migration-guides: add release notes for 4.0.32

(From yocto-docs rev: 398a2a080361eb22b9c447dbde31fca58bf4e0bb) Signed-off-by: Lee Chee Yang <chee.yang.lee@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Antonin Godard <antonin.godard@bootlin.com> (cherry picked from commit 095981c08b9d63905472df5d1d60c07af96f0250) Signed-off-by: Antonin Godard <antonin.godard@bootlin.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
dev-manual/packages.rst: fix example recipe version
2026-02-20 16:39:40 +01:00 · 2026-02-12 17:00:21 +00:00 · 2026-02-12 17:00:21 +00:00 · 2026-02-12 17:00:21 +00:00 · 2026-02-12 17:00:21 +00:00 · 2026-02-12 17:00:21 +00:00
88 changed files with 6802 additions and 341 deletions
--- a/documentation/contributor-guide/recipe-style-guide.rst
+++ b/documentation/contributor-guide/recipe-style-guide.rst
@@ -221,6 +221,20 @@ Recipes need to define both the :term:`LICENSE` and
   ``meta/files/common-licenses/`` or the :term:`SPDXLICENSEMAP` flag names
   defined in ``meta/conf/licenses.conf``.

+   .. note::
+
+      Setting a :term:`LICENSE` in a recipe applies to the software to be built
+      by this recipe, not to the recipe file itself. The license of recipes,
+      configuration files and scripts should also be clearly specified, for
+      example via comments or via a license found in the :term:`layer` that
+      holds these files. These license files are usually found at the root of
+      the layer. Exceptions should be clearly stated in the layer README or
+      LICENSE file.
+
+      For example, the :term:`OpenEmbedded-Core (OE-Core)` layer provides both
+      the GPL-2.0-only and MIT license files, and a "LICENSE" file to explain
+      how these two licenses are attributed to files found in the layer.
+
 -  :term:`LIC_FILES_CHKSUM`: The OpenEmbedded build system uses this
   variable to make sure the license text has not changed. If it has,
   the build produces an error and it affords you the chance to figure
--- a/documentation/dev-manual/index.rst
+++ b/documentation/dev-manual/index.rst
@@ -41,7 +41,6 @@ Yocto Project Development Tasks Manual
   build-quality
   debugging
   licenses
-   security-subjects
   vulnerabilities
   sbom
   error-reporting-tool
--- a/documentation/dev-manual/packages.rst
+++ b/documentation/dev-manual/packages.rst
@@ -279,8 +279,23 @@ with a number. The number used depends on the state of the PR Service:

   .. code-block:: none

-      hello-world-git_0.0+git0+b6558dd387-r0.0_armv7a-neon.ipk
-      hello-world-git_0.0+git1+dd2f5c3565-r0.0_armv7a-neon.ipk
+      hello-world-git_1.0+git0+b6558dd387-r0.0_armv7a-neon.ipk
+      hello-world-git_1.0+git1+dd2f5c3565-r0.1_armv7a-neon.ipk
+
+   Two numbers got incremented here:
+
+   -  ``gitX`` changed from ``git0`` to ``git1``. This is because there was a
+      change in the source code (``SRCREV``).
+
+   -  ``r0.X`` changed from ``r0.0`` to ``r0.1``. This is because the hash of
+      the :ref:`ref-tasks-package` task changed.
+
+      The reason for this change can be many. To understand why the hash of the
+      :ref:`ref-tasks-package` task changed, you can run the following command:
+
+      .. code-block:: console
+
+         $ bitbake-diffsigs -t hello-world package

 -  If PR Service is not enabled, the build system replaces the
   ``AUTOINC`` placeholder with zero (i.e. "0"). This results in
@@ -290,8 +305,8 @@ with a number. The number used depends on the state of the PR Service:

   .. code-block:: none

-      hello-world-git_0.0+git0+b6558dd387-r0.0_armv7a-neon.ipk
-      hello-world-git_0.0+git0+dd2f5c3565-r0.0_armv7a-neon.ipk
+      hello-world-git_1.0+git0+b6558dd387-r0_armv7a-neon.ipk
+      hello-world-git_1.0+git0+dd2f5c3565-r0_armv7a-neon.ipk

 In summary, the OpenEmbedded build system does not track the history of
 binary package versions for this purpose. ``AUTOINC``, in this case, is
--- a/documentation/dev-manual/security-subjects.rst
+++ b/documentation/dev-manual/security-subjects.rst
@@ -1,194 +0,0 @@
-.. SPDX-License-Identifier: CC-BY-SA-2.0-UK
-
-Dealing with Vulnerability Reports
-**********************************
-
-The Yocto Project and OpenEmbedded are open-source, community-based projects
-used in numerous products. They assemble multiple other open-source projects,
-and need to handle security issues and practices both internal (in the code
-maintained by both projects), and external (maintained by other projects and
-organizations).
-
-This manual assembles security-related information concerning the whole
-ecosystem. It includes information on reporting a potential security issue,
-the operation of the YP Security team and how to contribute in the
-related code. It is written to be useful for both security researchers and
-YP developers.
-
-How to report a potential security vulnerability?
-=================================================
-
-If you would like to report a public issue (for example, one with a released
-CVE number), please report it using the
-:yocto_bugs:`Security Bugzilla </enter_bug.cgi?product=Security>`.
-
-If you are dealing with a not-yet-released issue, or an urgent one, please send
-a message to security AT yoctoproject DOT org, including as many details as
-possible: the layer or software module affected, the recipe and its version,
-and any example code, if available. This mailing list is monitored by the
-Yocto Project Security team.
-
-For each layer, you might also look for specific instructions (if any) for
-reporting potential security issues in the specific ``SECURITY.md`` file at the
-root of the repository. Instructions on how and where submit a patch are
-usually available in ``README.md``. If this is your first patch to the
-Yocto Project/OpenEmbedded, you might want to have a look into the
-Contributor's Manual section
-":ref:`contributor-guide/submit-changes:preparing changes for submission`".
-
-Branches maintained with security fixes
---------------------------------------
-
-See the
-:ref:`Release process <ref-manual/release-process:Stable Release Process>`
-documentation for details regarding the policies and maintenance of stable
-branches.
-
-The :yocto_home:`Releases </development/releases/>` page contains a list of all
-releases of the Yocto Project, grouped into current and previous releases.
-Previous releases are no longer actively maintained with security patches, but
-well-tested patches may still be accepted for them for significant issues.
-
-Security-related discussions at the Yocto Project
-------------------------------------------------
-
-We have set up two security-related emails/mailing lists:
-
-  -  Public Mailing List: yocto [dash] security [at] yoctoproject[dot] org
-
-     This is a public mailing list for anyone to subscribe to. This list is an
-     open list to discuss public security issues/patches and security-related
-     initiatives. For more information, including subscription information,
-     please see the  :yocto_lists:`yocto-security mailing list info page
-     </g/yocto-security>`.
-
-     This list requires moderator approval for new topics to be posted, to avoid
-     private security reports to be posted by mistake.
-
-  -  Yocto Project Security Team: security [at] yoctoproject [dot] org
-
-     This is an email for reporting non-published potential vulnerabilities.
-     Emails sent to this address are forwarded to the Yocto Project Security
-     Team members.
-
-
-What you should do if you find a security vulnerability
-------------------------------------------------------
-
-If you find a security flaw: a crash, an information leakage, or anything that
-can have a security impact if exploited in any Open Source software built or
-used by the Yocto Project, please report this to the Yocto Project Security
-Team. If you prefer to contact the upstream project directly, please send a
-copy to the security team at the Yocto Project as well. If you believe this is
-highly sensitive information, please report the vulnerability in a secure way,
-i.e. encrypt the email and send it to the private list. This ensures that
-the exploit is not leaked and exploited before a response/fix has been generated.
-
-Security team
-=============
-
-The Yocto Project/OpenEmbedded security team coordinates the work on security
-subjects in the project. All general discussion takes place publicly. The
-Security Team only uses confidential communication tools to deal with private
-vulnerability reports before they are released.
-
-Security team appointment
-------------------------
-
-The Yocto Project Security Team consists of at least three members. When new
-members are needed, the Yocto Project Technical Steering Committee (YP TSC)
-asks for nominations by public channels including a nomination deadline.
-Self-nominations are possible. When the limit time is
-reached, the YP TSC posts the list of candidates for the comments of project
-participants and developers. Comments may be sent publicly or privately to the
-YP and OE TSCs. The candidates are approved by both YP TSC and OpenEmbedded
-Technical Steering Committee (OE TSC) and the final list of the team members
-is announced publicly. The aim is to have people representing technical
-leadership, security knowledge and infrastructure present with enough people
-to provide backup/coverage but keep the notification list small enough to
-minimize information risk and maintain trust.
-
-YP Security Team members may resign at any time.
-
-Security Team Operations
------------------------
-
-The work of the Security Team might require high confidentiality. Team members
-are individuals selected by merit and do not represent the companies they work
-for. They do not share information about confidential issues outside of the team
-and do not hint about ongoing embargoes.
-
-Team members can bring in domain experts as needed. Those people should be
-added to individual issues only and adhere to the same standards as the YP
-Security Team.
-
-The YP security team organizes its meetings and communication as needed.
-
-When the YP Security team receives a report about a potential security
-vulnerability, they quickly analyze and notify the reporter of the result.
-They might also request more information.
-
-If the issue is confirmed and affects the code maintained by the YP, they
-confidentially notify maintainers of that code and work with them to prepare
-a fix.
-
-If the issue is confirmed and affects an upstream project, the YP security team
-notifies the project. Usually, the upstream project analyzes the problem again.
-If they deem it a real security problem in their software, they develop and
-release a fix following their security policy. They may want to include the
-original reporter in the loop. There is also sometimes some coordination for
-handling patches, backporting patches etc, or just understanding the problem
-or what caused it.
-
-When the fix is publicly available, the YP security team member or the
-package maintainer sends patches against the YP code base, following usual
-procedures, including public code review.
-
-What Yocto Security Team does when it receives a security vulnerability
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-The YP Security Team team performs a quick analysis and would usually report
-the flaw to the upstream project. Normally the upstream project analyzes the
-problem. If they deem it a real security problem in their software, they
-develop and release a fix following their own security policy. They may want
-to include the original reporter in the loop. There is also sometimes some
-coordination for handling patches, backporting patches etc, or just
-understanding the problem or what caused it.
-
-The security policy of the upstream project might include a notification to
-Linux distributions or other important downstream projects in advance to
-discuss coordinated disclosure. These mailing lists are normally non-public.
-
-When the upstream project releases a version with the fix, they are responsible
-for contacting `Mitre <https://www.cve.org/>`__ to get a CVE number assigned and
-the CVE record published.
-
-If an upstream project does not respond quickly
-----------------------------------------------
-
-If an upstream project does not fix the problem in a reasonable time,
-the Yocto's Security Team will contact other interested parties (usually
-other distributions) in the community and together try to solve the
-vulnerability as quickly as possible.
-
-The Yocto Project Security team adheres to the 90 days disclosure policy
-by default. An increase of the embargo time is possible when necessary.
-
-Current Security Team members
-----------------------------
-
-For secure communications, please send your messages encrypted using the GPG
-keys. Remember, message headers are not encrypted so do not include sensitive
-information in the subject line.
-
-  -  Ross Burton: <ross@burtonini.com> `Public key <https://keys.openpgp.org/search?q=ross%40burtonini.com>`__
-
-  -  Michael Halstead: <mhalstead [at] linuxfoundation [dot] org>
-     `Public key <https://pgp.mit.edu/pks/lookup?op=vindex&search=0x3373170601861969>`__
-     or `Public key <https://keyserver.ubuntu.com/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0xd1f2407285e571ed12a407a73373170601861969>`__
-
-  -  Richard Purdie: <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org> `Public key <https://keys.openpgp.org/search?q=richard.purdie%40linuxfoundation.org>`__
-
-  -  Marta Rybczynska: <marta DOT rybczynska [at] syslinbit [dot] com> `Public key <https://keys.openpgp.org/search?q=marta.rybczynska@syslinbit.com>`__
-
-  -  Steve Sakoman: <steve [at] sakoman [dot] com> `Public key <https://keys.openpgp.org/search?q=steve%40sakoman.com>`__
--- a/documentation/index.rst
+++ b/documentation/index.rst
@@ -20,7 +20,6 @@ Welcome to the Yocto Project Documentation
   Yocto Project Software Overview <https://www.yoctoproject.org/software-overview/>
   Tips and Tricks Wiki <https://wiki.yoctoproject.org/wiki/TipsAndTricks>

-
 .. toctree::
   :maxdepth: 1
   :caption: Manuals
@@ -37,6 +36,12 @@ Welcome to the Yocto Project Documentation
   Test Environment Manual <test-manual/index>
   bitbake

+.. toctree::
+   :maxdepth: 1
+   :caption: Security
+
+   Yocto Project Security Reference <security-reference/index>
+
 .. toctree::
   :maxdepth: 1
   :caption: Release Manuals
--- a/documentation/migration-guides/release-4.0.rst
+++ b/documentation/migration-guides/release-4.0.rst
@@ -38,3 +38,4 @@ Release 4.0 (kirkstone)
   release-notes-4.0.29
   release-notes-4.0.30
   release-notes-4.0.31
+   release-notes-4.0.32
--- a/documentation/migration-guides/release-notes-4.0.32.rst
+++ b/documentation/migration-guides/release-notes-4.0.32.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
+Release notes for Yocto-4.0.32 (Kirkstone)
+------------------------------------------
+
+Security Fixes in Yocto-4.0.32
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+-  bind: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-8677`, :cve_nist:`2025-40778` and :cve_nist:`2025-40780`
+-  binutils: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-11412` and :cve_nist:`2025-11413`
+-  curl: Ignore :cve_nist:`2025-10966`
+-  elfutils: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-1376` and :cve_nist:`2025-1377`
+-  gnutls: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-9820`
+-  go: Fix :cve_nist:`2024-24783`, :cve_nist:`2025-58187`, :cve_nist:`2025-58189`,
+   :cve_nist:`2025-61723` and :cve_nist:`2025-61724`
+-  libarchive: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-60753`
+-  libarchive: Fix 2 security issue (https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/pull/2753 and
+   https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/pull/2768)
+-  libpng: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-64505`, :cve_nist:`2025-64506`, :cve_nist:`2025-64720`,
+   :cve_nist:`2025-65018` and :cve_nist:`2025-66293`
+-  libxml2: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-7425`
+-  musl: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-26519`
+-  openssh: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-61984` and :cve_nist:`2025-61985`
+-  python3-idna: Fix :cve_nist:`2024-3651`
+-  python3-urllib3: Fix :cve_nist:`2024-37891`
+-  python3: fix :cve_nist:`2025-6075`
+-  ruby: Fix :cve_nist:`2024-35176`, :cve_nist:`2024-39908` and :cve_nist:`2024-41123`
+-  rust-cross-canadian: Ignore :cve_nist:`2024-43402`
+-  u-boot: Fix :cve_nist:`2024-42040`
+-  wpa-supplicant: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-24912`
+-  xserver-xorg: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-62229`, :cve_nist:`2025-62230` and :cve_nist:`2025-62231`
+-  xwayland: Fix :cve_nist:`2025-62229`, :cve_nist:`2025-62230` and :cve_nist:`2025-62231`
+
+
+Fixes in Yocto-4.0.32
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+-  babeltrace2: fetch with https protocol
+-  bind: upgrade to 9.18.41
+-  build-appliance-image: Update to kirkstone head revision
+-  dev-manual/layers.rst: document "bitbake-layers show-machines"
+-  dev-manual/new-recipe.rst: replace 'bitbake -e' with 'bitbake-getvar'
+-  dev-manual/new-recipe.rst: typo, "whith" -> "which"
+-  dev-manual/new-recipe.rst: update "recipetool -h" output
+-  dev-manual: debugging: use bitbake-getvar in Viewing Variable Values section
+-  documentation: link to the Releases page on yoctoproject.org instead of wiki
+-  efibootmgr: update :term:`SRC_URI` branch
+-  flac: patch seeking bug
+-  goarch.bbclass: do not leak :term:`TUNE_FEATURES` into crosssdk task signatures
+-  kernel-dev: add disable config example
+-  kernel-dev: common: migrate bitbake -e to bitbake-getvar
+-  libmicrohttpd: disable experimental code by default
+-  migration-guides: add release notes for 4.0.31
+-  oe-build-perf-report: relax metadata matching rules
+-  overview-manual: migrate to SVG + fix typo
+-  poky.conf: bump version for 4.0.32
+-  python3-urllib3: upgrade to 1.26.20
+-  recipes: Don't use ftp.gnome.org
+-  ref-manual: variables: migrate the :term:`OVERRIDES` note to bitbake-getvar
+-  systemd-bootchart: update :term:`SRC_URI` branch
+-  xf86-video-intel: correct :term:`SRC_URI` as freedesktop anongit is down
+
+
+Known Issues in Yocto-4.0.32
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+- N/A
+
+
+Contributors to Yocto-4.0.32
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+Thanks to the following people who contributed to this release:
+
+-  Alexander Kanavin
+-  Archana Polampalli
+-  Divya Chellam
+-  Gyorgy Sarvari
+-  Hitendra Prajapati
+-  Hongxu Jia
+-  Jason Schonberg
+-  Lee Chee Yang
+-  Peter Marko
+-  Praveen Kumar
+-  Quentin Schulz
+-  Richard Purdie
+-  Robert P. J. Day
+-  Ross Burton
+-  Saquib Iltaf
+-  Soumya Sambu
+-  Steve Sakoman
+-  Vijay Anusuri
+-  Walter Werner SCHNEIDER
+
+
+Repositories / Downloads for Yocto-4.0.32
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+yocto-docs
+
+-  Repository Location: :yocto_git:`/yocto-docs`
+-  Branch: :yocto_git:`kirkstone </yocto-docs/log/?h=kirkstone>`
+-  Tag:  :yocto_git:`yocto-4.0.32 </yocto-docs/log/?h=yocto-4.0.32>`
+-  Git Revision: :yocto_git:`4b9df539fa06fb19ed8b51ef2d46e5c56779de81 </yocto-docs/commit/?id=4b9df539fa06fb19ed8b51ef2d46e5c56779de81>`
+-  Release Artefact: yocto-docs-4b9df539fa06fb19ed8b51ef2d46e5c56779de81
+-  sha: 70ee2caf576683c5f31ac5a592cde1c0650ece25cfcd5ff3cc7eedf531575611
+-  Download Locations:
+
+   https://downloads.yoctoproject.org/releases/yocto/yocto-4.0.32/yocto-docs-4b9df539fa06fb19ed8b51ef2d46e5c56779de81.tar.bz2
+
+   https://mirrors.edge.kernel.org/yocto/yocto/yocto-4.0.32/yocto-docs-4b9df539fa06fb19ed8b51ef2d46e5c56779de81.tar.bz2
+
+poky
+
+-  Repository Location: :yocto_git:`/poky`
+-  Branch: :yocto_git:`kirkstone </poky/log/?h=kirkstone>`
+-  Tag:  :yocto_git:`yocto-4.0.32 </poky/log/?h=yocto-4.0.32>`
+-  Git Revision: :yocto_git:`2c05660b21c7cc1082aeac8b75d8a2d82e249f63 </poky/commit/?id=2c05660b21c7cc1082aeac8b75d8a2d82e249f63>`
+-  Release Artefact: poky-2c05660b21c7cc1082aeac8b75d8a2d82e249f63
+-  sha: d7a55a18a597a7b140a81586b7ca6379c208ebbb3285de36c48fde10882947d8
+-  Download Locations:
+
+   https://downloads.yoctoproject.org/releases/yocto/yocto-4.0.32/poky-2c05660b21c7cc1082aeac8b75d8a2d82e249f63.tar.bz2
+
+   https://mirrors.edge.kernel.org/yocto/yocto/yocto-4.0.32/poky-2c05660b21c7cc1082aeac8b75d8a2d82e249f63.tar.bz2
+
+openembedded-core
+
+-  Repository Location: :oe_git:`/openembedded-core`
+-  Branch: :oe_git:`kirkstone </openembedded-core/log/?h=kirkstone>`
+-  Tag:  :oe_git:`yocto-4.0.32 </openembedded-core/log/?h=yocto-4.0.32>`
+-  Git Revision: :oe_git:`2ed3f8b938579dbbb804e04c45a968cc57761db7 </openembedded-core/commit/?id=2ed3f8b938579dbbb804e04c45a968cc57761db7>`
+-  Release Artefact: oecore-2ed3f8b938579dbbb804e04c45a968cc57761db7
+-  sha: 11b9632586dfbf3f0ef69eca2014a8002f25ca8d53cfe9424e27361ba3a20831
+-  Download Locations:
+
+   https://downloads.yoctoproject.org/releases/yocto/yocto-4.0.32/oecore-2ed3f8b938579dbbb804e04c45a968cc57761db7.tar.bz2
+
+   https://mirrors.edge.kernel.org/yocto/yocto/yocto-4.0.32/oecore-2ed3f8b938579dbbb804e04c45a968cc57761db7.tar.bz2
+
+meta-yocto
+
+-  Repository Location: :yocto_git:`/meta-yocto`
+-  Branch: :yocto_git:`kirkstone </meta-yocto/log/?h=kirkstone>`
+-  Tag:  :yocto_git:`yocto-4.0.32 </meta-yocto/log/?h=yocto-4.0.32>`
+-  Git Revision: :yocto_git:`77b40877c179ea3ce5c37c7ba1831e9c0e289266 </meta-yocto/commit/?id=77b40877c179ea3ce5c37c7ba1831e9c0e289266>`
+-  Release Artefact: meta-yocto-77b40877c179ea3ce5c37c7ba1831e9c0e289266
+-  sha: e908d42690881cd6e07b9ca18a21eb8761a0ec72d940b12905622e75ba913974
+-  Download Locations:
+
+   https://downloads.yoctoproject.org/releases/yocto/yocto-4.0.32/meta-yocto-77b40877c179ea3ce5c37c7ba1831e9c0e289266.tar.bz2
+
+   https://mirrors.edge.kernel.org/yocto/yocto/yocto-4.0.32/meta-yocto-77b40877c179ea3ce5c37c7ba1831e9c0e289266.tar.bz2
+
+meta-mingw
+
+-  Repository Location: :yocto_git:`/meta-mingw`
+-  Branch: :yocto_git:`kirkstone </meta-mingw/log/?h=kirkstone>`
+-  Tag:  :yocto_git:`yocto-4.0.32 </meta-mingw/log/?h=yocto-4.0.32>`
+-  Git Revision: :yocto_git:`87c22abb1f11be430caf4372e6b833dc7d77564e </meta-mingw/commit/?id=87c22abb1f11be430caf4372e6b833dc7d77564e>`
+-  Release Artefact: meta-mingw-87c22abb1f11be430caf4372e6b833dc7d77564e
+-  sha: f0bc4873e2e0319fb9d6d6ab9b98eb3f89664d4339a167d2db6a787dd12bc1a8
+-  Download Locations:
+
+   https://downloads.yoctoproject.org/releases/yocto/yocto-4.0.32/meta-mingw-87c22abb1f11be430caf4372e6b833dc7d77564e.tar.bz2
+
+   https://mirrors.edge.kernel.org/yocto/yocto/yocto-4.0.32/meta-mingw-87c22abb1f11be430caf4372e6b833dc7d77564e.tar.bz2
+
+meta-gplv2
+
+-  Repository Location: :yocto_git:`/meta-gplv2`
+-  Branch: :yocto_git:`kirkstone </meta-gplv2/log/?h=kirkstone>`
+-  Tag:  :yocto_git:`yocto-4.0.32 </meta-gplv2/log/?h=yocto-4.0.32>`
+-  Git Revision: :yocto_git:`d2f8b5cdb285b72a4ed93450f6703ca27aa42e8a </meta-gplv2/commit/?id=d2f8b5cdb285b72a4ed93450f6703ca27aa42e8a>`
+-  Release Artefact: meta-gplv2-d2f8b5cdb285b72a4ed93450f6703ca27aa42e8a
+-  sha: c386f59f8a672747dc3d0be1d4234b6039273d0e57933eb87caa20f56b9cca6d
+-  Download Locations:
+
+   https://downloads.yoctoproject.org/releases/yocto/yocto-4.0.32/meta-gplv2-d2f8b5cdb285b72a4ed93450f6703ca27aa42e8a.tar.bz2
+
+   https://mirrors.edge.kernel.org/yocto/yocto/yocto-4.0.32/meta-gplv2-d2f8b5cdb285b72a4ed93450f6703ca27aa42e8a.tar.bz2
+
+bitbake
+
+-  Repository Location: :oe_git:`/bitbake`
+-  Branch: :oe_git:`2.0 </bitbake/log/?h=2.0>`
+-  Tag:  :oe_git:`yocto-4.0.32 </bitbake/log/?h=yocto-4.0.32>`
+-  Git Revision: :oe_git:`8e2d1f8de055549b2101614d85454fcd1d0f94b2 </bitbake/commit/?id=8e2d1f8de055549b2101614d85454fcd1d0f94b2>`
+-  Release Artefact: bitbake-8e2d1f8de055549b2101614d85454fcd1d0f94b2
+-  sha: fad4e7699bae62082118e89785324b031b0af0743064caee87c91ba28549afb0
+-  Download Locations:
+
+   https://downloads.yoctoproject.org/releases/yocto/yocto-4.0.32/bitbake-8e2d1f8de055549b2101614d85454fcd1d0f94b2.tar.bz2
+
+   https://mirrors.edge.kernel.org/yocto/yocto/yocto-4.0.32/bitbake-8e2d1f8de055549b2101614d85454fcd1d0f94b2.tar.bz2
+
--- a/documentation/overview-manual/concepts.rst
+++ b/documentation/overview-manual/concepts.rst
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ The following diagram represents the high-level workflow of a build. The
 remainder of this section expands on the fundamental input, output,
 process, and metadata logical blocks that make up the workflow.

-.. image:: figures/YP-flow-diagram.png
+.. image:: svg/yp-flow-diagram.*
   :align: center

