This is a public mailing list for anyone to subscribe to. This list is an
-    open list to discuss public security issues/patches and security-related
-    initiatives. For more information, including subscription information,
-    please see the  :yocto_lists:`yocto-security mailing list info page </g/yocto-security>`.
+     This is a public mailing list for anyone to subscribe to. This list is an
+     open list to discuss public security issues/patches and security-related
+     initiatives. For more information, including subscription information,
+     please see the  :yocto_lists:`yocto-security mailing list info page
+     </g/yocto-security>`.
 
-  - Private List: security [at] yoctoproject [dot] org
+     This list requires moderator approval for new topics to be posted, to avoid
+     private security reports to be posted by mistake.
 
-    This is a private mailing list for reporting non-published potential
-    vulnerabilities. The list is monitored by the Yocto Project Security team.
+  -  Yocto Project Security Team: security [at] yoctoproject [dot] org
+
+     This is an email for reporting non-published potential vulnerabilities.
+     Emails sent to this address are forwarded to the Yocto Project Security
+     Team members.
 
 
 What you should do if you find a security vulnerability

documentation/dev-manual/start.rst

@@ -676,7 +676,7 @@ described in the ":ref:`dev-manual/start:accessing index of releases`" section.
    .. note::
 
       For a "map" of Yocto Project releases to version numbers, see the
-      :yocto_wiki:`Releases </Releases>` wiki page.
+      :yocto_home:`Releases </development/releases/>` page.
 
    You can use the "RELEASE ARCHIVE" link to reveal a menu of all Yocto
    Project releases.

documentation/dev-manual/vulnerabilities.rst

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ known security vulnerabilities, as tracked by the public
 database.
 
 The Yocto Project maintains a `list of known vulnerabilities
-<https://autobuilder.yocto.io/pub/non-release/patchmetrics/>`__
+<https://valkyrie.yocto.io/pub/non-release/patchmetrics/>`__
 for packages in Poky and OE-Core, tracking the evolution of the number of
 unpatched CVEs and the status of patches. Such information is available for
 the current development version and for each supported release.
@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ products defined in :term:`CVE_PRODUCT`. Then, for each found CVE:
 The CVE database is stored in :term:`DL_DIR` and can be inspected using
 ``sqlite3`` command as follows::
 
-   sqlite3 downloads/CVE_CHECK/nvdcve_1.1.db .dump | grep CVE-2021-37462
+   sqlite3 downloads/CVE_CHECK/nvd*.db .dump | grep CVE-2021-37462
 
 When analyzing CVEs, it is recommended to:
 

documentation/kernel-dev/common.rst

@@ -724,13 +724,9 @@ a Raspberry Pi 2, which is based on the Broadcom 2708/2709 chipset::
 
    KBUILD_DEFCONFIG:raspberrypi2 ?= "bcm2709_defconfig"
 
-Aside from modifying your kernel recipe and providing your own
-``defconfig`` file, you need to be sure no files or statements set
-:term:`SRC_URI` to use a ``defconfig`` other than your "in-tree" file (e.g.
-a kernel's ``linux-``\ `machine`\ ``.inc`` file). In other words, if the
-build system detects a statement that identifies an "out-of-tree"
-``defconfig`` file, that statement will override your
-:term:`KBUILD_DEFCONFIG` variable.
+If the build system detects a statement that identifies an "out-of-tree"
+``defconfig`` file, your :term:`KBUILD_DEFCONFIG` variable will take precedence
+over it.
 
 See the
 :term:`KBUILD_DEFCONFIG`
@@ -1276,10 +1272,12 @@ appear in the ``.config`` file, which is in the :term:`Build Directory`.
 
 It is simple to create a configuration fragment. One method is to use
 shell commands. For example, issuing the following from the shell
-creates a configuration fragment file named ``my_smp.cfg`` that enables
-multi-processor support within the kernel::
+creates a configuration fragment file named ``my_changes.cfg`` that enables
+multi-processor support within the kernel and disables the FPGA
+Configuration Framework::
 
-   $ echo "CONFIG_SMP=y" >> my_smp.cfg
+   $ echo "CONFIG_SMP=y" >> my_changes.cfg
+   $ echo "# CONFIG_FPGA is not set" >> my_changes.cfg
 
 .. note::
 
@@ -1516,15 +1514,13 @@ Expanding Variables
 ===================
 
 Sometimes it is helpful to determine what a variable expands to during a
-build. You can examine the values of variables by examining the
-output of the ``bitbake -e`` command. The output is long and is more
-easily managed in a text file, which allows for easy searches::
+build. You can examine the value of a variable by running the ``bitbake-getvar``
+command::
 
-   $ bitbake -e virtual/kernel > some_text_file
+   $ bitbake-getvar -r virtual/kernel VARIABLE
 
-Within the text file, you can see
-exactly how each variable is expanded and used by the OpenEmbedded build
-system.
+The output of the command explains exactly how the variable is expanded and used
+by the :term:`OpenEmbedded Build System`.
 
 Working with a "Dirty" Kernel Version String
 ============================================

documentation/migration-guides/release-4.0.rst

@@ -35,3 +35,6 @@ Release 4.0 (kirkstone)
    release-notes-4.0.26
    release-notes-4.0.27
    release-notes-4.0.28
+   release-notes-4.0.29
+   release-notes-4.0.30
+   release-notes-4.0.31

documentation/migration-guides/release-notes-4.0.29.rst

@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
+Release notes for Yocto-4.0.29 (Kirkstone)
+------------------------------------------
+
+Security Fixes in Yocto-4.0.29
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+-  avahi: Fix :cve_nist:`2024-52615`
+-  binutils: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-7545` and :cve_nist:`2025-7546`
+-  coreutils: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-5278`
+-  curl: Fix :cve_nist:`2024-11053` and :cve_nist:`2025-0167`
+-  dropbear: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-47203`
+-  ffmpeg: Ignore :cve_nist:`2022-3109` and :cve_nist:`2022-3341`
+-  gdk-pixbuf: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-7345`
+-  ghostscript: Ignore :cve_nist:`2025-46646`
+-  gnupg: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-30258`
+-  gnutls: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-6395`, :cve_nist:`2025-32988`, :cve_nist:`2025-32989` and
+   :cve_nist:`2025-32990`
+-  iputils: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-48964`
+-  libarchive: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-5914`, :cve_nist:`2025-5915`, :cve_nist:`2025-5916` and
+   :cve_nist:`2025-5917`
+-  libpam: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-6020`
+-  libsoup-2.4: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-4945`
+-  libsoup-2.4: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-4969` (update patch)
+-  libsoup: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-4945`, :cve_nist:`2025-6021`, :cve_nist:`2025-6170`,
+   :cve_nist:`2025-49794` and :cve_nist:`2025-49796`
+-  ncurses: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-6141`
+-  ofono: Fix :cve_nist:`2023-4232` and :cve_nist:`2023-4235`
+-  openssl: Fix :cve_nist:`2024-41996`
+-  python3-urllib3: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-50181`
+-  ruby: Fix :cve_nist:`2024-43398` (update patches)
+-  sqlite3: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-6965` and :cve_nist:`2025-7458`
+-  sqlite3: Ignore :cve_nist:`2025-3277`
+-  systemd: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-4598`
+-  xwayland: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-49175`, :cve_nist:`2025-49176`, :cve_nist:`2025-49177`,
+   :cve_nist:`2025-49178`, :cve_nist:`2025-49179` and :cve_nist:`2025-49180`
+
+
+Fixes in Yocto-4.0.29
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+-  bintuils: stable 2.38 branch update
+-  bitbake: test/fetch: Switch u-boot based test to use our own mirror
+-  build-appliance-image: Update to kirkstone head revision
+-  conf.py: improve SearchEnglish to handle terms with dots
+-  db: ignore implicit-int and implicit-function-declaration issues fatal with gcc-14
+-  dev-manual/start.rst: added missing command in Optimize your VHDX file using DiskPart
+-  glibc: stable 2.35 branch updates
+-  gnutls: patch read buffer overrun in the "pre_shared_key" extension
+-  gnutls: patch reject zero-length version in certificate request
+-  linux-yocto/5.15: update to v5.15.186
+-  migration-guides: add release notes for 4.0.28
+-  oeqa/core/decorator: add decorators to skip based on :term:`HOST_ARCH`
+-  openssl: upgrade to 3.0.17
+-  orc: set :term:`CVE_PRODUCT`
+-  overview-manual/concepts.rst: fix sayhello hardcoded bindir
+-  poky.conf: bump version for 4.0.29
+-  python3: update CVE product
+-  ref-manual: document :term:`KERNEL_SPLIT_MODULES` variable
+-  scripts/install-buildtools: Update to 4.0.28
+-  sudo: upgrade to 1.9.17p1
+-  tcf-agent: correct the :term:`SRC_URI`
+
+
+Known Issues in Yocto-4.0.29
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+- N/A 
+
+
+Contributors to Yocto-4.0.29
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+-  Aleksandar Nikolic
+-  Antonin Godard
+-  Archana Polampalli
+-  Bruce Ashfield
+-  Changqing Li
+-  Chen Qi
+-  Colin Pinnell McAllister
+-  Daniel Díaz
+-  Deepesh Varatharajan
+-  Divya Chellam
+-  Dixit Parmar
+-  Enrico Jörns
+-  Guocai He
+-  Hitendra Prajapati
+-  Lee Chee Yang
+-  Marco Cavallini
+-  Martin Jansa
+-  Peter Marko
+-  Praveen Kumar
+-  Richard Purdie
+-  Rob Woolley
+-  Ross Burton
+-  Steve Sakoman
+-  Vijay Anusuri
+-  Yash Shinde
+-  Yogita Urade
+-  Zhang Peng
+
+
+Repositories / Downloads for Yocto-4.0.29
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+poky
+
+-  Repository Location: :yocto_git:`/poky`
+-  Branch: :yocto_git:`kirkstone </poky/log/?h=kirkstone>`
+-  Tag:  :yocto_git:`yocto-4.0.29 </poky/log/?h=yocto-4.0.29>`
+-  Git Revision: :yocto_git:`81ab000fa437ca04f584a3327b076f7a512dc6d0 </poky/commit/?id=81ab000fa437ca04f584a3327b076f7a512dc6d0>`
+-  Release Artefact: poky-81ab000fa437ca04f584a3327b076f7a512dc6d0
+-  sha: 2fecf3cac5c2361c201b5ae826960af92289862ec9be13837a8431138e534fd2
+-  Download Locations:
+   https://downloads.yoctoproject.org/releases/yocto/yocto-4.0.29/poky-81ab000fa437ca04f584a3327b076f7a512dc6d0.tar.bz2
+   https://mirrors.kernel.org/yocto/yocto/yocto-4.0.29/poky-81ab000fa437ca04f584a3327b076f7a512dc6d0.tar.bz2
+
+openembedded-core
+
+-  Repository Location: :oe_git:`/openembedded-core`
+-  Branch: :oe_git:`kirkstone </openembedded-core/log/?h=kirkstone>`
+-  Tag:  :oe_git:`yocto-4.0.29 </openembedded-core/log/?h=yocto-4.0.29>`
+-  Git Revision: :oe_git:`bd620eb14660075fd0f7476bbbb65d5da6293874 </openembedded-core/commit/?id=bd620eb14660075fd0f7476bbbb65d5da6293874>`
+-  Release Artefact: oecore-bd620eb14660075fd0f7476bbbb65d5da6293874
+-  sha: f32ab195c7090268e6e87ccf8db2813cf705c517030654326d14b25d926de88e
+-  Download Locations:
+   https://downloads.yoctoproject.org/releases/yocto/yocto-4.0.29/oecore-bd620eb14660075fd0f7476bbbb65d5da6293874.tar.bz2
+   https://mirrors.kernel.org/yocto/yocto/yocto-4.0.29/oecore-bd620eb14660075fd0f7476bbbb65d5da6293874.tar.bz2
+
+meta-mingw
+
+-  Repository Location: :yocto_git:`/meta-mingw`
+-  Branch: :yocto_git:`kirkstone </meta-mingw/log/?h=kirkstone>`
+-  Tag:  :yocto_git:`yocto-4.0.29 </meta-mingw/log/?h=yocto-4.0.29>`
+-  Git Revision: :yocto_git:`87c22abb1f11be430caf4372e6b833dc7d77564e </meta-mingw/commit/?id=87c22abb1f11be430caf4372e6b833dc7d77564e>`
+-  Release Artefact: meta-mingw-87c22abb1f11be430caf4372e6b833dc7d77564e
+-  sha: f0bc4873e2e0319fb9d6d6ab9b98eb3f89664d4339a167d2db6a787dd12bc1a8
+-  Download Locations:
+   https://downloads.yoctoproject.org/releases/yocto/yocto-4.0.29/meta-mingw-87c22abb1f11be430caf4372e6b833dc7d77564e.tar.bz2
+   https://mirrors.kernel.org/yocto/yocto/yocto-4.0.29/meta-mingw-87c22abb1f11be430caf4372e6b833dc7d77564e.tar.bz2
+
+meta-gplv2
+
+-  Repository Location: :yocto_git:`/meta-gplv2`
+-  Branch: :yocto_git:`kirkstone </meta-gplv2/log/?h=kirkstone>`
+-  Tag:  :yocto_git:`yocto-4.0.29 </meta-gplv2/log/?h=yocto-4.0.29>`
+-  Git Revision: :yocto_git:`d2f8b5cdb285b72a4ed93450f6703ca27aa42e8a </meta-gplv2/commit/?id=d2f8b5cdb285b72a4ed93450f6703ca27aa42e8a>`
+-  Release Artefact: meta-gplv2-d2f8b5cdb285b72a4ed93450f6703ca27aa42e8a
+-  sha: c386f59f8a672747dc3d0be1d4234b6039273d0e57933eb87caa20f56b9cca6d
+-  Download Locations:
+   https://downloads.yoctoproject.org/releases/yocto/yocto-4.0.29/meta-gplv2-d2f8b5cdb285b72a4ed93450f6703ca27aa42e8a.tar.bz2
+   https://mirrors.kernel.org/yocto/yocto/yocto-4.0.29/meta-gplv2-d2f8b5cdb285b72a4ed93450f6703ca27aa42e8a.tar.bz2
+
+bitbake
+
+-  Repository Location: :oe_git:`/bitbake`
+-  Branch: :oe_git:`2.0 </bitbake/log/?h=2.0>`
+-  Tag:  :oe_git:`yocto-4.0.29 </bitbake/log/?h=yocto-4.0.29>`
+-  Git Revision: :oe_git:`8e2d1f8de055549b2101614d85454fcd1d0f94b2 </bitbake/commit/?id=8e2d1f8de055549b2101614d85454fcd1d0f94b2>`
+-  Release Artefact: bitbake-8e2d1f8de055549b2101614d85454fcd1d0f94b2
+-  sha: fad4e7699bae62082118e89785324b031b0af0743064caee87c91ba28549afb0
+-  Download Locations:
+   https://downloads.yoctoproject.org/releases/yocto/yocto-4.0.29/bitbake-8e2d1f8de055549b2101614d85454fcd1d0f94b2.tar.bz2
+   https://mirrors.kernel.org/yocto/yocto/yocto-4.0.29/bitbake-8e2d1f8de055549b2101614d85454fcd1d0f94b2.tar.bz2
+
+meta-yocto
+
+-  Repository Location: :yocto_git:`/meta-yocto`
+-  Branch: :yocto_git:`kirkstone </meta-yocto/log/?h=kirkstone>`
+-  Tag: :yocto_git:`yocto-4.0.29 </meta-yocto/log/?h=yocto-4.0.29>`
+-  Git Revision: :yocto_git:`e916d3bad58f955b73e2c67aba975e63cd191394 </meta-yocto/commit/?id=e916d3bad58f955b73e2c67aba975e63cd191394>`
+
+yocto-docs
+
+-  Repository Location: :yocto_git:`/yocto-docs`
+-  Branch: :yocto_git:`kirkstone </yocto-docs/log/?h=kirkstone>`
+-  Tag: :yocto_git:`yocto-4.0.29 </yocto-docs/log/?h=yocto-4.0.29>`
+-  Git Revision: :yocto_git:`bf855ecaf4bec4cef9bbfea2e50caa65a8339828 </yocto-docs/commit/?id=bf855ecaf4bec4cef9bbfea2e50caa65a8339828>`
+

documentation/migration-guides/release-notes-4.0.30.rst

@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
+Release notes for Yocto-4.0.30 (Kirkstone)
+------------------------------------------
+
+Security Fixes in Yocto-4.0.30
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+-  cups: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-58060` and :cve_nist:`2025-58364`
+-  dpkg: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-6297`
+-  ffmpeg: Fix :cve_nist:`2023-6602`, :cve_nist:`2023-6604`, :cve_nist:`2023-6605`,
+   :cve_nist:`2025-1594` and CVE-2025-7700
+-  git: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-27613`, :cve_nist:`2025-27614`, :cve_nist:`2025-46334`,
+   :cve_nist:`2025-46835` and :cve_nist:`2025-48384`
+-  glib-2.0: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-7039`
+-  glib-2.0: Ignore :cve_nist:`2025-4056`
+-  go: Ignore :cve_nist:`2024-24790` and :cve_nist:`2025-0913`
+-  gstreamer1.0-plugins-base: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-47806`, :cve_nist:`2025-47807` and
+   :cve_nist:`2025-47808`
+-  gstreamer1.0-plugins-good: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-47183` and :cve_nist:`2025-47219`
+-  libarchive: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-5918`
+-  libxslt: Fix :cve_nist:`2023-40403`
+-  openssl: Fix :cve_nist:`2023-50781`
+-  python3: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-8194`
+-  qemu: Ignore :cve_nist:`2024-7730`
+-  sqlite3: Revert "sqlite3: patch CVE-2025-7458"
+-  tiff: Fix :cve_nist:`2024-13978`, :cve_nist:`2025-8176`, :cve_nist:`2025-8177`,
+   :cve_nist:`2025-8534` and :cve_nist:`2025-8851`
+-  vim: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-53905` and :cve_nist:`2025-53906`
+-  wpa-supplicant: Fix :cve_nist:`2022-37660`
+-  xserver-xorg: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-49175`, :cve_nist:`2025-49176`, :cve_nist:`2025-49177`,
+   :cve_nist:`2025-49178`, :cve_nist:`2025-49179` and :cve_nist:`2025-49180`
+
+
+Fixes in Yocto-4.0.30
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+-  build-appliance-image: Update to kirkstone head revision
+-  default-distrovars.inc: Fix CONNECTIVITY_CHECK_URIS redirect issue
+-  dev-manual/security-subjects.rst: update mailing lists
+-  gnupg: disable tests to avoid running target binaries at build time
+-  go-helloworld: fix license
+-  insane: Ensure that `src-uri-bad` fails correctly
+-  insane: Improve patch warning/error handling
+-  libubootenv: backport patch to fix unknown type name 'size_t'
+-  llvm: fix typo in CVE-2024-0151.patch
+-  migration-guides: add release notes for 4.0.29
+-  overview-manual/yp-intro.rst: fix broken link to article
+-  poky.conf: bump version for 4.0.30
+-  pulseaudio: Add audio group explicitly
+-  ref-manual/classes.rst: document the testexport class
+-  ref-manual/system-requirements.rst: update supported distributions
+-  ref-manual/variables.rst: document :term:`FIT_CONF_PREFIX` :term:`SPL_DTB_BINARY` variable
+-  ref-manual/variables.rst: expand :term:`IMAGE_OVERHEAD_FACTOR` glossary entry
+-  sdk: The main in the C example should return an int
+-  sudo: remove devtool FIXME comment
+-  systemd: Fix manpage build after :cve_nist:`2025-4598`
+-  vim: not adjust script pathnames for native scripts either
+-  vim: upgrade to 9.1.1652
+
+
+Known Issues in Yocto-4.0.30
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+- N/A
+
+Contributors to Yocto-4.0.30
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+-  Antonin Godard
+-  Archana Polampalli
+-  Dan McGregor
+-  Deepak Rathore
+-  Divya Chellam
+-  Erik Lindsten
+-  Guocai He
+-  Gyorgy Sarvari
+-  Hitendra Prajapati
+-  Jan Vermaete
+-  Jiaying Song
+-  Joao Marcos Costa
+-  Kyungjik Min
+-  Lee Chee Yang
+-  Mingli Yu
+-  Peter Marko
+-  Philip Lorenz
+-  Praveen Kumar
+-  Quentin Schulz
+-  Richard Purdie
+-  Steve Sakoman
+-  Vijay Anusuri
+-  Yogita Urade
+-  Youngseok Jeong
+
+
+Repositories / Downloads for Yocto-4.0.30
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+poky
+
+-  Repository Location: :yocto_git:`/poky`
+-  Branch: :yocto_git:`kirkstone </poky/log/?h=kirkstone>`
+-  Tag:  :yocto_git:`yocto-4.0.30 </poky/log/?h=yocto-4.0.30>`
+-  Git Revision: :yocto_git:`51dc9c464de0703bfbc6f1ee71ac9bea20933a45 </poky/commit/?id=51dc9c464de0703bfbc6f1ee71ac9bea20933a45>`
+-  Release Artefact: poky-51dc9c464de0703bfbc6f1ee71ac9bea20933a45
+-  sha: 2b5db0a07598df7684975c0839e6f31515a8e78d366503feb9917ef1ca56c0b2
+-  Download Locations:
+   https://downloads.yoctoproject.org/releases/yocto/yocto-4.0.30/poky-51dc9c464de0703bfbc6f1ee71ac9bea20933a45.tar.bz2
+   https://mirrors.kernel.org/yocto/yocto/yocto-4.0.30/poky-51dc9c464de0703bfbc6f1ee71ac9bea20933a45.tar.bz2
+
+openembedded-core
+
+-  Repository Location: :oe_git:`/openembedded-core`
+-  Branch: :oe_git:`kirkstone </openembedded-core/log/?h=kirkstone>`
+-  Tag:  :oe_git:`yocto-4.0.30 </openembedded-core/log/?h=yocto-4.0.30>`
+-  Git Revision: :oe_git:`d381eeb5e70bd0ce9e78032c909e4a23564f4dd7 </openembedded-core/commit/?id=d381eeb5e70bd0ce9e78032c909e4a23564f4dd7>`
+-  Release Artefact: oecore-d381eeb5e70bd0ce9e78032c909e4a23564f4dd7
+-  sha: 022ab4ef5ac59ac3f01a9dacd8b1d6310cc117c6bed2e86e195ced88e0689c85
+-  Download Locations:
+   https://downloads.yoctoproject.org/releases/yocto/yocto-4.0.30/oecore-d381eeb5e70bd0ce9e78032c909e4a23564f4dd7.tar.bz2
+   https://mirrors.kernel.org/yocto/yocto/yocto-4.0.30/oecore-d381eeb5e70bd0ce9e78032c909e4a23564f4dd7.tar.bz2
+
+meta-mingw
+
+-  Repository Location: :yocto_git:`/meta-mingw`
+-  Branch: :yocto_git:`kirkstone </meta-mingw/log/?h=kirkstone>`
+-  Tag:  :yocto_git:`yocto-4.0.30 </meta-mingw/log/?h=yocto-4.0.30>`
+-  Git Revision: :yocto_git:`87c22abb1f11be430caf4372e6b833dc7d77564e </meta-mingw/commit/?id=87c22abb1f11be430caf4372e6b833dc7d77564e>`
+-  Release Artefact: meta-mingw-87c22abb1f11be430caf4372e6b833dc7d77564e
+-  sha: f0bc4873e2e0319fb9d6d6ab9b98eb3f89664d4339a167d2db6a787dd12bc1a8
+-  Download Locations:
+   https://downloads.yoctoproject.org/releases/yocto/yocto-4.0.30/meta-mingw-87c22abb1f11be430caf4372e6b833dc7d77564e.tar.bz2
+   https://mirrors.kernel.org/yocto/yocto/yocto-4.0.30/meta-mingw-87c22abb1f11be430caf4372e6b833dc7d77564e.tar.bz2
+
+meta-gplv2
+
+-  Repository Location: :yocto_git:`/meta-gplv2`
+-  Branch: :yocto_git:`kirkstone </meta-gplv2/log/?h=kirkstone>`
+-  Tag:  :yocto_git:`yocto-4.0.30 </meta-gplv2/log/?h=yocto-4.0.30>`
+-  Git Revision: :yocto_git:`d2f8b5cdb285b72a4ed93450f6703ca27aa42e8a </meta-gplv2/commit/?id=d2f8b5cdb285b72a4ed93450f6703ca27aa42e8a>`
+-  Release Artefact: meta-gplv2-d2f8b5cdb285b72a4ed93450f6703ca27aa42e8a
+-  sha: c386f59f8a672747dc3d0be1d4234b6039273d0e57933eb87caa20f56b9cca6d
+-  Download Locations:
+   https://downloads.yoctoproject.org/releases/yocto/yocto-4.0.30/meta-gplv2-d2f8b5cdb285b72a4ed93450f6703ca27aa42e8a.tar.bz2
+   https://mirrors.kernel.org/yocto/yocto/yocto-4.0.30/meta-gplv2-d2f8b5cdb285b72a4ed93450f6703ca27aa42e8a.tar.bz2
+
+bitbake
+
+-  Repository Location: :oe_git:`/bitbake`
+-  Branch: :oe_git:`2.0 </bitbake/log/?h=2.0>`
+-  Tag:  :oe_git:`yocto-4.0.30 </bitbake/log/?h=yocto-4.0.30>`
+-  Git Revision: :oe_git:`8e2d1f8de055549b2101614d85454fcd1d0f94b2 </bitbake/commit/?id=8e2d1f8de055549b2101614d85454fcd1d0f94b2>`
+-  Release Artefact: bitbake-8e2d1f8de055549b2101614d85454fcd1d0f94b2
+-  sha: fad4e7699bae62082118e89785324b031b0af0743064caee87c91ba28549afb0
+-  Download Locations:
+   https://downloads.yoctoproject.org/releases/yocto/yocto-4.0.30/bitbake-8e2d1f8de055549b2101614d85454fcd1d0f94b2.tar.bz2
+   https://mirrors.kernel.org/yocto/yocto/yocto-4.0.30/bitbake-8e2d1f8de055549b2101614d85454fcd1d0f94b2.tar.bz2
+
+meta-yocto
+
+-  Repository Location: :yocto_git:`/meta-yocto`
+-  Branch: :yocto_git:`kirkstone </meta-yocto/log/?h=kirkstone>`
+-  Tag: :yocto_git:`yocto-4.0.30 </meta-yocto/log/?h=yocto-4.0.30>`
+-  Git Revision: :yocto_git:`edf7950e4d81dd31f29a58acdd8022dabd2be494 </meta-yocto/commit/?id=edf7950e4d81dd31f29a58acdd8022dabd2be494>`
+
+yocto-docs
+
+-  Repository Location: :yocto_git:`/yocto-docs`
+-  Branch: :yocto_git:`kirkstone </yocto-docs/log/?h=kirkstone>`
+-  Tag: :yocto_git:`yocto-4.0.30 </yocto-docs/log/?h=yocto-4.0.30>`
+-  Git Revision: :yocto_git:`71a3933c609ce73ff07e5be48d9e7b03f22ef8d7 </yocto-docs/commit/?id=71a3933c609ce73ff07e5be48d9e7b03f22ef8d7>`
+

documentation/migration-guides/release-notes-4.0.31.rst

@@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
+Release notes for Yocto-4.0.31 (Kirkstone)
+------------------------------------------
+
+Security Fixes in Yocto-4.0.31
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+-  binutils: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-8225`, :cve_nist:`2025-11081`, :cve_nist:`2025-11082` and
+   :cve_nist:`2025-11083`
+-  busybox: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-46394`
+-  cmake: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-9301`
+-  curl: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-9086`
+-  ffmpeg: Ignore :cve_nist:`2023-6603`
+-  ffmpeg: mark :cve_nist:`2023-6601` as Fixed
+-  ghostscript: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-59798`, :cve_nist:`2025-59799` and :cve_nist:`2025-59800`
+-  git: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-48386`
+-  glib-networking: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-60018` and :cve_nist:`2025-60019`
+-  go: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-47906` and :cve_nist:`2025-47907`
+-  grub2: Fix :cve_nist:`2024-56738`
+-  grub: Ignore :cve_nist:`2024-2312`
+-  gstreamer1.0-plugins-bad: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-3887`
+-  gstreamer1.0: Ignore :cve_nist:`2025-2759`, :cve_nist:`2025-3887`, :cve_nist:`2025-47183`,
+   :cve_nist:`2025-47219`, :cve_nist:`2025-47806`, :cve_nist:`2025-47807` and :cve_nist:`2025-47808`
+-  python3-jinja2: Fix :cve_nist:`2024-56201`, :cve_nist:`2024-56326` and :cve_nist:`2025-27516`
+-  libxml2: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-9714`
+-  libxslt: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-7424`
+-  lz4: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-62813`
+-  openssl: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-9230` and :cve_nist:`2025-9232`
+-  pulseaudio: Ignore :cve_nist:`2024-11586`
+-  python3: Fix :cve_nist:`2024-6345`, :cve_nist:`2025-47273` and :cve_nist:`2025-59375`
+-  qemu: Fix :cve_nist:`2024-8354`
+-  tiff: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-8961`, :cve_nist:`2025-9165` and :cve_nist:`2025-9900`
+-  vim: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-9389`
+
+
+Fixes in Yocto-4.0.31
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+-  build-appliance-image: Update to kirkstone head revision
+-  poky.conf: bump version for 4.0.31
+-  ref-manual/classes.rst: document the relative_symlinks class
+-  ref-manual/classes.rst: gettext: extend the documentation of the class
+-  ref-manual/variables.rst: document the CCACHE_DISABLE, UNINATIVE_CHECKSUM, UNINATIVE_URL, USE_NLS,
+   REQUIRED_COMBINED_FEATURES, REQUIRED_IMAGE_FEATURES, :term:`REQUIRED_MACHINE_FEATURES` variable
+-  ref-manual/variables.rst: fix :term:`LAYERDEPENDS` description
+-  dev-manual, test-manual: Update autobuilder output links
+-  ref-manual/classes.rst: extend the uninative class documentation
+-  python3: upgrade to 3.10.19
+-  linux-yocto/5.15: update to v5.15.194
+-  glibc: : PTHREAD_COND_INITIALIZER compatibility with pre-2.41 versions (bug 32786)
+-  glibc: nptl Use all of g1_start and g_signals
+-  glibc: nptl rename __condvar_quiesce_and_switch_g1
+-  glibc: nptl Fix indentation
+-  glibc: nptl Use a single loop in pthread_cond_wait instaed of a nested loop
+-  glibc: Remove g_refs from condition variables
+-  glibc: nptl Remove unnecessary quadruple check in pthread_cond_wait
+-  glibc: nptl Remove unnecessary catch-all-wake in condvar group switch
+-  glibc: nptl Update comments and indentation for new condvar implementation
+-  glibc: pthreads NPTL lost wakeup fix 2
+-  glibc: Remove partial BZ#25847 backport patches
+-  vulnerabilities: update nvdcve file name
+-  migration-guides: add release notes for 4.0.30
+-  oeqa/sdk/cases/buildcpio.py: use gnu mirror instead of main server
+-  selftest/cases/meta_ide.py: use use gnu mirror instead of main server
+-  conf/bitbake.conf: use gnu mirror instead of main server
+-  p11-kit: backport fix for handle :term:`USE_NLS` from master
+-  systemd: backport fix for handle :term:`USE_NLS` from master
+-  glibc: stable 2.35 branch updates
+-  openssl: upgrade to 3.0.18
+-  scripts/install-buildtools: Update to 4.0.30
+-  ref-manual/variables.rst: fix the description of :term:`STAGING_DIR`
+-  ref-manual/structure: document the auto.conf file
+-  dev-manual/building.rst: add note about externalsrc variables absolute paths
+-  ref-manual/variables.rst: fix the description of :term:`KBUILD_DEFCONFIG`
+-  kernel-dev/common.rst: fix the in-tree defconfig description
+-  test-manual/yocto-project-compatible.rst: fix a typo
+-  contributor-guide: submit-changes: make "Crediting contributors" part of "Commit your changes"
+-  contributor-guide: submit-changes: number instruction list in commit your changes
+-  contributor-guide: submit-changes: reword commit message instructions
+-  contributor-guide: submit-changes: make the Cc tag follow kernel guidelines
+-  contributor-guide: submit-changes: align :term:`CC` tag description
+-  contributor-guide: submit-changes: clarify example with Yocto bug ID
+-  contributor-guide: submit-changes: fix improper bold string
+-  libhandy: update git branch name
+-  python3-jinja2: upgrade to 3.1.6
+-  vim: upgrade to 9.1.1683
+
+
+Known Issues in Yocto-4.0.31
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+- N/A
+
+
+Contributors to Yocto-4.0.31
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+-  Adam Blank
+-  Aleksandar Nikolic
+-  Antonin Godard
+-  Archana Polampalli
+-  AshishKumar Mishra
+-  Bruce Ashfield
+-  Deepesh Varatharajan
+-  Divya Chellam
+-  Gyorgy Sarvari
+-  Hitendra Prajapati
+-  João Marcos Costa
+-  Lee Chee Yang
+-  Paul Barker
+-  Peter Marko
+-  Praveen Kumar
+-  Quentin Schulz
+-  Rajeshkumar Ramasamy
+-  Saravanan
+-  Soumya Sambu
+-  Steve Sakoman
+-  Sunil Dora
+-  Talel BELHAJ SALEM
+-  Theo GAIGE
+-  Vijay Anusuri
+-  Yash Shinde
+-  Yogita Urade
+
+Repositories / Downloads for Yocto-4.0.31
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+yocto-docs
+
+-  Repository Location: :yocto_git:`/yocto-docs`
+-  Branch: :yocto_git:`kirkstone </yocto-docs/log/?h=kirkstone>`
+-  Tag:  :yocto_git:`yocto-4.0.31 </yocto-docs/log/?h=yocto-4.0.31>`
+-  Git Revision: :yocto_git:`073f3bca4c374b03398317e7f445d2440a287741 </yocto-docs/commit/?id=073f3bca4c374b03398317e7f445d2440a287741>`
+-  Release Artefact: yocto-docs-073f3bca4c374b03398317e7f445d2440a287741
+-  sha: 3bfde9b6ad310dd42817509b67f61cd69552f74b2bc5011bd20788fe96d6823b
+-  Download Locations:
+   https://downloads.yoctoproject.org/releases/yocto/yocto-4.0.31/yocto-docs-073f3bca4c374b03398317e7f445d2440a287741.tar.bz2
+   https://mirrors.edge.kernel.org/yocto/yocto/yocto-4.0.31/yocto-docs-073f3bca4c374b03398317e7f445d2440a287741.tar.bz2
+
+poky
+
+-  Repository Location: :yocto_git:`/poky`
+-  Branch: :yocto_git:`kirkstone </poky/log/?h=kirkstone>`
+-  Tag:  :yocto_git:`yocto-4.0.31 </poky/log/?h=yocto-4.0.31>`
+-  Git Revision: :yocto_git:`04b39e5b7eb19498215d85c88a5fffb460fea1eb </poky/commit/?id=04b39e5b7eb19498215d85c88a5fffb460fea1eb>`
+-  Release Artefact: poky-04b39e5b7eb19498215d85c88a5fffb460fea1eb
+-  sha: 0ca18ab1ed25c0d77412ba30dbb03d74811756c7c2fe2401940f848a5e734930
+-  Download Locations:
+   https://downloads.yoctoproject.org/releases/yocto/yocto-4.0.31/poky-04b39e5b7eb19498215d85c88a5fffb460fea1eb.tar.bz2
+   https://mirrors.edge.kernel.org/yocto/yocto/yocto-4.0.31/poky-04b39e5b7eb19498215d85c88a5fffb460fea1eb.tar.bz2
+
+openembedded-core
+
+-  Repository Location: :oe_git:`/openembedded-core`
+-  Branch: :oe_git:`kirkstone </openembedded-core/log/?h=kirkstone>`
+-  Tag:  :oe_git:`yocto-4.0.31 </openembedded-core/log/?h=yocto-4.0.31>`
+-  Git Revision: :oe_git:`99204008786f659ab03538cd2ae2fd23ed4164c5 </openembedded-core/commit/?id=99204008786f659ab03538cd2ae2fd23ed4164c5>`
+-  Release Artefact: oecore-99204008786f659ab03538cd2ae2fd23ed4164c5
+-  sha: aa97bf826ad217b3a5278b4ad60bef4d194f0f1ff617677cf2323d3cc4897687
+-  Download Locations:
+   https://downloads.yoctoproject.org/releases/yocto/yocto-4.0.31/oecore-99204008786f659ab03538cd2ae2fd23ed4164c5.tar.bz2
+   https://mirrors.edge.kernel.org/yocto/yocto/yocto-4.0.31/oecore-99204008786f659ab03538cd2ae2fd23ed4164c5.tar.bz2
+
+meta-yocto
+
+-  Repository Location: :yocto_git:`/meta-yocto`
+-  Branch: :yocto_git:`kirkstone </meta-yocto/log/?h=kirkstone>`
+-  Tag:  :yocto_git:`yocto-4.0.31 </meta-yocto/log/?h=yocto-4.0.31>`
+-  Git Revision: :yocto_git:`3b2df00345b46479237fe0218675a818249f891c </meta-yocto/commit/?id=3b2df00345b46479237fe0218675a818249f891c>`
+-  Release Artefact: meta-yocto-3b2df00345b46479237fe0218675a818249f891c
+-  sha: 630e99e0f515bab8a316b2e32aff1352b4404f15aa087e8821b84093596a08ce
+-  Download Locations:
+   https://downloads.yoctoproject.org/releases/yocto/yocto-4.0.31/meta-yocto-3b2df00345b46479237fe0218675a818249f891c.tar.bz2
+   https://mirrors.edge.kernel.org/yocto/yocto/yocto-4.0.31/meta-yocto-3b2df00345b46479237fe0218675a818249f891c.tar.bz2
+
+meta-mingw
+
+-  Repository Location: :yocto_git:`/meta-mingw`
+-  Branch: :yocto_git:`kirkstone </meta-mingw/log/?h=kirkstone>`
+-  Tag:  :yocto_git:`yocto-4.0.31 </meta-mingw/log/?h=yocto-4.0.31>`
+-  Git Revision: :yocto_git:`87c22abb1f11be430caf4372e6b833dc7d77564e </meta-mingw/commit/?id=87c22abb1f11be430caf4372e6b833dc7d77564e>`
+-  Release Artefact: meta-mingw-87c22abb1f11be430caf4372e6b833dc7d77564e
+-  sha: f0bc4873e2e0319fb9d6d6ab9b98eb3f89664d4339a167d2db6a787dd12bc1a8
+-  Download Locations:
+   https://downloads.yoctoproject.org/releases/yocto/yocto-4.0.31/meta-mingw-87c22abb1f11be430caf4372e6b833dc7d77564e.tar.bz2
+   https://mirrors.edge.kernel.org/yocto/yocto/yocto-4.0.31/meta-mingw-87c22abb1f11be430caf4372e6b833dc7d77564e.tar.bz2
+
+meta-gplv2
+
+-  Repository Location: :yocto_git:`/meta-gplv2`
+-  Branch: :yocto_git:`kirkstone </meta-gplv2/log/?h=kirkstone>`
+-  Tag:  :yocto_git:`yocto-4.0.31 </meta-gplv2/log/?h=yocto-4.0.31>`
+-  Git Revision: :yocto_git:`d2f8b5cdb285b72a4ed93450f6703ca27aa42e8a </meta-gplv2/commit/?id=d2f8b5cdb285b72a4ed93450f6703ca27aa42e8a>`
+-  Release Artefact: meta-gplv2-d2f8b5cdb285b72a4ed93450f6703ca27aa42e8a
+-  sha: c386f59f8a672747dc3d0be1d4234b6039273d0e57933eb87caa20f56b9cca6d
+-  Download Locations:
+   https://downloads.yoctoproject.org/releases/yocto/yocto-4.0.31/meta-gplv2-d2f8b5cdb285b72a4ed93450f6703ca27aa42e8a.tar.bz2
+   https://mirrors.edge.kernel.org/yocto/yocto/yocto-4.0.31/meta-gplv2-d2f8b5cdb285b72a4ed93450f6703ca27aa42e8a.tar.bz2
+
+bitbake
+
+-  Repository Location: :oe_git:`/bitbake`
+-  Branch: :oe_git:`2.0 </bitbake/log/?h=2.0>`
+-  Tag:  :oe_git:`yocto-4.0.31 </bitbake/log/?h=yocto-4.0.31>`
+-  Git Revision: :oe_git:`8e2d1f8de055549b2101614d85454fcd1d0f94b2 </bitbake/commit/?id=8e2d1f8de055549b2101614d85454fcd1d0f94b2>`
+-  Release Artefact: bitbake-8e2d1f8de055549b2101614d85454fcd1d0f94b2
+-  sha: fad4e7699bae62082118e89785324b031b0af0743064caee87c91ba28549afb0
+-  Download Locations:
+   https://downloads.yoctoproject.org/releases/yocto/yocto-4.0.31/bitbake-8e2d1f8de055549b2101614d85454fcd1d0f94b2.tar.bz2
+   https://mirrors.edge.kernel.org/yocto/yocto/yocto-4.0.31/bitbake-8e2d1f8de055549b2101614d85454fcd1d0f94b2.tar.bz2
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+         id="tspan14">and YP-Compatible Metadata</tspan><tspan
+         sodipodi:role="line"
+         style="font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;font-stretch:normal;font-size:3.01677px;font-family:'Liberation Sans';-inkscape-font-specification:'Liberation Sans, Normal';font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;stroke-width:0"
+         x="40.36692"
+         y="168.53017"
+         id="tspan15">for Embedded Linux</tspan></text></g></svg>

documentation/overview-manual/yp-intro.rst

@@ -23,12 +23,12 @@ comes to delivering embedded software stacks. The project allows
 software customizations and build interchange for multiple hardware
 platforms as well as software stacks that can be maintained and scaled.
 
-.. image:: figures/key-dev-elements.png
-    :align: center
+.. image:: svg/key-dev-elements.*
+    :width: 100%
 
 For further introductory information on the Yocto Project, you might be
 interested in this
-`article <https://www.embedded.com/electronics-blogs/say-what-/4458600/Why-the-Yocto-Project-for-my-IoT-Project->`__
+`article <https://www.embedded.com/why-the-yocto-project-for-my-iot-project/>`__
 by Drew Moseley and in this short introductory
 `video <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=utZpKM7i5Z4>`__.
 

documentation/ref-manual/classes.rst

@@ -309,8 +309,12 @@ file for details about how to enable this mechanism in your configuration
 file, how to disable it for specific recipes, and how to share ``ccache``
 files between builds.
 
-However, using the class can lead to unexpected side-effects. Thus, using
-this class is not recommended.
+Recipes can also explicitly disable `Ccache` support even when the
+:ref:`ref-classes-ccache` class is enabled, by setting the
+:term:`CCACHE_DISABLE` variable to "1".
+
+Using the :ref:`ref-classes-ccache` class can lead to unexpected side-effects.
+Using this class is not recommended.
 
 .. _ref-classes-chrpath:
 
@@ -825,6 +829,14 @@ software that uses the GNU ``gettext`` internationalization and localization
 system. All recipes building software that use ``gettext`` should inherit this
 class.
 
+This class will configure recipes to build translations *unless*:
+
+-  the :term:`USE_NLS` variable is set to ``no``, or
+
+-  the :term:`INHIBIT_DEFAULT_DEPS` variable is set and the recipe inheriting
+   the :ref:`ref-classes-gettext` class does not also inherit the
+   :ref:`ref-classes-cross-canadian` class.
+
 .. _ref-classes-gnomebase:
 
 ``gnomebase``
@@ -2544,6 +2556,25 @@ The :ref:`ref-classes-recipe_sanity` class checks for the presence of any host s
 recipe prerequisites that might affect the build (e.g. variables that
 are set or software that is present).
 
+.. _ref-classes-relative_symlinks:
+
+``relative_symlinks``
+=====================
+
+The :ref:`ref-classes-relative_symlinks` class walks the symbolic links in the
+:term:`D` directory and replaces links pointing to absolute paths to relative
+paths. This is occasionally used in some recipes that create wrong symbolic
+links when their :ref:`ref-classes-native` version is built, and/or would cause
+breakage in the :ref:`overview-manual/concepts:shared state cache`.
+
+For example, if the following symbolic link is found in :term:`D`::
+
+   /usr/bin/foo -> /sbin/bar
+
+It is replaced by::
+
+   /usr/bin/foo -> ../../sbin/bar
+
 .. _ref-classes-relocatable:
 
 ``relocatable``
@@ -3038,6 +3069,22 @@ class assuming :term:`PATCHRESOLVE` is set to "user", the
 :ref:`ref-classes-cml1` class, and the :ref:`ref-classes-devshell` class all
 use the :ref:`ref-classes-terminal` class.
 
+.. _ref-classes-testexport:
+
+``testexport``
+==============
+
+Based on the :ref:`ref-classes-testimage` class, the
+:ref:`ref-classes-testexport` class can be used to export the test environment
+outside of the :term:`OpenEmbedded Build System`. This will generate the
+directory structure to execute the runtime tests using the
+:oe_git:`runexported.py </openembedded-core/tree/meta/lib/oeqa/runexported.py>`
+Python script.
+
+For more details on how to use :ref:`ref-classes-testexport`, see
+the :ref:`test-manual/runtime-testing:Exporting Tests` section in the Yocto
+Project Test Environment Manual.
+
 .. _ref-classes-testimage:
 
 ``testimage``
@@ -3163,6 +3210,9 @@ It is intended to be inherited from U-Boot recipes.
 
 The variables used by this class are:
 
+-  :term:`SPL_DTB_BINARY`: Name of the SPL device tree binary. Can be set to an
+   empty string to indicate that no SPL should be created and added to the FIT
+   image.
 -  :term:`SPL_MKIMAGE_DTCOPTS`: DTC options for U-Boot ``mkimage`` when
    building the FIT image.
 -  :term:`SPL_SIGN_ENABLE`: enable signing the FIT image.
@@ -3195,22 +3245,51 @@ imitates.
 ``uninative``
 =============
 
-Attempts to isolate the build system from the host distribution's C
-library in order to make re-use of native shared state artifacts across
-different host distributions practical. With this class enabled, a
-tarball containing a pre-built C library is downloaded at the start of
-the build. In the Poky reference distribution this is enabled by default
-through ``meta/conf/distro/include/yocto-uninative.inc``. Other
-distributions that do not derive from poky can also
-"``require conf/distro/include/yocto-uninative.inc``" to use this.
-Alternatively if you prefer, you can build the uninative-tarball recipe
-yourself, publish the resulting tarball (e.g. via HTTP) and set
-``UNINATIVE_URL`` and ``UNINATIVE_CHECKSUM`` appropriately. For an
-example, see the ``meta/conf/distro/include/yocto-uninative.inc``.
+The :ref:`ref-classes-uninative` class allows binaries to run on systems with
+older or newer :wikipedia:`Glibc <Glibc>` versions. This means
+:ref:`ref-classes-native` recipe :ref:`overview-manual/concepts:shared state
+cache` can be shared among different host distributions of different versions,
+i.e. the :ref:`overview-manual/concepts:shared state cache` is "universal".
 
-The :ref:`ref-classes-uninative` class is also used unconditionally by the extensible
-SDK. When building the extensible SDK, ``uninative-tarball`` is built
-and the resulting tarball is included within the SDK.
+To allow this to work, the dynamic loader is changed to our own :manpage:`ld.so
+<ld.so.8>` when binaries are compiled using the
+``--dynamic-linker`` option. This means when the binary is executed, it finds
+our own :manpage:`ld.so <ld.so.8>` and that loader has a modified search path
+which finds a newer Glibc version.
+
+The linking of the binaries is not changed at link time since the
+headers on the system wouldn't match the newer Glibc and this causes
+obtuse failures. Changing the loader is effectively the same as if the
+system had a Glibc upgrade after the binary was compiled, so it is a
+mechanism supported by upstream.
+
+One caveat to this approach is that the uninative Glibc binary must be
+equal to or newer in version to the versions on all the systems using
+the common :ref:`overview-manual/concepts:shared state cache`. This is why
+:ref:`ref-classes-uninative`  is regularly changed on the development and stable
+branches.
+
+Another potential issue is static linking: static libraries created on
+a system with a new Glibc version may have symbols not present in older
+versions, which would then fail during linking on older systems. This
+is one reason we don't use static linking for our :ref:`ref-classes-native`
+binaries.
+
+With this class enabled, a tarball containing a pre-built C library is
+downloaded at the start of the build. In the Poky reference distribution this is
+enabled by default through :oe_git:`meta/conf/distro/include/yocto-uninative.inc
+</openembedded-core/tree/meta/conf/distro/include/yocto-uninative.inc>`. Other distributions that do
+not derive from Poky can also "``require conf/distro/include/yocto-uninative.inc``"
+to use this. Alternatively if you prefer, you can build the uninative-tarball
+recipe yourself, publish the resulting tarball (e.g. via HTTP) and set
+:term:`UNINATIVE_URL` and :term:`UNINATIVE_CHECKSUM` appropriately. For an
+example, see :oe_git:`meta/conf/distro/include/yocto-uninative.inc
+</openembedded-core/tree/meta/conf/distro/include/yocto-uninative.inc>`.
+
+The :ref:`ref-classes-uninative` class is also used unconditionally by the
+:doc:`extensible SDK </sdk-manual/extensible>`. When building the extensible
+SDK, ``uninative-tarball`` is built and the resulting tarball is included within
+the SDK.
 
 .. _ref-classes-update-alternatives:
 

documentation/ref-manual/release-process.rst

@@ -62,7 +62,8 @@ codename are likely to be compatible and thus work together.
 
 Releases are given a nominal release version as well but the codename is
 used in repositories for this reason. You can find information on Yocto
-Project releases and codenames at :yocto_wiki:`/Releases`.
+Project releases and codenames in the :yocto_home:`Releases page
+</development/releases/>`.
 
 Our :doc:`/migration-guides/index` detail how to migrate from one release of
 the Yocto Project to the next.

documentation/ref-manual/structure.rst

@@ -328,6 +328,15 @@ Once the build process gets the sample file, it uses ``sed`` to substitute final
 This file indicates the state of the sanity checks and is created during
 the build.
 
