build-appliance-image: Update to dunfell head revision

(From OE-Core rev: 8b91c463fb3546836789e1890b3c68acf69c162a)

Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>

documentation/poky.yaml

@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
-DISTRO : "3.1.27"
+DISTRO : "3.1.28"
 DISTRO_NAME_NO_CAP : "dunfell"
 DISTRO_NAME : "Dunfell"
 DISTRO_NAME_NO_CAP_MINUS_ONE : "zeus"
-YOCTO_DOC_VERSION : "3.1.27"
+YOCTO_DOC_VERSION : "3.1.28"
 YOCTO_DOC_VERSION_MINUS_ONE : "3.0.4"
-DISTRO_REL_TAG : "yocto-3.1.27"
-DOCCONF_VERSION : "3.1.27"
+DISTRO_REL_TAG : "yocto-3.1.28"
+DOCCONF_VERSION : "3.1.28"
 BITBAKE_SERIES : "1.46"
-POKYVERSION : "23.0.27"
+POKYVERSION : "23.0.28"
 YOCTO_POKY : "poky-&DISTRO_NAME_NO_CAP;-&POKYVERSION;"
 YOCTO_DL_URL : "https://downloads.yoctoproject.org"
 YOCTO_AB_URL : "https://autobuilder.yoctoproject.org"

documentation/ref-manual/ref-system-requirements.rst

@@ -34,19 +34,35 @@ and conceptual information in the :doc:`../overview-manual/overview-manual`.
 Supported Linux Distributions
 =============================
 
-Currently, the Yocto Project is supported on the following
-distributions:
+Currently, the &DISTRO; release ("&DISTRO_NAME;") of the Yocto Project is
+supported on the following distributions:
 
--  Ubuntu 16.04 (LTS)
+
+-  Ubuntu 20.04 (LTS)
+
+-  Ubuntu 22.04 (LTS)
+
+-  Fedora 37
+
+-  Debian GNU/Linux 11.x (Bullseye)
+
+-  AlmaLinux 8.8
+
+The following distribution versions are still tested (being listed
+in :term:`SANITY_TESTED_DISTROS`), even though the organizations
+publishing them no longer make updates publicly available:
 
 -  Ubuntu 18.04 (LTS)
 
+-  OpenSUSE Leap 15.3
+
+Finally, here are the distribution versions which were previously
+tested on former revisions of "&DISTRO_NAME;", but no longer are:
+
+-  Ubuntu 16.04 (LTS)
+
 -  Ubuntu 19.04
 
--  Ubuntu 20.04
-
--  Ubuntu 22.04
-
 -  Fedora 28
 
 -  Fedora 29
@@ -67,20 +83,18 @@ distributions:
 
 -  CentOS 7.x
 
+-  CentOS 8.x
+
 -  Debian GNU/Linux 8.x (Jessie)
 
 -  Debian GNU/Linux 9.x (Stretch)
 
 -  Debian GNU/Linux 10.x (Buster)
 
--  Debian GNU/Linux 11.x (Bullseye)
-
 -  OpenSUSE Leap 15.1
 
 -  OpenSUSE Leap 15.2
 
--  OpenSUSE Leap 15.3
-
 -  AlmaLinux 8.5
 
 -  AlmaLinux 8.7

meta-poky/conf/distro/poky.conf

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 DISTRO = "poky"
 DISTRO_NAME = "Poky (Yocto Project Reference Distro)"
-DISTRO_VERSION = "3.1.27"
+DISTRO_VERSION = "3.1.28"
 DISTRO_CODENAME = "dunfell"
 SDK_VENDOR = "-pokysdk"
 SDK_VERSION = "${@d.getVar('DISTRO_VERSION').replace('snapshot-${DATE}', 'snapshot')}"
@@ -43,29 +43,13 @@ SANITY_TESTED_DISTROS ?= " \
             poky-2.7 \n \
             poky-3.0 \n \
             poky-3.1 \n \
-            ubuntu-16.04 \n \
             ubuntu-18.04 \n \
-            ubuntu-19.04 \n \
             ubuntu-20.04 \n \
             ubuntu-22.04 \n \
-            fedora-30 \n \
-            fedora-31 \n \
-            fedora-32 \n \
-            fedora-33 \n \
-            fedora-34 \n \
-            fedora-35 \n \
-            fedora-36 \n \
-            centos-7 \n \
-            centos-8 \n \
-            debian-8 \n \
-            debian-9 \n \
-            debian-10 \n \
+            fedora-37 \n \
             debian-11 \n \
-            opensuseleap-15.1 \n \
-            opensuseleap-15.2 \n \
             opensuseleap-15.3 \n \
-            almalinux-8.5 \n \
-            almalinux-8.7 \n \
+            almalinux-8.8 \n \
             "
 # add poky sanity bbclass
 INHERIT += "poky-sanity"