 In general, the build's workflow consists of several functional areas:
--- a/documentation/overview-manual/figures/YP-flow-diagram.png
+++ b/documentation/overview-manual/figures/YP-flow-diagram.png
--- a/documentation/overview-manual/svg/yp-flow-diagram.svg
+++ b/documentation/overview-manual/svg/yp-flow-diagram.svg
@@ -0,0 +1,950 @@
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
+<!-- Generator: Adobe Illustrator 13.0.2, SVG Export Plug-In . SVG Version: 6.00 Build 14948)  -->
+
+<svg
+   version="1.1"
+   id="Layer_1"
+   x="0px"
+   y="0px"
+   width="760.50098"
+   height="352.582"
+   viewBox="0 0 760.50095 352.582"
+   enable-background="new 0 0 758.189 424.276"
+   xml:space="preserve"
+   sodipodi:docname="yp-flow-diagram.svg"
+   inkscape:version="1.4.3 (0d15f75042, 2025-12-25)"
+   xmlns:inkscape="http://www.inkscape.org/namespaces/inkscape"
+   xmlns:sodipodi="http://sodipodi.sourceforge.net/DTD/sodipodi-0.dtd"
+   xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"
+   xmlns:svg="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"><defs
+   id="defs86">
+		
+	</defs><sodipodi:namedview
+   id="namedview86"
+   pagecolor="#ffffff"
+   bordercolor="#000000"
+   borderopacity="0.25"
+   inkscape:showpageshadow="2"
+   inkscape:pageopacity="0.0"
+   inkscape:pagecheckerboard="0"
+   inkscape:deskcolor="#d1d1d1"
+   inkscape:zoom="2.8284271"
+   inkscape:cx="296.80807"
+   inkscape:cy="212.83914"
+   inkscape:window-width="1906"
+   inkscape:window-height="934"
+   inkscape:window-x="0"
+   inkscape:window-y="0"
+   inkscape:window-maximized="0"
+   inkscape:current-layer="Layer_1" />
+<g
+   id="g17"
+   transform="matrix(1,0,0,1.0035497,-2.0824824,-11.037238)"><rect
+     style="opacity:1;fill:#00b6de;fill-opacity:1;stroke:#ff631a;stroke-width:0;stroke-linejoin:bevel;stroke-miterlimit:0;stroke-dasharray:none"
+     id="rect11"
+     width="484.25"
+     height="249"
+     x="90"
+     y="112.5" /><rect
+     style="fill:#00b6de;fill-opacity:1;stroke:#ff631a;stroke-width:0;stroke-linejoin:bevel;stroke-miterlimit:0;stroke-dasharray:none"
+     id="rect11-8"
+     width="12"
+     height="12"
+     x="507.56818"
+     y="-301.10004"
+     ry="0"
+     transform="rotate(44.313856)" /><rect
+     style="fill:#e6e6e6;fill-opacity:1;stroke:#ff631a;stroke-width:0;stroke-linejoin:bevel;stroke-miterlimit:0;stroke-dasharray:none"
+     id="rect11-8-1"
+     width="12"
+     height="12"
+     x="361.46231"
+     y="-89.463524"
+     ry="0"
+     transform="rotate(44.313856)" /><rect
+     style="fill:#e6e6e6;fill-opacity:1;stroke:#ff631a;stroke-width:0;stroke-linejoin:bevel;stroke-miterlimit:0;stroke-dasharray:none"
+     id="rect11-8-1-1"
+     width="12"
+     height="12"
+     x="389.40585"
+     y="-60.842598"
+     ry="0"
+     transform="rotate(44.313856)" /><rect
+     style="fill:#e6e6e6;fill-opacity:1;stroke:#ff631a;stroke-width:0;stroke-linejoin:bevel;stroke-miterlimit:0;stroke-dasharray:none"
+     id="rect11-8-1-1-0"
+     width="12"
+     height="12"
+     x="416.47607"
+     y="-33.116081"
+     ry="0"
+     transform="rotate(44.313856)" /></g><rect
+   style="fill:#e6e6e6;fill-opacity:1;stroke:#ff631a;stroke-width:0;stroke-linejoin:bevel;stroke-miterlimit:0;stroke-dasharray:none"
+   id="rect11-9"
+   width="87"
+   height="216"
+   x="193.91776"
+   y="119.24599" /><rect
+   style="fill:#e6e6e6;fill-opacity:1;stroke:#ff631a;stroke-width:0;stroke-linejoin:bevel;stroke-miterlimit:0;stroke-dasharray:none"
+   id="rect11-8-1-4"
+   width="12"
+   height="12"
+   x="487.27533"
+   y="-296.15897"
+   ry="0"
+   transform="rotate(44.313856)" /><rect
+   style="fill:#e6e6e6;fill-opacity:1;stroke:#ff631a;stroke-width:0;stroke-linejoin:bevel;stroke-miterlimit:0;stroke-dasharray:none"
+   id="rect11-9-3"
+   width="85.75"
+   height="219.75"
+   x="470.16751"
+   y="119.49599" /><g
+   id="g2"
+   transform="translate(2.3119996,-71.694)">
+	<g
+   id="g1">
+		<polygon
+   fill="#00b6de"
+   points="703.77,340.194 712.852,349.277 721.934,340.194 758.189,340.194 758.189,256.861 723.582,256.861 713.171,267.274 702.758,256.861 628.582,256.861 618.171,267.274 607.758,256.861 561.523,256.861 561.523,340.194 609.104,340.194 618.186,349.277 627.268,340.194 "
+   id="polygon1" />
+	</g>
+</g>
+<g
+   id="g4"
+   transform="translate(2.3119996,-71.694)">
+	<g
+   id="g3">
+		<polygon
+   fill="#e6e6e6"
+   points="712.837,278.274 707.221,272.658 676.557,272.658 676.557,333.657 706.983,333.657 713.055,339.729 719.128,333.657 751.557,333.657 751.557,272.658 718.452,272.658 "
+   id="polygon2" />
+	</g>
+</g>
+<g
+   id="g6"
+   transform="translate(2.3119996,-71.694)">
+	<g
+   id="g5">
+		<polygon
+   fill="#e6e6e6"
+   points="618.171,278.274 611.555,271.658 581.558,271.658 581.558,332.657 611.983,332.657 618.056,338.729 624.128,332.657 656.558,332.657 656.558,271.658 624.786,271.658 "
+   id="polygon4" />
+	</g>
+</g>
+<g
+   id="g8"
+   transform="translate(2.3119996,-71.694)"
+   style="fill:#000080">
+	<g
+   id="g7"
+   style="fill:#000080">
+		<polygon
+   fill="#ed1849"
+   points="722.166,349.277 712.504,358.941 702.84,349.277 670.523,349.277 670.523,424.276 757.523,424.276 757.523,349.277 "
+   id="polygon6"
+   style="fill:#000080" />
+	</g>
+</g>
+<g
+   id="g10"
+   transform="translate(2.3119996,-71.694)"
+   style="fill:#000080">
+	<g
+   id="g9"
+   style="fill:#000080">
+		<polygon
+   fill="#ed1849"
+   points="628.371,348.611 618.043,358.941 607.713,348.611 575.523,348.611 575.523,423.61 662.523,423.61 662.523,348.611 "
+   id="polygon8"
+   style="fill:#000080" />
+	</g>
+</g>
+
+<g
+   id="g14"
+   transform="translate(2.3119996,-71.694)">
+	<g
+   id="g13">
+		<polygon
+   fill="#c1d82f"
+   points="575.428,217.35 575.428,250.526 610.09,250.526 618.171,258.607 626.251,250.526 705.09,250.526 713.171,258.607 721.251,250.526 757.427,250.526 757.427,173.527 575.428,173.527 575.428,199.703 584.252,208.525 "
+   id="polygon12" />
+	</g>
+</g>
+
+
+
+
+
+<g
+   id="g26"
+   transform="translate(0.4155534,-73.944)">
+	<g
+   id="g25">
+		<polygon
+   fill="#4a4a30"
+   points="177.974,133.944 125.111,133.944 118.043,141.013 110.974,133.944 86.834,133.944 86.834,166.944 178.263,166.944 184.834,173.514 191.403,166.944 281.833,166.944 281.833,133.944 258.611,133.944 251.543,141.013 244.474,133.944 192.111,133.944 185.043,141.013 "
+   id="polygon24" />
+	</g>
+</g>
+<g
+   id="g28"
+   transform="matrix(0.93986241,0,0,1,-22.331287,-17.694)">
+	<g
+   id="g27">
+		<polygon
+   fill="#e6e6e6"
+   points="330.188,290.202 330.188,296.444 511.188,296.444 511.188,289.015 517.259,282.942 511.188,276.87 511.188,268.444 330.188,268.444 330.188,277.683 336.447,283.942 "
+   id="polygon26" />
+	</g>
+</g>
+<g
+   id="g30"
+   transform="matrix(0.93986241,0,0,1,-22.331287,-17.694)">
+	<g
+   id="g29">
+		<polygon
+   fill="#e6e6e6"
+   points="330.188,251.536 330.188,257.944 511.188,257.944 511.188,250.515 517.259,244.442 511.188,238.37 511.188,229.944 330.188,229.944 330.188,239.016 336.447,245.276 "
+   id="polygon28" />
+	</g>
+</g>
+<g
+   id="g32"
+   transform="matrix(0.93986241,0,0,1,-22.331287,-17.694)">
+	<g
+   id="g31">
+		<polygon
+   fill="#e6e6e6"
+   points="330.188,211.18 330.188,218.444 511.188,218.444 511.188,211.015 517.259,204.942 511.188,198.87 511.188,190.444 330.188,190.444 330.188,199.372 336.092,205.276 "
+   id="polygon30" />
+	</g>
+</g>
+<g
+   id="g34"
+   transform="translate(-40.188,-71.694)">
+	<g
+   id="g33">
+		<polygon
+   fill="#e6e6e6"
+   points="144.188,342.944 144.188,406.944 225.188,406.944 225.188,381.515 231.259,375.442 225.188,369.37 225.188,342.944 190.445,342.944 184.043,349.348 177.639,342.944 "
+   id="polygon32" />
+	</g>
+</g>
+<g
+   id="g36"
+   transform="translate(-40.188,-71.694)">
+	<g
+   id="g35">
+		<polygon
+   fill="#e6e6e6"
+   points="177.618,330.944 184.188,337.514 190.757,330.944 225.188,330.944 225.188,266.944 190.778,266.944 183.71,274.014 176.64,266.944 144.188,266.944 144.188,330.944 "
+   id="polygon34" />
+	</g>
+</g>
+<g
+   id="g38"
+   transform="translate(-40.188,-71.694)">
+	<g
+   id="g37">
+		<polygon
+   fill="#e6e6e6"
+   points="177.118,254.944 183.688,261.514 190.257,254.944 224.688,254.944 224.688,190.944 191.445,190.944 184.376,198.014 177.306,190.944 143.688,190.944 143.688,254.944 "
+   id="polygon36" />
+	</g>
+</g>
+<g
+   id="g40"
+   transform="matrix(1,0,0,0.86327911,0.062,-77.645148)">
+	<g
+   id="g39">
+		<polygon
+   fill="#4a4a30"
+   points="81.188,221.611 0.188,221.611 0.188,285.61 81.188,285.61 81.188,260.181 87.259,254.109 81.188,248.037 "
+   id="polygon38" />
+	</g>
+</g><g
+   id="g40-0"
+   transform="matrix(1,0,0,0.86327911,0.312,-18.368819)">
+	<g
+   id="g39-6">
+		<polygon
+   fill="#4a4a30"
+   points="87.259,254.109 81.188,248.037 81.188,221.611 0.188,221.611 0.188,285.61 81.188,285.61 81.188,260.181 "
+   id="polygon38-4" />
+	</g>
+</g><g
+   id="g40-0-2"
+   transform="matrix(1,0,0,0.86327911,0.062,40.907511)">
+	<g
+   id="g39-6-5">
+		<polygon
+   fill="#4a4a30"
+   points="87.259,254.109 81.188,248.037 81.188,221.611 0.188,221.611 0.188,285.61 81.188,285.61 81.188,260.181 "
+   id="polygon38-4-8" />
+	</g>
+</g><g
+   id="g40-0-28"
+   transform="matrix(1,0,0,0.86327911,-0.188,100.18384)">
+	<g
+   id="g39-6-4">
+		<polygon
+   fill="#4a4a30"
+   points="81.188,285.61 81.188,260.181 87.259,254.109 81.188,248.037 81.188,221.611 0.188,221.611 0.188,285.61 "
+   id="polygon38-4-7" />
+	</g>
+</g>
+<g
+   id="g42"
+   transform="translate(0.062,-71.944)"
+   style="fill:#ff7f2a">
+	<g
+   id="g41"
+   style="fill:#ff7f2a">
+		<polygon
+   fill="#7e8082"
+   points="178.618,123.944 185.188,130.514 191.757,123.944 215.188,123.944 215.188,71.944 154.188,71.944 154.188,123.944 "
+   id="polygon40"
+   style="fill:#ff7f2a" />
+	</g>
+</g>
+<rect
+   x="126.062"
+   y="75.334"
+   fill="none"
+   width="116.666"
+   height="21.333"
+   id="rect42" />
+<text
+   fill="#ffffff"
+   font-family="MyriadPro-Regular"
+   font-size="12px"
+   id="text42"
+   x="139.47949"
+   y="82.440079"
+   style="font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;font-stretch:normal;font-size:10.6667px;font-family:'Nimbus Sans L';-inkscape-font-specification:'Nimbus Sans L, Normal';font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal">Source Materials</text>
+<rect
+   x="155.41699"
+   y="10.834001"
+   fill="none"
+   width="58.666"
+   height="40.667"
+   id="rect43" />
+<text
+   id="text44"
+   x="190.00726"
+   y="29.10741"
+   style="font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;font-stretch:normal;font-size:10.6667px;font-family:'Nimbus Sans L';-inkscape-font-specification:'Nimbus Sans L, Normal';font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;text-align:center;text-anchor:middle;white-space:pre;inline-size:49.6985"
+   transform="translate(-5.5244746,-7.8775879)"
+   xml:space="preserve"><tspan
+     x="190.00726"
+     y="29.10741"
+     id="tspan1">Local<tspan
+   y="29.10741"
+   id="tspan2"> </tspan></tspan><tspan
+     x="190.00726"
+     y="42.440787"
+     id="tspan3">Projects</tspan></text>
+<g
+   id="g45"
+   transform="translate(0.062,-71.944)"
+   style="fill:#ff7f2a">
+	<g
+   id="g44"
+   style="fill:#ff7f2a">
+		<polygon
+   fill="#7e8082"
+   points="245.118,123.944 251.688,130.514 258.257,123.944 281.688,123.944 281.688,71.944 220.688,71.944 220.688,123.944 "
+   id="polygon44"
+   style="fill:#ff7f2a" />
+	</g>
+</g>
+<rect
+   x="221.91699"
+   y="7.8340006"
+   fill="none"
+   width="58.666"
+   height="40.667"
+   id="rect45" />
+<text
+   id="text47"
+   x="258.17291"
+   y="26.10741"
+   style="font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;font-stretch:normal;font-size:10.6667px;font-family:'Nimbus Sans L';-inkscape-font-specification:'Nimbus Sans L, Normal';font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;text-align:center;text-anchor:middle;white-space:pre;inline-size:56.5275;fill:#000000"
+   transform="translate(-6.4360358,-3.6326896)"
+   xml:space="preserve"><tspan
+     x="258.17291"
+     y="26.10741"
+     id="tspan4">SCMs<tspan
+   y="26.10741"
+   id="tspan5"> </tspan></tspan><tspan
+     x="258.17291"
+     y="39.440787"
+     id="tspan6">(optional)</tspan></text>
+<g
+   id="g48"
+   transform="translate(0.062,-71.944)"
+   style="fill:#ff7f2a">
+	<g
+   id="g47"
+   style="fill:#ff7f2a">
+		<polygon
+   fill="#7e8082"
+   points="111.618,123.944 118.188,130.514 124.757,123.944 148.188,123.944 148.188,71.944 87.188,71.944 87.188,123.944 "
+   id="polygon47"
+   style="fill:#ff7f2a" />
+	</g>
+</g>
+<rect
+   x="88.417007"
+   y="10.834001"
+   fill="none"
+   width="58.666"
+   height="40.667"
+   id="rect48" />
+<text
+   id="text49"
+   x="125.51399"
+   y="29.10741"
+   style="font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;font-stretch:normal;font-size:10.6667px;font-family:'Nimbus Sans L';-inkscape-font-specification:'Nimbus Sans L, Normal';font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;text-align:center;text-anchor:middle;white-space:pre;inline-size:64.823"
+   transform="translate(-8.2169997,-13.75401)"
+   xml:space="preserve"><tspan
+     x="125.51399"
+     y="29.10741"
+     id="tspan7">Upstream<tspan
+   y="29.10741"
+   id="tspan8"> </tspan></tspan><tspan
+     x="125.51399"
+     y="42.440787"
+     id="tspan9">Project<tspan
+   y="42.440787"
+   id="tspan10"> </tspan></tspan><tspan
+     x="125.51399"
+     y="55.774165"
+     id="tspan11">Releases</tspan></text>
+<rect
+   x="115.167"
+   y="137.084"
+   fill="none"
+   width="58.666"
+   height="40.667"
+   id="rect49" />
+<text
+   id="text51"
+   x="128.34723"
+   y="147.37112"
+   style="font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;font-stretch:normal;font-size:10.6667px;font-family:'Nimbus Sans L';-inkscape-font-specification:'Nimbus Sans L, Normal';font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal"><tspan
+     x="128.34723"
+     y="147.37112"
+     font-family="MyriadPro-Regular"
+     font-size="12px"
+     id="tspan50"
+     style="font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;font-stretch:normal;font-size:10.6667px;font-family:'Nimbus Sans L';-inkscape-font-specification:'Nimbus Sans L, Normal';font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal">Source </tspan><tspan
+     x="123.54125"
+     y="161.77113"
+     font-family="MyriadPro-Regular"
+     font-size="12px"
+     id="tspan51"
+     style="font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;font-stretch:normal;font-size:10.6667px;font-family:'Nimbus Sans L';-inkscape-font-specification:'Nimbus Sans L, Normal';font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal">Fetching</tspan></text>
+<rect
+   x="115.167"
+   y="215.08401"
+   fill="none"
+   width="58.666"
+   height="40.666"
+   id="rect51" />
+<text
+   id="text53"
+   x="131.82678"
+   y="224.31099"
+   style="font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;font-stretch:normal;font-size:10.6667px;font-family:'Nimbus Sans L';-inkscape-font-specification:'Nimbus Sans L, Normal';font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal"><tspan
+     x="131.82678"
+     y="224.31099"
+     font-family="MyriadPro-Regular"
+     font-size="12px"
+     id="tspan52"
+     style="font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;font-stretch:normal;font-size:10.6667px;font-family:'Nimbus Sans L';-inkscape-font-specification:'Nimbus Sans L, Normal';font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal">Patch </tspan><tspan
+     x="117.00081"
+     y="238.70999"
+     font-family="MyriadPro-Regular"
+     font-size="12px"
+     id="tspan53"
+     style="font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;font-stretch:normal;font-size:10.6667px;font-family:'Nimbus Sans L';-inkscape-font-specification:'Nimbus Sans L, Normal';font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal">Application</tspan></text>
+<rect
+   x="107.167"
+   y="279.08401"
+   fill="none"
+   width="74.166"
+   height="69.237"
+   id="rect53" />
+<text
+   id="text57"
+   x="149.00055"
+   y="297.35791"
+   style="font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;font-stretch:normal;font-size:10.6667px;font-family:'Nimbus Sans L';-inkscape-font-specification:'Nimbus Sans L, Normal';font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;text-align:center;text-anchor:middle;white-space:pre;inline-size:74.8743"
+   transform="translate(-3.496696,4.953096)"
+   xml:space="preserve"><tspan
+     x="149.00055"
+     y="297.35791"
+     id="tspan12">Configuration /<tspan
+   y="297.35791"
+   id="tspan13"> </tspan></tspan><tspan
+     x="149.00055"
+     y="310.69127"
+     id="tspan14">Compile</tspan></text>
+<rect
+   x="201.16699"
+   y="184.084"
+   fill="none"
+   width="74.166"
+   height="89.237"
+   id="rect57" />
+<text
+   id="text63"
+   x="221.86859"
+   y="192.60429"
+   style="font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;font-stretch:normal;font-size:10.6667px;font-family:'Nimbus Sans L';-inkscape-font-specification:'Nimbus Sans L, Normal';font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal"><tspan
+     x="221.86859"
+     y="192.60429"
+     font-family="MyriadPro-Regular"
+     font-size="12px"
+     id="tspan58"
+     style="font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;font-stretch:normal;font-size:10.6667px;font-family:'Nimbus Sans L';-inkscape-font-specification:'Nimbus Sans L, Normal';font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal">Output </tspan><tspan
+     x="211.42859"
+     y="207.0043"
+     font-family="MyriadPro-Regular"
+     font-size="12px"
+     id="tspan59"
+     style="font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;font-stretch:normal;font-size:10.6667px;font-family:'Nimbus Sans L';-inkscape-font-specification:'Nimbus Sans L, Normal';font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal">Analysis for </tspan><tspan
+     x="218.94058"
+     y="221.4043"
+     font-family="MyriadPro-Regular"
+     font-size="12px"
+     id="tspan60"
+     style="font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;font-stretch:normal;font-size:10.6667px;font-family:'Nimbus Sans L';-inkscape-font-specification:'Nimbus Sans L, Normal';font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal">package </tspan><tspan
+     x="207.54759"
+     y="235.80429"
+     font-family="MyriadPro-Regular"
+     font-size="12px"
+     id="tspan61"
+     style="font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;font-stretch:normal;font-size:10.6667px;font-family:'Nimbus Sans L';-inkscape-font-specification:'Nimbus Sans L, Normal';font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal">splitting plus </tspan><tspan
+     x="218.94058"
+     y="250.2043"
+     font-family="MyriadPro-Regular"
+     font-size="12px"
+     id="tspan62"
+     style="font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;font-stretch:normal;font-size:10.6667px;font-family:'Nimbus Sans L';-inkscape-font-specification:'Nimbus Sans L, Normal';font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal">package </tspan><tspan
+     x="207.81059"
+     y="264.60431"
+     font-family="MyriadPro-Regular"
+     font-size="12px"
+     id="tspan63"
+     style="font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;font-stretch:normal;font-size:10.6667px;font-family:'Nimbus Sans L';-inkscape-font-specification:'Nimbus Sans L, Normal';font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal">relationships</tspan></text><text
+   id="text63-1"
+   x="555.48315"
+   y="202.90402"
+   style="font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;font-stretch:normal;font-size:10.6667px;font-family:'Nimbus Sans L';-inkscape-font-specification:'Nimbus Sans L, Normal';font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;text-align:center;text-anchor:middle;white-space:pre;inline-size:31.0495"
+   transform="translate(-42.334211,23.629617)"
+   xml:space="preserve"><tspan
+     x="555.48315"
+     y="202.90402"
+     id="tspan15">QA<tspan
+   y="202.90402"
+   id="tspan16"> </tspan></tspan><tspan
+     x="555.48315"
+     y="216.2374"
+     id="tspan18">Tests</tspan></text>
+<rect
+   x="319.146"
+   y="127.084"
+   fill="none"
+   width="116.666"
+   height="21.333"
+   id="rect63" />
+<text
+   font-family="MyriadPro-Regular"
+   font-size="12px"
+   id="text64"
+   x="335.19238"
+   y="189.60429"
+   style="font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;font-stretch:normal;font-size:10.6667px;font-family:'Nimbus Sans L';-inkscape-font-specification:'Nimbus Sans L, Normal';font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal">.rpm generation</text>
+<rect
+   x="319.146"
+   y="166.584"
+   fill="none"
+   width="116.666"
+   height="21.333"
+   id="rect64" />
+<text
+   font-family="MyriadPro-Regular"
+   font-size="12px"
+   id="text65"
+   x="335.76849"
+   y="229.10429"
+   style="font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;font-stretch:normal;font-size:10.6667px;font-family:'Nimbus Sans L';-inkscape-font-specification:'Nimbus Sans L, Normal';font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal">.deb generation</text>
+<rect
+   x="319.146"
+   y="205.08401"
+   fill="none"
+   width="116.666"
+   height="21.333"
+   id="rect65" />
+<text
+   font-family="MyriadPro-Regular"
+   font-size="12px"
+   id="text66"
+   x="337.9404"
+   y="267.60391"
+   style="font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;font-stretch:normal;font-size:10.6667px;font-family:'Nimbus Sans L';-inkscape-font-specification:'Nimbus Sans L, Normal';font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal">.ipk generation</text>
+<rect
+   x="296.16699"
+   y="307.08401"
+   fill="none"
+   width="77.166"
+   height="30.237"
+   id="rect66" />
+
+<rect
+   x="299.66699"
+   y="261.08401"
+   fill="none"
+   width="71.853996"
+   height="33.664001"
+   id="rect67" />
+
+<rect
+   x="395.97998"
+   y="261.08401"
+   fill="none"
+   width="71.853996"
+   height="33.664001"
+   id="rect69" />
+
+<rect
+   x="390.66699"
+   y="307.08401"
+   fill="none"
+   width="77.166"
+   height="30.237"
+   id="rect71" />
+
+<rect
+   y="133"
+   fill="none"
+   width="81.666"
+   height="39.334"
+   id="rect73"
+   x="0.061999973" />
+<text
+   id="text75"
+   x="64.610138"
+   y="186.94585"
+   style="font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;font-stretch:normal;font-size:10.6667px;font-family:'Nimbus Sans L';-inkscape-font-specification:'Nimbus Sans L, Normal';font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;text-align:center;text-anchor:middle;white-space:pre;inline-size:66.7773"
+   transform="translate(-23.458902,-49.50401)"
+   xml:space="preserve"><tspan
+     x="64.610138"
+     y="186.94585"
+     id="tspan20"><tspan
+   style="fill:#ffffff"
+   id="tspan19">User</tspan>
+</tspan><tspan
+     x="64.610138"
+     y="200.27922"
+     id="tspan22"><tspan
+       style="fill:#ffffff"
+       id="tspan21">Configuration</tspan></tspan></text><text
+   id="text75-4"
+   x="64.610138"
+   y="186.94585"
+   style="font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;font-stretch:normal;font-size:10.6667px;font-family:'Nimbus Sans L';-inkscape-font-specification:'Nimbus Sans L, Normal';font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;text-align:center;text-anchor:middle;white-space:pre;inline-size:66.7773"
+   transform="translate(-24.603766,70.32617)"
+   xml:space="preserve"><tspan
+     x="64.610138"
+     y="186.94585"
+     id="tspan24"><tspan
+   style="fill:#ffffff"
+   id="tspan23">Machine BSP</tspan>
+</tspan><tspan
+     x="64.610138"
+     y="200.27922"
+     id="tspan26"><tspan
+       style="fill:#ffffff"
+       id="tspan25">Configuration</tspan></tspan></text><text
+   id="text75-4-6"
+   x="64.610138"
+   y="186.94585"
+   style="font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;font-stretch:normal;font-size:10.6667px;font-family:'Nimbus Sans L';-inkscape-font-specification:'Nimbus Sans L, Normal';font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;text-align:center;text-anchor:middle;white-space:pre;inline-size:66.7773"
+   transform="translate(-25.353766,128.82617)"
+   xml:space="preserve"><tspan
+     x="64.610138"
+     y="186.94585"
+     id="tspan28"><tspan
+   style="fill:#ffffff"
+   id="tspan27">Policy</tspan>
+</tspan><tspan
+     x="64.610138"
+     y="200.27922"
+     id="tspan30"><tspan
+       style="fill:#ffffff"
+       id="tspan29">Configuration</tspan></tspan></text>
+
+<rect
+   y="211.16798"
+   fill="none"
+   width="81.666"
+   height="39.333"
+   id="rect76"
+   x="0.061999973" />
+<text
+   id="text78"
+   x="70.02713"
+   y="265.4418"
+   style="font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;font-stretch:normal;font-size:10.6667px;font-family:'Nimbus Sans L';-inkscape-font-specification:'Nimbus Sans L, Normal';font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;text-align:center;text-anchor:middle;white-space:pre;inline-size:89.4625"
+   transform="translate(-28.848315,-69.549143)"
+   xml:space="preserve"><tspan
+     x="70.02713"
+     y="265.4418"
+     id="tspan32"><tspan
+       style="fill:#ffffff"
+       id="tspan31">Metadata
+</tspan></tspan><tspan
+     x="70.02713"
+     y="278.77516"
+     id="tspan34"><tspan
+       style="fill:#ffffff"
+       id="tspan33">(.bb + patches)</tspan></tspan></text>
+<rect
+   x="612.83502"
+   y="131.418"
+   fill="none"
+   width="112.186"
+   height="20.163"
+   id="rect78" />
+<text
+   font-family="MyriadPro-Regular"
+   font-size="12px"
+   id="text79"
+   x="629.87451"
+   y="142.68779"
+   style="font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;font-stretch:normal;font-size:10.6667px;font-family:'Nimbus Sans L';-inkscape-font-specification:'Nimbus Sans L, Normal';font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal">Package Feeds</text>
+<rect
+   x="579.98102"
+   y="306.25101"
+   fill="none"
+   width="81.666"
+   height="39.332001"
+   id="rect79" />
+<text
+   fill="#ffffff"
+   font-family="MyriadPro-Regular"
+   font-size="12px"
+   id="text80"
+   x="604.24854"
+   y="319.7699"
+   style="font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;font-stretch:normal;font-size:10.6667px;font-family:'Nimbus Sans L';-inkscape-font-specification:'Nimbus Sans L, Normal';font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal">Images</text>
+<rect
+   x="584.14703"
+   y="216.08499"
+   fill="none"
+   width="71.853996"
+   height="33.664001"
+   id="rect80" />
+<text
+   id="text81"
+   x="606.88434"
+   y="227.1058"
+   style="font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;font-stretch:normal;font-size:10.6667px;font-family:'Nimbus Sans L';-inkscape-font-specification:'Nimbus Sans L, Normal';font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal"><tspan
+     x="606.88434"
+     y="227.1058"
+     font-family="MyriadPro-Regular"
+     font-size="12px"
+     id="tspan80"
+     style="font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;font-stretch:normal;font-size:10.6667px;font-family:'Nimbus Sans L';-inkscape-font-specification:'Nimbus Sans L, Normal';font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal">Image </tspan><tspan
+     x="594.48834"
+     y="241.50479"
+     font-family="MyriadPro-Regular"
+     font-size="12px"
+     id="tspan81"
+     style="font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;font-stretch:normal;font-size:10.6667px;font-family:'Nimbus Sans L';-inkscape-font-specification:'Nimbus Sans L, Normal';font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal">Generation</tspan></text>
+<rect
+   x="678.83301"
+   y="215.08499"
+   fill="none"
+   width="77.166"
+   height="30.237"
+   id="rect81" />
+<text
+   id="text83"
+   x="708.21045"
+   y="228.6058"
+   style="font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;font-stretch:normal;font-size:10.6667px;font-family:'Nimbus Sans L';-inkscape-font-specification:'Nimbus Sans L, Normal';font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal"><tspan
+     x="708.21045"
+     y="228.6058"
+     font-family="MyriadPro-Regular"
+     font-size="12px"
+     id="tspan82"
+     style="font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;font-stretch:normal;font-size:10.6667px;font-family:'Nimbus Sans L';-inkscape-font-specification:'Nimbus Sans L, Normal';font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal">SDK </tspan><tspan
+     x="690.33142"
+     y="243.00479"
+     font-family="MyriadPro-Regular"
+     font-size="12px"
+     id="tspan83"
+     style="font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;font-stretch:normal;font-size:10.6667px;font-family:'Nimbus Sans L';-inkscape-font-specification:'Nimbus Sans L, Normal';font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal">Generation</tspan></text>
+<rect
+   x="379.06299"
+   y="86.834"
+   fill="none"
+   width="199.03999"
+   height="21.164"
+   id="rect83" />
+<text
+   fill="#333333"
+   font-family="MyriadPro-Regular"
+   font-size="12px"
+   id="text84"
+   x="426.28253"
+   y="26.005543"
+   style="font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:bold;font-stretch:normal;font-size:12px;font-family:'Nimbus Sans L';-inkscape-font-specification:'Nimbus Sans L, Bold';font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;fill:#333333">OpenEmbedded Architecture Workflow</text><g
+   id="g18"
+   transform="translate(-10.254525,-9.75401)"><rect
+     style="fill:#00b6de;fill-opacity:1;stroke:#ff631a;stroke-width:0;stroke-linejoin:bevel;stroke-miterlimit:0;stroke-dasharray:none"
+     id="rect11-5"
+     width="10"
+     height="9.9646282"
+     x="442.00568"
+     y="76.711205"
+     transform="matrix(1,0,0,1.0035497,0,-1.2832284)" /><text
+     fill="#333333"
+     font-family="MyriadPro-Regular"
+     font-size="12px"
+     id="text84-6"
+     x="456.48013"
+     y="84.126945"
+     style="font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:bold;font-stretch:normal;font-size:12px;font-family:'Nimbus Sans L';-inkscape-font-specification:'Nimbus Sans L, Bold';font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;fill:#333333"><tspan
+       style="font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;font-stretch:normal;font-size:9.33333px;font-family:Sans;-inkscape-font-specification:'Sans, Normal';font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal"
+       id="tspan17">Build System</tspan></text></g><g
+   id="g18-4"
+   transform="translate(-10.254525,-25.970712)"><rect
+     style="fill:#4a4a30;fill-opacity:1;stroke:#ff631a;stroke-width:0;stroke-linejoin:bevel;stroke-miterlimit:0;stroke-dasharray:none"
+     id="rect11-5-8"
+     width="10"
+     height="9.9646282"
+     x="442.00568"
+     y="76.711205"
+     transform="matrix(1,0,0,1.0035497,0,-1.2832284)" /><text
+     fill="#333333"
+     font-family="MyriadPro-Regular"
+     font-size="12px"
+     id="text84-6-0"
+     x="456.48013"
+     y="84.126945"
+     style="font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:bold;font-stretch:normal;font-size:12px;font-family:'Nimbus Sans L';-inkscape-font-specification:'Nimbus Sans L, Bold';font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;fill:#333333"><tspan
+       style="font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;font-stretch:normal;font-size:9.33333px;font-family:Sans;-inkscape-font-specification:'Sans, Normal';font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal"
+       id="tspan17-4">Metadata/Inputs</tspan></text></g><g
+   id="g18-4-9"
+   transform="translate(-10.254525,-42.187414)"><rect
+     style="fill:#ff7f2a;fill-opacity:1;stroke:#ff631a;stroke-width:0.49911493;stroke-linejoin:bevel;stroke-miterlimit:0;stroke-dasharray:none"
+     id="rect11-5-8-6"
+     width="10"
+     height="9.9646282"
+     x="442.00568"
+     y="76.711205"
+     transform="matrix(1,0,0,1.0035497,0,-1.2832284)" /><text
+     fill="#333333"
+     font-family="MyriadPro-Regular"
+     font-size="12px"
+     id="text84-6-0-1"
+     x="456.48013"
+     y="84.126945"
+     style="font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:bold;font-stretch:normal;font-size:12px;font-family:'Nimbus Sans L';-inkscape-font-specification:'Nimbus Sans L, Bold';font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;fill:#333333"><tspan
+       style="font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;font-stretch:normal;font-size:9.33333px;font-family:Sans;-inkscape-font-specification:'Sans, Normal';font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal"
+       id="tspan17-4-0">Upstream Source</tspan></text></g><g
+   id="g18-4-9-2"
+   transform="translate(101.50803,-40.934366)"><rect
+     style="fill:#c1d82f;fill-opacity:1;stroke:#ff631a;stroke-width:0;stroke-linejoin:bevel;stroke-miterlimit:0;stroke-dasharray:none"
+     id="rect11-5-8-6-2"
+     width="10"
+     height="9.9646282"
+     x="442.00568"
+     y="76.711205"
+     transform="matrix(1,0,0,1.0035497,0,-1.2832284)" /><text
+     fill="#333333"
+     font-family="MyriadPro-Regular"
+     font-size="12px"
+     id="text84-6-0-1-2"
+     x="456.48013"
+     y="84.126945"
+     style="font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:bold;font-stretch:normal;font-size:12px;font-family:'Nimbus Sans L';-inkscape-font-specification:'Nimbus Sans L, Bold';font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;fill:#333333"><tspan
+       style="font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;font-stretch:normal;font-size:9.33333px;font-family:Sans;-inkscape-font-specification:'Sans, Normal';font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal"
+       id="tspan17-4-0-0">Output Packages</tspan></text></g><g
+   id="g18-4-9-2-5"
+   transform="translate(101.50803,-24.709046)"><rect
+     style="fill:#e6e6e6;fill-opacity:1;stroke:#ff631a;stroke-width:0;stroke-linejoin:bevel;stroke-miterlimit:0;stroke-dasharray:none"
+     id="rect11-5-8-6-2-2"
+     width="10"
+     height="9.9646282"
+     x="442.00568"
+     y="76.711205"
+     transform="matrix(1,0,0,1.0035497,0,-1.2832284)" /><text
+     fill="#333333"
+     font-family="MyriadPro-Regular"
+     font-size="12px"
+     id="text84-6-0-1-2-9"
+     x="456.48013"
+     y="84.126945"
+     style="font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:bold;font-stretch:normal;font-size:12px;font-family:'Nimbus Sans L';-inkscape-font-specification:'Nimbus Sans L, Bold';font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;fill:#333333"><tspan
+       style="font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;font-stretch:normal;font-size:9.33333px;font-family:Sans;-inkscape-font-specification:'Sans, Normal';font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal"
+       id="tspan17-4-0-0-0">Process steps (tasks)</tspan></text></g><g
+   id="g18-4-9-2-5-8"
+   transform="translate(101.50803,-8.4837252)"><rect
+     style="fill:#000080;fill-opacity:1;stroke:#ff631a;stroke-width:0;stroke-linejoin:bevel;stroke-miterlimit:0;stroke-dasharray:none"
+     id="rect11-5-8-6-2-2-3"
+     width="10"
+     height="9.9646282"
+     x="442.00568"
+     y="76.711205"
+     transform="matrix(1,0,0,1.0035497,0,-1.2832284)" /><text
+     fill="#333333"
+     font-family="MyriadPro-Regular"
+     font-size="12px"
+     id="text84-6-0-1-2-9-8"
+     x="456.48013"
+     y="84.126945"
+     style="font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:bold;font-stretch:normal;font-size:12px;font-family:'Nimbus Sans L';-inkscape-font-specification:'Nimbus Sans L, Bold';font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;fill:#333333"><tspan
+       style="font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;font-stretch:normal;font-size:9.33333px;font-family:Sans;-inkscape-font-specification:'Sans, Normal';font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal"
+       id="tspan17-4-0-0-0-0">Output Imaga Data</tspan></text></g>
+
+
+<rect
+   x="675.64801"
+   y="304.91699"
+   fill="none"
+   width="81.666"
+   height="39.332001"
+   id="rect85" />
+<text
+   id="text86"
+   x="720.58508"
+   y="322.93991"
+   style="font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;font-stretch:normal;font-size:10.6667px;font-family:'Nimbus Sans L';-inkscape-font-specification:'Nimbus Sans L, Normal';font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;text-align:center;text-anchor:middle;white-space:pre;inline-size:65.518"
+   transform="translate(-2.5824824,-12.25401)"
+   xml:space="preserve"><tspan
+     x="720.58508"
+     y="322.93991"
+     id="tspan36"><tspan
+   style="fill:#ffffff"
+   id="tspan35">Application</tspan><tspan
+   y="322.93991"
+   id="tspan37"> </tspan></tspan><tspan
+     x="720.58508"
+     y="336.27327"
+     id="tspan39"><tspan
+   style="fill:#ffffff"
+   id="tspan38">Development</tspan><tspan
+   y="336.27327"
+   id="tspan40"> </tspan></tspan><tspan
+     x="720.58508"
+     y="349.60665"
+     id="tspan42"><tspan
+       style="fill:#ffffff"
+       id="tspan41">SDK</tspan></tspan></text>
+</svg>
--- a/documentation/overview-manual/yp-intro.rst
+++ b/documentation/overview-manual/yp-intro.rst
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ Here are features and advantages of the Yocto Project:
   system, software, and service vendors adopt and support the Yocto
   Project in their products and services. For a look at the Yocto
   Project community and the companies involved with the Yocto Project,
-   see the "COMMUNITY" and "ECOSYSTEM" tabs on the
+   see the "COMMUNITY" and "ABOUT" tabs on the
   :yocto_home:`Yocto Project <>` home page.

 -  *Architecture Agnostic:* Yocto Project supports Intel, ARM, MIPS,
@@ -60,10 +60,9 @@ Here are features and advantages of the Yocto Project:
   move between architectures without moving to new development
   environments. Additionally, if you have used the Yocto Project to
   create an image or application and you find yourself not able to
-   support it, commercial Linux vendors such as Wind River, Mentor
-   Graphics, Timesys, and ENEA could take it and provide ongoing
-   support. These vendors have offerings that are built using the Yocto
-   Project.
+   support it, commercial Linux vendors listed on :yocto_home:`/members/` and
+   :yocto_home:`/about/participants/` could take it and provide ongoing
+   support.

 -  *Flexibility:* Corporations use the Yocto Project many different
   ways. One example is to create an internal Linux distribution as a
@@ -734,7 +733,7 @@ The :term:`OpenEmbedded Build System` uses a "workflow" to
 accomplish image and SDK generation. The following figure overviews that
 workflow:

-.. image:: figures/YP-flow-diagram.png
+.. image:: svg/yp-flow-diagram.*
    :align: center

 Here is a brief summary of the "workflow":
@@ -760,7 +759,8 @@ Here is a brief summary of the "workflow":
   package feed that is used to create the final root file image.

 7. The build system generates the file system image and a customized
-   Extensible SDK (eSDK) for application development in parallel.
+   :doc:`SDK </sdk-manual/index>` (Software Development Kit) for application
+   development in parallel.

 For a very detailed look at this workflow, see the
 ":ref:`overview-manual/concepts:openembedded build system concepts`" section.
--- a/documentation/ref-manual/classes.rst
+++ b/documentation/ref-manual/classes.rst
@@ -1118,6 +1118,53 @@ The :ref:`ref-classes-image_types` class also handles conversion and compression
   :term:`IMAGE_FSTYPES`. This would also be similar for Virtual Box Virtual Disk
   Image ("vdi") and QEMU Copy On Write Version 2 ("qcow2") images.

+.. _ref-classes-image-container:
+
+``image-container``
+===================
+
+The :ref:`ref-classes-image-container` class is automatically inherited in
+:doc:`image </ref-manual/images>` recipes that have the ``container`` image type
+in :term:`IMAGE_FSTYPES`. It provides relevant settings to generate an image
+ready for use with an :wikipedia:`OCI <Open_Container_Initiative>`-compliant
+container management tool, such as :wikipedia:`Podman <Podman>` or
+:wikipedia:`Docker <Docker_(software)>`.
+
+.. note::
+
+   This class neither builds nor installs container management tools on the
+   target. Those tools are available in the :yocto_git:`meta-virtualization
+   </meta-virtualization>` layer.
+
+You should set the :term:`PREFERRED_PROVIDER` for the Linux kernel to
+``linux-dummy`` in a :term:`configuration file`::
+
+   PREFERRED_PROVIDER_virtual/kernel = "linux-dummy"
+
+Otherwise an error is triggered. If desired, the
+:term:`IMAGE_CONTAINER_NO_DUMMY` variable can be set to "1" to avoid triggering
+this error.
+
+The ``linux-dummy`` recipe acts as a Linux kernel recipe but builds nothing. It
+is relevant to use as the preferred Linux kernel provider in this case as a
+container image does not need to include a Linux kernel. Selecting it as the
+preferred provider for the kernel will also decrease build time.
+
+Using this class only deploys an additional ``tar.bz2`` archive to
+:term:`DEPLOY_DIR_IMAGE`. This archive can be used in a container file (a file
+typically named ``Dockerfile`` or ``Containerfile``). For example, to be used with
+:wikipedia:`Podman <Podman>` or :wikipedia:`Docker <Docker_(software)>`, the
+`container file <https://docs.docker.com/reference/dockerfile/>`__ could contain
+the following instructions:
+
+.. code-block:: dockerfile
+
+   FROM scratch
+   ADD ./image-container-qemux86-64.rootfs.tar.bz2 /
+   ENTRYPOINT /bin/sh
+
+This is suitable to build a container using our generated root filesystem image.
+
 .. _ref-classes-image-live:

 ``image-live``
--- a/documentation/ref-manual/release-process.rst
+++ b/documentation/ref-manual/release-process.rst
@@ -45,6 +45,45 @@ release process validates the content of the new branch.
   Realize that there can be patches merged onto the stable release
   branches as and when they become available.

+.. _ref-yp-development-cycle:
+
+Development Cycle
+=================
+
+As explained in the previous :ref:`ref-manual/release-process:Major and Minor
+Release Cadence` section, a new release comes out every six months.
+
+During this six-months period of time, the Yocto Project releases four
+"Milestone" releases which represent distinct points of time. The milestone
+releases are tested through the :ref:`ref-manual/release-process:Testing and
+Quality Assurance` process and helps spotting issues before the actual release
+is out.
+
+The time span between milestone releases can vary, but they are in general
+evenly spaced out during this six-months period of time.
+
+These milestone releases are tagged with a capital "M" after the future release
+tag name. For example, the milestone tags "&DISTRO_RELEASE_SERIES;M1",
+"&DISTRO_RELEASE_SERIES;M2", and "&DISTRO_RELEASE_SERIES;M3" are released before
+the actual "&DISTRO_RELEASE_SERIES;" release.
+
+.. note::
+
+   The fourth milestone (M4) is not actually released and announced, but
+   represents a point of time for the Quality Assurance team to start the
+   :ref:`ref-manual/release-process:Testing and Quality Assurance` process
+   before tagging and delivering the final release.
+
+After the third milestone release (M3), the Yocto Project enters **Feature
+Freeze**. This means that the maintainers of :term:`OpenEmbedded-Core
+(OE-Core)`, :term:`BitBake` and other core repositories stop accepting
+significant changes on the "master" branch. Changes that may be accepted are
+minor upgrades to core components and security/bug fixes.
+
+During feature freeze, a new branch is created and maintained separately to
+test new features and enhancements received from contributors, but these changes
+will only make it to the master branch after the release is out.
+
 Major Release Codenames
 =======================

--- a/documentation/ref-manual/svg/releases.svg
+++ b/documentation/ref-manual/svg/releases.svg
@@ -608,7 +608,7 @@
         style="font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:bold;font-stretch:normal;font-size:13.3333px;font-family:'Liberation Sans';-inkscape-font-specification:'Liberation Sans Bold';text-align:center;text-anchor:middle;fill:#fffefe;fill-opacity:1;stroke:none"
         id="tspan10317-2-9-1-4">4.2</tspan></text>
    <rect
-       style="opacity:1;fill:#333333;fill-opacity:1;fill-rule:evenodd;stroke:none;stroke-width:2;stroke-opacity:1"
+       style="opacity:0.5;fill:#333333;fill-opacity:1;fill-rule:evenodd;stroke:none;stroke-width:2;stroke-opacity:1"
       id="rect917-0-0-4-4-9-4-5-3-9-2-3-6"
       width="140"
       height="45.000004"
@@ -632,7 +632,7 @@
         style="font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:bold;font-stretch:normal;font-size:13.3333px;font-family:'Liberation Sans';-inkscape-font-specification:'Liberation Sans Bold';text-align:center;text-anchor:middle;fill:#fffefe;fill-opacity:1;stroke:none"
         id="tspan10317-2-9-1-4-6-5-6">5.1</tspan></text>
    <rect
-       style="fill:#333333;fill-opacity:1;fill-rule:evenodd;stroke:none;stroke-width:2;stroke-opacity:1"
+       style="fill:#333333;fill-opacity:1;fill-rule:evenodd;stroke:none;stroke-width:2;stroke-opacity:1;opacity:0.5"
       id="rect917-0-0-4-4-9-4-5-3-9-2-3-6-2"
       width="140"
       height="45.000004"
@@ -656,26 +656,26 @@
         style="font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:bold;font-stretch:normal;font-size:13.3333px;font-family:'Liberation Sans';-inkscape-font-specification:'Liberation Sans Bold';text-align:center;text-anchor:middle;fill:#fffefe;fill-opacity:1;stroke:none"
         id="tspan10317-2-9-1-4-6-5-6-9">5.2</tspan></text>
    <rect
-       style="opacity:0.75;fill:#251f32;fill-opacity:1;fill-rule:evenodd;stroke:none;stroke-width:2;stroke-opacity:1"
+       style="opacity:1;fill:#333333;fill-opacity:1;fill-rule:evenodd;stroke:none;stroke-width:2;stroke-opacity:1"
       id="rect917-0-0-4-4-9-4-5-3-9-2-3-67"
       width="140"
       height="45.000004"
-       x="1163.6425"
+       x="1223.8723"
       y="-382.27469"
       ry="2.2558987" />
    <text
       xml:space="preserve"
       style="font-weight:bold;font-size:13.3333px;line-height:125%;font-family:'Nimbus Roman';-inkscape-font-specification:'Nimbus Roman, Bold';letter-spacing:0px;word-spacing:0px;writing-mode:lr-tb;fill:#fffefe;fill-opacity:1;stroke:#000000;stroke-width:1px;stroke-linecap:butt;stroke-linejoin:miter;stroke-opacity:1"
-       x="1214.9716"
+       x="1275.2014"
       y="-363.89413"
       id="text1185-3-55-4-0-0-0-1-1-6-4-3-53"><tspan
         sodipodi:role="line"
-         x="1214.9716"
+         x="1275.2014"
         y="-363.89413"
         style="font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:bold;font-stretch:normal;font-size:13.3333px;font-family:'Liberation Sans';-inkscape-font-specification:'Liberation Sans Bold';text-align:center;text-anchor:middle;fill:#fffefe;fill-opacity:1;stroke:none"
         id="tspan957-2-8-6-3-9-7-4-2-0-5-5">Whinlatter</tspan><tspan
         sodipodi:role="line"
-         x="1214.9716"
+         x="1275.2014"
         y="-345.89746"
         style="font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:bold;font-stretch:normal;font-size:13.3333px;font-family:'Liberation Sans';-inkscape-font-specification:'Liberation Sans Bold';text-align:center;text-anchor:middle;fill:#fffefe;fill-opacity:1;stroke:none"
         id="tspan10317-2-9-1-4-6-5-6-6-6">5.3</tspan></text>
@@ -1847,7 +1847,7 @@
         x="2128.7158"
         y="-7.6722765"
         style="font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;font-stretch:normal;font-size:13.3333px;font-family:'Liberation Sans';-inkscape-font-specification:'Liberation Sans';text-align:center;text-anchor:middle;fill:#000000;fill-opacity:1;stroke:none"
-         id="tspan10317-2-9-1-4-6-5-6-6-5-9-7">Current (Apr. 25)</tspan></text>
+         id="tspan10317-2-9-1-4-6-5-6-6-5-9-7">Current (Dec. 25)</tspan></text>
    <text
       xml:space="preserve"
       style="font-weight:bold;font-size:13.3333px;line-height:125%;font-family:'Nimbus Roman';-inkscape-font-specification:'Nimbus Roman, Bold';letter-spacing:0px;word-spacing:0px;writing-mode:lr-tb;fill:#fffefe;fill-opacity:1;stroke:#000000;stroke-width:1px;stroke-linecap:butt;stroke-linejoin:miter;stroke-opacity:1"
--- a/documentation/ref-manual/variables.rst
+++ b/documentation/ref-manual/variables.rst
@@ -1102,6 +1102,12 @@ system and gives an overview of their function and contents.
      :term:`CCACHE_DISABLE` variable can be set to "1" in a recipe to disable
      `Ccache` support. This is useful when the recipe is known to not support it.

+   :term:`CCACHE_TOP_DIR`
+      When inheriting the :ref:`ref-classes-ccache` class, the
+      :term:`CCACHE_TOP_DIR` variable can be set to the location of where
+      `Ccache` stores its cache files. This directory can be shared between
+      builds.
+
   :term:`CFLAGS`
      Specifies the flags to pass to the C compiler. This variable is
      exported to an environment variable and thus made visible to the
@@ -3314,6 +3320,24 @@ system and gives an overview of their function and contents.
      variable, see the :ref:`image_types <ref-classes-image_types>`
      class file, which is ``meta/classes/image_types.bbclass``.