+.. _structure-build-conf-auto.conf:
+
+``build/conf/auto.conf``
+------------------------
+
+This file contains configuration variables that are automatically modified by
+tools such as :oe_git:`bitbake-config-build </bitbake/tree/bin/bitbake-config-build>`.
+This file should not be modified manually.
+
 .. _structure-build-downloads:
 
 ``build/downloads/``

documentation/ref-manual/system-requirements.rst

@@ -58,20 +58,35 @@ Supported Linux Distributions
 Currently, the &DISTRO; release ("&DISTRO_NAME;") of the Yocto Project is
 supported on the following distributions:
 
--  Ubuntu 20.04 (LTS)
-
--  Ubuntu 22.04 (LTS)
-
--  Fedora 38
-
--  Debian GNU/Linux 11.x (Bullseye)
+..
+   Can be generated with yocto-autobuilder-helper's scripts/yocto-supported-distros:
+   yocto-supported-distros --release kirkstone --config yocto-autobuilder2/config.py --output-format docs --poky-distros
 
 -  AlmaLinux 8
+-  AlmaLinux 9
+-  Debian 11
+-  Debian 12
+-  Fedora 39
+-  Fedora 40
+-  Fedora 41
+-  Rocky Linux 8
+-  Rocky Linux 9
+-  Ubuntu 20.04 (LTS)
+-  Ubuntu 22.04 (LTS)
+-  Ubuntu 24.04 (LTS)
+-  Ubuntu 24.10
 
 The following distribution versions are still tested, even though the
 organizations publishing them no longer make updates publicly available:
 
--  Ubuntu 18.04 (LTS)
+..
+   This list contains EOL distros that are still tested on the Autobuilder
+   (meaning there are running workers for them).
+   See https://endoflife.date for information of EOL releases.
+
+-  Fedora 39
+-  Fedora 40
+-  Ubuntu 20.04 (LTS)
 
 Note that the Yocto Project doesn't have access to private updates
 that some of these versions may have. Therefore, our testing has
@@ -80,19 +95,33 @@ limited value if you have access to such updates.
 Finally, here are the distribution versions which were previously
 tested on former revisions of "&DISTRO_NAME;", but no longer are:
 
--  Ubuntu 18.04 (LTS)
-
--  Ubuntu 20.04 (LTS)
-
--  Ubuntu 22.04 (LTS)
+..
+   Can be generated with yocto-autobuilder-helper's scripts/yocto-supported-distros:
+   yocto-supported-distros --release kirkstone --config yocto-autobuilder2/config.py --output-format docs --old-distros
 
+-  CentOS 7
+-  CentOS 8
+-  Debian 10
+-  Debian 8
+-  Debian 9
+-  Fedora 29
+-  Fedora 30
+-  Fedora 31
+-  Fedora 32
+-  Fedora 33
+-  Fedora 34
+-  Fedora 35
+-  Fedora 36
 -  Fedora 37
-
--  Debian GNU/Linux 11.x (Bookworm)
-
+-  Fedora 38
+-  OpenSUSE Leap 15.0
+-  OpenSUSE Leap 15.1
+-  OpenSUSE Leap 15.2
 -  OpenSUSE Leap 15.3
-
--  AlmaLinux 8
+-  Ubuntu 16.04
+-  Ubuntu 18.04
+-  Ubuntu 19.04
+-  Ubuntu 21.10
 
 .. note::
 

documentation/ref-manual/variables.rst

@@ -1097,6 +1097,11 @@ system and gives an overview of their function and contents.
    :term:`CC`
       The minimal command and arguments used to run the C compiler.
 
+   :term:`CCACHE_DISABLE`
+      When inheriting the :ref:`ref-classes-ccache` class, the
+      :term:`CCACHE_DISABLE` variable can be set to "1" in a recipe to disable
+      `Ccache` support. This is useful when the recipe is known to not support it.
+
    :term:`CFLAGS`
       Specifies the flags to pass to the C compiler. This variable is
       exported to an environment variable and thus made visible to the
@@ -2801,6 +2806,10 @@ system and gives an overview of their function and contents.
       For guidance on how to create your own file permissions settings
       table file, examine the existing ``fs-perms.txt``.
 
+   :term:`FIT_CONF_PREFIX`
+      When using the :ref:`ref-classes-kernel-fitimage`, this is the prefix
+      used for creating FIT configuration nodes. Its default value is "conf-".
+
    :term:`FIT_DESC`
       Specifies the description string encoded into a fitImage. The default
       value is set by the :ref:`kernel-fitimage <ref-classes-kernel-fitimage>`
@@ -3531,6 +3540,12 @@ system and gives an overview of their function and contents.
       added to the image by using the :term:`IMAGE_ROOTFS_EXTRA_SPACE`
       variable.
 
+      When using Wic tool, beware that a second overhead factor is also applied.
+      This overhead value is defined by the ``--overhead-factor`` option, which
+      defaults to "1.3" when omitted. See the
+      :ref:`ref-manual/kickstart:command: part or partition` chapter in
+      :doc:`/ref-manual/kickstart` for details.
+
    :term:`IMAGE_PKGTYPE`
       Defines the package type (i.e. DEB, RPM, IPK, or TAR) used by the
       OpenEmbedded build system. The variable is defined appropriately by
@@ -4241,8 +4256,7 @@ system and gives an overview of their function and contents.
       would place patch files and configuration fragment files (i.e.
       "out-of-tree"). However, if you want to use a ``defconfig`` file that
       is part of the kernel tree (i.e. "in-tree"), you can use the
-      :term:`KBUILD_DEFCONFIG` variable and append the
-      :term:`KMACHINE` variable to point to the
+      :term:`KBUILD_DEFCONFIG` variable to point to the
       ``defconfig`` file.
 
       To use the variable, set it in the append file for your kernel recipe
@@ -4678,7 +4692,7 @@ system and gives an overview of their function and contents.
       information on how this variable is used.
 
    :term:`LAYERDEPENDS`
-      Lists the layers, separated by spaces, on which this recipe depends.
+      Lists the layers, separated by spaces, on which this layer depends.
       Optionally, you can specify a specific layer version for a dependency
       by adding it to the end of the layer name. Here is an example::
 
@@ -5535,8 +5549,8 @@ system and gives an overview of their function and contents.
 
       .. note::
 
-         An easy way to see what overrides apply is to search for :term:`OVERRIDES`
-         in the output of the ``bitbake -e`` command. See the
+         An easy way to see what overrides apply is to run the command
+         ``bitbake-getvar -r myrecipe OVERRIDES``. See the
          ":ref:`dev-manual/debugging:viewing variable values`" section in the Yocto
          Project Development Tasks Manual for more information.
 
@@ -6812,6 +6826,16 @@ system and gives an overview of their function and contents.
    :term:`REPODIR`
       See :term:`bitbake:REPODIR` in the BitBake manual.
 
+   :term:`REQUIRED_COMBINED_FEATURES`
+      When inheriting the :ref:`ref-classes-features_check` class, this variable
+      identifies combined features (the intersection of :term:`MACHINE_FEATURES`
+      and :term:`DISTRO_FEATURES`) that must exist in the current configuration
+      in order for the :term:`OpenEmbedded Build System` to build the recipe. In
+      other words, if the :term:`REQUIRED_COMBINED_FEATURES` variable lists a
+      feature that does not appear in :term:`COMBINED_FEATURES` within the
+      current configuration, then the recipe will be skipped, and if the build
+      system attempts to build the recipe then an error will be triggered.
+
    :term:`REQUIRED_DISTRO_FEATURES`
       When inheriting the
       :ref:`features_check <ref-classes-features_check>`
@@ -6823,6 +6847,32 @@ system and gives an overview of their function and contents.
       the recipe will be skipped, and if the build system attempts to build
       the recipe then an error will be triggered.
 
+   :term:`REQUIRED_IMAGE_FEATURES`
+      When inheriting the :ref:`ref-classes-features_check` class, this variable
+      identifies image features that must exist in the current
+      configuration in order for the :term:`OpenEmbedded Build System` to build
+      the recipe. In other words, if the :term:`REQUIRED_IMAGE_FEATURES` variable
+      lists a feature that does not appear in :term:`IMAGE_FEATURES` within the
+      current configuration, then the recipe will be skipped, and if the build
+      system attempts to build the recipe then an error will be triggered.
+
+      Compared to other ``REQUIRED_*_FEATURES`` variables, the
+      :term:`REQUIRED_IMAGE_FEATURES` varible only targets image recipes, as the
+      :term:`IMAGE_FEATURES` variable is handled by the :ref:`ref-classes-core-image`
+      class). However, the :term:`REQUIRED_IMAGE_FEATURES` varible can also be
+      set from a :term:`Configuration File`, such as a distro
+      configuration file, if the list of required image features should apply to
+      all images using this :term:`DISTRO`.
+
+   :term:`REQUIRED_MACHINE_FEATURES`
+      When inheriting the :ref:`ref-classes-features_check` class, this variable
+      identifies :term:`MACHINE_FEATURES` that must exist in the current
+      configuration in order for the :term:`OpenEmbedded Build System` to build
+      the recipe. In other words, if the :term:`REQUIRED_MACHINE_FEATURES` variable
+      lists a feature that does not appear in :term:`MACHINE_FEATURES` within the
+      current configuration, then the recipe will be skipped, and if the build
+      system attempts to build the recipe then an error will be triggered.
+
    :term:`REQUIRED_VERSION`
       If there are multiple versions of a recipe available, this variable
       determines which version should be given preference.
@@ -7791,6 +7841,11 @@ system and gives an overview of their function and contents.
       section in the Yocto Project Board Support Package Developer's Guide
       for additional information.
 
+   :term:`SPL_DTB_BINARY`
+      When inheriting the :ref:`ref-classes-uboot-sign` class, the
+      :term:`SPL_DTB_BINARY` variable contains the name of the SPL binary to be
+      compiled.
+
    :term:`SPL_MKIMAGE_DTCOPTS`
       Options for the device tree compiler passed to ``mkimage -D`` feature
       while creating a FIT image with the :ref:`ref-classes-uboot-sign`
@@ -8159,7 +8214,7 @@ system and gives an overview of their function and contents.
       directory for the build host.
 
    :term:`STAGING_DIR`
-      Helps construct the ``recipe-sysroots`` directory, which is used
+      Helps construct the ``recipe-sysroot*`` directories, which are used
       during packaging.
 
       For information on how staging for recipe-specific sysroots occurs,
@@ -9407,6 +9462,22 @@ system and gives an overview of their function and contents.
       passes and uses "all" for the target during the U-Boot building
       process.
 
+   :term:`UNINATIVE_CHECKSUM`
+      When inheriting the :ref:`ref-classes-uninative` class, the
+      :term:`UNINATIVE_CHECKSUM` variable flags contain the checksums of the
+      uninative tarball as specified by the :term:`UNINATIVE_URL` variable.
+      There should be one checksum per tarballs published at
+      :term:`UNINATIVE_URL`, which match architectures. For example::
+
+         UNINATIVE_CHECKSUM[aarch64] ?= "812045d826b7fda88944055e8526b95a5a9440bfef608d5b53fd52faab49bf85"
+         UNINATIVE_CHECKSUM[i686] ?= "5cc28efd0c15a75de4bcb147c6cce65f1c1c9d442173a220f08427f40a3ffa09"
+         UNINATIVE_CHECKSUM[x86_64] ?= "4c03d1ed2b7b4e823aca4a1a23d8f2e322f1770fc10e859adcede5777aff4f3a"
+
+   :term:`UNINATIVE_URL`
+      When inheriting the :ref:`ref-classes-uninative` class, the
+      :term:`UNINATIVE_URL` variable contains the URL where the uninative
+      tarballs are published.
+
    :term:`UNKNOWN_CONFIGURE_OPT_IGNORE`
       Specifies a list of options that, if reported by the configure script
       as being invalid, should not generate a warning during the
@@ -9502,6 +9573,18 @@ system and gives an overview of their function and contents.
       the Yocto Project Development Tasks Manual for information on how to
       use this variable.
 
+   :term:`USE_NLS`
+      Determine if language translations should be built for recipes that can
+      build them. This variable can be equal to:
+
+      -  ``yes``: translations are enabled.
+      -  ``no``: translation are disabled.
+
+      Recipes can use the value of this variable to enable language
+      translations in their build. Classes such as :ref:`ref-classes-gettext`
+      use the value of this variable to enable :wikipedia:`Gettext <Gettext>`
+      support.
+
    :term:`USE_VT`
       When using
       :ref:`SysVinit <dev-manual/new-recipe:enabling system services>`,

documentation/sdk-manual/working-projects.rst

@@ -56,9 +56,10 @@ project:
 
          #include <stdio.h>
 
-         main()
+         int main()
              {
                  printf("Hello World!\n");
+                 return 0;
              }
 
    -  ``configure.ac``::

documentation/test-manual/reproducible-builds.rst

@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ If ``OEQA_DEBUGGING_SAVED_OUTPUT`` is set, any differing packages will be saved
 here. The test is also able to run the ``diffoscope`` command on the output to
 generate HTML files showing the differences between the packages, to aid
 debugging. On the Autobuilder, these appear under
-https://autobuilder.yocto.io/pub/repro-fail/ in the form ``oe-reproducible +
+https://valkyrie.yocto.io/pub/repro-fail/ in the form ``oe-reproducible +
 <date> + <random ID>``, e.g. ``oe-reproducible-20200202-1lm8o1th``.
 
 The project's current reproducibility status can be seen at

documentation/test-manual/test-process.rst

@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ box to "generate an email to QA" is also checked.
 When the build completes, an email is sent out using the ``send-qa-email``
 script in the :yocto_git:`yocto-autobuilder-helper </yocto-autobuilder-helper>`
 repository to the list of people configured for that release. Release builds
-are placed into a directory in https://autobuilder.yocto.io/pub/releases on the
+are placed into a directory in https://valkyrie.yocto.io/pub/releases on the
 Autobuilder which is included in the email. The process from here is
 more manual and control is effectively passed to release engineering.
 The next steps include:

documentation/test-manual/yocto-project-compatible.rst

@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ Benefits
 and flexible: it gives users the ultimate power to change pretty much any
 aspect of the system but as with most things, power comes with responsibility.
 The Yocto Project would like to see people able to mix and match BSPs with
-distro configs or software stacks and be able to merge succesfully.
+distro configs or software stacks and be able to merge successfully.
 Over time, the project identified characteristics in layers that allow them
 to operate well together. "anti-patterns" were also found, preventing layers
 from working well together.

meta-poky/conf/distro/poky.conf

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 DISTRO = "poky"
 DISTRO_NAME = "Poky (Yocto Project Reference Distro)"
 #DISTRO_VERSION = "3.4+snapshot-${METADATA_REVISION}"
-DISTRO_VERSION = "4.0.29"
+DISTRO_VERSION = "4.0.32"
 DISTRO_CODENAME = "kirkstone"
 SDK_VENDOR = "-pokysdk"
 SDK_VERSION = "${@d.getVar('DISTRO_VERSION').replace('snapshot-${METADATA_REVISION}', 'snapshot')}"

meta-selftest/files/static-group

@@ -25,3 +25,4 @@ weston:x:525:
 wayland:x:526:
 render:x:527:
 sgx:x:528:
+audio:x:529:

meta/classes/goarch.bbclass

@@ -18,6 +18,9 @@ TARGET_GOMIPS = "${@go_map_mips(d.getVar('TARGET_ARCH'), d.getVar('TUNE_FEATURES
 TARGET_GOARM:class-native = "7"
 TARGET_GO386:class-native = "sse2"
 TARGET_GOMIPS:class-native = "hardfloat"
+TARGET_GOARM:class-crosssdk = "7"
+TARGET_GO386:class-crosssdk = "sse2"
+TARGET_GOMIPS:class-crosssdk = "hardfloat"
 TARGET_GOTUPLE = "${TARGET_GOOS}_${TARGET_GOARCH}"
 GO_BUILD_BINDIR = "${@['bin/${HOST_GOTUPLE}','bin'][d.getVar('BUILD_GOTUPLE') == d.getVar('HOST_GOTUPLE')]}"
 

meta/classes/insane.bbclass

@@ -1182,24 +1182,27 @@ python do_qa_patch() {
             msg += "    devtool modify %s\n" % d.getVar('PN')
             msg += "    devtool finish --force-patch-refresh %s <layer_path>\n\n" % d.getVar('PN')
             msg += "Don't forget to review changes done by devtool!\n"
-            if bb.utils.filter('ERROR_QA', 'patch-fuzz', d):
-                bb.error(msg)
-            elif bb.utils.filter('WARN_QA', 'patch-fuzz', d):
-                bb.warn(msg)
-            msg = "Patch log indicates that patches do not apply cleanly."
+            msg += "\nPatch log indicates that patches do not apply cleanly."
             oe.qa.handle_error("patch-fuzz", msg, d)
 
     # Check if the patch contains a correctly formatted and spelled Upstream-Status
     import re
     from oe import patch
 
+    allpatches = False
+    if bb.utils.filter('ERROR_QA', 'patch-status-noncore', d) or bb.utils.filter('WARN_QA', 'patch-status-noncore', d):
+        allpatches = True
+
     coremeta_path = os.path.join(d.getVar('COREBASE'), 'meta', '')
     for url in patch.src_patches(d):
        (_, _, fullpath, _, _, _) = bb.fetch.decodeurl(url)
 
        # skip patches not in oe-core
+       patchtype = "patch-status-core"
        if not os.path.abspath(fullpath).startswith(coremeta_path):
-           continue
+           patchtype = "patch-status-noncore"
+           if not allpatches:
+               continue
 
        kinda_status_re = re.compile(r"^.*upstream.*status.*$", re.IGNORECASE | re.MULTILINE)
        strict_status_re = re.compile(r"^Upstream-Status: (Pending|Submitted|Denied|Accepted|Inappropriate|Backport|Inactive-Upstream)( .+)?$", re.MULTILINE)
@@ -1212,9 +1215,13 @@ python do_qa_patch() {
 
            if not match_strict:
                if match_kinda:
-                   bb.error("Malformed Upstream-Status in patch\n%s\nPlease correct according to %s :\n%s" % (fullpath, guidelines, match_kinda.group(0)))
+                   msg = "Malformed Upstream-Status in patch\n%s\nPlease correct according to %s :\n%s" % (fullpath, guidelines, match_kinda.group(0))
+                   oe.qa.handle_error(patchtype, msg, d)
                else:
-                   bb.error("Missing Upstream-Status in patch\n%s\nPlease add according to %s ." % (fullpath, guidelines))
+                   msg = "Missing Upstream-Status in patch\n%s\nPlease add according to %s ." % (fullpath, guidelines)
+                   oe.qa.handle_error(patchtype, msg, d)
+
+    oe.qa.exit_if_errors(d)
 }
 
 python do_qa_configure() {
@@ -1331,6 +1338,7 @@ python do_qa_unpack() {
         bb.warn('%s: the directory %s (%s) pointed to by the S variable doesn\'t exist - please set S within the recipe to point to where the source has been unpacked to' % (d.getVar('PN'), d.getVar('S', False), s_dir))
 
     unpack_check_src_uri(d.getVar('PN'), d)
+    oe.qa.exit_if_errors(d)
 }
 
 # The Staging Func, to check all staging

meta/conf/bitbake.conf

@@ -690,7 +690,7 @@ DEBIAN_MIRROR = "http://ftp.debian.org/debian/pool"
 GENTOO_MIRROR = "http://distfiles.gentoo.org/distfiles"
 GNOME_GIT = "git://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME"
 GNOME_MIRROR = "https://download.gnome.org/sources/"
-GNU_MIRROR = "https://ftp.gnu.org/gnu"
+GNU_MIRROR = "https://ftpmirror.gnu.org/gnu"
 GNUPG_MIRROR = "https://www.gnupg.org/ftp/gcrypt"
 GPE_MIRROR = "http://gpe.linuxtogo.org/download/source"
 KERNELORG_MIRROR = "https://cdn.kernel.org/pub"

meta/conf/distro/include/default-distrovars.inc

@@ -52,4 +52,4 @@ KERNEL_IMAGETYPES ??= "${KERNEL_IMAGETYPE}"
 # fetch from the network (and warn you if not). To disable the test set
 # the variable to be empty.
 # Git example url: git://git.yoctoproject.org/yocto-firewall-test;protocol=git;rev=master;branch=master
-CONNECTIVITY_CHECK_URIS ?= "https://yoctoproject.org/connectivity.html"
+CONNECTIVITY_CHECK_URIS ?= "https://www.yoctoproject.org/connectivity.html"

meta/lib/oeqa/sdk/buildtools-cases/https.py

@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ class HTTPTests(OESDKTestCase):
     """
 
     def test_wget(self):
-        self._run('env -i wget --debug --output-document /dev/null https://yoctoproject.org/connectivity.html')
+        self._run('env -i wget --debug --output-document /dev/null https://www.yoctoproject.org/connectivity.html')
 
     def test_python(self):
         # urlopen() returns a file-like object on success and throws an exception otherwise
-        self._run('python3 -c \'import urllib.request; urllib.request.urlopen("https://yoctoproject.org/connectivity.html")\'')
+        self._run('python3 -c \'import urllib.request; urllib.request.urlopen("https://www.yoctoproject.org/connectivity.html")\'')

meta/lib/oeqa/sdk/cases/buildcpio.py

@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ class BuildCpioTest(OESDKTestCase):
     """
     def test_cpio(self):
         with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="cpio-", dir=self.tc.sdk_dir) as testdir:
-            tarball = self.fetch(testdir, self.td["DL_DIR"], "https://ftp.gnu.org/gnu/cpio/cpio-2.13.tar.gz")
+            tarball = self.fetch(testdir, self.td["DL_DIR"], "https://ftpmirror.gnu.org/gnu/cpio/cpio-2.13.tar.gz")
 
             dirs = {}
             dirs["source"] = os.path.join(testdir, "cpio-2.13")

meta/lib/oeqa/selftest/cases/meta_ide.py

@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ class MetaIDE(OESelftestTestCase):
     def test_meta_ide_can_build_cpio_project(self):
         dl_dir = self.td.get('DL_DIR', None)
         self.project = SDKBuildProject(self.tmpdir_metaideQA + "/cpio/", self.environment_script_path,
-                        "https://ftp.gnu.org/gnu/cpio/cpio-2.13.tar.gz",
+                        "https://ftpmirror.gnu.org/gnu/cpio/cpio-2.13.tar.gz",
                         self.tmpdir_metaideQA, self.td['DATETIME'], dl_dir=dl_dir)
         self.project.download_archive()
         self.assertEqual(self.project.run_configure('$CONFIGURE_FLAGS --disable-maintainer-mode','sed -i -e "/char \*program_name/d" src/global.c;'), 0,

meta/recipes-bsp/efibootmgr/efibootmgr_17.bb

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ DEPENDS = "efivar popt"
 
 COMPATIBLE_HOST = "(i.86|x86_64|arm|aarch64).*-linux"
 
-SRC_URI = "git://github.com/rhinstaller/efibootmgr.git;protocol=https;branch=master \
+SRC_URI = "git://github.com/rhinstaller/efibootmgr.git;protocol=https;branch=main \
            file://0001-remove-extra-decl.patch \
            file://97668ae0bce776a36ea2001dea63d376be8274ac.patch \
            file://0001-src-make-compatible-with-efivar-38.patch \

meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2024-56738.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+From 4cef2fc7308b2132317ad166939994f098b41561 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com>
+Date: Tue, 9 Sep 2025 14:23:14 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2024-56738
+
+Backport an algorithmic change to grub_crypto_memcmp() so that it completes in
+constant time and thus isn't susceptible to side-channel attacks.
+
+This is a partial backport of grub 0739d24cd
+("libgcrypt: Adjust import script, definitions and API users for libgcrypt 1.11")
+
+CVE: CVE-2024-56738
+Upstream-Status: Backport [0739d24cd]
+Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com>
+Signed-off-by: Yogita Urade <yogita.urade@windriver.com>
+---
+ grub-core/lib/crypto.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++-------
+ include/grub/crypto.h  |  2 +-
+ 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/lib/crypto.c b/grub-core/lib/crypto.c
+index ca334d5..1bfa922 100644
+--- a/grub-core/lib/crypto.c
++++ b/grub-core/lib/crypto.c
+@@ -433,19 +433,28 @@ grub_crypto_gcry_error (gcry_err_code_t in)
+   return GRUB_ACCESS_DENIED;
+ }
+
++/*
++ * Compare byte arrays of length LEN, return 1 if it's not same,
++ * 0, otherwise.
++ */
+ int
+-grub_crypto_memcmp (const void *a, const void *b, grub_size_t n)
++grub_crypto_memcmp (const void *b1, const void *b2, grub_size_t len)
+ {
+-  register grub_size_t counter = 0;
+-  const grub_uint8_t *pa, *pb;
++  const grub_uint8_t *a = b1;
++  const grub_uint8_t *b = b2;
++  int ab, ba;
++  grub_size_t i;
+
+-  for (pa = a, pb = b; n; pa++, pb++, n--)
++  /* Constant-time compare. */
++  for (i = 0, ab = 0, ba = 0; i < len; i++)
+     {
+-      if (*pa != *pb)
+-	counter++;
++      /* If a[i] != b[i], either ab or ba will be negative. */
++      ab |= a[i] - b[i];
++      ba |= b[i] - a[i];
+     }
+
+-  return !!counter;
++  /* 'ab | ba' is negative when buffers are not equal, extract sign bit.  */
++  return ((unsigned int)(ab | ba) >> (sizeof(unsigned int) * 8 - 1)) & 1;
+ }
+
+ #ifndef GRUB_UTIL
+diff --git a/include/grub/crypto.h b/include/grub/crypto.h
+index 21cd1f7..432912b 100644
+--- a/include/grub/crypto.h
++++ b/include/grub/crypto.h
+@@ -393,7 +393,7 @@ grub_crypto_pbkdf2 (const struct gcry_md_spec *md,
+		    grub_uint8_t *DK, grub_size_t dkLen);
+
+ int
+-grub_crypto_memcmp (const void *a, const void *b, grub_size_t n);
++grub_crypto_memcmp (const void *b1, const void *b2, grub_size_t len);
+
+ int
+ grub_password_get (char buf[], unsigned buf_size);
+--
+2.40.0

meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc

@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://CVE-2025-0678_CVE-2025-1125.patch \
            file://CVE-2025-0690.patch \
            file://CVE-2025-1118.patch \
+           file://CVE-2024-56738.patch \
 "
 
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "23b64b4c741569f9426ed2e3d0e6780796fca081bee4c99f62aa3f53ae803f5f"
@@ -69,6 +70,8 @@ CVE_CHECK_IGNORE += "CVE-2019-14865"
 CVE_CHECK_IGNORE += "CVE-2021-46705"
 # not-applicable-platform: Applies only to RHEL/Fedora
 CVE_CHECK_IGNORE += "CVE-2024-1048 CVE-2023-4001"
+# not-applicable-platform: Applies only to Ubuntu
+CVE_CHECK_IGNORE += "CVE-2024-2312"
 
 DEPENDS = "flex-native bison-native gettext-native"
 

meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/files/0001-Include-cstddef-in-the-header-for-C.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+From 10c9a571f1c0472799f72b1924b039aab231e95f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Oleksandr Kravchuk <open.source@oleksandr-kravchuk.com>
+Date: Thu, 16 Dec 2021 16:19:50 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Include cstddef in the header for C++
+
+So C++ compiler always has access to the definition of size_t.
+
+Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Kravchuk <open.source@oleksandr-kravchuk.com>
+Signed-off-by: Youngseok Jeong <youngseok1.jeong@lge.com>
+Upstream-Status: Backport [v0.3.3 https://github.com/sbabic/libubootenv/pull/19/commits/764226a7de2ea79b182d92829922489537c766fa]
+---
+ src/libuboot.h | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/libuboot.h b/src/libuboot.h
+index 88f0558..1f305f4 100644
+--- a/src/libuboot.h
++++ b/src/libuboot.h
+@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@
+  */
+ 
+ #ifdef __cplusplus
++#include <cstddef>
++
+ extern "C" {
+ #endif
+ 

meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/files/CVE-2024-42040.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+From 1406fc918977bba4dac0af5e22e63a5553aa6aff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Paul HENRYS <paul.henrys_ext@softathome.com>
+Date: Thu, 9 Oct 2025 17:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] net: bootp: Prevent buffer overflow to avoid leaking the RAM
+ content
+
+CVE-2024-42040 describes a possible buffer overflow when calling
+bootp_process_vendor() in bootp_handler() since the total length
+of the packet is passed to bootp_process_vendor() without being
+reduced to len-(offsetof(struct bootp_hdr,bp_vend)+4).
+
+The packet length is also checked against its minimum size to avoid
+reading data from struct bootp_hdr outside of the packet length.
+
+Signed-off-by: Paul HENRYS <paul.henrys_ext@softathome.com>
+Signed-off-by: Philippe Reynes <philippe.reynes@softathome.com>
+
+CVE: CVE-2024-42040
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://source.denx.de/u-boot/u-boot/-/commit/81e5708cc2c865df606e49aed5415adb2a662171]
+Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com>
+---
+ net/bootp.c | 11 ++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/net/bootp.c b/net/bootp.c
+index 68002909634..843180d296c 100644
+--- a/net/bootp.c
++++ b/net/bootp.c
+@@ -362,6 +362,14 @@ static void bootp_handler(uchar *pkt, unsigned dest, struct in_addr sip,
+ 	debug("got BOOTP packet (src=%d, dst=%d, len=%d want_len=%zu)\n",
+ 	      src, dest, len, sizeof(struct bootp_hdr));
+ 
++	/* Check the minimum size of a BOOTP packet is respected.
++	 * A BOOTP packet is between 300 bytes and 576 bytes big
++	 */
++	if (len < offsetof(struct bootp_hdr, bp_vend) + 64) {
++		printf("Error: got an invalid BOOTP packet (len=%u)\n", len);
++		return;
++	}
++
+ 	bp = (struct bootp_hdr *)pkt;
+ 
+ 	/* Filter out pkts we don't want */
+@@ -379,7 +387,8 @@ static void bootp_handler(uchar *pkt, unsigned dest, struct in_addr sip,
+ 
+ 	/* Retrieve extended information (we must parse the vendor area) */
+ 	if (net_read_u32((u32 *)&bp->bp_vend[0]) == htonl(BOOTP_VENDOR_MAGIC))
+-		bootp_process_vendor((uchar *)&bp->bp_vend[4], len);
++		bootp_process_vendor((uchar *)&bp->bp_vend[4], len -
++				     (offsetof(struct bootp_hdr, bp_vend) + 4));
+ 
+ 	net_set_timeout_handler(0, (thand_f *)0);
+ 	bootstage_mark_name(BOOTSTAGE_ID_BOOTP_STOP, "bootp_stop");
+-- 
+2.49.0
+

meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/libubootenv_0.3.2.bb

@@ -10,7 +10,11 @@ LICENSE = "LGPL-2.1-only"
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://Licenses/lgpl-2.1.txt;md5=4fbd65380cdd255951079008b364516c"
 SECTION = "libs"
 
-SRC_URI = "git://github.com/sbabic/libubootenv;protocol=https;branch=master"
+SRC_URI = " \
+    git://github.com/sbabic/libubootenv;protocol=https;branch=master \
+    file://0001-Include-cstddef-in-the-header-for-C.patch \
+"
+
 SRCREV = "ba7564f5006d09bec51058cf4f5ac90d4dc18b3c"
 
 S = "${WORKDIR}/git"

meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/u-boot-common.inc

@@ -14,7 +14,9 @@ PE = "1"
 # repo during parse
 SRCREV = "d637294e264adfeb29f390dfc393106fd4d41b17"
 
-SRC_URI = "git://source.denx.de/u-boot/u-boot.git;protocol=https;branch=master"
+SRC_URI = "git://source.denx.de/u-boot/u-boot.git;protocol=https;branch=master \
+           file://CVE-2024-42040.patch \
+"
 
 S = "${WORKDIR}/git"
 B = "${WORKDIR}/build"

meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind_9.18.41.bb

@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://ftp.isc.org/isc/bind9/${PV}/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.xz \
            file://0001-avoid-start-failure-with-bind-user.patch \
            "
 
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "fb373fac5ebbc41c645160afd5a9fb451918f6c0e69ab1d9474154e2b515de40"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "6ddc1d981511c4da0b203b0513af131e5d15e5f1c261145736fe1f35dd1fe79d"
 
 UPSTREAM_CHECK_URI = "https://ftp.isc.org/isc/bind9/"
 # follow the ESV versions divisible by 2

meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2025-61984.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+From 35d5917652106aede47621bb3f64044604164043 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu, 4 Sep 2025 00:29:09 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] upstream: Improve rules for %-expansion of username.
+
+Usernames passed on the commandline will no longer be subject to
+% expansion. Some tools invoke ssh with connection information
+(i.e. usernames and host names) supplied from untrusted sources.
+These may contain % expansion sequences which could yield
+unexpected results.
+
+Since openssh-9.6, all usernames have been subject to validity
+checking. This change tightens the validity checks by refusing
+usernames that include control characters (again, these can cause
+surprises when supplied adversarially).
+
+This change also relaxes the validity checks in one small way:
+usernames supplied via the configuration file as literals (i.e.
+include no % expansion characters) are not subject to these
+validity checks. This allows usernames that contain arbitrary
+characters to be used, but only via configuration files. This
+is done on the basis that ssh's configuration is trusted.
+
+Pointed out by David Leadbeater, ok deraadt@
+
+OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e2f0c871fbe664aba30607321575e7c7fc798362
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-61984
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/35d5917652106aede47621bb3f64044604164043]
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+---
+ ssh.c | 11 +++++++++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
+index 82ed15f..d4e2040 100644
+--- a/ssh.c
++++ b/ssh.c
+@@ -634,6 +634,8 @@ valid_ruser(const char *s)
+ 	if (*s == '-')
+ 		return 0;
+ 	for (i = 0; s[i] != 0; i++) {
++		if (iscntrl((u_char)s[i]))
++			return 0;
+ 		if (strchr("'`\";&<>|(){}", s[i]) != NULL)
+ 			return 0;
+ 		/* Disallow '-' after whitespace */
+@@ -655,6 +657,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	struct ssh *ssh = NULL;
+ 	int i, r, opt, exit_status, use_syslog, direct, timeout_ms;
+ 	int was_addr, config_test = 0, opt_terminated = 0, want_final_pass = 0;
++	int user_on_commandline = 0, user_was_default = 0, user_expanded = 0;
+ 	char *p, *cp, *line, *argv0, *logfile, *host_arg;
+ 	char cname[NI_MAXHOST], thishost[NI_MAXHOST];
+ 	struct stat st;
+@@ -995,8 +998,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 			}
+ 			break;
+ 		case 'l':
+-			if (options.user == NULL)
++			if (options.user == NULL) {
+ 				options.user = optarg;
++				user_on_commandline = 1;
++			}
+ 			break;
+ 
+ 		case 'L':
+@@ -1099,6 +1104,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 			if (options.user == NULL) {
+ 				options.user = tuser;
+ 				tuser = NULL;
++				user_on_commandline = 1;
+ 			}
+ 			free(tuser);
+ 			if (options.port == -1 && tport != -1)
+@@ -1113,6 +1119,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 				if (options.user == NULL) {
+ 					options.user = p;
+ 					p = NULL;
++					user_on_commandline = 1;
+ 				}
+ 				*cp++ = '\0';
+ 				host = xstrdup(cp);
+@@ -1265,8 +1272,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	if (fill_default_options(&options) != 0)
+ 		cleanup_exit(255);
+ 
+-	if (options.user == NULL)
++	if (options.user == NULL) {
++		user_was_default = 1;
+ 		options.user = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
++	}
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * If ProxyJump option specified, then construct a ProxyCommand now.
+-- 
+2.50.1
+

meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2025-61985.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+From 54928cb9eaa7143ff17f463efa7ed3109afdbf30 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu, 4 Sep 2025 00:30:06 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] upstream: don't allow \0 characters in url-encoded strings.
+ Suggested by David Leadbeater, ok deraadt@
+
+OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c92196cef0f970ceabc1e8007a80b01e9b7cd49c
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-61985
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/43b3bff47bb029f2299bacb6a36057981b39fdb0]
+
+Signed-off-by: Archana Polampalli <archana.polampalli@windriver.com>
+---
+ misc.c | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/misc.c b/misc.c
+index 6135b15..3d133b5 100644
+--- a/misc.c
++++ b/misc.c
+@@ -934,9 +934,10 @@ urldecode(const char *src)
+			*dst++ = ' ';
+			break;
+		case '%':
++			/* note: don't allow \0 characters */
+			if (!isxdigit((unsigned char)src[1]) ||
+			    !isxdigit((unsigned char)src[2]) ||
+-			    (ch = hexchar(src + 1)) == -1) {
++			    (ch = hexchar(src + 1)) == -1 || ch == 0) {
+				free(ret);
+				return NULL;
+			}
+--
+2.40.0

meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_8.9p1.bb

@@ -39,6 +39,8 @@ SRC_URI = "http://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-${PV}.tar
            file://CVE-2024-6387.patch \
            file://CVE-2025-26465.patch \
            file://CVE-2025-32728.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-61985.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-61984.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "fd497654b7ab1686dac672fb83dfb4ba4096e8b5ffcdaccd262380ae58bec5e7"
 

meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-50781-1.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,618 @@
+From 24734088e1034392de981151dfe57e3a379ada18 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 15 Mar 2022 13:58:08 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 1/3] rsa: add implicit rejection in PKCS#1 v1.5
+
+The RSA decryption as implemented before required very careful handling
+of both the exit code returned by OpenSSL and the potentially returned
+ciphertext. Looking at the recent security vulnerabilities
+(CVE-2020-25659 and CVE-2020-25657) it is unlikely that most users of
+OpenSSL do it correctly.
+
+Given that correct code requires side channel secure programming in
+application code, we can classify the existing RSA decryption methods
+as CWE-676, which in turn likely causes CWE-208 and CWE-385 in
+application code.
+
+To prevent that, we can use a technique called "implicit rejection".
+For that we generate a random message to be returned in case the
+padding check fails. We generate the message based on static secret
+data (the private exponent) and the provided ciphertext (so that the
+attacker cannot determine that the returned value is randomly generated
+instead of result of decryption and de-padding). We return it in case
+any part of padding check fails.
+
+The upshot of this approach is that then not only is the length of the
+returned message useless as the Bleichenbacher oracle, so are the
+actual bytes of the returned message. So application code doesn't have
+to perform any operations on the returned message in side-channel free
+way to remain secure against Bleichenbacher attacks.
+
+Note: this patch implements a specific algorithm, shared with Mozilla
+NSS, so that the attacker cannot use one library as an oracle against the
+other in heterogeneous environments.
+
+CVE: CVE-2023-50781
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+[https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/7fc67e0a33102aa47bbaa56533eeecb98c0450f7]
+
+Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13817)
+
+Signed-off-by: Jiaying Song <jiaying.song.cn@windriver.com>
+---
+ crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c                     |  95 +++++++-
+ crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c                      | 252 ++++++++++++++++++++++
+ doc/man1/openssl-pkeyutl.pod.in           |   5 +
+ doc/man1/openssl-rsautl.pod.in            |   5 +
+ doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod            |   7 +
+ doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_decrypt.pod             |  12 ++
+ doc/man3/RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1.pod |   7 +-
+ doc/man3/RSA_public_encrypt.pod           |  11 +-
+ include/crypto/rsa.h                      |   4 +
+ 9 files changed, 393 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c
+index 0fc642e777..330302ae55 100644
+--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c
++++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c
+@@ -17,6 +17,9 @@
+ #include "crypto/bn.h"
+ #include "rsa_local.h"
+ #include "internal/constant_time.h"
++#include <openssl/evp.h>
++#include <openssl/sha.h>
++#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+ 
+ static int rsa_ossl_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+                                   unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+@@ -377,8 +380,13 @@ static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+     BIGNUM *f, *ret;
+     int j, num = 0, r = -1;
+     unsigned char *buf = NULL;
++    unsigned char d_hash[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH] = {0};
++    HMAC_CTX *hmac = NULL;
++    unsigned int md_len = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
++    unsigned char kdk[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH] = {0};
+     BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+     int local_blinding = 0;
++    EVP_MD *md = NULL;
+     /*
+      * Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind
+      * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store
+@@ -408,6 +416,11 @@ static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+         goto err;
+     }
+ 
++    if (flen < 1) {
++        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL);
++        goto err;
++    }
++
+     /* make data into a big number */
+     if (BN_bin2bn(from, (int)flen, f) == NULL)
+         goto err;
+@@ -472,13 +485,91 @@ static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+         if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx))
+             goto err;
+ 
++    /*
++     * derive the Key Derivation Key from private exponent and public
++     * ciphertext
++     */
++    if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY)) {
++        /*
++         * because we use d as a handle to rsa->d we need to keep it local and
++         * free before any further use of rsa->d
++         */
++        BIGNUM *d = BN_new();
++        if (d == NULL) {
++            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++            goto err;
++        }
++        if (rsa->d == NULL) {
++            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_MISSING_PRIVATE_KEY);
++            BN_free(d);
++            goto err;
++        }
++        BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
++        if (BN_bn2binpad(d, buf, num) < 0) {
++            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++            BN_free(d);
++            goto err;
++        }
++        BN_free(d);
++
++        /*
++         * we use hardcoded hash so that migrating between versions that use
++         * different hash doesn't provide a Bleichenbacher oracle:
++         * if the attacker can see that different versions return different
++         * messages for the same ciphertext, they'll know that the message is
++         * syntethically generated, which means that the padding check failed
++         */
++        md = EVP_MD_fetch(rsa->libctx, "sha256", NULL);
++        if (md == NULL) {
++            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++            goto err;
++        }
++
++        if (EVP_Digest(buf, num, d_hash, NULL, md, NULL) <= 0) {
++            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++            goto err;
++        }
++
++        hmac = HMAC_CTX_new();
++        if (hmac == NULL) {
++            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++            goto err;
++        }
++
++        if (HMAC_Init_ex(hmac, d_hash, sizeof(d_hash), md, NULL) <= 0) {
++            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++            goto err;
++        }
++
++        if (flen < num) {
++            memset(buf, 0, num - flen);
++            if (HMAC_Update(hmac, buf, num - flen) <= 0) {
++                ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++                goto err;
++            }
++        }
++        if (HMAC_Update(hmac, from, flen) <= 0) {
++            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++            goto err;
++        }
++
++        md_len = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
++        if (HMAC_Final(hmac, kdk, &md_len) <= 0) {
++            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++            goto err;
++        }
++    }
++
+     j = BN_bn2binpad(ret, buf, num);
+     if (j < 0)
+         goto err;
+ 
+     switch (padding) {
+     case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+-        r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to, num, buf, j, num);
++        if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY)
++            r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to, num, buf, j, num);
++        else
++            r = ossl_rsa_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(rsa->libctx, to, num, buf, j, num, kdk);
+         break;
+     case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
+         r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to, num, buf, j, num, NULL, 0);
+@@ -501,6 +592,8 @@ static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+ #endif
+ 
+  err:
++    HMAC_CTX_free(hmac);
++    EVP_MD_free(md);
+     BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+     BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+     OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, num);
+diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
+index 51507fc030..5cd2b26879 100644
+--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
++++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
+@@ -21,10 +21,14 @@
+ #include <openssl/rand.h>
+ /* Just for the SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH value */
+ #include <openssl/prov_ssl.h>
++#include <openssl/evp.h>
++#include <openssl/sha.h>
++#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+ #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+ #include "crypto/rsa.h"
+ #include "rsa_local.h"
+ 
++
+ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+                                  const unsigned char *from, int flen)
+ {
+@@ -273,6 +277,254 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+     return constant_time_select_int(good, mlen, -1);
+ }
+ 
++
++static int ossl_rsa_prf(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx,
++                        unsigned char *to, int tlen,
++                        const char *label, int llen,
++                        const unsigned char *kdk,
++                        uint16_t bitlen)
++{
++    int pos;
++    int ret = -1;
++    uint16_t iter = 0;
++    unsigned char be_iter[sizeof(iter)];
++    unsigned char be_bitlen[sizeof(bitlen)];
++    HMAC_CTX *hmac = NULL;
++    EVP_MD *md = NULL;
++    unsigned char hmac_out[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
++    unsigned int md_len;
++
++    if (tlen * 8 != bitlen) {
++        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++        return ret;
++    }
++
++    be_bitlen[0] = (bitlen >> 8) & 0xff;
++    be_bitlen[1] = bitlen & 0xff;
++
++    hmac = HMAC_CTX_new();
++    if (hmac == NULL) {
++        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++        goto err;
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * we use hardcoded hash so that migrating between versions that use
++     * different hash doesn't provide a Bleichenbacher oracle:
++     * if the attacker can see that different versions return different
++     * messages for the same ciphertext, they'll know that the message is
++     * syntethically generated, which means that the padding check failed
++     */
++    md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx, "sha256", NULL);
++    if (md == NULL) {
++        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++        goto err;
++    }
++
++    if (HMAC_Init_ex(hmac, kdk, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, md, NULL) <= 0) {
++        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++        goto err;
++    }
++
++    for (pos = 0; pos < tlen; pos += SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, iter++) {
++        if (HMAC_Init_ex(hmac, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL) <= 0) {
++            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++            goto err;
++        }
++
++        be_iter[0] = (iter >> 8) & 0xff;
++        be_iter[1] = iter & 0xff;
++
++        if (HMAC_Update(hmac, be_iter, sizeof(be_iter)) <= 0) {
++            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++            goto err;
++        }
++        if (HMAC_Update(hmac, (unsigned char *)label, llen) <= 0) {
++            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++            goto err;
++        }
++        if (HMAC_Update(hmac, be_bitlen, sizeof(be_bitlen)) <= 0) {
++            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++            goto err;
++        }
++
++        /*
++         * HMAC_Final requires the output buffer to fit the whole MAC
++         * value, so we need to use the intermediate buffer for the last
++         * unaligned block
++         */
++        md_len = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
++        if (pos + SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH > tlen) {
++            if (HMAC_Final(hmac, hmac_out, &md_len) <= 0) {
++                ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++                goto err;
++            }
++            memcpy(to + pos, hmac_out, tlen - pos);
++        } else {
++            if (HMAC_Final(hmac, to + pos, &md_len) <= 0) {
++                ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++                goto err;
++            }
++        }
++    }
++
++    ret = 0;
++
++err:
++    HMAC_CTX_free(hmac);
++    EVP_MD_free(md);
++    return ret;
++}
++
++/*
++ * ossl_rsa_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2() checks and removes the PKCS#1 type 2
++ * padding from a decrypted RSA message. Unlike the
++ * RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2() it will not return an error in case it
++ * detects a padding error, rather it will return a deterministically generated
++ * random message. In other words it will perform an implicit rejection
++ * of an invalid padding. This means that the returned value does not indicate
++ * if the padding of the encrypted message was correct or not, making
++ * side channel attacks like the ones described by Bleichenbacher impossible
++ * without access to the full decrypted value and a brute-force search of
++ * remaining padding bytes
++ */
++int ossl_rsa_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx,
++                                        unsigned char *to, int tlen,
++                                        const unsigned char *from, int flen,
++                                        int num, unsigned char *kdk)
++{
++/*
++ * We need to generate a random length for the synthethic message, to avoid
++ * bias towards zero and avoid non-constant timeness of DIV, we prepare
++ * 128 values to check if they are not too large for the used key size,
++ * and use 0 in case none of them are small enough, as 2^-128 is a good enough
++ * safety margin
++ */
++#define MAX_LEN_GEN_TRIES 128
++    unsigned char *synthetic = NULL;
++    int synthethic_length;
++    uint16_t len_candidate;
++    unsigned char candidate_lengths[MAX_LEN_GEN_TRIES * sizeof(len_candidate)];
++    uint16_t len_mask;
++    uint16_t max_sep_offset;
++    int synth_msg_index = 0;
++    int ret = -1;
++    int i, j;
++    unsigned int good, found_zero_byte;
++    int zero_index = 0, msg_index;
++
++    /*
++     * If these checks fail then either the message in publicly invalid, or
++     * we've been called incorrectly. We can fail immediately.
++     * Since this code is called only internally by openssl, those are just
++     * sanity checks
++     */
++    if (num != flen || tlen <= 0 || flen <= 0) {
++        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++        return -1;
++    }
++
++    /* Generate a random message to return in case the padding checks fail */
++    synthetic = OPENSSL_malloc(flen);
++    if (synthetic == NULL) {
++        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++        return -1;
++    }
++
++    if (ossl_rsa_prf(ctx, synthetic, flen, "message", 7, kdk, flen * 8) < 0)
++        goto err;
++
++    /* decide how long the random message should be */
++    if (ossl_rsa_prf(ctx, candidate_lengths, sizeof(candidate_lengths),
++                     "length", 6, kdk,
++                     MAX_LEN_GEN_TRIES * sizeof(len_candidate) * 8) < 0)
++        goto err;
++
++    /*
++     * max message size is the size of the modulus size less 2 bytes for
++     * version and padding type and a minimum of 8 bytes padding
++     */
++    len_mask = max_sep_offset = flen - 2 - 8;
++    /*
++     * we want a mask so lets propagate the high bit to all positions less
++     * significant than it
++     */
++    len_mask |= len_mask >> 1;
++    len_mask |= len_mask >> 2;
++    len_mask |= len_mask >> 4;
++    len_mask |= len_mask >> 8;
++
++    synthethic_length = 0;
++    for (i = 0; i < MAX_LEN_GEN_TRIES * (int)sizeof(len_candidate);
++            i += sizeof(len_candidate)) {
++        len_candidate = (candidate_lengths[i] << 8) | candidate_lengths[i + 1];
++        len_candidate &= len_mask;
++
++        synthethic_length = constant_time_select_int(
++            constant_time_lt(len_candidate, max_sep_offset),
++            len_candidate, synthethic_length);
++    }
++
++    synth_msg_index = flen - synthethic_length;
++
++    /* we have alternative message ready, check the real one */
++    good = constant_time_is_zero(from[0]);
++    good &= constant_time_eq(from[1], 2);
++
++    /* then look for the padding|message separator (the first zero byte) */
++    found_zero_byte = 0;
++    for (i = 2; i < flen; i++) {
++        unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(from[i]);
++        zero_index = constant_time_select_int(~found_zero_byte & equals0,
++                                              i, zero_index);
++        found_zero_byte |= equals0;
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * padding must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into
++     * |from|. If we never found a 0-byte, then |zero_index| is 0 and the check
++     * also fails.
++     */
++    good &= constant_time_ge(zero_index, 2 + 8);
++
++    /*
++     * Skip the zero byte. This is incorrect if we never found a zero-byte
++     * but in this case we also do not copy the message out.
++     */
++    msg_index = zero_index + 1;
++
++    /*
++     * old code returned an error in case the decrypted message wouldn't fit
++     * into the |to|, since that would leak information, return the synthethic
++     * message instead
++     */
++    good &= constant_time_ge(tlen, num - msg_index);
++
++    msg_index = constant_time_select_int(good, msg_index, synth_msg_index);
++
++    /*
++     * since at this point the |msg_index| does not provide the signal
++     * indicating if the padding check failed or not, we don't have to worry
++     * about leaking the length of returned message, we still need to ensure
++     * that we read contents of both buffers so that cache accesses don't leak
++     * the value of |good|
++     */
++    for (i = msg_index, j = 0; i < flen && j < tlen; i++, j++)
++        to[j] = constant_time_select_8(good, from[i], synthetic[i]);
++    ret = j;
++
++err:
++    /*
++     * the only time ret < 0 is when the ciphertext is publicly invalid
++     * or we were called with invalid parameters, so we don't have to perform
++     * a side-channel secure raising of the error
++     */
++    if (ret < 0)
++        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++    OPENSSL_free(synthetic);
++    return ret;
++}
++
+ /*
+  * ossl_rsa_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2_TLS() checks and removes the PKCS1 type 2
+  * padding from a decrypted RSA message in a TLS signature. The result is stored
+diff --git a/doc/man1/openssl-pkeyutl.pod.in b/doc/man1/openssl-pkeyutl.pod.in
+index 2f6ef0021d..015265a74d 100644
+--- a/doc/man1/openssl-pkeyutl.pod.in
++++ b/doc/man1/openssl-pkeyutl.pod.in
+@@ -273,6 +273,11 @@ signed or verified directly instead of using a B<DigestInfo> structure. If a
+ digest is set, then the B<DigestInfo> structure is used and its length
+ must correspond to the digest type.
+ 
++Note, for B<pkcs1> padding, as a protection against Bleichenbacher attack,
++the decryption will not fail in case of padding check failures. Use B<none>
++and manual inspection of the decrypted message to verify if the decrypted
++value has correct PKCS#1 v1.5 padding.
++
+ For B<oaep> mode only encryption and decryption is supported.
+ 
+ For B<x931> if the digest type is set it is used to format the block data
+diff --git a/doc/man1/openssl-rsautl.pod.in b/doc/man1/openssl-rsautl.pod.in
+index 0a32fd965b..4c462abc8c 100644
+--- a/doc/man1/openssl-rsautl.pod.in
++++ b/doc/man1/openssl-rsautl.pod.in
+@@ -105,6 +105,11 @@ The padding to use: PKCS#1 v1.5 (the default), PKCS#1 OAEP,
+ ANSI X9.31, or no padding, respectively.
+ For signatures, only B<-pkcs> and B<-raw> can be used.
+ 
++Note: because of protection against Bleichenbacher attacks, decryption
++using PKCS#1 v1.5 mode will not return errors in case padding check failed.
++Use B<-raw> and inspect the returned value manually to check if the
++padding is correct.
++
+ =item B<-hexdump>
+ 
+ Hex dump the output data.
+diff --git a/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod b/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod
+index 3075eaafd6..e788f38809 100644
+--- a/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod
++++ b/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod
+@@ -386,6 +386,13 @@ this behaviour should be tolerated then
+ OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_NEGOTIATED_VERSION should be set to the actual
+ negotiated protocol version. Otherwise it should be left unset.
+ 
++Similarly to the B<RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING> above, since OpenSSL version
++3.1.0, the use of B<RSA_PKCS1_PADDING> will return a randomly generated message
++instead of padding errors in case padding checks fail. Applications that
++want to remain secure while using earlier versions of OpenSSL, still need to
++handle both the error code from the RSA decryption operation and the
++returned message in a side channel secure manner.
++
+ =head2 DSA parameters
+ 
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dsa_paramgen_bits() sets the number of bits used for DSA
+diff --git a/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_decrypt.pod b/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_decrypt.pod
+index b6f9bad5f1..898535a7a2 100644
+--- a/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_decrypt.pod
++++ b/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_decrypt.pod
+@@ -51,6 +51,18 @@ return 1 for success and 0 or a negative value for failure. In particular a
+ return value of -2 indicates the operation is not supported by the public key
+ algorithm.
+ 
++=head1 WARNINGS
++
++In OpenSSL versions before 3.1.0, when used in PKCS#1 v1.5 padding,
++both the return value from the EVP_PKEY_decrypt() and the B<outlen> provided
++information useful in mounting a Bleichenbacher attack against the
++used private key. They had to processed in a side-channel free way.
++
++Since version 3.1.0, the EVP_PKEY_decrypt() method when used with PKCS#1
++v1.5 padding doesn't return an error in case it detects an error in padding,
++instead it returns a pseudo-randomly generated message, removing the need
++of side-channel secure code from applications using OpenSSL.
++
+ =head1 EXAMPLES
+ 
+ Decrypt data using OAEP (for RSA keys):
+diff --git a/doc/man3/RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1.pod b/doc/man3/RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1.pod
+index 9f7025c497..36ae18563f 100644
+--- a/doc/man3/RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1.pod
++++ b/doc/man3/RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1.pod
+@@ -121,8 +121,8 @@ L<ERR_get_error(3)>.
+ 
+ =head1 WARNINGS
+ 
+-The result of RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2() is a very sensitive
+-information which can potentially be used to mount a Bleichenbacher
++The result of RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2() is exactly the
++information which is used to mount a classical Bleichenbacher
+ padding oracle attack. This is an inherent weakness in the PKCS #1
+ v1.5 padding design. Prefer PKCS1_OAEP padding. If that is not
+ possible, the result of RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2() should be
+@@ -137,6 +137,9 @@ as this would create a small timing side channel which could be
+ used to mount a Bleichenbacher attack against any padding mode
+ including PKCS1_OAEP.
+ 
++You should prefer the use of EVP PKEY APIs for PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption
++as they implement the necessary workarounds internally.
++
+ =head1 SEE ALSO
+ 
+ L<RSA_public_encrypt(3)>,
+diff --git a/doc/man3/RSA_public_encrypt.pod b/doc/man3/RSA_public_encrypt.pod
+index 1d38073aea..bd3f835ac6 100644
+--- a/doc/man3/RSA_public_encrypt.pod
++++ b/doc/man3/RSA_public_encrypt.pod
+@@ -52,8 +52,8 @@ Encrypting user data directly with RSA is insecure.
+ 
+ =back
+ 
+-B<flen> must not be more than RSA_size(B<rsa>) - 11 for the PKCS #1 v1.5
+-based padding modes, not more than RSA_size(B<rsa>) - 42 for
++When encrypting B<flen> must not be more than RSA_size(B<rsa>) - 11 for the
++PKCS #1 v1.5 based padding modes, not more than RSA_size(B<rsa>) - 42 for
+ RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING and exactly RSA_size(B<rsa>) for RSA_NO_PADDING.
+ When a padding mode other than RSA_NO_PADDING is in use, then
+ RSA_public_encrypt() will include some random bytes into the ciphertext
+@@ -92,6 +92,13 @@ which can potentially be used to mount a Bleichenbacher padding oracle
+ attack. This is an inherent weakness in the PKCS #1 v1.5 padding
+ design. Prefer RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING.
+ 
++In OpenSSL before version 3.1.0, both the return value and the length of
++returned value could be used to mount the Bleichenbacher attack.
++Since version 3.1.0, OpenSSL does not return an error in case of padding
++checks failed. Instead it generates a random message based on used private
++key and provided ciphertext so that application code doesn't have to implement
++a side-channel secure error handling.
++
+ =head1 CONFORMING TO
+ 
+ SSL, PKCS #1 v2.0
+diff --git a/include/crypto/rsa.h b/include/crypto/rsa.h
+index 949873d0ee..f267e5d9d1 100644
+--- a/include/crypto/rsa.h
++++ b/include/crypto/rsa.h
+@@ -83,6 +83,10 @@ int ossl_rsa_param_decode(RSA *rsa, const X509_ALGOR *alg);
+ RSA *ossl_rsa_key_from_pkcs8(const PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf,
+                              OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, const char *propq);
+ 
++int ossl_rsa_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx,
++                                        unsigned char *to, int tlen,
++                                        const unsigned char *from, int flen,
++                                        int num, unsigned char *kdk);
+ int ossl_rsa_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2_TLS(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *to,
+                                             size_t tlen,
+                                             const unsigned char *from,
+-- 
+2.34.1
+

meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-50781-2.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,358 @@
+From e92f0cd3b03e5aca948b03df7e3d02e536700f68 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 27 Oct 2022 19:16:58 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 2/3] rsa: Add option to disable implicit rejection
+
+CVE: CVE-2023-50781
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+[https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/5ab3ec1bb1eaa795d775f5896818cfaa84d33a1a]
+
+Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13817)
+
+Signed-off-by: Jiaying Song <jiaying.song.cn@windriver.com>
+---
+ crypto/cms/cms_env.c                          |  7 +++++
+ crypto/evp/ctrl_params_translate.c            |  6 +++++
+ crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c                         | 16 ++++++++----
+ crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c                        | 20 +++++++++++++-
+ doc/man1/openssl-pkeyutl.pod.in               | 10 +++++++
+ doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod                |  2 ++
+ doc/man7/provider-asym_cipher.pod             |  9 +++++++
+ include/openssl/core_names.h                  |  2 ++
+ include/openssl/rsa.h                         |  5 ++++
+ .../implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c     | 26 +++++++++++++++++--
+ 10 files changed, 95 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/cms/cms_env.c b/crypto/cms/cms_env.c
+index 445a16fb77..49b0289114 100644
+--- a/crypto/cms/cms_env.c
++++ b/crypto/cms/cms_env.c
+@@ -581,6 +581,13 @@ static int cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
+     if (!ossl_cms_env_asn1_ctrl(ri, 1))
+         goto err;
+ 
++    if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "RSA"))
++        /* upper layer CMS code incorrectly assumes that a successful RSA
++         * decryption means that the key matches ciphertext (which never
++         * was the case, implicit rejection or not), so to make it work
++         * disable implicit rejection for RSA keys */
++        EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl_str(ktri->pctx, "rsa_pkcs1_implicit_rejection", "0");
++
+     if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ktri->pctx, NULL, &eklen,
+                          ktri->encryptedKey->data,
+                          ktri->encryptedKey->length) <= 0)
+diff --git a/crypto/evp/ctrl_params_translate.c b/crypto/evp/ctrl_params_translate.c
+index 44d0895bcf..db7325439a 100644
+--- a/crypto/evp/ctrl_params_translate.c
++++ b/crypto/evp/ctrl_params_translate.c
+@@ -2269,6 +2269,12 @@ static const struct translation_st evp_pkey_ctx_translations[] = {
+       EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_LABEL, NULL, NULL,
+       OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_LABEL, OSSL_PARAM_OCTET_PTR, NULL },
+ 
++    { SET, EVP_PKEY_RSA, 0, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
++      EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_IMPLICIT_REJECTION, NULL,
++      "rsa_pkcs1_implicit_rejection",
++      OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_IMPLICIT_REJECTION, OSSL_PARAM_UNSIGNED_INTEGER,
++      NULL },
++
+     { SET, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, 0, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_GEN,
+       EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD, "rsa_pss_keygen_md", NULL,
+       OSSL_ALG_PARAM_DIGEST, OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING, fix_md },
+diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c
+index 330302ae55..4bdacd5ed9 100644
+--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c
++++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c
+@@ -395,6 +395,12 @@ static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+     BIGNUM *unblind = NULL;
+     BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
+ 
++    /*
++     * we need the value of the private exponent to perform implicit rejection
++     */
++    if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) && (padding == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING))
++        padding = RSA_PKCS1_NO_IMPLICIT_REJECT_PADDING;
++
+     if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(rsa->libctx)) == NULL)
+         goto err;
+     BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+@@ -489,7 +495,7 @@ static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+      * derive the Key Derivation Key from private exponent and public
+      * ciphertext
+      */
+-    if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY)) {
++    if (padding == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) {
+         /*
+          * because we use d as a handle to rsa->d we need to keep it local and
+          * free before any further use of rsa->d
+@@ -565,11 +571,11 @@ static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+         goto err;
+ 
+     switch (padding) {
++    case RSA_PKCS1_NO_IMPLICIT_REJECT_PADDING:
++        r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to, num, buf, j, num);
++        break;
+     case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+-        if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY)
+-            r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to, num, buf, j, num);
+-        else
+-            r = ossl_rsa_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(rsa->libctx, to, num, buf, j, num, kdk);
++        r = ossl_rsa_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(rsa->libctx, to, num, buf, j, num, kdk);
+         break;
+     case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
+         r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to, num, buf, j, num, NULL, 0);
+diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c
+index 0bf5ac098a..81b031f81b 100644
+--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c
++++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c
+@@ -52,6 +52,8 @@ typedef struct {
+     /* OAEP label */
+     unsigned char *oaep_label;
+     size_t oaep_labellen;
++    /* if to use implicit rejection in PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption */
++    int implicit_rejection;
+ } RSA_PKEY_CTX;
+ 
+ /* True if PSS parameters are restricted */
+@@ -72,6 +74,7 @@ static int pkey_rsa_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
+     /* Maximum for sign, auto for verify */
+     rctx->saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
+     rctx->min_saltlen = -1;
++    rctx->implicit_rejection = 1;
+     ctx->data = rctx;
+     ctx->keygen_info = rctx->gentmp;
+     ctx->keygen_info_count = 2;
+@@ -97,6 +100,7 @@ static int pkey_rsa_copy(EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst, const EVP_PKEY_CTX *src)
+     dctx->md = sctx->md;
+     dctx->mgf1md = sctx->mgf1md;
+     dctx->saltlen = sctx->saltlen;
++    dctx->implicit_rejection = sctx->implicit_rejection;
+     if (sctx->oaep_label) {
+         OPENSSL_free(dctx->oaep_label);
+         dctx->oaep_label = OPENSSL_memdup(sctx->oaep_label, sctx->oaep_labellen);
+@@ -347,6 +351,7 @@ static int pkey_rsa_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                             const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)
+ {
+     int ret;
++    int pad_mode;
+     RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
+     /*
+      * Discard const. Its marked as const because this may be a cached copy of
+@@ -367,7 +372,12 @@ static int pkey_rsa_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                                 rctx->oaep_labellen,
+                                                 rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md);
+     } else {
+-        ret = RSA_private_decrypt(inlen, in, out, rsa, rctx->pad_mode);
++        if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING &&
++              rctx->implicit_rejection == 0)
++            pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_NO_IMPLICIT_REJECT_PADDING;
++        else
++            pad_mode = rctx->pad_mode;
++        ret = RSA_private_decrypt(inlen, in, out, rsa, pad_mode);
+     }
+     *outlen = constant_time_select_s(constant_time_msb_s(ret), *outlen, ret);
+     ret = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_msb(ret), ret, 1);
+@@ -591,6 +601,14 @@ static int pkey_rsa_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2)
+         *(unsigned char **)p2 = rctx->oaep_label;
+         return rctx->oaep_labellen;
+ 
++    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_IMPLICIT_REJECTION:
++        if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) {
++            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
++            return -2;
++        }
++        rctx->implicit_rejection = p1;
++        return 1;
++
+     case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DIGESTINIT:
+     case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN:
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
+diff --git a/doc/man1/openssl-pkeyutl.pod.in b/doc/man1/openssl-pkeyutl.pod.in
+index 015265a74d..5e62551d34 100644
+--- a/doc/man1/openssl-pkeyutl.pod.in
++++ b/doc/man1/openssl-pkeyutl.pod.in
+@@ -305,6 +305,16 @@ explicitly set in PSS mode then the signing digest is used.
+ Sets the digest used for the OAEP hash function. If not explicitly set then
+ SHA1 is used.
+ 
++=item B<rsa_pkcs1_implicit_rejection:>I<flag>
++
++Disables (when set to 0) or enables (when set to 1) the use of implicit
++rejection with PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption. When enabled (the default), as a
++protection against Bleichenbacher attack, the library will generate a
++deterministic random plaintext that it will return to the caller in case
++of padding check failure.
++When disabled, it's the callers' responsibility to handle the returned
++errors in a side-channel free manner.
++
+ =back
+ 
+ =head1 RSA-PSS ALGORITHM
+diff --git a/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod b/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod
+index e788f38809..3844aa2199 100644
+--- a/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod
++++ b/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod
+@@ -392,6 +392,8 @@ instead of padding errors in case padding checks fail. Applications that
+ want to remain secure while using earlier versions of OpenSSL, still need to
+ handle both the error code from the RSA decryption operation and the
+ returned message in a side channel secure manner.
++This protection against Bleichenbacher attacks can be disabled by setting
++the OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_IMPLICIT_REJECTION (an unsigned integer) to 0.
+ 
+ =head2 DSA parameters
+ 
+diff --git a/doc/man7/provider-asym_cipher.pod b/doc/man7/provider-asym_cipher.pod
+index 0976a263a8..2a8426a6ed 100644
+--- a/doc/man7/provider-asym_cipher.pod
++++ b/doc/man7/provider-asym_cipher.pod
+@@ -234,6 +234,15 @@ The TLS protocol version first requested by the client.
+ 
+ The negotiated TLS protocol version.
+ 
++=item "implicit-rejection" (B<OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_IMPLICIT_REJECTION>) <unsigned integer>
++
++Gets of sets the use of the implicit rejection mechanism for RSA PKCS#1 v1.5
++decryption. When set (non zero value), the decryption API will return
++a deterministically random value if the PKCS#1 v1.5 padding check fails.
++This makes explotation of the Bleichenbacher significantly harder, even
++if the code using the RSA decryption API is not implemented in side-channel
++free manner. Set by default.
++
+ =back
+ 
+ OSSL_FUNC_asym_cipher_gettable_ctx_params() and OSSL_FUNC_asym_cipher_settable_ctx_params()
+diff --git a/include/openssl/core_names.h b/include/openssl/core_names.h
+index 6bed5a8a67..5a350b537f 100644
+--- a/include/openssl/core_names.h
++++ b/include/openssl/core_names.h
+@@ -292,6 +292,7 @@ extern "C" {
+ #define OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_DIST_ID             "distid"
+ #define OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY             "pub"
+ #define OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY            "priv"
++#define OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_IMPLICIT_REJECTION  "implicit-rejection"
+ 
+ /* Diffie-Hellman/DSA Parameters */
+ #define OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P               "p"
+@@ -467,6 +468,7 @@ extern "C" {
+ #define OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_LABEL               "oaep-label"
+ #define OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_CLIENT_VERSION       "tls-client-version"
+ #define OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_NEGOTIATED_VERSION   "tls-negotiated-version"
++#define OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_IMPLICIT_REJECTION       "implicit-rejection"
+ 
+ /*
+  * Encoder / decoder parameters
+diff --git a/include/openssl/rsa.h b/include/openssl/rsa.h
+index a55c9727c6..247f9014e3 100644
+--- a/include/openssl/rsa.h
++++ b/include/openssl/rsa.h
+@@ -183,6 +183,8 @@ int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_rsa_oaep_label(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char **label);
+ 
+ # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PRIMES  (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 13)
+ 
++# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_IMPLICIT_REJECTION (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 14)
++
+ # define RSA_PKCS1_PADDING          1
+ # define RSA_NO_PADDING             3
+ # define RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING     4
+@@ -192,6 +194,9 @@ int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_rsa_oaep_label(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char **label);
+ # define RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING      6
+ # define RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING 7
+ 
++/* internal RSA_ only */
++# define RSA_PKCS1_NO_IMPLICIT_REJECT_PADDING 8
++
+ # define RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE    11
+ 
+ # define RSA_set_app_data(s,arg)         RSA_set_ex_data(s,0,arg)
+diff --git a/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c b/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c
+index c8921acd6e..11a91e62b1 100644
+--- a/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c
++++ b/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c
+@@ -75,6 +75,8 @@ typedef struct {
+     /* TLS padding */
+     unsigned int client_version;
+     unsigned int alt_version;
++    /* PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption mode */
++    unsigned int implicit_rejection;
+ } PROV_RSA_CTX;
+ 
+ static void *rsa_newctx(void *provctx)
+@@ -107,6 +109,7 @@ static int rsa_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa, const OSSL_PARAM params[],
+     RSA_free(prsactx->rsa);
+     prsactx->rsa = vrsa;
+     prsactx->operation = operation;
++    prsactx->implicit_rejection = 1;
+ 
+     switch (RSA_test_flags(prsactx->rsa, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_MASK)) {
+     case RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSA:
+@@ -199,6 +202,7 @@ static int rsa_decrypt(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
+ {
+     PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
+     int ret;
++    int pad_mode;
+     size_t len = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa);
+ 
+     if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+@@ -276,8 +280,12 @@ static int rsa_decrypt(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
+         }
+         OPENSSL_free(tbuf);
+     } else {
+-        ret = RSA_private_decrypt(inlen, in, out, prsactx->rsa,
+-                                  prsactx->pad_mode);
++        if ((prsactx->implicit_rejection == 0) &&
++                (prsactx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING))
++            pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_NO_IMPLICIT_REJECT_PADDING;
++        else
++            pad_mode = prsactx->pad_mode;
++        ret = RSA_private_decrypt(inlen, in, out, prsactx->rsa, pad_mode);
+     }
+     *outlen = constant_time_select_s(constant_time_msb_s(ret), *outlen, ret);
+     ret = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_msb(ret), 0, 1);
+@@ -401,6 +409,10 @@ static int rsa_get_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params)
+     if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_uint(p, prsactx->alt_version))
+         return 0;
+ 
++    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_IMPLICIT_REJECTION);
++    if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_uint(p, prsactx->implicit_rejection))
++        return 0;
++
+     return 1;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -412,6 +424,7 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
+                     NULL, 0),
+     OSSL_PARAM_uint(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_CLIENT_VERSION, NULL),
+     OSSL_PARAM_uint(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_NEGOTIATED_VERSION, NULL),
++    OSSL_PARAM_uint(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_IMPLICIT_REJECTION, NULL),
+     OSSL_PARAM_END
+ };
+ 
+@@ -549,6 +562,14 @@ static int rsa_set_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+             return 0;
+         prsactx->alt_version = alt_version;
+     }
++    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_IMPLICIT_REJECTION);
++    if (p != NULL) {
++        unsigned int implicit_rejection;
++
++        if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p, &implicit_rejection))
++            return 0;
++        prsactx->implicit_rejection = implicit_rejection;
++    }
+ 
+     return 1;
+ }
+@@ -562,6 +583,7 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
+     OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_LABEL, NULL, 0),
+     OSSL_PARAM_uint(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_CLIENT_VERSION, NULL),
+     OSSL_PARAM_uint(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_NEGOTIATED_VERSION, NULL),
++    OSSL_PARAM_uint(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_IMPLICIT_REJECTION, NULL),
+     OSSL_PARAM_END
+ };
+ 
+-- 
+2.34.1
+

meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-50781-3.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+From ba78f7b0599ba5bfb5032dd2664465c5b13388e3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2022 18:25:49 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 3/3] smime/pkcs7: disable the Bleichenbacher workaround
+
+CVE: CVE-2023-50781
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+[https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/056dade341d2589975a3aae71f81c8d7061583c7]
+
+Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13817)
+
+Signed-off-by: Jiaying Song <jiaying.song.cn@windriver.com>
+---
+ crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c | 7 +++++++
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c b/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
+index e9de097da1..6d3124da87 100644
+--- a/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
++++ b/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
+@@ -170,6 +170,13 @@ static int pkcs7_decrypt_rinfo(unsigned char **pek, int *peklen,
+     if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pctx) <= 0)
+         goto err;
+ 
++    if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "RSA"))
++        /* upper layer pkcs7 code incorrectly assumes that a successful RSA
++         * decryption means that the key matches ciphertext (which never
++         * was the case, implicit rejection or not), so to make it work
++         * disable implicit rejection for RSA keys */
++        EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl_str(pctx, "rsa_pkcs1_implicit_rejection", "0");
++
+     if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pctx, NULL, &eklen,
+                          ri->enc_key->data, ri->enc_key->length) <= 0)
+         goto err;
+-- 
+2.34.1
+

meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-50781-4.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,441 @@
+From 8ae4f0e68ebb7435be494b58676827ae91695371 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2021 14:58:04 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] rsa: add test vectors for the implicit rejection in RSA
+ PKCS#1 v1.5
+
+CVE: CVE-2023-50781
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/8ae4f0e68ebb7435be494b58676827ae91695371]
+
+Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13817)
+Signed-off-by: Jiaying Song <jiaying.song.cn@windriver.com>
+---
+ .../30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt   | 408 ++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 408 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt b/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt
+index 080c4d02af..1405465098 100644
+--- a/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt
++++ b/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt
+@@ -277,6 +277,414 @@ Derive = RSA-2048
+ Result = KEYOP_INIT_ERROR
+ Reason = operation not supported for this keytype
+ 
++# Test vectors for the Bleichenbacher workaround
++
++PrivateKey = RSA-2048-2
++-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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++-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
++
++# corresponding public key
++PublicKey = RSA-2048-2-PUBLIC
++-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
++MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAyMyDlxQJjaVsqiNkD5Pc
++iZfBY3KWj8Gwxt9RE8HJTosh5IrSKX5lQZARtObY9ec7G3iyV0ADIdHva2AtTsjO
++jRQclJBetK0wZjmkkgZTS25/JgdCPpff/RM8iNchOZ3vvH6WzNy9fzquH+iScSv7
++SSmBfVEWZkQKH6y3ogj16hZZEK3Yo/LUlyAjYMy2MgJPDQcWnBkY8xb3lLFDrvVO
++yHUipMApePlomYC/+/ZJwwfoGBm/+IQJY41IvZS+FStZ/2SfoL1inQ/6GBPDq/S1
++a9PC6lRl3/oUWJKSqdiiStJr5+4FEHQbY4LUPIPVv6QKRmE9BivkRVF9vK8MtOGn
++aQIDAQAB
++-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
++
++PrivPubKeyPair = RSA-2048-2:RSA-2048-2-PUBLIC
++
++# RSA decrypt
++
++# a random positive test case
++Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
++Input = 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
++Output = "lorem ipsum dolor sit amet"
++
++# a random negative test case decrypting to empty
++Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
++Input = 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
++Output =
++
++# invalid decrypting to max length message
++Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
++Input = 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
++Output = 22d850137b9eebe092b24f602dc5bb7918c16bd89ddbf20467b119d205f9c2e4bd7d2592cf1e532106e0f33557565923c73a02d4f09c0c22bea89148183e60317f7028b3aa1f261f91c979393101d7e15f4067e63979b32751658ef769610fe97cf9cef3278b3117d384051c3b1d82c251c2305418c8f6840530e631aad63e70e20e025bcd8efb54c92ec6d3b106a2f8e64eeff7d38495b0fc50c97138af4b1c0a67a1c4e27b077b8439332edfa8608dfeae653cd6a628ac550395f7e74390e42c11682234870925eeaa1fa71b76cf1f2ee3bda69f6717033ff8b7c95c9799e7a3bea5e7e4a1c359772fb6b1c6e6c516661dfe30c3
++
++# invalid decrypting to message with length specified by second to last value from PRF
++Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
++Input = 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
++Output = 0f9b
++
++# invalid decrypting to message with length specified by third to last value from PRF
++Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
++Input = 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
++Output = 4f02
++
++# positive test with 11 byte long value
++Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
++Input = 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
++Output = "lorem ipsum"
++
++# positive test with 11 byte long value and zero padded ciphertext
++Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
++Input = 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
++Output = "lorem ipsum"
++
++# positive test with 11 byte long value and zero truncated ciphertext
++Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
++Input = 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
++Output = "lorem ipsum"
++
++# positive test with 11 byte long value and double zero padded ciphertext
++Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
++Input = 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
++Output = "lorem ipsum"
++
++# positive test with 11 byte long value and double zero truncated ciphertext
++Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
++Input = 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
++Output = "lorem ipsum"
++
++# positive that generates a 0 byte long synthethic message internally
++Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
++Input = 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
++Output = "lorem ipsum"
++
++# positive that generates a 245 byte long synthethic message internally
++Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
++Input = 1ea0b50ca65203d0a09280d39704b24fe6e47800189db5033f202761a78bafb270c5e25abd1f7ecc6e7abc4f26d1b0cd9b8c648d529416ee64ccbdd7aa72a771d0353262b543f0e436076f40a1095f5c7dfd10dcf0059ccb30e92dfa5e0156618215f1c3ff3aa997a9d999e506924f5289e3ac72e5e2086cc7b499d71583ed561028671155db4005bee01800a7cdbdae781dd32199b8914b5d4011dd6ff11cd26d46aad54934d293b0bc403dd211bf13b5a5c6836a5e769930f437ffd8634fb7371776f4bc88fa6c271d8aa6013df89ae6470154497c4ac861be2a1c65ebffec139bf7aaba3a81c7c5cdd84da9af5d3edfb957848074686b5837ecbcb6a41c50
++Output = "lorem ipsum"
++
++# a random negative test that generates an 11 byte long message
++Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
++Input = 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
++Output = af9ac70191c92413cb9f2d
++
++# an otherwise correct plaintext, but with wrong first byte
++# (0x01 instead of 0x00), generates a random 11 byte long plaintext
++Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
++Input = 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
++Output = a1f8c9255c35cfba403ccc
++
++# an otherwise correct plaintext, but with wrong second byte
++# (0x01 instead of 0x02), generates a random 11 byte long plaintext
++Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
++Input = 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
++Output = e6d700309ca0ed62452254
++
++# an invalid ciphertext, with a zero byte in first byte of
++# ciphertext, decrypts to a random 11 byte long synthethic
++# plaintext
++Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
++Input = 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
++Output = ba27b1842e7c21c0e7ef6a
++
++# an invalid ciphertext, with a zero byte removed from first byte of
++# ciphertext, decrypts to a random 11 byte long synthethic
++# plaintext
++Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
++Input = 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
++Output = ba27b1842e7c21c0e7ef6a
++
++# an invalid ciphertext, with two zero bytes in first bytes of
++# ciphertext, decrypts to a random 11 byte long synthethic
++# plaintext
++Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
++Input = 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
++Output = d5cf555b1d6151029a429a
++
++# an invalid ciphertext, with two zero bytes removed from first bytes of
++# ciphertext, decrypts to a random 11 byte long synthethic
++# plaintext
++Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
++Input = 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
++Output = d5cf555b1d6151029a429a
++
++# and invalid ciphertext, otherwise valid but starting with 000002, decrypts
++# to random 11 byte long synthethic plaintext
++Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
++Input = 1786550ce8d8433052e01ecba8b76d3019f1355b212ac9d0f5191b023325a7e7714b7802f8e9a17c4cb3cd3a84041891471b10ca1fcfb5d041d34c82e6d0011cf4dc76b90e9c2e0743590579d55bcd7857057152c4a8040361343d1d22ba677d62b011407c652e234b1d663af25e2386251d7409190f19fc8ec3f9374fdf1254633874ce2ec2bff40ad0cb473f9761ec7b68da45a4bd5e33f5d7dac9b9a20821df9406b653f78a95a6c0ea0a4d57f867e4db22c17bf9a12c150f809a7b72b6db86c22a8732241ebf3c6a4f2cf82671d917aba8bc61052b40ccddd743a94ea9b538175106201971cca9d136d25081739aaf6cd18b2aecf9ad320ea3f89502f955
++Output = 3d4a054d9358209e9cbbb9
++
++# negative test with otherwise valid padding but a zero byte in first byte
++# of padding
++Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
++Input = 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
++Output = 1f037dd717b07d3e7f7359
++
++# negative test with otherwise valid padding but a zero byte at the eigth
++# byte of padding
++Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
++Input = 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
++Output = 63cb0bf65fc8255dd29e17
++
++# negative test with an otherwise valid plaintext but with missing separator
++# byte
++Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
++Input = 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
++Output = 6f09a0b62699337c497b0b
++
++# Test vectors for the Bleichenbacher workaround (2049 bit key size)
++
++PrivateKey = RSA-2049
++-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
++MIIEpQIBAAKCAQEBVfiJVWoXdfHHp3hqULGLwoyemG7eVmfKs5uEEk6Q66dcHbCD
++rD5EO7qU3CNWD3XjqBaToqQ73HQm2MTq/mjIXeD+dX9uSbue1EfmAkMIANuwTOsi
++5/pXoY0zj7ZgJs20Z+cMwEDn02fvQDx78ePfYkZQCUYx8h6v0vtbyRX/BDeazRES
++9zLAtGYHwXjTiiD1LtpQny+cBAXVEGnoDM+UFVTQRwRnUFw89UHqCJffyfQAzssp
++j/x1M3LZ9pM68XTMQO2W1GcDFzO5f4zd0/krw6A+qFdsQX8kAHteT3UBEFtUTen6
++3N/635jftLsFuBmfP4Ws/ZH3qaCUuaOD9QSQlwIDAQABAoIBAQEZwrP1CnrWFSZ5
++1/9RCVisLYym8AKFkvMy1VoWc2F4qOZ/F+cFzjAOPodUclEAYBP5dNCj20nvNEyl
++omo0wEUHBNDkIuDOI6aUJcFf77bybhBu7/ZMyLnXRC5NpOjIUAjq6zZYWaIpT6OT
++e8Jr5WMy59geLBYO9jXMUoqnvlXmM6cj28Hha6KeUrKa7y+eVlT9wGZrsPwlSsvo
++DmOHTw9fAgeC48nc/CUg0MnEp7Y05FA/u0k+Gq/us/iL16EzmHJdrm/jmed1zV1M
++8J/IODR8TJjasaSIPM5iBRNhWvqhCmM2jm17ed9BZqsWJznvUVpEAu4eBgHFpVvH
++HfDjDt+BAoGBAYj2k2DwHhjZot4pUlPSUsMeRHbOpf97+EE99/3jVlI83JdoBfhP
++wN3sdw3wbO0GXIETSHVLNGrxaXVod/07PVaGgsh4fQsxTvasZ9ZegTM5i2Kgg8D4
++dlxa1A1agfm73OJSftfpUAjLECnLTKvR+em+38KGyWVSJV2n6rGSF473AoGBAN7H
++zxHa3oOkxD0vgBl/If1dRv1XtDH0T+gaHeN/agkf/ARk7ZcdyFCINa3mzF9Wbzll
++YTqLNnmMkubiP1LvkH6VZ+NBvrxTNxiWJfu+qx87ez+S/7JoHm71p4SowtePfC2J
++qqok0s7b0GaBz+ZcNse/o8W6E1FiIi71wukUyYNhAoGAEgk/OnPK7dkPYKME5FQC
+++HGrMsjJVbCa9GOjvkNw8tVYSpq7q2n9sDHqRPmEBl0EYehAqyGIhmAONxVUbIsL
++ha0m04y0MI9S0H+ZRH2R8IfzndNAONsuk46XrQU6cfvtZ3Xh3IcY5U5sr35lRn2c
++ut3H52XIWJ4smN/cJcpOyoECgYEAjM5hNHnPlgj392wkXPkbtJXWHp3mSISQVLTd
++G0MW8/mBQg3AlXi/eRb+RpHPrppk5jQLhgMjRSPyXXe2amb8PuWTqfGN6l32PtX3
++3+udILpppb71Wf+w7JTbcl9v9uq7o9SVR8DKdPA+AeweSQ0TmqCnlHuNZizOSjwP
++G16GF0ECgYEA+ZWbNMS8qM5IiHgbMbHptdit9dDT4+1UXoNn0/hUW6ZEMriHMDXv
++iBwrzeANGAn5LEDYeDe1xPms9Is2uNxTpZVhpFZSNALR6Po68wDlTJG2PmzuBv5t
++5mbzkpWCoD4fRU53ifsHgaTW+7Um74gWIf0erNIUZuTN2YrtEPTnb3k=
++-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
++
++# corresponding public key
++PublicKey = RSA-2049-PUBLIC
++-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
++MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEBVfiJVWoXdfHHp3hqULGL
++woyemG7eVmfKs5uEEk6Q66dcHbCDrD5EO7qU3CNWD3XjqBaToqQ73HQm2MTq/mjI
++XeD+dX9uSbue1EfmAkMIANuwTOsi5/pXoY0zj7ZgJs20Z+cMwEDn02fvQDx78ePf
++YkZQCUYx8h6v0vtbyRX/BDeazRES9zLAtGYHwXjTiiD1LtpQny+cBAXVEGnoDM+U
++FVTQRwRnUFw89UHqCJffyfQAzsspj/x1M3LZ9pM68XTMQO2W1GcDFzO5f4zd0/kr
++w6A+qFdsQX8kAHteT3UBEFtUTen63N/635jftLsFuBmfP4Ws/ZH3qaCUuaOD9QSQ
++lwIDAQAB
++-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
++
++PrivPubKeyPair = RSA-2049:RSA-2049-PUBLIC
++
++# RSA decrypt
++
++# malformed that generates length specified by 3rd last value from PRF
++Decrypt = RSA-2049
++Input = 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
++Output = 42
++
++# simple positive test case
++Decrypt = RSA-2049
++Input = 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
++Output = "lorem ipsum"
++
++# positive test case with null padded ciphertext
++Decrypt = RSA-2049
++Input = 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
++Output = "lorem ipsum"
++
++# positive test case with null truncated ciphertext
++Decrypt = RSA-2049
++Input = 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
++Output = "lorem ipsum"
++
++# positive test case with double null padded ciphertext
++Decrypt = RSA-2049
++Input = 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
++Output = "lorem ipsum"
++
++# positive test case with double null truncated ciphertext
++Decrypt = RSA-2049
++Input = 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
++Output = "lorem ipsum"
++
++# a random negative test case that generates an 11 byte long message
++Decrypt = RSA-2049
++Input = 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
++Output = 1189b6f5498fd6df532b00
++
++# otherwise correct plaintext, but with wrong first byte (0x01 instead of 0x00)
++Decrypt = RSA-2049
++Input = 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
++Output = f6d0f5b78082fe61c04674
++
++# otherwise correct plaintext, but with wrong second byte (0x01 instead of 0x02)
++Decrypt = RSA-2049
++Input = 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
++Output = 1ab287fcef3ff17067914d
++
++# RSA decrypt with 3072 bit keys
++PrivateKey = RSA-3072
++-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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++-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
++
++PublicKey = RSA-3072-PUBLIC
++-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----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++-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
++
++PrivPubKeyPair = RSA-3072:RSA-3072-PUBLIC
++
++# a random invalid ciphertext that generates an empty synthethic one
++Decrypt = RSA-3072
++Input = 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
++Output =
++
++# a random invalid that has PRF output with a length one byte too long
++# in the last value
++Decrypt = RSA-3072
++Input = 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
++Output = 56a3bea054e01338be9b7d7957539c
++
++# a random invalid that generates a synthethic of maximum size
++Decrypt = RSA-3072
++Input = 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
++Output = 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
++
++# a positive test case that decrypts to 9 byte long value
++Decrypt = RSA-3072
++Input = 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
++Output = "forty two"
++
++# a positive test case with null padded ciphertext
++Decrypt = RSA-3072
++Input = 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
++Output = "forty two"
++
++# a positive test case with null truncated ciphertext
++Decrypt = RSA-3072
++Input = 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
++Output = "forty two"
++
++# a positive test case with double null padded ciphertext
++Decrypt = RSA-3072
++Input = 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
++Output = "forty two"
++
++# a positive test case with double null truncated ciphertext
++Decrypt = RSA-3072
++Input = 1ec97ac981dfd9dcc7a7389fdfa9d361141dac80c23a060410d472c16094e6cdffc0c3684d84aa402d7051dfccb2f6da33f66985d2a259f5b7fbf39ac537e95c5b7050eb18844a0513abef812cc8e74a3c5240009e6e805dcadf532bc1a2702d5acc9e585fad5b89d461fcc1397351cdce35171523758b171dc041f412e42966de7f94856477356d06f2a6b40e3ff0547562a4d91bbf1338e9e049facbee8b20171164505468cd308997447d3dc4b0acb49e7d368fedd8c734251f30a83491d2506f3f87318cc118823244a393dc7c5c739a2733d93e1b13db6840a9429947357f47b23fbe39b7d2d61e5ee26f9946c4632f6c4699e452f412a26641d4751135400713cd56ec66f0370423d55d2af70f5e7ad0adea8e4a0d904a01e4ac272eba4af1a029dd53eb71f115bf31f7a6c8b19a6523adeecc0d4c3c107575e38572a8f8474ccad163e46e2e8b08111132aa97a16fb588c9b7e37b3b3d7490381f3c55d1a9869a0fd42cd86fed59ecec78cb6b2dfd06a497f5afe3419691314ba0
++Output = "forty two"
++
++# a random negative test case that generates a 9 byte long message
++Decrypt = RSA-3072
++Input = 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
++Output = 257906ca6de8307728
++
++# a random negative test case that generates a 9 byte long message based on
++# second to last value from PRF
++Decrypt = RSA-3072
++Input = 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
++Output = 043383c929060374ed
++
++# a random negative test that generates message based on 3rd last value from
++# PRF
++Decrypt = RSA-3072
++Input = 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
++Output = 70263fa6050534b9e0
++
++# an otherwise valid plaintext, but with wrong first byte (0x01 instead of 0x00)
++Decrypt = RSA-3072
++Input = 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
++Output = 6d8d3a094ff3afff4c
++
++# an otherwise valid plaintext, but with wrong second byte (0x01 instead of 0x02)
++Decrypt = RSA-3072
++Input = 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
++Output = c6ae80ffa80bc184b0
++
++# an otherwise valid plaintext, but with zero byte in first byte of padding
++Decrypt = RSA-3072
++Input = 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
++Output = a8a9301daa01bb25c7
++
++# an otherwise valid plaintext, but with zero byte in eight byte of padding
++Decrypt = RSA-3072
++Input = 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
++Output = 6c716fe01d44398018
++
++# an otherwise valid plaintext, but with null separator missing
++Decrypt = RSA-3072
++Input = 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
++Output = aa2de6cde4e2442884
++
+ # RSA PSS key tests
+ 
+ # PSS only key, no parameter restrictions
+-- 
+2.34.1
+

meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-50781-5.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,284 @@
+From c693522a96b6fb2bb4b55a53d86550811bc0d7df Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 3 Nov 2022 17:45:58 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] rsa: Skip the synthethic plaintext test with old FIPS
+ provider
+
+since the 3.0.0 FIPS provider doesn't implement the Bleichenbacher
+workaround, the decryption fails instead of providing a synthetic
+plaintext, so skip them then
+
+CVE: CVE-2023-50781
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/ddecbef6e389d263b728b7fa30fd3d9ce13feddb]
+
+Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13817)
+Signed-off-by: Jiaying Song <jiaying.song.cn@windriver.com>
+---
+ .../30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt   | 66 ++++++++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 63 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt b/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt
+index d569e78..4bd7c72 100644
+--- a/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt
++++ b/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt
+@@ -253,12 +253,12 @@ Decrypt = RSA-2048
+ Input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
+ Output = "Hello World"
+ 
++# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
++FIPSversion = >3.0.0
+ # Corrupted ciphertext
+-FIPSversion = <3.2.0
+ Decrypt = RSA-2048
+ Input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
+-Output = "Hello World"
+-Result = KEYOP_ERROR
++Output = 4cbb988d6a46228379132b0b5f8c249b3860043848c93632fb982c807c7c82fffc7a9ef83f4908f890373ac181ffea6381e103bcaa27e65638b6ecebef38b59ed4226a9d12af675cfcb634d8c40e7a7aff
+ 
+ # OAEP padding
+ Decrypt = RSA-2048
+@@ -330,21 +330,29 @@ Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
+ Input = 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
+ Output = "lorem ipsum dolor sit amet"
+ 
++# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
++FIPSversion = >3.0.0
+ # a random negative test case decrypting to empty
+ Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
+ Input = 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
+ Output =
+ 
++# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
++FIPSversion = >3.0.0
+ # invalid decrypting to max length message
+ Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
+ Input = 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
+ Output = 22d850137b9eebe092b24f602dc5bb7918c16bd89ddbf20467b119d205f9c2e4bd7d2592cf1e532106e0f33557565923c73a02d4f09c0c22bea89148183e60317f7028b3aa1f261f91c979393101d7e15f4067e63979b32751658ef769610fe97cf9cef3278b3117d384051c3b1d82c251c2305418c8f6840530e631aad63e70e20e025bcd8efb54c92ec6d3b106a2f8e64eeff7d38495b0fc50c97138af4b1c0a67a1c4e27b077b8439332edfa8608dfeae653cd6a628ac550395f7e74390e42c11682234870925eeaa1fa71b76cf1f2ee3bda69f6717033ff8b7c95c9799e7a3bea5e7e4a1c359772fb6b1c6e6c516661dfe30c3
+ 
++# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
++FIPSversion = >3.0.0
+ # invalid decrypting to message with length specified by second to last value from PRF
+ Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
+ Input = 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
+ Output = 0f9b
+ 
++# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
++FIPSversion = >3.0.0
+ # invalid decrypting to message with length specified by third to last value from PRF
+ Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
+ Input = 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
+@@ -385,23 +393,31 @@ Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
+ Input = 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
+ Output = "lorem ipsum"
+ 
++# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
++FIPSversion = >3.0.0
+ # a random negative test that generates an 11 byte long message
+ Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
+ Input = 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
+ Output = af9ac70191c92413cb9f2d
+ 
++# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
++FIPSversion = >3.0.0
+ # an otherwise correct plaintext, but with wrong first byte
+ # (0x01 instead of 0x00), generates a random 11 byte long plaintext
+ Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
+ Input = 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
+ Output = a1f8c9255c35cfba403ccc
+ 
++# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
++FIPSversion = >3.0.0
+ # an otherwise correct plaintext, but with wrong second byte
+ # (0x01 instead of 0x02), generates a random 11 byte long plaintext
+ Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
+ Input = 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
+ Output = e6d700309ca0ed62452254
+ 
++# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
++FIPSversion = >3.0.0
+ # an invalid ciphertext, with a zero byte in first byte of
+ # ciphertext, decrypts to a random 11 byte long synthethic
+ # plaintext
+@@ -409,6 +425,8 @@ Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
+ Input = 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
+ Output = ba27b1842e7c21c0e7ef6a
+ 
++# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
++FIPSversion = >3.0.0
+ # an invalid ciphertext, with a zero byte removed from first byte of
+ # ciphertext, decrypts to a random 11 byte long synthethic
+ # plaintext
+@@ -416,6 +434,8 @@ Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
+ Input = 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
+ Output = ba27b1842e7c21c0e7ef6a
+ 
++# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
++FIPSversion = >3.0.0
+ # an invalid ciphertext, with two zero bytes in first bytes of
+ # ciphertext, decrypts to a random 11 byte long synthethic
+ # plaintext
+@@ -423,6 +443,8 @@ Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
+ Input = 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
+ Output = d5cf555b1d6151029a429a
+ 
++# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
++FIPSversion = >3.0.0
+ # an invalid ciphertext, with two zero bytes removed from first bytes of
+ # ciphertext, decrypts to a random 11 byte long synthethic
+ # plaintext
+@@ -430,24 +452,32 @@ Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
+ Input = 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
+ Output = d5cf555b1d6151029a429a
+ 
++# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
++FIPSversion = >3.0.0
+ # and invalid ciphertext, otherwise valid but starting with 000002, decrypts
+ # to random 11 byte long synthethic plaintext
+ Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
+ Input = 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
+ Output = 3d4a054d9358209e9cbbb9
+ 
++# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
++FIPSversion = >3.0.0
+ # negative test with otherwise valid padding but a zero byte in first byte
+ # of padding
+ Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
+ Input = 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
+ Output = 1f037dd717b07d3e7f7359
+ 
++# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
++FIPSversion = >3.0.0
+ # negative test with otherwise valid padding but a zero byte at the eigth
+ # byte of padding
+ Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
+ Input = 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
+ Output = 63cb0bf65fc8255dd29e17
+ 
++# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
++FIPSversion = >3.0.0
+ # negative test with an otherwise valid plaintext but with missing separator
+ # byte
+ Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
+@@ -501,6 +531,8 @@ PrivPubKeyPair = RSA-2049:RSA-2049-PUBLIC
+ 
+ # RSA decrypt
+ 
++# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
++FIPSversion = >3.0.0
+ # malformed that generates length specified by 3rd last value from PRF
+ Decrypt = RSA-2049
+ Input = 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
+@@ -531,16 +563,22 @@ Decrypt = RSA-2049
+ Input = 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
+ Output = "lorem ipsum"
+ 
++# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
++FIPSversion = >3.0.0
+ # a random negative test case that generates an 11 byte long message
+ Decrypt = RSA-2049
+ Input = 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
+ Output = 1189b6f5498fd6df532b00
+ 
++# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
++FIPSversion = >3.0.0
+ # otherwise correct plaintext, but with wrong first byte (0x01 instead of 0x00)
+ Decrypt = RSA-2049
+ Input = 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
+ Output = f6d0f5b78082fe61c04674
+ 
++# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
++FIPSversion = >3.0.0
+ # otherwise correct plaintext, but with wrong second byte (0x01 instead of 0x02)
+ Decrypt = RSA-2049
+ Input = 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
+@@ -603,17 +641,23 @@ ooCElYcob01/JWzoXl61Z5sdrMH5CVZJty5foHKusAN5AgMBAAE=
+ 
+ PrivPubKeyPair = RSA-3072:RSA-3072-PUBLIC
+ 
++# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
++FIPSversion = >3.0.0
+ # a random invalid ciphertext that generates an empty synthethic one
+ Decrypt = RSA-3072
+ Input = 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
+ Output =
+ 
++# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
++FIPSversion = >3.0.0
+ # a random invalid that has PRF output with a length one byte too long
+ # in the last value
+ Decrypt = RSA-3072
+ Input = 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
+ Output = 56a3bea054e01338be9b7d7957539c
+ 
++# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
++FIPSversion = >3.0.0
+ # a random invalid that generates a synthethic of maximum size
+ Decrypt = RSA-3072
+ Input = 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
+@@ -644,43 +688,59 @@ Decrypt = RSA-3072
+ Input = 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
+ Output = "forty two"
+ 
++# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
++FIPSversion = >3.0.0
+ # a random negative test case that generates a 9 byte long message
+ Decrypt = RSA-3072
+ Input = 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
+ Output = 257906ca6de8307728
+ 
++# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
++FIPSversion = >3.0.0
+ # a random negative test case that generates a 9 byte long message based on
+ # second to last value from PRF
+ Decrypt = RSA-3072
+ Input = 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
+ Output = 043383c929060374ed
+ 
++# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
++FIPSversion = >3.0.0
+ # a random negative test that generates message based on 3rd last value from
+ # PRF
+ Decrypt = RSA-3072
+ Input = 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
+ Output = 70263fa6050534b9e0
+ 
++# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
++FIPSversion = >3.0.0
+ # an otherwise valid plaintext, but with wrong first byte (0x01 instead of 0x00)
+ Decrypt = RSA-3072
+ Input = 6db80adb5ff0a768caf1378ecc382a694e7d1bde2eff4ba12c48aaf794ded7a994a5b2b57acec20dbec4ae385c9dd531945c0f197a5496908725fc99d88601a17d3bb0b2d38d2c1c3100f39955a4cb3dbed5a38bf900f23d91e173640e4ec655c84fdfe71fcdb12a386108fcf718c9b7af37d39703e882436224c877a2235e8344fba6c951eb7e2a4d1d1de81fb463ac1b880f6cc0e59ade05c8ce35179ecd09546731fc07b141d3d6b342a97ae747e61a9130f72d37ac5a2c30215b6cbd66c7db893810df58b4c457b4b54f34428247d584e0fa71062446210db08254fb9ead1ba1a393c724bd291f0cf1a7143f32df849051dc896d7d176fef3b57ab6dffd626d0c3044e9edb2e3d012ace202d2581df01bec7e9aa0727a6650dd373d374f0bc0f4a611f8139dfe97d63e70c6188f4df5b672e47c51d8aa567097293fbff127c75ec690b43407578b73c85451710a0cece58fd497d7f7bd36a8a92783ef7dc6265dff52aac8b70340b996508d39217f2783ce6fc91a1cc94bb2ac487b84f62
+ Output = 6d8d3a094ff3afff4c
+ 
++# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
++FIPSversion = >3.0.0
+ # an otherwise valid plaintext, but with wrong second byte (0x01 instead of 0x02)
+ Decrypt = RSA-3072
+ Input = 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
+ Output = c6ae80ffa80bc184b0
+ 
++# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
++FIPSversion = >3.0.0
+ # an otherwise valid plaintext, but with zero byte in first byte of padding
+ Decrypt = RSA-3072
+ Input = 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
+ Output = a8a9301daa01bb25c7
+ 
++# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
++FIPSversion = >3.0.0
+ # an otherwise valid plaintext, but with zero byte in eight byte of padding
+ Decrypt = RSA-3072
+ Input = 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
+ Output = 6c716fe01d44398018
+ 
++# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
++FIPSversion = >3.0.0
+ # an otherwise valid plaintext, but with null separator missing
+ Decrypt = RSA-3072
+ Input = 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
+-- 
+2.34.1
+

meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-50781-6.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+From 455db0c94c0b83083ce8b792982c03aa56fc866f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2022 17:42:11 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] rsa: add test for the option to disable implicit rejection
+
+CVE: CVE-2023-50781
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/455db0c94c0b83083ce8b792982c03aa56fc866f]
+
+Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13817)
+Signed-off-by: Jiaying Song <jiaying.song.cn@windriver.com>
+---
+ .../30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt    | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt b/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt
+index 0ad654fc60..a3d01eec45 100644
+--- a/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt
++++ b/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt
+@@ -253,6 +253,14 @@ Decrypt = RSA-2048
+ Input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
+ Output = "Hello World"
+ 
++# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
++FIPSversion = >3.0.0
++# Note: disable the Bleichenbacher workaround to see if it passes
++Decrypt = RSA-2048
++Ctrl = rsa_pkcs1_implicit_rejection:0
++Input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
++Output = "Hello World"
++
+ # The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
+ FIPSversion = >3.0.0
+ # Corrupted ciphertext
+@@ -261,6 +269,16 @@ Decrypt = RSA-2048
+ Input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
+ Output = 4cbb988d6a46228379132b0b5f8c249b3860043848c93632fb982c807c7c82fffc7a9ef83f4908f890373ac181ffea6381e103bcaa27e65638b6ecebef38b59ed4226a9d12af675cfcb634d8c40e7a7aff
+ 
++# The old FIPS provider doesn't include the workaround (#13817)
++FIPSversion = >3.0.0
++# Corrupted ciphertext
++# Note: disable the Bleichenbacher workaround to see if it fails
++Decrypt = RSA-2048
++Ctrl = rsa_pkcs1_implicit_rejection:0
++Input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
++Output = "Hello World"
++Result = KEYOP_ERROR
++
+ # OAEP padding
+ Decrypt = RSA-2048
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+-- 
+2.34.1
+

meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_3.0.18.bb

@@ -13,13 +13,19 @@ SRC_URI = "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/releases/download/openssl-${PV}/op
            file://afalg.patch \
            file://0001-Configure-do-not-tweak-mips-cflags.patch \
            file://CVE-2024-41996.patch \
-           "
+           file://CVE-2023-50781-1.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-50781-2.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-50781-3.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-50781-4.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-50781-5.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-50781-6.patch \
+          "
 