meta/classes/kernel.bbclass

@@ -143,13 +143,14 @@ do_unpack[cleandirs] += " ${S} ${STAGING_KERNEL_DIR} ${B} ${STAGING_KERNEL_BUILD
 do_clean[cleandirs] += " ${S} ${STAGING_KERNEL_DIR} ${B} ${STAGING_KERNEL_BUILDDIR}"
 python do_symlink_kernsrc () {
     s = d.getVar("S")
-    if s[-1] == '/':
-        # drop trailing slash, so that os.symlink(kernsrc, s) doesn't use s as directory name and fail
-        s=s[:-1]
     kernsrc = d.getVar("STAGING_KERNEL_DIR")
     if s != kernsrc:
         bb.utils.mkdirhier(kernsrc)
         bb.utils.remove(kernsrc, recurse=True)
+        if s[-1] == '/':
+            # drop trailing slash, so that os.symlink(kernsrc, s) doesn't use s as
+            # directory name and fail
+            s = s[:-1]
         if d.getVar("EXTERNALSRC"):
             # With EXTERNALSRC S will not be wiped so we can symlink to it
             os.symlink(s, kernsrc)
@@ -417,12 +418,26 @@ kernel_do_install() {
 	#
 	install -d ${D}/${KERNEL_IMAGEDEST}
 	install -d ${D}/boot
+
+	#
+	# When including an initramfs bundle inside a FIT image, the fitImage is created after the install task
+	# by do_assemble_fitimage_initramfs.
+	# This happens after the generation of the initramfs bundle (done by do_bundle_initramfs).
+	# So, at the level of the install task we should not try to install the fitImage. fitImage is still not
+	# generated yet.
+	# After the generation of the fitImage, the deploy task copies the fitImage from the build directory to
+	# the deploy folder.
+	#
+
 	for imageType in ${KERNEL_IMAGETYPES} ; do
-		install -m 0644 ${KERNEL_OUTPUT_DIR}/${imageType} ${D}/${KERNEL_IMAGEDEST}/${imageType}-${KERNEL_VERSION}
-		if [ "${KERNEL_PACKAGE_NAME}" = "kernel" ]; then
-			ln -sf ${imageType}-${KERNEL_VERSION} ${D}/${KERNEL_IMAGEDEST}/${imageType}
+		if [ $imageType != "fitImage" ] || [ "${INITRAMFS_IMAGE_BUNDLE}" != "1" ] ; then
+			install -m 0644 ${KERNEL_OUTPUT_DIR}/${imageType} ${D}/${KERNEL_IMAGEDEST}/${imageType}-${KERNEL_VERSION}
+			if [ "${KERNEL_PACKAGE_NAME}" = "kernel" ]; then
+				ln -sf ${imageType}-${KERNEL_VERSION} ${D}/${KERNEL_IMAGEDEST}/${imageType}
+			fi
 		fi
 	done
+
 	install -m 0644 System.map ${D}/boot/System.map-${KERNEL_VERSION}
 	install -m 0644 .config ${D}/boot/config-${KERNEL_VERSION}
 	install -m 0644 vmlinux ${D}/boot/vmlinux-${KERNEL_VERSION}

meta/classes/rootfs-postcommands.bbclass

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 
 # Zap the root password if debug-tweaks feature is not enabled
-ROOTFS_POSTPROCESS_COMMAND += '${@bb.utils.contains_any("IMAGE_FEATURES", [ 'debug-tweaks', 'empty-root-password' ], "", "zap_empty_root_password ; ",d)}'
+ROOTFS_POSTPROCESS_COMMAND += '${@bb.utils.contains_any("IMAGE_FEATURES", [ 'debug-tweaks', 'empty-root-password' ], "", "zap_empty_root_password; ",d)}'
 
 # Allow dropbear/openssh to accept logins from accounts with an empty password string if debug-tweaks or allow-empty-password is enabled
 ROOTFS_POSTPROCESS_COMMAND += '${@bb.utils.contains_any("IMAGE_FEATURES", [ 'debug-tweaks', 'allow-empty-password' ], "ssh_allow_empty_password; ", "",d)}'
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ ROOTFS_POSTPROCESS_COMMAND += '${@bb.utils.contains_any("IMAGE_FEATURES", [ 'deb
 ROOTFS_POSTPROCESS_COMMAND += '${@bb.utils.contains_any("IMAGE_FEATURES", [ 'debug-tweaks', 'post-install-logging' ], "postinst_enable_logging; ", "",d)}'
 