+   :term:`IMAGE_CONTAINER_NO_DUMMY`
+      When an image recipe has the ``container`` image type in
+      :term:`IMAGE_FSTYPES`, it expects the :term:`PREFERRED_PROVIDER` for
+      the Linux kernel (``virtual/kernel``) to be set to ``linux-dummy`` from a
+      :term:`configuration file`. Otherwise, an error is triggered.
+
+      When set to "1", the :term:`IMAGE_CONTAINER_NO_DUMMY` variable allows the
+      :term:`PREFERRED_PROVIDER` variable to be set to another value, thus
+      skipping the check and not triggering the build error. Any other value
+      will keep the check.
+
+      This variable should be set from the image recipe using the ``container``
+      image type.
+
+      See the documentation of the :ref:`ref-classes-image-container` class for
+      more information on why setting the :term:`PREFERRED_PROVIDER` to
+      ``linux-dummy`` is advised with this class.
+
   :term:`IMAGE_DEVICE_TABLES`
      Specifies one or more files that contain custom device tables that
      are passed to the ``makedevs`` command as part of creating an image.
--- a/documentation/security-reference/index.rst
+++ b/documentation/security-reference/index.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: CC-BY-SA-2.0-UK
+
+================================
+Yocto Project Security Reference
+================================
+
+.. toctree::
+   :caption: Table of Contents
+   :numbered:
+
+   security-team
+   reporting-vulnerabilities
+
+.. include:: /boilerplate.rst
--- a/documentation/security-reference/reporting-vulnerabilities.rst
+++ b/documentation/security-reference/reporting-vulnerabilities.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: CC-BY-SA-2.0-UK
+
+Reporting Vulnerabilities
+*************************
+
+The Yocto Project and OpenEmbedded are open-source, community-based projects
+used in numerous products. They assemble multiple other open-source projects,
+and need to handle security issues and practices both internal (in the code
+maintained by both projects), and external (maintained by other projects and
+organizations).
+
+This manual assembles security-related information concerning the whole
+ecosystem. It includes information on reporting a potential security issue,
+the operation of the YP Security team and how to contribute in the
+related code. It is written to be useful for both security researchers and
+YP developers.
+
+How to report a potential security vulnerability?
+=================================================
+
+If you would like to report a public issue (for example, one with a released
+CVE number), please report it using the
+:yocto_bugs:`Security Bugzilla </enter_bug.cgi?product=Security>`.
+
+If you are dealing with a not-yet-released issue, or an urgent one, please send
+a message to security AT yoctoproject DOT org, including as many details as
+possible: the layer or software module affected, the recipe and its version,
+and any example code, if available. This mailing list is monitored by the
+Yocto Project Security team.
+
+For each layer, you might also look for specific instructions (if any) for
+reporting potential security issues in the specific ``SECURITY.md`` file at the
+root of the repository. Instructions on how and where submit a patch are
+usually available in ``README.md``. If this is your first patch to the
+Yocto Project/OpenEmbedded, you might want to have a look into the
+Contributor's Manual section
+":ref:`contributor-guide/submit-changes:preparing changes for submission`".
+
+Branches maintained with security fixes
+---------------------------------------
+
+See the
+:ref:`Release process <ref-manual/release-process:Stable Release Process>`
+documentation for details regarding the policies and maintenance of stable
+branches.
+
+The :yocto_home:`Releases </development/releases/>` page contains a list of all
+releases of the Yocto Project, grouped into current and previous releases.
+Previous releases are no longer actively maintained with security patches, but
+well-tested patches may still be accepted for them for significant issues.
+
+Security-related discussions at the Yocto Project
+-------------------------------------------------
+
+We have set up two security-related emails/mailing lists:
+
+  -  Public Mailing List: yocto [dash] security [at] yoctoproject[dot] org
+
+     This is a public mailing list for anyone to subscribe to. This list is an
+     open list to discuss public security issues/patches and security-related
+     initiatives. For more information, including subscription information,
+     please see the  :yocto_lists:`yocto-security mailing list info page
+     </g/yocto-security>`.
+
+     This list requires moderator approval for new topics to be posted, to avoid
+     private security reports to be posted by mistake.
+
+  -  Yocto Project Security Team: security [at] yoctoproject [dot] org
+
+     This is an email for reporting non-published potential vulnerabilities.
+     Emails sent to this address are forwarded to the Yocto Project Security
+     Team members.
+
+
+What you should do if you find a security vulnerability
+-------------------------------------------------------
+
+If you find a security flaw: a crash, an information leakage, or anything that
+can have a security impact if exploited in any Open Source software built or
+used by the Yocto Project, please report this to the Yocto Project Security
+Team. If you prefer to contact the upstream project directly, please send a
+copy to the security team at the Yocto Project as well. If you believe this is
+highly sensitive information, please report the vulnerability in a secure way,
+i.e. encrypt the email and send it to the private list. This ensures that
+the exploit is not leaked and exploited before a response/fix has been generated.
--- a/documentation/security-reference/security-team.rst
+++ b/documentation/security-reference/security-team.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: CC-BY-SA-2.0-UK
+
+Security team
+*************
+
+The Yocto Project/OpenEmbedded security team coordinates the work on security
+subjects in the project. All general discussion takes place publicly. The
+Security Team only uses confidential communication tools to deal with private
+vulnerability reports before they are released.
+
+Security team appointment
+=========================
+
+The Yocto Project Security Team consists of at least three members. When new
+members are needed, the Yocto Project Technical Steering Committee (YP TSC)
+asks for nominations by public channels including a nomination deadline.
+Self-nominations are possible. When the limit time is
+reached, the YP TSC posts the list of candidates for the comments of project
+participants and developers. Comments may be sent publicly or privately to the
+YP and OE TSCs. The candidates are approved by both YP TSC and OpenEmbedded
+Technical Steering Committee (OE TSC) and the final list of the team members
+is announced publicly. The aim is to have people representing technical
+leadership, security knowledge and infrastructure present with enough people
+to provide backup/coverage but keep the notification list small enough to
+minimize information risk and maintain trust.
+
+YP Security Team members may resign at any time.
+
+Security Team Operations
+========================
+
+The work of the Security Team might require high confidentiality. Team members
+are individuals selected by merit and do not represent the companies they work
+for. They do not share information about confidential issues outside of the team
+and do not hint about ongoing embargoes.
+
+Team members can bring in domain experts as needed. Those people should be
+added to individual issues only and adhere to the same standards as the YP
+Security Team.
+
+The YP security team organizes its meetings and communication as needed.
+
+When the YP Security team receives a report about a potential security
+vulnerability, they quickly analyze and notify the reporter of the result.
+They might also request more information.
+
+If the issue is confirmed and affects the code maintained by the YP, they
+confidentially notify maintainers of that code and work with them to prepare
+a fix.
+
+If the issue is confirmed and affects an upstream project, the YP security team
+notifies the project. Usually, the upstream project analyzes the problem again.
+If they deem it a real security problem in their software, they develop and
+release a fix following their security policy. They may want to include the
+original reporter in the loop. There is also sometimes some coordination for
+handling patches, backporting patches etc, or just understanding the problem
+or what caused it.
+
+When the fix is publicly available, the YP security team member or the
+package maintainer sends patches against the YP code base, following usual
+procedures, including public code review.
+
+What Yocto Security Team does when it receives a security vulnerability
+=======================================================================
+
+The YP Security Team team performs a quick analysis and would usually report
+the flaw to the upstream project. Normally the upstream project analyzes the
+problem. If they deem it a real security problem in their software, they
+develop and release a fix following their own security policy. They may want
+to include the original reporter in the loop. There is also sometimes some
+coordination for handling patches, backporting patches etc, or just
+understanding the problem or what caused it.
+
+The security policy of the upstream project might include a notification to
+Linux distributions or other important downstream projects in advance to
+discuss coordinated disclosure. These mailing lists are normally non-public.
+
+When the upstream project releases a version with the fix, they are responsible
+for contacting `Mitre <https://www.cve.org/>`__ to get a CVE number assigned and
+the CVE record published.
+
+If an upstream project does not respond quickly
+===============================================
+
+If an upstream project does not fix the problem in a reasonable time,
+the Yocto's Security Team will contact other interested parties (usually
+other distributions) in the community and together try to solve the
+vulnerability as quickly as possible.
+
+The Yocto Project Security team adheres to the 90 days disclosure policy
+by default. An increase of the embargo time is possible when necessary.
+
+Security Team Members
+=====================
+
+For secure communications, please send your messages encrypted using the GPG
+keys. Remember, message headers are not encrypted so do not include sensitive
+information in the subject line.
+
+-  Ross Burton: <ross [at] burtonini [dot] com> `Public key <https://keys.openpgp.org/search?q=ross%40burtonini.com>`__
+
+-  Michael Halstead: <mhalstead [at] linuxfoundation [dot] org>
+   `Public key <https://pgp.mit.edu/pks/lookup?op=vindex&search=0x3373170601861969>`__
+   or `Public key <https://keyserver.ubuntu.com/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0xd1f2407285e571ed12a407a73373170601861969>`__
+
+-  Richard Purdie: <richard.purdie [at] linuxfoundation [dot] org> `Public key <https://keys.openpgp.org/search?q=richard.purdie%40linuxfoundation.org>`__
+
+-  Marta Rybczynska: <marta DOT rybczynska [at] syslinbit [dot] com> `Public key <https://keys.openpgp.org/search?q=marta.rybczynska@syslinbit.com>`__
+
+-  Steve Sakoman: <steve [at] sakoman [dot] com> `Public key <https://keys.openpgp.org/search?q=steve%40sakoman.com>`__
--- a/documentation/test-manual/ptest.rst
+++ b/documentation/test-manual/ptest.rst
@@ -70,6 +70,25 @@ test. Here is what you have to do for each recipe:
      cd test
      make -k runtest-TESTS

+-  *Return an appropriate exit code*: The ``run-ptest`` script must return 0 on
+   success, 1 on failure. This is needed by ``ptest-runner`` to keep track of
+   the successful and failed tests.
+
+-  *Make sure the test prints at least one test result*: The execution of the
+   ``run-ptest`` script must result in at least one test result output on the
+   console, with the following format::
+
+      result: testname
+
+   Where ``result`` can be one of ``PASS``, ``SKIP``, or ``FAIL``. ``testname``
+   can be any name.
+
+   There can be as many test results as desired.
+
+   This information is read by the :ref:`ref-classes-testimage` class and
+   :oe_git:`logparser </openembedded-core/tree/meta/lib/oeqa/utils/logparser.py>`
+   module.
+
 -  *Ensure dependencies are met:* If the test adds build or runtime
   dependencies that normally do not exist for the package (such as
   requiring "make" to run the test suite), use the
--- a/meta-poky/conf/distro/poky.conf
+++ b/meta-poky/conf/distro/poky.conf
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 DISTRO = "poky"
 DISTRO_NAME = "Poky (Yocto Project Reference Distro)"
 #DISTRO_VERSION = "3.4+snapshot-${METADATA_REVISION}"
-DISTRO_VERSION = "4.0.32"
+DISTRO_VERSION = "4.0.33"
 DISTRO_CODENAME = "kirkstone"
 SDK_VENDOR = "-pokysdk"
 SDK_VERSION = "${@d.getVar('DISTRO_VERSION').replace('snapshot-${METADATA_REVISION}', 'snapshot')}"
--- a/meta/classes/cross.bbclass
+++ b/meta/classes/cross.bbclass
@@ -95,3 +95,39 @@ addtask addto_recipe_sysroot after do_populate_sysroot
 do_addto_recipe_sysroot[deptask] = "do_populate_sysroot"

 PATH:prepend = "${COREBASE}/scripts/cross-intercept:"
+
+#
+# Cross task outputs can call native dependencies and even when cross
+# recipe output doesn't change it might produce different results when
+# the called native dependency is changed, e.g. clang-cross-${TARGET_ARCH}
+# contains symlink to clang binary from clang-native, but when clang-native
+# outhash is changed, clang-cross-${TARGET_ARCH} will still be considered
+# equivalent and target recipes aren't rebuilt with new clang binary, see
+# work around in https://github.com/kraj/meta-clang/pull/1140 to make target
+# recipes to depend directly not only on clang-cross-${TARGET_ARCH} but
+# clang-native as well.
+#
+# This can cause poor interactions with hash equivalence, since this recipes
+# output-changing dependency is "hidden" and downstream task only see that this
+# recipe has the same outhash and therefore is equivalent. This can result in
+# different output in different cases.
+#
+# To resolve this, unhide the output-changing dependency by adding its unihash
+# to this tasks outhash calculation. Unfortunately, don't know specifically
+# know which dependencies are output-changing, so we have to add all of them.
+#
+python cross_add_do_populate_sysroot_deps () {
+    current_task = "do_" + d.getVar("BB_CURRENTTASK")
+    if current_task != "do_populate_sysroot":
+        return
+
+    taskdepdata = d.getVar("BB_TASKDEPDATA", False)
+    pn = d.getVar("PN")
+    deps = {
+        dep[0]:dep[6] for dep in taskdepdata.values() if
+            dep[1] == current_task and dep[0] != pn
+    }
+
+    d.setVar("HASHEQUIV_EXTRA_SIGDATA", "\n".join("%s: %s" % (k, deps[k]) for k in sorted(deps.keys())))
+}
+SSTATECREATEFUNCS += "cross_add_do_populate_sysroot_deps"
--- a/meta/lib/oeqa/runtime/cases/buildcpio.py
+++ b/meta/lib/oeqa/runtime/cases/buildcpio.py
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ class BuildCpioTest(OERuntimeTestCase):

    @classmethod
    def setUpClass(cls):
-        uri = 'https://downloads.yoctoproject.org/mirror/sources/cpio-2.13.tar.gz'
+        uri = 'https://downloads.yoctoproject.org/mirror/sources/cpio-2.14.tar.gz'
        cls.project = TargetBuildProject(cls.tc.target,
                                         uri,
                                         dl_dir = cls.tc.td['DL_DIR'])
--- a/meta/lib/oeqa/sdk/cases/buildcpio.py
+++ b/meta/lib/oeqa/sdk/cases/buildcpio.py
@@ -17,10 +17,10 @@ class BuildCpioTest(OESDKTestCase):
    """
    def test_cpio(self):
        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="cpio-", dir=self.tc.sdk_dir) as testdir:
-            tarball = self.fetch(testdir, self.td["DL_DIR"], "https://ftpmirror.gnu.org/gnu/cpio/cpio-2.13.tar.gz")
+            tarball = self.fetch(testdir, self.td["DL_DIR"], "https://ftpmirror.gnu.org/gnu/cpio/cpio-2.14.tar.gz")

            dirs = {}
-            dirs["source"] = os.path.join(testdir, "cpio-2.13")
+            dirs["source"] = os.path.join(testdir, "cpio-2.14")
            dirs["build"] = os.path.join(testdir, "build")
            dirs["install"] = os.path.join(testdir, "install")

--- a/meta/lib/oeqa/selftest/cases/meta_ide.py
+++ b/meta/lib/oeqa/selftest/cases/meta_ide.py
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ class MetaIDE(OESelftestTestCase):
    def test_meta_ide_can_build_cpio_project(self):
        dl_dir = self.td.get('DL_DIR', None)
        self.project = SDKBuildProject(self.tmpdir_metaideQA + "/cpio/", self.environment_script_path,
-                        "https://ftpmirror.gnu.org/gnu/cpio/cpio-2.13.tar.gz",
+                        "https://ftpmirror.gnu.org/gnu/cpio/cpio-2.14.tar.gz",
                        self.tmpdir_metaideQA, self.td['DATETIME'], dl_dir=dl_dir)
        self.project.download_archive()
        self.assertEqual(self.project.run_configure('$CONFIGURE_FLAGS --disable-maintainer-mode','sed -i -e "/char \*program_name/d" src/global.c;'), 0,
--- a/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2025-61661.patch
+++ b/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2025-61661.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+From 9c2ae73b549a653f5f1bd5d4edebc50a764bad06 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jamie <volticks@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 14 Jul 2025 09:52:59 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 1/3] commands/usbtest: Use correct string length field
+
+An incorrect length field is used for buffer allocation. This leads to
+grub_utf16_to_utf8() receiving an incorrect/different length and possibly
+causing OOB write. This makes sure to use the correct length.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2025-61661
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-61661
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+[https://gitweb.git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=grub.git;a=commit;h=549a9cc372fd0b96a4ccdfad0e12140476cc62a3]
+
+Reported-by: Jamie <volticks@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jamie <volticks@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jiaying Song <jiaying.song.cn@windriver.com>
+---
+ grub-core/commands/usbtest.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/commands/usbtest.c b/grub-core/commands/usbtest.c
+index 2c6d93fe6..8ef187a9a 100644
+--- a/grub-core/commands/usbtest.c
+++ b/grub-core/commands/usbtest.c
+@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ grub_usb_get_string (grub_usb_device_t dev, grub_uint8_t index, int langid,
+       return GRUB_USB_ERR_NONE;
+     }
+ 
+-  *string = grub_malloc (descstr.length * 2 + 1);
+  *string = grub_malloc (descstrp->length * 2 + 1);
+   if (! *string)
+     {
+       grub_free (descstrp);
+-- 
+2.34.1
+
--- a/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2025-61662.patch
+++ b/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2025-61662.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+From c47760a907c91283bac9a8400d6975574b1d3986 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alec Brown <alec.r.brown@oracle.com>
+Date: Thu, 21 Aug 2025 21:14:06 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 2/3] gettext/gettext: Unregister gettext command on module
+ unload
+
+When the gettext module is loaded, the gettext command is registered but
+isn't unregistered when the module is unloaded. We need to add a call to
+grub_unregister_command() when unloading the module.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2025-61662
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-61662
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+[https://gitweb.git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=grub.git;a=commit;h=8ed78fd9f0852ab218cc1f991c38e5a229e43807]
+
+Reported-by: Alec Brown <alec.r.brown@oracle.com>
+Signed-off-by: Alec Brown <alec.r.brown@oracle.com>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jiaying Song <jiaying.song.cn@windriver.com>
+---
+ grub-core/gettext/gettext.c | 19 ++++++++++++-------
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/gettext/gettext.c b/grub-core/gettext/gettext.c
+index 7a25c9d67..ef1258ee0 100644
+--- a/grub-core/gettext/gettext.c
+++ b/grub-core/gettext/gettext.c
+@@ -502,6 +502,8 @@ grub_cmd_translate (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),
+   return 0;
+ }
+ 
+static grub_command_t cmd;
+
+ GRUB_MOD_INIT (gettext)
+ {
+   const char *lang;
+@@ -521,13 +523,14 @@ GRUB_MOD_INIT (gettext)
+   grub_register_variable_hook ("locale_dir", NULL, read_main);
+   grub_register_variable_hook ("secondary_locale_dir", NULL, read_secondary);
+ 
+-  grub_register_command_p1 ("gettext", grub_cmd_translate,
+-			    N_("STRING"),
+-			    /* TRANSLATORS: It refers to passing the string through gettext.
+-			       So it's "translate" in the same meaning as in what you're 
+-			       doing now.
+-			     */
+-			    N_("Translates the string with the current settings."));
+  cmd = grub_register_command_p1 ("gettext", grub_cmd_translate,
+				  N_("STRING"),
+				  /*
+				   * TRANSLATORS: It refers to passing the string through gettext.
+				   * So it's "translate" in the same meaning as in what you're
+				   * doing now.
+				   */
+				  N_("Translates the string with the current settings."));
+ 
+   /* Reload .mo file information if lang changes.  */
+   grub_register_variable_hook ("lang", NULL, grub_gettext_env_write_lang);
+@@ -544,6 +547,8 @@ GRUB_MOD_FINI (gettext)
+   grub_register_variable_hook ("secondary_locale_dir", NULL, NULL);
+   grub_register_variable_hook ("lang", NULL, NULL);
+ 
+  grub_unregister_command (cmd);
+
+   grub_gettext_delete_list (&main_context);
+   grub_gettext_delete_list (&secondary_context);
+ 
+-- 
+2.34.1
+
--- a/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2025-61663_61664.patch
+++ b/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2025-61663_61664.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+From a182bd873e4aa93205ecbb7845ef7f0eda99dcf5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alec Brown <alec.r.brown@oracle.com>
+Date: Thu, 21 Aug 2025 21:14:07 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 3/3] normal/main: Unregister commands on module unload
+
+When the normal module is loaded, the normal and normal_exit commands
+are registered but aren't unregistered when the module is unloaded. We
+need to add calls to grub_unregister_command() when unloading the module
+for these commands.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2025-61663
+Fixes: CVE-2025-61664
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-61663 CVE-2025-61664
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+[https://gitweb.git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=grub.git;a=commit;h=05d3698b8b03eccc49e53491bbd75dba15f40917]
+
+Reported-by: Alec Brown <alec.r.brown@oracle.com>
+Signed-off-by: Alec Brown <alec.r.brown@oracle.com>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jiaying Song <jiaying.song.cn@windriver.com>
+---
+ grub-core/normal/main.c | 12 +++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/normal/main.c b/grub-core/normal/main.c
+index a95c25e5f..9d576de7a 100644
+--- a/grub-core/normal/main.c
+++ b/grub-core/normal/main.c
+@@ -499,7 +499,7 @@ grub_mini_cmd_clear (struct grub_command *cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),
+   return 0;
+ }
+ 
+-static grub_command_t cmd_clear;
+static grub_command_t cmd_clear, cmd_normal, cmd_normal_exit;
+ 
+ static void (*grub_xputs_saved) (const char *str);
+ static const char *features[] = {
+@@ -541,10 +541,10 @@ GRUB_MOD_INIT(normal)
+   grub_env_export ("pager");
+ 
+   /* Register a command "normal" for the rescue mode.  */
+-  grub_register_command ("normal", grub_cmd_normal,
+-			 0, N_("Enter normal mode."));
+-  grub_register_command ("normal_exit", grub_cmd_normal_exit,
+-			 0, N_("Exit from normal mode."));
+  cmd_normal = grub_register_command ("normal", grub_cmd_normal,
+				      0, N_("Enter normal mode."));
+  cmd_normal_exit = grub_register_command ("normal_exit", grub_cmd_normal_exit,
+					   0, N_("Exit from normal mode."));
+ 
+   /* Reload terminal colors when these variables are written to.  */
+   grub_register_variable_hook ("color_normal", NULL, grub_env_write_color_normal);
+@@ -586,4 +586,6 @@ GRUB_MOD_FINI(normal)
+   grub_register_variable_hook ("color_highlight", NULL, NULL);
+   grub_fs_autoload_hook = 0;
+   grub_unregister_command (cmd_clear);
+  grub_unregister_command (cmd_normal);
+  grub_unregister_command (cmd_normal_exit);
+ }
+-- 
+2.34.1
+
--- a/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc
+++ b/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc
@@ -60,6 +60,9 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \
           file://CVE-2025-0690.patch \
           file://CVE-2025-1118.patch \
           file://CVE-2024-56738.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-61661.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-61662.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-61663_61664.patch \
 "

 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "23b64b4c741569f9426ed2e3d0e6780796fca081bee4c99f62aa3f53ae803f5f"
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/libpcap/libpcap/CVE-2025-11961-01.patch
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/libpcap/libpcap/CVE-2025-11961-01.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+From 7224be0fe2f4beb916b7b69141f478facd0f0634 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Denis Ovsienko <denis@ovsienko.info>
+Date: Sat, 27 Dec 2025 21:36:11 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Rename one of the xdtoi() copies to simplify backporting.
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-11961
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/libpcap/commit/7224be0fe2f4beb916b7b69141f478facd0f0634]
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
+---
+ nametoaddr.c | 6 +++---
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/nametoaddr.c b/nametoaddr.c
+index dc75495c..bdaacbf1 100644
+--- a/nametoaddr.c
+++ b/nametoaddr.c
+@@ -646,7 +646,7 @@ pcap_nametollc(const char *s)
+ 
+ /* Hex digit to 8-bit unsigned integer. */
+ static inline u_char
+-xdtoi(u_char c)
+pcapint_xdtoi(u_char c)
+ {
+ 	if (c >= '0' && c <= '9')
+ 		return (u_char)(c - '0');
+@@ -728,10 +728,10 @@ pcap_ether_aton(const char *s)
+ 	while (*s) {
+ 		if (*s == ':' || *s == '.' || *s == '-')
+ 			s += 1;
+-		d = xdtoi(*s++);
+		d = pcapint_xdtoi(*s++);
+ 		if (PCAP_ISXDIGIT(*s)) {
+ 			d <<= 4;
+-			d |= xdtoi(*s++);
+			d |= pcapint_xdtoi(*s++);
+ 		}
+ 		*ep++ = d;
+ 	}
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/libpcap/libpcap/CVE-2025-11961-02.patch
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/libpcap/libpcap/CVE-2025-11961-02.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,433 @@
+From b2d2f9a9a0581c40780bde509f7cc715920f1c02 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Denis Ovsienko <denis@ovsienko.info>
+Date: Fri, 19 Dec 2025 17:31:13 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2025-11961: Fix OOBR and OOBW in pcap_ether_aton().
+
+pcap_ether_aton() has for a long time required its string argument to be
+a well-formed MAC-48 address, which is always the case when the argument
+comes from other libpcap code, so the function has never validated the
+input and used a simple loop to parse any of the three common MAC-48
+address formats.  However, the function has also been a part of the
+public API, so calling it directly with a malformed address can cause
+the loop to read beyond the end of the input string and/or to write
+beyond the end of the allocated output buffer.
+
+To handle invalid input more appropriately, replace the simple loop with
+new functions and require the input to match a supported address format.
+
+This problem was reported by Jin Wei, Kunwei Qian and Ping Chen.
+
+(backported from commit dd08e53e9380e217ae7c7768da9cc3d7bf37bf83)
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-11961
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/libpcap/commit/b2d2f9a9a0581c40780bde509f7cc715920f1c02]
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
+---
+ gencode.c    |   5 +
+ nametoaddr.c | 367 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
+ 2 files changed, 349 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/gencode.c b/gencode.c
+index 3ddd15f8..76fb2d82 100644
+--- a/gencode.c
+++ b/gencode.c
+@@ -7206,6 +7206,11 @@ gen_ecode(compiler_state_t *cstate, const char *s, struct qual q)
+ 		return (NULL);
+ 
+ 	if ((q.addr == Q_HOST || q.addr == Q_DEFAULT) && q.proto == Q_LINK) {
+		/*
+		 * Because the lexer guards the input string format, in this
+		 * context the function returns NULL iff the implicit malloc()
+		 * has failed.
+		 */
+ 		cstate->e = pcap_ether_aton(s);
+ 		if (cstate->e == NULL)
+ 			bpf_error(cstate, "malloc");
+diff --git a/nametoaddr.c b/nametoaddr.c
+index f9fcd288..f50d0da5 100644
+--- a/nametoaddr.c
+++ b/nametoaddr.c
+@@ -703,39 +703,360 @@ __pcap_atodn(const char *s, bpf_u_int32 *addr)
+ 	return(32);
+ }
+ 
+// Man page: "xxxxxxxxxxxx", regexp: "^[0-9a-fA-F]{12}$".
+static u_char
+pcapint_atomac48_xxxxxxxxxxxx(const char *s, uint8_t *addr)
+{
+	if (strlen(s) == 12 &&
+	    PCAP_ISXDIGIT(s[0]) &&
+	    PCAP_ISXDIGIT(s[1]) &&
+	    PCAP_ISXDIGIT(s[2]) &&
+	    PCAP_ISXDIGIT(s[3]) &&
+	    PCAP_ISXDIGIT(s[4]) &&
+	    PCAP_ISXDIGIT(s[5]) &&
+	    PCAP_ISXDIGIT(s[6]) &&
+	    PCAP_ISXDIGIT(s[7]) &&
+	    PCAP_ISXDIGIT(s[8]) &&
+	    PCAP_ISXDIGIT(s[9]) &&
+	    PCAP_ISXDIGIT(s[10]) &&
+	    PCAP_ISXDIGIT(s[11])) {
+		addr[0] = pcapint_xdtoi(s[0]) << 4 | pcapint_xdtoi(s[1]);
+		addr[1] = pcapint_xdtoi(s[2]) << 4 | pcapint_xdtoi(s[3]);
+		addr[2] = pcapint_xdtoi(s[4]) << 4 | pcapint_xdtoi(s[5]);
+		addr[3] = pcapint_xdtoi(s[6]) << 4 | pcapint_xdtoi(s[7]);
+		addr[4] = pcapint_xdtoi(s[8]) << 4 | pcapint_xdtoi(s[9]);
+		addr[5] = pcapint_xdtoi(s[10]) << 4 | pcapint_xdtoi(s[11]);
+		return 1;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+// Man page: "xxxx.xxxx.xxxx", regexp: "^[0-9a-fA-F]{4}(\.[0-9a-fA-F]{4}){2}$".
+static u_char
+pcapint_atomac48_xxxx_3_times(const char *s, uint8_t *addr)
+{
+	const char sep = '.';
+	if (strlen(s) == 14 &&
+	    PCAP_ISXDIGIT(s[0]) &&
+	    PCAP_ISXDIGIT(s[1]) &&
+	    PCAP_ISXDIGIT(s[2]) &&
+	    PCAP_ISXDIGIT(s[3]) &&
+	    s[4] == sep &&
+	    PCAP_ISXDIGIT(s[5]) &&
+	    PCAP_ISXDIGIT(s[6]) &&
+	    PCAP_ISXDIGIT(s[7]) &&
+	    PCAP_ISXDIGIT(s[8]) &&
+	    s[9] == sep &&
+	    PCAP_ISXDIGIT(s[10]) &&
+	    PCAP_ISXDIGIT(s[11]) &&
+	    PCAP_ISXDIGIT(s[12]) &&
+	    PCAP_ISXDIGIT(s[13])) {
+		addr[0] = pcapint_xdtoi(s[0]) << 4 | pcapint_xdtoi(s[1]);
+		addr[1] = pcapint_xdtoi(s[2]) << 4 | pcapint_xdtoi(s[3]);
+		addr[2] = pcapint_xdtoi(s[5]) << 4 | pcapint_xdtoi(s[6]);
+		addr[3] = pcapint_xdtoi(s[7]) << 4 | pcapint_xdtoi(s[8]);
+		addr[4] = pcapint_xdtoi(s[10]) << 4 | pcapint_xdtoi(s[11]);
+		addr[5] = pcapint_xdtoi(s[12]) << 4 | pcapint_xdtoi(s[13]);
+		return 1;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+ /*
+- * Convert 's', which can have the one of the forms:
+ * Man page: "xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx", regexp: "^[0-9a-fA-F]{1,2}(:[0-9a-fA-F]{1,2}){5}$".
+ * Man page: "xx-xx-xx-xx-xx-xx", regexp: "^[0-9a-fA-F]{1,2}(-[0-9a-fA-F]{1,2}){5}$".
+ * Man page: "xx.xx.xx.xx.xx.xx", regexp: "^[0-9a-fA-F]{1,2}(\.[0-9a-fA-F]{1,2}){5}$".
+ * (Any "xx" above can be "x", which is equivalent to "0x".)
+  *
+- *	"xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx"
+- *	"xx.xx.xx.xx.xx.xx"
+- *	"xx-xx-xx-xx-xx-xx"
+- *	"xxxx.xxxx.xxxx"
+- *	"xxxxxxxxxxxx"
+ * An equivalent (and parametrisable for EUI-64) FSM could be implemented using
+ * a smaller graph, but that graph would be neither acyclic nor planar nor
+ * trivial to verify.
+  *
+- * (or various mixes of ':', '.', and '-') into a new
+- * ethernet address.  Assumes 's' is well formed.
+ *                |
+ *    [.]         v
+ * +<---------- START
+ * |              |
+ * |              | [0-9a-fA-F]
+ * |  [.]         v
+ * +<--------- BYTE0_X ----------+
+ * |              |              |
+ * |              | [0-9a-fA-F]  |
+ * |  [.]         v              |
+ * +<--------- BYTE0_XX          | [:\.-]
+ * |              |              |
+ * |              | [:\.-]       |
+ * |  [.]         v              |
+ * +<----- BYTE0_SEP_BYTE1 <-----+
+ * |              |
+ * |              | [0-9a-fA-F]
+ * |  [.]         v
+ * +<--------- BYTE1_X ----------+
+ * |              |              |
+ * |              | [0-9a-fA-F]  |
+ * |  [.]         v              |
+ * +<--------- BYTE1_XX          | <sep>
+ * |              |              |
+ * |              | <sep>        |
+ * |  [.]         v              |
+ * +<----- BYTE1_SEP_BYTE2 <-----+
+ * |              |
+ * |              | [0-9a-fA-F]
+ * |  [.]         v
+ * +<--------- BYTE2_X ----------+
+ * |              |              |
+ * |              | [0-9a-fA-F]  |
+ * |  [.]         v              |
+ * +<--------- BYTE2_XX          | <sep>
+ * |              |              |
+ * |              | <sep>        |
+ * |  [.]         v              |
+ * +<----- BYTE2_SEP_BYTE3 <-----+
+ * |              |
+ * |              | [0-9a-fA-F]
+ * |  [.]         v
+ * +<--------- BYTE3_X ----------+
+ * |              |              |
+ * |              | [0-9a-fA-F]  |
+ * |  [.]         v              |
+ * +<--------- BYTE3_XX          | <sep>
+ * |              |              |
+ * |              | <sep>        |
+ * |  [.]         v              |
+ * +<----- BYTE3_SEP_BYTE4 <-----+
+ * |              |
+ * |              | [0-9a-fA-F]
+ * |  [.]         v
+ * +<--------- BYTE4_X ----------+
+ * |              |              |
+ * |              | [0-9a-fA-F]  |
+ * |  [.]         v              |
+ * +<--------- BYTE4_XX          | <sep>
+ * |              |              |
+ * |              | <sep>        |
+ * |  [.]         v              |
+ * +<----- BYTE4_SEP_BYTE5 <-----+
+ * |              |
+ * |              | [0-9a-fA-F]
+ * |  [.]         v
+ * +<--------- BYTE5_X ----------+
+ * |              |              |
+ * |              | [0-9a-fA-F]  |
+ * |  [.]         v              |
+ * +<--------- BYTE5_XX          | \0
+ * |              |              |
+ * |              | \0           |
+ * |              |              v
+ * +--> (reject)  +---------> (accept)
+ *
+ */
+static u_char
+pcapint_atomac48_x_xx_6_times(const char *s, uint8_t *addr)
+{
+	enum {
+		START,
+		BYTE0_X,
+		BYTE0_XX,
+		BYTE0_SEP_BYTE1,
+		BYTE1_X,
+		BYTE1_XX,
+		BYTE1_SEP_BYTE2,
+		BYTE2_X,
+		BYTE2_XX,
+		BYTE2_SEP_BYTE3,
+		BYTE3_X,
+		BYTE3_XX,
+		BYTE3_SEP_BYTE4,
+		BYTE4_X,
+		BYTE4_XX,
+		BYTE4_SEP_BYTE5,
+		BYTE5_X,
+		BYTE5_XX,
+	} fsm_state = START;
+	uint8_t buf[6];
+	const char *seplist = ":.-";
+	char sep;
+
+	while (*s) {
+		switch (fsm_state) {
+		case START:
+			if (PCAP_ISXDIGIT(*s)) {
+				buf[0] = pcapint_xdtoi(*s);
+				fsm_state = BYTE0_X;
+				break;
+			}
+			goto reject;
+		case BYTE0_X:
+			if (strchr(seplist, *s)) {
+				sep = *s;
+				fsm_state = BYTE0_SEP_BYTE1;
+				break;
+			}
+			if (PCAP_ISXDIGIT(*s)) {
+				buf[0] = buf[0] << 4 | pcapint_xdtoi(*s);
+				fsm_state = BYTE0_XX;
+				break;
+			}
+			goto reject;
+		case BYTE0_XX:
+			if (strchr(seplist, *s)) {
+				sep = *s;
+				fsm_state = BYTE0_SEP_BYTE1;
+				break;
+			}
+			goto reject;
+		case BYTE0_SEP_BYTE1:
+			if (PCAP_ISXDIGIT(*s)) {
+				buf[1] = pcapint_xdtoi(*s);
+				fsm_state = BYTE1_X;
+				break;
+			}
+			goto reject;
+		case BYTE1_X:
+			if (*s == sep) {
+				fsm_state = BYTE1_SEP_BYTE2;
+				break;
+			}
+			if (PCAP_ISXDIGIT(*s)) {
+				buf[1] = buf[1] << 4 | pcapint_xdtoi(*s);
+				fsm_state = BYTE1_XX;
+				break;
+			}
+			goto reject;
+		case BYTE1_XX:
+			if (*s == sep) {
+				fsm_state = BYTE1_SEP_BYTE2;
+				break;
+			}
+			goto reject;
+		case BYTE1_SEP_BYTE2:
+			if (PCAP_ISXDIGIT(*s)) {
+				buf[2] = pcapint_xdtoi(*s);
+				fsm_state = BYTE2_X;
+				break;
+			}
+			goto reject;
+		case BYTE2_X:
+			if (*s == sep) {
+				fsm_state = BYTE2_SEP_BYTE3;
+				break;
+			}
+			if (PCAP_ISXDIGIT(*s)) {
+				buf[2] = buf[2] << 4 | pcapint_xdtoi(*s);
+				fsm_state = BYTE2_XX;
+				break;
+			}
+			goto reject;
+		case BYTE2_XX:
+			if (*s == sep) {
+				fsm_state = BYTE2_SEP_BYTE3;
+				break;
+			}
+			goto reject;
+		case BYTE2_SEP_BYTE3:
+			if (PCAP_ISXDIGIT(*s)) {
+				buf[3] = pcapint_xdtoi(*s);
+				fsm_state = BYTE3_X;
+				break;
+			}
+			goto reject;
+		case BYTE3_X:
+			if (*s == sep) {
+				fsm_state = BYTE3_SEP_BYTE4;
+				break;
+			}
+			if (PCAP_ISXDIGIT(*s)) {
+				buf[3] = buf[3] << 4 | pcapint_xdtoi(*s);
+				fsm_state = BYTE3_XX;
+				break;
+			}
+			goto reject;
+		case BYTE3_XX:
+			if (*s == sep) {
+				fsm_state = BYTE3_SEP_BYTE4;
+				break;
+			}
+			goto reject;
+		case BYTE3_SEP_BYTE4:
+			if (PCAP_ISXDIGIT(*s)) {
+				buf[4] = pcapint_xdtoi(*s);
+				fsm_state = BYTE4_X;
+				break;
+			}
+			goto reject;
+		case BYTE4_X:
+			if (*s == sep) {
+				fsm_state = BYTE4_SEP_BYTE5;
+				break;
+			}
+			if (PCAP_ISXDIGIT(*s)) {
+				buf[4] = buf[4] << 4 | pcapint_xdtoi(*s);
+				fsm_state = BYTE4_XX;
+				break;
+			}
+			goto reject;
+		case BYTE4_XX:
+			if (*s == sep) {
+				fsm_state = BYTE4_SEP_BYTE5;
+				break;
+			}
+			goto reject;
+		case BYTE4_SEP_BYTE5:
+			if (PCAP_ISXDIGIT(*s)) {
+				buf[5] = pcapint_xdtoi(*s);
+				fsm_state = BYTE5_X;
+				break;
+			}
+			goto reject;
+		case BYTE5_X:
+			if (PCAP_ISXDIGIT(*s)) {
+				buf[5] = buf[5] << 4 | pcapint_xdtoi(*s);
+				fsm_state = BYTE5_XX;
+				break;
+			}
+			goto reject;
+		case BYTE5_XX:
+			goto reject;
+		} // switch
+		s++;
+	} // while
+
+	if (fsm_state == BYTE5_X || fsm_state == BYTE5_XX) {
+		// accept
+		memcpy(addr, buf, sizeof(buf));
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+reject:
+	return 0;
+}
+
+// The 'addr' argument must point to an array of at least 6 elements.
+static int
+pcapint_atomac48(const char *s, uint8_t *addr)
+{
+	return s && (
+	    pcapint_atomac48_xxxxxxxxxxxx(s, addr) ||
+	    pcapint_atomac48_xxxx_3_times(s, addr) ||
+	    pcapint_atomac48_x_xx_6_times(s, addr)
+	);
+}
+
+/*
+ * If 's' is a MAC-48 address in one of the forms documented in pcap-filter(7)
+ * for "ether host", return a pointer to an allocated buffer with the binary
+ * value of the address.  Return NULL on any error.
+  */
+ u_char *
+ pcap_ether_aton(const char *s)
+ {
+-	register u_char *ep, *e;
+-	register u_char d;
+	uint8_t tmp[6];
+	if (! pcapint_atomac48(s, tmp))
+		return (NULL);
+ 
+-	e = ep = (u_char *)malloc(6);
+	u_char *e = malloc(6);
+ 	if (e == NULL)
+ 		return (NULL);
+-
+-	while (*s) {
+-		if (*s == ':' || *s == '.' || *s == '-')
+-			s += 1;
+-		d = pcapint_xdtoi(*s++);
+-		if (PCAP_ISXDIGIT(*s)) {
+-			d <<= 4;
+-			d |= pcapint_xdtoi(*s++);
+-		}
+-		*ep++ = d;
+-	}
+-
+	memcpy(e, tmp, sizeof(tmp));
+ 	return (e);
+ }
+ 
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/libpcap/libpcap/CVE-2025-11964.patch
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/libpcap/libpcap/CVE-2025-11964.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+From 7fabf607f2319a36a0bd78444247180acb838e69 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Guy Harris <gharris@sonic.net>
+Date: Sun, 7 Sep 2025 12:51:56 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix a copy-and-pasteo in utf_16le_to_utf_8_truncated().
+
+For the four octets of UTF-8 case, it was decrementing the remaining
+buffer length by 3, not 4.
+
+Thanks to a team of developers from the Univesity of Waterloo for
+reporting this.
+
+(cherry picked from commit aebfca1aea2fc8c177760a26e8f4de27b51d1b3b)
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-11964
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/libpcap/commit/7fabf607f2319a36a0bd78444247180acb838e69]
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
+---
+ fmtutils.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/fmtutils.c b/fmtutils.c
+index a5a4fe62..78a0f8b7 100644
+--- a/fmtutils.c
+++ b/fmtutils.c
+@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ utf_16le_to_utf_8_truncated(const wchar_t *utf_16, char *utf_8,
+ 			*utf_8++ = ((uc >> 12) & 0x3F) | 0x80;
+ 			*utf_8++ = ((uc >> 6) & 0x3F) | 0x80;
+ 			*utf_8++ = ((uc >> 0) & 0x3F) | 0x80;
+-			utf_8_len -= 3;
+			utf_8_len -= 4;
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/libpcap/libpcap_1.10.1.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/libpcap/libpcap_1.10.1.bb
@@ -17,6 +17,9 @@ SRC_URI = "https://www.tcpdump.org/release/${BP}.tar.gz \
           file://CVE-2023-7256-pre4.patch \
           file://CVE-2023-7256.patch \
           file://CVE-2024-8006.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-11961-01.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-11961-02.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-11964.patch \
          "

 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "ed285f4accaf05344f90975757b3dbfe772ba41d1c401c2648b7fa45b711bdd4"
--- a/meta/recipes-core/dropbear/dropbear.inc
+++ b/meta/recipes-core/dropbear/dropbear.inc
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://matt.ucc.asn.au/dropbear/releases/dropbear-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
           file://0001-Add-m_snprintf-that-won-t-return-negative.patch \
           file://0001-Handle-arbitrary-length-paths-and-commands-in-multih.patch \
           file://CVE-2025-47203.patch \
+           file://CVE-2019-6111.patch \
 	   "