 SRC_URI:append:class-nativesdk = " \
            file://environment.d-openssl.sh \
            "
 
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "dfdd77e4ea1b57ff3a6dbde6b0bdc3f31db5ac99e7fdd4eaf9e1fbb6ec2db8ce"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "d80c34f5cf902dccf1f1b5df5ebb86d0392e37049e5d73df1b3abae72e4ffe8b"
 
 inherit lib_package multilib_header multilib_script ptest perlnative
 MULTILIB_SCRIPTS = "${PN}-bin:${bindir}/c_rehash"

meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/CVE-2022-37660-0001.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,254 @@
+From 9d3f347a2b14652e767d51142600206a32676b62 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
+Date: Mon, 24 Jan 2022 20:57:19 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] DPP3: Add PKEX initiator retries and fallback from v2 to v1
+ for hostapd
+
+This extends hostapd with the design used in wpa_supplicant for PKEX
+initiator retries and automatic version fallback from v2 to v1 (the
+latter is enabled only with CONFIG_DPP3=y).
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
+
+CVE: CVE-2022-37660
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/?id=9d3f347a2b14652e767d51142600206a32676b62]
+
+Signed-off-by: Divya Chellam <divya.chellam@windriver.com>
+---
+ src/ap/dpp_hostapd.c | 188 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 171 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/ap/dpp_hostapd.c b/src/ap/dpp_hostapd.c
+index 13e1fc5..6c30ba3 100644
+--- a/src/ap/dpp_hostapd.c
++++ b/src/ap/dpp_hostapd.c
+@@ -216,6 +216,163 @@ static void hostapd_dpp_auth_resp_retry(struct hostapd_data *hapd)
+ }
+ 
+ 
++static int hostapd_dpp_allow_ir(struct hostapd_data *hapd, unsigned int freq)
++{
++	int i, j;
++
++	if (!hapd->iface->hw_features)
++		return -1;
++
++	for (i = 0; i < hapd->iface->num_hw_features; i++) {
++		struct hostapd_hw_modes *mode = &hapd->iface->hw_features[i];
++
++		for (j = 0; j < mode->num_channels; j++) {
++			struct hostapd_channel_data *chan = &mode->channels[j];
++
++			if (chan->freq != (int) freq)
++				continue;
++
++			if (chan->flag & (HOSTAPD_CHAN_DISABLED |
++					  HOSTAPD_CHAN_NO_IR |
++					  HOSTAPD_CHAN_RADAR))
++				continue;
++
++			return 1;
++		}
++	}
++
++	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
++		   "DPP: Frequency %u MHz not supported or does not allow PKEX initiation in the current channel list",
++		   freq);
++
++	return 0;
++}
++
++
++static int hostapd_dpp_pkex_next_channel(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
++					 struct dpp_pkex *pkex)
++{
++	if (pkex->freq == 2437)
++		pkex->freq = 5745;
++	else if (pkex->freq == 5745)
++		pkex->freq = 5220;
++	else if (pkex->freq == 5220)
++		pkex->freq = 60480;
++	else
++		return -1; /* no more channels to try */
++
++	if (hostapd_dpp_allow_ir(hapd, pkex->freq) == 1) {
++		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: Try to initiate on %u MHz",
++			   pkex->freq);
++		return 0;
++	}
++
++	/* Could not use this channel - try the next one */
++	return hostapd_dpp_pkex_next_channel(hapd, pkex);
++}
++
++
++static int hostapd_dpp_pkex_init(struct hostapd_data *hapd, bool v2)
++{
++	struct dpp_pkex *pkex;
++	struct wpabuf *msg;
++	unsigned int wait_time;
++
++	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: Initiating PKEXv%d", v2 ? 2 : 1);
++	dpp_pkex_free(hapd->dpp_pkex);
++	hapd->dpp_pkex = dpp_pkex_init(hapd->msg_ctx, hapd->dpp_pkex_bi,
++				       hapd->own_addr,
++				       hapd->dpp_pkex_identifier,
++				       hapd->dpp_pkex_code, v2);
++	pkex = hapd->dpp_pkex;
++	if (!pkex)
++		return -1;
++
++	msg = hapd->dpp_pkex->exchange_req;
++	wait_time = 2000; /* TODO: hapd->max_remain_on_chan; */
++	pkex->freq = 2437;
++	wpa_msg(hapd->msg_ctx, MSG_INFO, DPP_EVENT_TX "dst=" MACSTR
++		" freq=%u type=%d", MAC2STR(broadcast), pkex->freq,
++		v2 ? DPP_PA_PKEX_EXCHANGE_REQ :
++		DPP_PA_PKEX_V1_EXCHANGE_REQ);
++	hostapd_drv_send_action(hapd, pkex->freq, 0, broadcast,
++				wpabuf_head(msg), wpabuf_len(msg));
++	pkex->exch_req_wait_time = wait_time;
++	pkex->exch_req_tries = 1;
++
++	return 0;
++}
++
++
++static void hostapd_dpp_pkex_retry_timeout(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx)
++{
++	struct hostapd_data *hapd = eloop_ctx;
++	struct dpp_pkex *pkex = hapd->dpp_pkex;
++
++	if (!pkex || !pkex->exchange_req)
++		return;
++	if (pkex->exch_req_tries >= 5) {
++		if (hostapd_dpp_pkex_next_channel(hapd, pkex) < 0) {
++#ifdef CONFIG_DPP3
++			if (pkex->v2) {
++				wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
++					   "DPP: Fall back to PKEXv1");
++				hostapd_dpp_pkex_init(hapd, false);
++				return;
++			}
++#endif /* CONFIG_DPP3 */
++			wpa_msg(hapd->msg_ctx, MSG_INFO, DPP_EVENT_FAIL
++				"No response from PKEX peer");
++			dpp_pkex_free(pkex);
++			hapd->dpp_pkex = NULL;
++			return;
++		}
++		pkex->exch_req_tries = 0;
++	}
++
++	pkex->exch_req_tries++;
++	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: Retransmit PKEX Exchange Request (try %u)",
++		   pkex->exch_req_tries);
++	wpa_msg(hapd->msg_ctx, MSG_INFO, DPP_EVENT_TX "dst=" MACSTR
++		" freq=%u type=%d",
++		MAC2STR(broadcast), pkex->freq,
++		pkex->v2 ? DPP_PA_PKEX_EXCHANGE_REQ :
++		DPP_PA_PKEX_V1_EXCHANGE_REQ);
++	hostapd_drv_send_action(hapd, pkex->freq, pkex->exch_req_wait_time,
++				broadcast,
++				wpabuf_head(pkex->exchange_req),
++				wpabuf_len(pkex->exchange_req));
++}
++
++
++static void hostapd_dpp_pkex_tx_status(struct hostapd_data *hapd, const u8 *dst,
++				       const u8 *data, size_t data_len, int ok)
++{
++	struct dpp_pkex *pkex = hapd->dpp_pkex;
++
++	if (pkex->failed) {
++		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
++			   "DPP: Terminate PKEX exchange due to an earlier error");
++		if (pkex->t > pkex->own_bi->pkex_t)
++			pkex->own_bi->pkex_t = pkex->t;
++		dpp_pkex_free(pkex);
++		hapd->dpp_pkex = NULL;
++		return;
++	}
++
++	if (pkex->exch_req_wait_time && pkex->exchange_req) {
++		/* Wait for PKEX Exchange Response frame and retry request if
++		 * no response is seen. */
++		eloop_cancel_timeout(hostapd_dpp_pkex_retry_timeout, hapd,
++				     NULL);
++		eloop_register_timeout(pkex->exch_req_wait_time / 1000,
++				       (pkex->exch_req_wait_time % 1000) * 1000,
++				       hostapd_dpp_pkex_retry_timeout, hapd,
++				       NULL);
++	}
++}
++
++
+ void hostapd_dpp_tx_status(struct hostapd_data *hapd, const u8 *dst,
+ 			   const u8 *data, size_t data_len, int ok)
+ {
+@@ -227,6 +384,11 @@ void hostapd_dpp_tx_status(struct hostapd_data *hapd, const u8 *dst,
+ 		" result=%s", MAC2STR(dst), ok ? "SUCCESS" : "FAILED");
+ 
+ 	if (!hapd->dpp_auth) {
++		if (hapd->dpp_pkex) {
++			hostapd_dpp_pkex_tx_status(hapd, dst, data, data_len,
++						   ok);
++			return;
++		}
+ 		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+ 			   "DPP: Ignore TX status since there is no ongoing authentication exchange");
+ 		return;
+@@ -1783,6 +1945,9 @@ hostapd_dpp_rx_pkex_exchange_resp(struct hostapd_data *hapd, const u8 *src,
+ 		return;
+ 	}
+ 
++	eloop_cancel_timeout(hostapd_dpp_pkex_retry_timeout, hapd, NULL);
++	hapd->dpp_pkex->exch_req_wait_time = 0;
++
+ 	msg = dpp_pkex_rx_exchange_resp(hapd->dpp_pkex, src, buf, len);
+ 	if (!msg) {
+ 		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: Failed to process the response");
+@@ -2172,26 +2337,14 @@ int hostapd_dpp_pkex_add(struct hostapd_data *hapd, const char *cmd)
+ 		return -1;
+ 
+ 	if (os_strstr(cmd, " init=1") || os_strstr(cmd, " init=2")) {
+-		struct wpabuf *msg;
++#ifdef CONFIG_DPP3
++		bool v2 = true;
++#else /* CONFIG_DPP3 */
+ 		bool v2 = os_strstr(cmd, " init=2") != NULL;
++#endif /* CONFIG_DPP3 */
+ 
+-		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: Initiating PKEX");
+-		dpp_pkex_free(hapd->dpp_pkex);
+-		hapd->dpp_pkex = dpp_pkex_init(hapd->msg_ctx, own_bi,
+-					       hapd->own_addr,
+-					       hapd->dpp_pkex_identifier,
+-					       hapd->dpp_pkex_code, v2);
+-		if (!hapd->dpp_pkex)
++		if (hostapd_dpp_pkex_init(hapd, v2) < 0)
+ 			return -1;
+-
+-		msg = hapd->dpp_pkex->exchange_req;
+-		/* TODO: Which channel to use? */
+-		wpa_msg(hapd->msg_ctx, MSG_INFO, DPP_EVENT_TX "dst=" MACSTR
+-			" freq=%u type=%d", MAC2STR(broadcast), 2437,
+-			v2 ? DPP_PA_PKEX_EXCHANGE_REQ :
+-			DPP_PA_PKEX_V1_EXCHANGE_REQ);
+-		hostapd_drv_send_action(hapd, 2437, 0, broadcast,
+-					wpabuf_head(msg), wpabuf_len(msg));
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* TODO: Support multiple PKEX info entries */
+@@ -2319,6 +2472,7 @@ void hostapd_dpp_deinit(struct hostapd_data *hapd)
+ #endif /* CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS */
+ 	if (!hapd->dpp_init_done)
+ 		return;
++	eloop_cancel_timeout(hostapd_dpp_pkex_retry_timeout, hapd, NULL);
+ 	eloop_cancel_timeout(hostapd_dpp_reply_wait_timeout, hapd, NULL);
+ 	eloop_cancel_timeout(hostapd_dpp_auth_conf_wait_timeout, hapd, NULL);
+ 	eloop_cancel_timeout(hostapd_dpp_init_timeout, hapd, NULL);
+-- 
+2.40.0
+

meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/CVE-2022-37660-0002.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
+From 80213629981a21825e4688fde1b590e4c4d4bcea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
+Date: Mon, 24 Jan 2022 20:21:24 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] DPP3: Start with PKEXv2 and fall back to v1
+
+Use automatic PKEX version negotiation as the initiator by starting with
+PKEXv2 and if no response is received, trying again with PKEXv1. For
+now, this is enabled only in wpa_supplicant CONFIG_DPP3=y builds.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
+
+CVE: CVE-2022-37660
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/?id=80213629981a21825e4688fde1b590e4c4d4bcea]
+
+Signed-off-by: Divya Chellam <divya.chellam@windriver.com>
+---
+ wpa_supplicant/dpp_supplicant.c | 81 +++++++++++++++++++++------------
+ 1 file changed, 52 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/dpp_supplicant.c b/wpa_supplicant/dpp_supplicant.c
+index 584654a..43c85d3 100644
+--- a/wpa_supplicant/dpp_supplicant.c
++++ b/wpa_supplicant/dpp_supplicant.c
+@@ -2557,6 +2557,45 @@ static int wpas_dpp_pkex_next_channel(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
+ }
+ 
+ 
++static int wpas_dpp_pkex_init(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, bool v2)
++{
++	struct dpp_pkex *pkex;
++	struct wpabuf *msg;
++	unsigned int wait_time;
++
++	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: Initiating PKEXv%d", v2 ? 2 : 1);
++	dpp_pkex_free(wpa_s->dpp_pkex);
++	wpa_s->dpp_pkex = dpp_pkex_init(wpa_s, wpa_s->dpp_pkex_bi,
++					wpa_s->own_addr,
++					wpa_s->dpp_pkex_identifier,
++					wpa_s->dpp_pkex_code, v2);
++	pkex = wpa_s->dpp_pkex;
++	if (!pkex)
++		return -1;
++
++	msg = pkex->exchange_req;
++	wait_time = wpa_s->max_remain_on_chan;
++	if (wait_time > 2000)
++		wait_time = 2000;
++	pkex->freq = 2437;
++	wpa_msg(wpa_s, MSG_INFO, DPP_EVENT_TX "dst=" MACSTR
++		" freq=%u type=%d",
++		MAC2STR(broadcast), pkex->freq,
++		v2 ? DPP_PA_PKEX_EXCHANGE_REQ :
++		DPP_PA_PKEX_V1_EXCHANGE_REQ);
++	offchannel_send_action(wpa_s, pkex->freq, broadcast,
++			       wpa_s->own_addr, broadcast,
++			       wpabuf_head(msg), wpabuf_len(msg),
++			       wait_time, wpas_dpp_tx_pkex_status, 0);
++	if (wait_time == 0)
++		wait_time = 2000;
++	pkex->exch_req_wait_time = wait_time;
++	pkex->exch_req_tries = 1;
++
++	return 0;
++}
++
++
+ static void wpas_dpp_pkex_retry_timeout(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx)
+ {
+ 	struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s = eloop_ctx;
+@@ -2566,6 +2605,14 @@ static void wpas_dpp_pkex_retry_timeout(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx)
+ 		return;
+ 	if (pkex->exch_req_tries >= 5) {
+ 		if (wpas_dpp_pkex_next_channel(wpa_s, pkex) < 0) {
++#ifdef CONFIG_DPP3
++			if (pkex->v2) {
++				wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
++					   "DPP: Fall back to PKEXv1");
++				wpas_dpp_pkex_init(wpa_s, false);
++				return;
++			}
++#endif /* CONFIG_DPP3 */
+ 			wpa_msg(wpa_s, MSG_INFO, DPP_EVENT_FAIL
+ 				"No response from PKEX peer");
+ 			dpp_pkex_free(pkex);
+@@ -3271,7 +3318,6 @@ int wpas_dpp_pkex_add(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, const char *cmd)
+ {
+ 	struct dpp_bootstrap_info *own_bi;
+ 	const char *pos, *end;
+-	unsigned int wait_time;
+ 
+ 	pos = os_strstr(cmd, " own=");
+ 	if (!pos)
+@@ -3315,37 +3361,14 @@ int wpas_dpp_pkex_add(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, const char *cmd)
+ 		return -1;
+ 
+ 	if (os_strstr(cmd, " init=1") || os_strstr(cmd, " init=2")) {
+-		struct dpp_pkex *pkex;
+-		struct wpabuf *msg;
++#ifdef CONFIG_DPP3
++		bool v2 = true;
++#else /* CONFIG_DPP3 */
+ 		bool v2 = os_strstr(cmd, " init=2") != NULL;
++#endif /* CONFIG_DPP3 */
+ 
+-		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: Initiating PKEX");
+-		dpp_pkex_free(wpa_s->dpp_pkex);
+-		wpa_s->dpp_pkex = dpp_pkex_init(wpa_s, own_bi, wpa_s->own_addr,
+-						wpa_s->dpp_pkex_identifier,
+-						wpa_s->dpp_pkex_code, v2);
+-		pkex = wpa_s->dpp_pkex;
+-		if (!pkex)
++		if (wpas_dpp_pkex_init(wpa_s, v2) < 0)
+ 			return -1;
+-
+-		msg = pkex->exchange_req;
+-		wait_time = wpa_s->max_remain_on_chan;
+-		if (wait_time > 2000)
+-			wait_time = 2000;
+-		pkex->freq = 2437;
+-		wpa_msg(wpa_s, MSG_INFO, DPP_EVENT_TX "dst=" MACSTR
+-			" freq=%u type=%d",
+-			MAC2STR(broadcast), pkex->freq,
+-			v2 ? DPP_PA_PKEX_EXCHANGE_REQ :
+-			DPP_PA_PKEX_V1_EXCHANGE_REQ);
+-		offchannel_send_action(wpa_s, pkex->freq, broadcast,
+-				       wpa_s->own_addr, broadcast,
+-				       wpabuf_head(msg), wpabuf_len(msg),
+-				       wait_time, wpas_dpp_tx_pkex_status, 0);
+-		if (wait_time == 0)
+-			wait_time = 2000;
+-		pkex->exch_req_wait_time = wait_time;
+-		pkex->exch_req_tries = 1;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* TODO: Support multiple PKEX info entries */
+-- 
+2.40.0
+

meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/CVE-2022-37660-0003.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,196 @@
+From bdcccbc2755dd1a75731496782e02b5435fb9534 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
+Date: Tue, 25 Jan 2022 20:06:49 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] DPP: Change PKEX version configuration design
+
+Use a separate ver=<1|2> parameter to DPP_PKEX_ADD instead of
+overloading init=1 with version indication. This allows additional
+options for forcing v1-only and v2-only in addition to automatic mode
+(start with v2 and fall back to v1, if needed).
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
+
+CVE: CVE-2022-37660
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/?id=bdcccbc2755dd1a75731496782e02b5435fb9534]
+
+Signed-off-by: Divya Chellam <divya.chellam@windriver.com>
+---
+ src/ap/dpp_hostapd.c            | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
+ src/common/dpp.h                |  1 +
+ wpa_supplicant/dpp_supplicant.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
+ 3 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/ap/dpp_hostapd.c b/src/ap/dpp_hostapd.c
+index 6c30ba3..fdfdcf9 100644
+--- a/src/ap/dpp_hostapd.c
++++ b/src/ap/dpp_hostapd.c
+@@ -272,11 +272,19 @@ static int hostapd_dpp_pkex_next_channel(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
+ }
+ 
+ 
+-static int hostapd_dpp_pkex_init(struct hostapd_data *hapd, bool v2)
++enum hostapd_dpp_pkex_ver {
++	PKEX_VER_AUTO,
++	PKEX_VER_ONLY_1,
++	PKEX_VER_ONLY_2,
++};
++
++static int hostapd_dpp_pkex_init(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
++				 enum hostapd_dpp_pkex_ver ver)
+ {
+ 	struct dpp_pkex *pkex;
+ 	struct wpabuf *msg;
+ 	unsigned int wait_time;
++	bool v2 = ver != PKEX_VER_ONLY_1;
+ 
+ 	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: Initiating PKEXv%d", v2 ? 2 : 1);
+ 	dpp_pkex_free(hapd->dpp_pkex);
+@@ -287,6 +295,7 @@ static int hostapd_dpp_pkex_init(struct hostapd_data *hapd, bool v2)
+ 	pkex = hapd->dpp_pkex;
+ 	if (!pkex)
+ 		return -1;
++	pkex->forced_ver = ver != PKEX_VER_AUTO;
+ 
+ 	msg = hapd->dpp_pkex->exchange_req;
+ 	wait_time = 2000; /* TODO: hapd->max_remain_on_chan; */
+@@ -314,10 +323,10 @@ static void hostapd_dpp_pkex_retry_timeout(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx)
+ 	if (pkex->exch_req_tries >= 5) {
+ 		if (hostapd_dpp_pkex_next_channel(hapd, pkex) < 0) {
+ #ifdef CONFIG_DPP3
+-			if (pkex->v2) {
++			if (pkex->v2 && !pkex->forced_ver) {
+ 				wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+ 					   "DPP: Fall back to PKEXv1");
+-				hostapd_dpp_pkex_init(hapd, false);
++				hostapd_dpp_pkex_init(hapd, PKEX_VER_ONLY_1);
+ 				return;
+ 			}
+ #endif /* CONFIG_DPP3 */
+@@ -2336,14 +2345,28 @@ int hostapd_dpp_pkex_add(struct hostapd_data *hapd, const char *cmd)
+ 	if (!hapd->dpp_pkex_code)
+ 		return -1;
+ 
+-	if (os_strstr(cmd, " init=1") || os_strstr(cmd, " init=2")) {
++	if (os_strstr(cmd, " init=1")) {
+ #ifdef CONFIG_DPP3
+-		bool v2 = true;
++		enum hostapd_dpp_pkex_ver ver = PKEX_VER_AUTO;
+ #else /* CONFIG_DPP3 */
+-		bool v2 = os_strstr(cmd, " init=2") != NULL;
++		enum hostapd_dpp_pkex_ver ver = PKEX_VER_ONLY_1;
+ #endif /* CONFIG_DPP3 */
+ 
+-		if (hostapd_dpp_pkex_init(hapd, v2) < 0)
++		pos = os_strstr(cmd, " ver=");
++		if (pos) {
++			int v;
++
++			pos += 5;
++			v = atoi(pos);
++			if (v == 1)
++				ver = PKEX_VER_ONLY_1;
++			else if (v == 2)
++				ver = PKEX_VER_ONLY_2;
++			else
++				return -1;
++		}
++
++		if (hostapd_dpp_pkex_init(hapd, ver) < 0)
+ 			return -1;
+ 	}
+ 
+diff --git a/src/common/dpp.h b/src/common/dpp.h
+index 8d62a0e..bfea446 100644
+--- a/src/common/dpp.h
++++ b/src/common/dpp.h
+@@ -177,6 +177,7 @@ struct dpp_pkex {
+ 	unsigned int exchange_done:1;
+ 	unsigned int failed:1;
+ 	unsigned int v2:1;
++	unsigned int forced_ver:1;
+ 	struct dpp_bootstrap_info *own_bi;
+ 	u8 own_mac[ETH_ALEN];
+ 	u8 peer_mac[ETH_ALEN];
+diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/dpp_supplicant.c b/wpa_supplicant/dpp_supplicant.c
+index 43c85d3..61b300f 100644
+--- a/wpa_supplicant/dpp_supplicant.c
++++ b/wpa_supplicant/dpp_supplicant.c
+@@ -2557,11 +2557,19 @@ static int wpas_dpp_pkex_next_channel(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
+ }
+ 
+ 
+-static int wpas_dpp_pkex_init(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, bool v2)
++enum wpas_dpp_pkex_ver {
++	PKEX_VER_AUTO,
++	PKEX_VER_ONLY_1,
++	PKEX_VER_ONLY_2,
++};
++
++static int wpas_dpp_pkex_init(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
++			      enum wpas_dpp_pkex_ver ver)
+ {
+ 	struct dpp_pkex *pkex;
+ 	struct wpabuf *msg;
+ 	unsigned int wait_time;
++	bool v2 = ver != PKEX_VER_ONLY_1;
+ 
+ 	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: Initiating PKEXv%d", v2 ? 2 : 1);
+ 	dpp_pkex_free(wpa_s->dpp_pkex);
+@@ -2572,6 +2580,7 @@ static int wpas_dpp_pkex_init(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, bool v2)
+ 	pkex = wpa_s->dpp_pkex;
+ 	if (!pkex)
+ 		return -1;
++	pkex->forced_ver = ver != PKEX_VER_AUTO;
+ 
+ 	msg = pkex->exchange_req;
+ 	wait_time = wpa_s->max_remain_on_chan;
+@@ -2606,10 +2615,10 @@ static void wpas_dpp_pkex_retry_timeout(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx)
+ 	if (pkex->exch_req_tries >= 5) {
+ 		if (wpas_dpp_pkex_next_channel(wpa_s, pkex) < 0) {
+ #ifdef CONFIG_DPP3
+-			if (pkex->v2) {
++			if (pkex->v2 && !pkex->forced_ver) {
+ 				wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+ 					   "DPP: Fall back to PKEXv1");
+-				wpas_dpp_pkex_init(wpa_s, false);
++				wpas_dpp_pkex_init(wpa_s, PKEX_VER_ONLY_1);
+ 				return;
+ 			}
+ #endif /* CONFIG_DPP3 */
+@@ -3360,14 +3369,28 @@ int wpas_dpp_pkex_add(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, const char *cmd)
+ 	if (!wpa_s->dpp_pkex_code)
+ 		return -1;
+ 
+-	if (os_strstr(cmd, " init=1") || os_strstr(cmd, " init=2")) {
++	if (os_strstr(cmd, " init=1")) {
+ #ifdef CONFIG_DPP3
+-		bool v2 = true;
++		enum wpas_dpp_pkex_ver ver = PKEX_VER_AUTO;
+ #else /* CONFIG_DPP3 */
+-		bool v2 = os_strstr(cmd, " init=2") != NULL;
++		enum wpas_dpp_pkex_ver ver = PKEX_VER_ONLY_1;
+ #endif /* CONFIG_DPP3 */
+ 
+-		if (wpas_dpp_pkex_init(wpa_s, v2) < 0)
++		pos = os_strstr(cmd, " ver=");
++		if (pos) {
++			int v;
++
++			pos += 5;
++			v = atoi(pos);
++			if (v == 1)
++				ver = PKEX_VER_ONLY_1;
++			else if (v == 2)
++				ver = PKEX_VER_ONLY_2;
++			else
++				return -1;
++		}
++
++		if (wpas_dpp_pkex_init(wpa_s, ver) < 0)
+ 			return -1;
+ 	}
+ 
+-- 
+2.40.0
+

meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/CVE-2022-37660-0004.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,941 @@
+From d7be749335f2585658cf98c4f0e7d6cd5ac06865 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
+Date: Tue, 25 Jan 2022 00:35:36 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] DPP3: PKEX over TCP
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
+
+CVE: CVE-2022-37660
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/?id=d7be749335f2585658cf98c4f0e7d6cd5ac06865]
+
+Signed-off-by: Divya Chellam <divya.chellam@windriver.com>
+---
+ src/ap/dpp_hostapd.c            | 155 ++++++++++++++--
+ src/common/dpp.h                |  13 ++
+ src/common/dpp_pkex.c           |  18 +-
+ src/common/dpp_tcp.c            | 308 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ wpa_supplicant/dpp_supplicant.c | 122 ++++++++++++-
+ 5 files changed, 580 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/ap/dpp_hostapd.c b/src/ap/dpp_hostapd.c
+index fdfdcf9..d956be9 100644
+--- a/src/ap/dpp_hostapd.c
++++ b/src/ap/dpp_hostapd.c
+@@ -28,12 +28,16 @@ static void hostapd_dpp_auth_conf_wait_timeout(void *eloop_ctx,
+ static void hostapd_dpp_auth_success(struct hostapd_data *hapd, int initiator);
+ static void hostapd_dpp_init_timeout(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx);
+ static int hostapd_dpp_auth_init_next(struct hostapd_data *hapd);
++static void hostapd_dpp_set_testing_options(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
++					    struct dpp_authentication *auth);
+ #ifdef CONFIG_DPP2
+ static void hostapd_dpp_reconfig_reply_wait_timeout(void *eloop_ctx,
+ 						    void *timeout_ctx);
+ static void hostapd_dpp_handle_config_obj(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
+ 					  struct dpp_authentication *auth,
+ 					  struct dpp_config_obj *conf);
++static int hostapd_dpp_process_conf_obj(void *ctx,
++					struct dpp_authentication *auth);
+ #endif /* CONFIG_DPP2 */
+ 
+ static const u8 broadcast[ETH_ALEN] = { 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff };
+@@ -272,6 +276,75 @@ static int hostapd_dpp_pkex_next_channel(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
+ }
+ 
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_DPP2
++static int hostapd_dpp_pkex_done(void *ctx, void *conn,
++				 struct dpp_bootstrap_info *peer_bi)
++{
++	struct hostapd_data *hapd = ctx;
++	const char *cmd = hapd->dpp_pkex_auth_cmd;
++	const char *pos;
++	u8 allowed_roles = DPP_CAPAB_CONFIGURATOR;
++	struct dpp_bootstrap_info *own_bi = NULL;
++	struct dpp_authentication *auth;
++
++	if (!cmd)
++		cmd = "";
++	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: Start authentication after PKEX (cmd: %s)",
++		   cmd);
++
++	pos = os_strstr(cmd, " own=");
++	if (pos) {
++		pos += 5;
++		own_bi = dpp_bootstrap_get_id(hapd->iface->interfaces->dpp,
++					      atoi(pos));
++		if (!own_bi) {
++			wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
++				   "DPP: Could not find bootstrapping info for the identified local entry");
++			return -1;
++		}
++
++		if (peer_bi->curve != own_bi->curve) {
++			wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
++				   "DPP: Mismatching curves in bootstrapping info (peer=%s own=%s)",
++				   peer_bi->curve->name, own_bi->curve->name);
++			return -1;
++		}
++	}
++
++	pos = os_strstr(cmd, " role=");
++	if (pos) {
++		pos += 6;
++		if (os_strncmp(pos, "configurator", 12) == 0)
++			allowed_roles = DPP_CAPAB_CONFIGURATOR;
++		else if (os_strncmp(pos, "enrollee", 8) == 0)
++			allowed_roles = DPP_CAPAB_ENROLLEE;
++		else if (os_strncmp(pos, "either", 6) == 0)
++			allowed_roles = DPP_CAPAB_CONFIGURATOR |
++				DPP_CAPAB_ENROLLEE;
++		else
++			return -1;
++	}
++
++	auth = dpp_auth_init(hapd->iface->interfaces->dpp, hapd->msg_ctx,
++			     peer_bi, own_bi, allowed_roles, 0,
++			     hapd->iface->hw_features,
++			     hapd->iface->num_hw_features);
++	if (!auth)
++		return -1;
++
++	hostapd_dpp_set_testing_options(hapd, auth);
++	if (dpp_set_configurator(auth, cmd) < 0) {
++		dpp_auth_deinit(auth);
++		return -1;
++	}
++
++	return dpp_tcp_auth(hapd->iface->interfaces->dpp, conn, auth,
++			    hapd->conf->dpp_name, DPP_NETROLE_AP,
++			    hostapd_dpp_process_conf_obj);
++}
++#endif /* CONFIG_DPP2 */
++
++
+ enum hostapd_dpp_pkex_ver {
+ 	PKEX_VER_AUTO,
+ 	PKEX_VER_ONLY_1,
+@@ -279,7 +352,9 @@ enum hostapd_dpp_pkex_ver {
+ };
+ 
+ static int hostapd_dpp_pkex_init(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
+-				 enum hostapd_dpp_pkex_ver ver)
++				 enum hostapd_dpp_pkex_ver ver,
++				 const struct hostapd_ip_addr *ipaddr,
++				 int tcp_port)
+ {
+ 	struct dpp_pkex *pkex;
+ 	struct wpabuf *msg;
+@@ -288,15 +363,26 @@ static int hostapd_dpp_pkex_init(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
+ 
+ 	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: Initiating PKEXv%d", v2 ? 2 : 1);
+ 	dpp_pkex_free(hapd->dpp_pkex);
+-	hapd->dpp_pkex = dpp_pkex_init(hapd->msg_ctx, hapd->dpp_pkex_bi,
+-				       hapd->own_addr,
+-				       hapd->dpp_pkex_identifier,
+-				       hapd->dpp_pkex_code, v2);
+-	pkex = hapd->dpp_pkex;
++	hapd->dpp_pkex = NULL;
++	pkex = dpp_pkex_init(hapd->msg_ctx, hapd->dpp_pkex_bi, hapd->own_addr,
++			     hapd->dpp_pkex_identifier,
++			     hapd->dpp_pkex_code, v2);
+ 	if (!pkex)
+ 		return -1;
+ 	pkex->forced_ver = ver != PKEX_VER_AUTO;
+ 
++	if (ipaddr) {
++#ifdef CONFIG_DPP2
++		return dpp_tcp_pkex_init(hapd->iface->interfaces->dpp, pkex,
++					 ipaddr, tcp_port,
++					 hapd->msg_ctx, hapd,
++					 hostapd_dpp_pkex_done);
++#else /* CONFIG_DPP2 */
++		return -1;
++#endif /* CONFIG_DPP2 */
++	}
++
++	hapd->dpp_pkex = pkex;
+ 	msg = hapd->dpp_pkex->exchange_req;
+ 	wait_time = 2000; /* TODO: hapd->max_remain_on_chan; */
+ 	pkex->freq = 2437;
+@@ -326,7 +412,8 @@ static void hostapd_dpp_pkex_retry_timeout(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx)
+ 			if (pkex->v2 && !pkex->forced_ver) {
+ 				wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+ 					   "DPP: Fall back to PKEXv1");
+-				hostapd_dpp_pkex_init(hapd, PKEX_VER_ONLY_1);
++				hostapd_dpp_pkex_init(hapd, PKEX_VER_ONLY_1,
++						      NULL, 0);
+ 				return;
+ 			}
+ #endif /* CONFIG_DPP3 */
+@@ -1883,7 +1970,7 @@ static void hostapd_dpp_rx_peer_disc_req(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
+ 
+ static void
+ hostapd_dpp_rx_pkex_exchange_req(struct hostapd_data *hapd, const u8 *src,
+-				 const u8 *buf, size_t len,
++				 const u8 *hdr, const u8 *buf, size_t len,
+ 				 unsigned int freq, bool v2)
+ {
+ 	struct wpabuf *msg;
+@@ -1897,14 +1984,14 @@ hostapd_dpp_rx_pkex_exchange_req(struct hostapd_data *hapd, const u8 *src,
+ 	if (!hapd->dpp_pkex_code || !hapd->dpp_pkex_bi) {
+ 		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+ 			   "DPP: No PKEX code configured - ignore request");
+-		return;
++		goto try_relay;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if (hapd->dpp_pkex) {
+ 		/* TODO: Support parallel operations */
+ 		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+ 			   "DPP: Already in PKEX session - ignore new request");
+-		return;
++		goto try_relay;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	hapd->dpp_pkex = dpp_pkex_rx_exchange_req(hapd->msg_ctx,
+@@ -1916,7 +2003,7 @@ hostapd_dpp_rx_pkex_exchange_req(struct hostapd_data *hapd, const u8 *src,
+ 	if (!hapd->dpp_pkex) {
+ 		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+ 			   "DPP: Failed to process the request - ignore it");
+-		return;
++		goto try_relay;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	msg = hapd->dpp_pkex->exchange_resp;
+@@ -1933,6 +2020,17 @@ hostapd_dpp_rx_pkex_exchange_req(struct hostapd_data *hapd, const u8 *src,
+ 		dpp_pkex_free(hapd->dpp_pkex);
+ 		hapd->dpp_pkex = NULL;
+ 	}
++
++	return;
++
++try_relay:
++#ifdef CONFIG_DPP2
++	if (v2)
++		dpp_relay_rx_action(hapd->iface->interfaces->dpp,
++				    src, hdr, buf, len, freq, NULL, NULL, hapd);
++#else /* CONFIG_DPP2 */
++	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: No relay functionality included - skip");
++#endif /* CONFIG_DPP2 */
+ }
+ 
+ 
+@@ -2132,12 +2230,12 @@ void hostapd_dpp_rx_action(struct hostapd_data *hapd, const u8 *src,
+ 		/* This is for PKEXv2, but for now, process only with
+ 		 * CONFIG_DPP3 to avoid issues with a capability that has not
+ 		 * been tested with other implementations. */
+-		hostapd_dpp_rx_pkex_exchange_req(hapd, src, buf, len, freq,
++		hostapd_dpp_rx_pkex_exchange_req(hapd, src, hdr, buf, len, freq,
+ 						 true);
+ 		break;
+ #endif /* CONFIG_DPP3 */
+ 	case DPP_PA_PKEX_V1_EXCHANGE_REQ:
+-		hostapd_dpp_rx_pkex_exchange_req(hapd, src, buf, len, freq,
++		hostapd_dpp_rx_pkex_exchange_req(hapd, src, hdr, buf, len, freq,
+ 						 false);
+ 		break;
+ 	case DPP_PA_PKEX_EXCHANGE_RESP:
+@@ -2303,6 +2401,29 @@ int hostapd_dpp_pkex_add(struct hostapd_data *hapd, const char *cmd)
+ {
+ 	struct dpp_bootstrap_info *own_bi;
+ 	const char *pos, *end;
++	int tcp_port = DPP_TCP_PORT;
++	struct hostapd_ip_addr *ipaddr = NULL;
++#ifdef CONFIG_DPP2
++	struct hostapd_ip_addr ipaddr_buf;
++	char *addr;
++
++	pos = os_strstr(cmd, " tcp_port=");
++	if (pos) {
++		pos += 10;
++		tcp_port = atoi(pos);
++	}
++
++	addr = get_param(cmd, " tcp_addr=");
++	if (addr) {
++		int res;
++
++		res = hostapd_parse_ip_addr(addr, &ipaddr_buf);
++		os_free(addr);
++		if (res)
++			return -1;
++		ipaddr = &ipaddr_buf;
++	}
++#endif /* CONFIG_DPP2 */
+ 
+ 	pos = os_strstr(cmd, " own=");
+ 	if (!pos)
+@@ -2366,8 +2487,14 @@ int hostapd_dpp_pkex_add(struct hostapd_data *hapd, const char *cmd)
+ 				return -1;
+ 		}
+ 
+-		if (hostapd_dpp_pkex_init(hapd, ver) < 0)
++		if (hostapd_dpp_pkex_init(hapd, ver, ipaddr, tcp_port) < 0)
+ 			return -1;
++	} else {
++#ifdef CONFIG_DPP2
++		dpp_controller_pkex_add(hapd->iface->interfaces->dpp, own_bi,
++					hapd->dpp_pkex_code,
++					hapd->dpp_pkex_identifier);
++#endif /* CONFIG_DPP2 */
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* TODO: Support multiple PKEX info entries */
+diff --git a/src/common/dpp.h b/src/common/dpp.h
+index bfea446..ca33fe3 100644
+--- a/src/common/dpp.h
++++ b/src/common/dpp.h
+@@ -550,6 +550,9 @@ int dpp_auth_conf_rx(struct dpp_authentication *auth, const u8 *hdr,
+ 		     const u8 *attr_start, size_t attr_len);
+ int dpp_notify_new_qr_code(struct dpp_authentication *auth,
+ 			   struct dpp_bootstrap_info *peer_bi);
++void dpp_controller_pkex_add(struct dpp_global *dpp,
++			     struct dpp_bootstrap_info *bi,
++			     const char *code, const char *identifier);
+ struct dpp_configuration * dpp_configuration_alloc(const char *type);
+ int dpp_akm_psk(enum dpp_akm akm);
+ int dpp_akm_sae(enum dpp_akm akm);
+@@ -688,12 +691,22 @@ struct dpp_authentication * dpp_controller_get_auth(struct dpp_global *dpp,
+ 						    unsigned int id);
+ void dpp_controller_new_qr_code(struct dpp_global *dpp,
+ 				struct dpp_bootstrap_info *bi);
++int dpp_tcp_pkex_init(struct dpp_global *dpp, struct dpp_pkex *pkex,
++		      const struct hostapd_ip_addr *addr, int port,
++		      void *msg_ctx, void *cb_ctx,
++		      int (*pkex_done)(void *ctx, void *conn,
++				       struct dpp_bootstrap_info *bi));
+ int dpp_tcp_init(struct dpp_global *dpp, struct dpp_authentication *auth,
+ 		 const struct hostapd_ip_addr *addr, int port,
+ 		 const char *name, enum dpp_netrole netrole, void *msg_ctx,
+ 		 void *cb_ctx,
+ 		 int (*process_conf_obj)(void *ctx,
+ 					 struct dpp_authentication *auth));
++int dpp_tcp_auth(struct dpp_global *dpp, void *_conn,
++		 struct dpp_authentication *auth, const char *name,
++		 enum dpp_netrole netrole,
++		 int (*process_conf_obj)(void *ctx,
++					 struct dpp_authentication *auth));
+ 
+ struct wpabuf * dpp_build_presence_announcement(struct dpp_bootstrap_info *bi);
+ void dpp_notify_chirp_received(void *msg_ctx, int id, const u8 *src,
+diff --git a/src/common/dpp_pkex.c b/src/common/dpp_pkex.c
+index 38349fa..72084d9 100644
+--- a/src/common/dpp_pkex.c
++++ b/src/common/dpp_pkex.c
+@@ -469,8 +469,10 @@ struct dpp_pkex * dpp_pkex_rx_exchange_req(void *msg_ctx,
+ 	pkex->t = bi->pkex_t;
+ 	pkex->msg_ctx = msg_ctx;
+ 	pkex->own_bi = bi;
+-	os_memcpy(pkex->own_mac, own_mac, ETH_ALEN);
+-	os_memcpy(pkex->peer_mac, peer_mac, ETH_ALEN);
++	if (own_mac)
++		os_memcpy(pkex->own_mac, own_mac, ETH_ALEN);
++	if (peer_mac)
++		os_memcpy(pkex->peer_mac, peer_mac, ETH_ALEN);
+ 	if (identifier) {
+ 		pkex->identifier = os_strdup(identifier);
+ 		if (!pkex->identifier)
+@@ -742,7 +744,8 @@ struct wpabuf * dpp_pkex_rx_exchange_resp(struct dpp_pkex *pkex,
+ 	}
+ #endif /* CONFIG_DPP2 */
+ 
+-	os_memcpy(pkex->peer_mac, peer_mac, ETH_ALEN);
++	if (peer_mac)
++		os_memcpy(pkex->peer_mac, peer_mac, ETH_ALEN);
+ 
+ 	attr_status = dpp_get_attr(buf, buflen, DPP_ATTR_STATUS,
+ 				   &attr_status_len);
+@@ -1341,9 +1344,12 @@ dpp_pkex_finish(struct dpp_global *dpp, struct dpp_pkex *pkex, const u8 *peer,
+ 		return NULL;
+ 	bi->id = dpp_next_id(dpp);
+ 	bi->type = DPP_BOOTSTRAP_PKEX;
+-	os_memcpy(bi->mac_addr, peer, ETH_ALEN);
+-	bi->num_freq = 1;
+-	bi->freq[0] = freq;
++	if (peer)
++		os_memcpy(bi->mac_addr, peer, ETH_ALEN);
++	if (freq) {
++		bi->num_freq = 1;
++		bi->freq[0] = freq;
++	}
+ 	bi->curve = pkex->own_bi->curve;
+ 	bi->pubkey = pkex->peer_bootstrap_key;
+ 	pkex->peer_bootstrap_key = NULL;
+diff --git a/src/common/dpp_tcp.c b/src/common/dpp_tcp.c
+index fb8ef1c..1a8a7c7 100644
+--- a/src/common/dpp_tcp.c
++++ b/src/common/dpp_tcp.c
+@@ -24,10 +24,12 @@ struct dpp_connection {
+ 	struct dpp_controller *ctrl;
+ 	struct dpp_relay_controller *relay;
+ 	struct dpp_global *global;
++	struct dpp_pkex *pkex;
+ 	struct dpp_authentication *auth;
+ 	void *msg_ctx;
+ 	void *cb_ctx;
+ 	int (*process_conf_obj)(void *ctx, struct dpp_authentication *auth);
++	int (*pkex_done)(void *ctx, void *conn, struct dpp_bootstrap_info *bi);
+ 	int sock;
+ 	u8 mac_addr[ETH_ALEN];
+ 	unsigned int freq;
+@@ -71,6 +73,9 @@ struct dpp_controller {
+ 	struct dl_list conn; /* struct dpp_connection */
+ 	char *configurator_params;
+ 	enum dpp_netrole netrole;
++	struct dpp_bootstrap_info *pkex_bi;
++	char *pkex_code;
++	char *pkex_identifier;
+ 	void *msg_ctx;
+ 	void *cb_ctx;
+ 	int (*process_conf_obj)(void *ctx, struct dpp_authentication *auth);
+@@ -102,6 +107,7 @@ static void dpp_connection_free(struct dpp_connection *conn)
+ 	wpabuf_free(conn->msg);
+ 	wpabuf_free(conn->msg_out);
+ 	dpp_auth_deinit(conn->auth);
++	dpp_pkex_free(conn->pkex);
+ 	os_free(conn->name);
+ 	os_free(conn);
+ }
+@@ -525,6 +531,8 @@ int dpp_relay_rx_action(struct dpp_global *dpp, const u8 *src, const u8 *hdr,
+ 		/* TODO: Could send this to all configured Controllers. For now,
+ 		 * only the first Controller is supported. */
+ 		ctrl = dpp_relay_controller_get_ctx(dpp, cb_ctx);
++	} else if (type == DPP_PA_PKEX_EXCHANGE_REQ) {
++		ctrl = dpp_relay_controller_get_ctx(dpp, cb_ctx);
+ 	} else {
+ 		if (!r_bootstrap)
+ 			return -1;
+@@ -609,6 +617,8 @@ static void dpp_controller_free(struct dpp_controller *ctrl)
+ 		eloop_unregister_sock(ctrl->sock, EVENT_TYPE_READ);
+ 	}
+ 	os_free(ctrl->configurator_params);
++	os_free(ctrl->pkex_code);
++	os_free(ctrl->pkex_identifier);
+ 	os_free(ctrl);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -955,6 +965,143 @@ static int dpp_controller_rx_reconfig_auth_resp(struct dpp_connection *conn,
+ }
+ 
+ 
++static int dpp_controller_rx_pkex_exchange_req(struct dpp_connection *conn,
++					       const u8 *hdr, const u8 *buf,
++					       size_t len)
++{
++	struct dpp_controller *ctrl = conn->ctrl;
++
++	if (!ctrl)
++		return 0;
++
++	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: PKEX Exchange Request");
++
++	/* TODO: Support multiple PKEX codes by iterating over all the enabled
++	 * values here */
++
++	if (!ctrl->pkex_code || !ctrl->pkex_bi) {
++		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
++			   "DPP: No PKEX code configured - ignore request");
++		return 0;
++	}
++
++	if (conn->pkex || conn->auth) {
++		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
++			   "DPP: Already in PKEX/Authentication session - ignore new PKEX request");
++		return 0;
++	}
++
++	conn->pkex = dpp_pkex_rx_exchange_req(conn->ctrl->global, ctrl->pkex_bi,
++					      NULL, NULL,
++					      ctrl->pkex_identifier,
++					      ctrl->pkex_code,
++					      buf, len, true);
++	if (!conn->pkex) {
++		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
++			   "DPP: Failed to process the request");
++		return -1;
++	}
++
++	return dpp_tcp_send_msg(conn, conn->pkex->exchange_resp);
++}
++
++
++static int dpp_controller_rx_pkex_exchange_resp(struct dpp_connection *conn,
++						const u8 *hdr, const u8 *buf,
++						size_t len)
++{
++	struct dpp_pkex *pkex = conn->pkex;
++	struct wpabuf *msg;
++	int res;
++
++	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: PKEX Exchange Response");
++
++	if (!pkex || !pkex->initiator || pkex->exchange_done) {
++		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: No matching PKEX session");
++		return 0;
++	}
++
++	msg = dpp_pkex_rx_exchange_resp(pkex, NULL, buf, len);
++	if (!msg) {
++		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: Failed to process the response");
++		return -1;
++	}
++
++	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: Send PKEX Commit-Reveal Request");
++	res = dpp_tcp_send_msg(conn, msg);
++	wpabuf_free(msg);
++	return res;
++}
++
++
++static int dpp_controller_rx_pkex_commit_reveal_req(struct dpp_connection *conn,
++						    const u8 *hdr,
++						    const u8 *buf, size_t len)
++{
++	struct dpp_pkex *pkex = conn->pkex;
++	struct wpabuf *msg;
++	int res;
++	struct dpp_bootstrap_info *bi;
++
++	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: PKEX Commit-Reveal Request");
++
++	if (!pkex || pkex->initiator || !pkex->exchange_done) {
++		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: No matching PKEX session");
++		return 0;
++	}
++
++	msg = dpp_pkex_rx_commit_reveal_req(pkex, hdr, buf, len);
++	if (!msg) {
++		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: Failed to process the request");
++		return -1;
++	}
++
++	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: Send PKEX Commit-Reveal Response");
++	res = dpp_tcp_send_msg(conn, msg);
++	wpabuf_free(msg);
++	if (res < 0)
++		return res;
++	bi = dpp_pkex_finish(conn->global, pkex, NULL, 0);
++	if (!bi)
++		return -1;
++	conn->pkex = NULL;
++	return 0;
++}
++
++
++static int
++dpp_controller_rx_pkex_commit_reveal_resp(struct dpp_connection *conn,
++					  const u8 *hdr,
++					  const u8 *buf, size_t len)
++{
++	struct dpp_pkex *pkex = conn->pkex;
++	int res;
++	struct dpp_bootstrap_info *bi;
++
++	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: PKEX Commit-Reveal Response");
++
++	if (!pkex || !pkex->initiator || !pkex->exchange_done) {
++		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: No matching PKEX session");
++		return 0;
++	}
++
++	res = dpp_pkex_rx_commit_reveal_resp(pkex, hdr, buf, len);
++	if (res < 0) {
++		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: Failed to process the response");
++		return res;
++	}
++
++	bi = dpp_pkex_finish(conn->global, pkex, NULL, 0);
++	if (!bi)
++		return -1;
++	conn->pkex = NULL;
++
++	if (!conn->pkex_done)
++		return -1;
++	return conn->pkex_done(conn->cb_ctx, conn, bi);
++}
++
++
+ static int dpp_controller_rx_action(struct dpp_connection *conn, const u8 *msg,
+ 				    size_t len)
+ {
+@@ -1014,6 +1161,22 @@ static int dpp_controller_rx_action(struct dpp_connection *conn, const u8 *msg,
+ 	case DPP_PA_RECONFIG_AUTH_RESP:
+ 		return dpp_controller_rx_reconfig_auth_resp(conn, msg, pos,
+ 							    end - pos);
++	case DPP_PA_PKEX_V1_EXCHANGE_REQ:
++		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
++			   "DPP: Ignore PKEXv1 Exchange Request - not supported over TCP");
++		return -1;
++	case DPP_PA_PKEX_EXCHANGE_REQ:
++		return dpp_controller_rx_pkex_exchange_req(conn, msg, pos,
++							   end - pos);
++	case DPP_PA_PKEX_EXCHANGE_RESP:
++		return dpp_controller_rx_pkex_exchange_resp(conn, msg, pos,
++							    end - pos);
++	case DPP_PA_PKEX_COMMIT_REVEAL_REQ:
++		return dpp_controller_rx_pkex_commit_reveal_req(conn, msg, pos,
++								end - pos);
++	case DPP_PA_PKEX_COMMIT_REVEAL_RESP:
++		return dpp_controller_rx_pkex_commit_reveal_resp(conn, msg, pos,
++								 end - pos);
+ 	default:
+ 		/* TODO: missing messages types */
+ 		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+@@ -1559,6 +1722,101 @@ fail:
+ }
+ 
+ 
++int dpp_tcp_pkex_init(struct dpp_global *dpp, struct dpp_pkex *pkex,
++		      const struct hostapd_ip_addr *addr, int port,
++		      void *msg_ctx, void *cb_ctx,
++		      int (*pkex_done)(void *ctx, void *conn,
++				       struct dpp_bootstrap_info *bi))
++{
++	struct dpp_connection *conn;
++	struct sockaddr_storage saddr;
++	socklen_t addrlen;
++	const u8 *hdr, *pos, *end;
++	char txt[100];
++
++	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: Initialize TCP connection to %s port %d",
++		   hostapd_ip_txt(addr, txt, sizeof(txt)), port);
++	if (dpp_ipaddr_to_sockaddr((struct sockaddr *) &saddr, &addrlen,
++				   addr, port) < 0) {
++		dpp_pkex_free(pkex);
++		return -1;
++	}
++
++	conn = os_zalloc(sizeof(*conn));
++	if (!conn) {
++		dpp_pkex_free(pkex);
++		return -1;
++	}
++
++	conn->msg_ctx = msg_ctx;
++	conn->cb_ctx = cb_ctx;
++	conn->pkex_done = pkex_done;
++	conn->global = dpp;
++	conn->pkex = pkex;
++	conn->sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
++	if (conn->sock < 0)
++		goto fail;
++
++	if (fcntl(conn->sock, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK) != 0) {
++		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: fnctl(O_NONBLOCK) failed: %s",
++			   strerror(errno));
++		goto fail;
++	}
++
++	if (connect(conn->sock, (struct sockaddr *) &saddr, addrlen) < 0) {
++		if (errno != EINPROGRESS) {
++			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: Failed to connect: %s",
++				   strerror(errno));
++			goto fail;
++		}
++
++		/*
++		 * Continue connecting in the background; eloop will call us
++		 * once the connection is ready (or failed).
++		 */
++	}
++
++	if (eloop_register_sock(conn->sock, EVENT_TYPE_WRITE,
++				dpp_conn_tx_ready, conn, NULL) < 0)
++		goto fail;
++	conn->write_eloop = 1;
++
++	hdr = wpabuf_head(pkex->exchange_req);
++	end = hdr + wpabuf_len(pkex->exchange_req);
++	hdr += 2; /* skip Category and Actiom */
++	pos = hdr + DPP_HDR_LEN;
++	conn->msg_out = dpp_tcp_encaps(hdr, pos, end - pos);
++	if (!conn->msg_out)
++		goto fail;
++	/* Message will be sent in dpp_conn_tx_ready() */
++
++	/* TODO: eloop timeout to clear a connection if it does not complete
++	 * properly */
++	dl_list_add(&dpp->tcp_init, &conn->list);
++	return 0;
++fail:
++	dpp_connection_free(conn);
++	return -1;
++}
++
++
++static int dpp_tcp_auth_start(struct dpp_connection *conn,
++			      struct dpp_authentication *auth)
++{
++	const u8 *hdr, *pos, *end;
++
++	hdr = wpabuf_head(auth->req_msg);
++	end = hdr + wpabuf_len(auth->req_msg);
++	hdr += 2; /* skip Category and Actiom */
++	pos = hdr + DPP_HDR_LEN;
++	conn->msg_out = dpp_tcp_encaps(hdr, pos, end - pos);
++	if (!conn->msg_out)
++		return -1;
++	/* Message will be sent in dpp_conn_tx_ready() */
++	return 0;
++}
++
++
+ int dpp_tcp_init(struct dpp_global *dpp, struct dpp_authentication *auth,
+ 		 const struct hostapd_ip_addr *addr, int port, const char *name,
+ 		 enum dpp_netrole netrole, void *msg_ctx, void *cb_ctx,
+@@ -1568,7 +1826,6 @@ int dpp_tcp_init(struct dpp_global *dpp, struct dpp_authentication *auth,
+ 	struct dpp_connection *conn;
+ 	struct sockaddr_storage saddr;
+ 	socklen_t addrlen;
+-	const u8 *hdr, *pos, *end;
+ 	char txt[100];
+ 
+ 	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: Initialize TCP connection to %s port %d",
+@@ -1620,14 +1877,8 @@ int dpp_tcp_init(struct dpp_global *dpp, struct dpp_authentication *auth,
+ 		goto fail;
+ 	conn->write_eloop = 1;
+ 
+-	hdr = wpabuf_head(auth->req_msg);
+-	end = hdr + wpabuf_len(auth->req_msg);
+-	hdr += 2; /* skip Category and Actiom */
+-	pos = hdr + DPP_HDR_LEN;
+-	conn->msg_out = dpp_tcp_encaps(hdr, pos, end - pos);
+-	if (!conn->msg_out)
++	if (dpp_tcp_auth_start(conn, auth) < 0)
+ 		goto fail;
+-	/* Message will be sent in dpp_conn_tx_ready() */
+ 
+ 	/* TODO: eloop timeout to clear a connection if it does not complete
+ 	 * properly */
+@@ -1639,6 +1890,30 @@ fail:
+ }
+ 
+ 
++int dpp_tcp_auth(struct dpp_global *dpp, void *_conn,
++		 struct dpp_authentication *auth, const char *name,
++		 enum dpp_netrole netrole,
++		 int (*process_conf_obj)(void *ctx,
++					 struct dpp_authentication *auth))
++{
++	struct dpp_connection *conn = _conn;
++
++	/* Continue with Authentication exchange on an existing TCP connection.
++	 */
++	conn->process_conf_obj = process_conf_obj;
++	os_free(conn->name);
++	conn->name = os_strdup(name ? name : "Test");
++	conn->netrole = netrole;
++	conn->auth = auth;
++
++	if (dpp_tcp_auth_start(conn, auth) < 0)
++		return -1;
++
++	dpp_conn_tx_ready(conn->sock, conn, NULL);
++	return 0;
++}
++
++
+ int dpp_controller_start(struct dpp_global *dpp,
+ 			 struct dpp_controller_config *config)
+ {
+@@ -1789,6 +2064,23 @@ void dpp_controller_new_qr_code(struct dpp_global *dpp,
+ }
+ 
+ 
++void dpp_controller_pkex_add(struct dpp_global *dpp,
++			     struct dpp_bootstrap_info *bi,
++			     const char *code, const char *identifier)
++{
++	struct dpp_controller *ctrl = dpp->controller;
++
++	if (!ctrl)
++		return;
++
++	ctrl->pkex_bi = bi;
++	os_free(ctrl->pkex_code);
++	ctrl->pkex_code = code ? os_strdup(code) : NULL;
++	os_free(ctrl->pkex_identifier);
++	ctrl->pkex_identifier = identifier ? os_strdup(identifier) : NULL;
++}
++
++
+ void dpp_tcp_init_flush(struct dpp_global *dpp)
+ {
+ 	struct dpp_connection *conn, *tmp;
+diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/dpp_supplicant.c b/wpa_supplicant/dpp_supplicant.c
+index 61b300f..aab94cb 100644
+--- a/wpa_supplicant/dpp_supplicant.c
++++ b/wpa_supplicant/dpp_supplicant.c
+@@ -2557,6 +2557,71 @@ static int wpas_dpp_pkex_next_channel(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
+ }
+ 
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_DPP2
++static int wpas_dpp_pkex_done(void *ctx, void *conn,
++			      struct dpp_bootstrap_info *peer_bi)
++{
++	struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s = ctx;
++	const char *cmd = wpa_s->dpp_pkex_auth_cmd;
++	const char *pos;
++	u8 allowed_roles = DPP_CAPAB_CONFIGURATOR;
++	struct dpp_bootstrap_info *own_bi = NULL;
++	struct dpp_authentication *auth;
++
++	if (!cmd)
++		cmd = "";
++	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: Start authentication after PKEX (cmd: %s)",
++		   cmd);
++
++	pos = os_strstr(cmd, " own=");
++	if (pos) {
++		pos += 5;
++		own_bi = dpp_bootstrap_get_id(wpa_s->dpp, atoi(pos));
++		if (!own_bi) {
++			wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
++				   "DPP: Could not find bootstrapping info for the identified local entry");
++			return -1;
++		}
++
++		if (peer_bi->curve != own_bi->curve) {
++			wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
++				   "DPP: Mismatching curves in bootstrapping info (peer=%s own=%s)",
++				   peer_bi->curve->name, own_bi->curve->name);
++			return -1;
++		}
++	}
++
++	pos = os_strstr(cmd, " role=");
++	if (pos) {
++		pos += 6;
++		if (os_strncmp(pos, "configurator", 12) == 0)
++			allowed_roles = DPP_CAPAB_CONFIGURATOR;
++		else if (os_strncmp(pos, "enrollee", 8) == 0)
++			allowed_roles = DPP_CAPAB_ENROLLEE;
++		else if (os_strncmp(pos, "either", 6) == 0)
++			allowed_roles = DPP_CAPAB_CONFIGURATOR |
++				DPP_CAPAB_ENROLLEE;
++		else
++			return -1;
++	}
++
++	auth = dpp_auth_init(wpa_s->dpp, wpa_s, peer_bi, own_bi, allowed_roles,
++			     0, wpa_s->hw.modes, wpa_s->hw.num_modes);
++	if (!auth)
++		return -1;
++
++	wpas_dpp_set_testing_options(wpa_s, auth);
++	if (dpp_set_configurator(auth, cmd) < 0) {
++		dpp_auth_deinit(auth);
++		return -1;
++	}
++
++	return dpp_tcp_auth(wpa_s->dpp, conn, auth, wpa_s->conf->dpp_name,
++			    DPP_NETROLE_STA, wpas_dpp_process_conf_obj);
++}
++#endif /* CONFIG_DPP2 */
++
++
+ enum wpas_dpp_pkex_ver {
+ 	PKEX_VER_AUTO,
+ 	PKEX_VER_ONLY_1,
+@@ -2564,7 +2629,9 @@ enum wpas_dpp_pkex_ver {
+ };
+ 
+ static int wpas_dpp_pkex_init(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
+-			      enum wpas_dpp_pkex_ver ver)
++			      enum wpas_dpp_pkex_ver ver,
++			      const struct hostapd_ip_addr *ipaddr,
++			      int tcp_port)
+ {
+ 	struct dpp_pkex *pkex;
+ 	struct wpabuf *msg;
+@@ -2573,15 +2640,24 @@ static int wpas_dpp_pkex_init(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
+ 
+ 	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: Initiating PKEXv%d", v2 ? 2 : 1);
+ 	dpp_pkex_free(wpa_s->dpp_pkex);
+-	wpa_s->dpp_pkex = dpp_pkex_init(wpa_s, wpa_s->dpp_pkex_bi,
+-					wpa_s->own_addr,
+-					wpa_s->dpp_pkex_identifier,
+-					wpa_s->dpp_pkex_code, v2);
+-	pkex = wpa_s->dpp_pkex;
++	wpa_s->dpp_pkex = NULL;
++	pkex = dpp_pkex_init(wpa_s, wpa_s->dpp_pkex_bi, wpa_s->own_addr,
++			     wpa_s->dpp_pkex_identifier,
++			     wpa_s->dpp_pkex_code, v2);
+ 	if (!pkex)
+ 		return -1;
+ 	pkex->forced_ver = ver != PKEX_VER_AUTO;
+ 
++	if (ipaddr) {
++#ifdef CONFIG_DPP2
++		return dpp_tcp_pkex_init(wpa_s->dpp, pkex, ipaddr, tcp_port,
++					 wpa_s, wpa_s, wpas_dpp_pkex_done);
++#else /* CONFIG_DPP2 */
++		return -1;
++#endif /* CONFIG_DPP2 */
++	}
++
++	wpa_s->dpp_pkex = pkex;
+ 	msg = pkex->exchange_req;
+ 	wait_time = wpa_s->max_remain_on_chan;
+ 	if (wait_time > 2000)
+@@ -2618,7 +2694,8 @@ static void wpas_dpp_pkex_retry_timeout(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx)
+ 			if (pkex->v2 && !pkex->forced_ver) {
+ 				wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+ 					   "DPP: Fall back to PKEXv1");
+-				wpas_dpp_pkex_init(wpa_s, PKEX_VER_ONLY_1);
++				wpas_dpp_pkex_init(wpa_s, PKEX_VER_ONLY_1,
++						   NULL, 0);
+ 				return;
+ 			}
+ #endif /* CONFIG_DPP3 */
+@@ -3327,6 +3404,29 @@ int wpas_dpp_pkex_add(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, const char *cmd)
+ {
+ 	struct dpp_bootstrap_info *own_bi;
+ 	const char *pos, *end;
++	int tcp_port = DPP_TCP_PORT;
++	struct hostapd_ip_addr *ipaddr = NULL;
++#ifdef CONFIG_DPP2
++	struct hostapd_ip_addr ipaddr_buf;
++	char *addr;
++
++	pos = os_strstr(cmd, " tcp_port=");
++	if (pos) {
++		pos += 10;
++		tcp_port = atoi(pos);
++	}
++
++	addr = get_param(cmd, " tcp_addr=");
++	if (addr) {
++		int res;
++
++		res = hostapd_parse_ip_addr(addr, &ipaddr_buf);
++		os_free(addr);
++		if (res)
++			return -1;
++		ipaddr = &ipaddr_buf;
++	}
++#endif /* CONFIG_DPP2 */
+ 
+ 	pos = os_strstr(cmd, " own=");
+ 	if (!pos)
+@@ -3390,8 +3490,14 @@ int wpas_dpp_pkex_add(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, const char *cmd)
+ 				return -1;
+ 		}
+ 
+-		if (wpas_dpp_pkex_init(wpa_s, ver) < 0)
++		if (wpas_dpp_pkex_init(wpa_s, ver, ipaddr, tcp_port) < 0)
+ 			return -1;
++	} else {
++#ifdef CONFIG_DPP2
++		dpp_controller_pkex_add(wpa_s->dpp, own_bi,
++					wpa_s->dpp_pkex_code,
++					wpa_s->dpp_pkex_identifier);
++#endif /* CONFIG_DPP2 */
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* TODO: Support multiple PKEX info entries */
+-- 
+2.40.0
+

meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/CVE-2022-37660-0005.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
+From 15af83cf1846870873a011ed4d714732f01cd2e4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
+Date: Tue, 19 Jul 2022 21:23:04 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] DPP: Delete PKEX code and identifier on success completion of
+ PKEX
+
+We are not supposed to reuse these without being explicitly requested to
+perform PKEX again. There is not a strong use case for being able to
+provision an Enrollee multiple times with PKEX, so this should have no
+issues on the Enrollee. For a Configurator, there might be some use
+cases that would benefit from being able to use the same code with
+multiple Enrollee devices, e.g., for guess access with a laptop and a
+smart phone. That case will now require a new DPP_PKEX_ADD command on
+the Configurator after each completion of the provisioning exchange.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
+
+CVE: CVE-2022-37660
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/?id=15af83cf1846870873a011ed4d714732f01cd2e4]
+
+Signed-off-by: Divya Chellam <divya.chellam@windriver.com>
+---
+ src/ap/dpp_hostapd.c            | 22 +++++++++++++++++++++-
+ wpa_supplicant/dpp_supplicant.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++++++-
+ 2 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/ap/dpp_hostapd.c b/src/ap/dpp_hostapd.c
+index d956be9..73b09ba 100644
+--- a/src/ap/dpp_hostapd.c
++++ b/src/ap/dpp_hostapd.c
+@@ -276,6 +276,22 @@ static int hostapd_dpp_pkex_next_channel(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
+ }
+ 
+ 
++static void hostapd_dpp_pkex_clear_code(struct hostapd_data *hapd)
++{
++	if (!hapd->dpp_pkex_code && !hapd->dpp_pkex_identifier)
++		return;
++
++	/* Delete PKEX code and identifier on successful completion of
++	 * PKEX. We are not supposed to reuse these without being
++	 * explicitly requested to perform PKEX again. */
++	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: Delete PKEX code/identifier");
++	os_free(hapd->dpp_pkex_code);
++	hapd->dpp_pkex_code = NULL;
++	os_free(hapd->dpp_pkex_identifier);
++	hapd->dpp_pkex_identifier = NULL;
++}
++
++
+ #ifdef CONFIG_DPP2
+ static int hostapd_dpp_pkex_done(void *ctx, void *conn,
+ 				 struct dpp_bootstrap_info *peer_bi)
+@@ -287,6 +303,8 @@ static int hostapd_dpp_pkex_done(void *ctx, void *conn,
+ 	struct dpp_bootstrap_info *own_bi = NULL;
+ 	struct dpp_authentication *auth;
+ 
++	hostapd_dpp_pkex_clear_code(hapd);
++
+ 	if (!cmd)
+ 		cmd = "";
+ 	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: Start authentication after PKEX (cmd: %s)",
+@@ -2114,6 +2132,7 @@ hostapd_dpp_rx_pkex_commit_reveal_req(struct hostapd_data *hapd, const u8 *src,
+ 				wpabuf_head(msg), wpabuf_len(msg));
+ 	wpabuf_free(msg);
+ 
++	hostapd_dpp_pkex_clear_code(hapd);
+ 	bi = dpp_pkex_finish(hapd->iface->interfaces->dpp, pkex, src, freq);
+ 	if (!bi)
+ 		return;
+@@ -2145,6 +2164,7 @@ hostapd_dpp_rx_pkex_commit_reveal_resp(struct hostapd_data *hapd, const u8 *src,
+ 		return;
+ 	}
+ 
++	hostapd_dpp_pkex_clear_code(hapd);
+ 	bi = dpp_pkex_finish(hapd->iface->interfaces->dpp, pkex, src, freq);
+ 	if (!bi)
+ 		return;
+@@ -2518,7 +2538,7 @@ int hostapd_dpp_pkex_remove(struct hostapd_data *hapd, const char *id)
+ 			return -1;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if ((id_val != 0 && id_val != 1) || !hapd->dpp_pkex_code)
++	if ((id_val != 0 && id_val != 1))
+ 		return -1;
+ 
+ 	/* TODO: Support multiple PKEX entries */
+diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/dpp_supplicant.c b/wpa_supplicant/dpp_supplicant.c
+index aab94cb..015ae66 100644
+--- a/wpa_supplicant/dpp_supplicant.c
++++ b/wpa_supplicant/dpp_supplicant.c
+@@ -2557,6 +2557,22 @@ static int wpas_dpp_pkex_next_channel(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
+ }
+ 
+ 
++static void wpas_dpp_pkex_clear_code(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s)
++{
++	if (!wpa_s->dpp_pkex_code && !wpa_s->dpp_pkex_identifier)
++		return;
++
++	/* Delete PKEX code and identifier on successful completion of
++	 * PKEX. We are not supposed to reuse these without being
++	 * explicitly requested to perform PKEX again. */
++	os_free(wpa_s->dpp_pkex_code);
++	wpa_s->dpp_pkex_code = NULL;
++	os_free(wpa_s->dpp_pkex_identifier);
++	wpa_s->dpp_pkex_identifier = NULL;
++
++}
++
++
+ #ifdef CONFIG_DPP2
+ static int wpas_dpp_pkex_done(void *ctx, void *conn,
+ 			      struct dpp_bootstrap_info *peer_bi)
+@@ -2568,6 +2584,8 @@ static int wpas_dpp_pkex_done(void *ctx, void *conn,
+ 	struct dpp_bootstrap_info *own_bi = NULL;
+ 	struct dpp_authentication *auth;
+ 
++	wpas_dpp_pkex_clear_code(wpa_s);
++
+ 	if (!cmd)
+ 		cmd = "";
+ 	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "DPP: Start authentication after PKEX (cmd: %s)",
+@@ -2872,6 +2890,7 @@ wpas_dpp_pkex_finish(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, const u8 *peer,
+ {
+ 	struct dpp_bootstrap_info *bi;
+ 
++	wpas_dpp_pkex_clear_code(wpa_s);
+ 	bi = dpp_pkex_finish(wpa_s->dpp, wpa_s->dpp_pkex, peer, freq);
+ 	if (!bi)
+ 		return NULL;
+@@ -3521,7 +3540,7 @@ int wpas_dpp_pkex_remove(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, const char *id)
+ 			return -1;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if ((id_val != 0 && id_val != 1) || !wpa_s->dpp_pkex_code)
++	if ((id_val != 0 && id_val != 1))
+ 		return -1;
+ 
+ 	/* TODO: Support multiple PKEX entries */
+-- 
+2.40.0
+

meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/CVE-2025-24912-01.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+From 726432d7622cc0088ac353d073b59628b590ea44 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Sat, 25 Jan 2025 11:21:16 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] RADIUS: Drop pending request only when accepting the response
+
+The case of an invalid authenticator in a RADIUS response could imply
+that the response is not from the correct RADIUS server and as such,
+such a response should be discarded without changing internal state for
+the pending request. The case of an unknown response (RADIUS_RX_UNKNOWN)
+is somewhat more complex since it could have been indicated before
+validating the authenticator. In any case, it seems better to change the
+state for the pending request only when we have fully accepted the
+response.
+
+Allowing the internal state of pending RADIUS request to change based on
+responses that are not fully validation could have allow at least a
+theoretical DoS attack if an attacker were to have means for injecting
+RADIUS messages to the network using the IP address of the real RADIUS
+server and being able to do so more quickly than the real server and
+with the matching identifier from the request header (i.e., either by
+flooding 256 responses quickly or by having means to capture the RADIUS
+request). These should not really be realistic options in a properly
+protected deployment, but nevertheless it is good to be more careful in
+processing RADIUS responses.
+
+Remove a pending RADIUS request from the internal list only when having
+fully accepted a matching RADIUS response, i.e., after one of the
+registered handlers has confirmed that the authenticator is valid and
+processing of the response has succeeded.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-24912
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/?id=726432d7622cc0088ac353d073b59628b590ea44]
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
+---
+ src/radius/radius_client.c | 15 +++++++--------
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/radius/radius_client.c b/src/radius/radius_client.c
+index 2a7f36170..7909b29a7 100644
+--- a/src/radius/radius_client.c
++++ b/src/radius/radius_client.c
+@@ -922,13 +922,6 @@ static void radius_client_receive(int sock, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx)
+ 		       roundtrip / 100, roundtrip % 100);
+ 	rconf->round_trip_time = roundtrip;
+ 
+-	/* Remove ACKed RADIUS packet from retransmit list */
+-	if (prev_req)
+-		prev_req->next = req->next;
+-	else
+-		radius->msgs = req->next;
+-	radius->num_msgs--;
+-
+ 	for (i = 0; i < num_handlers; i++) {
+ 		RadiusRxResult res;
+ 		res = handlers[i].handler(msg, req->msg, req->shared_secret,
+@@ -939,6 +932,13 @@ static void radius_client_receive(int sock, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx)
+ 			radius_msg_free(msg);
+ 			/* fall through */
+ 		case RADIUS_RX_QUEUED:
++			/* Remove ACKed RADIUS packet from retransmit list */
++			if (prev_req)
++				prev_req->next = req->next;
++			else
++				radius->msgs = req->next;
++			radius->num_msgs--;
++
+ 			radius_client_msg_free(req);
+ 			return;
+ 		case RADIUS_RX_INVALID_AUTHENTICATOR:
+@@ -960,7 +960,6 @@ static void radius_client_receive(int sock, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx)
+ 		       msg_type, hdr->code, hdr->identifier,
+ 		       invalid_authenticator ? " [INVALID AUTHENTICATOR]" :
+ 		       "");
+-	radius_client_msg_free(req);
+ 
+  fail:
+ 	radius_msg_free(msg);

meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/CVE-2025-24912-02.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+From 339a334551ca911187cc870f4f97ef08e11db109 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
+Date: Wed, 5 Feb 2025 19:23:39 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] RADIUS: Fix pending request dropping
+
+A recent change to this moved the place where the processed RADIUS
+request was removed from the pending list to happen after the message
+handler had been called. This did not take into account possibility of
+the handler adding a new pending request in the list and the prev_req
+pointer not necessarily pointing to the correct entry anymore. As such,
+some of the pending requests could have been lost and that would result
+in not being able to process responses to those requests and also, to a
+memory leak.
+
+Fix this by determining prev_req at the point when the pending request
+is being removed, i.e., after the handler function has already added a
+new entry.
+
+Fixes: 726432d7622c ("RADIUS: Drop pending request only when accepting the response")
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-24912
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/?id=339a334551ca911187cc870f4f97ef08e11db109]
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
+---
+ src/radius/radius_client.c | 10 +++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/radius/radius_client.c b/src/radius/radius_client.c
+index 7909b29a7..d4faa7936 100644
+--- a/src/radius/radius_client.c
++++ b/src/radius/radius_client.c
+@@ -824,7 +824,7 @@ static void radius_client_receive(int sock, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx)
+ 	struct radius_hdr *hdr;
+ 	struct radius_rx_handler *handlers;
+ 	size_t num_handlers, i;
+-	struct radius_msg_list *req, *prev_req;
++	struct radius_msg_list *req, *prev_req, *r;
+ 	struct os_reltime now;
+ 	struct hostapd_radius_server *rconf;
+ 	int invalid_authenticator = 0;
+@@ -887,7 +887,6 @@ static void radius_client_receive(int sock, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx)
+ 		break;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	prev_req = NULL;
+ 	req = radius->msgs;
+ 	while (req) {
+ 		/* TODO: also match by src addr:port of the packet when using
+@@ -899,7 +898,6 @@ static void radius_client_receive(int sock, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx)
+ 		    hdr->identifier)
+ 			break;
+ 
+-		prev_req = req;
+ 		req = req->next;
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -933,6 +931,12 @@ static void radius_client_receive(int sock, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx)
+ 			/* fall through */
+ 		case RADIUS_RX_QUEUED:
+ 			/* Remove ACKed RADIUS packet from retransmit list */
++			prev_req = NULL;
++			for (r = radius->msgs; r; r = r->next) {
++				if (r == req)
++					break;
++				prev_req = r;
++			}
+ 			if (prev_req)
+ 				prev_req->next = req->next;
+ 			else

meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.10.bb

@@ -38,6 +38,13 @@ SRC_URI = "http://w1.fi/releases/wpa_supplicant-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://0001-SAE-Check-for-invalid-Rejected-Groups-element-length.patch \
            file://0002-SAE-Check-for-invalid-Rejected-Groups-element-length.patch \
            file://0003-SAE-Reject-invalid-Rejected-Groups-element-in-the-pa.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-37660-0001.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-37660-0002.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-37660-0003.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-37660-0004.patch \
+           file://CVE-2022-37660-0005.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-24912-01.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-24912-02.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "20df7ae5154b3830355f8ab4269123a87affdea59fe74fe9292a91d0d7e17b2f"
 

meta/recipes-core/busybox/busybox/CVE-2025-46394-01.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+From f5e1bf966b19ea1821f00a8c9ecd7774598689b4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com>
+Date: Wed, 24 Sep 2025 03:28:47 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] archival/libarchive: sanitize filenames on output (prevent
+ control sequence attacks
+
+This fixes CVE-2025-46394 (terminal escape sequence injection)
+
+Original credit: Ian.Norton at entrust.com
+
+function                                             old     new   delta
+header_list                                            9      15      +6
+header_verbose_list                                  239     244      +5
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+(add/remove: 0/0 grow/shrink: 2/0 up/down: 11/0)               Total: 11 bytes
+
+Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com>
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-46394
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.busybox.net/busybox/commit/?id=f5e1bf966b19ea1821f00a8c9ecd7774598689b4]
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
+---
+ archival/libarchive/header_list.c         | 2 +-
+ archival/libarchive/header_verbose_list.c | 4 ++--
+ 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/archival/libarchive/header_list.c b/archival/libarchive/header_list.c
+index 0621aa406..9490b3635 100644
+--- a/archival/libarchive/header_list.c
++++ b/archival/libarchive/header_list.c
+@@ -8,5 +8,5 @@
+ void FAST_FUNC header_list(const file_header_t *file_header)
+ {
+ //TODO: cpio -vp DIR should output "DIR/NAME", not just "NAME" */
+-	puts(file_header->name);
++	puts(printable_string(file_header->name));
+ }
+diff --git a/archival/libarchive/header_verbose_list.c b/archival/libarchive/header_verbose_list.c
+index a575a08a0..e7a09430d 100644
+--- a/archival/libarchive/header_verbose_list.c
++++ b/archival/libarchive/header_verbose_list.c
+@@ -57,13 +57,13 @@ void FAST_FUNC header_verbose_list(const file_header_t *file_header)
+ 		ptm->tm_hour,
+ 		ptm->tm_min,
+ 		ptm->tm_sec,
+-		file_header->name);
++		printable_string(file_header->name));
+ 
+ #endif /* FEATURE_TAR_UNAME_GNAME */
+ 
+ 	/* NB: GNU tar shows "->" for symlinks and "link to" for hardlinks */
+ 	if (file_header->link_target) {
+-		printf(" -> %s", file_header->link_target);
++		printf(" -> %s", printable_string(file_header->link_target));
+ 	}
+ 	bb_putchar('\n');
+ }

meta/recipes-core/busybox/busybox/CVE-2025-46394-02.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+From 7378db981d87b4a2264e14d60340a7fb5c67ae59 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
+Date: Fri, 3 Oct 2025 16:12:56 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] testsuite/tar.tests: fix test after CVE-2025-46394
+
+tar now sanitizes output and this test needs to expect that.
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-46394
+Upstream-Status: Submitted [https://lists.busybox.net/pipermail/busybox/2025-October/091743.html]
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
+---
+ testsuite/tar.tests | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/testsuite/tar.tests b/testsuite/tar.tests
+index 0f2e89112..48fc38114 100755
+--- a/testsuite/tar.tests
++++ b/testsuite/tar.tests
+@@ -325,9 +325,9 @@ unset LANG
+ rm -rf etc usr
+ ' "\
+ etc/ssl/certs/3b2716e5.0
+-etc/ssl/certs/EBG_Elektronik_Sertifika_Hizmet_Sağlayıcısı.pem
++etc/ssl/certs/EBG_Elektronik_Sertifika_Hizmet_Sa??lay??c??s??.pem
+ etc/ssl/certs/f80cc7f6.0
+-usr/share/ca-certificates/mozilla/EBG_Elektronik_Sertifika_Hizmet_Sağlayıcısı.crt
++usr/share/ca-certificates/mozilla/EBG_Elektronik_Sertifika_Hizmet_Sa??lay??c??s??.crt
+ 0
+ etc/ssl/certs/3b2716e5.0 -> EBG_Elektronik_Sertifika_Hizmet_Sağlayıcısı.pem
+ etc/ssl/certs/EBG_Elektronik_Sertifika_Hizmet_Sağlayıcısı.pem -> /usr/share/ca-certificates/mozilla/EBG_Elektronik_Sertifika_Hizmet_Sağlayıcısı.crt

meta/recipes-core/busybox/busybox_1.35.0.bb

@@ -59,6 +59,8 @@ SRC_URI = "https://busybox.net/downloads/busybox-${PV}.tar.bz2;name=tarball \
            file://CVE-2023-42366.patch \
            file://0001-cut-Fix-s-flag-to-omit-blank-lines.patch \
            file://CVE-2023-39810.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-46394-01.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-46394-02.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI:append:libc-musl = " file://musl.cfg "
 

meta/recipes-core/glib-2.0/glib-2.0/CVE-2025-7039-01.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+From 285db475ecaa4d2cc39ce326b4c63aacb87ca6ad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alexander Kanavin <alex@linutronix.de>
+Date: Tue, 22 Aug 2023 19:57:48 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] glib/gfileutils.c: use 64 bits for value in get_tmp_file()
+
+On 32 bit systems 'long' value will overflow in 2038 and become negative.
+As it is used to index into letters array, and % operation preserves signs,
+data corruption will then occur.
+
+Signed-off-by: Alexander Kanavin <alex@linutronix.de>
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-7039
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/-/commit/285db475ecaa4d2cc39ce326b4c63aacb87ca6ad]
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
+---
+ glib/gfileutils.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/glib/gfileutils.c b/glib/gfileutils.c
+index 9646c696e..bd3cc179a 100644
+--- a/glib/gfileutils.c
++++ b/glib/gfileutils.c
+@@ -1475,7 +1475,7 @@ get_tmp_file (gchar            *tmpl,
+   static const char letters[] =
+     "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789";
+   static const int NLETTERS = sizeof (letters) - 1;
+-  glong value;
++  gint64 value;
+   gint64 now_us;
+   static int counter = 0;
+ 
+@@ -1496,7 +1496,7 @@ get_tmp_file (gchar            *tmpl,
+ 
+   for (count = 0; count < 100; value += 7777, ++count)
+     {
+-      glong v = value;
++      gint64 v = value;
+ 
+       /* Fill in the random bits.  */
+       XXXXXX[0] = letters[v % NLETTERS];

meta/recipes-core/glib-2.0/glib-2.0/CVE-2025-7039-02.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+From 61e963284889ddb4544e6f1d5261c16120f6fcc3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Michael Catanzaro <mcatanzaro@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2025 10:58:07 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH] gfileutils: fix computation of temporary file name
+
+We need to ensure that the value we use to index into the letters array
+is always positive.
+
+Fixes #3716
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-7039
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/-/commit/61e963284889ddb4544e6f1d5261c16120f6fcc3]
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
+---
+ glib/gfileutils.c | 8 ++++----
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/glib/gfileutils.c b/glib/gfileutils.c
+index c7d3339d1..286b1b154 100644
+--- a/glib/gfileutils.c
++++ b/glib/gfileutils.c
+@@ -1475,9 +1475,9 @@ get_tmp_file (gchar            *tmpl,
+   static const char letters[] =
+     "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789";
+   static const int NLETTERS = sizeof (letters) - 1;
+-  gint64 value;
+-  gint64 now_us;
+-  static int counter = 0;
++  guint64 value;
++  guint64 now_us;
++  static guint counter = 0;
+ 
+   g_return_val_if_fail (tmpl != NULL, -1);
+ 
+@@ -1496,7 +1496,7 @@ get_tmp_file (gchar            *tmpl,
+ 
+   for (count = 0; count < 100; value += 7777, ++count)
+     {
+-      gint64 v = value;
++      guint64 v = value;
+ 
+       /* Fill in the random bits.  */
+       XXXXXX[0] = letters[v % NLETTERS];

meta/recipes-core/glib-2.0/glib-2.0_2.72.3.bb

@@ -62,6 +62,8 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNOME_MIRROR}/glib/${SHRT_VER}/glib-${PV}.tar.xz \
            file://CVE-2025-3360-06.patch \
            file://CVE-2025-4373-01.patch \
            file://CVE-2025-4373-02.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-7039-01.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-7039-02.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI:append:class-native = " file://relocate-modules.patch"
 
@@ -97,3 +99,6 @@ def find_meson_cross_files(d):
 python () {
     find_meson_cross_files(d)
 }
+
+# not-applicable-platform: Issue only applies on Windows
+CVE_CHECK_IGNORE += "CVE-2025-4056"

meta/recipes-core/glib-networking/glib-networking/CVE-2025-60018.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+From 4dd540505d40babe488404f3174ec39f49a84485 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Michael Catanzaro <mcatanzaro@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 4 Aug 2025 15:10:21 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH] openssl: properly check return value when writing to BIO
+ objects
+
+In particular, we will read out of bounds, and then write the invalid
+memory, if BIO_write() fails when getting the PROP_CERTIFICATE_PEM
+property. Here we attempt to check the return value, but the check is
+not correct.
+
+This also fixes a leak of the BIO in the same place.
+
+Also add error checking to PROP_SUBJECT_NAME and PROP_ISSUER_NAME, for
+good measure.
+
+Fixes #226
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-60018
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib-networking/-/commit/4dd540505d40babe488404f3174ec39f49a84485]
+
+Signed-off-by: Rajeshkumar Ramasamy <rajeshkumar.ramasamy@windriver.com>
+---
+ tls/openssl/gtlscertificate-openssl.c | 25 +++++++++++++++----------
+ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/tls/openssl/gtlscertificate-openssl.c b/tls/openssl/gtlscertificate-openssl.c
+index 648f3e8..b536559 100644
+--- a/tls/openssl/gtlscertificate-openssl.c
++++ b/tls/openssl/gtlscertificate-openssl.c
+@@ -362,15 +362,12 @@ g_tls_certificate_openssl_get_property (GObject    *object,
+     case PROP_CERTIFICATE_PEM:
+       bio = BIO_new (BIO_s_mem ());
+
+-      if (!PEM_write_bio_X509 (bio, openssl->cert) || !BIO_write (bio, "\0", 1))
+-        certificate_pem = NULL;
+-      else
++      if (PEM_write_bio_X509 (bio, openssl->cert) == 1 && BIO_write (bio, "\0", 1) == 1)
+         {
+           BIO_get_mem_data (bio, &certificate_pem);
+           g_value_set_string (value, certificate_pem);
+-
+-          BIO_free_all (bio);
+         }
++      BIO_free_all (bio);
+       break;
+
+     case PROP_PRIVATE_KEY:
+@@ -411,8 +408,12 @@ g_tls_certificate_openssl_get_property (GObject    *object,
+     case PROP_SUBJECT_NAME:
+       bio = BIO_new (BIO_s_mem ());
+       name = X509_get_subject_name (openssl->cert);
+-      X509_NAME_print_ex (bio, name, 0, XN_FLAG_SEP_COMMA_PLUS);
+-      BIO_write (bio, "\0", 1);
++      if (X509_NAME_print_ex (bio, name, 0, XN_FLAG_SEP_COMMA_PLUS) < 0 ||
++          BIO_write (bio, "\0", 1) != 1)
++        {
++          BIO_free_all (bio);
++          break;
++        }
+       BIO_get_mem_data (bio, (char **)&name_string);
+       g_value_set_string (value, name_string);
+       BIO_free_all (bio);
+@@ -421,9 +422,13 @@ g_tls_certificate_openssl_get_property (GObject    *object,
+     case PROP_ISSUER_NAME:
+       bio = BIO_new (BIO_s_mem ());
+       name = X509_get_issuer_name (openssl->cert);
+-      X509_NAME_print_ex (bio, name, 0, XN_FLAG_SEP_COMMA_PLUS);
+-      BIO_write (bio, "\0", 1);
+-      BIO_get_mem_data (bio, &name_string);
++      if (X509_NAME_print_ex (bio, name, 0, XN_FLAG_SEP_COMMA_PLUS) < 0 ||
++          BIO_write (bio, "\0", 1) != 1)
++        {
++          BIO_free_all (bio);
++          break;
++        }
++      BIO_get_mem_data (bio, (char **)&name_string);
+       g_value_set_string (value, name_string);
+       BIO_free_all (bio);
+       break;
+--
+2.48.1

meta/recipes-core/glib-networking/glib-networking/CVE-2025-60019.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+From 70df675dd4f5e4a593b2f95406c1aac031aa8bc7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Michael Catanzaro <mcatanzaro@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 21 Aug 2025 17:21:01 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH] openssl: check return values of BIO_new()
+
+We probably need to check even more return values of even more OpenSSL
+functions, but these ones allocate memory and that's particularly
+important to get right.
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-60019
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib-networking/-/commit/70df675dd4f5e4a593b2f95406c1aac031aa8bc7]
+
+Signed-off-by: Rajeshkumar Ramasamy <rajeshkumar.ramasamy@windriver.com>
+---
+ tls/openssl/gtlscertificate-openssl.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++-------
+ 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/tls/openssl/gtlscertificate-openssl.c b/tls/openssl/gtlscertificate-openssl.c
+index 8f828a7..f7fde51 100644
+--- a/tls/openssl/gtlscertificate-openssl.c
++++ b/tls/openssl/gtlscertificate-openssl.c
+@@ -156,6 +156,9 @@ export_privkey_to_der (GTlsCertificateOpenssl  *openssl,
+     goto err;
+
+   bio = BIO_new (BIO_s_mem ());
++  if (!bio)
++    goto err;
++
+   if (i2d_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_bio (bio, pkcs8) == 0)
+     goto err;
+
+@@ -189,6 +192,9 @@ export_privkey_to_pem (GTlsCertificateOpenssl *openssl)
+     return NULL;
+
+   bio = BIO_new (BIO_s_mem ());
++  if (!bio)
++    goto out;
++
+   ret = PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey (bio, openssl->key, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
+   if (ret == 0)
+     goto out;
+@@ -201,7 +207,7 @@ export_privkey_to_pem (GTlsCertificateOpenssl *openssl)
+   result = g_strdup (data);
+
+ out:
+-  BIO_free_all (bio);
++  g_clear_pointer (&bio, BIO_free_all);
+   return result;
+ }
+
+@@ -216,7 +222,7 @@ g_tls_certificate_openssl_get_property (GObject    *object,
+   guint8 *data;
+   BIO *bio;
+   GByteArray *byte_array;
+-  char *certificate_pem;
++  const char *certificate_pem;
+   long size;
+
+   const ASN1_TIME *time_asn1;
+@@ -251,12 +257,12 @@ g_tls_certificate_openssl_get_property (GObject    *object,
+     case PROP_CERTIFICATE_PEM:
+       bio = BIO_new (BIO_s_mem ());
+
+-      if (PEM_write_bio_X509 (bio, openssl->cert) == 1 && BIO_write (bio, "\0", 1) == 1)
++      if (bio && PEM_write_bio_X509 (bio, openssl->cert) == 1 && BIO_write (bio, "\0", 1) == 1)
+         {
+           BIO_get_mem_data (bio, &certificate_pem);
+           g_value_set_string (value, certificate_pem);
+         }
+-      BIO_free_all (bio);
++      g_clear_pointer (&bio, BIO_free_all);
+       break;
+
+     case PROP_PRIVATE_KEY:
+@@ -296,6 +302,8 @@ g_tls_certificate_openssl_get_property (GObject    *object,
+
+     case PROP_SUBJECT_NAME:
+       bio = BIO_new (BIO_s_mem ());
++      if (!bio)
++        break;
+       name = X509_get_subject_name (openssl->cert);
+       if (X509_NAME_print_ex (bio, name, 0, XN_FLAG_SEP_COMMA_PLUS) < 0 ||
+           BIO_write (bio, "\0", 1) != 1)
+@@ -310,6 +318,8 @@ g_tls_certificate_openssl_get_property (GObject    *object,
+
+     case PROP_ISSUER_NAME:
+       bio = BIO_new (BIO_s_mem ());
++      if (!bio)
++        break;
+       name = X509_get_issuer_name (openssl->cert);
+       if (X509_NAME_print_ex (bio, name, 0, XN_FLAG_SEP_COMMA_PLUS) < 0 ||
+           BIO_write (bio, "\0", 1) != 1)
+@@ -377,8 +387,11 @@ g_tls_certificate_openssl_set_property (GObject      *object,
+         break;
+       g_return_if_fail (openssl->have_cert == FALSE);
+       bio = BIO_new_mem_buf ((gpointer)string, -1);
+-      openssl->cert = PEM_read_bio_X509 (bio, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+-      BIO_free (bio);
++      if (bio)
++        {
++          openssl->cert = PEM_read_bio_X509 (bio, NULL, NULL, NULL);
++          BIO_free (bio);
++        }
+       if (openssl->cert)
+         openssl->have_cert = TRUE;
+       else if (!openssl->construct_error)
+@@ -397,8 +410,11 @@ g_tls_certificate_openssl_set_property (GObject      *object,
+         break;
+       g_return_if_fail (openssl->have_key == FALSE);
+       bio = BIO_new_mem_buf (bytes->data, bytes->len);
+-      openssl->key = d2i_PrivateKey_bio (bio, NULL);
+-      BIO_free (bio);
++      if (bio)
++        {
++          openssl->key = d2i_PrivateKey_bio (bio, NULL);
++          BIO_free (bio);
++        }
+       if (openssl->key)
+         openssl->have_key = TRUE;
+       else if (!openssl->construct_error)
+@@ -417,8 +433,11 @@ g_tls_certificate_openssl_set_property (GObject      *object,
+         break;
+       g_return_if_fail (openssl->have_key == FALSE);
+       bio = BIO_new_mem_buf ((gpointer)string, -1);
+-      openssl->key = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey (bio, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+-      BIO_free (bio);
++      if (bio)
++        {
++          openssl->key = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey (bio, NULL, NULL, NULL);
++          BIO_free (bio);
++        }
+       if (openssl->key)
+         openssl->have_key = TRUE;
+       else if (!openssl->construct_error)
+--
+2.48.1

meta/recipes-core/glib-networking/glib-networking_2.72.2.bb

@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@ GNOMEBASEBUILDCLASS = "meson"
 inherit gnomebase gettext upstream-version-is-even gio-module-cache ptest-gnome
 
 SRC_URI += "file://run-ptest"
+SRC_URI += "file://CVE-2025-60018.patch"
+SRC_URI += "file://CVE-2025-60019.patch"
 
 FILES:${PN} += "\
                 ${libdir}/gio/modules/libgio*.so \

meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc-version.inc

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 SRCBRANCH ?= "release/2.35/master"
 PV = "2.35"
-SRCREV_glibc ?= "a66bc3941ff298e474d5f02d0c3303401951141f"
+SRCREV_glibc ?= "4e50046821f05ada5f14c76803845125ddb3ed7d"
 SRCREV_localedef ?= "794da69788cbf9bf57b59a852f9f11307663fa87"
 
 GLIBC_GIT_URI ?= "git://sourceware.org/git/glibc.git"

meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc/0026-PR25847-1.patch

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-From 31d9848830e496f57d4182b518467c4c63bfd4bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 0402999b82f697011de388f61bad68da26060bef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Frank Barrus <frankbarrus_sw@shaggy.cc>
-Date: Mon, 16 Jun 2025 22:37:54 -0700
+Date: Tue, 14 Oct 2025 03:55:17 -0700
 Subject: [PATCH] pthreads NPTL: lost wakeup fix 2
 
 This fixes the lost wakeup (from a bug in signal stealing) with a change
@@ -65,18 +65,19 @@ full wakeup from a G1/G2 switch.
 