 # Create /etc/timestamp during image construction to give a reasonably sane default time setting
-ROOTFS_POSTPROCESS_COMMAND += "rootfs_update_timestamp ; "
+ROOTFS_POSTPROCESS_COMMAND += "rootfs_update_timestamp; "
 
 # Tweak the mount options for rootfs in /etc/fstab if read-only-rootfs is enabled
 ROOTFS_POSTPROCESS_COMMAND += '${@bb.utils.contains("IMAGE_FEATURES", "read-only-rootfs", "read_only_rootfs_hook; ", "",d)}'
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ ROOTFS_POSTPROCESS_COMMAND += '${@bb.utils.contains("IMAGE_FEATURES", "read-only
 APPEND_append = '${@bb.utils.contains("IMAGE_FEATURES", "read-only-rootfs", " ro", "", d)}'
 
 # Generates test data file with data store variables expanded in json format
-ROOTFS_POSTPROCESS_COMMAND += "write_image_test_data ; "
+ROOTFS_POSTPROCESS_COMMAND += "write_image_test_data; "
 
 # Write manifest
 IMAGE_MANIFEST = "${IMGDEPLOYDIR}/${IMAGE_NAME}${IMAGE_NAME_SUFFIX}.manifest"

meta/classes/rootfsdebugfiles.bbclass

@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
 ROOTFS_DEBUG_FILES ?= ""
 ROOTFS_DEBUG_FILES[doc] = "Lists additional files or directories to be installed with 'cp -a' in the format 'source1 target1;source2 target2;...'"
 
-ROOTFS_POSTPROCESS_COMMAND += "rootfs_debug_files ;"
+ROOTFS_POSTPROCESS_COMMAND += "rootfs_debug_files;"
 rootfs_debug_files () {
    #!/bin/sh -e
    echo "${ROOTFS_DEBUG_FILES}" | sed -e 's/;/\n/g' | while read source target mode; do

meta/conf/distro/include/yocto-uninative.inc

@@ -6,10 +6,10 @@
 # to the distro running on the build machine.
 #
 
-UNINATIVE_MAXGLIBCVERSION = "2.37"
-UNINATIVE_VERSION = "4.0"
+UNINATIVE_MAXGLIBCVERSION = "2.38"
+UNINATIVE_VERSION = "4.3"
 
 UNINATIVE_URL ?= "http://downloads.yoctoproject.org/releases/uninative/${UNINATIVE_VERSION}/"
-UNINATIVE_CHECKSUM[aarch64] ?= "7baa8418a302df52e00916193b0a04f318356d9d2670c9a2bce3e966efefd738"
-UNINATIVE_CHECKSUM[i686] ?= "83114d36883d43a521e280742b9849bf85d039b2f83d8e21d480659babe75ee8"
-UNINATIVE_CHECKSUM[x86_64] ?= "fd75b2a1a67a10f6b7d65afb7d0f3e71a63b0038e428f34dfe420bb37716558a"
+UNINATIVE_CHECKSUM[aarch64] ?= "8df05f4a41455018b4303b2e0ea4eac5c960b5a13713f6dbb33dfdb3e32753ec"
+UNINATIVE_CHECKSUM[i686] ?= "bea76b4a97c9ba0077c0dd1295f519cd599dbf71f0ca1c964471c4cdb043addd"
+UNINATIVE_CHECKSUM[x86_64] ?= "1c35f09a75c4096749bbe1e009df4e3968cde151424062cf4aa3ed89db22b030"

meta/lib/oeqa/core/target/ssh.py

@@ -226,6 +226,9 @@ def SSHCall(command, logger, timeout=None, **opts):
                             endtime = time.time() + timeout
                 except InterruptedError:
                     continue
+                except BlockingIOError:
+                    logger.debug('BlockingIOError')
+                    continue
 