 PAM_SRC_URI = "file://0005-dropbear-enable-pam.patch \
--- a/meta/recipes-core/dropbear/dropbear/CVE-2019-6111.patch
+++ b/meta/recipes-core/dropbear/dropbear/CVE-2019-6111.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
+From 48a17cff6aa104b8e806ddb2191f83f1024060f1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Johnston <matt@ucc.asn.au>
+Date: Tue, 9 Dec 2025 22:59:19 +0900
+Subject: [PATCH] scp CVE-2019-6111 fix
+
+Cherry-pick from OpenSSH portable
+
+391ffc4b9d31 ("upstream: check in scp client that filenames sent during")
+
+upstream: check in scp client that filenames sent during
+
+remote->local directory copies satisfy the wildcard specified by the user.
+
+This checking provides some protection against a malicious server
+sending unexpected filenames, but it comes at a risk of rejecting wanted
+files due to differences between client and server wildcard expansion rules.
+
+For this reason, this also adds a new -T flag to disable the check.
+
+reported by Harry Sintonen
+fix approach suggested by markus@;
+has been in snaps for ~1wk courtesy deraadt@
+
+CVE: CVE-2019-6111
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/mkj/dropbear/commit/48a17cff6aa104b8e806ddb2191f83f1024060f1]
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
+---
+ scp.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
+ 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
+index 384f2cb..bf98986 100644
+--- a/scp.c
+++ b/scp.c
+@@ -76,6 +76,8 @@
+ #include "includes.h"
+ /*RCSID("$OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.130 2006/01/31 10:35:43 djm Exp $");*/
+ 
+#include <fnmatch.h>
+
+ #include "atomicio.h"
+ #include "compat.h"
+ #include "scpmisc.h"
+@@ -291,14 +293,14 @@ void verifydir(char *);
+ 
+ uid_t userid;
+ int errs, remin, remout;
+-int pflag, iamremote, iamrecursive, targetshouldbedirectory;
+int Tflag, pflag, iamremote, iamrecursive, targetshouldbedirectory;
+ 
+ #define	CMDNEEDS	64
+ char cmd[CMDNEEDS];		/* must hold "rcp -r -p -d\0" */
+ 
+ int response(void);
+ void rsource(char *, struct stat *);
+-void sink(int, char *[]);
+void sink(int, char *[], const char *);
+ void source(int, char *[]);
+ void tolocal(int, char *[]);
+ void toremote(char *, int, char *[]);
+@@ -325,8 +327,8 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 	args.list = NULL;
+ 	addargs(&args, "%s", ssh_program);
+ 
+-	fflag = tflag = 0;
+-	while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "dfl:prtvBCc:i:P:q1246S:o:F:")) != -1)
+	fflag = Tflag = tflag = 0;
+	while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "dfl:prtTvBCc:i:P:q1246S:o:F:")) != -1)
+ 		switch (ch) {
+ 		/* User-visible flags. */
+ 		case '1':
+@@ -389,9 +391,12 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 			setmode(0, O_BINARY);
+ #endif
+ 			break;
+		case 'T':
+			Tflag = 1;
+			break;
+ 		default:
+ 			usage();
+-		}
+	}
+ 	argc -= optind;
+ 	argv += optind;
+ 
+@@ -409,7 +414,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 	}
+ 	if (tflag) {
+ 		/* Receive data. */
+-		sink(argc, argv);
+		sink(argc, argv, NULL);
+ 		exit(errs != 0);
+ 	}
+ 	if (argc < 2)
+@@ -590,7 +595,7 @@ tolocal(int argc, char **argv)
+ 			continue;
+ 		}
+ 		xfree(bp);
+-		sink(1, argv + argc - 1);
+		sink(1, argv + argc - 1, src);
+ 		(void) close(remin);
+ 		remin = remout = -1;
+ 	}
+@@ -823,7 +828,7 @@ bwlimit(int amount)
+ }
+ 
+ void
+-sink(int argc, char **argv)
+sink(int argc, char **argv, const char *src)
+ {
+ 	static BUF buffer;
+ 	struct stat stb;
+@@ -837,6 +842,7 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv)
+ 	off_t size, statbytes;
+ 	int setimes, targisdir, wrerrno = 0;
+ 	char ch, *cp, *np, *targ, *why, *vect[1], buf[2048];
+	char *src_copy = NULL, *restrict_pattern = NULL;
+ 	struct timeval tv[2];
+ 
+ #define	atime	tv[0]
+@@ -858,6 +864,17 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv)
+ 	(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
+ 	if (stat(targ, &stb) == 0 && S_ISDIR(stb.st_mode))
+ 		targisdir = 1;
+	if (src != NULL && !iamrecursive && !Tflag) {
+		/*
+		 * Prepare to try to restrict incoming filenames to match
+		 * the requested destination file glob.
+		 */
+		if ((src_copy = strdup(src)) == NULL)
+			fatal("strdup failed");
+		if ((restrict_pattern = strrchr(src_copy, '/')) != NULL) {
+			*restrict_pattern++ = '\0';
+		}
+	}
+ 	for (first = 1;; first = 0) {
+ 		cp = buf;
+ 		if (atomicio(read, remin, cp, 1) != 1)
+@@ -940,6 +957,9 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv)
+ 			run_err("error: unexpected filename: %s", cp);
+ 			exit(1);
+ 		}
+		if (restrict_pattern != NULL &&
+		    fnmatch(restrict_pattern, cp, 0) != 0)
+			SCREWUP("filename does not match request");
+ 		if (targisdir) {
+ 			static char *namebuf = NULL;
+ 			static size_t cursize = 0;
+@@ -978,7 +998,7 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv)
+ 					goto bad;
+ 			}
+ 			vect[0] = xstrdup(np);
+-			sink(1, vect);
+			sink(1, vect, src);
+ 			if (setimes) {
+ 				setimes = 0;
+ 				if (utimes(vect[0], tv) < 0)
--- a/meta/recipes-core/glib-2.0/glib-2.0/CVE-2025-13601-01.patch
+++ b/meta/recipes-core/glib-2.0/glib-2.0/CVE-2025-13601-01.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+From f28340ee62c655487972ad3c632d231ee098fb7f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Philip Withnall <pwithnall@gnome.org>
+Date: Thu, 13 Nov 2025 18:27:22 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] gconvert: Error out if g_escape_uri_string() would overflow
+
+If the string to escape contains a very large number of unacceptable
+characters (which would need escaping), the calculation of the length of
+the escaped string could overflow, leading to a potential write off the
+end of the newly allocated string.
+
+In addition to that, the number of unacceptable characters was counted
+in a signed integer, which would overflow to become negative, making it
+easier for an attacker to craft an input string which would cause an
+out-of-bounds write.
+
+Fix that by validating the allocation length, and using an unsigned
+integer to count the number of unacceptable characters.
+
+Spotted by treeplus. Thanks to the Sovereign Tech Resilience programme
+from the Sovereign Tech Agency. ID: #YWH-PGM9867-134
+
+Signed-off-by: Philip Withnall <pwithnall@gnome.org>
+
+Fixes: #3827
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-13601
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/-/commit/f28340ee62c655487972ad3c632d231ee098fb7f]
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
+---
+ glib/gconvert.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
+ 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/glib/gconvert.c b/glib/gconvert.c
+index b066dd5a8..a02d2ea73 100644
+--- a/glib/gconvert.c
+++ b/glib/gconvert.c
+@@ -1425,8 +1425,9 @@ static const gchar hex[] = "0123456789ABCDEF";
+ /* Note: This escape function works on file: URIs, but if you want to
+  * escape something else, please read RFC-2396 */
+ static gchar *
+-g_escape_uri_string (const gchar *string, 
+-		     UnsafeCharacterSet mask)
+g_escape_uri_string (const gchar         *string,
+                     UnsafeCharacterSet   mask,
+                     GError             **error)
+ {
+ #define ACCEPTABLE(a) ((a)>=32 && (a)<128 && (acceptable[(a)-32] & use_mask))
+ 
+@@ -1434,7 +1435,7 @@ g_escape_uri_string (const gchar *string,
+   gchar *q;
+   gchar *result;
+   int c;
+-  gint unacceptable;
+  size_t unacceptable;
+   UnsafeCharacterSet use_mask;
+   
+   g_return_val_if_fail (mask == UNSAFE_ALL
+@@ -1451,7 +1452,14 @@ g_escape_uri_string (const gchar *string,
+       if (!ACCEPTABLE (c)) 
+ 	unacceptable++;
+     }
+-  
+
+  if (unacceptable >= (G_MAXSIZE - (p - string)) / 2)
+    {
+      g_set_error_literal (error, G_CONVERT_ERROR, G_CONVERT_ERROR_BAD_URI,
+                           _("The URI is too long"));
+      return NULL;
+    }
+
+   result = g_malloc (p - string + unacceptable * 2 + 1);
+   
+   use_mask = mask;
+@@ -1476,12 +1484,13 @@ g_escape_uri_string (const gchar *string,
+ 
+ 
+ static gchar *
+-g_escape_file_uri (const gchar *hostname,
+-		   const gchar *pathname)
+g_escape_file_uri (const gchar  *hostname,
+                   const gchar  *pathname,
+                   GError      **error)
+ {
+   char *escaped_hostname = NULL;
+-  char *escaped_path;
+-  char *res;
+  char *escaped_path = NULL;
+  char *res = NULL;
+ 
+ #ifdef G_OS_WIN32
+   char *p, *backslash;
+@@ -1502,10 +1511,14 @@ g_escape_file_uri (const gchar *hostname,
+ 
+   if (hostname && *hostname != '\0')
+     {
+-      escaped_hostname = g_escape_uri_string (hostname, UNSAFE_HOST);
+      escaped_hostname = g_escape_uri_string (hostname, UNSAFE_HOST, error);
+      if (escaped_hostname == NULL)
+        goto out;
+     }
+ 
+-  escaped_path = g_escape_uri_string (pathname, UNSAFE_PATH);
+  escaped_path = g_escape_uri_string (pathname, UNSAFE_PATH, error);
+  if (escaped_path == NULL)
+    goto out;
+ 
+   res = g_strconcat ("file://",
+ 		     (escaped_hostname) ? escaped_hostname : "",
+@@ -1513,6 +1526,7 @@ g_escape_file_uri (const gchar *hostname,
+ 		     escaped_path,
+ 		     NULL);
+ 
+out:
+ #ifdef G_OS_WIN32
+   g_free ((char *) pathname);
+ #endif
+@@ -1832,7 +1846,7 @@ g_filename_to_uri (const gchar *filename,
+     hostname = NULL;
+ #endif
+ 
+-  escaped_uri = g_escape_file_uri (hostname, filename);
+  escaped_uri = g_escape_file_uri (hostname, filename, error);
+ 
+   return escaped_uri;
+ }
--- a/meta/recipes-core/glib-2.0/glib-2.0/CVE-2025-13601-02.patch
+++ b/meta/recipes-core/glib-2.0/glib-2.0/CVE-2025-13601-02.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+From 7bd3fc372040cdf8eada7f65c32c30da52a7461d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Philip Withnall <pwithnall@gnome.org>
+Date: Thu, 13 Nov 2025 18:31:43 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] fuzzing: Add fuzz tests for g_filename_{to,from}_uri()
+
+These functions could be called on untrusted input data, and since they
+do URI escaping/unescaping, they have non-trivial string handling code.
+
+Signed-off-by: Philip Withnall <pwithnall@gnome.org>
+
+See: #3827
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-13601
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/-/commit/7bd3fc372040cdf8eada7f65c32c30da52a7461d]
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
+---
+ fuzzing/fuzz_filename_from_uri.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ fuzzing/fuzz_filename_to_uri.c   | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ fuzzing/meson.build              |  2 ++
+ 3 files changed, 82 insertions(+)
+ create mode 100644 fuzzing/fuzz_filename_from_uri.c
+ create mode 100644 fuzzing/fuzz_filename_to_uri.c
+
+diff --git a/fuzzing/fuzz_filename_from_uri.c b/fuzzing/fuzz_filename_from_uri.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 000000000..9b7a715f0
+--- /dev/null
+++ b/fuzzing/fuzz_filename_from_uri.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2025 GNOME Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later
+ *
+ * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
+ * Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License along with this library; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+#include "fuzz.h"
+
+int
+LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput (const unsigned char *data, size_t size)
+{
+  unsigned char *nul_terminated_data = NULL;
+  char *filename = NULL;
+  GError *local_error = NULL;
+
+  fuzz_set_logging_func ();
+
+  /* ignore @size (g_filename_from_uri() doesn’t support it); ensure @data is nul-terminated */
+  nul_terminated_data = (unsigned char *) g_strndup ((const char *) data, size);
+  filename = g_filename_from_uri ((const char *) nul_terminated_data, NULL, &local_error);
+  g_free (nul_terminated_data);
+
+  g_free (filename);
+  g_clear_error (&local_error);
+
+  return 0;
+}
+diff --git a/fuzzing/fuzz_filename_to_uri.c b/fuzzing/fuzz_filename_to_uri.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 000000000..acb319203
+--- /dev/null
+++ b/fuzzing/fuzz_filename_to_uri.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2025 GNOME Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later
+ *
+ * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
+ * Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License along with this library; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+#include "fuzz.h"
+
+int
+LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput (const unsigned char *data, size_t size)
+{
+  unsigned char *nul_terminated_data = NULL;
+  char *uri = NULL;
+  GError *local_error = NULL;
+
+  fuzz_set_logging_func ();
+
+  /* ignore @size (g_filename_to_uri() doesn’t support it); ensure @data is nul-terminated */
+  nul_terminated_data = (unsigned char *) g_strndup ((const char *) data, size);
+  uri = g_filename_to_uri ((const char *) nul_terminated_data, NULL, &local_error);
+  g_free (nul_terminated_data);
+
+  g_free (uri);
+  g_clear_error (&local_error);
+
+  return 0;
+}
+diff --git a/fuzzing/meson.build b/fuzzing/meson.build
+index addbe9071..05f936eeb 100644
+--- a/fuzzing/meson.build
+++ b/fuzzing/meson.build
+@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ fuzz_targets = [
+   'fuzz_date_parse',
+   'fuzz_date_time_new_from_iso8601',
+   'fuzz_dbus_message',
+  'fuzz_filename_from_uri',
+  'fuzz_filename_to_uri',
+   'fuzz_inet_address_mask_new_from_string',
+   'fuzz_inet_address_new_from_string',
+   'fuzz_inet_socket_address_new_from_string',
--- a/meta/recipes-core/glib-2.0/glib-2.0/CVE-2025-14087-01.patch
+++ b/meta/recipes-core/glib-2.0/glib-2.0/CVE-2025-14087-01.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+From 31f82e22e21bae520b7228f7f57d357fb20df8a4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Philip Withnall <pwithnall@gnome.org>
+Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2025 19:02:56 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] gvariant-parser: Fix potential integer overflow parsing
+ (byte)strings
+
+The termination condition for parsing string and bytestring literals in
+GVariant text format input was subject to an integer overflow for input
+string (or bytestring) literals longer than `INT_MAX`.
+
+Fix that by counting as a `size_t` rather than as an `int`. The counter
+can never correctly be negative.
+
+Spotted by treeplus. Thanks to the Sovereign Tech Resilience programme
+from the Sovereign Tech Agency. ID: #YWH-PGM9867-145
+
+Signed-off-by: Philip Withnall <pwithnall@gnome.org>
+Fixes: #3834
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-14087
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/-/commit/31f82e22e21bae520b7228f7f57d357fb20df8a4]
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
+---
+ glib/gvariant-parser.c | 10 +++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/glib/gvariant-parser.c b/glib/gvariant-parser.c
+index 2f1d3db9f..2d6e9856f 100644
+--- a/glib/gvariant-parser.c
+++ b/glib/gvariant-parser.c
+@@ -594,7 +594,7 @@ ast_resolve (AST     *ast,
+ {
+   GVariant *value;
+   gchar *pattern;
+-  gint i, j = 0;
+  size_t i, j = 0;
+ 
+   pattern = ast_get_pattern (ast, error);
+ 
+@@ -1555,9 +1555,9 @@ string_free (AST *ast)
+  * No leading/trailing space allowed. */
+ static gboolean
+ unicode_unescape (const gchar  *src,
+-                  gint         *src_ofs,
+                  size_t       *src_ofs,
+                   gchar        *dest,
+-                  gint         *dest_ofs,
+                  size_t       *dest_ofs,
+                   gsize         length,
+                   SourceRef    *ref,
+                   GError      **error)
+@@ -1618,7 +1618,7 @@ string_parse (TokenStream  *stream,
+   gsize length;
+   gchar quote;
+   gchar *str;
+-  gint i, j;
+  size_t i, j;
+ 
+   token_stream_start_ref (stream, &ref);
+   token = token_stream_get (stream);
+@@ -1748,7 +1748,7 @@ bytestring_parse (TokenStream  *stream,
+   gsize length;
+   gchar quote;
+   gchar *str;
+-  gint i, j;
+  size_t i, j;
+ 
+   token_stream_start_ref (stream, &ref);
+   token = token_stream_get (stream);
--- a/meta/recipes-core/glib-2.0/glib-2.0/CVE-2025-14087-02.patch
+++ b/meta/recipes-core/glib-2.0/glib-2.0/CVE-2025-14087-02.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,240 @@
+From ac9de0871281cf734f6e269988f90a2521582a08 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Philip Withnall <pwithnall@gnome.org>
+Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2025 19:19:16 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] gvariant-parser: Use size_t to count numbers of child
+ elements
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+Rather than using `gint`, which could overflow for arrays (or dicts, or
+tuples) longer than `INT_MAX`. There may be other limits which prevent
+parsed containers becoming that long, but we might as well make the type
+system reflect the programmer’s intention as best it can anyway.
+
+For arrays and tuples this is straightforward. For dictionaries, it’s
+slightly complicated by the fact that the code used
+`dict->n_children == -1` to indicate that the `Dictionary` struct in
+question actually represented a single freestanding dict entry. In
+GVariant text format, that would be `{1, "one"}`.
+
+The implementation previously didn’t define the semantics of
+`dict->n_children < -1`.
+
+Now, instead, change `Dictionary.n_children` to `size_t`, and define a
+magic value `DICTIONARY_N_CHILDREN_FREESTANDING_ENTRY` to indicate that
+the `Dictionary` represents a single freestanding dict entry.
+
+This magic value is `SIZE_MAX`, and given that a dictionary entry takes
+more than one byte to represent in GVariant text format, that means it’s
+not possible to have that many entries in a parsed dictionary, so this
+magic value won’t be hit by a normal dictionary. An assertion checks
+this anyway.
+
+Spotted while working on #3834.
+
+Signed-off-by: Philip Withnall <pwithnall@gnome.org>
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-14087
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/-/commit/ac9de0871281cf734f6e269988f90a2521582a08]
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
+---
+ glib/gvariant-parser.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
+ 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/glib/gvariant-parser.c b/glib/gvariant-parser.c
+index 2d6e9856f..519baa3f3 100644
+--- a/glib/gvariant-parser.c
+++ b/glib/gvariant-parser.c
+@@ -647,9 +647,9 @@ static AST *parse (TokenStream  *stream,
+                    GError      **error);
+ 
+ static void
+-ast_array_append (AST  ***array,
+-                  gint   *n_items,
+-                  AST    *ast)
+ast_array_append (AST    ***array,
+                  size_t   *n_items,
+                  AST      *ast)
+ {
+   if ((*n_items & (*n_items - 1)) == 0)
+     *array = g_renew (AST *, *array, *n_items ? 2 ** n_items : 1);
+@@ -658,10 +658,10 @@ ast_array_append (AST  ***array,
+ }
+ 
+ static void
+-ast_array_free (AST  **array,
+-                gint   n_items)
+ast_array_free (AST    **array,
+                size_t   n_items)
+ {
+-  gint i;
+  size_t i;
+ 
+   for (i = 0; i < n_items; i++)
+     ast_free (array[i]);
+@@ -670,11 +670,11 @@ ast_array_free (AST  **array,
+ 
+ static gchar *
+ ast_array_get_pattern (AST    **array,
+-                       gint     n_items,
+                       size_t   n_items,
+                        GError **error)
+ {
+   gchar *pattern;
+-  gint i;
+  size_t i;
+ 
+   /* Find the pattern which applies to all children in the array, by l-folding a
+    * coalesce operation.
+@@ -706,7 +706,7 @@ ast_array_get_pattern (AST    **array,
+          * pair of values.
+          */
+         {
+-          int j = 0;
+          size_t j = 0;
+ 
+           while (TRUE)
+             {
+@@ -891,7 +891,7 @@ typedef struct
+   AST ast;
+ 
+   AST **children;
+-  gint n_children;
+  size_t n_children;
+ } Array;
+ 
+ static gchar *
+@@ -924,7 +924,7 @@ array_get_value (AST                 *ast,
+   Array *array = (Array *) ast;
+   const GVariantType *childtype;
+   GVariantBuilder builder;
+-  gint i;
+  size_t i;
+ 
+   if (!g_variant_type_is_array (type))
+     return ast_type_error (ast, type, error);
+@@ -1010,7 +1010,7 @@ typedef struct
+   AST ast;
+ 
+   AST **children;
+-  gint n_children;
+  size_t n_children;
+ } Tuple;
+ 
+ static gchar *
+@@ -1020,7 +1020,7 @@ tuple_get_pattern (AST     *ast,
+   Tuple *tuple = (Tuple *) ast;
+   gchar *result = NULL;
+   gchar **parts;
+-  gint i;
+  size_t i;
+ 
+   parts = g_new (gchar *, tuple->n_children + 4);
+   parts[tuple->n_children + 1] = (gchar *) ")";
+@@ -1050,7 +1050,7 @@ tuple_get_value (AST                 *ast,
+   Tuple *tuple = (Tuple *) ast;
+   const GVariantType *childtype;
+   GVariantBuilder builder;
+-  gint i;
+  size_t i;
+ 
+   if (!g_variant_type_is_tuple (type))
+     return ast_type_error (ast, type, error);
+@@ -1242,9 +1242,16 @@ typedef struct
+ 
+   AST **keys;
+   AST **values;
+-  gint n_children;
+
+  /* Iff this is DICTIONARY_N_CHILDREN_FREESTANDING_ENTRY then this struct
+   * represents a single freestanding dict entry (`{1, "one"}`) rather than a
+   * full dict. In the freestanding case, @keys and @values have exactly one
+   * member each. */
+  size_t n_children;
+ } Dictionary;
+ 
+#define DICTIONARY_N_CHILDREN_FREESTANDING_ENTRY ((size_t) -1)
+
+ static gchar *
+ dictionary_get_pattern (AST     *ast,
+                         GError **error)
+@@ -1259,7 +1266,7 @@ dictionary_get_pattern (AST     *ast,
+     return g_strdup ("Ma{**}");
+ 
+   key_pattern = ast_array_get_pattern (dict->keys,
+-                                       abs (dict->n_children),
+                                       (dict->n_children == DICTIONARY_N_CHILDREN_FREESTANDING_ENTRY) ? 1 : dict->n_children,
+                                        error);
+ 
+   if (key_pattern == NULL)
+@@ -1290,7 +1297,7 @@ dictionary_get_pattern (AST     *ast,
+     return NULL;
+ 
+   result = g_strdup_printf ("M%s{%c%s}",
+-                            dict->n_children > 0 ? "a" : "",
+                            (dict->n_children > 0 && dict->n_children != DICTIONARY_N_CHILDREN_FREESTANDING_ENTRY) ? "a" : "",
+                             key_char, value_pattern);
+   g_free (value_pattern);
+ 
+@@ -1304,7 +1311,7 @@ dictionary_get_value (AST                 *ast,
+ {
+   Dictionary *dict = (Dictionary *) ast;
+ 
+-  if (dict->n_children == -1)
+  if (dict->n_children == DICTIONARY_N_CHILDREN_FREESTANDING_ENTRY)
+     {
+       const GVariantType *subtype;
+       GVariantBuilder builder;
+@@ -1337,7 +1344,7 @@ dictionary_get_value (AST                 *ast,
+     {
+       const GVariantType *entry, *key, *val;
+       GVariantBuilder builder;
+-      gint i;
+      size_t i;
+ 
+       if (!g_variant_type_is_subtype_of (type, G_VARIANT_TYPE_DICTIONARY))
+         return ast_type_error (ast, type, error);
+@@ -1378,12 +1385,12 @@ static void
+ dictionary_free (AST *ast)
+ {
+   Dictionary *dict = (Dictionary *) ast;
+-  gint n_children;
+  size_t n_children;
+ 
+-  if (dict->n_children > -1)
+-    n_children = dict->n_children;
+-  else
+  if (dict->n_children == DICTIONARY_N_CHILDREN_FREESTANDING_ENTRY)
+     n_children = 1;
+  else
+    n_children = dict->n_children;
+ 
+   ast_array_free (dict->keys, n_children);
+   ast_array_free (dict->values, n_children);
+@@ -1401,7 +1408,7 @@ dictionary_parse (TokenStream  *stream,
+     maybe_wrapper, dictionary_get_value,
+     dictionary_free
+   };
+-  gint n_keys, n_values;
+  size_t n_keys, n_values;
+   gboolean only_one;
+   Dictionary *dict;
+   AST *first;
+@@ -1444,7 +1451,7 @@ dictionary_parse (TokenStream  *stream,
+         goto error;
+ 
+       g_assert (n_keys == 1 && n_values == 1);
+-      dict->n_children = -1;
+      dict->n_children = DICTIONARY_N_CHILDREN_FREESTANDING_ENTRY;
+ 
+       return (AST *) dict;
+     }
+@@ -1477,6 +1484,7 @@ dictionary_parse (TokenStream  *stream,
+     }
+ 
+   g_assert (n_keys == n_values);
+  g_assert (n_keys != DICTIONARY_N_CHILDREN_FREESTANDING_ENTRY);
+   dict->n_children = n_keys;
+ 
+   return (AST *) dict;
--- a/meta/recipes-core/glib-2.0/glib-2.0/CVE-2025-14087-03.patch
+++ b/meta/recipes-core/glib-2.0/glib-2.0/CVE-2025-14087-03.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
+From acaabfedff42e974334dd5368e6103d2845aaba6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Philip Withnall <pwithnall@gnome.org>
+Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2025 19:25:58 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] gvariant-parser: Convert error handling code to use size_t
+
+The error handling code allows for printing out the range of input bytes
+related to a parsing error. This was previously done using `gint`, but
+the input could be longer than `INT_MAX`, so it should really be done
+using `size_t`.
+
+Spotted while working on #3834.
+
+Signed-off-by: Philip Withnall <pwithnall@gnome.org>
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-14087
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/-/commit/acaabfedff42e974334dd5368e6103d2845aaba6]
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
+---
+ glib/gvariant-parser.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
+ 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/glib/gvariant-parser.c b/glib/gvariant-parser.c
+index 519baa3f3..1b1ddd654 100644
+--- a/glib/gvariant-parser.c
+++ b/glib/gvariant-parser.c
+@@ -88,7 +88,9 @@ g_variant_parser_get_error_quark (void)
+ 
+ typedef struct
+ {
+-  gint start, end;
+  /* Offsets from the start of the input, in bytes. Can be equal when referring
+   * to a point rather than a range. The invariant `end >= start` always holds. */
+  size_t start, end;
+ } SourceRef;
+ 
+ G_GNUC_PRINTF(5, 0)
+@@ -103,14 +105,16 @@ parser_set_error_va (GError      **error,
+   GString *msg = g_string_new (NULL);
+ 
+   if (location->start == location->end)
+-    g_string_append_printf (msg, "%d", location->start);
+    g_string_append_printf (msg, "%" G_GSIZE_FORMAT, location->start);
+   else
+-    g_string_append_printf (msg, "%d-%d", location->start, location->end);
+    g_string_append_printf (msg, "%" G_GSIZE_FORMAT "-%" G_GSIZE_FORMAT,
+                            location->start, location->end);
+ 
+   if (other != NULL)
+     {
+       g_assert (other->start != other->end);
+-      g_string_append_printf (msg, ",%d-%d", other->start, other->end);
+      g_string_append_printf (msg, ",%" G_GSIZE_FORMAT "-%" G_GSIZE_FORMAT,
+                              other->start, other->end);
+     }
+   g_string_append_c (msg, ':');
+ 
+@@ -137,11 +141,15 @@ parser_set_error (GError      **error,
+ 
+ typedef struct
+ {
+  /* We should always have the following ordering constraint:
+   *   start <= this <= stream <= end
+   * Additionally, unless in an error or EOF state, `this < stream`.
+   */
+   const gchar *start;
+   const gchar *stream;
+   const gchar *end;
+ 
+-  const gchar *this;
+  const gchar *this;  /* (nullable) */
+ } TokenStream;
+ 
+ 
+@@ -172,7 +180,7 @@ token_stream_set_error (TokenStream  *stream,
+ static gboolean
+ token_stream_prepare (TokenStream *stream)
+ {
+-  gint brackets = 0;
+  gssize brackets = 0;
+   const gchar *end;
+ 
+   if (stream->this != NULL)
+@@ -402,7 +410,7 @@ static void
+ pattern_copy (gchar       **out,
+               const gchar **in)
+ {
+-  gint brackets = 0;
+  gssize brackets = 0;
+ 
+   while (**in == 'a' || **in == 'm' || **in == 'M')
+     *(*out)++ = *(*in)++;
+@@ -2666,7 +2674,7 @@ g_variant_builder_add_parsed (GVariantBuilder *builder,
+ static gboolean
+ parse_num (const gchar *num,
+            const gchar *limit,
+-           guint       *result)
+           size_t      *result)
+ {
+   gchar *endptr;
+   gint64 bignum;
+@@ -2676,10 +2684,12 @@ parse_num (const gchar *num,
+   if (endptr != limit)
+     return FALSE;
+ 
+  /* The upper bound here is more restrictive than it technically needs to be,
+   * but should be enough for any practical situation: */
+   if (bignum < 0 || bignum > G_MAXINT)
+     return FALSE;
+ 
+-  *result = (guint) bignum;
+  *result = (size_t) bignum;
+ 
+   return TRUE;
+ }
+@@ -2690,7 +2700,7 @@ add_last_line (GString     *err,
+ {
+   const gchar *last_nl;
+   gchar *chomped;
+-  gint i;
+  size_t i;
+ 
+   /* This is an error at the end of input.  If we have a file
+    * with newlines, that's probably the empty string after the
+@@ -2835,7 +2845,7 @@ g_variant_parse_error_print_context (GError      *error,
+ 
+   if (dash == NULL || colon < dash)
+     {
+-      guint point;
+      size_t point;
+ 
+       /* we have a single point */
+       if (!parse_num (error->message, colon, &point))
+@@ -2853,7 +2863,7 @@ g_variant_parse_error_print_context (GError      *error,
+       /* We have one or two ranges... */
+       if (comma && comma < colon)
+         {
+-          guint start1, end1, start2, end2;
+          size_t start1, end1, start2, end2;
+           const gchar *dash2;
+ 
+           /* Two ranges */
+@@ -2869,7 +2879,7 @@ g_variant_parse_error_print_context (GError      *error,
+         }
+       else
+         {
+-          guint start, end;
+          size_t start, end;
+ 
+           /* One range */
+           if (!parse_num (error->message, dash, &start) || !parse_num (dash + 1, colon, &end))
--- a/meta/recipes-core/glib-2.0/glib-2.0/CVE-2025-14512.patch
+++ b/meta/recipes-core/glib-2.0/glib-2.0/CVE-2025-14512.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+From 1909d8ea9297287f1ff6862968608dcf06e60523 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Philip Withnall <pwithnall@gnome.org>
+Date: Thu, 4 Dec 2025 16:37:19 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] gfileattribute: Fix integer overflow calculating escaping for
+ byte strings
+
+The number of invalid characters in the byte string (characters which
+would have to be percent-encoded) was only stored in an `int`, which
+gave the possibility of a long string largely full of invalid
+characters overflowing this and allowing an attacker-controlled buffer
+size to be allocated.
+
+This could be triggered by an attacker controlled file attribute (of
+type `G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_BYTE_STRING`), such as
+`G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_THUMBNAIL_PATH` or `G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_STANDARD_NAME`,
+being read by user code.
+
+Spotted by Codean Labs.
+
+Signed-off-by: Philip Withnall <pwithnall@gnome.org>
+
+Fixes: #3845
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-14512
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/-/commit/1909d8ea9297287f1ff6862968608dcf06e60523]
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
+---
+ gio/gfileattribute.c | 11 +++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/gio/gfileattribute.c b/gio/gfileattribute.c
+index c6fde60fa..d3083e5bd 100644
+--- a/gio/gfileattribute.c
+++ b/gio/gfileattribute.c
+@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
+ 
+ #include "config.h"
+ 
+#include <stdint.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+ 
+ #include "gfileattribute.h"
+@@ -271,11 +272,12 @@ valid_char (char c)
+   return c >= 32 && c <= 126 && c != '\\';
+ }
+ 
+/* Returns NULL on error */
+ static char *
+ escape_byte_string (const char *str)
+ {
+   size_t i, len;
+-  int num_invalid;
+  size_t num_invalid;
+   char *escaped_val, *p;
+   unsigned char c;
+   const char hex_digits[] = "0123456789abcdef";
+@@ -293,7 +295,12 @@ escape_byte_string (const char *str)
+     return g_strdup (str);
+   else
+     {
+-      escaped_val = g_malloc (len + num_invalid*3 + 1);
+      /* Check for overflow. We want to check the inequality:
+       * !(len + num_invalid * 3 + 1 > SIZE_MAX) */
+      if (num_invalid >= (SIZE_MAX - len) / 3)
+        return NULL;
+
+      escaped_val = g_malloc (len + num_invalid * 3 + 1);
+ 
+       p = escaped_val;
+       for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
--- a/meta/recipes-core/glib-2.0/glib-2.0_2.72.3.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-core/glib-2.0/glib-2.0_2.72.3.bb
@@ -64,6 +64,12 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNOME_MIRROR}/glib/${SHRT_VER}/glib-${PV}.tar.xz \
           file://CVE-2025-4373-02.patch \
           file://CVE-2025-7039-01.patch \
           file://CVE-2025-7039-02.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-13601-01.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-13601-02.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-14087-01.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-14087-02.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-14087-03.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-14512.patch \
           "
 SRC_URI:append:class-native = " file://relocate-modules.patch"

--- a/meta/recipes-core/images/build-appliance-image_15.0.0.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-core/images/build-appliance-image_15.0.0.bb
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ IMAGE_FSTYPES = "wic.vmdk wic.vhd wic.vhdx"

 inherit core-image setuptools3

-SRCREV ?= "cb1206dd8460f2701df03b1e9224825bad23a90e"
+SRCREV ?= "ff118ede826a9ae45eb35025a5f7f612880fba01"
 SRC_URI = "git://git.yoctoproject.org/poky;branch=kirkstone \
           file://Yocto_Build_Appliance.vmx \
           file://Yocto_Build_Appliance.vmxf \
--- a/meta/recipes-core/util-linux/util-linux.inc
+++ b/meta/recipes-core/util-linux/util-linux.inc
@@ -42,6 +42,8 @@ SRC_URI = "${KERNELORG_MIRROR}/linux/utils/util-linux/v${MAJOR_VERSION}/util-lin
           file://CVE-2024-28085-0004.patch \
           file://CVE-2024-28085-0005.patch \
 	   file://fstab-isolation.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-14104-01.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-14104-02.patch \
           "