 The following commits have been cherry-picked from Glibc master branch:
 Bug : https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=25847
+Commit : 1db84775f831a1494993ce9c118deaf9537cc50a
 
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-[https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=commit;h=1db84775f831a1494993ce9c118deaf9537cc50a]
+Upstream-Status: Submitted
+[https://sourceware.org/pipermail/libc-stable/2025-July/002277.html]
 
 Signed-off-by: Sunil Dora <sunilkumar.dora@windriver.com>
 ---
- nptl/pthread_cond_common.c | 106 +++++++++------------------
+ nptl/pthread_cond_common.c | 105 +++++++++------------------
  nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c   | 144 ++++++++++++-------------------------
- 2 files changed, 81 insertions(+), 169 deletions(-)
+ 2 files changed, 81 insertions(+), 168 deletions(-)
 
 diff --git a/nptl/pthread_cond_common.c b/nptl/pthread_cond_common.c
-index fb035f72c3..8dd7037923 100644
+index fb035f72..a55eee3e 100644
 --- a/nptl/pthread_cond_common.c
 +++ b/nptl/pthread_cond_common.c
 @@ -201,7 +201,6 @@ static bool __attribute__ ((unused))
@@ -87,7 +88,7 @@ index fb035f72c3..8dd7037923 100644
    unsigned int g1 = *g1index;
  
    /* If there is no waiter in G2, we don't do anything.  The expression may
-@@ -222,85 +221,46 @@ __condvar_quiesce_and_switch_g1 (pthread_cond_t *cond, uint64_t wseq,
+@@ -222,84 +221,46 @@ __condvar_quiesce_and_switch_g1 (pthread_cond_t *cond, uint64_t wseq,
       * New waiters arriving concurrently with the group switching will all go
         into G2 until we atomically make the switch.  Waiters existing in G2
         are not affected.
@@ -176,7 +177,6 @@ index fb035f72c3..8dd7037923 100644
 -     that this is now a new group (see __pthread_cond_wait_common for the
 -     matching acquire MO loads).  */
 -  atomic_store_release (cond->__data.__g_signals + g1, 0);
--
 +  unsigned int lowseq = ((old_g1_start + old_orig_size) << 1) & ~1U;
 +
 +  /* If any waiters still hold group references (and thus could be blocked),
@@ -201,10 +201,10 @@ index fb035f72c3..8dd7037923 100644
 +
 +    futex_wake (cond->__data.__g_signals + g1, INT_MAX, private);
 +   }
+ 
    /* At this point, the old G1 is now a valid new G2 (but not in use yet).
       No old waiter can neither grab a signal nor acquire a reference without
-      noticing that __g1_start is larger.
-@@ -311,6 +271,10 @@ __condvar_quiesce_and_switch_g1 (pthread_cond_t *cond, uint64_t wseq,
+@@ -311,6 +272,10 @@ __condvar_quiesce_and_switch_g1 (pthread_cond_t *cond, uint64_t wseq,
    g1 ^= 1;
    *g1index ^= 1;
  
@@ -216,7 +216,7 @@ index fb035f72c3..8dd7037923 100644
       lock.  */
    unsigned int orig_size = wseq - (old_g1_start + old_orig_size);
 diff --git a/nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c b/nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c
-index 20c348a503..1cb3dbf7b0 100644
+index 20c348a5..1cb3dbf7 100644
 --- a/nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c
 +++ b/nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c
 @@ -238,9 +238,7 @@ __condvar_cleanup_waiting (void *arg)

meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc/0026-PR25847-10.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+From 4f78382dd671f381db6d1f452e6f1593d17b177e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 14 Oct 2025 06:53:40 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] nptl: PTHREAD_COND_INITIALIZER compatibility with pre-2.41
+ versions (bug 32786)
+
+The new initializer and struct layout does not initialize the
+__g_signals field in the old struct layout before the change in
+commit c36fc50781995e6758cae2b6927839d0157f213c ("nptl: Remove
+g_refs from condition variables").  Bring back fields at the end
+of struct __pthread_cond_s, so that they are again zero-initialized.
+
+The following commits have been cherry-picked from Glibc master branch:
+Bug : https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=25847
+commit: dbc5a50d12eff4cb3f782129029d04b8a76f58e7
+
+Upstream-Status: Submitted
+[https://sourceware.org/pipermail/libc-stable/2025-July/002282.html]
+
+Signed-off-by: Sunil Dora <sunilkumar.dora@windriver.com>
+---
+ sysdeps/nptl/bits/thread-shared-types.h | 2 ++
+ sysdeps/nptl/pthread.h                  | 2 +-
+ 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/sysdeps/nptl/bits/thread-shared-types.h b/sysdeps/nptl/bits/thread-shared-types.h
+index 6f17afa4..2354ea21 100644
+--- a/sysdeps/nptl/bits/thread-shared-types.h
++++ b/sysdeps/nptl/bits/thread-shared-types.h
+@@ -99,6 +99,8 @@ struct __pthread_cond_s
+   unsigned int __g1_orig_size;
+   unsigned int __wrefs;
+   unsigned int __g_signals[2];
++  unsigned int __unused_initialized_1;
++  unsigned int __unused_initialized_2;
+ };
+ 
+ typedef unsigned int __tss_t;
+diff --git a/sysdeps/nptl/pthread.h b/sysdeps/nptl/pthread.h
+index bbb36540..8d6d24ff 100644
+--- a/sysdeps/nptl/pthread.h
++++ b/sysdeps/nptl/pthread.h
+@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ enum
+ 
+ 
+ /* Conditional variable handling.  */
+-#define PTHREAD_COND_INITIALIZER { { {0}, {0}, {0, 0}, 0, 0, {0, 0} } }
++#define PTHREAD_COND_INITIALIZER { { {0}, {0}, {0, 0}, 0, 0, {0, 0}, 0, 0 } }
+ 
+ 
+ /* Cleanup buffers */
+-- 
+2.49.0
+

meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc/0026-PR25847-2.patch

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-From 6aab1191e35a3da66e8c49d95178a9d77c119a1f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 306ea7810f5f6709ef3942a7be75077203b5d201 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Malte Skarupke <malteskarupke@fastmail.fm>
-Date: Mon, 16 Jun 2025 23:17:53 -0700
+Date: Tue, 14 Oct 2025 04:27:19 -0700
 Subject: [PATCH] nptl: Update comments and indentation for new condvar
  implementation
 
@@ -9,9 +9,10 @@ Also fixing indentation where it was using spaces instead of tabs.
 
 The following commits have been cherry-picked from Glibc master branch:
 Bug : https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=25847
+commit: 0cc973160c23bb67f895bc887dd6942d29f8fee3
 
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-[https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=commit;h=0cc973160c23bb67f895bc887dd6942d29f8fee3]
+Upstream-Status: Submitted
+[https://sourceware.org/pipermail/libc-stable/2025-July/002275.html]
 
 Signed-off-by: Sunil Dora <sunilkumar.dora@windriver.com>
 ---
@@ -20,7 +21,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Sunil Dora <sunilkumar.dora@windriver.com>
  2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
 
 diff --git a/nptl/pthread_cond_common.c b/nptl/pthread_cond_common.c
-index 8dd7037923..306a207dd6 100644
+index a55eee3e..350a16fa 100644
 --- a/nptl/pthread_cond_common.c
 +++ b/nptl/pthread_cond_common.c
 @@ -221,8 +221,9 @@ __condvar_quiesce_and_switch_g1 (pthread_cond_t *cond, uint64_t wseq,
@@ -36,7 +37,7 @@ index 8dd7037923..306a207dd6 100644
         __g_signals since it provides enough signals for all possible
         remaining waiters.  As a result, they can each consume a signal
 diff --git a/nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c b/nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c
-index 1cb3dbf7b0..cee1968756 100644
+index 1cb3dbf7..cee19687 100644
 --- a/nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c
 +++ b/nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c
 @@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ __condvar_cleanup_waiting (void *arg)

meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc/0026-PR25847-3.patch

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-From 28a5082045429fdc5a4744d45fdc5b5202528eaa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 5f22e8cf95cf6b3b2e16ddb03820ae3e77fd420d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Malte Skarupke <malteskarupke@fastmail.fm>
-Date: Mon, 16 Jun 2025 23:29:49 -0700
+Date: Tue, 14 Oct 2025 04:47:48 -0700
 Subject: [PATCH] nptl: Remove unnecessary catch-all-wake in condvar group
  switch
 
@@ -15,17 +15,18 @@ switch g1 when it should, so we wouldn't even have entered this code path.
 
 The following commits have been cherry-picked from Glibc master branch:
 Bug : https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=25847
+commit: b42cc6af11062c260c7dfa91f1c89891366fed3e
 
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-[https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=commit;h=b42cc6af11062c260c7dfa91f1c89891366fed3e]
+Upstream-Status: Submitted
+[https://sourceware.org/pipermail/libc-stable/2025-July/002274.html]
 
 Signed-off-by: Sunil Dora <sunilkumar.dora@windriver.com>
 ---
- nptl/pthread_cond_common.c | 30 +-----------------------------
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 29 deletions(-)
+ nptl/pthread_cond_common.c | 31 +------------------------------
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 30 deletions(-)
 
 diff --git a/nptl/pthread_cond_common.c b/nptl/pthread_cond_common.c
-index 306a207dd6..f976a533a1 100644
+index 350a16fa..f976a533 100644
 --- a/nptl/pthread_cond_common.c
 +++ b/nptl/pthread_cond_common.c
 @@ -221,13 +221,7 @@ __condvar_quiesce_and_switch_g1 (pthread_cond_t *cond, uint64_t wseq,
@@ -43,7 +44,7 @@ index 306a207dd6..f976a533a1 100644
  
    /* Update __g1_start, which finishes closing this group.  The value we add
       will never be negative because old_orig_size can only be zero when we
-@@ -240,28 +234,6 @@ __condvar_quiesce_and_switch_g1 (pthread_cond_t *cond, uint64_t wseq,
+@@ -240,29 +234,6 @@ __condvar_quiesce_and_switch_g1 (pthread_cond_t *cond, uint64_t wseq,
  
    unsigned int lowseq = ((old_g1_start + old_orig_size) << 1) & ~1U;
  
@@ -69,6 +70,7 @@ index 306a207dd6..f976a533a1 100644
 -
 -    futex_wake (cond->__data.__g_signals + g1, INT_MAX, private);
 -   }
+-
    /* At this point, the old G1 is now a valid new G2 (but not in use yet).
       No old waiter can neither grab a signal nor acquire a reference without
       noticing that __g1_start is larger.

meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc/0026-PR25847-4.patch

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-From 16b9af737c77b153fca4f36cbdbe94f7416c0b42 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From d714165c8bb3cac420077cfa61e3df87ea7f8b2c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Malte Skarupke <malteskarupke@fastmail.fm>
-Date: Mon, 16 Jun 2025 23:38:40 -0700
+Date: Tue, 14 Oct 2025 05:34:06 -0700
 Subject: [PATCH] nptl: Remove unnecessary quadruple check in pthread_cond_wait
 
 pthread_cond_wait was checking whether it was in a closed group no less than
@@ -22,9 +22,10 @@ Removing the duplicate checks clarifies the code.
 
 The following commits have been cherry-picked from Glibc master branch:
 Bug : https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=25847
+commit: 4f7b051f8ee3feff1b53b27a906f245afaa9cee1
 
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-[https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=commit;h=4f7b051f8ee3feff1b53b27a906f245afaa9cee1]
+Upstream-Status: Submitted
+[https://sourceware.org/pipermail/libc-stable/2025-July/002276.html]
 
 Signed-off-by: Sunil Dora <sunilkumar.dora@windriver.com>
 ---
@@ -32,7 +33,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Sunil Dora <sunilkumar.dora@windriver.com>
  1 file changed, 49 deletions(-)
 
 diff --git a/nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c b/nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c
-index cee1968756..47e834cade 100644
+index cee19687..47e834ca 100644
 --- a/nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c
 +++ b/nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c
 @@ -366,7 +366,6 @@ static __always_inline int

meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc/0026-PR25847-5.patch

@@ -1,105 +1,188 @@
-From d9ffb50dc55f77e584a5d0275eea758c7a6b04e3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From f904a81ff8d0469ceaf3220329e716c03fcbd2d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Malte Skarupke <malteskarupke@fastmail.fm>
-Date: Mon, 16 Jun 2025 23:53:35 -0700
-Subject: [PATCH] nptl: Use a single loop in pthread_cond_wait instaed of a
- nested loop
+Date: Tue, 14 Oct 2025 05:59:02 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] nptl: Remove g_refs from condition variables
 
-The loop was a little more complicated than necessary. There was only one
-break statement out of the inner loop, and the outer loop was nearly empty.
-So just remove the outer loop, moving its code to the one break statement in
-the inner loop. This allows us to replace all gotos with break statements.
+This variable used to be needed to wait in group switching until all sleepers
+have confirmed that they have woken. This is no longer needed. Nothing waits
+on this variable so there is no need to track how many threads are currently
+asleep in each group.
 
 The following commits have been cherry-picked from Glibc master branch:
 Bug : https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=25847
+cmmit: c36fc50781995e6758cae2b6927839d0157f213c
 
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-[https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=commit;h=929a4764ac90382616b6a21f099192b2475da674]
+Upstream-Status: Submitted
+[https://sourceware.org/pipermail/libc-stable/2025-July/002278.html]
 
 Signed-off-by: Sunil Dora <sunilkumar.dora@windriver.com>
 ---
- nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++---------------------
- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
+ nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c                | 52 +------------------------
+ nptl/tst-cond22.c                       | 12 +++---
+ sysdeps/nptl/bits/thread-shared-types.h |  3 +-
+ sysdeps/nptl/pthread.h                  |  2 +-
+ 4 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 60 deletions(-)
 
 diff --git a/nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c b/nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c
-index 47e834cade..5c86880105 100644
+index 47e834ca..8a9219e0 100644
 --- a/nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c
 +++ b/nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c
-@@ -410,17 +410,15 @@ __pthread_cond_wait_common (pthread_cond_t *cond, pthread_mutex_t *mutex,
-       return err;
+@@ -143,23 +143,6 @@ __condvar_cancel_waiting (pthread_cond_t *cond, uint64_t seq, unsigned int g,
      }
+ }
  
--  /* Now wait until a signal is available in our group or it is closed.
--     Acquire MO so that if we observe (signals == lowseq) after group
--     switching in __condvar_quiesce_and_switch_g1, we synchronize with that
--     store and will see the prior update of __g1_start done while switching
--     groups too.  */
--  unsigned int signals = atomic_load_acquire (cond->__data.__g_signals + g);
--
--  do
+-/* Wake up any signalers that might be waiting.  */
+-static void
+-__condvar_dec_grefs (pthread_cond_t *cond, unsigned int g, int private)
+-{
+-  /* Release MO to synchronize-with the acquire load in
+-     __condvar_quiesce_and_switch_g1.  */
+-  if (atomic_fetch_add_release (cond->__data.__g_refs + g, -2) == 3)
 -    {
-+
-       while (1)
- 	{
-+	  /* Now wait until a signal is available in our group or it is closed.
-+	     Acquire MO so that if we observe (signals == lowseq) after group
-+	     switching in __condvar_quiesce_and_switch_g1, we synchronize with that
-+	     store and will see the prior update of __g1_start done while switching
-+	     groups too.  */
-+	  unsigned int signals = atomic_load_acquire (cond->__data.__g_signals + g);
- 	  uint64_t g1_start = __condvar_load_g1_start_relaxed (cond);
- 	  unsigned int lowseq = (g1_start & 1) == g ? signals : g1_start & ~1U;
- 
-@@ -429,7 +427,7 @@ __pthread_cond_wait_common (pthread_cond_t *cond, pthread_mutex_t *mutex,
- 	      /* If the group is closed already,
- 	         then this waiter originally had enough extra signals to
- 	         consume, up until the time its group was closed.  */
--	       goto done;
-+	       break;
- 	    }
- 
- 	  /* If there is an available signal, don't block.
-@@ -438,8 +436,16 @@ __pthread_cond_wait_common (pthread_cond_t *cond, pthread_mutex_t *mutex,
- 	     G2, but in either case we're allowed to consume the available
- 	     signal and should not block anymore.  */
- 	  if ((int)(signals - lowseq) >= 2)
--	    break;
+-      /* Clear the wake-up request flag before waking up.  We do not need more
+-	 than relaxed MO and it doesn't matter if we apply this for an aliased
+-	 group because we wake all futex waiters right after clearing the
+-	 flag.  */
+-      atomic_fetch_and_relaxed (cond->__data.__g_refs + g, ~(unsigned int) 1);
+-      futex_wake (cond->__data.__g_refs + g, INT_MAX, private);
+-    }
+-}
 -
-+           {
-+             /* Try to grab a signal.  See above for MO.  (if we do another loop
-+                iteration we need to see the correct value of g1_start)  */
-+                     if (atomic_compare_exchange_weak_acquire (
-+                               cond->__data.__g_signals + g,
-+                       &signals, signals - 2))
-+                       break;
-+                     else
-+                       continue;
-+           }
- 	  /* No signals available after spinning, so prepare to block.
- 	     We first acquire a group reference and use acquire MO for that so
- 	     that we synchronize with the dummy read-modify-write in
-@@ -479,21 +485,12 @@ __pthread_cond_wait_common (pthread_cond_t *cond, pthread_mutex_t *mutex,
- 		 the lock during cancellation is not possible.  */
+ /* Clean-up for cancellation of waiters waiting for normal signals.  We cancel
+    our registration as a waiter, confirm we have woken up, and re-acquire the
+    mutex.  */
+@@ -171,8 +154,6 @@ __condvar_cleanup_waiting (void *arg)
+   pthread_cond_t *cond = cbuffer->cond;
+   unsigned g = cbuffer->wseq & 1;
+ 
+-  __condvar_dec_grefs (cond, g, cbuffer->private);
+-
+   __condvar_cancel_waiting (cond, cbuffer->wseq >> 1, g, cbuffer->private);
+   /* FIXME With the current cancellation implementation, it is possible that
+      a thread is cancelled after it has returned from a syscall.  This could
+@@ -327,15 +308,6 @@ __condvar_cleanup_waiting (void *arg)
+    sufficient because if a waiter can see a sufficiently large value, it could
+    have also consume a signal in the waiters group.
+ 
+-   It is essential that the last field in pthread_cond_t is __g_signals[1]:
+-   The previous condvar used a pointer-sized field in pthread_cond_t, so a
+-   PTHREAD_COND_INITIALIZER from that condvar implementation might only
+-   initialize 4 bytes to zero instead of the 8 bytes we need (i.e., 44 bytes
+-   in total instead of the 48 we need).  __g_signals[1] is not accessed before
+-   the first group switch (G2 starts at index 0), which will set its value to
+-   zero after a harmless fetch-or whose return value is ignored.  This
+-   effectively completes initialization.
+-
+ 
+    Limitations:
+    * This condvar isn't designed to allow for more than
+@@ -440,21 +412,6 @@ __pthread_cond_wait_common (pthread_cond_t *cond, pthread_mutex_t *mutex,
+ 	  if ((int)(signals - lowseq) >= 2)
+ 	    break;
+ 
+-	  /* No signals available after spinning, so prepare to block.
+-	     We first acquire a group reference and use acquire MO for that so
+-	     that we synchronize with the dummy read-modify-write in
+-	     __condvar_quiesce_and_switch_g1 if we read from that.  In turn,
+-	     in this case this will make us see the advancement of __g_signals
+-	     to the upcoming new g1_start that occurs with a concurrent
+-	     attempt to reuse the group's slot.
+-	     We use acquire MO for the __g_signals check to make the
+-	     __g1_start check work (see spinning above).
+-	     Note that the group reference acquisition will not mask the
+-	     release MO when decrementing the reference count because we use
+-	     an atomic read-modify-write operation and thus extend the release
+-	     sequence.  */
+-	  atomic_fetch_add_acquire (cond->__data.__g_refs + g, 2);
+-
+ 	  // Now block.
+ 	  struct _pthread_cleanup_buffer buffer;
+ 	  struct _condvar_cleanup_buffer cbuffer;
+@@ -471,18 +428,11 @@ __pthread_cond_wait_common (pthread_cond_t *cond, pthread_mutex_t *mutex,
+ 
+ 	  if (__glibc_unlikely (err == ETIMEDOUT || err == EOVERFLOW))
+ 	    {
+-	      __condvar_dec_grefs (cond, g, private);
+-	      /* If we timed out, we effectively cancel waiting.  Note that
+-		 we have decremented __g_refs before cancellation, so that a
+-		 deadlock between waiting for quiescence of our group in
+-		 __condvar_quiesce_and_switch_g1 and us trying to acquire
+-		 the lock during cancellation is not possible.  */
++	      /* If we timed out, we effectively cancel waiting.  */
  	      __condvar_cancel_waiting (cond, seq, g, private);
  	      result = err;
--	      goto done;
-+	      break;
+ 	      goto done;
  	    }
- 	  else
- 	    __condvar_dec_grefs (cond, g, private);
+-	  else
+-	    __condvar_dec_grefs (cond, g, private);
  
--	  /* Reload signals.  See above for MO.  */
--	  signals = atomic_load_acquire (cond->__data.__g_signals + g);
- 	}
--    }
--  /* Try to grab a signal.  See above for MO.  (if we do another loop
--     iteration we need to see the correct value of g1_start)  */
--  while (!atomic_compare_exchange_weak_acquire (cond->__data.__g_signals + g,
--						&signals, signals - 2));
--
-- done:
+ 	  /* Reload signals.  See above for MO.  */
+ 	  signals = atomic_load_acquire (cond->__data.__g_signals + g);
+diff --git a/nptl/tst-cond22.c b/nptl/tst-cond22.c
+index 1336e9c7..bdcb45c5 100644
+--- a/nptl/tst-cond22.c
++++ b/nptl/tst-cond22.c
+@@ -106,13 +106,13 @@ do_test (void)
+       status = 1;
+     }
  
-   /* Confirm that we have been woken.  We do that before acquiring the mutex
-      to allow for execution of pthread_cond_destroy while having acquired the
+-  printf ("cond = { 0x%x:%x, 0x%x:%x, %u/%u/%u, %u/%u/%u, %u, %u }\n",
++  printf ("cond = { 0x%x:%x, 0x%x:%x, %u/%u, %u/%u, %u, %u }\n",
+ 	  c.__data.__wseq.__value32.__high,
+ 	  c.__data.__wseq.__value32.__low,
+ 	  c.__data.__g1_start.__value32.__high,
+ 	  c.__data.__g1_start.__value32.__low,
+-	  c.__data.__g_signals[0], c.__data.__g_refs[0], c.__data.__g_size[0],
+-	  c.__data.__g_signals[1], c.__data.__g_refs[1], c.__data.__g_size[1],
++	  c.__data.__g_signals[0], c.__data.__g_size[0],
++	  c.__data.__g_signals[1], c.__data.__g_size[1],
+ 	  c.__data.__g1_orig_size, c.__data.__wrefs);
+ 
+   if (pthread_create (&th, NULL, tf, (void *) 1l) != 0)
+@@ -152,13 +152,13 @@ do_test (void)
+       status = 1;
+     }
+ 
+-  printf ("cond = { 0x%x:%x, 0x%x:%x, %u/%u/%u, %u/%u/%u, %u, %u }\n",
++  printf ("cond = { 0x%x:%x, 0x%x:%x, %u/%u, %u/%u, %u, %u }\n",
+ 	  c.__data.__wseq.__value32.__high,
+ 	  c.__data.__wseq.__value32.__low,
+ 	  c.__data.__g1_start.__value32.__high,
+ 	  c.__data.__g1_start.__value32.__low,
+-	  c.__data.__g_signals[0], c.__data.__g_refs[0], c.__data.__g_size[0],
+-	  c.__data.__g_signals[1], c.__data.__g_refs[1], c.__data.__g_size[1],
++	  c.__data.__g_signals[0], c.__data.__g_size[0],
++	  c.__data.__g_signals[1], c.__data.__g_size[1],
+ 	  c.__data.__g1_orig_size, c.__data.__wrefs);
+ 
+   return status;
+diff --git a/sysdeps/nptl/bits/thread-shared-types.h b/sysdeps/nptl/bits/thread-shared-types.h
+index 5653507e..6f17afa4 100644
+--- a/sysdeps/nptl/bits/thread-shared-types.h
++++ b/sysdeps/nptl/bits/thread-shared-types.h
+@@ -95,8 +95,7 @@ struct __pthread_cond_s
+ {
+   __atomic_wide_counter __wseq;
+   __atomic_wide_counter __g1_start;
+-  unsigned int __g_refs[2] __LOCK_ALIGNMENT;
+-  unsigned int __g_size[2];
++  unsigned int __g_size[2] __LOCK_ALIGNMENT;
+   unsigned int __g1_orig_size;
+   unsigned int __wrefs;
+   unsigned int __g_signals[2];
+diff --git a/sysdeps/nptl/pthread.h b/sysdeps/nptl/pthread.h
+index dedad4ec..bbb36540 100644
+--- a/sysdeps/nptl/pthread.h
++++ b/sysdeps/nptl/pthread.h
+@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ enum
+ 
+ 
+ /* Conditional variable handling.  */
+-#define PTHREAD_COND_INITIALIZER { { {0}, {0}, {0, 0}, {0, 0}, 0, 0, {0, 0} } }
++#define PTHREAD_COND_INITIALIZER { { {0}, {0}, {0, 0}, 0, 0, {0, 0} } }
+ 
+ 
+ /* Cleanup buffers */
 -- 
 2.49.0
 

meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc/0026-PR25847-6.patch

@@ -1,166 +1,100 @@
-From a2faee6d0dac6e5232255da9afda4d9ed6cfb6e5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From bbd7c84a1a14bf93bf1e5976d8a1540aabbf901b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Malte Skarupke <malteskarupke@fastmail.fm>
-Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2025 01:37:12 -0700
-Subject: [PATCH] nptl: Fix indentation
+Date: Tue, 14 Oct 2025 06:19:02 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] nptl: Use a single loop in pthread_cond_wait instaed of a
+ nested loop
 
-In my previous change I turned a nested loop into a simple loop. I'm doing
-the resulting indentation changes in a separate commit to make the diff on
-the previous commit easier to review.
+The loop was a little more complicated than necessary. There was only one
+break statement out of the inner loop, and the outer loop was nearly empty.
+So just remove the outer loop, moving its code to the one break statement in
+the inner loop. This allows us to replace all gotos with break statements.
 
 The following commits have been cherry-picked from Glibc master branch:
 Bug : https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=25847
+commit: 929a4764ac90382616b6a21f099192b2475da674
 
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-[https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=commit;h=ee6c14ed59d480720721aaacc5fb03213dc153da]
+Upstream-Status: Submitted
+[https://sourceware.org/pipermail/libc-stable/2025-July/002279.html]
 
 Signed-off-by: Sunil Dora <sunilkumar.dora@windriver.com>
 ---
- nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c | 132 ++++++++++++++++-----------------------
- 1 file changed, 54 insertions(+), 78 deletions(-)
+ nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++---------------------
+ 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
 
 diff --git a/nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c b/nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c
-index 5c86880105..104ebd48ca 100644
+index 8a9219e0..c8c99bbf 100644
 --- a/nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c
 +++ b/nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c
-@@ -410,87 +410,63 @@ __pthread_cond_wait_common (pthread_cond_t *cond, pthread_mutex_t *mutex,
+@@ -382,17 +382,15 @@ __pthread_cond_wait_common (pthread_cond_t *cond, pthread_mutex_t *mutex,
        return err;
      }
  
+-  /* Now wait until a signal is available in our group or it is closed.
+-     Acquire MO so that if we observe (signals == lowseq) after group
+-     switching in __condvar_quiesce_and_switch_g1, we synchronize with that
+-     store and will see the prior update of __g1_start done while switching
+-     groups too.  */
+-  unsigned int signals = atomic_load_acquire (cond->__data.__g_signals + g);
 -
--      while (1)
--	{
--	  /* Now wait until a signal is available in our group or it is closed.
--	     Acquire MO so that if we observe (signals == lowseq) after group
--	     switching in __condvar_quiesce_and_switch_g1, we synchronize with that
--	     store and will see the prior update of __g1_start done while switching
--	     groups too.  */
--	  unsigned int signals = atomic_load_acquire (cond->__data.__g_signals + g);
--	  uint64_t g1_start = __condvar_load_g1_start_relaxed (cond);
--	  unsigned int lowseq = (g1_start & 1) == g ? signals : g1_start & ~1U;
--
--	  if (seq < (g1_start >> 1))
--	    {
--	      /* If the group is closed already,
--	         then this waiter originally had enough extra signals to
--	         consume, up until the time its group was closed.  */
--	       break;
--	    }
--
--	  /* If there is an available signal, don't block.
--	     If __g1_start has advanced at all, then we must be in G1
--	     by now, perhaps in the process of switching back to an older
--	     G2, but in either case we're allowed to consume the available
--	     signal and should not block anymore.  */
--	  if ((int)(signals - lowseq) >= 2)
--           {
--             /* Try to grab a signal.  See above for MO.  (if we do another loop
--                iteration we need to see the correct value of g1_start)  */
--                     if (atomic_compare_exchange_weak_acquire (
--                               cond->__data.__g_signals + g,
-+  while (1)
-+    {
-+      /* Now wait until a signal is available in our group or it is closed.
-+         Acquire MO so that if we observe (signals == lowseq) after group
-+         switching in __condvar_quiesce_and_switch_g1, we synchronize with that
-+         store and will see the prior update of __g1_start done while switching
-+         groups too.  */
-+      unsigned int signals = atomic_load_acquire (cond->__data.__g_signals + g);
-+      uint64_t g1_start = __condvar_load_g1_start_relaxed (cond);
-+      unsigned int lowseq = (g1_start & 1) == g ? signals : g1_start & ~1U;
+-  do
+-    {
 +
-+      if (seq < (g1_start >> 1))
-+        {
-+          /* If the group is closed already,
-+             then this waiter originally had enough extra signals to
-+             consume, up until the time its group was closed.  */
-+           break;
-+        }
-+
-+      /* If there is an available signal, don't block.
-+         If __g1_start has advanced at all, then we must be in G1
-+         by now, perhaps in the process of switching back to an older
-+         G2, but in either case we're allowed to consume the available
-+         signal and should not block anymore.  */
-+      if ((int)(signals - lowseq) >= 2)
-+        {
-+         /* Try to grab a signal.  See above for MO.  (if we do another loop
-+            iteration we need to see the correct value of g1_start)  */
-+           if (atomic_compare_exchange_weak_acquire (
-+                       cond->__data.__g_signals + g,
-                        &signals, signals - 2))
--                       break;
--                     else
--                       continue;
--           }
--	  /* No signals available after spinning, so prepare to block.
--	     We first acquire a group reference and use acquire MO for that so
--	     that we synchronize with the dummy read-modify-write in
--	     __condvar_quiesce_and_switch_g1 if we read from that.  In turn,
--	     in this case this will make us see the advancement of __g_signals
--	     to the upcoming new g1_start that occurs with a concurrent
--	     attempt to reuse the group's slot.
--	     We use acquire MO for the __g_signals check to make the
--	     __g1_start check work (see spinning above).
--	     Note that the group reference acquisition will not mask the
--	     release MO when decrementing the reference count because we use
--	     an atomic read-modify-write operation and thus extend the release
--	     sequence.  */
--	  atomic_fetch_add_acquire (cond->__data.__g_refs + g, 2);
+       while (1)
+ 	{
++	  /* Now wait until a signal is available in our group or it is closed.
++	     Acquire MO so that if we observe (signals == lowseq) after group
++	     switching in __condvar_quiesce_and_switch_g1, we synchronize with that
++	     store and will see the prior update of __g1_start done while switching
++	     groups too.  */
++	  unsigned int signals = atomic_load_acquire (cond->__data.__g_signals + g);
+ 	  uint64_t g1_start = __condvar_load_g1_start_relaxed (cond);
+ 	  unsigned int lowseq = (g1_start & 1) == g ? signals : g1_start & ~1U;
+ 
+@@ -401,7 +399,7 @@ __pthread_cond_wait_common (pthread_cond_t *cond, pthread_mutex_t *mutex,
+ 	      /* If the group is closed already,
+ 	         then this waiter originally had enough extra signals to
+ 	         consume, up until the time its group was closed.  */
+-	       goto done;
++	       break;
+ 	    }
+ 
+ 	  /* If there is an available signal, don't block.
+@@ -410,7 +408,16 @@ __pthread_cond_wait_common (pthread_cond_t *cond, pthread_mutex_t *mutex,
+ 	     G2, but in either case we're allowed to consume the available
+ 	     signal and should not block anymore.  */
+ 	  if ((int)(signals - lowseq) >= 2)
+-	    break;
++           {
++             /* Try to grab a signal.  See above for MO.  (if we do another loop
++                iteration we need to see the correct value of g1_start)  */
++                     if (atomic_compare_exchange_weak_acquire (
++                               cond->__data.__g_signals + g,
++                       &signals, signals - 2))
++                       break;
++                     else
++                       continue;
++           }
+ 
+ 	  // Now block.
+ 	  struct _pthread_cleanup_buffer buffer;
+@@ -431,19 +438,9 @@ __pthread_cond_wait_common (pthread_cond_t *cond, pthread_mutex_t *mutex,
+ 	      /* If we timed out, we effectively cancel waiting.  */
+ 	      __condvar_cancel_waiting (cond, seq, g, private);
+ 	      result = err;
+-	      goto done;
++	      break;
+ 	    }
 -
--	  // Now block.
--	  struct _pthread_cleanup_buffer buffer;
--	  struct _condvar_cleanup_buffer cbuffer;
--	  cbuffer.wseq = wseq;
--	  cbuffer.cond = cond;
--	  cbuffer.mutex = mutex;
--	  cbuffer.private = private;
--	  __pthread_cleanup_push (&buffer, __condvar_cleanup_waiting, &cbuffer);
--
--	  err = __futex_abstimed_wait_cancelable64 (
--	    cond->__data.__g_signals + g, signals, clockid, abstime, private);
--
--	  __pthread_cleanup_pop (&buffer, 0);
--
--	  if (__glibc_unlikely (err == ETIMEDOUT || err == EOVERFLOW))
--	    {
--	      __condvar_dec_grefs (cond, g, private);
--	      /* If we timed out, we effectively cancel waiting.  Note that
--		 we have decremented __g_refs before cancellation, so that a
--		 deadlock between waiting for quiescence of our group in
--		 __condvar_quiesce_and_switch_g1 and us trying to acquire
--		 the lock during cancellation is not possible.  */
--	      __condvar_cancel_waiting (cond, seq, g, private);
--	      result = err;
- 	      break;
--	    }
--	  else
--	    __condvar_dec_grefs (cond, g, private);
--
-+	   else
-+	      continue;
+-	  /* Reload signals.  See above for MO.  */
+-	  signals = atomic_load_acquire (cond->__data.__g_signals + g);
  	}
-+      // Now block.
-+      struct _pthread_cleanup_buffer buffer;
-+      struct _condvar_cleanup_buffer cbuffer;
-+      cbuffer.wseq = wseq;
-+      cbuffer.cond = cond;
-+      cbuffer.mutex = mutex;
-+      cbuffer.private = private;
-+      __pthread_cleanup_push (&buffer, __condvar_cleanup_waiting, &cbuffer);
-+
-+      err = __futex_abstimed_wait_cancelable64 (
-+        cond->__data.__g_signals + g, signals, clockid, abstime, private);
-+
-+      __pthread_cleanup_pop (&buffer, 0);
-+
-+      if (__glibc_unlikely (err == ETIMEDOUT || err == EOVERFLOW))
-+        {
-+          /* If we timed out, we effectively cancel waiting.  */
-+          __condvar_cancel_waiting (cond, seq, g, private);
-+          result = err;
-+          break;
-+        }
-+    }
+-    }
+-  /* Try to grab a signal.  See above for MO.  (if we do another loop
+-     iteration we need to see the correct value of g1_start)  */
+-  while (!atomic_compare_exchange_weak_acquire (cond->__data.__g_signals + g,
+-						&signals, signals - 2));
+-
+- done:
  
    /* Confirm that we have been woken.  We do that before acquiring the mutex
       to allow for execution of pthread_cond_destroy while having acquired the

meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc/0026-PR25847-7.patch

@@ -1,160 +1,149 @@
-From 2a601ac9041e2ca645acad2c174b1c545cfceafe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 1077953950d1e8864c63222967141c67f51297f8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Malte Skarupke <malteskarupke@fastmail.fm>
-Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2025 01:53:25 -0700
-Subject: [PATCH] nptl: rename __condvar_quiesce_and_switch_g1
+Date: Tue, 14 Oct 2025 06:27:04 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] nptl: Fix indentation
 
-This function no longer waits for threads to leave g1, so rename it to
-__condvar_switch_g1
+In my previous change I turned a nested loop into a simple loop. I'm doing
+the resulting indentation changes in a separate commit to make the diff on
+the previous commit easier to review.
 
 The following commits have been cherry-picked from Glibc master branch:
 Bug : https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=25847
+commit: ee6c14ed59d480720721aaacc5fb03213dc153da
 
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-[https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=commit;h=4b79e27a5073c02f6bff9aa8f4791230a0ab1867]
+Upstream-Status: Submitted
+[https://sourceware.org/pipermail/libc-stable/2025-July/002280.html]
 
 Signed-off-by: Sunil Dora <sunilkumar.dora@windriver.com>
 ---
- nptl/pthread_cond_broadcast.c |  4 ++--
- nptl/pthread_cond_common.c    | 26 ++++++++++++--------------
- nptl/pthread_cond_signal.c    | 17 ++++++++---------
- nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c      |  9 ++++-----
- 4 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
+ nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c | 110 +++++++++++++++++++--------------------
+ 1 file changed, 55 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-)
 
-diff --git a/nptl/pthread_cond_broadcast.c b/nptl/pthread_cond_broadcast.c
-index 5ae141ac81..a07435589a 100644
---- a/nptl/pthread_cond_broadcast.c
-+++ b/nptl/pthread_cond_broadcast.c
-@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ ___pthread_cond_broadcast (pthread_cond_t *cond)
- 				cond->__data.__g_size[g1] << 1);
-       cond->__data.__g_size[g1] = 0;
- 
--      /* We need to wake G1 waiters before we quiesce G1 below.  */
-+      /* We need to wake G1 waiters before we switch G1 below.  */
-       /* TODO Only set it if there are indeed futex waiters.  We could
- 	 also try to move this out of the critical section in cases when
- 	 G2 is empty (and we don't need to quiesce).  */
-@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ ___pthread_cond_broadcast (pthread_cond_t *cond)
- 
-   /* G1 is complete.  Step (2) is next unless there are no waiters in G2, in
-      which case we can stop.  */
--  if (__condvar_quiesce_and_switch_g1 (cond, wseq, &g1, private))
-+  if (__condvar_switch_g1 (cond, wseq, &g1, private))
-     {
-       /* Step (3): Send signals to all waiters in the old G2 / new G1.  */
-       atomic_fetch_add_relaxed (cond->__data.__g_signals + g1,
-diff --git a/nptl/pthread_cond_common.c b/nptl/pthread_cond_common.c
-index f976a533a1..3baac4dabc 100644
---- a/nptl/pthread_cond_common.c
-+++ b/nptl/pthread_cond_common.c
-@@ -189,16 +189,15 @@ __condvar_get_private (int flags)
-     return FUTEX_SHARED;
- }
- 
--/* This closes G1 (whose index is in G1INDEX), waits for all futex waiters to
--   leave G1, converts G1 into a fresh G2, and then switches group roles so that
--   the former G2 becomes the new G1 ending at the current __wseq value when we
--   eventually make the switch (WSEQ is just an observation of __wseq by the
--   signaler).
-+/* This closes G1 (whose index is in G1INDEX), converts G1 into a fresh G2,
-+   and then switches group roles so that the former G2 becomes the new G1
-+   ending at the current __wseq value when we eventually make the switch
-+   (WSEQ is just an observation of __wseq by the signaler).
-    If G2 is empty, it will not switch groups because then it would create an
-    empty G1 which would require switching groups again on the next signal.
-    Returns false iff groups were not switched because G2 was empty.  */
- static bool __attribute__ ((unused))
--__condvar_quiesce_and_switch_g1 (pthread_cond_t *cond, uint64_t wseq,
-+__condvar_switch_g1 (pthread_cond_t *cond, uint64_t wseq,
-     unsigned int *g1index, int private)
- {
-   unsigned int g1 = *g1index;
-@@ -214,8 +213,7 @@ __condvar_quiesce_and_switch_g1 (pthread_cond_t *cond, uint64_t wseq,
- 	  + cond->__data.__g_size[g1 ^ 1]) == 0)
- 	return false;
- 
--  /* Now try to close and quiesce G1.  We have to consider the following kinds
--     of waiters:
-+  /* We have to consider the following kinds of waiters:
-      * Waiters from less recent groups than G1 are not affected because
-        nothing will change for them apart from __g1_start getting larger.
-      * New waiters arriving concurrently with the group switching will all go
-@@ -223,12 +221,12 @@ __condvar_quiesce_and_switch_g1 (pthread_cond_t *cond, uint64_t wseq,
-        are not affected.
-      * Waiters in G1 have already received a signal and been woken.  */
- 
--  /* Update __g1_start, which finishes closing this group.  The value we add
--     will never be negative because old_orig_size can only be zero when we
--     switch groups the first time after a condvar was initialized, in which
--     case G1 will be at index 1 and we will add a value of 1.
--     Relaxed MO is fine because the change comes with no additional
--     constraints that others would have to observe.  */
-+  /* Update __g1_start, which closes this group.  The value we add will never
-+     be negative because old_orig_size can only be zero when we switch groups
-+     the first time after a condvar was initialized, in which case G1 will be
-+     at index 1 and we will add a value of 1. Relaxed MO is fine because the
-+     change comes with no additional constraints that others would have to
-+     observe.  */
-   __condvar_add_g1_start_relaxed (cond,
-       (old_orig_size << 1) + (g1 == 1 ? 1 : - 1));
- 
-diff --git a/nptl/pthread_cond_signal.c b/nptl/pthread_cond_signal.c
-index 14800ba00b..a9bc10dcca 100644
---- a/nptl/pthread_cond_signal.c
-+++ b/nptl/pthread_cond_signal.c
-@@ -69,18 +69,17 @@ ___pthread_cond_signal (pthread_cond_t *cond)
-   bool do_futex_wake = false;
- 
-   /* If G1 is still receiving signals, we put the signal there.  If not, we
--     check if G2 has waiters, and if so, quiesce and switch G1 to the former
--     G2; if this results in a new G1 with waiters (G2 might have cancellations
--     already, see __condvar_quiesce_and_switch_g1), we put the signal in the
--     new G1.  */
-+     check if G2 has waiters, and if so, switch G1 to the former G2; if this
-+     results in a new G1 with waiters (G2 might have cancellations already,
-+     see __condvar_switch_g1), we put the signal in the new G1. */
-   if ((cond->__data.__g_size[g1] != 0)
--      || __condvar_quiesce_and_switch_g1 (cond, wseq, &g1, private))
-+      || __condvar_switch_g1 (cond, wseq, &g1, private))
-     {
-       /* Add a signal.  Relaxed MO is fine because signaling does not need to
--	 establish a happens-before relation (see above).  We do not mask the
--	 release-MO store when initializing a group in
--	 __condvar_quiesce_and_switch_g1 because we use an atomic
--	 read-modify-write and thus extend that store's release sequence.  */
-+         establish a happens-before relation (see above).  We do not mask the
-+         release-MO store when initializing a group in __condvar_switch_g1
-+         because we use an atomic read-modify-write and thus extend that
-+         store's release sequence.  */
-       atomic_fetch_add_relaxed (cond->__data.__g_signals + g1, 2);
-       cond->__data.__g_size[g1]--;
-       /* TODO Only set it if there are indeed futex waiters.  */
 diff --git a/nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c b/nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c
-index 104ebd48ca..bb46f3605d 100644
+index c8c99bbf..adf26a80 100644
 --- a/nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c
 +++ b/nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c
-@@ -382,8 +382,7 @@ __pthread_cond_wait_common (pthread_cond_t *cond, pthread_mutex_t *mutex,
-      because we do not need to establish any happens-before relation with
-      signalers (see __pthread_cond_signal); modification order alone
-      establishes a total order of waiters/signals.  We do need acquire MO
--     to synchronize with group reinitialization in
--     __condvar_quiesce_and_switch_g1.  */
-+     to synchronize with group reinitialization in __condvar_switch_g1.  */
-   uint64_t wseq = __condvar_fetch_add_wseq_acquire (cond, 2);
-   /* Find our group's index.  We always go into what was G2 when we acquired
-      our position.  */
-@@ -414,9 +413,9 @@ __pthread_cond_wait_common (pthread_cond_t *cond, pthread_mutex_t *mutex,
-     {
-       /* Now wait until a signal is available in our group or it is closed.
-          Acquire MO so that if we observe (signals == lowseq) after group
--         switching in __condvar_quiesce_and_switch_g1, we synchronize with that
--         store and will see the prior update of __g1_start done while switching
--         groups too.  */
-+         switching in __condvar_switch_g1, we synchronize with that store and
-+         will see the prior update of __g1_start done while switching groups
-+         too.  */
-       unsigned int signals = atomic_load_acquire (cond->__data.__g_signals + g);
-       uint64_t g1_start = __condvar_load_g1_start_relaxed (cond);
-       unsigned int lowseq = (g1_start & 1) == g ? signals : g1_start & ~1U;
+@@ -383,65 +383,65 @@ __pthread_cond_wait_common (pthread_cond_t *cond, pthread_mutex_t *mutex,
+     }
+ 
+ 
+-      while (1)
+-	{
+-	  /* Now wait until a signal is available in our group or it is closed.
+-	     Acquire MO so that if we observe (signals == lowseq) after group
+-	     switching in __condvar_quiesce_and_switch_g1, we synchronize with that
+-	     store and will see the prior update of __g1_start done while switching
+-	     groups too.  */
+-	  unsigned int signals = atomic_load_acquire (cond->__data.__g_signals + g);
+-	  uint64_t g1_start = __condvar_load_g1_start_relaxed (cond);
+-	  unsigned int lowseq = (g1_start & 1) == g ? signals : g1_start & ~1U;
+-
+-	  if (seq < (g1_start >> 1))
+-	    {
+-	      /* If the group is closed already,
+-	         then this waiter originally had enough extra signals to
+-	         consume, up until the time its group was closed.  */
+-	       break;
+-	    }
+-
+-	  /* If there is an available signal, don't block.
+-	     If __g1_start has advanced at all, then we must be in G1
+-	     by now, perhaps in the process of switching back to an older
+-	     G2, but in either case we're allowed to consume the available
+-	     signal and should not block anymore.  */
+-	  if ((int)(signals - lowseq) >= 2)
+-           {
+-             /* Try to grab a signal.  See above for MO.  (if we do another loop
+-                iteration we need to see the correct value of g1_start)  */
+-                     if (atomic_compare_exchange_weak_acquire (
+-                               cond->__data.__g_signals + g,
++  while (1)
++    {
++      /* Now wait until a signal is available in our group or it is closed.
++         Acquire MO so that if we observe (signals == lowseq) after group
++         switching in __condvar_quiesce_and_switch_g1, we synchronize with that
++         store and will see the prior update of __g1_start done while switching
++         groups too.  */
++      unsigned int signals = atomic_load_acquire (cond->__data.__g_signals + g);
++      uint64_t g1_start = __condvar_load_g1_start_relaxed (cond);
++      unsigned int lowseq = (g1_start & 1) == g ? signals : g1_start & ~1U;
++
++      if (seq < (g1_start >> 1))
++        {
++          /* If the group is closed already,
++             then this waiter originally had enough extra signals to
++             consume, up until the time its group was closed.  */
++           break;
++        }
++
++      /* If there is an available signal, don't block.
++         If __g1_start has advanced at all, then we must be in G1
++         by now, perhaps in the process of switching back to an older
++         G2, but in either case we're allowed to consume the available
++         signal and should not block anymore.  */
++      if ((int)(signals - lowseq) >= 2)
++        {
++         /* Try to grab a signal.  See above for MO.  (if we do another loop
++            iteration we need to see the correct value of g1_start)  */
++           if (atomic_compare_exchange_weak_acquire (
++                       cond->__data.__g_signals + g,
+                        &signals, signals - 2))
+-                       break;
+-                     else
+-                       continue;
+-           }
+-
+-	  // Now block.
+-	  struct _pthread_cleanup_buffer buffer;
+-	  struct _condvar_cleanup_buffer cbuffer;
+-	  cbuffer.wseq = wseq;
+-	  cbuffer.cond = cond;
+-	  cbuffer.mutex = mutex;
+-	  cbuffer.private = private;
+-	  __pthread_cleanup_push (&buffer, __condvar_cleanup_waiting, &cbuffer);
+-
+-	  err = __futex_abstimed_wait_cancelable64 (
+-	    cond->__data.__g_signals + g, signals, clockid, abstime, private);
+-
+-	  __pthread_cleanup_pop (&buffer, 0);
+-
+-	  if (__glibc_unlikely (err == ETIMEDOUT || err == EOVERFLOW))
+-	    {
+-	      /* If we timed out, we effectively cancel waiting.  */
+-	      __condvar_cancel_waiting (cond, seq, g, private);
+-	      result = err;
+ 	      break;
+-	    }
++           else
++             continue;
+ 	}
+ 
++      // Now block.
++      struct _pthread_cleanup_buffer buffer;
++      struct _condvar_cleanup_buffer cbuffer;
++      cbuffer.wseq = wseq;
++      cbuffer.cond = cond;
++      cbuffer.mutex = mutex;
++      cbuffer.private = private;
++      __pthread_cleanup_push (&buffer, __condvar_cleanup_waiting, &cbuffer);
++
++      err = __futex_abstimed_wait_cancelable64 (
++        cond->__data.__g_signals + g, signals, clockid, abstime, private);
++
++      __pthread_cleanup_pop (&buffer, 0);
++
++      if (__glibc_unlikely (err == ETIMEDOUT || err == EOVERFLOW))
++        {
++          /* If we timed out, we effectively cancel waiting.  */
++          __condvar_cancel_waiting (cond, seq, g, private);
++          result = err;
++          break;
++        }
++    }
++
+   /* Confirm that we have been woken.  We do that before acquiring the mutex
+      to allow for execution of pthread_cond_destroy while having acquired the
+      mutex.  */
 -- 
 2.49.0
 

meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc/0026-PR25847-8.patch

@@ -1,192 +1,161 @@
-From fc074de88796eb2036fbe9bade638e00adfd5cb2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 20d84dfa0b9a32f88259269bbeaae588744ae4ae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Malte Skarupke <malteskarupke@fastmail.fm>
-Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2025 02:08:36 -0700
-Subject: [PATCH] nptl: Use all of g1_start and g_signals
+Date: Tue, 14 Oct 2025 06:33:50 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] nptl: rename __condvar_quiesce_and_switch_g1
 
-The LSB of g_signals was unused. The LSB of g1_start was used to indicate
-which group is G2. This was used to always go to sleep in pthread_cond_wait
-if a waiter is in G2. A comment earlier in the file says that this is not
-correct to do:
-
- "Waiters cannot determine whether they are currently in G2 or G1 -- but they
-  do not have to because all they are interested in is whether there are
-  available signals"
-
-I either would have had to update the comment, or get rid of the check. I
-chose to get rid of the check. In fact I don't quite know why it was there.
-There will never be available signals for group G2, so we didn't need the
-special case. Even if there were, this would just be a spurious wake. This
-might have caught some cases where the count has wrapped around, but it
-wouldn't reliably do that, (and even if it did, why would you want to force a
-sleep in that case?) and we don't support that many concurrent waiters
-anyway. Getting rid of it allows us to use one more bit, making us more
-robust to wraparound.
+This function no longer waits for threads to leave g1, so rename it to
+__condvar_switch_g1
 
 The following commits have been cherry-picked from Glibc master branch:
 Bug : https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=25847
+commit: 4b79e27a5073c02f6bff9aa8f4791230a0ab1867
 
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-[https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=commit;h=91bb902f58264a2fd50fbce8f39a9a290dd23706]
+Upstream-Status: Submitted
+[https://sourceware.org/pipermail/libc-stable/2025-July/002281.html]
 
 Signed-off-by: Sunil Dora <sunilkumar.dora@windriver.com>
 ---
  nptl/pthread_cond_broadcast.c |  4 ++--
- nptl/pthread_cond_common.c    | 26 ++++++++++----------------
- nptl/pthread_cond_signal.c    |  2 +-
- nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c      | 14 +++++---------
- 4 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
+ nptl/pthread_cond_common.c    | 26 ++++++++++++--------------
+ nptl/pthread_cond_signal.c    | 17 ++++++++---------
+ nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c      |  9 ++++-----
+ 4 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
 
 diff --git a/nptl/pthread_cond_broadcast.c b/nptl/pthread_cond_broadcast.c
-index a07435589a..ef0943cdc5 100644
+index 5ae141ac..a0743558 100644
 --- a/nptl/pthread_cond_broadcast.c
 +++ b/nptl/pthread_cond_broadcast.c
-@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ ___pthread_cond_broadcast (pthread_cond_t *cond)
-     {
-       /* Add as many signals as the remaining size of the group.  */
-       atomic_fetch_add_relaxed (cond->__data.__g_signals + g1,
--				cond->__data.__g_size[g1] << 1);
-+				cond->__data.__g_size[g1]);
+@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ ___pthread_cond_broadcast (pthread_cond_t *cond)
+ 				cond->__data.__g_size[g1] << 1);
        cond->__data.__g_size[g1] = 0;
  