             # process hasn't returned yet
             if not eof:

meta/lib/oeqa/runtime/cases/ltp.py

@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ class LtpTest(LtpTestBase):
     def runltp(self, ltp_group):
             cmd = '/opt/ltp/runltp -f %s -p -q -r /opt/ltp -l /opt/ltp/results/%s -I 1 -d /opt/ltp' % (ltp_group, ltp_group)
             starttime = time.time()
-            (status, output) = self.target.run(cmd)
+            (status, output) = self.target.run(cmd, timeout=1200)
             endtime = time.time()
 
             with open(os.path.join(self.ltptest_log_dir, "%s-raw.log" % ltp_group), 'w') as f:

meta/lib/oeqa/runtime/cases/rpm.py

@@ -57,8 +57,8 @@ class RpmBasicTest(OERuntimeTestCase):
                     return
                 time.sleep(1)
             user_pss = [ps for ps in output.split("\n") if u + ' ' in ps]
-            msg = "There're %s 's process(es) still running: %s".format(u, "\n".join(user_pss))
-            assertTrue(True, msg=msg)
+            msg = "User %s has processes still running: %s" % (u, "\n".join(user_pss))
+            self.fail(msg=msg)
 
         def unset_up_test_user(u):
             # ensure no test1 process in running

meta/lib/oeqa/selftest/cases/glibc.py

@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ class GlibcSelfTestBase(OESelftestTestCase, OEPTestResultTestCase):
         with contextlib.ExitStack() as s:
             # use the base work dir, as the nfs mount, since the recipe directory may not exist
             tmpdir = get_bb_var("BASE_WORKDIR")
-            nfsport, mountport = s.enter_context(unfs_server(tmpdir))
+            nfsport, mountport = s.enter_context(unfs_server(tmpdir, udp = False))
 
             # build core-image-minimal with required packages
             default_installed_packages = [
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ class GlibcSelfTestBase(OESelftestTestCase, OEPTestResultTestCase):
             bitbake("core-image-minimal")
 
             # start runqemu
-            qemu = s.enter_context(runqemu("core-image-minimal", runqemuparams = "nographic"))
+            qemu = s.enter_context(runqemu("core-image-minimal", runqemuparams = "nographic", qemuparams = "-m 1024"))
 
             # validate that SSH is working
             status, _ = qemu.run("uname")
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ class GlibcSelfTestBase(OESelftestTestCase, OEPTestResultTestCase):
             # setup nfs mount
             if qemu.run("mkdir -p \"{0}\"".format(tmpdir))[0] != 0:
                 raise Exception("Failed to setup NFS mount directory on target")
-            mountcmd = "mount -o noac,nfsvers=3,port={0},udp,mountport={1} \"{2}:{3}\" \"{3}\"".format(nfsport, mountport, qemu.server_ip, tmpdir)
+            mountcmd = "mount -o noac,nfsvers=3,port={0},mountport={1} \"{2}:{3}\" \"{3}\"".format(nfsport, mountport, qemu.server_ip, tmpdir)
             status, output = qemu.run(mountcmd)
             if status != 0:
                 raise Exception("Failed to setup NFS mount on target ({})".format(repr(output)))

meta/lib/oeqa/utils/nfs.py

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ from oeqa.utils.commands import bitbake, get_bb_var, Command
 from oeqa.utils.network import get_free_port
 
 @contextlib.contextmanager
-def unfs_server(directory, logger = None):
+def unfs_server(directory, logger = None, udp = True):
     unfs_sysroot = get_bb_var("RECIPE_SYSROOT_NATIVE", "unfs3-native")
     if not os.path.exists(os.path.join(unfs_sysroot, "usr", "bin", "unfsd")):
         # build native tool
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ def unfs_server(directory, logger = None):
             exports.write("{0} (rw,no_root_squash,no_all_squash,insecure)\n".format(directory).encode())
 
         # find some ports for the server
-        nfsport, mountport = get_free_port(udp = True), get_free_port(udp = True)
+        nfsport, mountport = get_free_port(udp), get_free_port(udp)
 
         nenv = dict(os.environ)
         nenv['PATH'] = "{0}/sbin:{0}/usr/sbin:{0}/usr/bin:".format(unfs_sysroot) + nenv.get('PATH', '')

meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc

@@ -128,6 +128,8 @@ GRUBPLATFORM ??= "pc"
 
 inherit autotools gettext texinfo pkgconfig
 
+CFLAGS_remove = "-O2"
+
 EXTRA_OECONF = "--with-platform=${GRUBPLATFORM} \
                 --disable-grub-mkfont \
                 --program-prefix="" \

meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2023-2828.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [import from debian security.debian.org/debian-security/pool/updates/main/b/bind9/bind9_9.11.5.P4+dfsg-5.1+deb10u9.debian.tar.xz
+Upstream patch https://downloads.isc.org/isc/bind9/9.16.42/patches/0001-CVE-2023-2828.patch]
+Upstream Commit: https://github.com/isc-projects/bind9/commit/da0eafcdee52147e72d407cc3b9f179378ee1d3a
+CVE: CVE-2023-2828
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+
+---
+ lib/dns/rbtdb.c | 106 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------
+ 1 file changed, 63 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/dns/rbtdb.c b/lib/dns/rbtdb.c
+index b1b928c..3165e26 100644
+--- a/lib/dns/rbtdb.c
++++ b/lib/dns/rbtdb.c
+@@ -792,7 +792,7 @@ static void update_header(dns_rbtdb_t *rbtdb, rdatasetheader_t *header,
+ static void expire_header(dns_rbtdb_t *rbtdb, rdatasetheader_t *header,
+ 			  bool tree_locked, expire_t reason);
+ static void overmem_purge(dns_rbtdb_t *rbtdb, unsigned int locknum_start,
+-			  isc_stdtime_t now, bool tree_locked);
++			  size_t purgesize, bool tree_locked);
+ static isc_result_t resign_insert(dns_rbtdb_t *rbtdb, int idx,
+ 				  rdatasetheader_t *newheader);
+ static void resign_delete(dns_rbtdb_t *rbtdb, rbtdb_version_t *version,
+@@ -6784,6 +6784,16 @@ addclosest(dns_rbtdb_t *rbtdb, rdatasetheader_t *newheader,
+ 
+ static dns_dbmethods_t zone_methods;
+ 
++static size_t
++rdataset_size(rdatasetheader_t *header) {
++	if (!NONEXISTENT(header)) {
++		return (dns_rdataslab_size((unsigned char *)header,
++					   sizeof(*header)));
++	}
++
++	return (sizeof(*header));
++}
++
+ static isc_result_t
+ addrdataset(dns_db_t *db, dns_dbnode_t *node, dns_dbversion_t *version,
+ 	    isc_stdtime_t now, dns_rdataset_t *rdataset, unsigned int options,
+@@ -6932,7 +6942,8 @@ addrdataset(dns_db_t *db, dns_dbnode_t *node, dns_dbversion_t *version,
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if (cache_is_overmem)
+-		overmem_purge(rbtdb, rbtnode->locknum, now, tree_locked);
++		overmem_purge(rbtdb, rbtnode->locknum, rdataset_size(newheader),
++		              tree_locked);
+ 
+ 	NODE_LOCK(&rbtdb->node_locks[rbtnode->locknum].lock,
+ 		  isc_rwlocktype_write);
+@@ -6947,9 +6958,14 @@ addrdataset(dns_db_t *db, dns_dbnode_t *node, dns_dbversion_t *version,
+ 			cleanup_dead_nodes(rbtdb, rbtnode->locknum);
+ 
+ 		header = isc_heap_element(rbtdb->heaps[rbtnode->locknum], 1);
+-		if (header && header->rdh_ttl < now - RBTDB_VIRTUAL)
+-			expire_header(rbtdb, header, tree_locked,
+-				      expire_ttl);
++		if (header != NULL) {
++			dns_ttl_t rdh_ttl = header->rdh_ttl;
++
++			if (rdh_ttl < now - RBTDB_VIRTUAL) {
++				expire_header(rbtdb, header, tree_locked,
++					      expire_ttl);
++			}
++		}
+ 
+ 		/*
+ 		 * If we've been holding a write lock on the tree just for
+@@ -10388,54 +10404,58 @@ update_header(dns_rbtdb_t *rbtdb, rdatasetheader_t *header,
+ 	ISC_LIST_PREPEND(rbtdb->rdatasets[header->node->locknum], header, link);
+ }
+ 
++static size_t
++expire_lru_headers(dns_rbtdb_t *rbtdb, unsigned int locknum, size_t purgesize,
++		   bool tree_locked) {
++	rdatasetheader_t *header, *header_prev;
++	size_t purged = 0;
++
++	for (header = ISC_LIST_TAIL(rbtdb->rdatasets[locknum]);
++	     header != NULL && purged <= purgesize; header = header_prev)
++	{
++		header_prev = ISC_LIST_PREV(header, link);
++		/*