 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "634e6916ad913366c3536b6468e7844769549b99a7b2bf80314de78ab5655b83"
--- a/meta/recipes-core/util-linux/util-linux/CVE-2025-14104-01.patch
+++ b/meta/recipes-core/util-linux/util-linux/CVE-2025-14104-01.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+From aaa9e718c88d6916b003da7ebcfe38a3c88df8e6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mohamed Maatallah <hotelsmaatallahrecemail@gmail.com>
+Date: Sat, 24 May 2025 03:16:09 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Update setpwnam.c
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-14104
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/util-linux/util-linux/commit/aaa9e718c88d6916b003da7ebcfe38a3c88df8e6]
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
+---
+ login-utils/setpwnam.c | 10 ++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/login-utils/setpwnam.c b/login-utils/setpwnam.c
+index 3e3c1abde..95e470b5a 100644
+--- a/login-utils/setpwnam.c
+++ b/login-utils/setpwnam.c
+@@ -126,10 +126,12 @@ int setpwnam(struct passwd *pwd, const char *prefix)
+ 		}
+ 
+ 		/* Is this the username we were sent to change? */
+-		if (!found && linebuf[namelen] == ':' &&
+-		    !strncmp(linebuf, pwd->pw_name, namelen)) {
+-			/* Yes! So go forth in the name of the Lord and
+-			 * change it!  */
+		if (!found &&
+		    strncmp(linebuf, pwd->pw_name, namelen) == 0 &&
+		    strlen(linebuf) > namelen &&
+		    linebuf[namelen] == ':') {
+			/* Yes! But this time let’s not walk past the end of the buffer
+			 * in the name of the Lord, SUID, or anything else. */
+ 			if (putpwent(pwd, fp) < 0)
+ 				goto fail;
+ 			found = 1;
--- a/meta/recipes-core/util-linux/util-linux/CVE-2025-14104-02.patch
+++ b/meta/recipes-core/util-linux/util-linux/CVE-2025-14104-02.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+From 9a36d77012c4c771f8d51eba46b6e62c29bf572a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mohamed Maatallah <hotelsmaatallahrecemail@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 26 May 2025 10:06:02 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Update bufflen
+
+Update buflen
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-14104
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/util-linux/util-linux/commit/9a36d77012c4c771f8d51eba46b6e62c29bf572a]
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
+---
+ login-utils/setpwnam.c | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/login-utils/setpwnam.c b/login-utils/setpwnam.c
+index 95e470b5a..7778e98f7 100644
+--- a/login-utils/setpwnam.c
+++ b/login-utils/setpwnam.c
+@@ -99,7 +99,8 @@ int setpwnam(struct passwd *pwd, const char *prefix)
+ 		goto fail;
+ 
+ 	namelen = strlen(pwd->pw_name);
+-
+	if (namelen > buflen)
+		buflen += namelen;
+ 	linebuf = malloc(buflen);
+ 	if (!linebuf)
+ 		goto fail;
--- a/meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils-2.38.inc
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils-2.38.inc
@@ -86,5 +86,10 @@ SRC_URI = "\
     file://0047-CVE-2025-8225.patch \
     file://CVE-2025-11412.patch \
     file://CVE-2025-11413.patch \
+     file://0048-CVE-2025-11494.patch \
+     file://0049-CVE-2025-11839.patch \
+     file://0050-CVE-2025-11840.patch \
+     file://CVE-2025-1181-pre.patch \
+     file://CVE-2025-1181.patch \
 "
 S  = "${WORKDIR}/git"
--- a/meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/0048-CVE-2025-11494.patch
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/0048-CVE-2025-11494.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+From: "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>
+Date: Tue, 30 Sep 2025 08:13:56 +0800
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://sourceware.org/git/?p=binutils-gdb.git;a=patch;h=b6ac5a8a5b82f0ae6a4642c8d7149b325f4cc60a]
+CVE: CVE-2025-11494
+
+Since x86 .eh_frame section may reference _GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_, keep
+_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_ if there is dynamic section and the output
+.eh_frame section is non-empty.
+
+	PR ld/33499
+	* elfxx-x86.c (_bfd_x86_elf_late_size_sections): Keep
+	_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_ if there is dynamic section and the
+	output .eh_frame section is non-empty.
+
+Signed-off-by: Deepesh Varatharajan <Deepesh.Varatharajan@windriver.com>
+
+diff --git a/bfd/elfxx-x86.c b/bfd/elfxx-x86.c
+index c054f7cd..ddc15945 100644
+--- a/bfd/elfxx-x86.c
+++ b/bfd/elfxx-x86.c
+@@ -2447,6 +2447,8 @@ _bfd_x86_elf_late_size_sections (bfd *output_bfd,
+ 
+   if (htab->elf.sgotplt)
+     {
+      asection *eh_frame;
+
+       /* Don't allocate .got.plt section if there are no GOT nor PLT
+ 	 entries and there is no reference to _GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_.  */
+       if ((htab->elf.hgot == NULL
+@@ -2459,7 +2461,11 @@ _bfd_x86_elf_late_size_sections (bfd *output_bfd,
+ 	  && (htab->elf.iplt == NULL
+ 	      || htab->elf.iplt->size == 0)
+ 	  && (htab->elf.igotplt == NULL
+-	      || htab->elf.igotplt->size == 0))
+             || htab->elf.igotplt->size == 0)
+         && (!htab->elf.dynamic_sections_created
+             || (eh_frame = bfd_get_section_by_name (output_bfd,
+                                                     ".eh_frame")) == NULL
+             || eh_frame->rawsize == 0))
+ 	{
+ 	  htab->elf.sgotplt->size = 0;
+ 	  /* Solaris requires to keep _GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_ even if it
--- a/meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/0049-CVE-2025-11839.patch
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/0049-CVE-2025-11839.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+From 12ef7d5b7b02d0023db645d86eb9d0797bc747fe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Nick Clifton <nickc@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2025 11:49:02 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Remove call to abort in the DGB debug format printing code,
+ thus allowing the display of a fuzzed input file to complete without
+ triggering an abort.
+
+PR 33448
+---
+ binutils/prdbg.c | 1 -
+ 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://sourceware.org/git/?p=binutils-gdb.git;a=commitdiff;h=12ef7d5b7b02d0023db645d86eb9d0797bc747fe]
+CVE: CVE-2025-11839
+
+Signed-off-by: Yash Shinde <Yash.Shinde@windriver.com>
+
+diff --git a/binutils/prdbg.c b/binutils/prdbg.c
+index c239aeb1a79..5d405c48e3d 100644
+--- a/binutils/prdbg.c
+++ b/binutils/prdbg.c
+@@ -2449,7 +2449,6 @@ tg_tag_type (void *p, const char *name, unsigned int id,
+       t = "union class ";
+       break;
+     default:
+-      abort ();
+       return false;
+     }
+ 
+-- 
+2.43.7
+
--- a/meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/0050-CVE-2025-11840.patch
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/0050-CVE-2025-11840.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+From f6b0f53a36820da91eadfa9f466c22f92e4256e0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alan Modra <amodra@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2025 09:03:37 +1030
+Subject: [PATCH] PR 33455 SEGV in vfinfo at ldmisc.c:527
+
+A reloc howto set up with EMPTY_HOWTO has a NULL name.  More than one
+place emitting diagnostics assumes a reloc howto won't have a NULL
+name.
+
+	PR 33455
+	* coffcode.h (coff_slurp_reloc_table): Don't allow a howto with
+	a NULL name.
+---
+ bfd/coffcode.h | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://sourceware.org/git/?p=binutils-gdb.git;a=commitdiff;h=f6b0f53a36820da91eadfa9f466c22f92e4256e0]
+CVE: CVE-2025-11840
+
+Signed-off-by: Yash Shinde <Yash.Shinde@windriver.com>
+
+diff --git a/bfd/coffcode.h b/bfd/coffcode.h
+index 1e5acc0032c..ce1e39131b4 100644
+--- a/bfd/coffcode.h
+++ b/bfd/coffcode.h
+@@ -5345,7 +5345,7 @@ coff_slurp_reloc_table (bfd * abfd, sec_ptr asect, asymbol ** symbols)
+       RTYPE2HOWTO (cache_ptr, &dst);
+ #endif	/* RELOC_PROCESSING */
+ 
+-      if (cache_ptr->howto == NULL)
+      if (cache_ptr->howto == NULL || cache_ptr->howto->name == NULL)
+ 	{
+ 	  _bfd_error_handler
+ 	    /* xgettext:c-format */
+-- 
+2.43.7
+
--- a/meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/CVE-2025-1181-pre.patch
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/CVE-2025-1181-pre.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+Backported of:
+
+From 18cc11a2771d9e40180485da9a4fb660c03efac3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Nick Clifton <nickc@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 5 Feb 2025 14:31:10 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Prevent illegal memory access when checking relocs in a
+ corrupt ELF binary.
+
+PR 32641
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [import from ubuntu https://git.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/binutils/tree/debian/patches/CVE-2025-1181-pre.patch?h=ubuntu/jammy-security
+Upstream commit https://sourceware.org/git/gitweb.cgi?p=binutils-gdb.git;h=18cc11a2771d9e40180485da9a4fb660c03efac3]
+CVE: CVE-2025-1181
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ bfd/elf-bfd.h      |  3 +++
+ bfd/elf64-x86-64.c | 10 +++++-----
+ bfd/elflink.c      | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ bfd/elfxx-x86.c    | 20 +++++++-------------
+ 4 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
+Index: binutils-2.38/bfd/elf-bfd.h
+===================================================================
+--- binutils-2.38.orig/bfd/elf-bfd.h
+++ binutils-2.38/bfd/elf-bfd.h
+@@ -3007,6 +3007,9 @@ extern bool _bfd_elf_maybe_set_textrel
+ extern bool _bfd_elf_add_dynamic_tags
+   (bfd *, struct bfd_link_info *, bool);
+ 
+extern struct elf_link_hash_entry * _bfd_elf_get_link_hash_entry
+  (struct elf_link_hash_entry **, unsigned int, Elf_Internal_Shdr *);
+
+ /* Large common section.  */
+ extern asection _bfd_elf_large_com_section;
+ 
+Index: binutils-2.38/bfd/elf64-x86-64.c
+===================================================================
+--- binutils-2.38.orig/bfd/elf64-x86-64.c
+++ binutils-2.38/bfd/elf64-x86-64.c
+@@ -1484,7 +1484,7 @@ elf_x86_64_convert_load_reloc (bfd *abfd
+   bool to_reloc_pc32;
+   bool abs_symbol;
+   bool local_ref;
+-  asection *tsec;
+  asection *tsec = NULL;
+   bfd_signed_vma raddend;
+   unsigned int opcode;
+   unsigned int modrm;
+@@ -1639,6 +1639,9 @@ elf_x86_64_convert_load_reloc (bfd *abfd
+ 	return true;
+     }
+ 
+  if (tsec == NULL)
+    return false;
+
+   /* Don't convert GOTPCREL relocation against large section.  */
+   if (elf_section_data (tsec) !=  NULL
+       && (elf_section_flags (tsec) & SHF_X86_64_LARGE) != 0)
+@@ -1915,10 +1918,7 @@ elf_x86_64_scan_relocs (bfd *abfd, struc
+       else
+ 	{
+ 	  isym = NULL;
+-	  h = sym_hashes[r_symndx - symtab_hdr->sh_info];
+-	  while (h->root.type == bfd_link_hash_indirect
+-		 || h->root.type == bfd_link_hash_warning)
+-	    h = (struct elf_link_hash_entry *) h->root.u.i.link;
+	  h = _bfd_elf_get_link_hash_entry (sym_hashes, r_symndx, symtab_hdr);
+ 	}
+ 
+       /* Check invalid x32 relocations.  */
+Index: binutils-2.38/bfd/elflink.c
+===================================================================
+--- binutils-2.38.orig/bfd/elflink.c
+++ binutils-2.38/bfd/elflink.c
+@@ -62,6 +62,27 @@ struct elf_find_verdep_info
+ static bool _bfd_elf_fix_symbol_flags
+   (struct elf_link_hash_entry *, struct elf_info_failed *);
+ 
+struct elf_link_hash_entry *
+_bfd_elf_get_link_hash_entry (struct elf_link_hash_entry **  sym_hashes,
+			      unsigned int                   symndx,
+			      Elf_Internal_Shdr *            symtab_hdr)
+{
+  if (symndx < symtab_hdr->sh_info)
+    return NULL;
+
+  struct elf_link_hash_entry *h = sym_hashes[symndx - symtab_hdr->sh_info];
+
+  /* The hash might be empty.  See PR 32641 for an example of this.  */
+  if (h == NULL)
+    return NULL;
+
+  while (h->root.type == bfd_link_hash_indirect
+	 || h->root.type == bfd_link_hash_warning)
+    h = (struct elf_link_hash_entry *) h->root.u.i.link;
+
+  return h;
+}
+
+ static struct elf_link_hash_entry *
+ get_ext_sym_hash (struct elf_reloc_cookie *cookie, unsigned long r_symndx)
+ {
+@@ -75,6 +96,9 @@ get_ext_sym_hash (struct elf_reloc_cooki
+ 
+       h = cookie->sym_hashes[r_symndx - cookie->extsymoff];
+ 
+      if (h == NULL)
+	return NULL;
+
+       while (h->root.type == bfd_link_hash_indirect
+ 	     || h->root.type == bfd_link_hash_warning)
+ 	h = (struct elf_link_hash_entry *) h->root.u.i.link;
+Index: binutils-2.38/bfd/elfxx-x86.c
+===================================================================
+--- binutils-2.38.orig/bfd/elfxx-x86.c
+++ binutils-2.38/bfd/elfxx-x86.c
+@@ -973,15 +973,7 @@ _bfd_x86_elf_check_relocs (bfd *abfd,
+ 	  goto error_return;
+ 	}
+ 
+-      if (r_symndx < symtab_hdr->sh_info)
+-	h = NULL;
+-      else
+-	{
+-	  h = sym_hashes[r_symndx - symtab_hdr->sh_info];
+-	  while (h->root.type == bfd_link_hash_indirect
+-		 || h->root.type == bfd_link_hash_warning)
+-	    h = (struct elf_link_hash_entry *) h->root.u.i.link;
+-	}
+      h = _bfd_elf_get_link_hash_entry (sym_hashes, r_symndx, symtab_hdr);
+ 
+       if (X86_NEED_DYNAMIC_RELOC_TYPE_P (is_x86_64, r_type)
+ 	  && NEED_DYNAMIC_RELOCATION_P (is_x86_64, info, true, h, sec,
+@@ -1200,10 +1192,12 @@ _bfd_x86_elf_link_relax_section (bfd *ab
+       else
+ 	{
+ 	  /* Get H and SEC for GENERATE_DYNAMIC_RELOCATION_P below.  */
+-	  h = sym_hashes[r_symndx - symtab_hdr->sh_info];
+-	  while (h->root.type == bfd_link_hash_indirect
+-		 || h->root.type == bfd_link_hash_warning)
+-	    h = (struct elf_link_hash_entry *) h->root.u.i.link;
+	  h = _bfd_elf_get_link_hash_entry (sym_hashes, r_symndx, symtab_hdr);
+	  if (h == NULL)
+	    {
+	      /* FIXMEL: Issue an error message ?  */
+	      continue;
+	    }
+ 
+ 	  if (h->root.type == bfd_link_hash_defined
+ 	      || h->root.type == bfd_link_hash_defweak)
--- a/meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/CVE-2025-1181.patch
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/CVE-2025-1181.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,342 @@
+Backported of:
+
+From 931494c9a89558acb36a03a340c01726545eef24 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Nick Clifton <nickc@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 5 Feb 2025 15:43:04 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Add even more checks for corrupt input when processing
+ relocations for ELF files.
+
+PR 32643
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [import from ubuntu https://git.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/binutils/tree/debian/patches/CVE-2025-1181.patch?h=ubuntu/jammy-security
+Upstream commit https://sourceware.org/git/gitweb.cgi?p=binutils-gdb.git;h=931494c9a89558acb36a03a340c01726545eef24]
+CVE: CVE-2025-1181
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+
+Index: binutils-2.38/bfd/elflink.c
+===================================================================
+--- binutils-2.38.orig/bfd/elflink.c
+++ binutils-2.38/bfd/elflink.c
+@@ -62,15 +62,17 @@ struct elf_find_verdep_info
+ static bool _bfd_elf_fix_symbol_flags
+   (struct elf_link_hash_entry *, struct elf_info_failed *);
+ 
+-struct elf_link_hash_entry *
+-_bfd_elf_get_link_hash_entry (struct elf_link_hash_entry **  sym_hashes,
+-			      unsigned int                   symndx,
+-			      Elf_Internal_Shdr *            symtab_hdr)
+static struct elf_link_hash_entry *
+get_link_hash_entry (struct elf_link_hash_entry **  sym_hashes,
+		     unsigned int                   symndx,
+		     unsigned int                   ext_sym_start)
+ {
+-  if (symndx < symtab_hdr->sh_info)
+  if (sym_hashes == NULL
+      /* Guard against corrupt input.  See PR 32636 for an example.  */
+      || symndx < ext_sym_start)
+     return NULL;
+ 
+-  struct elf_link_hash_entry *h = sym_hashes[symndx - symtab_hdr->sh_info];
+  struct elf_link_hash_entry *h = sym_hashes[symndx - ext_sym_start];
+ 
+   /* The hash might be empty.  See PR 32641 for an example of this.  */
+   if (h == NULL)
+@@ -83,29 +85,28 @@ _bfd_elf_get_link_hash_entry (struct elf
+   return h;
+ }
+ 
+-static struct elf_link_hash_entry *
+-get_ext_sym_hash (struct elf_reloc_cookie *cookie, unsigned long r_symndx)
+struct elf_link_hash_entry *
+_bfd_elf_get_link_hash_entry (struct elf_link_hash_entry **  sym_hashes,
+			      unsigned int                   symndx,
+			      Elf_Internal_Shdr *            symtab_hdr)
+ {
+-  struct elf_link_hash_entry *h = NULL;
+-
+-  if ((r_symndx >= cookie->locsymcount
+-       || ELF_ST_BIND (cookie->locsyms[r_symndx].st_info) != STB_LOCAL)
+-      /* Guard against corrupt input.  See PR 32636 for an example.  */
+-      && r_symndx >= cookie->extsymoff)
+-    {
+-
+-      h = cookie->sym_hashes[r_symndx - cookie->extsymoff];
+-
+-      if (h == NULL)
+-	return NULL;
+  if (symtab_hdr == NULL)
+    return NULL;
+ 
+-      while (h->root.type == bfd_link_hash_indirect
+-	     || h->root.type == bfd_link_hash_warning)
+-	h = (struct elf_link_hash_entry *) h->root.u.i.link;
+  return get_link_hash_entry (sym_hashes, symndx, symtab_hdr->sh_info);
+}
+ 
+-    }
+static struct elf_link_hash_entry *
+get_ext_sym_hash_from_cookie (struct elf_reloc_cookie *cookie, unsigned long r_symndx)
+{
+  if (cookie == NULL || cookie->sym_hashes == NULL)
+    return NULL;
+  
+  if (r_symndx >= cookie->locsymcount
+      || ELF_ST_BIND (cookie->locsyms[r_symndx].st_info) != STB_LOCAL)
+    return get_link_hash_entry (cookie->sym_hashes, r_symndx, cookie->extsymoff);
+ 
+-  return h;
+  return NULL;
+ }
+  
+ asection *
+@@ -115,7 +116,7 @@ _bfd_elf_section_for_symbol (struct elf_
+ {
+   struct elf_link_hash_entry *h;
+ 
+-  h = get_ext_sym_hash (cookie, r_symndx);
+  h = get_ext_sym_hash_from_cookie (cookie, r_symndx);
+   
+   if (h != NULL)
+     {
+@@ -8783,7 +8784,6 @@ set_symbol_value (bfd *bfd_with_globals,
+ 		  size_t symidx,
+ 		  bfd_vma val)
+ {
+-  struct elf_link_hash_entry **sym_hashes;
+   struct elf_link_hash_entry *h;
+   size_t extsymoff = locsymcount;
+ 
+@@ -8806,12 +8806,12 @@ set_symbol_value (bfd *bfd_with_globals,
+ 
+   /* It is a global symbol: set its link type
+      to "defined" and give it a value.  */
+-
+-  sym_hashes = elf_sym_hashes (bfd_with_globals);
+-  h = sym_hashes [symidx - extsymoff];
+-  while (h->root.type == bfd_link_hash_indirect
+-	 || h->root.type == bfd_link_hash_warning)
+-    h = (struct elf_link_hash_entry *) h->root.u.i.link;
+  h = get_link_hash_entry (elf_sym_hashes (bfd_with_globals), symidx, extsymoff);
+  if (h == NULL)
+    {
+      /* FIXMEL What should we do ?  */
+      return;
+    }
+   h->root.type = bfd_link_hash_defined;
+   h->root.u.def.value = val;
+   h->root.u.def.section = bfd_abs_section_ptr;
+@@ -11281,10 +11281,19 @@ elf_link_input_bfd (struct elf_final_lin
+ 	      || (elf_bad_symtab (input_bfd)
+ 		  && flinfo->sections[symndx] == NULL))
+ 	    {
+-	      struct elf_link_hash_entry *h = sym_hashes[symndx - extsymoff];
+-	      while (h->root.type == bfd_link_hash_indirect
+-		     || h->root.type == bfd_link_hash_warning)
+-		h = (struct elf_link_hash_entry *) h->root.u.i.link;
+	      struct elf_link_hash_entry *h;
+
+	      h = get_link_hash_entry (sym_hashes, symndx, extsymoff);
+	      if (h == NULL)
+		{
+		  _bfd_error_handler
+		    /* xgettext:c-format */
+		    (_("error: %pB: unable to create group section symbol"),
+		     input_bfd);
+		  bfd_set_error (bfd_error_bad_value);
+		  return false;
+		}	      
+
+ 	      /* Arrange for symbol to be output.  */
+ 	      h->indx = -2;
+ 	      elf_section_data (osec)->this_hdr.sh_info = -2;
+@@ -11411,7 +11420,7 @@ elf_link_input_bfd (struct elf_final_lin
+ 		  || (elf_bad_symtab (input_bfd)
+ 		      && flinfo->sections[r_symndx] == NULL))
+ 		{
+-		  h = sym_hashes[r_symndx - extsymoff];
+		  h = get_link_hash_entry (sym_hashes, r_symndx, extsymoff);
+ 
+ 		  /* Badly formatted input files can contain relocs that
+ 		     reference non-existant symbols.  Check here so that
+@@ -11420,17 +11429,13 @@ elf_link_input_bfd (struct elf_final_lin
+ 		    {
+ 		      _bfd_error_handler
+ 			/* xgettext:c-format */
+-			(_("error: %pB contains a reloc (%#" PRIx64 ") for section %pA "
+			(_("error: %pB contains a reloc (%#" PRIx64 ") for section '%pA' "
+ 			   "that references a non-existent global symbol"),
+ 			 input_bfd, (uint64_t) rel->r_info, o);
+ 		      bfd_set_error (bfd_error_bad_value);
+ 		      return false;
+ 		    }
+ 
+-		  while (h->root.type == bfd_link_hash_indirect
+-			 || h->root.type == bfd_link_hash_warning)
+-		    h = (struct elf_link_hash_entry *) h->root.u.i.link;
+-
+ 		  s_type = h->type;
+ 
+ 		  /* If a plugin symbol is referenced from a non-IR file,
+@@ -11646,7 +11651,6 @@ elf_link_input_bfd (struct elf_final_lin
+ 			  && flinfo->sections[r_symndx] == NULL))
+ 		    {
+ 		      struct elf_link_hash_entry *rh;
+-		      unsigned long indx;
+ 
+ 		      /* This is a reloc against a global symbol.  We
+ 			 have not yet output all the local symbols, so
+@@ -11655,15 +11659,16 @@ elf_link_input_bfd (struct elf_final_lin
+ 			 reloc to point to the global hash table entry
+ 			 for this symbol.  The symbol index is then
+ 			 set at the end of bfd_elf_final_link.  */
+-		      indx = r_symndx - extsymoff;
+-		      rh = elf_sym_hashes (input_bfd)[indx];
+-		      while (rh->root.type == bfd_link_hash_indirect
+-			     || rh->root.type == bfd_link_hash_warning)
+-			rh = (struct elf_link_hash_entry *) rh->root.u.i.link;
+-
+-		      /* Setting the index to -2 tells
+-			 elf_link_output_extsym that this symbol is
+-			 used by a reloc.  */
+		      rh = get_link_hash_entry (elf_sym_hashes (input_bfd),
+						r_symndx, extsymoff);
+		      if (rh == NULL)
+			{
+			  /* FIXME: Generate an error ?  */
+			  continue;
+			}
+
+		      /* Setting the index to -2 tells elf_link_output_extsym
+			 that this symbol is used by a reloc.  */
+ 		      BFD_ASSERT (rh->indx < 0);
+ 		      rh->indx = -2;
+ 		      *rel_hash = rh;
+@@ -13615,25 +13620,21 @@ _bfd_elf_gc_mark_hook (asection *sec,
+ 		       struct elf_link_hash_entry *h,
+ 		       Elf_Internal_Sym *sym)
+ {
+-  if (h != NULL)
+  if (h == NULL)
+    return bfd_section_from_elf_index (sec->owner, sym->st_shndx);
+
+  switch (h->root.type)
+     {
+-      switch (h->root.type)
+-	{
+-	case bfd_link_hash_defined:
+-	case bfd_link_hash_defweak:
+-	  return h->root.u.def.section;
+    case bfd_link_hash_defined:
+    case bfd_link_hash_defweak:
+      return h->root.u.def.section;
+ 
+-	case bfd_link_hash_common:
+-	  return h->root.u.c.p->section;
+    case bfd_link_hash_common:
+      return h->root.u.c.p->section;
+ 
+-	default:
+-	  break;
+-	}
+    default:
+      return NULL;
+     }
+-  else
+-    return bfd_section_from_elf_index (sec->owner, sym->st_shndx);
+-
+-  return NULL;
+ }
+ 
+ /* Return the debug definition section.  */
+@@ -13682,46 +13683,49 @@ _bfd_elf_gc_mark_rsec (struct bfd_link_i
+   if (r_symndx == STN_UNDEF)
+     return NULL;
+ 
+-  h = get_ext_sym_hash (cookie, r_symndx);
+-  
+-  if (h != NULL)
+  h = get_ext_sym_hash_from_cookie (cookie, r_symndx);
+  if (h == NULL)
+     {
+-      bool was_marked;
+      /* A corrup tinput file can lead to a situation where the index
+	 does not reference either a local or an external symbol.  */
+      if (r_symndx >= cookie->locsymcount)
+	return NULL;
+ 
+-      was_marked = h->mark;
+-      h->mark = 1;
+-      /* Keep all aliases of the symbol too.  If an object symbol
+-	 needs to be copied into .dynbss then all of its aliases
+-	 should be present as dynamic symbols, not just the one used
+-	 on the copy relocation.  */
+-      hw = h;
+-      while (hw->is_weakalias)
+-	{
+-	  hw = hw->u.alias;
+-	  hw->mark = 1;
+-	}
+      return (*gc_mark_hook) (sec, info, cookie->rel, NULL,
+			      &cookie->locsyms[r_symndx]);
+    }
+ 
+-      if (!was_marked && h->start_stop && !h->root.ldscript_def)
+-	{
+-	  if (info->start_stop_gc)
+-	    return NULL;
+  bool was_marked = h->mark;
+ 
+-	  /* To work around a glibc bug, mark XXX input sections
+-	     when there is a reference to __start_XXX or __stop_XXX
+-	     symbols.  */
+-	  else if (start_stop != NULL)
+-	    {
+-	      asection *s = h->u2.start_stop_section;
+-	      *start_stop = true;
+-	      return s;
+-	    }
+-	}
+  h->mark = 1;
+  /* Keep all aliases of the symbol too.  If an object symbol
+     needs to be copied into .dynbss then all of its aliases
+     should be present as dynamic symbols, not just the one used
+     on the copy relocation.  */
+  hw = h;
+  while (hw->is_weakalias)
+    {
+      hw = hw->u.alias;
+      hw->mark = 1;
+    }
+ 
+-      return (*gc_mark_hook) (sec, info, cookie->rel, h, NULL);
+  if (!was_marked && h->start_stop && !h->root.ldscript_def)
+    {
+      if (info->start_stop_gc)
+	return NULL;
+
+      /* To work around a glibc bug, mark XXX input sections
+	 when there is a reference to __start_XXX or __stop_XXX
+	 symbols.  */
+      else if (start_stop != NULL)
+	{
+	  asection *s = h->u2.start_stop_section;
+	  *start_stop = true;
+	  return s;
+	}
+     }
+ 
+-  return (*gc_mark_hook) (sec, info, cookie->rel, NULL,
+-			  &cookie->locsyms[r_symndx]);
+  return (*gc_mark_hook) (sec, info, cookie->rel, h, NULL);
+ }
+ 
+ /* COOKIE->rel describes a relocation against section SEC, which is
+@@ -14735,7 +14739,7 @@ bfd_elf_reloc_symbol_deleted_p (bfd_vma
+ 
+       struct elf_link_hash_entry *h;
+ 
+-      h = get_ext_sym_hash (rcookie, r_symndx);
+      h = get_ext_sym_hash_from_cookie (rcookie, r_symndx);
+       
+       if (h != NULL)
+ 	{
--- a/meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.17.13.inc
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.17.13.inc
@@ -69,10 +69,14 @@ SRC_URI = "https://golang.org/dl/go${PV}.src.tar.gz;name=main \
           file://CVE-2025-47907.patch \
           file://CVE-2025-47906.patch \
           file://CVE-2024-24783.patch \
-           file://CVE-2025-58187.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-58187-1.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-58187-2.patch \
           file://CVE-2025-58189.patch \
           file://CVE-2025-61723.patch \
           file://CVE-2025-61724.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-39323.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-61727.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-61729.patch \
           "
 SRC_URI[main.sha256sum] = "a1a48b23afb206f95e7bbaa9b898d965f90826f6f1d1fc0c1d784ada0cd300fd"