-       /* We need to wake G1 waiters before we switch G1 below.  */
-@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ ___pthread_cond_broadcast (pthread_cond_t *cond)
+-      /* We need to wake G1 waiters before we quiesce G1 below.  */
++      /* We need to wake G1 waiters before we switch G1 below.  */
+       /* TODO Only set it if there are indeed futex waiters.  We could
+ 	 also try to move this out of the critical section in cases when
+ 	 G2 is empty (and we don't need to quiesce).  */
+@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ ___pthread_cond_broadcast (pthread_cond_t *cond)
+ 
+   /* G1 is complete.  Step (2) is next unless there are no waiters in G2, in
+      which case we can stop.  */
+-  if (__condvar_quiesce_and_switch_g1 (cond, wseq, &g1, private))
++  if (__condvar_switch_g1 (cond, wseq, &g1, private))
      {
        /* Step (3): Send signals to all waiters in the old G2 / new G1.  */
        atomic_fetch_add_relaxed (cond->__data.__g_signals + g1,
--				cond->__data.__g_size[g1] << 1);
-+				cond->__data.__g_size[g1]);
-       cond->__data.__g_size[g1] = 0;
-       /* TODO Only set it if there are indeed futex waiters.  */
-       do_futex_wake = true;
 diff --git a/nptl/pthread_cond_common.c b/nptl/pthread_cond_common.c
-index 3baac4dabc..e48f914321 100644
+index f976a533..3baac4da 100644
 --- a/nptl/pthread_cond_common.c
 +++ b/nptl/pthread_cond_common.c
-@@ -208,9 +208,9 @@ __condvar_switch_g1 (pthread_cond_t *cond, uint64_t wseq,
-      behavior.
-      Note that this works correctly for a zero-initialized condvar too.  */
-   unsigned int old_orig_size = __condvar_get_orig_size (cond);
--  uint64_t old_g1_start = __condvar_load_g1_start_relaxed (cond) >> 1;
--  if (((unsigned) (wseq - old_g1_start - old_orig_size)
--	  + cond->__data.__g_size[g1 ^ 1]) == 0)
-+  uint64_t old_g1_start = __condvar_load_g1_start_relaxed (cond);
-+  uint64_t new_g1_start = old_g1_start + old_orig_size;
-+  if (((unsigned) (wseq - new_g1_start) + cond->__data.__g_size[g1 ^ 1]) == 0)
+@@ -189,16 +189,15 @@ __condvar_get_private (int flags)
+     return FUTEX_SHARED;
+ }
+ 
+-/* This closes G1 (whose index is in G1INDEX), waits for all futex waiters to
+-   leave G1, converts G1 into a fresh G2, and then switches group roles so that
+-   the former G2 becomes the new G1 ending at the current __wseq value when we
+-   eventually make the switch (WSEQ is just an observation of __wseq by the
+-   signaler).
++/* This closes G1 (whose index is in G1INDEX), converts G1 into a fresh G2,
++   and then switches group roles so that the former G2 becomes the new G1
++   ending at the current __wseq value when we eventually make the switch
++   (WSEQ is just an observation of __wseq by the signaler).
+    If G2 is empty, it will not switch groups because then it would create an
+    empty G1 which would require switching groups again on the next signal.
+    Returns false iff groups were not switched because G2 was empty.  */
+ static bool __attribute__ ((unused))
+-__condvar_quiesce_and_switch_g1 (pthread_cond_t *cond, uint64_t wseq,
++__condvar_switch_g1 (pthread_cond_t *cond, uint64_t wseq,
+     unsigned int *g1index, int private)
+ {
+   unsigned int g1 = *g1index;
+@@ -214,8 +213,7 @@ __condvar_quiesce_and_switch_g1 (pthread_cond_t *cond, uint64_t wseq,
+ 	  + cond->__data.__g_size[g1 ^ 1]) == 0)
  	return false;
  
-   /* We have to consider the following kinds of waiters:
-@@ -221,16 +221,10 @@ __condvar_switch_g1 (pthread_cond_t *cond, uint64_t wseq,
+-  /* Now try to close and quiesce G1.  We have to consider the following kinds
+-     of waiters:
++  /* We have to consider the following kinds of waiters:
+      * Waiters from less recent groups than G1 are not affected because
+        nothing will change for them apart from __g1_start getting larger.
+      * New waiters arriving concurrently with the group switching will all go
+@@ -223,12 +221,12 @@ __condvar_quiesce_and_switch_g1 (pthread_cond_t *cond, uint64_t wseq,
         are not affected.
       * Waiters in G1 have already received a signal and been woken.  */
  
--  /* Update __g1_start, which closes this group.  The value we add will never
--     be negative because old_orig_size can only be zero when we switch groups
--     the first time after a condvar was initialized, in which case G1 will be
--     at index 1 and we will add a value of 1. Relaxed MO is fine because the
--     change comes with no additional constraints that others would have to
--     observe.  */
--  __condvar_add_g1_start_relaxed (cond,
--      (old_orig_size << 1) + (g1 == 1 ? 1 : - 1));
--
--  unsigned int lowseq = ((old_g1_start + old_orig_size) << 1) & ~1U;
-+  /* Update __g1_start, which closes this group.  Relaxed MO is fine because
-+     the change comes with no additional constraints that others would have
-+     to observe.  */
-+  __condvar_add_g1_start_relaxed (cond, old_orig_size);
+-  /* Update __g1_start, which finishes closing this group.  The value we add
+-     will never be negative because old_orig_size can only be zero when we
+-     switch groups the first time after a condvar was initialized, in which
+-     case G1 will be at index 1 and we will add a value of 1.
+-     Relaxed MO is fine because the change comes with no additional
+-     constraints that others would have to observe.  */
++  /* Update __g1_start, which closes this group.  The value we add will never
++     be negative because old_orig_size can only be zero when we switch groups
++     the first time after a condvar was initialized, in which case G1 will be
++     at index 1 and we will add a value of 1. Relaxed MO is fine because the
++     change comes with no additional constraints that others would have to
++     observe.  */
+   __condvar_add_g1_start_relaxed (cond,
+       (old_orig_size << 1) + (g1 == 1 ? 1 : - 1));
  
-   /* At this point, the old G1 is now a valid new G2 (but not in use yet).
-      No old waiter can neither grab a signal nor acquire a reference without
-@@ -242,13 +236,13 @@ __condvar_switch_g1 (pthread_cond_t *cond, uint64_t wseq,
-   g1 ^= 1;
-   *g1index ^= 1;
- 
--  /* Now advance the new G1 g_signals to the new lowseq, giving it
-+  /* Now advance the new G1 g_signals to the new g1_start, giving it
-      an effective signal count of 0 to start.  */
--  atomic_store_release (cond->__data.__g_signals + g1, lowseq);
-+  atomic_store_release (cond->__data.__g_signals + g1, (unsigned)new_g1_start);
- 
-   /* These values are just observed by signalers, and thus protected by the
-      lock.  */
--  unsigned int orig_size = wseq - (old_g1_start + old_orig_size);
-+  unsigned int orig_size = wseq - new_g1_start;
-   __condvar_set_orig_size (cond, orig_size);
-   /* Use and addition to not loose track of cancellations in what was
-      previously G2.  */
 diff --git a/nptl/pthread_cond_signal.c b/nptl/pthread_cond_signal.c
-index a9bc10dcca..07427369aa 100644
+index 14800ba0..a9bc10dc 100644
 --- a/nptl/pthread_cond_signal.c
 +++ b/nptl/pthread_cond_signal.c
-@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ ___pthread_cond_signal (pthread_cond_t *cond)
-          release-MO store when initializing a group in __condvar_switch_g1
-          because we use an atomic read-modify-write and thus extend that
-          store's release sequence.  */
--      atomic_fetch_add_relaxed (cond->__data.__g_signals + g1, 2);
-+      atomic_fetch_add_relaxed (cond->__data.__g_signals + g1, 1);
+@@ -69,18 +69,17 @@ ___pthread_cond_signal (pthread_cond_t *cond)
+   bool do_futex_wake = false;
+ 
+   /* If G1 is still receiving signals, we put the signal there.  If not, we
+-     check if G2 has waiters, and if so, quiesce and switch G1 to the former
+-     G2; if this results in a new G1 with waiters (G2 might have cancellations
+-     already, see __condvar_quiesce_and_switch_g1), we put the signal in the
+-     new G1.  */
++     check if G2 has waiters, and if so, switch G1 to the former G2; if this
++     results in a new G1 with waiters (G2 might have cancellations already,
++     see __condvar_switch_g1), we put the signal in the new G1. */
+   if ((cond->__data.__g_size[g1] != 0)
+-      || __condvar_quiesce_and_switch_g1 (cond, wseq, &g1, private))
++      || __condvar_switch_g1 (cond, wseq, &g1, private))
+     {
+       /* Add a signal.  Relaxed MO is fine because signaling does not need to
+-	 establish a happens-before relation (see above).  We do not mask the
+-	 release-MO store when initializing a group in
+-	 __condvar_quiesce_and_switch_g1 because we use an atomic
+-	 read-modify-write and thus extend that store's release sequence.  */
++         establish a happens-before relation (see above).  We do not mask the
++         release-MO store when initializing a group in __condvar_switch_g1
++         because we use an atomic read-modify-write and thus extend that
++         store's release sequence.  */
+       atomic_fetch_add_relaxed (cond->__data.__g_signals + g1, 2);
        cond->__data.__g_size[g1]--;
        /* TODO Only set it if there are indeed futex waiters.  */
-       do_futex_wake = true;
 diff --git a/nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c b/nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c
-index bb46f3605d..430cbe8a35 100644
+index adf26a80..40a74342 100644
 --- a/nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c
 +++ b/nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c
-@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ __condvar_cancel_waiting (pthread_cond_t *cond, uint64_t seq, unsigned int g,
-      not hold a reference on the group.  */
-   __condvar_acquire_lock (cond, private);
- 
--  uint64_t g1_start = __condvar_load_g1_start_relaxed (cond) >> 1;
-+  uint64_t g1_start = __condvar_load_g1_start_relaxed (cond);
-   if (g1_start > seq)
+@@ -354,8 +354,7 @@ __pthread_cond_wait_common (pthread_cond_t *cond, pthread_mutex_t *mutex,
+      because we do not need to establish any happens-before relation with
+      signalers (see __pthread_cond_signal); modification order alone
+      establishes a total order of waiters/signals.  We do need acquire MO
+-     to synchronize with group reinitialization in
+-     __condvar_quiesce_and_switch_g1.  */
++     to synchronize with group reinitialization in __condvar_switch_g1.  */
+   uint64_t wseq = __condvar_fetch_add_wseq_acquire (cond, 2);
+   /* Find our group's index.  We always go into what was G2 when we acquired
+      our position.  */
+@@ -387,9 +386,9 @@ __pthread_cond_wait_common (pthread_cond_t *cond, pthread_mutex_t *mutex,
      {
-       /* Our group is closed, so someone provided enough signals for it.
-@@ -278,7 +278,6 @@ __condvar_cleanup_waiting (void *arg)
-      * Waiters fetch-add while having acquire the mutex associated with the
-        condvar.  Signalers load it and fetch-xor it concurrently.
-    __g1_start: Starting position of G1 (inclusive)
--     * LSB is index of current G2.
-      * Modified by signalers while having acquired the condvar-internal lock
-        and observed concurrently by waiters.
-    __g1_orig_size: Initial size of G1
-@@ -299,11 +298,9 @@ __condvar_cleanup_waiting (void *arg)
-      * Reference count used by waiters concurrently with signalers that have
-        acquired the condvar-internal lock.
-    __g_signals: The number of signals that can still be consumed, relative to
--     the current g1_start.  (i.e. bits 31 to 1 of __g_signals are bits
--     31 to 1 of g1_start with the signal count added)
-+     the current g1_start.  (i.e. g1_start with the signal count added)
-      * Used as a futex word by waiters.  Used concurrently by waiters and
-        signalers.
--     * LSB is currently reserved and 0.
-    __g_size: Waiters remaining in this group (i.e., which have not been
-      signaled yet.
-      * Accessed by signalers and waiters that cancel waiting (both do so only
-@@ -418,9 +415,8 @@ __pthread_cond_wait_common (pthread_cond_t *cond, pthread_mutex_t *mutex,
-          too.  */
+       /* Now wait until a signal is available in our group or it is closed.
+          Acquire MO so that if we observe (signals == lowseq) after group
+-         switching in __condvar_quiesce_and_switch_g1, we synchronize with that
+-         store and will see the prior update of __g1_start done while switching
+-         groups too.  */
++         switching in __condvar_switch_g1, we synchronize with that store and
++         will see the prior update of __g1_start done while switching groups
++         too.  */
        unsigned int signals = atomic_load_acquire (cond->__data.__g_signals + g);
        uint64_t g1_start = __condvar_load_g1_start_relaxed (cond);
--      unsigned int lowseq = (g1_start & 1) == g ? signals : g1_start & ~1U;
- 
--      if (seq < (g1_start >> 1))
-+      if (seq < g1_start)
-         {
-           /* If the group is closed already,
-              then this waiter originally had enough extra signals to
-@@ -433,13 +429,13 @@ __pthread_cond_wait_common (pthread_cond_t *cond, pthread_mutex_t *mutex,
-          by now, perhaps in the process of switching back to an older
-          G2, but in either case we're allowed to consume the available
-          signal and should not block anymore.  */
--      if ((int)(signals - lowseq) >= 2)
-+      if ((int)(signals - (unsigned int)g1_start) > 0)
-         {
-          /* Try to grab a signal.  See above for MO.  (if we do another loop
-             iteration we need to see the correct value of g1_start)  */
-            if (atomic_compare_exchange_weak_acquire (
-                        cond->__data.__g_signals + g,
--                       &signals, signals - 2))
-+                       &signals, signals - 1))
- 	      break;
- 	   else
- 	      continue;
+       unsigned int lowseq = (g1_start & 1) == g ? signals : g1_start & ~1U;
 -- 
 2.49.0
 

meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc/0026-PR25847-9.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
+From c2677e68956bb9677d8de4ee6c5341b1a744d490 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Malte Skarupke <malteskarupke@fastmail.fm>
+Date: Tue, 14 Oct 2025 06:40:57 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] nptl: Use all of g1_start and g_signals
+
+The LSB of g_signals was unused. The LSB of g1_start was used to indicate
+which group is G2. This was used to always go to sleep in pthread_cond_wait
+if a waiter is in G2. A comment earlier in the file says that this is not
+correct to do:
+
+ "Waiters cannot determine whether they are currently in G2 or G1 -- but they
+  do not have to because all they are interested in is whether there are
+  available signals"
+
+I either would have had to update the comment, or get rid of the check. I
+chose to get rid of the check. In fact I don't quite know why it was there.
+There will never be available signals for group G2, so we didn't need the
+special case. Even if there were, this would just be a spurious wake. This
+might have caught some cases where the count has wrapped around, but it
+wouldn't reliably do that, (and even if it did, why would you want to force a
+sleep in that case?) and we don't support that many concurrent waiters
+anyway. Getting rid of it allows us to use one more bit, making us more
+robust to wraparound.
+
+The following commits have been cherry-picked from Glibc master branch:
+Bug : https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=25847
+commit: 91bb902f58264a2fd50fbce8f39a9a290dd23706
+
+Upstream-Status: Submitted
+[https://sourceware.org/pipermail/libc-stable/2025-July/002283.html]
+
+Signed-off-by: Sunil Dora <sunilkumar.dora@windriver.com>
+---
+ nptl/pthread_cond_broadcast.c |  4 ++--
+ nptl/pthread_cond_common.c    | 26 ++++++++++----------------
+ nptl/pthread_cond_signal.c    |  2 +-
+ nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c      | 14 +++++---------
+ 4 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/nptl/pthread_cond_broadcast.c b/nptl/pthread_cond_broadcast.c
+index a0743558..ef0943cd 100644
+--- a/nptl/pthread_cond_broadcast.c
++++ b/nptl/pthread_cond_broadcast.c
+@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ ___pthread_cond_broadcast (pthread_cond_t *cond)
+     {
+       /* Add as many signals as the remaining size of the group.  */
+       atomic_fetch_add_relaxed (cond->__data.__g_signals + g1,
+-				cond->__data.__g_size[g1] << 1);
++				cond->__data.__g_size[g1]);
+       cond->__data.__g_size[g1] = 0;
+ 
+       /* We need to wake G1 waiters before we switch G1 below.  */
+@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ ___pthread_cond_broadcast (pthread_cond_t *cond)
+     {
+       /* Step (3): Send signals to all waiters in the old G2 / new G1.  */
+       atomic_fetch_add_relaxed (cond->__data.__g_signals + g1,
+-				cond->__data.__g_size[g1] << 1);
++				cond->__data.__g_size[g1]);
+       cond->__data.__g_size[g1] = 0;
+       /* TODO Only set it if there are indeed futex waiters.  */
+       do_futex_wake = true;
+diff --git a/nptl/pthread_cond_common.c b/nptl/pthread_cond_common.c
+index 3baac4da..e48f9143 100644
+--- a/nptl/pthread_cond_common.c
++++ b/nptl/pthread_cond_common.c
+@@ -208,9 +208,9 @@ __condvar_switch_g1 (pthread_cond_t *cond, uint64_t wseq,
+      behavior.
+      Note that this works correctly for a zero-initialized condvar too.  */
+   unsigned int old_orig_size = __condvar_get_orig_size (cond);
+-  uint64_t old_g1_start = __condvar_load_g1_start_relaxed (cond) >> 1;
+-  if (((unsigned) (wseq - old_g1_start - old_orig_size)
+-	  + cond->__data.__g_size[g1 ^ 1]) == 0)
++  uint64_t old_g1_start = __condvar_load_g1_start_relaxed (cond);
++  uint64_t new_g1_start = old_g1_start + old_orig_size;
++  if (((unsigned) (wseq - new_g1_start) + cond->__data.__g_size[g1 ^ 1]) == 0)
+ 	return false;
+ 
+   /* We have to consider the following kinds of waiters:
+@@ -221,16 +221,10 @@ __condvar_switch_g1 (pthread_cond_t *cond, uint64_t wseq,
+        are not affected.
+      * Waiters in G1 have already received a signal and been woken.  */
+ 
+-  /* Update __g1_start, which closes this group.  The value we add will never
+-     be negative because old_orig_size can only be zero when we switch groups
+-     the first time after a condvar was initialized, in which case G1 will be
+-     at index 1 and we will add a value of 1. Relaxed MO is fine because the
+-     change comes with no additional constraints that others would have to
+-     observe.  */
+-  __condvar_add_g1_start_relaxed (cond,
+-      (old_orig_size << 1) + (g1 == 1 ? 1 : - 1));
+-
+-  unsigned int lowseq = ((old_g1_start + old_orig_size) << 1) & ~1U;
++  /* Update __g1_start, which closes this group.  Relaxed MO is fine because
++     the change comes with no additional constraints that others would have
++     to observe.  */
++  __condvar_add_g1_start_relaxed (cond, old_orig_size);
+ 
+   /* At this point, the old G1 is now a valid new G2 (but not in use yet).
+      No old waiter can neither grab a signal nor acquire a reference without
+@@ -242,13 +236,13 @@ __condvar_switch_g1 (pthread_cond_t *cond, uint64_t wseq,
+   g1 ^= 1;
+   *g1index ^= 1;
+ 
+-  /* Now advance the new G1 g_signals to the new lowseq, giving it
++  /* Now advance the new G1 g_signals to the new g1_start, giving it
+      an effective signal count of 0 to start.  */
+-  atomic_store_release (cond->__data.__g_signals + g1, lowseq);
++  atomic_store_release (cond->__data.__g_signals + g1, (unsigned)new_g1_start);
+ 
+   /* These values are just observed by signalers, and thus protected by the
+      lock.  */
+-  unsigned int orig_size = wseq - (old_g1_start + old_orig_size);
++  unsigned int orig_size = wseq - new_g1_start;
+   __condvar_set_orig_size (cond, orig_size);
+   /* Use and addition to not loose track of cancellations in what was
+      previously G2.  */
+diff --git a/nptl/pthread_cond_signal.c b/nptl/pthread_cond_signal.c
+index a9bc10dc..07427369 100644
+--- a/nptl/pthread_cond_signal.c
++++ b/nptl/pthread_cond_signal.c
+@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ ___pthread_cond_signal (pthread_cond_t *cond)
+          release-MO store when initializing a group in __condvar_switch_g1
+          because we use an atomic read-modify-write and thus extend that
+          store's release sequence.  */
+-      atomic_fetch_add_relaxed (cond->__data.__g_signals + g1, 2);
++      atomic_fetch_add_relaxed (cond->__data.__g_signals + g1, 1);
+       cond->__data.__g_size[g1]--;
+       /* TODO Only set it if there are indeed futex waiters.  */
+       do_futex_wake = true;
+diff --git a/nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c b/nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c
+index 40a74342..d7e073ab 100644
+--- a/nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c
++++ b/nptl/pthread_cond_wait.c
+@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ __condvar_cancel_waiting (pthread_cond_t *cond, uint64_t seq, unsigned int g,
+      not hold a reference on the group.  */
+   __condvar_acquire_lock (cond, private);
+ 
+-  uint64_t g1_start = __condvar_load_g1_start_relaxed (cond) >> 1;
++  uint64_t g1_start = __condvar_load_g1_start_relaxed (cond);
+   if (g1_start > seq)
+     {
+       /* Our group is closed, so someone provided enough signals for it.
+@@ -259,7 +259,6 @@ __condvar_cleanup_waiting (void *arg)
+      * Waiters fetch-add while having acquire the mutex associated with the
+        condvar.  Signalers load it and fetch-xor it concurrently.
+    __g1_start: Starting position of G1 (inclusive)
+-     * LSB is index of current G2.
+      * Modified by signalers while having acquired the condvar-internal lock
+        and observed concurrently by waiters.
+    __g1_orig_size: Initial size of G1
+@@ -280,11 +279,9 @@ __condvar_cleanup_waiting (void *arg)
+      * Reference count used by waiters concurrently with signalers that have
+        acquired the condvar-internal lock.
+    __g_signals: The number of signals that can still be consumed, relative to
+-     the current g1_start.  (i.e. bits 31 to 1 of __g_signals are bits
+-     31 to 1 of g1_start with the signal count added)
++     the current g1_start.  (i.e. g1_start with the signal count added)
+      * Used as a futex word by waiters.  Used concurrently by waiters and
+        signalers.
+-     * LSB is currently reserved and 0.
+    __g_size: Waiters remaining in this group (i.e., which have not been
+      signaled yet.
+      * Accessed by signalers and waiters that cancel waiting (both do so only
+@@ -391,9 +388,8 @@ __pthread_cond_wait_common (pthread_cond_t *cond, pthread_mutex_t *mutex,
+          too.  */
+       unsigned int signals = atomic_load_acquire (cond->__data.__g_signals + g);
+       uint64_t g1_start = __condvar_load_g1_start_relaxed (cond);
+-      unsigned int lowseq = (g1_start & 1) == g ? signals : g1_start & ~1U;
+ 
+-      if (seq < (g1_start >> 1))
++      if (seq < g1_start)
+         {
+           /* If the group is closed already,
+              then this waiter originally had enough extra signals to
+@@ -406,13 +402,13 @@ __pthread_cond_wait_common (pthread_cond_t *cond, pthread_mutex_t *mutex,
+          by now, perhaps in the process of switching back to an older
+          G2, but in either case we're allowed to consume the available
+          signal and should not block anymore.  */
+-      if ((int)(signals - lowseq) >= 2)
++      if ((int)(signals - (unsigned int)g1_start) > 0)
+         {
+          /* Try to grab a signal.  See above for MO.  (if we do another loop
+             iteration we need to see the correct value of g1_start)  */
+            if (atomic_compare_exchange_weak_acquire (
+                        cond->__data.__g_signals + g,
+-                       &signals, signals - 2))
++                       &signals, signals - 1))
+ 	      break;
+            else
+              continue;
+-- 
+2.49.0
+

meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc_2.35.bb

@@ -70,6 +70,8 @@ SRC_URI =  "${GLIBC_GIT_URI};branch=${SRCBRANCH};name=glibc \
            file://0026-PR25847-6.patch \
            file://0026-PR25847-7.patch \
            file://0026-PR25847-8.patch \
+           file://0026-PR25847-9.patch \
+           file://0026-PR25847-10.patch \
            \
            file://0001-Revert-Linux-Implement-a-useful-version-of-_startup_.patch \
            file://0002-get_nscd_addresses-Fix-subscript-typos-BZ-29605.patch \

meta/recipes-core/images/build-appliance-image_15.0.0.bb

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ IMAGE_FSTYPES = "wic.vmdk wic.vhd wic.vhdx"
 
 inherit core-image setuptools3
 
-SRCREV ?= "3c825671cb8f30e6205f1bcf177f3432161295f5"
+SRCREV ?= "cb1206dd8460f2701df03b1e9224825bad23a90e"
 SRC_URI = "git://git.yoctoproject.org/poky;branch=kirkstone \
            file://Yocto_Build_Appliance.vmx \
            file://Yocto_Build_Appliance.vmxf \

meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2025-7425.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,802 @@
+From 87786d6200ae1f5ac98d21f04d451e17ff25a216 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: David Kilzer <ddkilzer@apple.com>
+Reviewed-By: Aron Xu <aron@debian.org>
+Date: Mon, 23 Jun 2025 14:41:56 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] libxslt: heap-use-after-free in xmlFreeID caused by `atype`
+ corruption
+
+* include/libxml/tree.h:
+(XML_ATTR_CLEAR_ATYPE): Add.
+(XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE): Add.
+(XML_ATTR_SET_ATYPE): Add.
+(XML_NODE_ADD_EXTRA): Add.
+(XML_NODE_CLEAR_EXTRA): Add.
+(XML_NODE_GET_EXTRA): Add.
+(XML_NODE_SET_EXTRA): Add.
+(XML_DOC_ADD_PROPERTIES): Add.
+(XML_DOC_CLEAR_PROPERTIES): Add.
+(XML_DOC_GET_PROPERTIES): Add.
+(XML_DOC_SET_PROPERTIES): Add.
+- Add macros for accessing fields with upper bits that may be set by
+  libxslt.
+
+* HTMLparser.c:
+(htmlNewDocNoDtD):
+* SAX2.c:
+(xmlSAX2StartDocument):
+(xmlSAX2EndDocument):
+* parser.c:
+(xmlParseEntityDecl):
+(xmlParseExternalSubset):
+(xmlParseReference):
+(xmlCtxtParseDtd):
+* runxmlconf.c:
+(xmlconfTestInvalid):
+(xmlconfTestValid):
+* tree.c:
+(xmlNewDoc):
+(xmlFreeProp):
+(xmlNodeSetDoc):
+(xmlSetNsProp):
+(xmlDOMWrapAdoptBranch):
+* valid.c:
+(xmlFreeID):
+(xmlAddIDInternal):
+(xmlValidateAttributeValueInternal):
+(xmlValidateOneAttribute):
+(xmlValidateRef):
+* xmlreader.c:
+(xmlTextReaderStartElement):
+(xmlTextReaderStartElementNs):
+(xmlTextReaderValidateEntity):
+(xmlTextReaderRead):
+(xmlTextReaderNext):
+(xmlTextReaderIsEmptyElement):
+(xmlTextReaderPreserve):
+* xmlschemas.c:
+(xmlSchemaPValAttrNodeID):
+* xmlschemastypes.c:
+(xmlSchemaValAtomicType):
+- Adopt macros by renaming the struct fields, recompiling and fixing
+  compiler failures, then changing the struct field names back.
+Origin: https://launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/libxml2/2.9.14+dfsg-1.3ubuntu3.6
+Ref : https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2025-7425
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-7425
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libxslt/-/issues/140]
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+---
+ HTMLparser.c          |  1 +
+ SAX2.c                |  6 ++--
+ include/libxml/tree.h | 14 ++++++++-
+ parser.c              |  8 ++---
+ runxmlconf.c          |  4 +--
+ tree.c                | 20 ++++++-------
+ valid.c               | 68 +++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
+ xmlreader.c           | 30 +++++++++----------
+ xmlschemas.c          |  4 +--
+ xmlschemastypes.c     | 12 ++++----
+ 10 files changed, 90 insertions(+), 77 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/HTMLparser.c b/HTMLparser.c
+index e720bb2..1307f71 100644
+--- a/HTMLparser.c
++++ b/HTMLparser.c
+@@ -2514,6 +2514,7 @@ htmlNewDocNoDtD(const xmlChar *URI, const xmlChar *ExternalID) {
+     cur->refs = NULL;
+     cur->_private = NULL;
+     cur->charset = XML_CHAR_ENCODING_UTF8;
++    XML_DOC_SET_PROPERTIES(cur, XML_DOC_HTML | XML_DOC_USERBUILT);
+     cur->properties = XML_DOC_HTML | XML_DOC_USERBUILT;
+     if ((ExternalID != NULL) ||
+ 	(URI != NULL))
+diff --git a/SAX2.c b/SAX2.c
+index f7c77c2..0d8e84a 100644
+--- a/SAX2.c
++++ b/SAX2.c
+@@ -970,7 +970,7 @@ xmlSAX2StartDocument(void *ctx)
+ 	    xmlSAX2ErrMemory(ctxt, "xmlSAX2StartDocument");
+ 	    return;
+ 	}
+-	ctxt->myDoc->properties = XML_DOC_HTML;
++	XML_DOC_SET_PROPERTIES(ctxt->myDoc, XML_DOC_HTML);
+ 	ctxt->myDoc->parseFlags = ctxt->options;
+ #else
+         xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
+@@ -983,9 +983,9 @@ xmlSAX2StartDocument(void *ctx)
+     } else {
+ 	doc = ctxt->myDoc = xmlNewDoc(ctxt->version);
+ 	if (doc != NULL) {
+-	    doc->properties = 0;
++	    XML_DOC_CLEAR_PROPERTIES(doc);
+ 	    if (ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_OLD10)
+-	        doc->properties |= XML_DOC_OLD10;
++	        XML_DOC_ADD_PROPERTIES(doc, XML_DOC_OLD10);
+ 	    doc->parseFlags = ctxt->options;
+ 	    if (ctxt->encoding != NULL)
+ 		doc->encoding = xmlStrdup(ctxt->encoding);
+diff --git a/include/libxml/tree.h b/include/libxml/tree.h
+index 1e79be9..61178b2 100644
+--- a/include/libxml/tree.h
++++ b/include/libxml/tree.h
+@@ -365,7 +365,6 @@ struct _xmlElement {
+ #endif
+ };
+ 
+-
+ /**
+  * XML_LOCAL_NAMESPACE:
+  *
+@@ -446,6 +445,10 @@ struct _xmlAttr {
+     void            *psvi;	/* for type/PSVI information */
+ };
+ 
++#define XML_ATTR_CLEAR_ATYPE(attr) (((attr)->atype) = 0)
++#define XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(attr) (((attr)->atype) & ~(15U << 27))
++#define XML_ATTR_SET_ATYPE(attr, type) ((attr)->atype = ((((attr)->atype) & (15U << 27)) | ((type) & ~(15U << 27))))
++
+ /**
+  * xmlID:
+  *
+@@ -507,6 +510,11 @@ struct _xmlNode {
+     unsigned short   extra;	/* extra data for XPath/XSLT */
+ };
+ 
++#define XML_NODE_ADD_EXTRA(node, type) ((node)->extra |= ((type) & ~(15U << 12)))
++#define XML_NODE_CLEAR_EXTRA(node) (((node)->extra) = 0)
++#define XML_NODE_GET_EXTRA(node) (((node)->extra) & ~(15U << 12))
++#define XML_NODE_SET_EXTRA(node, type) ((node)->extra = ((((node)->extra) & (15U << 12)) | ((type) & ~(15U << 12))))
++
+ /**
+  * XML_GET_CONTENT:
+  *
+@@ -585,6 +593,10 @@ struct _xmlDoc {
+ 				   set at the end of parsing */
+ };
+ 
++#define XML_DOC_ADD_PROPERTIES(doc, type) ((doc)->properties |= ((type) & ~(15U << 27)))
++#define XML_DOC_CLEAR_PROPERTIES(doc) (((doc)->properties) = 0)
++#define XML_DOC_GET_PROPERTIES(doc) (((doc)->properties) & ~(15U << 27))
++#define XML_DOC_SET_PROPERTIES(doc, type) ((doc)->properties = ((((doc)->properties) & (15U << 27)) | ((type) & ~(15U << 27))))
+ 
+ typedef struct _xmlDOMWrapCtxt xmlDOMWrapCtxt;
+ typedef xmlDOMWrapCtxt *xmlDOMWrapCtxtPtr;
+diff --git a/parser.c b/parser.c
+index 738dbee..772d883 100644
+--- a/parser.c
++++ b/parser.c
+@@ -5523,7 +5523,7 @@ xmlParseEntityDecl(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
+ 			    xmlErrMemory(ctxt, "New Doc failed");
+ 			    return;
+ 			}
+-			ctxt->myDoc->properties = XML_DOC_INTERNAL;
++			XML_DOC_SET_PROPERTIES(ctxt->myDoc, XML_DOC_INTERNAL);
+ 		    }
+ 		    if (ctxt->myDoc->intSubset == NULL)
+ 			ctxt->myDoc->intSubset = xmlNewDtd(ctxt->myDoc,
+@@ -5594,7 +5594,7 @@ xmlParseEntityDecl(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
+ 			        xmlErrMemory(ctxt, "New Doc failed");
+ 				return;
+ 			    }
+-			    ctxt->myDoc->properties = XML_DOC_INTERNAL;
++			    XML_DOC_SET_PROPERTIES(ctxt->myDoc, XML_DOC_INTERNAL);
+ 			}
+ 
+ 			if (ctxt->myDoc->intSubset == NULL)
+@@ -7035,7 +7035,7 @@ xmlParseExternalSubset(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, const xmlChar *ExternalID,
+ 	    xmlErrMemory(ctxt, "New Doc failed");
+ 	    return;
+ 	}
+-	ctxt->myDoc->properties = XML_DOC_INTERNAL;
++	XML_DOC_SET_PROPERTIES(ctxt->myDoc, XML_DOC_INTERNAL);
+     }
+     if ((ctxt->myDoc != NULL) && (ctxt->myDoc->intSubset == NULL))
+         xmlCreateIntSubset(ctxt->myDoc, NULL, ExternalID, SystemID);
+@@ -7419,7 +7419,7 @@ xmlParseReference(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
+ 			    (nw != NULL) &&
+ 			    (nw->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE) &&
+ 			    (nw->children == NULL))
+-			    nw->extra = 1;
++			    XML_NODE_SET_EXTRA(nw, 1);
+ 
+ 			break;
+ 		    }
+diff --git a/runxmlconf.c b/runxmlconf.c
+index f43fdd3..82b7241 100644
+--- a/runxmlconf.c
++++ b/runxmlconf.c
+@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ xmlconfTestInvalid(const char *id, const char *filename, int options) {
+ 	         id, filename);
+     } else {
+     /* invalidity should be reported both in the context and in the document */
+-        if ((ctxt->valid != 0) || (doc->properties & XML_DOC_DTDVALID)) {
++        if ((ctxt->valid != 0) || (XML_DOC_GET_PROPERTIES(doc) & XML_DOC_DTDVALID)) {
+ 	    test_log("test %s : %s failed to detect invalid document\n",
+ 		     id, filename);
+ 	    nb_errors++;
+@@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ xmlconfTestValid(const char *id, const char *filename, int options) {
+ 	ret = 0;
+     } else {
+     /* validity should be reported both in the context and in the document */
+-        if ((ctxt->valid == 0) || ((doc->properties & XML_DOC_DTDVALID) == 0)) {
++        if ((ctxt->valid == 0) || ((XML_DOC_GET_PROPERTIES(doc) & XML_DOC_DTDVALID) == 0)) {
+ 	    test_log("test %s : %s failed to validate a valid document\n",
+ 		     id, filename);
+ 	    nb_errors++;
+diff --git a/tree.c b/tree.c
+index cdf863c..3bac0b8 100644
+--- a/tree.c
++++ b/tree.c
+@@ -1192,7 +1192,7 @@ xmlNewDoc(const xmlChar *version) {
+     cur->compression = -1; /* not initialized */
+     cur->doc = cur;
+     cur->parseFlags = 0;
+-    cur->properties = XML_DOC_USERBUILT;
++    XML_DOC_SET_PROPERTIES(cur, XML_DOC_USERBUILT);
+     /*
+      * The in memory encoding is always UTF8
+      * This field will never change and would
+@@ -2119,7 +2119,7 @@ xmlFreeProp(xmlAttrPtr cur) {
+ 	xmlDeregisterNodeDefaultValue((xmlNodePtr)cur);
+ 
+     /* Check for ID removal -> leading to invalid references ! */
+-    if ((cur->doc != NULL) && (cur->atype == XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID)) {
++    if ((cur->doc != NULL) && (XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(cur) == XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID)) {
+ 	    xmlRemoveID(cur->doc, cur);
+     }
+     if (cur->children != NULL) xmlFreeNodeList(cur->children);
+@@ -2838,7 +2838,7 @@ xmlSetTreeDoc(xmlNodePtr tree, xmlDocPtr doc) {
+ 	if(tree->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE) {
+ 	    prop = tree->properties;
+ 	    while (prop != NULL) {
+-                if (prop->atype == XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID) {
++                if (XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(prop) == XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID) {
+                     xmlRemoveID(tree->doc, prop);
+                 }
+ 
+@@ -6953,9 +6953,9 @@ xmlSetNsProp(xmlNodePtr node, xmlNsPtr ns, const xmlChar *name,
+ 	/*
+ 	* Modify the attribute's value.
+ 	*/
+-	if (prop->atype == XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID) {
++	if (XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(prop) == XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID) {
+ 	    xmlRemoveID(node->doc, prop);
+-	    prop->atype = XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID;
++	    XML_ATTR_SET_ATYPE(prop, XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID);
+ 	}
+ 	if (prop->children != NULL)
+ 	    xmlFreeNodeList(prop->children);
+@@ -6975,7 +6975,7 @@ xmlSetNsProp(xmlNodePtr node, xmlNsPtr ns, const xmlChar *name,
+ 		tmp = tmp->next;
+ 	    }
+ 	}
+-	if (prop->atype == XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID)
++	if (XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(prop) == XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID)
+ 	    xmlAddID(NULL, node->doc, value, prop);
+ 	return(prop);
+     }
+@@ -9252,7 +9252,7 @@ ns_end:
+ 		if (cur->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE) {
+ 		    cur->psvi = NULL;
+ 		    cur->line = 0;
+-		    cur->extra = 0;
++		    XML_NODE_CLEAR_EXTRA(cur);
+ 		    /*
+ 		    * Walk attributes.
+ 		    */
+@@ -9268,11 +9268,11 @@ ns_end:
+ 		    * Attributes.
+ 		    */
+ 		    if ((sourceDoc != NULL) &&
+-			(((xmlAttrPtr) cur)->atype == XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID))
++			(XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE((xmlAttrPtr) cur) == XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID))
+ 		    {
+ 			xmlRemoveID(sourceDoc, (xmlAttrPtr) cur);
+ 		    }
+-		    ((xmlAttrPtr) cur)->atype = 0;
++		    XML_ATTR_CLEAR_ATYPE((xmlAttrPtr) cur);
+ 		    ((xmlAttrPtr) cur)->psvi = NULL;
+ 		}
+ 		break;
+@@ -9992,7 +9992,7 @@ xmlDOMWrapAdoptAttr(xmlDOMWrapCtxtPtr ctxt,
+     }
+ 
+     XML_TREE_ADOPT_STR(attr->name);
+-    attr->atype = 0;
++    XML_ATTR_CLEAR_ATYPE(attr);
+     attr->psvi = NULL;
+     /*
+     * Walk content.
+diff --git a/valid.c b/valid.c
+index 36a0435..8e76cfa 100644
+--- a/valid.c
++++ b/valid.c
+@@ -1906,7 +1906,7 @@ xmlScanIDAttributeDecl(xmlValidCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlElementPtr elem, int err) {
+     if (elem == NULL) return(0);
+     cur = elem->attributes;
+     while (cur != NULL) {
+-        if (cur->atype == XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID) {
++        if (XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(cur) == XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID) {
+ 	    ret ++;
+ 	    if ((ret > 1) && (err))
+ 		xmlErrValidNode(ctxt, (xmlNodePtr) elem, XML_DTD_MULTIPLE_ID,
+@@ -2279,7 +2279,7 @@ xmlDumpAttributeDecl(xmlBufferPtr buf, xmlAttributePtr attr) {
+ 	xmlBufferWriteChar(buf, ":");
+     }
+     xmlBufferWriteCHAR(buf, attr->name);
+-    switch (attr->atype) {
++    switch (XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(attr)) {
+ 	case XML_ATTRIBUTE_CDATA:
+ 	    xmlBufferWriteChar(buf, " CDATA");
+ 	    break;
+@@ -2758,7 +2758,7 @@ xmlAddID(xmlValidCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlDocPtr doc, const xmlChar *value,
+ 	return(NULL);
+     }
+     if (attr != NULL)
+-	attr->atype = XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID;
++	XML_ATTR_SET_ATYPE(attr, XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID);
+     return(ret);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -2837,7 +2837,7 @@ xmlIsID(xmlDocPtr doc, xmlNodePtr elem, xmlAttrPtr attr) {
+ 	if ((fullelemname != felem) && (fullelemname != elem->name))
+ 	    xmlFree(fullelemname);
+ 
+-        if ((attrDecl != NULL) && (attrDecl->atype == XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID))
++        if ((attrDecl != NULL) && (XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(attrDecl) == XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID))
+ 	    return(1);
+     }
+     return(0);
+@@ -2878,7 +2878,7 @@ xmlRemoveID(xmlDocPtr doc, xmlAttrPtr attr) {
+ 
+     xmlHashRemoveEntry(table, ID, xmlFreeIDTableEntry);
+     xmlFree(ID);
+-    attr->atype = 0;
++    XML_ATTR_CLEAR_ATYPE(attr);
+     return(0);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -3157,8 +3157,8 @@ xmlIsRef(xmlDocPtr doc, xmlNodePtr elem, xmlAttrPtr attr) {
+ 		                         elem->name, attr->name);
+ 
+ 	if ((attrDecl != NULL) &&
+-	    (attrDecl->atype == XML_ATTRIBUTE_IDREF ||
+-	     attrDecl->atype == XML_ATTRIBUTE_IDREFS))
++	    (XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(attrDecl) == XML_ATTRIBUTE_IDREF ||
++	     XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(attrDecl) == XML_ATTRIBUTE_IDREFS))
+ 	return(1);
+     }
+     return(0);
+@@ -3532,7 +3532,7 @@ xmlIsMixedElement(xmlDocPtr doc, const xmlChar *name) {
+ 
+ static int
+ xmlIsDocNameStartChar(xmlDocPtr doc, int c) {
+-    if ((doc == NULL) || (doc->properties & XML_DOC_OLD10) == 0) {
++    if ((doc == NULL) || (XML_DOC_GET_PROPERTIES(doc) & XML_DOC_OLD10) == 0) {
+         /*
+ 	 * Use the new checks of production [4] [4a] amd [5] of the
+ 	 * Update 5 of XML-1.0
+@@ -3562,7 +3562,7 @@ xmlIsDocNameStartChar(xmlDocPtr doc, int c) {
+ 
+ static int
+ xmlIsDocNameChar(xmlDocPtr doc, int c) {
+-    if ((doc == NULL) || (doc->properties & XML_DOC_OLD10) == 0) {
++    if ((doc == NULL) || (XML_DOC_GET_PROPERTIES(doc) & XML_DOC_OLD10) == 0) {
+         /*
+ 	 * Use the new checks of production [4] [4a] amd [5] of the
+ 	 * Update 5 of XML-1.0
+@@ -4112,7 +4112,7 @@ xmlValidCtxtNormalizeAttributeValue(xmlValidCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlDocPtr doc,
+ 
+     if (attrDecl == NULL)
+ 	return(NULL);
+-    if (attrDecl->atype == XML_ATTRIBUTE_CDATA)
++    if (XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(attrDecl) == XML_ATTRIBUTE_CDATA)
+ 	return(NULL);
+ 
+     ret = xmlStrdup(value);
+@@ -4174,7 +4174,7 @@ xmlValidNormalizeAttributeValue(xmlDocPtr doc, xmlNodePtr elem,
+ 
+     if (attrDecl == NULL)
+ 	return(NULL);
+-    if (attrDecl->atype == XML_ATTRIBUTE_CDATA)
++    if (XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(attrDecl) == XML_ATTRIBUTE_CDATA)
+ 	return(NULL);
+ 
+     ret = xmlStrdup(value);
+@@ -4189,7 +4189,7 @@ xmlValidateAttributeIdCallback(void *payload, void *data,
+ 	                       const xmlChar *name ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED) {
+     xmlAttributePtr attr = (xmlAttributePtr) payload;
+     int *count = (int *) data;
+-    if (attr->atype == XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID) (*count)++;
++    if (XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(attr) == XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID) (*count)++;
+ }
+ 
+ /**
+@@ -4221,7 +4221,7 @@ xmlValidateAttributeDecl(xmlValidCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlDocPtr doc,
+     /* Attribute Default Legal */
+     /* Enumeration */
+     if (attr->defaultValue != NULL) {
+-	val = xmlValidateAttributeValueInternal(doc, attr->atype,
++	val = xmlValidateAttributeValueInternal(doc, XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(attr),
+ 	                                        attr->defaultValue);
+ 	if (val == 0) {
+ 	    xmlErrValidNode(ctxt, (xmlNodePtr) attr, XML_DTD_ATTRIBUTE_DEFAULT,
+@@ -4232,7 +4232,7 @@ xmlValidateAttributeDecl(xmlValidCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlDocPtr doc,
+     }
+ 
+     /* ID Attribute Default */
+-    if ((attr->atype == XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID)&&
++    if ((XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(attr) == XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID)&&
+         (attr->def != XML_ATTRIBUTE_IMPLIED) &&
+ 	(attr->def != XML_ATTRIBUTE_REQUIRED)) {
+ 	xmlErrValidNode(ctxt, (xmlNodePtr) attr, XML_DTD_ID_FIXED,
+@@ -4242,7 +4242,7 @@ xmlValidateAttributeDecl(xmlValidCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlDocPtr doc,
+     }
+ 
+     /* One ID per Element Type */
+-    if (attr->atype == XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID) {
++    if (XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(attr) == XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID) {
+         int nbId;
+ 
+ 	/* the trick is that we parse DtD as their own internal subset */
+@@ -4501,9 +4501,9 @@ xmlValidateOneAttribute(xmlValidCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlDocPtr doc,
+ 	       attr->name, elem->name, NULL);
+ 	return(0);
+     }
+-    attr->atype = attrDecl->atype;
++    XML_ATTR_SET_ATYPE(attr, attrDecl->atype);
+ 
+-    val = xmlValidateAttributeValueInternal(doc, attrDecl->atype, value);
++    val = xmlValidateAttributeValueInternal(doc, XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(attrDecl), value);
+     if (val == 0) {
+ 	    xmlErrValidNode(ctxt, elem, XML_DTD_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE,
+ 	   "Syntax of value for attribute %s of %s is not valid\n",
+@@ -4522,19 +4522,19 @@ xmlValidateOneAttribute(xmlValidCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlDocPtr doc,
+     }
+ 
+     /* Validity Constraint: ID uniqueness */
+-    if (attrDecl->atype == XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID) {
++    if (XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(attrDecl) == XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID) {
+         if (xmlAddID(ctxt, doc, value, attr) == NULL)
+ 	    ret = 0;
+     }
+ 
+-    if ((attrDecl->atype == XML_ATTRIBUTE_IDREF) ||
+-	(attrDecl->atype == XML_ATTRIBUTE_IDREFS)) {
++    if ((XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(attrDecl) == XML_ATTRIBUTE_IDREF) ||
++	(XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(attrDecl) == XML_ATTRIBUTE_IDREFS)) {
+         if (xmlAddRef(ctxt, doc, value, attr) == NULL)
+ 	    ret = 0;
+     }
+ 
+     /* Validity Constraint: Notation Attributes */
+-    if (attrDecl->atype == XML_ATTRIBUTE_NOTATION) {
++    if (XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(attrDecl) == XML_ATTRIBUTE_NOTATION) {
+         xmlEnumerationPtr tree = attrDecl->tree;
+         xmlNotationPtr nota;
+ 
+@@ -4564,7 +4564,7 @@ xmlValidateOneAttribute(xmlValidCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlDocPtr doc,
+     }
+ 
+     /* Validity Constraint: Enumeration */
+-    if (attrDecl->atype == XML_ATTRIBUTE_ENUMERATION) {
++    if (XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(attrDecl) == XML_ATTRIBUTE_ENUMERATION) {
+         xmlEnumerationPtr tree = attrDecl->tree;
+ 	while (tree != NULL) {
+ 	    if (xmlStrEqual(tree->name, value)) break;
+@@ -4589,7 +4589,7 @@ xmlValidateOneAttribute(xmlValidCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlDocPtr doc,
+ 
+     /* Extra check for the attribute value */
+     ret &= xmlValidateAttributeValue2(ctxt, doc, attr->name,
+-				      attrDecl->atype, value);
++				      XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(attrDecl), value);
+ 
+     return(ret);
+ }
+@@ -4688,7 +4688,7 @@ xmlNodePtr elem, const xmlChar *prefix, xmlNsPtr ns, const xmlChar *value) {
+ 	return(0);
+     }
+ 
+-    val = xmlValidateAttributeValueInternal(doc, attrDecl->atype, value);
++    val = xmlValidateAttributeValueInternal(doc, XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(attrDecl), value);
+     if (val == 0) {
+ 	if (ns->prefix != NULL) {
+ 	    xmlErrValidNode(ctxt, elem, XML_DTD_INVALID_DEFAULT,
+@@ -4738,7 +4738,7 @@ xmlNodePtr elem, const xmlChar *prefix, xmlNsPtr ns, const xmlChar *value) {
+ #endif
+ 
+     /* Validity Constraint: Notation Attributes */
+-    if (attrDecl->atype == XML_ATTRIBUTE_NOTATION) {
++    if (XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(attrDecl) == XML_ATTRIBUTE_NOTATION) {
+         xmlEnumerationPtr tree = attrDecl->tree;
+         xmlNotationPtr nota;
+ 
+@@ -4780,7 +4780,7 @@ xmlNodePtr elem, const xmlChar *prefix, xmlNsPtr ns, const xmlChar *value) {
+     }
+ 
+     /* Validity Constraint: Enumeration */
+-    if (attrDecl->atype == XML_ATTRIBUTE_ENUMERATION) {
++    if (XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(attrDecl) == XML_ATTRIBUTE_ENUMERATION) {
+         xmlEnumerationPtr tree = attrDecl->tree;
+ 	while (tree != NULL) {
+ 	    if (xmlStrEqual(tree->name, value)) break;
+@@ -4818,10 +4818,10 @@ xmlNodePtr elem, const xmlChar *prefix, xmlNsPtr ns, const xmlChar *value) {
+     /* Extra check for the attribute value */
+     if (ns->prefix != NULL) {
+ 	ret &= xmlValidateAttributeValue2(ctxt, doc, ns->prefix,
+-					  attrDecl->atype, value);
++					  XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(attrDecl), value);
+     } else {
+ 	ret &= xmlValidateAttributeValue2(ctxt, doc, BAD_CAST "xmlns",
+-					  attrDecl->atype, value);
++					  XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(attrDecl), value);
+     }
+ 
+     return(ret);
+@@ -6574,7 +6574,7 @@ xmlValidateRef(xmlRefPtr ref, xmlValidCtxtPtr ctxt,
+ 	    while (IS_BLANK_CH(*cur)) cur++;
+ 	}
+ 	xmlFree(dup);
+-    } else if (attr->atype == XML_ATTRIBUTE_IDREF) {
++    } else if (XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(attr) == XML_ATTRIBUTE_IDREF) {
+ 	id = xmlGetID(ctxt->doc, name);
+ 	if (id == NULL) {
+ 	    xmlErrValidNode(ctxt, attr->parent, XML_DTD_UNKNOWN_ID,
+@@ -6582,7 +6582,7 @@ xmlValidateRef(xmlRefPtr ref, xmlValidCtxtPtr ctxt,
+ 		   attr->name, name, NULL);
+ 	    ctxt->valid = 0;
+ 	}
+-    } else if (attr->atype == XML_ATTRIBUTE_IDREFS) {
++    } else if (XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(attr) == XML_ATTRIBUTE_IDREFS) {
+ 	xmlChar *dup, *str = NULL, *cur, save;
+ 
+ 	dup = xmlStrdup(name);
+@@ -6782,7 +6782,7 @@ xmlValidateAttributeCallback(void *payload, void *data,
+ 
+     if (cur == NULL)
+ 	return;
+-    switch (cur->atype) {
++    switch (XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(cur)) {
+ 	case XML_ATTRIBUTE_CDATA:
+ 	case XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID:
+ 	case XML_ATTRIBUTE_IDREF	:
+@@ -6797,7 +6797,7 @@ xmlValidateAttributeCallback(void *payload, void *data,
+ 	    if (cur->defaultValue != NULL) {
+ 
+ 		ret = xmlValidateAttributeValue2(ctxt, ctxt->doc, cur->name,
+-			                         cur->atype, cur->defaultValue);
++			                         XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(cur), cur->defaultValue);
+ 		if ((ret == 0) && (ctxt->valid == 1))
+ 		    ctxt->valid = 0;
+ 	    }
+@@ -6805,14 +6805,14 @@ xmlValidateAttributeCallback(void *payload, void *data,
+ 		xmlEnumerationPtr tree = cur->tree;
+ 		while (tree != NULL) {
+ 		    ret = xmlValidateAttributeValue2(ctxt, ctxt->doc,
+-				    cur->name, cur->atype, tree->name);
++				    cur->name, XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(cur), tree->name);
+ 		    if ((ret == 0) && (ctxt->valid == 1))
+ 			ctxt->valid = 0;
+ 		    tree = tree->next;
+ 		}
+ 	    }
+     }
+-    if (cur->atype == XML_ATTRIBUTE_NOTATION) {
++    if (XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(cur) == XML_ATTRIBUTE_NOTATION) {
+ 	doc = cur->doc;
+ 	if (cur->elem == NULL) {
+ 	    xmlErrValid(ctxt, XML_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+diff --git a/xmlreader.c b/xmlreader.c
+index 67ff2cd..2a1a66a 100644
+--- a/xmlreader.c
++++ b/xmlreader.c
+@@ -753,7 +753,7 @@ xmlTextReaderStartElement(void *ctx, const xmlChar *fullname,
+ 	if ((ctxt->node != NULL) && (ctxt->input != NULL) &&
+ 	    (ctxt->input->cur != NULL) && (ctxt->input->cur[0] == '/') &&
+ 	    (ctxt->input->cur[1] == '>'))
+-	    ctxt->node->extra = NODE_IS_EMPTY;
++	    XML_NODE_SET_EXTRA(ctxt->node, NODE_IS_EMPTY);
+     }
+     if (reader != NULL)
+ 	reader->state = XML_TEXTREADER_ELEMENT;
+@@ -818,7 +818,7 @@ xmlTextReaderStartElementNs(void *ctx,
+ 	if ((ctxt->node != NULL) && (ctxt->input != NULL) &&
+ 	    (ctxt->input->cur != NULL) && (ctxt->input->cur[0] == '/') &&
+ 	    (ctxt->input->cur[1] == '>'))
+-	    ctxt->node->extra = NODE_IS_EMPTY;
++	    XML_NODE_SET_EXTRA(ctxt->node, NODE_IS_EMPTY);
+     }
+     if (reader != NULL)
+ 	reader->state = XML_TEXTREADER_ELEMENT;
+@@ -1216,7 +1216,7 @@ skip_children:
+ 	        xmlNodePtr tmp;
+ 		if (reader->entNr == 0) {
+ 		    while ((tmp = node->last) != NULL) {
+-			if ((tmp->extra & NODE_IS_PRESERVED) == 0) {
++			if ((XML_NODE_GET_EXTRA(tmp) & NODE_IS_PRESERVED) == 0) {
+ 			    xmlUnlinkNode(tmp);
+ 			    xmlTextReaderFreeNode(reader, tmp);
+ 			} else
+@@ -1467,7 +1467,7 @@ get_next_node:
+ 	if ((oldstate == XML_TEXTREADER_ELEMENT) &&
+             (reader->node->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE) &&
+ 	    (reader->node->children == NULL) &&
+-	    ((reader->node->extra & NODE_IS_EMPTY) == 0)
++	    ((XML_NODE_GET_EXTRA(reader->node) & NODE_IS_EMPTY) == 0)
+ #ifdef LIBXML_XINCLUDE_ENABLED
+ 	    && (reader->in_xinclude <= 0)
+ #endif
+@@ -1481,7 +1481,7 @@ get_next_node:
+ 	    xmlTextReaderValidatePop(reader);
+ #endif /* LIBXML_REGEXP_ENABLED */
+         if ((reader->preserves > 0) &&
+-	    (reader->node->extra & NODE_IS_SPRESERVED))
++	    (XML_NODE_GET_EXTRA(reader->node) & NODE_IS_SPRESERVED))
+ 	    reader->preserves--;
+ 	reader->node = reader->node->next;
+ 	reader->state = XML_TEXTREADER_ELEMENT;
+@@ -1497,7 +1497,7 @@ get_next_node:
+ 	    (reader->node->prev != NULL) &&
+             (reader->node->prev->type != XML_DTD_NODE)) {
+ 	    xmlNodePtr tmp = reader->node->prev;
+-	    if ((tmp->extra & NODE_IS_PRESERVED) == 0) {
++	    if ((XML_NODE_GET_EXTRA(tmp) & NODE_IS_PRESERVED) == 0) {
+                 if (oldnode == tmp)
+                     oldnode = NULL;
+ 		xmlUnlinkNode(tmp);
+@@ -1510,7 +1510,7 @@ get_next_node:
+     if ((oldstate == XML_TEXTREADER_ELEMENT) &&
+ 	(reader->node->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE) &&
+ 	(reader->node->children == NULL) &&
+-	((reader->node->extra & NODE_IS_EMPTY) == 0)) {;
++	((XML_NODE_GET_EXTRA(reader->node) & NODE_IS_EMPTY) == 0)) {;
+ 	reader->state = XML_TEXTREADER_END;
+ 	goto node_found;
+     }
+@@ -1519,7 +1519,7 @@ get_next_node:
+ 	xmlTextReaderValidatePop(reader);
+ #endif /* LIBXML_REGEXP_ENABLED */
+     if ((reader->preserves > 0) &&
+-	(reader->node->extra & NODE_IS_SPRESERVED))
++	(XML_NODE_GET_EXTRA(reader->node) & NODE_IS_SPRESERVED))
+ 	reader->preserves--;
+     reader->node = reader->node->parent;
+     if ((reader->node == NULL) ||
+@@ -1546,7 +1546,7 @@ get_next_node:
+ #endif
+ 	    (reader->entNr == 0) &&
+ 	    (oldnode->type != XML_DTD_NODE) &&
+-	    ((oldnode->extra & NODE_IS_PRESERVED) == 0)) {
++	    ((XML_NODE_GET_EXTRA(oldnode) & NODE_IS_PRESERVED) == 0)) {
+ 	    xmlUnlinkNode(oldnode);
+ 	    xmlTextReaderFreeNode(reader, oldnode);
+ 	}
+@@ -1559,7 +1559,7 @@ get_next_node:
+ #endif
+ 	(reader->entNr == 0) &&
+         (reader->node->last != NULL) &&
+-        ((reader->node->last->extra & NODE_IS_PRESERVED) == 0)) {
++        ((XML_NODE_GET_EXTRA(reader->node->last) & NODE_IS_PRESERVED) == 0)) {
+ 	xmlNodePtr tmp = reader->node->last;
+ 	xmlUnlinkNode(tmp);
+ 	xmlTextReaderFreeNode(reader, tmp);
+@@ -1741,7 +1741,7 @@ xmlTextReaderNext(xmlTextReaderPtr reader) {
+         return(xmlTextReaderRead(reader));
+     if (reader->state == XML_TEXTREADER_END || reader->state == XML_TEXTREADER_BACKTRACK)
+         return(xmlTextReaderRead(reader));
+-    if (cur->extra & NODE_IS_EMPTY)
++    if (XML_NODE_GET_EXTRA(cur) & NODE_IS_EMPTY)
+         return(xmlTextReaderRead(reader));
+     do {
+         ret = xmlTextReaderRead(reader);
+@@ -3167,7 +3167,7 @@ xmlTextReaderIsEmptyElement(xmlTextReaderPtr reader) {
+     if (reader->in_xinclude > 0)
+         return(1);
+ #endif
+-    return((reader->node->extra & NODE_IS_EMPTY) != 0);
++    return((XML_NODE_GET_EXTRA(reader->node) & NODE_IS_EMPTY) != 0);
+ }
+ 
+ /**
+@@ -4035,15 +4035,15 @@ xmlTextReaderPreserve(xmlTextReaderPtr reader) {
+         return(NULL);
+ 
+     if ((cur->type != XML_DOCUMENT_NODE) && (cur->type != XML_DTD_NODE)) {
+-	cur->extra |= NODE_IS_PRESERVED;
+-	cur->extra |= NODE_IS_SPRESERVED;
++	XML_NODE_ADD_EXTRA(cur, NODE_IS_PRESERVED);
++	XML_NODE_ADD_EXTRA(cur, NODE_IS_SPRESERVED);
+     }
+     reader->preserves++;
+ 
+     parent = cur->parent;;
+     while (parent != NULL) {
+         if (parent->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE)
+-	    parent->extra |= NODE_IS_PRESERVED;
++	    XML_NODE_ADD_EXTRA(parent, NODE_IS_PRESERVED);
+ 	parent = parent->parent;
+     }
+     return(cur);
+diff --git a/xmlschemas.c b/xmlschemas.c
+index a2dd6cf..2e6c349 100644
+--- a/xmlschemas.c
++++ b/xmlschemas.c
+@@ -6024,7 +6024,7 @@ xmlSchemaPValAttrNodeID(xmlSchemaParserCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlAttrPtr attr)
+ 	/*
+ 	* NOTE: the IDness might have already be declared in the DTD
+ 	*/
+-	if (attr->atype != XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID) {
++	if (XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(attr) != XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID) {
+ 	    xmlIDPtr res;
+ 	    xmlChar *strip;
+ 
+@@ -6047,7 +6047,7 @@ xmlSchemaPValAttrNodeID(xmlSchemaParserCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlAttrPtr attr)
+ 		    NULL, NULL, "Duplicate value '%s' of simple "
+ 		    "type 'xs:ID'", value, NULL);
+ 	    } else
+-		attr->atype = XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID;
++		XML_ATTR_SET_ATYPE(attr, XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID);
+ 	}
+     } else if (ret > 0) {
+ 	ret = XML_SCHEMAP_S4S_ATTR_INVALID_VALUE;
+diff --git a/xmlschemastypes.c b/xmlschemastypes.c
+index af31be5..d40da49 100644
+--- a/xmlschemastypes.c
++++ b/xmlschemastypes.c
+@@ -2867,7 +2867,7 @@ xmlSchemaValAtomicType(xmlSchemaTypePtr type, const xmlChar * value,
+                 /*
+                  * NOTE: the IDness might have already be declared in the DTD
+                  */
+-                if (attr->atype != XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID) {
++                if (XML_ATTR_GET_ATYPE(attr) != XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID) {
+                     xmlIDPtr res;
+                     xmlChar *strip;
+ 
+@@ -2880,7 +2880,7 @@ xmlSchemaValAtomicType(xmlSchemaTypePtr type, const xmlChar * value,
+                     if (res == NULL) {
+                         ret = 2;
+                     } else {
+-                        attr->atype = XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID;
++                        XML_ATTR_SET_ATYPE(attr, XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID);
+                     }
+                 }
+             }
+@@ -2905,7 +2905,7 @@ xmlSchemaValAtomicType(xmlSchemaTypePtr type, const xmlChar * value,
+                     xmlFree(strip);
+                 } else
+                     xmlAddRef(NULL, node->doc, value, attr);
+-                attr->atype = XML_ATTRIBUTE_IDREF;
++                XML_ATTR_SET_ATYPE(attr, XML_ATTRIBUTE_IDREF);
+             }
+             goto done;
+         case XML_SCHEMAS_IDREFS:
+@@ -2919,7 +2919,7 @@ xmlSchemaValAtomicType(xmlSchemaTypePtr type, const xmlChar * value,
+                 (node->type == XML_ATTRIBUTE_NODE)) {
+                 xmlAttrPtr attr = (xmlAttrPtr) node;
+ 
+-                attr->atype = XML_ATTRIBUTE_IDREFS;
++                XML_ATTR_SET_ATYPE(attr, XML_ATTRIBUTE_IDREFS);
+             }
+             goto done;
+         case XML_SCHEMAS_ENTITY:{
+@@ -2950,7 +2950,7 @@ xmlSchemaValAtomicType(xmlSchemaTypePtr type, const xmlChar * value,
+                     (node->type == XML_ATTRIBUTE_NODE)) {
+                     xmlAttrPtr attr = (xmlAttrPtr) node;
+ 
+-                    attr->atype = XML_ATTRIBUTE_ENTITY;
++                    XML_ATTR_SET_ATYPE(attr, XML_ATTRIBUTE_ENTITY);
+                 }
+                 goto done;
+             }
+@@ -2967,7 +2967,7 @@ xmlSchemaValAtomicType(xmlSchemaTypePtr type, const xmlChar * value,
+                 (node->type == XML_ATTRIBUTE_NODE)) {
+                 xmlAttrPtr attr = (xmlAttrPtr) node;
+ 
+-                attr->atype = XML_ATTRIBUTE_ENTITIES;
++                XML_ATTR_SET_ATYPE(attr, XML_ATTRIBUTE_ENTITIES);
+             }
+             goto done;
+         case XML_SCHEMAS_NOTATION:{
+-- 
+2.50.1
+

meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2025-9714.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+From 6ef8b9f05cc21d3fc28156fe5d1251834c29c7d7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Nick Wellnhofer <wellnhofer@aevum.de>
+Date: Thu, 28 Jul 2022 20:21:24 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Make XPath depth check work with recursive invocations
+
+EXSLT functions like dyn:map or dyn:evaluate invoke xmlXPathRunEval
+recursively. Don't set depth to zero but keep and restore the original
+value to avoid stack overflows when abusing these functions.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libxml2/-/commit/677a42645ef22b5a50741bad5facf9d8a8bc6d21]
+CVE: CVE-2025-9714
+
+Signed-off-by: Theo GAIGE <tgaige.opensource@witekio.com>
+---
+ xpath.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/xpath.c b/xpath.c
+index c2d845888..028471d53 100644
+--- a/xpath.c
++++ b/xpath.c
+@@ -13883,12 +13883,11 @@ static int
+ xmlXPathRunEval(xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, int toBool)
+ {
+     xmlXPathCompExprPtr comp;
++    int oldDepth;
+ 
+     if ((ctxt == NULL) || (ctxt->comp == NULL))
+ 	return(-1);
+ 
+-    ctxt->context->depth = 0;
+-
+     if (ctxt->valueTab == NULL) {
+ 	/* Allocate the value stack */
+ 	ctxt->valueTab = (xmlXPathObjectPtr *)
+@@ -13942,11 +13941,13 @@ xmlXPathRunEval(xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, int toBool)
+ 	    "xmlXPathRunEval: last is less than zero\n");
+ 	return(-1);
+     }
++    oldDepth = ctxt->context->depth;
+     if (toBool)
+ 	return(xmlXPathCompOpEvalToBoolean(ctxt,
+ 	    &comp->steps[comp->last], 0));
+     else
+ 	xmlXPathCompOpEval(ctxt, &comp->steps[comp->last]);
++    ctxt->context->depth = oldDepth;
+ 
+     return(0);
+ }
+@@ -14217,6 +14218,7 @@ xmlXPathCompExprPtr
+ xmlXPathCtxtCompile(xmlXPathContextPtr ctxt, const xmlChar *str) {
+     xmlXPathParserContextPtr pctxt;
+     xmlXPathCompExprPtr comp;
++    int oldDepth = 0;
+ 
+ #ifdef XPATH_STREAMING
+     comp = xmlXPathTryStreamCompile(ctxt, str);
+@@ -14230,8 +14232,10 @@ xmlXPathCtxtCompile(xmlXPathContextPtr ctxt, const xmlChar *str) {
+     if (pctxt == NULL)
+         return NULL;
+     if (ctxt != NULL)
+-        ctxt->depth = 0;
++        oldDepth = ctxt->depth;
+     xmlXPathCompileExpr(pctxt, 1);
++    if (ctxt != NULL)
++        ctxt->depth = oldDepth;
+ 
+     if( pctxt->error != XPATH_EXPRESSION_OK )
+     {
+@@ -14252,8 +14256,10 @@ xmlXPathCtxtCompile(xmlXPathContextPtr ctxt, const xmlChar *str) {
+ 	comp = pctxt->comp;
+ 	if ((comp->nbStep > 1) && (comp->last >= 0)) {
+             if (ctxt != NULL)
+-                ctxt->depth = 0;
++                oldDepth = ctxt->depth;
+ 	    xmlXPathOptimizeExpression(pctxt, &comp->steps[comp->last]);
++            if (ctxt != NULL)
++                ctxt->depth = oldDepth;
+ 	}
+ 	pctxt->comp = NULL;
+     }
+@@ -14409,6 +14415,7 @@ xmlXPathEvalExpr(xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt) {
+ #ifdef XPATH_STREAMING
+     xmlXPathCompExprPtr comp;
+ #endif
++    int oldDepth = 0;
+ 
+     if (ctxt == NULL) return;
+ 
+@@ -14422,8 +14429,10 @@ xmlXPathEvalExpr(xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt) {
+ #endif
+     {
+         if (ctxt->context != NULL)
+-            ctxt->context->depth = 0;
++            oldDepth = ctxt->context->depth;
+ 	xmlXPathCompileExpr(ctxt, 1);
++        if (ctxt->context != NULL)
++            ctxt->context->depth = oldDepth;
+         CHECK_ERROR;
+ 
+         /* Check for trailing characters. */
+@@ -14432,9 +14441,11 @@ xmlXPathEvalExpr(xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt) {
+ 
+ 	if ((ctxt->comp->nbStep > 1) && (ctxt->comp->last >= 0)) {
+             if (ctxt->context != NULL)
+-                ctxt->context->depth = 0;
++                oldDepth = ctxt->context->depth;
+ 	    xmlXPathOptimizeExpression(ctxt,
+ 		&ctxt->comp->steps[ctxt->comp->last]);
++            if (ctxt->context != NULL)
++                ctxt->context->depth = oldDepth;
+         }
+     }
+ 
+-- 
+2.43.0
+

meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2_2.9.14.bb

@@ -42,6 +42,8 @@ SRC_URI += "http://www.w3.org/XML/Test/xmlts20080827.tar;subdir=${BP};name=testt
            file://CVE-2025-6021.patch \
            file://CVE-2025-49794-CVE-2025-49796.patch \
            file://CVE-2025-6170.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-9714.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-7425.patch \
            "
 
 SRC_URI[archive.sha256sum] = "60d74a257d1ccec0475e749cba2f21559e48139efba6ff28224357c7c798dfee"

meta/recipes-core/musl/musl/CVE-2025-26519-1.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+From 345d2a053c32f3443dbfdd313f49346ce30b92f8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Rich Felker <dalias@aerifal.cx>
+Date: Wed, 19 Nov 2025 13:23:38 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] iconv: fix erroneous input validation in EUC-KR decoder
+
+as a result of incorrect bounds checking on the lead byte being
+decoded, certain invalid inputs which should produce an encoding
+error, such as "\xc8\x41", instead produced out-of-bounds loads from
+the ksc table.
+
+in a worst case, the loaded value may not be a valid unicode scalar
+value, in which case, if the output encoding was UTF-8, wctomb would
+return (size_t)-1, causing an overflow in the output pointer and
+remaining buffer size which could clobber memory outside of the output
+buffer.
+
+bug report was submitted in private by Nick Wellnhofer on account of
+potential security implications.
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-26519
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.musl-libc.org/cgit/musl/commit/?id=e5adcd97b5196e29991b524237381a0202a60659]
+Signed-off-by: Gyorgy Sarvari <skandigraun@gmail.com>
+---
+ src/locale/iconv.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/locale/iconv.c b/src/locale/iconv.c
+index 3047c27b..1fb66bc8 100644
+--- a/src/locale/iconv.c
++++ b/src/locale/iconv.c
+@@ -495,7 +495,7 @@ size_t iconv(iconv_t cd, char **restrict in, size_t *restrict inb, char **restri
+ 			if (c >= 93 || d >= 94) {
+ 				c += (0xa1-0x81);
+ 				d += 0xa1;
+-				if (c >= 93 || c>=0xc6-0x81 && d>0x52)
++				if (c > 0xc6-0x81 || c==0xc6-0x81 && d>0x52)
+ 					goto ilseq;
+ 				if (d-'A'<26) d = d-'A';
+ 				else if (d-'a'<26) d = d-'a'+26;

meta/recipes-core/musl/musl/CVE-2025-26519-2.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+From b81230050f6c3348038fe470d260028824b9a9e5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Rich Felker <dalias@aerifal.cx>
+Date: Wed, 19 Nov 2025 13:27:15 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] iconv: harden UTF-8 output code path against input decoder
+ bugs
+
+the UTF-8 output code was written assuming an invariant that iconv's
+decoders only emit valid Unicode Scalar Values which wctomb can encode
+successfully, thereby always returning a value between 1 and 4.
+
+if this invariant is not satisfied, wctomb returns (size_t)-1, and the
+subsequent adjustments to the output buffer pointer and remaining
+output byte count overflow, moving the output position backwards,
+potentially past the beginning of the buffer, without storing any
+bytes.
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-26519
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.musl-libc.org/cgit/musl/commit/?id=c47ad25ea3b484e10326f933e927c0bc8cded3da]
+Signed-off-by: Gyorgy Sarvari <skandigraun@gmail.com>
+---
+ src/locale/iconv.c | 4 ++++
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/locale/iconv.c b/src/locale/iconv.c
+index 1fb66bc8..fb1d3217 100644
+--- a/src/locale/iconv.c
++++ b/src/locale/iconv.c
+@@ -538,6 +538,10 @@ size_t iconv(iconv_t cd, char **restrict in, size_t *restrict inb, char **restri
+ 				if (*outb < k) goto toobig;
+ 				memcpy(*out, tmp, k);
+ 			} else k = wctomb_utf8(*out, c);
++			/* This failure condition should be unreachable, but
++			 * is included to prevent decoder bugs from translating
++			 * into advancement outside the output buffer range. */
++			if (k>4) goto ilseq;
+ 			*out += k;
+ 			*outb -= k;
+ 			break;

meta/recipes-core/musl/musl_git.bb

@@ -15,7 +15,9 @@ PV = "${BASEVER}+git${SRCPV}"
 SRC_URI = "git://git.musl-libc.org/musl;branch=master \
            file://0001-Make-dynamic-linker-a-relative-symlink-to-libc.patch \
            file://0002-ldso-Use-syslibdir-and-libdir-as-default-pathes-to-l.patch \
-          "
+           file://CVE-2025-26519-1.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-26519-2.patch \
+           "
 
 S = "${WORKDIR}/git"
 

meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/CVE-2025-4598-0003.patch

@@ -33,16 +33,16 @@ Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/systemd/systemd-stable/commit/2eb4
 
 Signed-off-by: Chen Qi <Qi.Chen@windriver.com>
 ---
- man/systemd-coredump.xml     | 12 ++++++++++++
+ man/systemd-coredump.xml     | 11 +++++++++++
  src/coredump/coredump.c      | 21 ++++++++++++++++++---
  sysctl.d/50-coredump.conf.in |  2 +-
- 3 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+ 3 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
 
 diff --git a/man/systemd-coredump.xml b/man/systemd-coredump.xml
 index cb9f47745b..ba7cad12bc 100644
 --- a/man/systemd-coredump.xml
 +++ b/man/systemd-coredump.xml
-@@ -259,6 +259,18 @@ COREDUMP_FILENAME=/var/lib/systemd/coredump/core.Web….552351.….zst
+@@ -259,6 +259,17 @@ COREDUMP_FILENAME=/var/lib/systemd/coredump/core.Web….552351.….zst
          </listitem>
        </varlistentry>
  
@@ -54,7 +54,6 @@ index cb9f47745b..ba7cad12bc 100644
 +        project='man-pages'><refentrytitle>prctl</refentrytitle><manvolnum>2</manvolnum></citerefentry>.
 +        </para>
 +
-+        <xi:include href="version-info.xml" xpointer="v258"/>
 +        </listitem>
 +      </varlistentry>
 +

meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_250.14.bb

@@ -235,6 +235,7 @@ EXTRA_OEMESON += "-Dnobody-user=nobody \
                   -Dmode=release \
                   -Dsystem-alloc-uid-min=101 \
                   -Dsystem-uid-max=999 \
+                  -Dtranslations=${@'false' if d.getVar('USE_NLS') == 'no' else 'true'} \
                   -Dsystem-alloc-gid-min=101 \
                   -Dsystem-gid-max=999 \
                   "

meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils-2.38.inc

@@ -80,5 +80,11 @@ SRC_URI = "\
      file://0042-CVE-2025-5245.patch \
      file://0043-CVE-2025-7546.patch \
      file://0043-CVE-2025-7545.patch \
+     file://0044-CVE-2025-11082.patch \
+     file://0045-CVE-2025-11083.patch \
+     file://0046-CVE-2025-11081.patch \
+     file://0047-CVE-2025-8225.patch \
+     file://CVE-2025-11412.patch \
+     file://CVE-2025-11413.patch \
 "
 S  = "${WORKDIR}/git"

meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/0044-CVE-2025-11082.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+From ea1a0737c7692737a644af0486b71e4a392cbca8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 22 Sep 2025 15:20:34 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] elf: Don't read beyond .eh_frame section size
+
+	PR ld/33464
+	* elf-eh-frame.c (_bfd_elf_parse_eh_frame): Don't read beyond
+	.eh_frame section size.
+
+Signed-off-by: H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com>
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-11082
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://sourceware.org/git/gitweb.cgi?p=binutils-gdb.git;h=ea1a0737c7692737a644af0486b71e4a392cbca8]
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
+---
+ bfd/elf-eh-frame.c | 8 ++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/bfd/elf-eh-frame.c b/bfd/elf-eh-frame.c
+index dc0d2e097f5..30bb313489c 100644
+--- a/bfd/elf-eh-frame.c
++++ b/bfd/elf-eh-frame.c
+@@ -733,6 +733,7 @@ _bfd_elf_parse_eh_frame (bfd *abfd, struct bfd_link_info *info,
+       if (hdr_id == 0)
+ 	{
+ 	  unsigned int initial_insn_length;
++	  char *null_byte;
+ 
+ 	  /* CIE  */
+ 	  this_inf->cie = 1;
+@@ -749,10 +750,13 @@ _bfd_elf_parse_eh_frame (bfd *abfd, struct bfd_link_info *info,
+ 	  REQUIRE (cie->version == 1
+ 		   || cie->version == 3
+ 		   || cie->version == 4);
+-	  REQUIRE (strlen ((char *) buf) < sizeof (cie->augmentation));
++	  null_byte = memchr ((char *) buf, 0, end - buf);
++	  REQUIRE (null_byte != NULL);
++	  REQUIRE ((size_t) (null_byte - (char *) buf)
++		   < sizeof (cie->augmentation));
+ 
+ 	  strcpy (cie->augmentation, (char *) buf);
+-	  buf = (bfd_byte *) strchr ((char *) buf, '\0') + 1;
++	  buf = (bfd_byte *) null_byte + 1;
+ 	  this_inf->u.cie.aug_str_len = buf - start - 1;
+ 	  ENSURE_NO_RELOCS (buf);
+ 	  if (buf[0] == 'e' && buf[1] == 'h')

meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/0045-CVE-2025-11083.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+From 9ca499644a21ceb3f946d1c179c38a83be084490 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 18 Sep 2025 16:59:25 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] elf: Don't match corrupt section header in linker input
+
+Don't swap in nor match corrupt section header in linker input to avoid
+linker crash later.
+
+	PR ld/33457
+	* elfcode.h (elf_swap_shdr_in): Changed to return bool.  Return
+	false for corrupt section header in linker input.
+	(elf_object_p): Reject if elf_swap_shdr_in returns false.
+
+Signed-off-by: H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com>
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-11083
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://sourceware.org/git/gitweb.cgi?p=binutils-gdb.git;h=9ca499644a21ceb3f946d1c179c38a83be084490]
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
+---
+ bfd/elfcode.h | 14 +++++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/bfd/elfcode.h b/bfd/elfcode.h
+index 9c65852e103..5224a1abee6 100644
+--- a/bfd/elfcode.h
++++ b/bfd/elfcode.h
+@@ -298,7 +298,7 @@ elf_swap_ehdr_out (bfd *abfd,
+ /* Translate an ELF section header table entry in external format into an
+    ELF section header table entry in internal format.  */
+ 
+-static void
++static bool
+ elf_swap_shdr_in (bfd *abfd,
+ 		  const Elf_External_Shdr *src,
+ 		  Elf_Internal_Shdr *dst)
+@@ -328,6 +328,9 @@ elf_swap_shdr_in (bfd *abfd,
+ 	  if (!abfd->read_only)
+ 	    _bfd_error_handler (_("warning: %pB has a section "
+ 				  "extending past end of file"), abfd);
++	  /* PR ld/33457: Don't match corrupt section header.  */
++	  if (abfd->is_linker_input)
++	    return false;
+ 	  abfd->read_only = 1;
+ 	}
+     }
+@@ -337,6 +340,7 @@ elf_swap_shdr_in (bfd *abfd,
+   dst->sh_entsize = H_GET_WORD (abfd, src->sh_entsize);
+   dst->bfd_section = NULL;
+   dst->contents = NULL;
++  return true;
+ }
+ 
+ /* Translate an ELF section header table entry in internal format into an
+@@ -629,9 +633,9 @@ elf_object_p (bfd *abfd)
+ 
+       /* Read the first section header at index 0, and convert to internal
+ 	 form.  */
+-      if (bfd_bread (&x_shdr, sizeof x_shdr, abfd) != sizeof (x_shdr))
++      if (bfd_bread (&x_shdr, sizeof x_shdr, abfd) != sizeof (x_shdr)
++	  || !elf_swap_shdr_in (abfd, &x_shdr, &i_shdr))
+ 	goto got_no_match;
+-      elf_swap_shdr_in (abfd, &x_shdr, &i_shdr);
+ 
+       /* If the section count is zero, the actual count is in the first
+ 	 section header.  */
+@@ -717,9 +721,9 @@ elf_object_p (bfd *abfd)
+ 	 to internal form.  */
+       for (shindex = 1; shindex < i_ehdrp->e_shnum; shindex++)
+ 	{
+-	  if (bfd_bread (&x_shdr, sizeof x_shdr, abfd) != sizeof (x_shdr))
++	  if (bfd_bread (&x_shdr, sizeof x_shdr, abfd) != sizeof (x_shdr)
++	      || !elf_swap_shdr_in (abfd, &x_shdr, i_shdrp + shindex))
+ 	    goto got_no_match;
+-	  elf_swap_shdr_in (abfd, &x_shdr, i_shdrp + shindex);
+ 
+ 	  /* Sanity check sh_link and sh_info.  */
+ 	  if (i_shdrp[shindex].sh_link >= num_sec)

meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/0046-CVE-2025-11081.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+From f87a66db645caf8cc0e6fc87b0c28c78a38af59b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alan Modra <amodra@gmail.com>
+Date: Tue, 9 Sep 2025 18:32:09 +0930
+Subject: [PATCH] PR 33406 SEGV in dump_dwarf_section
+
+Trying to dump .sframe in a PE file results in a segfault accessing
+elf_section_data.
+
+	* objdump (dump_sframe_section, dump_dwarf_section): Don't access
+	elf_section_type without first checking the file is ELF.
+---
+ binutils/objdump.c | 10 ++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://sourceware.org/git/?p=binutils-gdb.git;a=commit;h=f87a66db645caf8cc0e6fc87b0c28c78a38af59b]
+CVE: CVE-2025-11081
+
+Signed-off-by: Alan Modra <amodra@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Yash Shinde <Yash.Shinde@windriver.com>
+
+diff --git a/binutils/objdump.c b/binutils/objdump.c
+index 290f7e51f66..ee8823da05a 100644
+--- a/binutils/objdump.c
++++ b/binutils/objdump.c
+@@ -4418,6 +4418,10 @@
+   else
+     match = name;
+ 
++  if (bfd_get_flavour (abfd) == bfd_target_elf_flavour
++      && elf_section_type (section) == SHT_GNU_SFRAME)
++    match = ".sframe";
++
+   for (i = 0; i < max; i++)
+     if ((strcmp (debug_displays [i].section.uncompressed_name, match) == 0
+	 || strcmp (debug_displays [i].section.compressed_name, match) == 0
+@@ -4923,6 +4927,36 @@
+ }
+ 
++static void
++dump_sframe_section (bfd *abfd, const char *sect_name, bool is_mainfile)
++
++{
++  /* Error checking for user provided SFrame section name, if any.  */
++  if (sect_name)
++    {
++      asection *sec = bfd_get_section_by_name (abfd, sect_name);
++      if (sec == NULL)
++       {
++         printf (_("No %s section present\n\n"), sanitize_string (sect_name));
++         return;
++       }
++      /* Starting with Binutils 2.45, SFrame sections have section type
++        SHT_GNU_SFRAME.  For SFrame sections from Binutils 2.44 or earlier,
++        check explcitly for SFrame sections of type SHT_PROGBITS and name
++        ".sframe" to allow them.  */
++      else if (bfd_get_flavour (abfd) != bfd_target_elf_flavour
++              || (elf_section_type (sec) != SHT_GNU_SFRAME
++                  && !(elf_section_type (sec) == SHT_PROGBITS
++                       && strcmp (sect_name, ".sframe") == 0)))
++       {
++         printf (_("Section %s does not contain SFrame data\n\n"),
++                 sanitize_string (sect_name));
++         return;
++       }
++    }
++  dump_dwarf (abfd, is_mainfile);
++}
++
+ static void
+ dump_target_specific (bfd *abfd)
+ {
+   const struct objdump_private_desc * const *desc;
+diff --git a/include/elf/common.h b/include/elf/common.h
+--- a/include/elf/common.h
++++ b/include/elf/common.h 
+@@ -528,6 +528,8 @@
+ #define SHT_LOOS	0x60000000	/* First of OS specific semantics */
+ #define SHT_HIOS	0x6fffffff	/* Last of OS specific semantics */
+ 
++#define SHT_GNU_SFRAME	0x6ffffff4	/* SFrame stack trace information.  */
++
+ #define SHT_GNU_INCREMENTAL_INPUTS 0x6fff4700   /* incremental build data */
+ #define SHT_GNU_ATTRIBUTES 0x6ffffff5	/* Object attributes */
+ #define SHT_GNU_HASH	0x6ffffff6	/* GNU style symbol hash table */

meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/0047-CVE-2025-8225.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+From e51fdff7d2e538c0e5accdd65649ac68e6e0ddd4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alan Modra <amodra@gmail.com>
+Date: Wed, 19 Feb 2025 22:45:29 +1030
+Subject: [PATCH] binutils/dwarf.c debug_information leak
+
+It is possible with fuzzed files to have num_debug_info_entries zero
+after allocating space for debug_information, leading to multiple
+allocations.
+
+	* dwarf.c (process_debug_info): Don't test num_debug_info_entries
+	to determine whether debug_information has been allocated,
+	test alloc_num_debug_info_entries.
+---
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://sourceware.org/git/?p=binutils-gdb.git;a=commitdiff;h=e51fdff7d2e538c0e5accdd65649ac68e6e0ddd4]
+CVE: CVE-2025-8225
+
+ binutils/dwarf.c | 8 +++-----
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+Signed-off-by: Alan Modra <amodra@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Yash Shinde <Yash.Shinde@windriver.com>
+
+diff --git a/binutils/dwarf.c b/binutils/dwarf.c
+index 8e004cea839..bfbf83ec9f4 100644
+--- a/binutils/dwarf.c
++++ b/binutils/dwarf.c
+@@ -3807,13 +3807,11 @@ process_debug_info (struct dwarf_section * section,
+     }
+ 
+   if ((do_loc || do_debug_loc || do_debug_ranges || do_debug_info)
+-      && num_debug_info_entries == 0
+-      && ! do_types)
++      && alloc_num_debug_info_entries == 0
++      && !do_types)
+     {
+-
+       /* Then allocate an array to hold the information.  */
+-      debug_information = (debug_info *) cmalloc (num_units,
+-						  sizeof (* debug_information));
++      debug_information = cmalloc (num_units, sizeof (*debug_information));
+       if (debug_information == NULL)
+ 	{
+ 	  error (_("Not enough memory for a debug info array of %u entries\n"),
+-- 
+2.43.7
+

meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/CVE-2025-11412.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+From 047435dd988a3975d40c6626a8f739a0b2e154bc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alan Modra <amodra@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 25 Sep 2025 08:22:24 +0930
+Subject: [PATCH] PR 33452 SEGV in bfd_elf_gc_record_vtentry
+
+Limit addends on vtentry relocs, otherwise ld might attempt to
+allocate a stupidly large array.  This also fixes the expression
+overflow leading to pr33452.  A vtable of 33M entries on a 64-bit
+host is surely large enough, especially considering that VTINHERIT
+and VTENTRY relocations are to support -fvtable-gc that disappeared
+from gcc over 20 years ago.
+
+	PR ld/33452
+	* elflink.c (bfd_elf_gc_record_vtentry): Sanity check addend.
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-11412
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://sourceware.org/git/gitweb.cgi?p=binutils-gdb.git;h=047435dd988a3975d40c6626a8f739a0b2e154bc]
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
+---
+ bfd/elflink.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/bfd/elflink.c b/bfd/elflink.c
+index 54f0d6e957e..0a0456177c2 100644
+--- a/bfd/elflink.c
++++ b/bfd/elflink.c
+@@ -14407,7 +14407,7 @@ bfd_elf_gc_record_vtentry (bfd *abfd, asection *sec,
+   const struct elf_backend_data *bed = get_elf_backend_data (abfd);
+   unsigned int log_file_align = bed->s->log_file_align;
+ 
+-  if (!h)
++  if (!h || addend > 1u << 28)
+     {
+       /* xgettext:c-format */
+       _bfd_error_handler (_("%pB: section '%pA': corrupt VTENTRY entry"),

meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/CVE-2025-11413.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+From 72efdf166aa0ed72ecc69fc2349af6591a7a19c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alan Modra <amodra@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 25 Sep 2025 10:41:32 +0930
+Subject: [PATCH] Re: elf: Disallow the empty global symbol name
+
+sparc64-linux-gnu  +FAIL: selective2
+sparc64-linux-gnu  +FAIL: selective3
+
+	PR ld/33456
+	* elflink.c (elf_link_add_object_symbols): Move new check later
+	to give the backend add_symbol_hook a chance to remove symbols
+	with empty names.
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-11413
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://sourceware.org/git/gitweb.cgi?p=binutils-gdb.git;h=72efdf166aa0ed72ecc69fc2349af6591a7a19c0]
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
+---
+ bfd/elflink.c | 7 +++++++
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/bfd/elflink.c b/bfd/elflink.c
+index 0a0456177c2..5c8b822e36a 100644
+--- a/bfd/elflink.c
++++ b/bfd/elflink.c
+@@ -4931,6 +4931,13 @@ elf_link_add_object_symbols (bfd *abfd, struct bfd_link_info *info)
+ 	    continue;
+ 	}
+ 
++      if (name[0] == '\0')
++	{
++	  _bfd_error_handler (_("%pB: corrupt symbol table"), abfd);
++	  bfd_set_error (bfd_error_bad_value);
++	  goto error_free_vers;
++	}
++
+       /* Sanity check that all possibilities were handled.  */
+       if (sec == NULL)
+ 	abort ();

meta/recipes-devtools/cmake/cmake/CVE-2025-9301.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+From 37e27f71bc356d880c908040cd0cb68fa2c371b8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tyler Yankee <tyler.yankee@kitware.com>
+Date: Wed, 13 Aug 2025 15:22:28 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] foreach: Explicitly skip replay without iterations
+
+As written, foreach loops with a trailing `IN` (i.e., no loop
+variable(s) given) lead to an assertion error. Handle this case by
+exiting early when we know the loop won't execute anything.
+
+Fixes: #27135
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-9301
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+https://gitlab.kitware.com/cmake/cmake/-/commit/37e27f71bc356d880c908040cd0cb68fa2c371b8
+
+Signed-off-by: Tyler Yankee <tyler.yankee@kitware.com>
+Signed-off-by: Saravanan <saravanan.kadambathursubramaniyam@windriver.com>
+---
+ Source/cmForEachCommand.cxx                  | 3 +++
+ Tests/RunCMake/foreach/RunCMakeTest.cmake    | 1 +
+ Tests/RunCMake/foreach/TrailingIn-result.txt | 1 +
+ Tests/RunCMake/foreach/TrailingIn.cmake      | 5 +++++
+ 4 files changed, 10 insertions(+)
+ create mode 100644 Tests/RunCMake/foreach/TrailingIn-result.txt
+ create mode 100644 Tests/RunCMake/foreach/TrailingIn.cmake
+
+diff --git a/Source/cmForEachCommand.cxx b/Source/cmForEachCommand.cxx
+index dcb36265..35b59960 100644
+--- a/Source/cmForEachCommand.cxx
++++ b/Source/cmForEachCommand.cxx
+@@ -100,6 +100,9 @@ bool cmForEachFunctionBlocker::ArgumentsMatch(cmListFileFunction const& lff,
+ bool cmForEachFunctionBlocker::Replay(
+   std::vector<cmListFileFunction> functions, cmExecutionStatus& inStatus)
+ {
++  if (this->Args.size() == this->IterationVarsCount) {
++    return true;
++  }
+   return this->ZipLists ? this->ReplayZipLists(functions, inStatus)
+                         : this->ReplayItems(functions, inStatus);
+ }
+diff --git a/Tests/RunCMake/foreach/RunCMakeTest.cmake b/Tests/RunCMake/foreach/RunCMakeTest.cmake
+index 15ca4770..acfc742e 100644
+--- a/Tests/RunCMake/foreach/RunCMakeTest.cmake
++++ b/Tests/RunCMake/foreach/RunCMakeTest.cmake
+@@ -22,3 +22,4 @@ run_cmake(foreach-RANGE-invalid-test)
+ run_cmake(foreach-RANGE-out-of-range-test)
+ run_cmake(foreach-var-scope-CMP0124-OLD)
+ run_cmake(foreach-var-scope-CMP0124-NEW)
++run_cmake(TrailingIn)
+diff --git a/Tests/RunCMake/foreach/TrailingIn-result.txt b/Tests/RunCMake/foreach/TrailingIn-result.txt
+new file mode 100644
+index 00000000..573541ac
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/Tests/RunCMake/foreach/TrailingIn-result.txt
+@@ -0,0 +1 @@
++0
+diff --git a/Tests/RunCMake/foreach/TrailingIn.cmake b/Tests/RunCMake/foreach/TrailingIn.cmake
+new file mode 100644
+index 00000000..e2b5b2f2
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/Tests/RunCMake/foreach/TrailingIn.cmake
+@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
++foreach(v IN)
++endforeach()
++
++foreach(v1 v2 IN)
++endforeach()
+-- 
+2.35.5
+

meta/recipes-devtools/cmake/cmake_3.22.3.bb

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ SRC_URI:append:class-nativesdk = " \
     file://0001-CMakeDetermineSystem-use-oe-environment-vars-to-load.patch \
     file://0001-ctest-Allow-arbitrary-characters-in-test-names-of-CT.patch \
 "
+SRC_URI += "file://CVE-2025-9301.patch"
 
 LICENSE:append = " & BSD-1-Clause & MIT"
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM:append = " \

meta/recipes-devtools/dpkg/dpkg/CVE-2025-6297.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+From 98c623c8d6814ae46a3b30ca22e584c77d47d86b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Guillem Jover <guillem@debian.org>
+Date: Sat, 7 Jun 2025 14:17:07 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] dpkg-deb: Fix cleanup for control member with restricted
+ directories
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+When extracting a control member into a temporary directory, which is
+documented as being a safe operation even on untrusted data, the code
+in charge of the temporary directory cleanup does not sanitize the
+directory permissions, which is then unable to perform the «rm -rf»
+when running as a non-root user, leaving temporary files behind.
+
+Given automated and repeated execution of dpkg-deb commands on
+adversarial .deb packages or with well compressible files, placed
+inside a directory with permissions not allowing removal by a non-root
+user, this can end up with a DoS scenario due to causing disk quota
+exhaustion or disk full conditions.
+
+This is considered a minor issue, given the required conditions to
+trigger a problem with it, but an issue non the less given the
+documented security guarantees of the command. This has been an
+issue since the initial commit introducing dpkg-deb in C.
+
+We use an existing string for the error message to avoid new strings
+needing translation for stable branches, which make the error message
+less descriptive than what would be ideal. This will be improved in
+git HEAD.
+
+Reported-by: zhutyra on HackerOne
+Fixes: CVE-2025-6297
+Stable-Candidate: 1.20.x 1.21.x 1.22.x
+(cherry picked from commit ed6bbd445dd8800308c67236ba35d08004c98e82)
+(cherry picked from commit 02ad0532bd490cbc95b344f670e622a38eecfbf6)
+(cherry picked from commit d8a76551e22abe76eefd7fef5c7f51f4118eb40e)
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-6297
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.dpkg.org/cgit/dpkg/dpkg.git/commit/?id=98c623c8d6814ae46a3b30ca22e584c77d47d86b]
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
+---
+ src/at/deb-content.at | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ src/deb/info.c        | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 52 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/at/deb-content.at b/src/at/deb-content.at
+index a192c9493..d48eed72b 100644
+--- a/src/at/deb-content.at
++++ b/src/at/deb-content.at
+@@ -127,3 +127,35 @@ newline'
+ ])
+ 
+ AT_CLEANUP
++
++AT_SETUP([dpkg-deb .deb extraction cleanup])
++AT_KEYWORDS([dpkg-deb deb extraction])
++
++DPKG_GEN_CONTROL([pkg-ctrl-dir-perms])
++AT_CHECK([
++dpkg-deb --root-owner-group -Znone -b pkg-ctrl-dir-perms
++DPKG_AR_EXTRACT([pkg-ctrl-dir-perms.deb])
++dpkg-deb -R pkg-ctrl-dir-perms.deb pkg-ctrl-dir-perms-bad
++mkdir -p pkg-ctrl-dir-perms-bad/DEBIAN/rx-subdir/inner
++touch pkg-ctrl-dir-perms-bad/DEBIAN/rx-subdir/inner/file
++chmod 0555 pkg-ctrl-dir-perms-bad/DEBIAN
++chmod 0555 pkg-ctrl-dir-perms-bad/DEBIAN/rx-subdir
++chmod 0555 pkg-ctrl-dir-perms-bad/DEBIAN/rx-subdir/inner
++$TAR cf control.tar --format=gnu --sort=name --mtime @0 --clamp-mtime --owner root:0 --group root:0 -C pkg-ctrl-dir-perms-bad/DEBIAN .
++DPKG_AR_GEN([pkg-ctrl-dir-perms.deb], [debian-binary control.tar data.tar])
++], [0], [dpkg-deb: building package 'pkg-ctrl-dir-perms' in 'pkg-ctrl-dir-perms.deb'.
++])
++AT_CHECK([
++dpkg-deb --ctrl-tarfile pkg-ctrl-dir-perms.deb | $TAR tvf -
++], [0], [dr-xr-xr-x root/root         0 1970-01-01 00:00 ./
++-rw-r--r-- root/root       176 1970-01-01 00:00 ./control
++dr-xr-xr-x root/root         0 1970-01-01 00:00 ./rx-subdir/
++dr-xr-xr-x root/root         0 1970-01-01 00:00 ./rx-subdir/inner/
++-rw-r--r-- root/root         0 1970-01-01 00:00 ./rx-subdir/inner/file
++])
++# Check that we can cleanup the temporarily extracted control.tar member.
++AT_CHECK([
++dpkg-deb -I pkg-ctrl-dir-perms.deb
++], [0], [ignore])
++
++AT_CLEANUP
+diff --git a/src/deb/info.c b/src/deb/info.c
+index f3d57e2ce..396ea4d14 100644
+--- a/src/deb/info.c
++++ b/src/deb/info.c
+@@ -45,14 +45,34 @@
+ #include <dpkg/pkg-format.h>
+ #include <dpkg/buffer.h>
+ #include <dpkg/path.h>
++#include <dpkg/treewalk.h>
+ #include <dpkg/options.h>
+ 
+ #include "dpkg-deb.h"
+ 
++static int
++cu_info_treewalk_fixup_dir(struct treenode *node)
++{
++  const char *nodename;
++
++  if (!S_ISDIR(treenode_get_mode(node)))
++    return 0;
++
++  nodename = treenode_get_pathname(node);
++  if (chmod(nodename, 0755) < 0)
++    ohshite(_("error setting permissions of '%.255s'"), nodename);
++
++  return 0;
++}
++
+ static void cu_info_prepare(int argc, void **argv) {
+   char *dir;
++  struct treewalk_funcs cu_info_treewalk_funcs = {
++    .visit = cu_info_treewalk_fixup_dir,
++  };
+ 
+   dir = argv[0];
++  treewalk(dir, TREEWALK_NONE, &cu_info_treewalk_funcs);
+   path_remove_tree(dir);
+   free(dir);
+ }