++		 * Unlink the entry at this point to avoid checking it
++		 * again even if it's currently used someone else and
++		 * cannot be purged at this moment.  This entry won't be
++		 * referenced any more (so unlinking is safe) since the
++		 * TTL was reset to 0.
++		 */
++		ISC_LIST_UNLINK(rbtdb->rdatasets[locknum], header, link);
++		size_t header_size = rdataset_size(header);
++		expire_header(rbtdb, header, tree_locked, expire_lru);
++		purged += header_size;
++	}
++
++	return (purged);
++}
++
+ /*%
+- * Purge some expired and/or stale (i.e. unused for some period) cache entries
+- * under an overmem condition.  To recover from this condition quickly, up to
+- * 2 entries will be purged.  This process is triggered while adding a new
+- * entry, and we specifically avoid purging entries in the same LRU bucket as
+- * the one to which the new entry will belong.  Otherwise, we might purge
+- * entries of the same name of different RR types while adding RRsets from a
+- * single response (consider the case where we're adding A and AAAA glue records
+- * of the same NS name).
+- */
++ * Purge some stale (i.e. unused for some period - LRU based cleaning) cache
++ * entries under the overmem condition.  To recover from this condition quickly,
++ * we cleanup entries up to the size of newly added rdata (passed as purgesize).
++ *
++ * This process is triggered while adding a new entry, and we specifically avoid
++ * purging entries in the same LRU bucket as the one to which the new entry will
++ * belong.  Otherwise, we might purge entries of the same name of different RR
++ * types while adding RRsets from a single response (consider the case where
++ * we're adding A and AAAA glue records of the same NS name).
++*/
+ static void
+-overmem_purge(dns_rbtdb_t *rbtdb, unsigned int locknum_start,
+-	      isc_stdtime_t now, bool tree_locked)
++overmem_purge(dns_rbtdb_t *rbtdb, unsigned int locknum_start, size_t purgesize,
++	      bool tree_locked)
+ {
+-	rdatasetheader_t *header, *header_prev;
+ 	unsigned int locknum;
+-	int purgecount = 2;
++	size_t purged = 0;
+ 
+ 	for (locknum = (locknum_start + 1) % rbtdb->node_lock_count;
+-	     locknum != locknum_start && purgecount > 0;
++	     locknum != locknum_start && purged <= purgesize;
+ 	     locknum = (locknum + 1) % rbtdb->node_lock_count) {
+ 		NODE_LOCK(&rbtdb->node_locks[locknum].lock,
+ 			  isc_rwlocktype_write);
+ 
+-		header = isc_heap_element(rbtdb->heaps[locknum], 1);
+-		if (header && header->rdh_ttl < now - RBTDB_VIRTUAL) {
+-			expire_header(rbtdb, header, tree_locked,
+-				      expire_ttl);
+-			purgecount--;
+-		}
+-
+-		for (header = ISC_LIST_TAIL(rbtdb->rdatasets[locknum]);
+-		     header != NULL && purgecount > 0;
+-		     header = header_prev) {
+-			header_prev = ISC_LIST_PREV(header, link);
+-			/*
+-			 * Unlink the entry at this point to avoid checking it
+-			 * again even if it's currently used someone else and
+-			 * cannot be purged at this moment.  This entry won't be
+-			 * referenced any more (so unlinking is safe) since the
+-			 * TTL was reset to 0.
+-			 */
+-			ISC_LIST_UNLINK(rbtdb->rdatasets[locknum], header,
+-					link);
+-			expire_header(rbtdb, header, tree_locked,
+-				      expire_lru);
+-			purgecount--;
+-		}
++		purged += expire_lru_headers(rbtdb, locknum, purgesize - purged,
++					     tree_locked);
+ 
+ 		NODE_UNLOCK(&rbtdb->node_locks[locknum].lock,
+ 				    isc_rwlocktype_write);

meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind_9.11.37.bb

@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://ftp.isc.org/isc/bind9/${PV}/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://CVE-2022-2795.patch \
            file://CVE-2022-38177.patch \
            file://CVE-2022-38178.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-2828.patch \
            "
 
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "0d8efbe7ec166ada90e46add4267b7e7c934790cba9bd5af6b8380a4fbfb5aff"

meta/recipes-connectivity/inetutils/inetutils/0001-CVE-2023-40303-ftpd-rcp-rlogin-rsh-rshd-uucpd-fix-ch.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,283 @@
+From 703418fe9d2e3b1e8d594df5788d8001a8116265 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jeffrey Bencteux <jeffbencteux@gmail.com>
+Date: Fri, 30 Jun 2023 19:02:45 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2023-40303: ftpd,rcp,rlogin,rsh,rshd,uucpd: fix: check
+ set*id() return values
+
+Several setuid(), setgid(), seteuid() and setguid() return values
+were not checked in ftpd/rcp/rlogin/rsh/rshd/uucpd code potentially
+leading to potential security issues.
+
+CVE: CVE-2023-40303
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/inetutils.git/commit/?id=e4e65c03f4c11292a3e40ef72ca3f194c8bffdd6]
+Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Bencteux <jeffbencteux@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Simon Josefsson <simon@josefsson.org>
+Signed-off-by: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ ftpd/ftpd.c  | 10 +++++++---
+ src/rcp.c    | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
+ src/rlogin.c | 11 +++++++++--
+ src/rsh.c    | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++----
+ src/rshd.c   | 20 +++++++++++++++++---
+ src/uucpd.c  | 15 +++++++++++++--
+ 6 files changed, 100 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ftpd/ftpd.c b/ftpd/ftpd.c
+index 5db88d0..b52b122 100644
+--- a/ftpd/ftpd.c
++++ b/ftpd/ftpd.c
+@@ -862,7 +862,9 @@ end_login (struct credentials *pcred)
+   char *remotehost = pcred->remotehost;
+   int atype = pcred->auth_type;
+ 
+-  seteuid ((uid_t) 0);
++  if (seteuid ((uid_t) 0) == -1)
++    _exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
++
+   if (pcred->logged_in)
+     {
+       logwtmp_keep_open (ttyline, "", "");
+@@ -1151,7 +1153,8 @@ getdatasock (const char *mode)
+ 
+   if (data >= 0)
+     return fdopen (data, mode);
+-  seteuid ((uid_t) 0);
++  if (seteuid ((uid_t) 0) == -1)
++    _exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
+   s = socket (ctrl_addr.ss_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+   if (s < 0)
+     goto bad;
+@@ -1978,7 +1981,8 @@ passive (int epsv, int af)
+   else	/* !AF_INET6 */
+     ((struct sockaddr_in *) &pasv_addr)->sin_port = 0;
+ 
+-  seteuid ((uid_t) 0);
++  if (seteuid ((uid_t) 0) == -1)
++    _exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
+   if (bind (pdata, (struct sockaddr *) &pasv_addr, pasv_addrlen) < 0)
+     {
+       if (seteuid ((uid_t) cred.uid))
+diff --git a/src/rcp.c b/src/rcp.c
+index bafa35f..366295c 100644
+--- a/src/rcp.c
++++ b/src/rcp.c
+@@ -347,14 +347,23 @@ main (int argc, char *argv[])
+   if (from_option)
+     {				/* Follow "protocol", send data. */
+       response ();
+-      setuid (userid);
++
++      if (setuid (userid) == -1)
++      {
++        error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, "Could not drop privileges (setuid() failed)");
++      }
++
+       source (argc, argv);
+       exit (errs);
+     }
+ 
+   if (to_option)
+     {				/* Receive data. */
+-      setuid (userid);
++      if (setuid (userid) == -1)
++      {
++        error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, "Could not drop privileges (setuid() failed)");
++      }
++
+       sink (argc, argv);
+       exit (errs);
+     }
+@@ -539,7 +548,11 @@ toremote (char *targ, int argc, char *argv[])
+ 	      if (response () < 0)
+ 		exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
+ 	      free (bp);
+-	      setuid (userid);
++
++	      if (setuid (userid) == -1)
++              {
++                error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, "Could not drop privileges (setuid() failed)");
++              }
+ 	    }
+ 	  source (1, argv + i);
+ 	  close (rem);
+@@ -634,7 +647,12 @@ tolocal (int argc, char *argv[])
+ 	  ++errs;
+ 	  continue;
+ 	}
+-      seteuid (userid);
++
++      if (seteuid (userid) == -1)