--- a/meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.18/CVE-2025-58187-1.patch
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.18/CVE-2025-58187-1.patch
--- a/meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.18/CVE-2025-58187-2.patch
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.18/CVE-2025-58187-2.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,516 @@
+From ca6a5545ba18844a97c88a90a385eb6335bb7526 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
+Date: Thu, 9 Oct 2025 13:35:24 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] [release-branch.go1.24] crypto/x509: rework fix for
+ CVE-2025-58187
+
+In CL 709854 we enabled strict validation for a number of properties of
+domain names (and their constraints). This caused significant breakage,
+since we didn't previously disallow the creation of certificates which
+contained these malformed domains.
+
+Rollback a number of the properties we enforced, making domainNameValid
+only enforce the same properties that domainToReverseLabels does. Since
+this also undoes some of the DoS protections our initial fix enabled,
+this change also adds caching of constraints in isValid (which perhaps
+is the fix we should've initially chosen).
+
+Updates #75835
+Updates #75828
+Fixes #75860
+
+Change-Id: Ie6ca6b4f30e9b8a143692b64757f7bbf4671ed0e
+Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/710735
+LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
+Reviewed-by: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 1cd71689f2ed8f07031a0cc58fc3586ca501839f)
+Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/710879
+Reviewed-by: Michael Pratt <mpratt@google.com>
+Auto-Submit: Michael Pratt <mpratt@google.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/golang/go/commit/ca6a5545ba18844a97c88a90a385eb6335bb7526]
+CVE: CVE-2025-58187
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ src/crypto/x509/name_constraints_test.go | 66 +++++++++++++++++--
+ src/crypto/x509/parser.go                | 57 +++++++++++-----
+ src/crypto/x509/parser_test.go           | 84 +++++++++++++++++++++---
+ src/crypto/x509/verify.go                | 53 ++++++++++-----
+ src/crypto/x509/verify_test.go           |  2 +-
+ 5 files changed, 213 insertions(+), 49 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/crypto/x509/name_constraints_test.go b/src/crypto/x509/name_constraints_test.go
+index d4f7d41..c59a7dc 100644
+--- a/src/crypto/x509/name_constraints_test.go
+++ b/src/crypto/x509/name_constraints_test.go
+@@ -1452,7 +1452,63 @@ var nameConstraintsTests = []nameConstraintsTest{
+ 		requestedEKUs: []ExtKeyUsage{ExtKeyUsageServerAuth},
+ 	},
+ 
+-	// #77: if several EKUs are requested, satisfying any of them is sufficient.
+	// An invalid DNS SAN should be detected only at validation time so
+	// that we can process CA certificates in the wild that have invalid SANs.
+	// See https://github.com/golang/go/issues/23995
+
+	// #77: an invalid DNS or mail SAN will not be detected if name constraint
+	// checking is not triggered.
+	{
+		roots: make([]constraintsSpec, 1),
+		intermediates: [][]constraintsSpec{
+			{
+				{},
+			},
+		},
+		leaf: leafSpec{
+			sans: []string{"dns:this is invalid", "email:this @ is invalid"},
+		},
+	},
+
+	// #78: an invalid DNS SAN will be detected if any name constraint checking
+	// is triggered.
+	{
+		roots: []constraintsSpec{
+			{
+				bad: []string{"uri:"},
+			},
+		},
+		intermediates: [][]constraintsSpec{
+			{
+				{},
+			},
+		},
+		leaf: leafSpec{
+			sans: []string{"dns:this is invalid"},
+		},
+		expectedError: "cannot parse dnsName",
+	},
+
+	// #79: an invalid email SAN will be detected if any name constraint
+	// checking is triggered.
+	{
+		roots: []constraintsSpec{
+			{
+				bad: []string{"uri:"},
+			},
+		},
+		intermediates: [][]constraintsSpec{
+			{
+				{},
+			},
+		},
+		leaf: leafSpec{
+			sans: []string{"email:this @ is invalid"},
+		},
+		expectedError: "cannot parse rfc822Name",
+	},
+
+	// #80: if several EKUs are requested, satisfying any of them is sufficient.
+ 	{
+ 		roots: make([]constraintsSpec, 1),
+ 		intermediates: [][]constraintsSpec{
+@@ -1467,7 +1523,7 @@ var nameConstraintsTests = []nameConstraintsTest{
+ 		requestedEKUs: []ExtKeyUsage{ExtKeyUsageClientAuth, ExtKeyUsageEmailProtection},
+ 	},
+ 
+-	// #78: EKUs that are not asserted in VerifyOpts are not required to be
+	// #81: EKUs that are not asserted in VerifyOpts are not required to be
+ 	// nested.
+ 	{
+ 		roots: make([]constraintsSpec, 1),
+@@ -1486,7 +1542,7 @@ var nameConstraintsTests = []nameConstraintsTest{
+ 		},
+ 	},
+ 
+-	// #79: a certificate without SANs and CN is accepted in a constrained chain.
+	// #82: a certificate without SANs and CN is accepted in a constrained chain.
+ 	{
+ 		roots: []constraintsSpec{
+ 			{
+@@ -1503,7 +1559,7 @@ var nameConstraintsTests = []nameConstraintsTest{
+ 		},
+ 	},
+ 
+-	// #80: a certificate without SANs and with a CN that does not parse as a
+	// #83: a certificate without SANs and with a CN that does not parse as a
+ 	// hostname is accepted in a constrained chain.
+ 	{
+ 		roots: []constraintsSpec{
+@@ -1522,7 +1578,7 @@ var nameConstraintsTests = []nameConstraintsTest{
+ 		},
+ 	},
+ 
+-	// #81: a certificate with SANs and CN is accepted in a constrained chain.
+	// #84: a certificate with SANs and CN is accepted in a constrained chain.
+ 	{
+ 		roots: []constraintsSpec{
+ 			{
+diff --git a/src/crypto/x509/parser.go b/src/crypto/x509/parser.go
+index 0788210..cfe4c86 100644
+--- a/src/crypto/x509/parser.go
+++ b/src/crypto/x509/parser.go
+@@ -391,14 +391,10 @@ func parseSANExtension(der cryptobyte.String) (dnsNames, emailAddresses []string
+ 			if err := isIA5String(email); err != nil {
+ 				return errors.New("x509: SAN rfc822Name is malformed")
+ 			}
+-			parsed, ok := parseRFC2821Mailbox(email)
+-			if !ok || (ok && !domainNameValid(parsed.domain, false)) {
+-				return errors.New("x509: SAN rfc822Name is malformed")
+-			}
+ 			emailAddresses = append(emailAddresses, email)
+ 		case nameTypeDNS:
+ 			name := string(data)
+-			if err := isIA5String(name); err != nil || (err == nil && !domainNameValid(name, false)) {
+			if err := isIA5String(name); err != nil {
+ 				return errors.New("x509: SAN dNSName is malformed")
+ 			}
+ 			dnsNames = append(dnsNames, string(name))
+@@ -408,9 +404,12 @@ func parseSANExtension(der cryptobyte.String) (dnsNames, emailAddresses []string
+ 				return errors.New("x509: SAN uniformResourceIdentifier is malformed")
+ 			}
+ 			uri, err := url.Parse(uriStr)
+-			if err != nil || (err == nil && uri.Host != "" && !domainNameValid(uri.Host, false)) {
+			if err != nil {
+ 				return fmt.Errorf("x509: cannot parse URI %q: %s", uriStr, err)
+ 			}
+			if len(uri.Host) > 0 && !domainNameValid(uri.Host, false) {
+				return fmt.Errorf("x509: cannot parse URI %q: invalid domain", uriStr)
+			}
+ 			uris = append(uris, uri)
+ 		case nameTypeIP:
+ 			switch len(data) {
+@@ -990,36 +989,58 @@ func ParseCertificates(der []byte) ([]*Certificate, error) {
+ 	return certs, nil
+ }
+ 
+-// domainNameValid does minimal domain name validity checking. In particular it
+-// enforces the following properties:
+-//   - names cannot have the trailing period
+-//   - names can only have a leading period if constraint is true
+-//   - names must be <= 253 characters
+-//   - names cannot have empty labels
+-//   - names cannot labels that are longer than 63 characters
+-//
+-// Note that this does not enforce the LDH requirements for domain names.
+// domainNameValid is an alloc-less version of the checks that
+// domainToReverseLabels does.
+ func domainNameValid(s string, constraint bool) bool {
+-	if len(s) == 0 && constraint {
+	// TODO(#75835): This function omits a number of checks which we
+	// really should be doing to enforce that domain names are valid names per
+	// RFC 1034. We previously enabled these checks, but this broke a
+	// significant number of certificates we previously considered valid, and we
+	// happily create via CreateCertificate (et al). We should enable these
+	// checks, but will need to gate them behind a GODEBUG.
+	//
+	// I have left the checks we previously enabled, noted with "TODO(#75835)" so
+	// that we can easily re-enable them once we unbreak everyone.
+
+	// TODO(#75835): this should only be true for constraints.
+	if len(s) == 0 {
+ 		return true
+ 	}
+-	if len(s) == 0 || (!constraint && s[0] == '.') || s[len(s)-1] == '.' || len(s) > 253 {
+
+	// Do not allow trailing period (FQDN format is not allowed in SANs or
+	// constraints).
+	if s[len(s)-1] == '.' {
+ 		return false
+ 	}
+
+	// TODO(#75835): domains must have at least one label, cannot have
+	// a leading empty label, and cannot be longer than 253 characters.
+	// if len(s) == 0 || (!constraint && s[0] == '.') || len(s) > 253 {
+	// 	return false
+	// }
+
+ 	lastDot := -1
+ 	if constraint && s[0] == '.' {
+ 		s = s[1:]
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	for i := 0; i <= len(s); i++ {
+		if i < len(s) && (s[i] < 33 || s[i] > 126) {
+			// Invalid character.
+			return false
+		}
+ 		if i == len(s) || s[i] == '.' {
+ 			labelLen := i
+ 			if lastDot >= 0 {
+ 				labelLen -= lastDot + 1
+ 			}
+-			if labelLen == 0 || labelLen > 63 {
+			if labelLen == 0 {
+ 				return false
+ 			}
+			// TODO(#75835): labels cannot be longer than 63 characters.
+			// if labelLen > 63 {
+			// 	return false
+			// }
+ 			lastDot = i
+ 		}
+ 	}
+diff --git a/src/crypto/x509/parser_test.go b/src/crypto/x509/parser_test.go
+index 95ed116..662e305 100644
+--- a/src/crypto/x509/parser_test.go
+++ b/src/crypto/x509/parser_test.go
+@@ -4,6 +4,9 @@
+ package x509
+ 
+ import (
+	"crypto/ecdsa"
+	"crypto/elliptic"
+	"crypto/rand"
+ 	"encoding/asn1"
+ 	"strings"
+ 	"testing"
+@@ -109,7 +112,31 @@ func TestDomainNameValid(t *testing.T) {
+ 		constraint bool
+ 		valid      bool
+ 	}{
+-		{"empty name, name", "", false, false},
+		// TODO(#75835): these tests are for stricter name validation, which we
+		// had to disable. Once we reenable these strict checks, behind a
+		// GODEBUG, we should add them back in.
+		// {"empty name, name", "", false, false},
+		// {"254 char label, name", strings.Repeat("a.a", 84) + "aaa", false, false},
+		// {"254 char label, constraint", strings.Repeat("a.a", 84) + "aaa", true, false},
+		// {"253 char label, name", strings.Repeat("a.a", 84) + "aa", false, false},
+		// {"253 char label, constraint", strings.Repeat("a.a", 84) + "aa", true, false},
+		// {"64 char single label, name", strings.Repeat("a", 64), false, false},
+		// {"64 char single label, constraint", strings.Repeat("a", 64), true, false},
+		// {"64 char label, name", "a." + strings.Repeat("a", 64), false, false},
+		// {"64 char label, constraint", "a." + strings.Repeat("a", 64), true, false},
+
+		// TODO(#75835): these are the inverse of the tests above, they should be removed
+		// once the strict checking is enabled.
+		{"254 char label, name", strings.Repeat("a.a", 84) + "aaa", false, true},
+		{"254 char label, constraint", strings.Repeat("a.a", 84) + "aaa", true, true},
+		{"253 char label, name", strings.Repeat("a.a", 84) + "aa", false, true},
+		{"253 char label, constraint", strings.Repeat("a.a", 84) + "aa", true, true},
+		{"64 char single label, name", strings.Repeat("a", 64), false, true},
+		{"64 char single label, constraint", strings.Repeat("a", 64), true, true},
+		{"64 char label, name", "a." + strings.Repeat("a", 64), false, true},
+		{"64 char label, constraint", "a." + strings.Repeat("a", 64), true, true},
+
+		// Check we properly enforce properties of domain names.
+ 		{"empty name, constraint", "", true, true},
+ 		{"empty label, name", "a..a", false, false},
+ 		{"empty label, constraint", "a..a", true, false},
+@@ -123,23 +150,60 @@ func TestDomainNameValid(t *testing.T) {
+ 		{"trailing period, constraint", "a.", true, false},
+ 		{"bare label, name", "a", false, true},
+ 		{"bare label, constraint", "a", true, true},
+-		{"254 char label, name", strings.Repeat("a.a", 84) + "aaa", false, false},
+-		{"254 char label, constraint", strings.Repeat("a.a", 84) + "aaa", true, false},
+-		{"253 char label, name", strings.Repeat("a.a", 84) + "aa", false, false},
+-		{"253 char label, constraint", strings.Repeat("a.a", 84) + "aa", true, false},
+-		{"64 char single label, name", strings.Repeat("a", 64), false, false},
+-		{"64 char single label, constraint", strings.Repeat("a", 64), true, false},
+ 		{"63 char single label, name", strings.Repeat("a", 63), false, true},
+ 		{"63 char single label, constraint", strings.Repeat("a", 63), true, true},
+-		{"64 char label, name", "a." + strings.Repeat("a", 64), false, false},
+-		{"64 char label, constraint", "a." + strings.Repeat("a", 64), true, false},
+ 		{"63 char label, name", "a." + strings.Repeat("a", 63), false, true},
+ 		{"63 char label, constraint", "a." + strings.Repeat("a", 63), true, true},
+ 	} {
+ 		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+-			if tc.valid != domainNameValid(tc.dnsName, tc.constraint) {
+			valid := domainNameValid(tc.dnsName, tc.constraint)
+			if tc.valid != valid {
+ 				t.Errorf("domainNameValid(%q, %t) = %v; want %v", tc.dnsName, tc.constraint, !tc.valid, tc.valid)
+ 			}
+			// Also check that we enforce the same properties as domainToReverseLabels
+			trimmedName := tc.dnsName
+			if tc.constraint && len(trimmedName) > 1 && trimmedName[0] == '.' {
+				trimmedName = trimmedName[1:]
+			}
+			_, revValid := domainToReverseLabels(trimmedName)
+			if valid != revValid {
+				t.Errorf("domainNameValid(%q, %t) = %t != domainToReverseLabels(%q) = %t", tc.dnsName, tc.constraint, valid, trimmedName, revValid)
+			}
+ 		})
+ 	}
+ }
+
+func TestRoundtripWeirdSANs(t *testing.T) {
+	// TODO(#75835): check that certificates we create with CreateCertificate that have malformed SAN values
+	// can be parsed by ParseCertificate. We should eventually restrict this, but for now we have to maintain
+	// this property as people have been relying on it.
+	k, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	badNames := []string{
+		"baredomain",
+		"baredomain.",
+		strings.Repeat("a", 255),
+		strings.Repeat("a", 65) + ".com",
+	}
+	tmpl := &Certificate{
+		EmailAddresses: badNames,
+		DNSNames:       badNames,
+	}
+	b, err := CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, tmpl, tmpl, &k.PublicKey, k)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	_, err = ParseCertificate(b)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Couldn't roundtrip certificate: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func FuzzDomainNameValid(f *testing.F) {
+	f.Fuzz(func(t *testing.T, data string) {
+		domainNameValid(data, false)
+		domainNameValid(data, true)
+	})
+}
+diff --git a/src/crypto/x509/verify.go b/src/crypto/x509/verify.go
+index fb2f4b2..99f38a0 100644
+--- a/src/crypto/x509/verify.go
+++ b/src/crypto/x509/verify.go
+@@ -390,7 +390,7 @@ func domainToReverseLabels(domain string) (reverseLabels []string, ok bool) {
+ 	return reverseLabels, true
+ }
+ 
+-func matchEmailConstraint(mailbox rfc2821Mailbox, constraint string) (bool, error) {
+func matchEmailConstraint(mailbox rfc2821Mailbox, constraint string, reversedDomainsCache map[string][]string, reversedConstraintsCache map[string][]string) (bool, error) {
+ 	// If the constraint contains an @, then it specifies an exact mailbox
+ 	// name.
+ 	if strings.Contains(constraint, "@") {
+@@ -403,10 +403,10 @@ func matchEmailConstraint(mailbox rfc2821Mailbox, constraint string) (bool, erro
+ 
+ 	// Otherwise the constraint is like a DNS constraint of the domain part
+ 	// of the mailbox.
+-	return matchDomainConstraint(mailbox.domain, constraint)
+	return matchDomainConstraint(mailbox.domain, constraint, reversedDomainsCache, reversedConstraintsCache)
+ }
+ 
+-func matchURIConstraint(uri *url.URL, constraint string) (bool, error) {
+func matchURIConstraint(uri *url.URL, constraint string, reversedDomainsCache map[string][]string, reversedConstraintsCache map[string][]string) (bool, error) {
+ 	// From RFC 5280, Section 4.2.1.10:
+ 	// “a uniformResourceIdentifier that does not include an authority
+ 	// component with a host name specified as a fully qualified domain
+@@ -433,7 +433,7 @@ func matchURIConstraint(uri *url.URL, constraint string) (bool, error) {
+ 		return false, fmt.Errorf("URI with IP (%q) cannot be matched against constraints", uri.String())
+ 	}
+ 
+-	return matchDomainConstraint(host, constraint)
+	return matchDomainConstraint(host, constraint, reversedDomainsCache, reversedConstraintsCache)
+ }
+ 
+ func matchIPConstraint(ip net.IP, constraint *net.IPNet) (bool, error) {
+@@ -450,16 +450,21 @@ func matchIPConstraint(ip net.IP, constraint *net.IPNet) (bool, error) {
+ 	return true, nil
+ }
+ 
+-func matchDomainConstraint(domain, constraint string) (bool, error) {
+func matchDomainConstraint(domain, constraint string, reversedDomainsCache map[string][]string, reversedConstraintsCache map[string][]string) (bool, error) {
+ 	// The meaning of zero length constraints is not specified, but this
+ 	// code follows NSS and accepts them as matching everything.
+ 	if len(constraint) == 0 {
+ 		return true, nil
+ 	}
+ 
+-	domainLabels, ok := domainToReverseLabels(domain)
+-	if !ok {
+-		return false, fmt.Errorf("x509: internal error: cannot parse domain %q", domain)
+	domainLabels, found := reversedDomainsCache[domain]
+	if !found {
+		var ok bool
+		domainLabels, ok = domainToReverseLabels(domain)
+		if !ok {
+			return false, fmt.Errorf("x509: internal error: cannot parse domain %q", domain)
+		}
+		reversedDomainsCache[domain] = domainLabels
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	// RFC 5280 says that a leading period in a domain name means that at
+@@ -473,9 +478,14 @@ func matchDomainConstraint(domain, constraint string) (bool, error) {
+ 		constraint = constraint[1:]
+ 	}
+ 
+-	constraintLabels, ok := domainToReverseLabels(constraint)
+-	if !ok {
+-		return false, fmt.Errorf("x509: internal error: cannot parse domain %q", constraint)
+	constraintLabels, found := reversedConstraintsCache[constraint]
+	if !found {
+		var ok bool
+		constraintLabels, ok = domainToReverseLabels(constraint)
+		if !ok {
+			return false, fmt.Errorf("x509: internal error: cannot parse domain %q", constraint)
+		}
+		reversedConstraintsCache[constraint] = constraintLabels
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if len(domainLabels) < len(constraintLabels) ||
+@@ -598,6 +608,19 @@ func (c *Certificate) isValid(certType int, currentChain []*Certificate, opts *V
+ 		leaf = currentChain[0]
+ 	}
+ 
+	// Each time we do constraint checking, we need to check the constraints in
+	// the current certificate against all of the names that preceded it. We
+	// reverse these names using domainToReverseLabels, which is a relatively
+	// expensive operation. Since we check each name against each constraint,
+	// this requires us to do N*C calls to domainToReverseLabels (where N is the
+	// total number of names that preceed the certificate, and C is the total
+	// number of constraints in the certificate). By caching the results of
+	// calling domainToReverseLabels, we can reduce that to N+C calls at the
+	// cost of keeping all of the parsed names and constraints in memory until
+	// we return from isValid.
+	reversedDomainsCache := map[string][]string{}
+	reversedConstraintsCache := map[string][]string{}
+
+ 	if (certType == intermediateCertificate || certType == rootCertificate) &&
+ 		c.hasNameConstraints() && leaf.hasSANExtension() {
+ 		err := forEachSAN(leaf.getSANExtension(), func(tag int, data []byte) error {
+@@ -611,20 +634,20 @@ func (c *Certificate) isValid(certType int, currentChain []*Certificate, opts *V
+ 
+ 				if err := c.checkNameConstraints(&comparisonCount, maxConstraintComparisons, "email address", name, mailbox,
+ 					func(parsedName, constraint interface{}) (bool, error) {
+-						return matchEmailConstraint(parsedName.(rfc2821Mailbox), constraint.(string))
+						return matchEmailConstraint(parsedName.(rfc2821Mailbox), constraint.(string), reversedDomainsCache, reversedConstraintsCache)
+ 					}, c.PermittedEmailAddresses, c.ExcludedEmailAddresses); err != nil {
+ 					return err
+ 				}
+ 
+ 			case nameTypeDNS:
+ 				name := string(data)
+-				if _, ok := domainToReverseLabels(name); !ok {
+				if !domainNameValid(name, false) {
+ 					return fmt.Errorf("x509: cannot parse dnsName %q", name)
+ 				}
+ 
+ 				if err := c.checkNameConstraints(&comparisonCount, maxConstraintComparisons, "DNS name", name, name,
+ 					func(parsedName, constraint interface{}) (bool, error) {
+-						return matchDomainConstraint(parsedName.(string), constraint.(string))
+						return matchDomainConstraint(parsedName.(string), constraint.(string), reversedDomainsCache, reversedConstraintsCache)
+ 					}, c.PermittedDNSDomains, c.ExcludedDNSDomains); err != nil {
+ 					return err
+ 				}
+@@ -638,7 +661,7 @@ func (c *Certificate) isValid(certType int, currentChain []*Certificate, opts *V
+ 
+ 				if err := c.checkNameConstraints(&comparisonCount, maxConstraintComparisons, "URI", name, uri,
+ 					func(parsedName, constraint interface{}) (bool, error) {
+-						return matchURIConstraint(parsedName.(*url.URL), constraint.(string))
+						return matchURIConstraint(parsedName.(*url.URL), constraint.(string), reversedDomainsCache, reversedConstraintsCache)
+ 					}, c.PermittedURIDomains, c.ExcludedURIDomains); err != nil {
+ 					return err
+ 				}
+diff --git a/src/crypto/x509/verify_test.go b/src/crypto/x509/verify_test.go
+index 9da39ca..31e8149 100644
+--- a/src/crypto/x509/verify_test.go
+++ b/src/crypto/x509/verify_test.go
+@@ -1648,7 +1648,7 @@ var nameConstraintTests = []struct {
+ 
+ func TestNameConstraints(t *testing.T) {
+ 	for i, test := range nameConstraintTests {
+-		result, err := matchDomainConstraint(test.domain, test.constraint)
+		result, err := matchDomainConstraint(test.domain, test.constraint, map[string][]string{}, map[string][]string{})
+ 
+ 		if err != nil && !test.expectError {
+ 			t.Errorf("unexpected error for test #%d: domain=%s, constraint=%s, err=%s", i, test.domain, test.constraint, err)
+-- 
+2.25.1
+
--- a/meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.18/CVE-2025-61727.patch
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.18/CVE-2025-61727.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,229 @@
+From 04db77a423cac75bb82cc9a6859991ae9c016344 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Roland Shoemaker <bracewell@google.com>
+Date: Mon, 24 Nov 2025 08:46:08 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH] [release-branch.go1.24] crypto/x509: excluded subdomain
+ constraints preclude wildcard SANs
+
+When evaluating name constraints in a certificate chain, the presence of
+an excluded subdomain constraint (e.g., excluding "test.example.com")
+should preclude the use of a wildcard SAN (e.g., "*.example.com").
+
+Fixes #76442
+Fixes #76463
+Fixes CVE-2025-61727
+
+Change-Id: I42a0da010cb36d2ec9d1239ae3f61cf25eb78bba
+Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/724401
+Reviewed-by: Nicholas Husin <husin@google.com>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel McCarney <daniel@binaryparadox.net>
+LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
+Reviewed-by: Nicholas Husin <nsh@golang.org>
+Reviewed-by: Neal Patel <nealpatel@google.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/golang/go/commit/04db77a423cac75bb82cc9a6859991ae9c016344]
+CVE: CVE-2025-61727
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ src/crypto/x509/name_constraints_test.go | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++
+ src/crypto/x509/verify.go                | 40 +++++++++++++++---------
+ src/crypto/x509/verify_test.go           |  2 +-
+ 3 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/crypto/x509/name_constraints_test.go b/src/crypto/x509/name_constraints_test.go
+index c59a7dc..963bc5a 100644
+--- a/src/crypto/x509/name_constraints_test.go
+++ b/src/crypto/x509/name_constraints_test.go
+@@ -1595,6 +1595,40 @@ var nameConstraintsTests = []nameConstraintsTest{
+ 			cn:   "foo.bar",
+ 		},
+ 	},
+	// #87: subdomain excluded constraints preclude wildcard names
+	{
+		roots: []constraintsSpec{
+			{
+				bad: []string{"dns:foo.example.com"},
+			},
+		},
+		intermediates: [][]constraintsSpec{
+			{
+				{},
+			},
+		},
+		leaf: leafSpec{
+			sans: []string{"dns:*.example.com"},
+		},
+		expectedError: "\"*.example.com\" is excluded by constraint \"foo.example.com\"",
+	},
+	// #88: wildcard names are not matched by subdomain permitted constraints
+	{
+		roots: []constraintsSpec{
+			{
+				ok: []string{"dns:foo.example.com"},
+			},
+		},
+		intermediates: [][]constraintsSpec{
+			{
+				{},
+			},
+		},
+		leaf: leafSpec{
+			sans: []string{"dns:*.example.com"},
+		},
+		expectedError: "\"*.example.com\" is not permitted",
+	},
+ }
+ 
+ func makeConstraintsCACert(constraints constraintsSpec, name string, key *ecdsa.PrivateKey, parent *Certificate, parentKey *ecdsa.PrivateKey) (*Certificate, error) {
+diff --git a/src/crypto/x509/verify.go b/src/crypto/x509/verify.go
+index 99f38a0..88260ee 100644
+--- a/src/crypto/x509/verify.go
+++ b/src/crypto/x509/verify.go
+@@ -390,7 +390,7 @@ func domainToReverseLabels(domain string) (reverseLabels []string, ok bool) {
+ 	return reverseLabels, true
+ }
+ 
+-func matchEmailConstraint(mailbox rfc2821Mailbox, constraint string, reversedDomainsCache map[string][]string, reversedConstraintsCache map[string][]string) (bool, error) {
+func matchEmailConstraint(mailbox rfc2821Mailbox, constraint string, excluded bool, reversedDomainsCache map[string][]string, reversedConstraintsCache map[string][]string) (bool, error) {
+ 	// If the constraint contains an @, then it specifies an exact mailbox
+ 	// name.
+ 	if strings.Contains(constraint, "@") {
+@@ -403,10 +403,10 @@ func matchEmailConstraint(mailbox rfc2821Mailbox, constraint string, reversedDom
+ 
+ 	// Otherwise the constraint is like a DNS constraint of the domain part
+ 	// of the mailbox.
+-	return matchDomainConstraint(mailbox.domain, constraint, reversedDomainsCache, reversedConstraintsCache)
+	return matchDomainConstraint(mailbox.domain, constraint, excluded, reversedDomainsCache, reversedConstraintsCache)
+ }
+ 
+-func matchURIConstraint(uri *url.URL, constraint string, reversedDomainsCache map[string][]string, reversedConstraintsCache map[string][]string) (bool, error) {
+func matchURIConstraint(uri *url.URL, constraint string, excluded bool, reversedDomainsCache map[string][]string, reversedConstraintsCache map[string][]string) (bool, error) {
+ 	// From RFC 5280, Section 4.2.1.10:
+ 	// “a uniformResourceIdentifier that does not include an authority
+ 	// component with a host name specified as a fully qualified domain
+@@ -433,7 +433,7 @@ func matchURIConstraint(uri *url.URL, constraint string, reversedDomainsCache ma
+ 		return false, fmt.Errorf("URI with IP (%q) cannot be matched against constraints", uri.String())
+ 	}
+ 
+-	return matchDomainConstraint(host, constraint, reversedDomainsCache, reversedConstraintsCache)
+	return matchDomainConstraint(host, constraint, excluded, reversedDomainsCache, reversedConstraintsCache)
+ }
+ 
+ func matchIPConstraint(ip net.IP, constraint *net.IPNet) (bool, error) {
+@@ -450,7 +450,7 @@ func matchIPConstraint(ip net.IP, constraint *net.IPNet) (bool, error) {
+ 	return true, nil
+ }
+ 
+-func matchDomainConstraint(domain, constraint string, reversedDomainsCache map[string][]string, reversedConstraintsCache map[string][]string) (bool, error) {
+func matchDomainConstraint(domain, constraint string, excluded bool, reversedDomainsCache map[string][]string, reversedConstraintsCache map[string][]string) (bool, error) {
+ 	// The meaning of zero length constraints is not specified, but this
+ 	// code follows NSS and accepts them as matching everything.
+ 	if len(constraint) == 0 {
+@@ -467,6 +467,11 @@ func matchDomainConstraint(domain, constraint string, reversedDomainsCache map[s
+ 		reversedDomainsCache[domain] = domainLabels
+ 	}
+ 
+	wildcardDomain := false
+	if len(domain) > 0 && domain[0] == '*' {
+		wildcardDomain = true
+	}
+
+ 	// RFC 5280 says that a leading period in a domain name means that at
+ 	// least one label must be prepended, but only for URI and email
+ 	// constraints, not DNS constraints. The code also supports that
+@@ -493,6 +498,11 @@ func matchDomainConstraint(domain, constraint string, reversedDomainsCache map[s
+ 		return false, nil
+ 	}
+ 
+	if excluded && wildcardDomain && len(domainLabels) > 1 && len(constraintLabels) > 0 {
+		domainLabels = domainLabels[:len(domainLabels)-1]
+		constraintLabels = constraintLabels[:len(constraintLabels)-1]
+	}
+
+ 	for i, constraintLabel := range constraintLabels {
+ 		if !strings.EqualFold(constraintLabel, domainLabels[i]) {
+ 			return false, nil
+@@ -512,7 +522,7 @@ func (c *Certificate) checkNameConstraints(count *int,
+ 	nameType string,
+ 	name string,
+ 	parsedName interface{},
+-	match func(parsedName, constraint interface{}) (match bool, err error),
+	match func(parsedName, constraint interface{}, excluded bool) (match bool, err error),
+ 	permitted, excluded interface{}) error {
+ 
+ 	excludedValue := reflect.ValueOf(excluded)
+@@ -524,7 +534,7 @@ func (c *Certificate) checkNameConstraints(count *int,
+ 
+ 	for i := 0; i < excludedValue.Len(); i++ {
+ 		constraint := excludedValue.Index(i).Interface()
+-		match, err := match(parsedName, constraint)
+		match, err := match(parsedName, constraint, true)
+ 		if err != nil {
+ 			return CertificateInvalidError{c, CANotAuthorizedForThisName, err.Error()}
+ 		}
+@@ -546,7 +556,7 @@ func (c *Certificate) checkNameConstraints(count *int,
+ 		constraint := permittedValue.Index(i).Interface()
+ 
+ 		var err error
+-		if ok, err = match(parsedName, constraint); err != nil {
+		if ok, err = match(parsedName, constraint, false); err != nil {
+ 			return CertificateInvalidError{c, CANotAuthorizedForThisName, err.Error()}
+ 		}
+ 
+@@ -633,8 +643,8 @@ func (c *Certificate) isValid(certType int, currentChain []*Certificate, opts *V
+ 				}
+ 
+ 				if err := c.checkNameConstraints(&comparisonCount, maxConstraintComparisons, "email address", name, mailbox,
+-					func(parsedName, constraint interface{}) (bool, error) {
+-						return matchEmailConstraint(parsedName.(rfc2821Mailbox), constraint.(string), reversedDomainsCache, reversedConstraintsCache)
+					func(parsedName, constraint interface{}, excluded bool) (bool, error) {
+						return matchEmailConstraint(parsedName.(rfc2821Mailbox), constraint.(string), excluded, reversedDomainsCache, reversedConstraintsCache)
+ 					}, c.PermittedEmailAddresses, c.ExcludedEmailAddresses); err != nil {
+ 					return err
+ 				}
+@@ -646,8 +656,8 @@ func (c *Certificate) isValid(certType int, currentChain []*Certificate, opts *V
+ 				}
+ 
+ 				if err := c.checkNameConstraints(&comparisonCount, maxConstraintComparisons, "DNS name", name, name,
+-					func(parsedName, constraint interface{}) (bool, error) {
+-						return matchDomainConstraint(parsedName.(string), constraint.(string), reversedDomainsCache, reversedConstraintsCache)
+					func(parsedName, constraint interface{}, excluded bool) (bool, error) {
+						return matchDomainConstraint(parsedName.(string), constraint.(string), excluded, reversedDomainsCache, reversedConstraintsCache)
+ 					}, c.PermittedDNSDomains, c.ExcludedDNSDomains); err != nil {
+ 					return err
+ 				}
+@@ -660,8 +670,8 @@ func (c *Certificate) isValid(certType int, currentChain []*Certificate, opts *V
+ 				}
+ 
+ 				if err := c.checkNameConstraints(&comparisonCount, maxConstraintComparisons, "URI", name, uri,
+-					func(parsedName, constraint interface{}) (bool, error) {
+-						return matchURIConstraint(parsedName.(*url.URL), constraint.(string), reversedDomainsCache, reversedConstraintsCache)
+					func(parsedName, constraint interface{}, excluded bool) (bool, error) {
+						return matchURIConstraint(parsedName.(*url.URL), constraint.(string), excluded, reversedDomainsCache, reversedConstraintsCache)
+ 					}, c.PermittedURIDomains, c.ExcludedURIDomains); err != nil {
+ 					return err
+ 				}
+@@ -673,7 +683,7 @@ func (c *Certificate) isValid(certType int, currentChain []*Certificate, opts *V
+ 				}
+ 
+ 				if err := c.checkNameConstraints(&comparisonCount, maxConstraintComparisons, "IP address", ip.String(), ip,
+-					func(parsedName, constraint interface{}) (bool, error) {
+					func(parsedName, constraint interface{}, _ bool) (bool, error) {
+ 						return matchIPConstraint(parsedName.(net.IP), constraint.(*net.IPNet))
+ 					}, c.PermittedIPRanges, c.ExcludedIPRanges); err != nil {
+ 					return err
+diff --git a/src/crypto/x509/verify_test.go b/src/crypto/x509/verify_test.go
+index 31e8149..5f7c834 100644
+--- a/src/crypto/x509/verify_test.go
+++ b/src/crypto/x509/verify_test.go
+@@ -1648,7 +1648,7 @@ var nameConstraintTests = []struct {
+ 
+ func TestNameConstraints(t *testing.T) {
+ 	for i, test := range nameConstraintTests {
+-		result, err := matchDomainConstraint(test.domain, test.constraint, map[string][]string{}, map[string][]string{})
+		result, err := matchDomainConstraint(test.domain, test.constraint, false, map[string][]string{}, map[string][]string{})
+ 
+ 		if err != nil && !test.expectError {
+ 			t.Errorf("unexpected error for test #%d: domain=%s, constraint=%s, err=%s", i, test.domain, test.constraint, err)
+-- 
+2.25.1
+
--- a/meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.18/CVE-2025-61729.patch
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.18/CVE-2025-61729.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
+From 3a842bd5c6aa8eefa13c0174de3ab361e50bd672 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Nicholas S. Husin" <nsh@golang.org>
+Date: Mon, 24 Nov 2025 14:56:23 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH] [release-branch.go1.24] crypto/x509: prevent
+ HostnameError.Error() from consuming excessive resource
+
+Constructing HostnameError.Error() takes O(N^2) runtime due to using a
+string concatenation in a loop. Additionally, there is no limit on how
+many names are included in the error message. As a result, a malicious
+attacker could craft a certificate with an infinite amount of names to
+unfairly consume resource.
+
+To remediate this, we will now use strings.Builder to construct the
+error message, preventing O(N^2) runtime. When a certificate has 100 or
+more names, we will also not print each name individually.
+
+Thanks to Philippe Antoine (Catena cyber) for reporting this issue.
+
+Updates #76445
+Fixes #76460
+Fixes CVE-2025-61729
+
+Change-Id: I6343776ec3289577abc76dad71766c491c1a7c81
+Reviewed-on: https://go-internal-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/3000
+Reviewed-by: Neal Patel <nealpatel@google.com>
+Reviewed-by: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
+Reviewed-on: https://go-internal-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/3220
+Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <bracewell@google.com>
+Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/725820
+Reviewed-by: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@google.com>
+TryBot-Bypass: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@golang.org>
+Auto-Submit: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@google.com>
+Reviewed-by: Mark Freeman <markfreeman@google.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/golang/go/commit/3a842bd5c6aa8eefa13c0174de3ab361e50bd672]
+CVE: CVE-2025-61729
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ src/crypto/x509/verify.go      | 21 ++++++++++-----
+ src/crypto/x509/verify_test.go | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/crypto/x509/verify.go b/src/crypto/x509/verify.go
+index 88260ee..c167191 100644
+--- a/src/crypto/x509/verify.go
+++ b/src/crypto/x509/verify.go
+@@ -97,31 +97,38 @@ type HostnameError struct {
+ 
+ func (h HostnameError) Error() string {
+ 	c := h.Certificate
+	maxNamesIncluded := 100
+ 
+ 	if !c.hasSANExtension() && matchHostnames(c.Subject.CommonName, h.Host) {
+ 		return "x509: certificate relies on legacy Common Name field, use SANs instead"
+ 	}
+ 
+-	var valid string
+	var valid strings.Builder
+ 	if ip := net.ParseIP(h.Host); ip != nil {
+ 		// Trying to validate an IP
+ 		if len(c.IPAddresses) == 0 {
+ 			return "x509: cannot validate certificate for " + h.Host + " because it doesn't contain any IP SANs"
+ 		}
+		if len(c.IPAddresses) >= maxNamesIncluded {
+			return fmt.Sprintf("x509: certificate is valid for %d IP SANs, but none matched %s", len(c.IPAddresses), h.Host)
+		}
+ 		for _, san := range c.IPAddresses {
+-			if len(valid) > 0 {
+-				valid += ", "
+			if valid.Len() > 0 {
+				valid.WriteString(", ")
+ 			}
+-			valid += san.String()
+			valid.WriteString(san.String())
+ 		}
+ 	} else {
+-		valid = strings.Join(c.DNSNames, ", ")
+		if len(c.DNSNames) >= maxNamesIncluded {
+			return fmt.Sprintf("x509: certificate is valid for %d names, but none matched %s", len(c.DNSNames), h.Host)
+		}
+		valid.WriteString(strings.Join(c.DNSNames, ", "))
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if len(valid) == 0 {
+	if valid.Len() == 0 {
+ 		return "x509: certificate is not valid for any names, but wanted to match " + h.Host
+ 	}
+-	return "x509: certificate is valid for " + valid + ", not " + h.Host
+	return "x509: certificate is valid for " + valid.String() + ", not " + h.Host
+ }
+ 
+ // UnknownAuthorityError results when the certificate issuer is unknown
+diff --git a/src/crypto/x509/verify_test.go b/src/crypto/x509/verify_test.go
+index 5f7c834..c2c2025 100644
+--- a/src/crypto/x509/verify_test.go
+++ b/src/crypto/x509/verify_test.go
+@@ -9,11 +9,14 @@ import (
+ 	"crypto/ecdsa"
+ 	"crypto/elliptic"
+ 	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/rsa"
+ 	"crypto/x509/pkix"
+ 	"encoding/pem"
+ 	"errors"
+ 	"fmt"
+	"log"
+ 	"math/big"
+	"net"
+ 	"runtime"
+ 	"strings"
+ 	"testing"
+@@ -70,6 +73,26 @@ var verifyTests = []verifyTest{
+ 
+ 		errorCallback: expectHostnameError("certificate is valid for"),
+ 	},
+	{
+		name:        "TooManyDNS",
+		leaf:        generatePEMCertWithRepeatSAN(1677615892, 200, "fake.dns"),
+		roots:       []string{generatePEMCertWithRepeatSAN(1677615892, 200, "fake.dns")},
+		currentTime: 1677615892,
+		dnsName:     "www.example.com",
+		systemSkip:  true, // does not chain to a system root
+
+		errorCallback: expectHostnameError("certificate is valid for 200 names, but none matched"),
+	},
+	{
+		name:        "TooManyIPs",
+		leaf:        generatePEMCertWithRepeatSAN(1677615892, 150, "4.3.2.1"),
+		roots:       []string{generatePEMCertWithRepeatSAN(1677615892, 150, "4.3.2.1")},
+		currentTime: 1677615892,
+		dnsName:     "1.2.3.4",
+		systemSkip:  true, // does not chain to a system root
+
+		errorCallback: expectHostnameError("certificate is valid for 150 IP SANs, but none matched"),
+	},
+ 	{
+ 		name:          "IPMissing",
+ 		leaf:          googleLeaf,
+@@ -584,6 +607,30 @@ func nameToKey(name *pkix.Name) string {
+ 	return strings.Join(name.Country, ",") + "/" + strings.Join(name.Organization, ",") + "/" + strings.Join(name.OrganizationalUnit, ",") + "/" + name.CommonName
+ }
+ 
+func generatePEMCertWithRepeatSAN(currentTime int64, count int, san string) string {
+	cert := Certificate{
+		NotBefore: time.Unix(currentTime, 0),
+		NotAfter:  time.Unix(currentTime, 0),
+	}
+	if ip := net.ParseIP(san); ip != nil {
+		cert.IPAddresses = slices.Repeat([]net.IP{ip}, count)
+	} else {
+		cert.DNSNames = slices.Repeat([]string{san}, count)
+	}
+	privKey, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 4096)
+	if err != nil {
+		log.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	certBytes, err := CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, &cert, &cert, &privKey.PublicKey, privKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		log.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	return string(pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{
+		Type:  "CERTIFICATE",
+		Bytes: certBytes,
+	}))
+}
+
+ const geoTrustRoot = `-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+ MIIDVDCCAjygAwIBAgIDAjRWMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMEIxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVT
+ MRYwFAYDVQQKEw1HZW9UcnVzdCBJbmMuMRswGQYDVQQDExJHZW9UcnVzdCBHbG9i
+-- 
+2.25.1
+
--- a/meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.21/CVE-2023-39323.patch
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.21/CVE-2023-39323.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+From 5e0a62c44fbaff6443bffe67911370bc0ea25f6d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ian Lance Taylor <iant@golang.org>
+Date: Wed, 20 Sep 2023 16:16:29 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] cmd/compile: use absolute file name in isCgo check
+
+For #23672
+Fixes #63211
+Fixes CVE-2023-39323
+
+Change-Id: I4586a69e1b2560036afec29d53e53cf25e6c7352
+Reviewed-on: https://team-review.git.corp.google.com/c/golang/go-private/+/2032884
+Reviewed-by: Matthew Dempsky <mdempsky@google.com>
+Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <bracewell@google.com>
+Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/534158
+Reviewed-by: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@google.com>
+Reviewed-by: Ian Lance Taylor <iant@google.com>
+LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
+Auto-Submit: Ian Lance Taylor <iant@google.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+CVE: CVE-2023-39323
+
+Reference to upstream patch:
+https://github.com/golang/go/commit/e7c142a19d8b3944c2f1b9ab7fd94c63d8d0c555
+
+Backport patch to fix CVE-2023-39323 and drop the modifications of test codes.
+
+Signed-off-by: Libo Chen <libo.chen.cn@windriver.com>
+---
+ src/cmd/compile/internal/noder/noder.go | 8 +++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/cmd/compile/internal/noder/noder.go b/src/cmd/compile/internal/noder/noder.go
+index 5fcad096c2..f35e065a31 100644
+--- a/src/cmd/compile/internal/noder/noder.go
+++ b/src/cmd/compile/internal/noder/noder.go
+@@ -1690,8 +1690,14 @@ func (p *noder) pragma(pos syntax.Pos, blankLine bool, text string, old syntax.P
+ // contain cgo directives, and for security reasons
+ // (primarily misuse of linker flags), other files are not.
+ // See golang.org/issue/23672.
+// Note that cmd/go ignores files whose names start with underscore,
+// so the only _cgo_ files we will see from cmd/go are generated by cgo.
+// It's easy to bypass this check by calling the compiler directly;
+// we only protect against uses by cmd/go.
+ func isCgoGeneratedFile(pos syntax.Pos) bool {
+-	return strings.HasPrefix(filepath.Base(filepath.Clean(fileh(pos.Base().Filename()))), "_cgo_")
+	// We need the absolute file, independent of //line directives,
+	// so we call pos.Base().Pos().Base().
+	return strings.HasPrefix(filepath.Base(filepath.Clean(fileh(pos.Base().Pos().Base().Filename()))), "_cgo_")
+ }
+ 
+ // safeArg reports whether arg is a "safe" command-line argument,
+-- 
+2.34.1
+
--- a/meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/files/0001-configure-Prune-PIE-flags.patch
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/files/0001-configure-Prune-PIE-flags.patch
@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
-From b5545c08e6c674c49aef14b47a56a3e92df4d2a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
-Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2016 07:36:34 +0000
-Subject: [pseudo][PATCH] configure: Prune PIE flags
-
-LDFLAGS are not taken from environment and CFLAGS is used for LDFLAGS
-however when using security options -fpie and -pie options are coming
-as part of ARCH_FLAGS and they get into LDFLAGS of shared objects as
-well so we end up with conflicting options -shared -pie, which gold
-rejects outright and bfd linker lets the one appearning last in cmdline
-take effect. This create quite a unpleasant situation in OE when
-security flags are enabled and gold or not-gold options are used
-it errors out but errors are not same.
-
-Anyway, with this patch we filter pie options from ARCH_FLAGS
-ouright and take control of generating PIC objects
-
-Helps with errors like
-
-| /mnt/oe/build/tmp-glibc/sysroots/x86_64-linux/usr/libexec/x86_64-oe-linux/gcc/x86_64-oe-linux/5.3.0/ld: pseudo_client.o: relocation R_X86_64_PC32 against symbol `pseudo_util_debug_flags' can not be used when making a shared object; recompile with -fPIC
-| /mnt/oe/build/tmp-glibc/sysroots/x86_64-linux/usr/libexec/x86_64-oe-linux/gcc/x86_64-oe-linux/5.3.0/ld: final link failed: Bad value
-| collect2: error: ld returned 1 exit status
-| make: *** [lib/pseudo/lib64/libpseudo.so] Error 1
-
-Signed-off-by: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
---
-Upstream-Status: Submitted
-
- configure | 2 ++
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/configure b/configure
-index e5ef9ce..83b0890 100755
--- a/configure
-+++ b/configure
-@@ -339,3 +339,5 @@ sed -e '
-   s,@ARCH@,'"$opt_arch"',g
-   s,@BITS@,'"$opt_bits"',g
- ' < Makefile.in > Makefile
-+
-+sed -i -e 's/\-[f]*pie//g' Makefile
-- 
-1.8.3.1
-
--- a/meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/files/glibc238.patch
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/files/glibc238.patch
@@ -1,65 +0,0 @@
-glibc 2.38 would include  __isoc23_strtol and similar symbols. This is trggerd by
-_GNU_SOURCE but we have to set that for other definitions. Therefore play with defines
-to turn this off within pseudo_wrappers.c. Elsewhere we can switch to _DEFAULT_SOURCE
-rather than _GNU_SOURCE.
-
-Upstream-Status: Pending
-
-Index: git/pseudo_wrappers.c
-===================================================================
--- git.orig/pseudo_wrappers.c
-+++ git/pseudo_wrappers.c
-@@ -6,6 +6,18 @@
-  * SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-only
-  *
-  */
-+/* glibc 2.38 would include  __isoc23_strtol and similar symbols. This is trggerd by
-+ * _GNU_SOURCE but we have to set that for other definitions. Therefore play with defines
-+ * to turn this off.
-+ */
-+#include <features.h>
-+#undef __GLIBC_USE_ISOC2X
-+#undef __GLIBC_USE_C2X_STRTOL
-+#define __GLIBC_USE_C2X_STRTOL 0
-+#undef __GLIBC_USE_ISOC23
-+#undef __GLIBC_USE_C23_STRTOL
-+#define __GLIBC_USE_C23_STRTOL 0
-+
- #include <assert.h>
- #include <stdlib.h>
- #include <limits.h>
-Index: git/pseudo_util.c
-===================================================================
--- git.orig/pseudo_util.c
-+++ git/pseudo_util.c
-@@ -8,6 +8,17 @@
-  */
- /* we need access to RTLD_NEXT for a horrible workaround */
- #define _GNU_SOURCE
-+/* glibc 2.38 would include  __isoc23_strtol and similar symbols. This is trggerd by
-+ * _GNU_SOURCE but we have to set that for other definitions. Therefore play with defines
-+ * to turn this off.
-+ */
-+#include <features.h>
-+#undef __GLIBC_USE_ISOC2X
-+#undef __GLIBC_USE_C2X_STRTOL
-+#define __GLIBC_USE_C2X_STRTOL 0
-+#undef __GLIBC_USE_ISOC23
-+#undef __GLIBC_USE_C23_STRTOL
-+#define __GLIBC_USE_C23_STRTOL 0
- 
- #include <ctype.h>
- #include <errno.h>
-Index: git/pseudo_client.c
-===================================================================
--- git.orig/pseudo_client.c
-+++ git/pseudo_client.c
-@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
-  * SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-only
-  *
-  */
-#define _GNU_SOURCE
-+#define _DEFAULT_SOURCE
- 
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include <signal.h>
--- a/meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/files/older-glibc-symbols.patch
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/files/older-glibc-symbols.patch
@@ -28,10 +28,10 @@ diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ $(PSEUDODB): pseudodb.o $(SHOBJS) $(DBOBJS) pseudo_ipc.o | $(BIN)
 libpseudo: $(LIBPSEUDO)
 
- $(LIBPSEUDO): $(WRAPOBJS) pseudo_client.o pseudo_ipc.o $(SHOBJS) | $(LIB)
+ $(LIBPSEUDO): $(WRAPOBJS) pseudo_client.o pseudo_client_scanf.o pseudo_ipc.o $(SHOBJS) | $(LIB)
 -	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS_PSEUDO) -shared -o $(LIBPSEUDO) \
 +	$(CC) $(CFLAGS)  -Lprebuilt/$(shell uname -m)-linux/lib/ $(CFLAGS_PSEUDO) -shared -o $(LIBPSEUDO) \
- 		pseudo_client.o pseudo_ipc.o \
+ 		pseudo_client.o pseudo_client_scanf.o pseudo_ipc.o \
 		$(WRAPOBJS) $(SHOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) $(CLIENT_LDFLAGS)
 
 diff --git a/pseudo_wrappers.c b/pseudo_wrappers.c
--- a/meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/pseudo.inc
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/pseudo.inc
@@ -156,3 +156,10 @@ do_install:append:class-nativesdk () {
 }

 BBCLASSEXTEND = "native nativesdk"
+
+# Setscene tasks which run under fakeroot must not be executed before
+# pseudo-native and *all* its runtime dependencies are available in the
+# sysroot.
+PSEUDO_SETSCENE_DEPS = ""
+PSEUDO_SETSCENE_DEPS:class-native = "sqlite3-native:do_populate_sysroot"
+do_populate_sysroot_setscene[depends] += "${PSEUDO_SETSCENE_DEPS}"
--- a/meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/pseudo_git.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/pseudo_git.bb
@@ -1,8 +1,6 @@
 require pseudo.inc

 SRC_URI = "git://git.yoctoproject.org/pseudo;branch=master \
-           file://0001-configure-Prune-PIE-flags.patch \
-           file://glibc238.patch \
           file://fallback-passwd \
           file://fallback-group \
           "
@@ -14,9 +12,9 @@ SRC_URI:append:class-nativesdk = " \
    file://older-glibc-symbols.patch"
 SRC_URI[prebuilt.sha256sum] = "ed9f456856e9d86359f169f46a70ad7be4190d6040282b84c8d97b99072485aa"

-SRCREV = "28dcefb809ce95db997811b5662f0b893b9923e0"
+SRCREV = "125b020dd2bc46baa37a80784704e382732357b4"
 S = "${WORKDIR}/git"
-PV = "1.9.0+git${SRCPV}"
+PV = "1.9.2+git"

 # largefile and 64bit time_t support adds these macros via compiler flags globally
 # remove them for pseudo since pseudo intercepts some of the functions which will be
--- a/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-urllib3/CVE-2025-66418.patch
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-urllib3/CVE-2025-66418.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+From 24d7b67eac89f94e11003424bcf0d8f7b72222a8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Illia Volochii <illia.volochii@gmail.com>
+Date: Fri, 5 Dec 2025 16:41:33 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Merge commit from fork
+
+* Add a hard-coded limit for the decompression chain
+
+* Reuse new list
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-66418
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/commit/24d7b67eac89f94e11003424bcf0d8f7b72222a8]
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
+---
+ changelog/GHSA-gm62-xv2j-4w53.security.rst |  4 ++++
+ src/urllib3/response.py                    | 12 +++++++++++-
+ test/test_response.py                      | 10 ++++++++++
+ 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+ create mode 100644 changelog/GHSA-gm62-xv2j-4w53.security.rst
+
+diff --git a/changelog/GHSA-gm62-xv2j-4w53.security.rst b/changelog/GHSA-gm62-xv2j-4w53.security.rst
+new file mode 100644
+index 00000000..6646eaa3
+--- /dev/null
+++ b/changelog/GHSA-gm62-xv2j-4w53.security.rst
+@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+Fixed a security issue where an attacker could compose an HTTP response with
+virtually unlimited links in the ``Content-Encoding`` header, potentially
+leading to a denial of service (DoS) attack by exhausting system resources
+during decoding. The number of allowed chained encodings is now limited to 5.
+diff --git a/src/urllib3/response.py b/src/urllib3/response.py
+index 4ba42136..069f726c 100644
+--- a/src/urllib3/response.py
+++ b/src/urllib3/response.py
+@@ -135,8 +135,18 @@ class MultiDecoder(object):
+         they were applied.
+     """
+ 
+    # Maximum allowed number of chained HTTP encodings in the
+    # Content-Encoding header.
+    max_decode_links = 5
+
+     def __init__(self, modes):
+-        self._decoders = [_get_decoder(m.strip()) for m in modes.split(",")]
+        encodings = [m.strip() for m in modes.split(",")]
+        if len(encodings) > self.max_decode_links:
+            raise DecodeError(
+                "Too many content encodings in the chain: "
+                f"{len(encodings)} > {self.max_decode_links}"
+            )
+        self._decoders = [_get_decoder(e) for e in encodings]
+ 
+     def flush(self):
+         return self._decoders[0].flush()
+diff --git a/test/test_response.py b/test/test_response.py
+index 9592fdd9..d824ae70 100644
+--- a/test/test_response.py
+++ b/test/test_response.py
+@@ -295,6 +295,16 @@ class TestResponse(object):
+ 
+         assert r.data == b"foo"
+ 
+    def test_read_multi_decoding_too_many_links(self) -> None:
+        fp = BytesIO(b"foo")
+        with pytest.raises(
+            DecodeError, match="Too many content encodings in the chain: 6 > 5"
+        ):
+            HTTPResponse(
+                fp,
+                headers={"content-encoding": "gzip, deflate, br, zstd, gzip, deflate"},
+            )
+
+     def test_body_blob(self):
+         resp = HTTPResponse(b"foo")
+         assert resp.data == b"foo"
--- a/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-urllib3_1.26.20.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-urllib3_1.26.20.bb
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ inherit pypi setuptools3

 SRC_URI += " \
    file://CVE-2025-50181.patch \
+    file://CVE-2025-66418.patch \
 "

 RDEPENDS:${PN} += "\
--- a/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2025-13836.patch
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2025-13836.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
+From 289f29b0fe38baf2d7cb5854f4bb573cc34a6a15 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Miss Islington (bot)"
+ <31488909+miss-islington@users.noreply.github.com>
+Date: Fri, 5 Dec 2025 16:21:57 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] [3.13] gh-119451: Fix a potential denial of service in
+ http.client (GH-119454) (#142139)
+
+gh-119451: Fix a potential denial of service in http.client (GH-119454)
+
+Reading the whole body of the HTTP response could cause OOM if
+the Content-Length value is too large even if the server does not send
+a large amount of data. Now the HTTP client reads large data by chunks,
+therefore the amount of consumed memory is proportional to the amount
+of sent data.
+(cherry picked from commit 5a4c4a033a4a54481be6870aa1896fad732555b5)
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-13836
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/python/cpython/commit/289f29b0fe38baf2d7cb5854f4bb573cc34a6a15]
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+---
+ Lib/http/client.py                            | 28 ++++++--
+ Lib/test/test_httplib.py                      | 66 +++++++++++++++++++
+ ...-05-23-11-47-48.gh-issue-119451.qkJe9-.rst |  5 ++
+ 3 files changed, 95 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2024-05-23-11-47-48.gh-issue-119451.qkJe9-.rst
+
+diff --git a/Lib/http/client.py b/Lib/http/client.py
+index d1b7b10..c8ab5b7 100644
+--- a/Lib/http/client.py
+++ b/Lib/http/client.py
+@@ -111,6 +111,11 @@ responses = {v: v.phrase for v in http.HTTPStatus.__members__.values()}
+ _MAXLINE = 65536
+ _MAXHEADERS = 100
+ 
+# Data larger than this will be read in chunks, to prevent extreme
+# overallocation.
+_MIN_READ_BUF_SIZE = 1 << 20
+
+
+ # Header name/value ABNF (http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7230#section-3.2)
+ #
+ # VCHAR          = %x21-7E
+@@ -628,10 +633,25 @@ class HTTPResponse(io.BufferedIOBase):
+         reading. If the bytes are truly not available (due to EOF), then the
+         IncompleteRead exception can be used to detect the problem.
+         """
+-        data = self.fp.read(amt)
+-        if len(data) < amt:
+-            raise IncompleteRead(data, amt-len(data))
+-        return data
+        cursize = min(amt, _MIN_READ_BUF_SIZE)
+        data = self.fp.read(cursize)
+        if len(data) >= amt:
+            return data
+        if len(data) < cursize:
+            raise IncompleteRead(data, amt - len(data))
+
+        data = io.BytesIO(data)
+        data.seek(0, 2)
+        while True:
+            # This is a geometric increase in read size (never more than
+            # doubling out the current length of data per loop iteration).
+            delta = min(cursize, amt - cursize)
+            data.write(self.fp.read(delta))
+            if data.tell() >= amt:
+                return data.getvalue()
+            cursize += delta
+            if data.tell() < cursize:
+                raise IncompleteRead(data.getvalue(), amt - data.tell())
+ 
+     def _safe_readinto(self, b):
+         """Same as _safe_read, but for reading into a buffer."""
+diff --git a/Lib/test/test_httplib.py b/Lib/test/test_httplib.py
+index 77152cf..89ec5f6 100644
+--- a/Lib/test/test_httplib.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_httplib.py
+@@ -1226,6 +1226,72 @@ class BasicTest(TestCase):
+         thread.join()
+         self.assertEqual(result, b"proxied data\n")
+ 
+    def test_large_content_length(self):
+        serv = socket.create_server((HOST, 0))
+        self.addCleanup(serv.close)
+
+        def run_server():
+            [conn, address] = serv.accept()
+            with conn:
+                while conn.recv(1024):
+                    conn.sendall(
+                        b"HTTP/1.1 200 Ok\r\n"
+                        b"Content-Length: %d\r\n"
+                        b"\r\n" % size)
+                    conn.sendall(b'A' * (size//3))
+                    conn.sendall(b'B' * (size - size//3))
+
+        thread = threading.Thread(target=run_server)
+        thread.start()
+        self.addCleanup(thread.join, 1.0)
+
+        conn = client.HTTPConnection(*serv.getsockname())
+        try:
+            for w in range(15, 27):
+                size = 1 << w
+                conn.request("GET", "/")
+                with conn.getresponse() as response:
+                    self.assertEqual(len(response.read()), size)
+        finally:
+            conn.close()
+            thread.join(1.0)
+
+    def test_large_content_length_truncated(self):
+        serv = socket.create_server((HOST, 0))
+        self.addCleanup(serv.close)
+
+        def run_server():
+            while True:
+                [conn, address] = serv.accept()
+                with conn:
+                    conn.recv(1024)
+                    if not size:
+                        break
+                    conn.sendall(
+                        b"HTTP/1.1 200 Ok\r\n"
+                        b"Content-Length: %d\r\n"
+                        b"\r\n"
+                        b"Text" % size)
+
+        thread = threading.Thread(target=run_server)
+        thread.start()
+        self.addCleanup(thread.join, 1.0)
+
+        conn = client.HTTPConnection(*serv.getsockname())
+        try:
+            for w in range(18, 65):
+                size = 1 << w
+                conn.request("GET", "/")
+                with conn.getresponse() as response:
+                    self.assertRaises(client.IncompleteRead, response.read)
+                conn.close()
+        finally:
+            conn.close()
+            size = 0
+            conn.request("GET", "/")
+            conn.close()
+            thread.join(1.0)
+
+     def test_putrequest_override_domain_validation(self):
+         """
+         It should be possible to override the default validation
+diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2024-05-23-11-47-48.gh-issue-119451.qkJe9-.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2024-05-23-11-47-48.gh-issue-119451.qkJe9-.rst
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..6d6f25c
+--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2024-05-23-11-47-48.gh-issue-119451.qkJe9-.rst
+@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+Fix a potential memory denial of service in the :mod:`http.client` module.
+When connecting to a malicious server, it could cause
+an arbitrary amount of memory to be allocated.
+This could have led to symptoms including a :exc:`MemoryError`, swapping, out
+of memory (OOM) killed processes or containers, or even system crashes.
+-- 
+2.50.1
+
--- a/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3_3.10.19.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3_3.10.19.bb
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://www.python.org/ftp/python/${PV}/Python-${PV}.tar.xz \
           file://0001-test_storlines-skip-due-to-load-variability.patch \
           file://0001-gh-107811-tarfile-treat-overflow-in-UID-GID-as-failu.patch \
           file://CVE-2025-6075.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-13836.patch \
           "

 SRC_URI:append:class-native = " \
--- a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc
@@ -129,6 +129,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.qemu.org/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.xz \
           file://CVE-2024-3446-0006.patch \
           file://CVE-2024-3447.patch \
           file://CVE-2024-8354.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-12464.patch \
           "
 UPSTREAM_CHECK_REGEX = "qemu-(?P<pver>\d+(\.\d+)+)\.tar"

@@ -168,6 +169,9 @@ CVE_CHECK_IGNORE += "CVE-2023-1386"
 # virtio-snd was implemented in 8.2.0, so version 6.2.0 is not yet affected
 CVE_CHECK_IGNORE += "CVE-2024-7730"

+# These issues were introduced in v10.0.0-rc0
+CVE_CHECK_IGNORE += "CVE-2025-54566 CVE-2025-54567"
+
 COMPATIBLE_HOST:mipsarchn32 = "null"
 COMPATIBLE_HOST:mipsarchn64 = "null"
 COMPATIBLE_HOST:riscv32 = "null"
--- a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2025-12464.patch
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2025-12464.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+From a01344d9d78089e9e585faaeb19afccff2050abf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
+Date: Tue, 28 Oct 2025 16:00:42 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] net: pad packets to minimum length in qemu_receive_packet()
+
+In commits like 969e50b61a28 ("net: Pad short frames to minimum size
+before sending from SLiRP/TAP") we switched away from requiring
+network devices to handle short frames to instead having the net core
+code do the padding of short frames out to the ETH_ZLEN minimum size.
+We then dropped the code for handling short frames from the network
+devices in a series of commits like 140eae9c8f7 ("hw/net: e1000:
+Remove the logic of padding short frames in the receive path").
+
+This missed one route where the device's receive code can still see a
+short frame: if the device is in loopback mode and it transmits a
+short frame via the qemu_receive_packet() function, this will be fed
+back into its own receive code without being padded.
+
+Add the padding logic to qemu_receive_packet().
+
+This fixes a buffer overrun which can be triggered in the
+e1000_receive_iov() logic via the loopback code path.
+
+Other devices that use qemu_receive_packet() to implement loopback
+are cadence_gem, dp8393x, lan9118, msf2-emac, pcnet, rtl8139
+and sungem.
+
+Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
+Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/3043
+Reviewed-by: Akihiko Odaki <odaki@rsg.ci.i.u-tokyo.ac.jp>
+Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
+Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-12464
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/a01344d9d7]
+
+Signed-off-by: Kai Kang <kai.kang@windriver.com>
+---
+ net/net.c | 10 ++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/net/net.c b/net/net.c
+index 27e0d27807..8aefdb3424 100644
+--- a/net/net.c
+++ b/net/net.c
+@@ -775,10 +775,20 @@ ssize_t qemu_send_packet(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf, int size)
+ 
+ ssize_t qemu_receive_packet(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf, int size)
+ {
+    uint8_t min_pkt[ETH_ZLEN];
+    size_t min_pktsz = sizeof(min_pkt);
+
+     if (!qemu_can_receive_packet(nc)) {
+         return 0;
+     }
+ 
+    if (net_peer_needs_padding(nc)) {
+        if (eth_pad_short_frame(min_pkt, &min_pktsz, buf, size)) {
+            buf = min_pkt;
+            size = min_pktsz;
+        }
+    }
+
+     return qemu_net_queue_receive(nc->incoming_queue, buf, size);
+ }
+ 
+-- 
+2.47.1
+
--- a/meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2025-10158.patch
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2025-10158.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+From a8fabf850c3c5164520c307199e9abc5ded45e4c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andrew Tridgell <andrew@tridgell.net>
+Date: Sat, 23 Aug 2025 17:26:53 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] fixed an invalid access to files array
+
+this was found by Calum Hutton from Rapid7. It is a real bug, but
+analysis shows it can't be leverged into an exploit. Worth fixing
+though.
+
+Many thanks to Calum and Rapid7 for finding and reporting this
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-10158
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/commit/797e17fc4a6f15e3b1756538a9f812b63942686f]
+
+Signed-off-by: Liyin Zhang <liyin.zhang.cn@windriver.com>
+---
+ sender.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/sender.c b/sender.c
+index a4d46c39..b1588b70 100644
+--- a/sender.c
+++ b/sender.c
+@@ -262,6 +262,8 @@ void send_files(int f_in, int f_out)
+ 
+ 		if (ndx - cur_flist->ndx_start >= 0)
+ 			file = cur_flist->files[ndx - cur_flist->ndx_start];
+		else if (cur_flist->parent_ndx < 0)
+			exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
+ 		else
+ 			file = dir_flist->files[cur_flist->parent_ndx];
+ 		if (F_PATHNAME(file)) {
+-- 
+2.35.5
+
--- a/meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.2.7.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.2.7.bb
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.samba.org/pub/${BPN}/src/${BP}.tar.gz \
           file://CVE-2024-12087-0003.patch \
           file://CVE-2024-12088.patch \
           file://CVE-2024-12747.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-10158.patch \
           "

 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "4e7d9d3f6ed10878c58c5fb724a67dacf4b6aac7340b13e488fb2dc41346f2bb"
--- a/meta/recipes-extended/cups/cups.inc
+++ b/meta/recipes-extended/cups/cups.inc
@@ -27,6 +27,9 @@ SRC_URI = "https://github.com/OpenPrinting/cups/releases/download/v${PV}/cups-${
 	   file://CVE-2024-47175-5.patch \
 	   file://CVE-2025-58060.patch \
 	   file://CVE-2025-58364.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-58436.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-61915.patch \
+           file://0001-conf.c-Fix-stopping-scheduler-on-unknown-directive.patch \
           "

 UPSTREAM_CHECK_URI = "https://github.com/OpenPrinting/cups/releases"
--- a/meta/recipes-extended/cups/cups/0001-conf.c-Fix-stopping-scheduler-on-unknown-directive.patch
+++ b/meta/recipes-extended/cups/cups/0001-conf.c-Fix-stopping-scheduler-on-unknown-directive.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+From 277d3b1c49895f070bbf4b73cada011d71fbf9f3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Zdenek Dohnal <zdohnal@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 4 Dec 2025 09:04:37 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] conf.c: Fix stopping scheduler on unknown directive
+
+Change the return value to do not trigger stopping the scheduler in case
+of unknown directive, because stopping the scheduler on config errors
+should only happen in case of syntax errors.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/OpenPrinting/cups/commit/277d3b1c49895f070bbf4b73cada011d71fbf9f3]
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
+---
+ scheduler/conf.c | 14 +++++++-------
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/scheduler/conf.c b/scheduler/conf.c
+index 7d6da0252..0e7be0ef4 100644
+--- a/scheduler/conf.c
+++ b/scheduler/conf.c
+@@ -2695,16 +2695,16 @@ parse_variable(
+   {
+    /*
+     * Unknown directive!  Output an error message and continue...
+    *
+    * Return value 1 is on purpose - we ignore unknown directives to log
+    * error, but do not stop the scheduler in case error in configuration
+    * is set to be fatal.
+     */
+ 
+-    if (!value)
+-      cupsdLogMessage(CUPSD_LOG_ERROR, "Missing value for %s on line %d of %s.",
+-		      line, linenum, filename);
+-    else
+-      cupsdLogMessage(CUPSD_LOG_ERROR, "Unknown directive %s on line %d of %s.",
+-		      line, linenum, filename);
+    cupsdLogMessage(CUPSD_LOG_ERROR, "Unknown directive %s on line %d of %s.",
+		    line, linenum, filename);
+ 
+-    return (0);
+    return (1);
+   }
+ 
+   switch (var->type)
--- a/meta/recipes-extended/cups/cups/CVE-2025-58436.patch
+++ b/meta/recipes-extended/cups/cups/CVE-2025-58436.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,630 @@
+From 5d414f1f91bdca118413301b148f0b188eb1cdc6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Zdenek Dohnal <zdohnal@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2025 10:16:48 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix unresponsive cupsd process caused by a slow client
+
+If client is very slow, it will slow cupsd process for other clients.
+The fix is the best effort without turning scheduler cupsd into
+multithreaded process which would be too complex and error-prone when
+backporting to 2.4.x series.
+
+The fix for unencrypted communication is to follow up on communication
+only if there is the whole line on input, and the waiting time is
+guarded by timeout.
+
+Encrypted communication now starts after we have the whole client hello
+packet, which conflicts with optional upgrade support to HTTPS via
+methods other than method OPTIONS, so this optional support defined in
+RFC 2817, section 3.1 is removed. Too slow or incomplete requests are
+handled by connection timeout.
+
+Fixes CVE-2025-58436
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-58436
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/OpenPrinting/cups/commit/5d414f1f91bdca118413301b148f0b188eb1cdc6]
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
+---
+ cups/http-private.h |   7 +-
+ cups/http.c         |  80 +++++++++++++-------
+ cups/tls-openssl.c  |  15 +++-
+ scheduler/client.c  | 178 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
+ scheduler/client.h  |   3 +
+ scheduler/select.c  |  12 +++
+ 6 files changed, 198 insertions(+), 97 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/cups/http-private.h b/cups/http-private.h
+index d9854faed..2d9035032 100644
+--- a/cups/http-private.h
+++ b/cups/http-private.h
+@@ -120,6 +120,7 @@ extern "C" {
+  * Constants...
+  */
+ 
+#  define _HTTP_MAX_BUFFER	32768	/* Size of read buffer */
+ #  define _HTTP_MAX_SBUFFER	65536	/* Size of (de)compression buffer */
+ #  define _HTTP_RESOLVE_DEFAULT	0	/* Just resolve with default options */
+ #  define _HTTP_RESOLVE_STDERR	1	/* Log resolve progress to stderr */
+@@ -231,8 +232,8 @@ struct _http_s				/**** HTTP connection structure ****/
+   http_encoding_t	data_encoding;	/* Chunked or not */
+   int			_data_remaining;/* Number of bytes left (deprecated) */
+   int			used;		/* Number of bytes used in buffer */
+-  char			buffer[HTTP_MAX_BUFFER];
+-					/* Buffer for incoming data */
+  char			_buffer[HTTP_MAX_BUFFER];
+					/* Old read buffer (deprecated) */
+   int			_auth_type;	/* Authentication in use (deprecated) */
+   unsigned char		_md5_state[88];	/* MD5 state (deprecated) */
+   char			nonce[HTTP_MAX_VALUE];
+@@ -306,6 +307,8 @@ struct _http_s				/**** HTTP connection structure ****/
+ 					/* Allocated field values */
+   			*default_fields[HTTP_FIELD_MAX];
+ 					/* Default field values, if any */
+  char			buffer[_HTTP_MAX_BUFFER];
+					/* Read buffer */
+ };
+ #  endif /* !_HTTP_NO_PRIVATE */
+ 
+diff --git a/cups/http.c b/cups/http.c
+index 7a42cb3d6..214e45158 100644
+--- a/cups/http.c
+++ b/cups/http.c
+@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ static http_t		*http_create(const char *host, int port,
+ static void		http_debug_hex(const char *prefix, const char *buffer,
+ 			               int bytes);
+ #endif /* DEBUG */
+-static ssize_t		http_read(http_t *http, char *buffer, size_t length);
+static ssize_t		http_read(http_t *http, char *buffer, size_t length, int timeout);
+ static ssize_t		http_read_buffered(http_t *http, char *buffer, size_t length);
+ static ssize_t		http_read_chunk(http_t *http, char *buffer, size_t length);
+ static int		http_send(http_t *http, http_state_t request,
+@@ -1188,7 +1188,7 @@ httpGets(char   *line,			/* I - Line to read into */
+         return (NULL);
+       }
+ 
+-      bytes = http_read(http, http->buffer + http->used, (size_t)(HTTP_MAX_BUFFER - http->used));
+      bytes = http_read(http, http->buffer + http->used, (size_t)(_HTTP_MAX_BUFFER - http->used), http->wait_value);
+ 
+       DEBUG_printf(("4httpGets: read " CUPS_LLFMT " bytes.", CUPS_LLCAST bytes));
+ 
+@@ -1706,24 +1706,13 @@ httpPeek(http_t *http,			/* I - HTTP connection */
+ 
+     ssize_t	buflen;			/* Length of read for buffer */
+ 
+-    if (!http->blocking)
+-    {
+-      while (!httpWait(http, http->wait_value))
+-      {
+-	if (http->timeout_cb && (*http->timeout_cb)(http, http->timeout_data))
+-	  continue;
+-
+-	return (0);
+-      }
+-    }
+-
+     if ((size_t)http->data_remaining > sizeof(http->buffer))
+       buflen = sizeof(http->buffer);
+     else
+       buflen = (ssize_t)http->data_remaining;
+ 
+     DEBUG_printf(("2httpPeek: Reading %d bytes into buffer.", (int)buflen));
+-    bytes = http_read(http, http->buffer, (size_t)buflen);
+    bytes = http_read(http, http->buffer, (size_t)buflen, http->wait_value);
+ 
+     DEBUG_printf(("2httpPeek: Read " CUPS_LLFMT " bytes into buffer.",
+                   CUPS_LLCAST bytes));
+@@ -1744,9 +1733,9 @@ httpPeek(http_t *http,			/* I - HTTP connection */
+     int		zerr;			/* Decompressor error */
+     z_stream	stream;			/* Copy of decompressor stream */
+ 
+-    if (http->used > 0 && ((z_stream *)http->stream)->avail_in < HTTP_MAX_BUFFER)
+    if (http->used > 0 && ((z_stream *)http->stream)->avail_in < _HTTP_MAX_BUFFER)
+     {
+-      size_t buflen = HTTP_MAX_BUFFER - ((z_stream *)http->stream)->avail_in;
+      size_t buflen = _HTTP_MAX_BUFFER - ((z_stream *)http->stream)->avail_in;
+ 					/* Number of bytes to copy */
+ 
+       if (((z_stream *)http->stream)->avail_in > 0 &&
+@@ -2004,7 +1993,7 @@ httpRead2(http_t *http,			/* I - HTTP connection */
+ 
+       if (bytes == 0)
+       {
+-        ssize_t buflen = HTTP_MAX_BUFFER - (ssize_t)((z_stream *)http->stream)->avail_in;
+        ssize_t buflen = _HTTP_MAX_BUFFER - (ssize_t)((z_stream *)http->stream)->avail_in;
+ 					/* Additional bytes for buffer */
+ 
+         if (buflen > 0)
+@@ -2754,7 +2743,7 @@ int					/* O - 1 to continue, 0 to stop */
+ _httpUpdate(http_t        *http,	/* I - HTTP connection */
+             http_status_t *status)	/* O - Current HTTP status */
+ {
+-  char		line[32768],		/* Line from connection... */
+  char		line[_HTTP_MAX_BUFFER],	/* Line from connection... */
+ 		*value;			/* Pointer to value on line */
+   http_field_t	field;			/* Field index */
+   int		major, minor;		/* HTTP version numbers */
+@@ -2762,12 +2751,46 @@ _httpUpdate(http_t        *http,	/* I - HTTP connection */
+ 
+   DEBUG_printf(("_httpUpdate(http=%p, status=%p), state=%s", (void *)http, (void *)status, httpStateString(http->state)));
+ 
+  /* When doing non-blocking I/O, make sure we have a whole line... */
+  if (!http->blocking)
+  {
+    ssize_t	bytes;			/* Bytes "peeked" from connection */
+
+    /* See whether our read buffer is full... */
+    DEBUG_printf(("2_httpUpdate: used=%d", http->used));
+
+    if (http->used > 0 && !memchr(http->buffer, '\n', (size_t)http->used) && (size_t)http->used < sizeof(http->buffer))
+    {
+      /* No, try filling in more data... */
+      if ((bytes = http_read(http, http->buffer + http->used, sizeof(http->buffer) - (size_t)http->used, /*timeout*/0)) > 0)
+      {
+	DEBUG_printf(("2_httpUpdate: Read %d bytes.", (int)bytes));
+	http->used += (int)bytes;
+      }
+    }
+
+    /* Peek at the incoming data... */
+    if (!http->used || !memchr(http->buffer, '\n', (size_t)http->used))
+    {
+      /* Don't have a full line, tell the reader to try again when there is more data... */
+      DEBUG_puts("1_htttpUpdate: No newline in buffer yet.");
+      if ((size_t)http->used == sizeof(http->buffer))
+	*status = HTTP_STATUS_ERROR;
+      else
+	*status = HTTP_STATUS_CONTINUE;
+      return (0);
+    }
+
+    DEBUG_puts("2_httpUpdate: Found newline in buffer.");
+  }
+
+  /*
+   * Grab a single line from the connection...
+   */
+ 
+   if (!httpGets(line, sizeof(line), http))
+   {
+    DEBUG_puts("1_httpUpdate: Error reading request line.");
+     *status = HTTP_STATUS_ERROR;
+     return (0);
+   }
+@@ -4089,7 +4112,8 @@ http_debug_hex(const char *prefix,	/* I - Prefix for line */
+ static ssize_t				/* O - Number of bytes read or -1 on error */
+ http_read(http_t *http,			/* I - HTTP connection */
+           char   *buffer,		/* I - Buffer */
+-          size_t length)		/* I - Maximum bytes to read */
+          size_t length,		/* I - Maximum bytes to read */
+          int    timeout)		/* I - Wait timeout */
+ {
+   ssize_t	bytes;			/* Bytes read */
+ 
+@@ -4098,7 +4122,7 @@ http_read(http_t *http,			/* I - HTTP connection */
+ 
+   if (!http->blocking || http->timeout_value > 0.0)
+   {
+-    while (!httpWait(http, http->wait_value))
+    while (!_httpWait(http, timeout, 1))
+     {
+       if (http->timeout_cb && (*http->timeout_cb)(http, http->timeout_data))
+ 	continue;
+@@ -4201,7 +4225,7 @@ http_read_buffered(http_t *http,	/* I - HTTP connection */
+     else
+       bytes = (ssize_t)length;
+ 
+-    DEBUG_printf(("8http_read: Grabbing %d bytes from input buffer.",
+    DEBUG_printf(("8http_read_buffered: Grabbing %d bytes from input buffer.",
+                   (int)bytes));
+ 
+     memcpy(buffer, http->buffer, (size_t)bytes);
+@@ -4211,7 +4235,7 @@ http_read_buffered(http_t *http,	/* I - HTTP connection */
+       memmove(http->buffer, http->buffer + bytes, (size_t)http->used);
+   }
+   else
+-    bytes = http_read(http, buffer, length);
+    bytes = http_read(http, buffer, length, http->wait_value);
+ 
+   return (bytes);
+ }
+@@ -4557,15 +4581,15 @@ http_set_timeout(int    fd,		/* I - File descriptor */
+ static void
+ http_set_wait(http_t *http)		/* I - HTTP connection */
+ {
+-  if (http->blocking)
+-  {
+-    http->wait_value = (int)(http->timeout_value * 1000);
+  http->wait_value = (int)(http->timeout_value * 1000);
+ 
+-    if (http->wait_value <= 0)
+  if (http->wait_value <= 0)
+  {
+    if (http->blocking)
+       http->wait_value = 60000;
+    else
+      http->wait_value = 1000;
+   }
+-  else
+-    http->wait_value = 10000;
+ }
+ 
+ 
+diff --git a/cups/tls-openssl.c b/cups/tls-openssl.c
+index 9fcbe0af3..f746f4cba 100644
+--- a/cups/tls-openssl.c
+++ b/cups/tls-openssl.c
+@@ -180,12 +180,14 @@ cupsMakeServerCredentials(
+   // Save them...
+   if ((bio = BIO_new_file(keyfile, "wb")) == NULL)
+   {
+    DEBUG_printf(("1cupsMakeServerCredentials: Unable to create private key file '%s': %s", keyfile, strerror(errno)));
+     _cupsSetError(IPP_STATUS_ERROR_INTERNAL, strerror(errno), 0);
+     goto done;
+   }
+ 
+   if (!PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey(bio, pkey, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL))
+   {
+    DEBUG_puts("1cupsMakeServerCredentials: PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey failed.");
+     _cupsSetError(IPP_STATUS_ERROR_INTERNAL, _("Unable to write private key."), 1);
+     BIO_free(bio);
+     goto done;
+@@ -195,12 +197,14 @@ cupsMakeServerCredentials(
+ 
+   if ((bio = BIO_new_file(crtfile, "wb")) == NULL)
+   {
+    DEBUG_printf(("1cupsMakeServerCredentials: Unable to create certificate file '%s': %s", crtfile, strerror(errno)));
+     _cupsSetError(IPP_STATUS_ERROR_INTERNAL, strerror(errno), 0);
+     goto done;
+   }
+ 
+   if (!PEM_write_bio_X509(bio, cert))
+   {
+    DEBUG_puts("1cupsMakeServerCredentials: PEM_write_bio_X509 failed.");
+     _cupsSetError(IPP_STATUS_ERROR_INTERNAL, _("Unable to write X.509 certificate."), 1);
+     BIO_free(bio);
+     goto done;
+@@ -1044,10 +1048,10 @@ _httpTLSStart(http_t *http)		// I - Connection to server
+ 
+       if (!cupsMakeServerCredentials(tls_keypath, cn, 0, NULL, time(NULL) + 365 * 86400))
+       {
+-	DEBUG_puts("4_httpTLSStart: cupsMakeServerCredentials failed.");
+	DEBUG_printf(("4_httpTLSStart: cupsMakeServerCredentials failed: %s", cupsLastErrorString()));
+ 	http->error  = errno = EINVAL;
+ 	http->status = HTTP_STATUS_ERROR;
+-	_cupsSetError(IPP_STATUS_ERROR_INTERNAL, _("Unable to create server credentials."), 1);
+//	_cupsSetError(IPP_STATUS_ERROR_INTERNAL, _("Unable to create server credentials."), 1);
+         SSL_CTX_free(context);
+ 
+ 	return (-1);
+@@ -1272,14 +1276,17 @@ http_bio_read(BIO  *h,			// I - BIO data
+ 
+   http = (http_t *)BIO_get_data(h);
+ 
+-  if (!http->blocking)
+  if (!http->blocking || http->timeout_value > 0.0)
+   {
+    /*
+     * Make sure we have data before we read...
+     */
+ 
+-    if (!_httpWait(http, 10000, 0))
+    while (!_httpWait(http, http->wait_value, 0))
+     {
+      if (http->timeout_cb && (*http->timeout_cb)(http, http->timeout_data))
+	continue;
+
+ #ifdef WIN32
+       http->error = WSAETIMEDOUT;
+ #else
+diff --git a/scheduler/client.c b/scheduler/client.c
+index f0349a6c9..9593c9138 100644
+--- a/scheduler/client.c
+++ b/scheduler/client.c
+@@ -34,11 +34,11 @@
+ 
+ static int		check_if_modified(cupsd_client_t *con,
+ 			                  struct stat *filestats);
+#ifdef HAVE_TLS
+static int		check_start_tls(cupsd_client_t *con);
+#endif /* HAVE_TLS */
+ static int		compare_clients(cupsd_client_t *a, cupsd_client_t *b,
+ 			                void *data);
+-#ifdef HAVE_TLS
+-static int		cupsd_start_tls(cupsd_client_t *con, http_encryption_t e);
+-#endif /* HAVE_TLS */
+ static char		*get_file(cupsd_client_t *con, struct stat *filestats,
+ 			          char *filename, size_t len);
+ static http_status_t	install_cupsd_conf(cupsd_client_t *con);
+@@ -360,14 +360,20 @@ cupsdAcceptClient(cupsd_listener_t *lis)/* I - Listener socket */
+   if (lis->encryption == HTTP_ENCRYPTION_ALWAYS)
+   {
+    /*
+-    * https connection; go secure...
+    * HTTPS connection, force TLS negotiation...
+     */
+ 
+-    if (cupsd_start_tls(con, HTTP_ENCRYPTION_ALWAYS))
+-      cupsdCloseClient(con);
+    con->tls_start = time(NULL);
+    con->encryption = HTTP_ENCRYPTION_ALWAYS;
+   }
+   else
+  {
+   /*
+    * HTTP connection, but check for HTTPS negotiation on first data...
+    */
+
+     con->auto_ssl = 1;
+  }
+ #endif /* HAVE_TLS */
+ }
+ 
+@@ -597,17 +603,46 @@ cupsdReadClient(cupsd_client_t *con)	/* I - Client to read from */
+ 
+     con->auto_ssl = 0;
+ 
+-    if (recv(httpGetFd(con->http), buf, 1, MSG_PEEK) == 1 &&
+-        (!buf[0] || !strchr("DGHOPT", buf[0])))
+    if (recv(httpGetFd(con->http), buf, 5, MSG_PEEK) == 5 && buf[0] == 0x16 && buf[1] == 3 && buf[2])
+     {
+      /*
+-      * Encrypt this connection...
+      * Client hello record, encrypt this connection...
+       */
+ 
+-      cupsdLogClient(con, CUPSD_LOG_DEBUG2, "Saw first byte %02X, auto-negotiating SSL/TLS session.", buf[0] & 255);
+      cupsdLogClient(con, CUPSD_LOG_DEBUG2, "Saw client hello record, auto-negotiating TLS session.");
+      con->tls_start = time(NULL);
+      con->encryption = HTTP_ENCRYPTION_ALWAYS;
+    }
+  }
+ 
+-      if (cupsd_start_tls(con, HTTP_ENCRYPTION_ALWAYS))
+-        cupsdCloseClient(con);
+  if (con->tls_start)
+  {
+   /*
+    * Try negotiating TLS...
+    */
+
+    int tls_status = check_start_tls(con);
+
+    if (tls_status < 0)
+    {
+     /*
+      * TLS negotiation failed, close the connection.
+      */
+
+      cupsdCloseClient(con);
+      return;
+    }
+    else if (tls_status == 0)
+    {
+     /*
+      * Nothing to do yet...
+      */
+
+      if ((time(NULL) - con->tls_start) > 5)
+      {
+	// Timeout, close the connection...
+	cupsdCloseClient(con);
+      }
+ 
+       return;
+     }
+@@ -771,9 +806,7 @@ cupsdReadClient(cupsd_client_t *con)	/* I - Client to read from */
+         * Parse incoming parameters until the status changes...
+ 	*/
+ 
+-        while ((status = httpUpdate(con->http)) == HTTP_STATUS_CONTINUE)
+-	  if (!httpGetReady(con->http))
+-	    break;
+	status = httpUpdate(con->http);
+ 
+ 	if (status != HTTP_STATUS_OK && status != HTTP_STATUS_CONTINUE)
+ 	{
+@@ -935,11 +968,10 @@ cupsdReadClient(cupsd_client_t *con)	/* I - Client to read from */
+ 	  return;
+ 	}
+ 
+-        if (cupsd_start_tls(con, HTTP_ENCRYPTION_REQUIRED))
+-        {
+-	  cupsdCloseClient(con);
+-	  return;
+-	}
+	con->tls_start = time(NULL);
+	con->tls_upgrade = 1;
+	con->encryption = HTTP_ENCRYPTION_REQUIRED;
+	return;
+ #else
+ 	if (!cupsdSendError(con, HTTP_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED, CUPSD_AUTH_NONE))
+ 	{
+@@ -978,32 +1010,11 @@ cupsdReadClient(cupsd_client_t *con)	/* I - Client to read from */
+       if (!_cups_strcasecmp(httpGetField(con->http, HTTP_FIELD_CONNECTION),
+                             "Upgrade") && !httpIsEncrypted(con->http))
+       {
+-#ifdef HAVE_TLS
+-       /*
+-        * Do encryption stuff...
+-	*/
+-
+-        httpClearFields(con->http);
+-
+-	if (!cupsdSendHeader(con, HTTP_STATUS_SWITCHING_PROTOCOLS, NULL,
+-	                     CUPSD_AUTH_NONE))
+-	{
+-	  cupsdCloseClient(con);
+-	  return;
+-	}
+-
+-        if (cupsd_start_tls(con, HTTP_ENCRYPTION_REQUIRED))
+-        {
+-	  cupsdCloseClient(con);
+-	  return;
+-	}
+-#else
+ 	if (!cupsdSendError(con, HTTP_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED, CUPSD_AUTH_NONE))
+ 	{
+ 	  cupsdCloseClient(con);
+ 	  return;
+ 	}
+-#endif /* HAVE_TLS */
+       }
+ 
+       if ((status = cupsdIsAuthorized(con, NULL)) != HTTP_STATUS_OK)
+@@ -2631,6 +2642,69 @@ check_if_modified(
+ }
+ 
+ 
+#ifdef HAVE_TLS
+/*
+ * 'check_start_tls()' - Start encryption on a connection.
+ */
+
+static int				/* O - 0 to continue, 1 on success, -1 on error */
+check_start_tls(cupsd_client_t *con)	/* I - Client connection */
+{
+  unsigned char	chello[4096];		/* Client hello record */
+  ssize_t	chello_bytes;		/* Bytes read/peeked */
+  int		chello_len;		/* Length of record */
+
+
+ /*
+  * See if we have a good and complete client hello record...
+  */
+
+  if ((chello_bytes = recv(httpGetFd(con->http), (char *)chello, sizeof(chello), MSG_PEEK)) < 5)
+    return (0);				/* Not enough bytes (yet) */
+
+  if (chello[0] != 0x016 || chello[1] != 3 || chello[2] == 0)
+    return (-1);			/* Not a TLS Client Hello record */
+
+  chello_len = (chello[3] << 8) | chello[4];
+
+  if ((chello_len + 5) > chello_bytes)
+    return (0);				/* Not enough bytes yet */
+
+ /*
+  * OK, we do, try negotiating...
+  */
+
+  con->tls_start = 0;
+
+  if (httpEncryption(con->http, con->encryption))
+  {
+    cupsdLogClient(con, CUPSD_LOG_ERROR, "Unable to encrypt connection: %s", cupsLastErrorString());
+    return (-1);
+  }
+
+  cupsdLogClient(con, CUPSD_LOG_DEBUG, "Connection now encrypted.");
+
+  if (con->tls_upgrade)
+  {
+    // Respond to the original OPTIONS command...
+    con->tls_upgrade = 0;
+
+    httpClearFields(con->http);
+    httpClearCookie(con->http);
+    httpSetField(con->http, HTTP_FIELD_CONTENT_LENGTH, "0");
+
+    if (!cupsdSendHeader(con, HTTP_STATUS_OK, NULL, CUPSD_AUTH_NONE))
+    {
+      cupsdCloseClient(con);
+      return (-1);
+    }
+  }
+
+  return (1);
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_TLS */
+
+
+ /*
+  * 'compare_clients()' - Compare two client connections.
+  */
+@@ -2651,28 +2725,6 @@ compare_clients(cupsd_client_t *a,	/* I - First client */
+ }
+ 
+ 
+-#ifdef HAVE_TLS
+-/*
+- * 'cupsd_start_tls()' - Start encryption on a connection.
+- */
+-
+-static int				/* O - 0 on success, -1 on error */
+-cupsd_start_tls(cupsd_client_t    *con,	/* I - Client connection */
+-                http_encryption_t e)	/* I - Encryption mode */
+-{
+-  if (httpEncryption(con->http, e))
+-  {
+-    cupsdLogClient(con, CUPSD_LOG_ERROR, "Unable to encrypt connection: %s",
+-                   cupsLastErrorString());
+-    return (-1);
+-  }
+-
+-  cupsdLogClient(con, CUPSD_LOG_DEBUG, "Connection now encrypted.");
+-  return (0);
+-}
+-#endif /* HAVE_TLS */
+-
+-
+ /*
+  * 'get_file()' - Get a filename and state info.
+  */
+diff --git a/scheduler/client.h b/scheduler/client.h
+index 9fe4e2ea6..2939ce997 100644
+--- a/scheduler/client.h
+++ b/scheduler/client.h
+@@ -51,6 +51,9 @@ struct cupsd_client_s
+   cups_lang_t		*language;	/* Language to use */
+ #ifdef HAVE_TLS
+   int			auto_ssl;	/* Automatic test for SSL/TLS */
+  time_t		tls_start;	/* Do TLS negotiation? */
+  int			tls_upgrade;	/* Doing TLS upgrade via OPTIONS? */
+  http_encryption_t	encryption;	/* Type of TLS negotiation */
+ #endif /* HAVE_TLS */
+   http_addr_t		clientaddr;	/* Client's server address */
+   char			clientname[256];/* Client's server name for connection */
+diff --git a/scheduler/select.c b/scheduler/select.c
+index 2e64f2a7e..ac6205c51 100644
+--- a/scheduler/select.c
+++ b/scheduler/select.c
+@@ -408,6 +408,9 @@ cupsdDoSelect(long timeout)		/* I - Timeout in seconds */
+ 
+   cupsd_in_select = 1;
+ 
+  // Prevent 100% CPU by releasing control before the kevent call...
+  usleep(1);
+
+   if (timeout >= 0 && timeout < 86400)
+   {
+     ktimeout.tv_sec  = timeout;
+@@ -454,6 +457,9 @@ cupsdDoSelect(long timeout)		/* I - Timeout in seconds */
+     struct epoll_event	*event;		/* Current event */
+ 
+ 
+    // Prevent 100% CPU by releasing control before the epoll_wait call...
+    usleep(1);
+
+     if (timeout >= 0 && timeout < 86400)
+       nfds = epoll_wait(cupsd_epoll_fd, cupsd_epoll_events, MaxFDs,
+                 	timeout * 1000);
+@@ -546,6 +552,9 @@ cupsdDoSelect(long timeout)		/* I - Timeout in seconds */
+     }
+   }
+ 
+  // Prevent 100% CPU by releasing control before the poll call...
+  usleep(1);
+
+   if (timeout >= 0 && timeout < 86400)
+     nfds = poll(cupsd_pollfds, (nfds_t)count, timeout * 1000);
+   else
+@@ -599,6 +608,9 @@ cupsdDoSelect(long timeout)		/* I - Timeout in seconds */
+   cupsd_current_input  = cupsd_global_input;
+   cupsd_current_output = cupsd_global_output;
+ 
+  // Prevent 100% CPU by releasing control before the select call...
+  usleep(1);
+
+   if (timeout >= 0 && timeout < 86400)
+   {
+     stimeout.tv_sec  = timeout;
--- a/meta/recipes-extended/cups/cups/CVE-2025-61915.patch
+++ b/meta/recipes-extended/cups/cups/CVE-2025-61915.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,487 @@
+From db8d560262c22a21ee1e55dfd62fa98d9359bcb0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Zdenek Dohnal <zdohnal@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 21 Nov 2025 07:36:36 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix various issues in cupsd
+
+Various issues were found by @SilverPlate3, recognized as CVE-2025-61915:
+
+- out of bound write when handling IPv6 addresses,
+- cupsd crash caused by null dereference when ErrorPolicy value is empty,
+
+On the top of that, Mike Sweet noticed vulnerability via domain socket,
+exploitable locally if attacker has access to domain socket and knows username
+of user within a group which is present in CUPS system groups:
+
+- rewrite of cupsd.conf via PeerCred authorization via domain socket
+
+The last vulnerability is fixed by introducing PeerCred directive for cups-files.conf,
+which controls whether PeerCred is enabled/disabled for user in CUPS system groups.
+
+Fixes CVE-2025-61915
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-61915
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/OpenPrinting/cups/commit/db8d560262c22a21ee1e55dfd62fa98d9359bcb0]
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
+---
+ conf/cups-files.conf.in              |  3 ++
+ config-scripts/cups-defaults.m4      |  9 +++++
+ config.h.in                          |  7 ++++
+ configure                            | 22 ++++++++++
+ doc/help/man-cups-files.conf.html    |  9 ++++-
+ man/cups-files.conf.5                | 17 ++++++--
+ scheduler/auth.c                     |  8 +++-
+ scheduler/auth.h                     |  7 ++++
+ scheduler/client.c                   |  2 +-
+ scheduler/conf.c                     | 60 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----
+ test/run-stp-tests.sh                |  2 +-
+ vcnet/config.h                       |  7 ++++
+ xcode/CUPS.xcodeproj/project.pbxproj |  2 -
+ xcode/config.h                       |  7 ++++
+ 14 files changed, 145 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/conf/cups-files.conf.in b/conf/cups-files.conf.in
+index f96f745ae..6db139297 100644
+--- a/conf/cups-files.conf.in
+++ b/conf/cups-files.conf.in
+@@ -19,6 +19,9 @@
+ SystemGroup @CUPS_SYSTEM_GROUPS@
+ @CUPS_SYSTEM_AUTHKEY@
+ 
+# Are Unix domain socket peer credentials used for authorization?
+PeerCred @CUPS_PEER_CRED@
+
+ # User that is substituted for unauthenticated (remote) root accesses...
+ #RemoteRoot remroot
+ 
+diff --git a/config-scripts/cups-defaults.m4 b/config-scripts/cups-defaults.m4
+index 999a8849d..fc9ba4a02 100644
+--- a/config-scripts/cups-defaults.m4
+++ b/config-scripts/cups-defaults.m4
+@@ -129,6 +129,15 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([log_level], AS_HELP_STRING([--with-log-level], [set default LogLeve
+ AC_SUBST([CUPS_LOG_LEVEL])
+ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([CUPS_DEFAULT_LOG_LEVEL], ["$CUPS_LOG_LEVEL"], [Default LogLevel value.])
+ 
+dnl Default PeerCred
+AC_ARG_WITH([peer_cred], AS_HELP_STRING([--with-peer-cred], [set default PeerCred value (on/off/root-only), default=on]), [
+    CUPS_PEER_CRED="$withval"
+], [
+    CUPS_PEER_CRED="on"
+])
+AC_SUBST([CUPS_PEER_CRED])
+AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([CUPS_DEFAULT_PEER_CRED], ["$CUPS_PEER_CRED"], [Default PeerCred value.])
+
+ dnl Default AccessLogLevel
+ AC_ARG_WITH(access_log_level, [  --with-access-log-level set default AccessLogLevel value, default=none],
+ 	CUPS_ACCESS_LOG_LEVEL="$withval",
+diff --git a/config.h.in b/config.h.in
+index 207df66a7..37c279088 100644
+--- a/config.h.in
+++ b/config.h.in
+@@ -86,6 +86,13 @@
+ #define CUPS_DEFAULT_ERROR_POLICY "stop-printer"
+ 
+ 
+/*
+ * Default PeerCred value...
+ */
+
+#define CUPS_DEFAULT_PEER_CRED "on"
+
+
+ /*
+  * Default MaxCopies value...
+  */
+diff --git a/configure b/configure
+index a38ebded9..1721634ba 100755
+--- a/configure
+++ b/configure
+@@ -672,6 +672,7 @@ CUPS_BROWSING
+ CUPS_SYNC_ON_CLOSE
+ CUPS_PAGE_LOG_FORMAT
+ CUPS_ACCESS_LOG_LEVEL
+CUPS_PEER_CRED
+ CUPS_LOG_LEVEL
+ CUPS_FATAL_ERRORS
+ CUPS_ERROR_POLICY
+@@ -925,6 +926,7 @@ with_max_log_size
+ with_error_policy
+ with_fatal_errors
+ with_log_level
+with_peer_cred
+ with_access_log_level
+ enable_page_logging
+ enable_sync_on_close
+@@ -1659,6 +1661,8 @@ Optional Packages:
+   --with-error-policy     set default ErrorPolicy value, default=stop-printer
+   --with-fatal-errors     set default FatalErrors value, default=config
+   --with-log-level        set default LogLevel value, default=warn
+  --with-peer-cred        set default PeerCred value (on/off/root-only),
+                          default=on
+   --with-access-log-level set default AccessLogLevel value, default=none
+   --with-local-protocols  set default BrowseLocalProtocols, default=""
+   --with-cups-user        set default user for CUPS
+@@ -11652,6 +11656,24 @@ printf "%s\n" "#define CUPS_DEFAULT_LOG_LEVEL \"$CUPS_LOG_LEVEL\"" >>confdefs.h
+ 
+ 
+ 
+# Check whether --with-peer_cred was given.
+if test ${with_peer_cred+y}
+then :
+  withval=$with_peer_cred;
+    CUPS_PEER_CRED="$withval"
+
+else $as_nop
+
+    CUPS_PEER_CRED="on"
+
+fi
+
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define CUPS_DEFAULT_PEER_CRED \"$CUPS_PEER_CRED\"" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+
+ # Check whether --with-access_log_level was given.
+ if test ${with_access_log_level+y}
+ then :
+diff --git a/doc/help/man-cups-files.conf.html b/doc/help/man-cups-files.conf.html
+index 440f033d5..5a9ddefeb 100644
+--- a/doc/help/man-cups-files.conf.html
+++ b/doc/help/man-cups-files.conf.html
+@@ -119,6 +119,13 @@ The default is "/var/log/cups/page_log".
+ <dt><a name="PassEnv"></a><b>PassEnv </b><i>variable </i>[ ... <i>variable </i>]
+ <dd style="margin-left: 5.0em">Passes the specified environment variable(s) to child processes.
+ Note: the standard CUPS filter and backend environment variables cannot be overridden using this directive.
+<dt><a name="PeerCred"></a><b>PeerCred off</b>
+<dd style="margin-left: 5.0em"><dt><b>PeerCred on</b>
+<dd style="margin-left: 5.0em"><dt><b>PeerCred root-only</b>
+<dd style="margin-left: 5.0em">Specifies whether peer credentials are used for authorization when communicating over the UNIX domain socket.
+When <b>on</b>, the peer credentials of any user are accepted for authorization.
+The value <b>off</b> disables the use of peer credentials entirely, while the value <b>root-only</b> allows peer credentials only for the root user.
+Note: for security reasons, the <b>on</b> setting is reduced to <b>root-only</b> for authorization of PUT requests.
+ <dt><a name="RemoteRoot"></a><b>RemoteRoot </b><i>username</i>
+ <dd style="margin-left: 5.0em">Specifies the username that is associated with unauthenticated accesses by clients claiming to be the root user.
+ The default is "remroot".
+@@ -199,7 +206,7 @@ command is used instead.
+ <a href="man-subscriptions.conf.html?TOPIC=Man+Pages"><b>subscriptions.conf</b>(5),</a>
+ CUPS Online Help (<a href="http://localhost:631/help">http://localhost:631/help</a>)
+ <h2 class="title"><a name="COPYRIGHT">Copyright</a></h2>
+-Copyright &copy; 2020-2022 by OpenPrinting.
+Copyright &copy; 2020-2025 by OpenPrinting.
+ 
+ </body>
+ </html>
+diff --git a/man/cups-files.conf.5 b/man/cups-files.conf.5
+index ec16c9e13..18ce2be00 100644
+--- a/man/cups-files.conf.5
+++ b/man/cups-files.conf.5
+@@ -1,14 +1,14 @@
+ .\"
+ .\" cups-files.conf man page for CUPS.
+ .\"
+-.\" Copyright © 2020-2022 by OpenPrinting.
+.\" Copyright © 2020-2025 by OpenPrinting.
+ .\" Copyright © 2007-2019 by Apple Inc.
+ .\" Copyright © 1997-2006 by Easy Software Products.
+ .\"
+ .\" Licensed under Apache License v2.0.  See the file "LICENSE" for more
+ .\" information.
+ .\"
+-.TH cups-files.conf 5 "CUPS" "2021-03-06" "OpenPrinting"
+.TH cups-files.conf 5 "CUPS" "2025-10-08" "OpenPrinting"
+ .SH NAME
+ cups\-files.conf \- file and directory configuration file for cups
+ .SH DESCRIPTION
+@@ -166,6 +166,17 @@ The default is "/var/log/cups/page_log".
+ \fBPassEnv \fIvariable \fR[ ... \fIvariable \fR]
+ Passes the specified environment variable(s) to child processes.
+ Note: the standard CUPS filter and backend environment variables cannot be overridden using this directive.
+.\"#PeerCred
+.TP 5
+\fBPeerCred off\fR
+.TP 5
+\fBPeerCred on\fR
+.TP 5
+\fBPeerCred root-only\fR
+Specifies whether peer credentials are used for authorization when communicating over the UNIX domain socket.
+When \fBon\fR, the peer credentials of any user are accepted for authorization.
+The value \fBoff\fR disables the use of peer credentials entirely, while the value \fBroot-only\fR allows peer credentials only for the root user.
+Note: for security reasons, the \fBon\fR setting is reduced to \fBroot-only\fR for authorization of PUT requests.
+ .\"#RemoteRoot
+ .TP 5
+ \fBRemoteRoot \fIusername\fR
+@@ -278,4 +289,4 @@ command is used instead.
+ .BR subscriptions.conf (5),
+ CUPS Online Help (http://localhost:631/help)
+ .SH COPYRIGHT
+-Copyright \[co] 2020-2022 by OpenPrinting.
+Copyright \[co] 2020-2025 by OpenPrinting.
+diff --git a/scheduler/auth.c b/scheduler/auth.c
+index 3c9aa72aa..bd0d28a0e 100644
+--- a/scheduler/auth.c
+++ b/scheduler/auth.c
+@@ -398,7 +398,7 @@ cupsdAuthorize(cupsd_client_t *con)	/* I - Client connection */
+   }
+ #endif /* HAVE_AUTHORIZATION_H */
+ #if defined(SO_PEERCRED) && defined(AF_LOCAL)
+-  else if (!strncmp(authorization, "PeerCred ", 9) &&
+  else if (PeerCred != CUPSD_PEERCRED_OFF && !strncmp(authorization, "PeerCred ", 9) &&
+            con->http->hostaddr->addr.sa_family == AF_LOCAL && con->best)
+   {
+    /*
+@@ -441,6 +441,12 @@ cupsdAuthorize(cupsd_client_t *con)	/* I - Client connection */
+     }
+ #endif /* HAVE_AUTHORIZATION_H */
+ 
+    if ((PeerCred == CUPSD_PEERCRED_ROOTONLY || httpGetState(con->http) == HTTP_STATE_PUT_RECV) && strcmp(authorization + 9, "root"))
+    {
+      cupsdLogClient(con, CUPSD_LOG_INFO, "User \"%s\" is not allowed to use peer credentials.", authorization + 9);
+      return;
+    }
+
+     if ((pwd = getpwnam(authorization + 9)) == NULL)
+     {
+       cupsdLogClient(con, CUPSD_LOG_ERROR, "User \"%s\" does not exist.", authorization + 9);
+diff --git a/scheduler/auth.h b/scheduler/auth.h
+index ee98e92c7..fdf71213f 100644
+--- a/scheduler/auth.h
+++ b/scheduler/auth.h
+@@ -50,6 +50,10 @@
+ #define CUPSD_AUTH_LIMIT_ALL	127	/* Limit all requests */
+ #define CUPSD_AUTH_LIMIT_IPP	128	/* Limit IPP requests */
+ 
+#define CUPSD_PEERCRED_OFF	0	/* Don't allow PeerCred authorization */
+#define CUPSD_PEERCRED_ON	1	/* Allow PeerCred authorization for all users */
+#define CUPSD_PEERCRED_ROOTONLY	2	/* Allow PeerCred authorization for root user */
+
+ #define IPP_ANY_OPERATION	(ipp_op_t)0
+ 					/* Any IPP operation */
+ #define IPP_BAD_OPERATION	(ipp_op_t)-1
+@@ -107,6 +111,9 @@ typedef struct cupsd_client_s cupsd_client_t;
+ 
+ VAR cups_array_t	*Locations	VALUE(NULL);
+ 					/* Authorization locations */
+VAR int			PeerCred	VALUE(CUPSD_PEERCRED_ON);
+					/* Allow PeerCred authorization? */
+
+ #ifdef HAVE_TLS
+ VAR http_encryption_t	DefaultEncryption VALUE(HTTP_ENCRYPT_REQUIRED);
+ 					/* Default encryption for authentication */
+diff --git a/scheduler/client.c b/scheduler/client.c
+index 9593c9138..d961c15db 100644
+--- a/scheduler/client.c
+++ b/scheduler/client.c
+@@ -2143,7 +2143,7 @@ cupsdSendHeader(
+       auth_size = sizeof(auth_str) - (size_t)(auth_key - auth_str);
+ 
+ #if defined(SO_PEERCRED) && defined(AF_LOCAL)
+-      if (httpAddrFamily(httpGetAddress(con->http)) == AF_LOCAL)
+      if (PeerCred != CUPSD_PEERCRED_OFF && httpAddrFamily(httpGetAddress(con->http)) == AF_LOCAL)
+       {
+         strlcpy(auth_key, ", PeerCred", auth_size);
+         auth_key += 10;
+diff --git a/scheduler/conf.c b/scheduler/conf.c
+index db4104ec5..7d6da0252 100644
+--- a/scheduler/conf.c
+++ b/scheduler/conf.c
+@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ typedef enum
+ {
+   CUPSD_VARTYPE_INTEGER,		/* Integer option */
+   CUPSD_VARTYPE_TIME,			/* Time interval option */
+  CUPSD_VARTYPE_NULLSTRING,		/* String option or NULL/empty string */
+   CUPSD_VARTYPE_STRING,			/* String option */
+   CUPSD_VARTYPE_BOOLEAN,		/* Boolean option */
+   CUPSD_VARTYPE_PATHNAME,		/* File/directory name option */
+@@ -69,7 +70,7 @@ static const cupsd_var_t	cupsd_vars[] =
+ {
+   { "AutoPurgeJobs", 		&JobAutoPurge,		CUPSD_VARTYPE_BOOLEAN },
+ #ifdef HAVE_DNSSD
+-  { "BrowseDNSSDSubTypes",	&DNSSDSubTypes,		CUPSD_VARTYPE_STRING },
+  { "BrowseDNSSDSubTypes",	&DNSSDSubTypes,		CUPSD_VARTYPE_NULLSTRING },
+ #endif /* HAVE_DNSSD */
+   { "BrowseWebIF",		&BrowseWebIF,		CUPSD_VARTYPE_BOOLEAN },
+   { "Browsing",			&Browsing,		CUPSD_VARTYPE_BOOLEAN },
+@@ -120,7 +121,7 @@ static const cupsd_var_t	cupsd_vars[] =
+   { "MaxSubscriptionsPerPrinter",&MaxSubscriptionsPerPrinter,	CUPSD_VARTYPE_INTEGER },
+   { "MaxSubscriptionsPerUser",	&MaxSubscriptionsPerUser,	CUPSD_VARTYPE_INTEGER },
+   { "MultipleOperationTimeout",	&MultipleOperationTimeout,	CUPSD_VARTYPE_TIME },
+-  { "PageLogFormat",		&PageLogFormat,		CUPSD_VARTYPE_STRING },
+  { "PageLogFormat",		&PageLogFormat,		CUPSD_VARTYPE_NULLSTRING },
+   { "PreserveJobFiles",		&JobFiles,		CUPSD_VARTYPE_TIME },
+   { "PreserveJobHistory",	&JobHistory,		CUPSD_VARTYPE_TIME },
+   { "ReloadTimeout",		&ReloadTimeout,		CUPSD_VARTYPE_TIME },
+@@ -777,6 +778,13 @@ cupsdReadConfiguration(void)
+   IdleExitTimeout = 60;
+ #endif /* HAVE_ONDEMAND */
+ 
+  if (!strcmp(CUPS_DEFAULT_PEER_CRED, "off"))
+    PeerCred = CUPSD_PEERCRED_OFF;
+  else if (!strcmp(CUPS_DEFAULT_PEER_CRED, "root-only"))
+    PeerCred = CUPSD_PEERCRED_ROOTONLY;
+  else
+    PeerCred = CUPSD_PEERCRED_ON;
+
+  /*
+   * Setup environment variables...
+   */
+@@ -1826,7 +1834,7 @@ get_addr_and_mask(const char *value,	/* I - String from config file */
+ 
+     family  = AF_INET6;
+ 
+-    for (i = 0, ptr = value + 1; *ptr && i < 8; i ++)
+    for (i = 0, ptr = value + 1; *ptr && i >= 0 && i < 8; i ++)
+     {
+       if (*ptr == ']')
+         break;
+@@ -1975,7 +1983,7 @@ get_addr_and_mask(const char *value,	/* I - String from config file */
+ #ifdef AF_INET6
+       if (family == AF_INET6)
+       {
+-        if (i > 128)
+        if (i < 0 || i > 128)
+ 	  return (0);
+ 
+         i = 128 - i;
+@@ -2009,7 +2017,7 @@ get_addr_and_mask(const char *value,	/* I - String from config file */
+       else
+ #endif /* AF_INET6 */
+       {
+-        if (i > 32)
+        if (i < 0 || i > 32)
+ 	  return (0);
+ 
+         mask[0] = 0xffffffff;
+@@ -2919,7 +2927,17 @@ parse_variable(
+ 	cupsdSetString((char **)var->ptr, temp);
+ 	break;
+ 
+    case CUPSD_VARTYPE_NULLSTRING :
+	cupsdSetString((char **)var->ptr, value);
+	break;
+
+     case CUPSD_VARTYPE_STRING :
+        if (!value)
+        {
+	  cupsdLogMessage(CUPSD_LOG_ERROR, "Missing value for %s on line %d of %s.", line, linenum, filename);
+	  return (0);
+        }
+
+ 	cupsdSetString((char **)var->ptr, value);
+ 	break;
+   }
+@@ -3447,9 +3465,10 @@ read_cupsd_conf(cups_file_t *fp)	/* I - File to read from */
+ 		      line, value ? " " : "", value ? value : "", linenum,
+ 		      ConfigurationFile, CupsFilesFile);
+     }
+-    else
+-      parse_variable(ConfigurationFile, linenum, line, value,
+-                     sizeof(cupsd_vars) / sizeof(cupsd_vars[0]), cupsd_vars);
+    else if (!parse_variable(ConfigurationFile, linenum, line, value,
+			     sizeof(cupsd_vars) / sizeof(cupsd_vars[0]), cupsd_vars) &&
+	     (FatalErrors & CUPSD_FATAL_CONFIG))
+      return (0);
+   }
+ 
+   return (1);
+@@ -3609,6 +3628,31 @@ read_cups_files_conf(cups_file_t *fp)	/* I - File to read from */
+ 	    break;
+       }
+     }
+    else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(line, "PeerCred") && value)
+    {
+     /*
+      * PeerCred {off,on,root-only}
+      */
+
+      if (!_cups_strcasecmp(value, "off"))
+      {
+        PeerCred = CUPSD_PEERCRED_OFF;
+      }
+      else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(value, "on"))
+      {
+        PeerCred = CUPSD_PEERCRED_ON;
+      }
+      else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(value, "root-only"))
+      {
+        PeerCred = CUPSD_PEERCRED_ROOTONLY;
+      }
+      else
+      {
+	cupsdLogMessage(CUPSD_LOG_ERROR, "Unknown PeerCred \"%s\" on line %d of %s.", value, linenum, CupsFilesFile);
+        if (FatalErrors & CUPSD_FATAL_CONFIG)
+          return (0);
+      }
+    }
+     else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(line, "PrintcapFormat") && value)
+     {
+      /*
+diff --git a/test/run-stp-tests.sh b/test/run-stp-tests.sh
+index 1c447edd7..8d677db71 100755
+--- a/test/run-stp-tests.sh
+++ b/test/run-stp-tests.sh
+@@ -512,7 +512,7 @@ fi
+ 
+ cat >$BASE/cups-files.conf <<EOF
+ FileDevice yes
+-Printcap
+Printcap $BASE/printcap
+ User $user
+ ServerRoot $BASE
+ StateDir $BASE
+diff --git a/vcnet/config.h b/vcnet/config.h
+index dbc6f05d5..317c956a6 100644
+--- a/vcnet/config.h
+++ b/vcnet/config.h
+@@ -169,6 +169,13 @@ typedef unsigned long useconds_t;
+ #define CUPS_DEFAULT_ERROR_POLICY "stop-printer"
+ 
+ 
+/*
+ * Default PeerCred value...
+ */
+
+#define CUPS_DEFAULT_PEER_CRED "on"
+
+
+ /*
+  * Default MaxCopies value...
+  */
+diff --git a/xcode/CUPS.xcodeproj/project.pbxproj b/xcode/CUPS.xcodeproj/project.pbxproj
+index 597946440..54ac652a1 100644
+--- a/xcode/CUPS.xcodeproj/project.pbxproj
+++ b/xcode/CUPS.xcodeproj/project.pbxproj
+@@ -3434,7 +3434,6 @@
+ 		72220FB313330BCE00FCA411 /* mime.c */ = {isa = PBXFileReference; fileEncoding = 4; lastKnownFileType = sourcecode.c.c; name = mime.c; path = ../scheduler/mime.c; sourceTree = "<group>"; };
+ 		72220FB413330BCE00FCA411 /* mime.h */ = {isa = PBXFileReference; fileEncoding = 4; lastKnownFileType = sourcecode.c.h; name = mime.h; path = ../scheduler/mime.h; sourceTree = "<group>"; };
+ 		72220FB513330BCE00FCA411 /* type.c */ = {isa = PBXFileReference; fileEncoding = 4; lastKnownFileType = sourcecode.c.c; name = type.c; path = ../scheduler/type.c; sourceTree = "<group>"; };
+-		7226369B18AE6D19004ED309 /* org.cups.cups-lpd.plist */ = {isa = PBXFileReference; lastKnownFileType = text.plist.xml; name = "org.cups.cups-lpd.plist"; path = "../scheduler/org.cups.cups-lpd.plist"; sourceTree = SOURCE_ROOT; };
+ 		7226369C18AE6D19004ED309 /* org.cups.cupsd.plist */ = {isa = PBXFileReference; lastKnownFileType = text.plist.xml; name = org.cups.cupsd.plist; path = ../scheduler/org.cups.cupsd.plist; sourceTree = SOURCE_ROOT; };
+ 		7226369D18AE73BB004ED309 /* config.h.in */ = {isa = PBXFileReference; lastKnownFileType = text; name = config.h.in; path = ../config.h.in; sourceTree = "<group>"; };
+ 		722A24EE2178D00C000CAB20 /* debug-internal.h */ = {isa = PBXFileReference; fileEncoding = 4; lastKnownFileType = sourcecode.c.h; name = "debug-internal.h"; path = "../cups/debug-internal.h"; sourceTree = "<group>"; };
+@@ -5056,7 +5055,6 @@
+ 			isa = PBXGroup;
+ 			children = (
+ 				72E65BDC18DC852700097E89 /* Makefile */,
+-				7226369B18AE6D19004ED309 /* org.cups.cups-lpd.plist */,
+ 				72E65BD518DC818400097E89 /* org.cups.cups-lpd.plist.in */,
+ 				7226369C18AE6D19004ED309 /* org.cups.cupsd.plist */,
+ 				72220F6913330B0C00FCA411 /* auth.c */,
+diff --git a/xcode/config.h b/xcode/config.h
+index e0ddd09dc..caec083ca 100644
+--- a/xcode/config.h
+++ b/xcode/config.h
+@@ -88,6 +88,13 @@
+ #define CUPS_DEFAULT_ERROR_POLICY "stop-printer"
+ 
+ 
+/*
+ * Default PeerCred value...
+ */
+
+#define CUPS_DEFAULT_PEER_CRED "on"
+
+
+ /*
+  * Default MaxCopies value...
+  */
--- a/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2025-60753-01.patch
+++ b/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2025-60753-01.patch
--- a/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2025-60753-02.patch
+++ b/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2025-60753-02.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+From cfb02de558d843dc5355c4aa2aeb4af49f88bdb9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Martin Matuska <martin@matuska.de>
+Date: Mon, 8 Dec 2025 21:40:46 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] tar: fix off-bounds read resulting from #2787 (3150539ed)
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-60753
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/cfb02de558d843dc5355c4aa2aeb4af49f88bdb9]
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
+---
+ tar/subst.c | 16 ++++++++--------
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/tar/subst.c b/tar/subst.c
+index a466f653..53497ad0 100644
+--- a/tar/subst.c
+++ b/tar/subst.c
+@@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ apply_substitution(struct bsdtar *bsdtar, const char *name, char **result,
+ 
+ 		char isEnd = 0;
+ 		do {
+-            isEnd = *name == '\0';
+			isEnd = *name == '\0';
+ 			if (regexec(&rule->re, name, 10, matches, 0))
+ 				break;
+ 
+@@ -294,13 +294,13 @@ apply_substitution(struct bsdtar *bsdtar, const char *name, char **result,
+ 
+ 			realloc_strcat(result, rule->result + j);
+ 			if (matches[0].rm_eo > 0) {
+-                name += matches[0].rm_eo;
+-            } else {
+-                // We skip a character because the match is 0-length
+-                // so we need to add it to the output
+-                realloc_strncat(result, name, 1);
+-                name += 1;
+-            }
+				name += matches[0].rm_eo;
+			} else if (!isEnd) {
+				// We skip a character because the match is 0-length
+				// so we need to add it to the output
+				realloc_strncat(result, name, 1);
+				name += 1;
+			}
+ 		} while (rule->global && !isEnd); // Testing one step after because sed et al. run 0-length patterns a last time on the empty string at the end
+ 	}
+ 
--- a/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive_3.6.2.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive_3.6.2.bb
@@ -48,7 +48,8 @@ SRC_URI = "http://libarchive.org/downloads/libarchive-${PV}.tar.gz \
           file://0001-Merge-pull-request-2749-from-KlaraSystems-des-tempdi.patch \
           file://0001-Merge-pull-request-2753-from-KlaraSystems-des-temp-f.patch \
           file://0001-Merge-pull-request-2768-from-Commandoss-master.patch \
-           file://CVE-2025-60753.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-60753-01.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-60753-02.patch \
           "
 UPSTREAM_CHECK_URI = "http://libarchive.org/"

--- a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2025-14017.patch
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2025-14017.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+From 39d1976b7f709a516e3243338ebc0443bdd8d56d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Thu, 4 Dec 2025 00:14:20 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] ldap: call ldap_init() before setting the options
+
+Closes #19830
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-14017
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/39d1976b7f709a516e3243338ebc0443bdd8d56d]
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
+---
+ lib/ldap.c | 49 +++++++++++++++++++------------------------------
+ 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/ldap.c b/lib/ldap.c
+index 63b2cbc414..0911a9239a 100644
+--- a/lib/ldap.c
+++ b/lib/ldap.c
+@@ -333,16 +333,29 @@ static CURLcode ldap_do(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done)
+     passwd = conn->passwd;
+   }
+ 
+#ifdef USE_WIN32_LDAP
+  if(ldap_ssl)
+    server = ldap_sslinit(host, (int)conn->port, 1);
+  else
+#else
+    server = ldap_init(host, (int)conn->port);
+#endif
+  if(!server) {
+    failf(data, "LDAP local: Cannot connect to %s:%ld",
+          conn->host.dispname, conn->port);
+    result = CURLE_COULDNT_CONNECT;
+    goto quit;
+  }
+
+ #ifdef LDAP_OPT_NETWORK_TIMEOUT
+-  ldap_set_option(NULL, LDAP_OPT_NETWORK_TIMEOUT, &ldap_timeout);
+  ldap_set_option(server, LDAP_OPT_NETWORK_TIMEOUT, &ldap_timeout);
+ #endif
+-  ldap_set_option(NULL, LDAP_OPT_PROTOCOL_VERSION, &ldap_proto);
+  ldap_set_option(server, LDAP_OPT_PROTOCOL_VERSION, &ldap_proto);
+ 
+   if(ldap_ssl) {
+ #ifdef HAVE_LDAP_SSL
+ #ifdef USE_WIN32_LDAP
+     /* Win32 LDAP SDK doesn't support insecure mode without CA! */
+-    server = ldap_sslinit(host, (int)conn->port, 1);
+     ldap_set_option(server, LDAP_OPT_SSL, LDAP_OPT_ON);
+ #else
+     int ldap_option;
+@@ -410,7 +423,7 @@ static CURLcode ldap_do(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done)
+         goto quit;
+       }
+       infof(data, "LDAP local: using PEM CA cert: %s", ldap_ca);
+-      rc = ldap_set_option(NULL, LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_CACERTFILE, ldap_ca);
+      rc = ldap_set_option(server, LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_CACERTFILE, ldap_ca);
+       if(rc != LDAP_SUCCESS) {
+         failf(data, "LDAP local: ERROR setting PEM CA cert: %s",
+                 ldap_err2string(rc));
+@@ -422,20 +435,13 @@ static CURLcode ldap_do(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done)
+     else
+       ldap_option = LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_NEVER;
+ 
+-    rc = ldap_set_option(NULL, LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_REQUIRE_CERT, &ldap_option);
+    rc = ldap_set_option(server, LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_REQUIRE_CERT, &ldap_option);
+     if(rc != LDAP_SUCCESS) {
+       failf(data, "LDAP local: ERROR setting cert verify mode: %s",
+               ldap_err2string(rc));
+       result = CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM;
+       goto quit;
+     }
+-    server = ldap_init(host, (int)conn->port);
+-    if(!server) {
+-      failf(data, "LDAP local: Cannot connect to %s:%ld",
+-            conn->host.dispname, conn->port);
+-      result = CURLE_COULDNT_CONNECT;
+-      goto quit;
+-    }
+     ldap_option = LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_HARD;
+     rc = ldap_set_option(server, LDAP_OPT_X_TLS, &ldap_option);
+     if(rc != LDAP_SUCCESS) {
+@@ -444,15 +450,6 @@ static CURLcode ldap_do(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done)
+       result = CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM;
+       goto quit;
+     }
+-/*
+-    rc = ldap_start_tls_s(server, NULL, NULL);
+-    if(rc != LDAP_SUCCESS) {
+-      failf(data, "LDAP local: ERROR starting SSL/TLS mode: %s",
+-              ldap_err2string(rc));
+-      result = CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM;
+-      goto quit;
+-    }
+-*/
+ #else
+     /* we should probably never come up to here since configure
+        should check in first place if we can support LDAP SSL/TLS */
+@@ -469,15 +466,7 @@ static CURLcode ldap_do(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done)
+     result = CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN;
+     goto quit;
+   }
+-  else {
+-    server = ldap_init(host, (int)conn->port);
+-    if(!server) {
+-      failf(data, "LDAP local: Cannot connect to %s:%ld",
+-            conn->host.dispname, conn->port);
+-      result = CURLE_COULDNT_CONNECT;
+-      goto quit;
+-    }
+-  }
+
+ #ifdef USE_WIN32_LDAP
+   ldap_set_option(server, LDAP_OPT_PROTOCOL_VERSION, &ldap_proto);
+   rc = ldap_win_bind(data, server, user, passwd);
--- a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2025-15079.patch
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2025-15079.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+From adca486c125d9a6d9565b9607a19dce803a8b479 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Wed, 24 Dec 2025 17:47:03 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] libssh: set both knownhosts options to the same file
+
+Reported-by: Harry Sintonen
+
+Closes #20092
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-15079
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/adca486c125d9a6d9565b9607a19dce803a8b479]
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
+---
+ lib/vssh/libssh.c | 5 +++++
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/lib/vssh/libssh.c b/lib/vssh/libssh.c
+index 7d5905c83d..98c109ab59 100644
+--- a/lib/vssh/libssh.c
+++ b/lib/vssh/libssh.c
+@@ -2224,6 +2224,11 @@ static CURLcode myssh_connect(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done)
+     infof(data, "Known hosts: %s", data->set.str[STRING_SSH_KNOWNHOSTS]);
+     rc = ssh_options_set(ssh->ssh_session, SSH_OPTIONS_KNOWNHOSTS,
+                          data->set.str[STRING_SSH_KNOWNHOSTS]);
+    if(rc == SSH_OK)
+      /* libssh has two separate options for this. Set both to the same file
+         to avoid surprises */
+      rc = ssh_options_set(ssh->ssh_session, SSH_OPTIONS_GLOBAL_KNOWNHOSTS,
+                           data->set.str[STRING_SSH_KNOWNHOSTS]);
+     if(rc != SSH_OK) {
+       failf(data, "Could not set known hosts file path");
+       return CURLE_FAILED_INIT;
--- a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2025-15224.patch
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2025-15224.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+From 16d5f2a5660c61cc27bd5f1c7f512391d1c927aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Harry Sintonen <sintonen@iki.fi>
+Date: Mon, 29 Dec 2025 16:56:39 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] libssh: require private key or user-agent for public key auth
+
+Closes #20110
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-15224
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/16d5f2a5660c61cc27bd5f1c7f512391d1c927aa]
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
+---
+ lib/vssh/libssh.c | 6 +++++-
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/vssh/libssh.c b/lib/vssh/libssh.c
+index 5d5125b526..bde6355f73 100644
+--- a/lib/vssh/libssh.c
+++ b/lib/vssh/libssh.c
+@@ -741,7 +741,11 @@ static CURLcode myssh_statemach_act(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *block)
+         }
+ 
+         sshc->auth_methods = ssh_userauth_list(sshc->ssh_session, NULL);
+-        if(sshc->auth_methods & SSH_AUTH_METHOD_PUBLICKEY) {
+  /* For public key auth we need either the private key or
+     CURLSSH_AUTH_AGENT. */
+  if((sshc->auth_methods & SSH_AUTH_METHOD_PUBLICKEY) &&
+    (data->set.str[STRING_SSH_PRIVATE_KEY] ||
+     (data->set.ssh_auth_types & CURLSSH_AUTH_AGENT))) {
+           state(data, SSH_AUTH_PKEY_INIT);
+           infof(data, "Authentication using SSH public key file");
+         }
--- a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_7.82.0.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_7.82.0.bb
@@ -67,6 +67,9 @@ SRC_URI = "https://curl.se/download/${BP}.tar.xz \
           file://CVE-2024-11053-0002.patch \
           file://CVE-2025-0167.patch \
           file://CVE-2025-9086.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-14017.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-15079.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-15224.patch \
           "
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "0aaa12d7bd04b0966254f2703ce80dd5c38dbbd76af0297d3d690cdce58a583c"

--- a/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg/CVE-2025-68973.patch
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg/CVE-2025-68973.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+From 4ecc5122f20e10c17172ed72f4fa46c784b5fb48 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
+Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2025 11:36:04 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] gpg: Fix possible memory corruption in the armor parser.
+
+* g10/armor.c (armor_filter): Fix faulty double increment.
+
+* common/iobuf.c (underflow_target): Assert that the filter
+implementations behave well.
+--
+
+This fixes a bug in a code path which can only be reached with special
+crafted input data and would then error out at an upper layer due to
+corrupt input (every second byte in the buffer is unitialized
+garbage).  No fuzzing has yet hit this case and we don't have a test
+case for this code path.  However memory corruption can never be
+tolerated as it always has the protential for remode code execution.
+
+Reported-by: 8b79fe4dd0581c1cd000e1fbecba9f39e16a396a
+Fixes-commit: c27c7416d5148865a513e007fb6f0a34993a6073
+which fixed
+Fixes-commit: 7d0efec7cf5ae110c99511abc32587ff0c45b14f
+Backported-from-master: 115d138ba599328005c5321c0ef9f00355838ca9
+
+The bug was introduced on 1999-01-07 by me:
+* armor.c: Rewrote large parts.
+which I fixed on 1999-03-02 but missed to fix the other case:
+* armor.c (armor_filter): Fixed armor bypassing.
+
+Below is base64+gzipped test data which can be used with valgrind to
+show access to uninitalized memory in write(2) in the unpatched code.
+
+--8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8---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+--8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8---
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-68973
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/gpg/gnupg/commit/4ecc5122f20e10c17172ed72f4fa46c784b5fb48]
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
+---
+ common/iobuf.c | 8 +++++++-
+ g10/armor.c    | 4 ++--
+ 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/common/iobuf.c b/common/iobuf.c
+index 748e6935d..2497713c1 100644
+--- a/common/iobuf.c
+++ b/common/iobuf.c
+@@ -2041,6 +2041,8 @@ underflow_target (iobuf_t a, int clear_pending_eof, size_t target)
+ 	rc = 0;
+       else
+       {
+        size_t tmplen;
+
+ 	/* If no buffered data and drain buffer has been setup, and drain
+ 	 * buffer is largish, read data directly to drain buffer. */
+ 	if (a->d.len == 0
+@@ -2053,8 +2055,10 @@ underflow_target (iobuf_t a, int clear_pending_eof, size_t target)
+ 	      log_debug ("iobuf-%d.%d: underflow: A->FILTER (%lu bytes, to external drain)\n",
+ 			 a->no, a->subno, (ulong)len);
+ 
+-	    rc = a->filter (a->filter_ov, IOBUFCTRL_UNDERFLOW, a->chain,
+            tmplen = len;  /* Used to check for bugs in the filter.  */
+            rc = a->filter (a->filter_ov, IOBUFCTRL_UNDERFLOW, a->chain,
+ 			    a->e_d.buf, &len);
+            log_assert (len <= tmplen);
+ 	    a->e_d.used = len;
+ 	    len = 0;
+ 	  }
+@@ -2064,8 +2068,10 @@ underflow_target (iobuf_t a, int clear_pending_eof, size_t target)
+ 	      log_debug ("iobuf-%d.%d: underflow: A->FILTER (%lu bytes)\n",
+ 			 a->no, a->subno, (ulong)len);
+ 
+            tmplen = len;  /* Used to check for bugs in the filter.  */
+ 	    rc = a->filter (a->filter_ov, IOBUFCTRL_UNDERFLOW, a->chain,
+ 			    &a->d.buf[a->d.len], &len);
+            log_assert (len <= tmplen);
+ 	  }
+       }
+       a->d.len += len;
+diff --git a/g10/armor.c b/g10/armor.c
+index 81af15339..f8cfa86db 100644
+--- a/g10/armor.c
+++ b/g10/armor.c
+@@ -1312,8 +1312,8 @@ armor_filter( void *opaque, int control,
+ 	n = 0;
+ 	if( afx->buffer_len ) {
+             /* Copy the data from AFX->BUFFER to BUF.  */
+-	    for(; n < size && afx->buffer_pos < afx->buffer_len; n++ )
+-		buf[n++] = afx->buffer[afx->buffer_pos++];
+            for(; n < size && afx->buffer_pos < afx->buffer_len;)
+                buf[n++] = afx->buffer[afx->buffer_pos++];
+ 	    if( afx->buffer_pos >= afx->buffer_len )
+ 		afx->buffer_len = 0;
+ 	}
--- a/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg_2.3.7.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg_2.3.7.bb
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNUPG_MIRROR}/${BPN}/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
           file://CVE-2025-30258-0003.patch \
           file://CVE-2025-30258-0004.patch \
           file://CVE-2025-30258-0005.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-68973.patch \
           "
 SRC_URI:append:class-native = " file://0001-configure.ac-use-a-custom-value-for-the-location-of-.patch \
                                file://relocate.patch"
--- a/meta/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup/CVE-2025-12105.patch
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup/CVE-2025-12105.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+From 465410f833e4288ad053b4e18d5fa6c3be3148e1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Eugene Mutavchi <Ievgen_Mutavchi@comcast.com>
+Date: Fri, 10 Oct 2025 16:24:27 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] fix 'heap-use-after-free' caused by 'finishing' queue item
+ twice
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-12105
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libsoup/-/commit/9ba1243a24e442fa5ec44684617a4480027da960]
+
+Signed-off-by: Changqing Li <changqing.li@windriver.com>
+---
+ libsoup/soup-session.c | 6 ++++--
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/libsoup/soup-session.c b/libsoup/soup-session.c
+index 5f2929f..b9f3e42 100644
+--- a/libsoup/soup-session.c
+++ b/libsoup/soup-session.c
+@@ -3093,8 +3093,10 @@ run_until_read_done (SoupMessage          *msg,
+ 		if (soup_message_io_in_progress (msg))
+ 			soup_message_io_finished (msg);
+ 		item->paused = FALSE;
+-		item->state = SOUP_MESSAGE_FINISHING;
+-		soup_session_process_queue_item (item->session, item, NULL, FALSE);
+		if (item->state != SOUP_MESSAGE_FINISHED) {
+			item->state = SOUP_MESSAGE_FINISHING;
+			soup_session_process_queue_item (item->session, item, NULL, FALSE);
+		}
+ 	}
+ 	async_send_request_return_result (item, NULL, error);
+ }
+-- 
+2.34.1
+
--- a/meta/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup_3.0.7.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup_3.0.7.bb
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNOME_MIRROR}/libsoup/${SHRT_VER}/libsoup-${PV}.tar.xz \
           file://CVE-2025-46421.patch \
           file://CVE-2025-4948.patch \
           file://CVE-2025-4945.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-12105.patch \
          "
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "ebdf90cf3599c11acbb6818a9d9e3fc9d2c68e56eb829b93962972683e1bf7c8"

--- a/meta/recipes-support/libxslt/libxslt/CVE-2025-11731.patch
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/libxslt/libxslt/CVE-2025-11731.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+From fe508f201efb9ea37bfbe95413b8b28251497de3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Dominik=20R=C3=B6ttsches?= <drott@chromium.org>
+Date: Wed, 27 Aug 2025 14:28:40 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] End function node ancestor search at document
+
+Avoids dereferencing a non-existent ->ns property on an
+XML_DOCUMENT_NODE pointer.
+
+Fixes #151.
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-11731
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libxslt/-/commit/fe508f201efb9ea37bfbe95413b8b28251497de3]
+
+Signed-off-by: Mingli Yu <mingli.yu@windriver.com>
+---
+ libexslt/functions.c | 9 +++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/libexslt/functions.c b/libexslt/functions.c
+index 8d35a7ae..a54ee70c 100644
+--- a/libexslt/functions.c
+++ b/libexslt/functions.c
+@@ -617,8 +617,13 @@ exsltFuncResultComp (xsltStylesheetPtr style, xmlNodePtr inst,
+      * instanciation of a func:result element.
+      */
+     for (test = inst->parent; test != NULL; test = test->parent) {
+-	if (IS_XSLT_ELEM(test) &&
+-	    IS_XSLT_NAME(test, "stylesheet")) {
+	if (/* Traversal has reached the top-level document without
+         * finding a func:function ancestor. */
+        (test != NULL && test->type == XML_DOCUMENT_NODE) ||
+        /* Traversal reached a stylesheet-namespace node,
+         * and has left the function namespace. */
+        (IS_XSLT_ELEM(test) &&
+         IS_XSLT_NAME(test, "stylesheet"))) {
+ 	    xsltGenericError(xsltGenericErrorContext,
+ 			     "func:result element not a descendant "
+ 			     "of a func:function\n");
+-- 
+2.34.1
+
--- a/meta/recipes-support/libxslt/libxslt_1.1.35.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/libxslt/libxslt_1.1.35.bb
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNOME_MIRROR}/libxslt/1.1/libxslt-${PV}.tar.xz \
           file://CVE-2023-40403-004.patch \
           file://CVE-2023-40403-005.patch \
           file://CVE-2025-7424.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-11731.patch \
          "

 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "8247f33e9a872c6ac859aa45018bc4c4d00b97e2feac9eebc10c93ce1f34dd79"
--- a/scripts/install-buildtools
+++ b/scripts/install-buildtools
@@ -57,8 +57,8 @@ logger = scriptutils.logger_create(PROGNAME, stream=sys.stdout)

 DEFAULT_INSTALL_DIR = os.path.join(os.path.split(scripts_path)[0],'buildtools')
 DEFAULT_BASE_URL = 'https://downloads.yoctoproject.org/releases/yocto'
-DEFAULT_RELEASE = 'yocto-4.0.30'
-DEFAULT_INSTALLER_VERSION = '4.0.30'
+DEFAULT_RELEASE = 'yocto-4.0.31'
+DEFAULT_INSTALLER_VERSION = '4.0.31'
 DEFAULT_BUILDDATE = '202110XX'

 # Python version sanity check