++      {
++        error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, "Could not drop privileges (seteuid() failed)");
++      }
++
+ #if defined IP_TOS && defined IPPROTO_IP && defined IPTOS_THROUGHPUT
+       sslen = sizeof (ss);
+       (void) getpeername (rem, (struct sockaddr *) &ss, &sslen);
+@@ -647,7 +665,12 @@ tolocal (int argc, char *argv[])
+ #endif
+       vect[0] = target;
+       sink (1, vect);
+-      seteuid (effuid);
++
++      if (seteuid (effuid) == -1)
++      {
++        error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, "Could not drop privileges (seteuid() failed)");
++      }
++
+       close (rem);
+       rem = -1;
+ #ifdef SHISHI
+@@ -1453,7 +1476,11 @@ susystem (char *s, int userid)
+       return (127);
+ 
+     case 0:
+-      setuid (userid);
++      if (setuid (userid) == -1)
++      {
++        error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, "Could not drop privileges (setuid() failed)");
++      }
++
+       execl (PATH_BSHELL, "sh", "-c", s, NULL);
+       _exit (127);
+     }
+diff --git a/src/rlogin.c b/src/rlogin.c
+index e5e11a7..6b38901 100644
+--- a/src/rlogin.c
++++ b/src/rlogin.c
+@@ -649,8 +649,15 @@ try_connect:
+   /* Now change to the real user ID.  We have to be set-user-ID root
+      to get the privileged port that rcmd () uses.  We now want, however,
+      to run as the real user who invoked us.  */
+-  seteuid (uid);
+-  setuid (uid);
++  if (seteuid (uid) == -1)
++  {
++    error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, "Could not drop privileges (seteuid() failed)");
++  }
++
++  if (setuid (uid) == -1)
++  {
++    error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, "Could not drop privileges (setuid() failed)");
++  }
+ 
+   doit (&osmask);	/* The old mask will activate SIGURG and SIGUSR1!  */
+ 
+diff --git a/src/rsh.c b/src/rsh.c
+index bd70372..b451a70 100644
+--- a/src/rsh.c
++++ b/src/rsh.c
+@@ -278,8 +278,17 @@ main (int argc, char **argv)
+     {
+       if (asrsh)
+ 	*argv = (char *) "rlogin";
+-      seteuid (getuid ());
+-      setuid (getuid ());
++
++      if (seteuid (getuid ()) == -1)
++      {
++        error (EXIT_FAILURE, errno, "seteuid() failed");
++      }
++
++      if (setuid (getuid ()) == -1)
++      {
++        error (EXIT_FAILURE, errno, "setuid() failed");
++      }
++
+       execv (PATH_RLOGIN, argv);
+       error (EXIT_FAILURE, errno, "cannot execute %s", PATH_RLOGIN);
+     }
+@@ -543,8 +552,16 @@ try_connect:
+ 	error (0, errno, "setsockopt DEBUG (ignored)");
+     }
+ 
+-  seteuid (uid);
+-  setuid (uid);
++  if (seteuid (uid) == -1)
++  {
++    error (EXIT_FAILURE, errno, "seteuid() failed");
++  }
++
++  if (setuid (uid) == -1)
++  {
++    error (EXIT_FAILURE, errno, "setuid() failed");
++  }
++
+ #ifdef HAVE_SIGACTION
+   sigemptyset (&sigs);
+   sigaddset (&sigs, SIGINT);
+diff --git a/src/rshd.c b/src/rshd.c
+index b824a10..8cdcd06 100644
+--- a/src/rshd.c
++++ b/src/rshd.c
+@@ -1848,8 +1848,18 @@ doit (int sockfd, struct sockaddr *fromp, socklen_t fromlen)
+     pwd->pw_shell = PATH_BSHELL;
+ 
+   /* Set the gid, then uid to become the user specified by "locuser" */
+-  setegid ((gid_t) pwd->pw_gid);
+-  setgid ((gid_t) pwd->pw_gid);
++  if (setegid ((gid_t) pwd->pw_gid) == -1)
++  {
++    rshd_error ("Cannot drop privileges (setegid() failed)\n");
++    exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
++  }
++
++  if (setgid ((gid_t) pwd->pw_gid) == -1)
++  {
++    rshd_error ("Cannot drop privileges (setgid() failed)\n");
++    exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
++  }
++
+ #ifdef HAVE_INITGROUPS
+   initgroups (pwd->pw_name, pwd->pw_gid);	/* BSD groups */
+ #endif
+@@ -1871,7 +1881,11 @@ doit (int sockfd, struct sockaddr *fromp, socklen_t fromlen)
+     }
+ #endif /* WITH_PAM */
+ 
+-  setuid ((uid_t) pwd->pw_uid);
++  if (setuid ((uid_t) pwd->pw_uid) == -1)
++  {
++    rshd_error ("Cannot drop privileges (setuid() failed)\n");
++    exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
++  }
+ 
+   /* We'll execute the client's command in the home directory
+    * of locuser. Note, that the chdir must be executed after
+diff --git a/src/uucpd.c b/src/uucpd.c
+index 55c3d44..6aba294 100644
+--- a/src/uucpd.c
++++ b/src/uucpd.c
+@@ -254,7 +254,12 @@ doit (struct sockaddr *sap, socklen_t salen)
+   sprintf (Username, "USER=%s", user);
+   sprintf (Logname, "LOGNAME=%s", user);
+   dologin (pw, sap, salen);
+-  setgid (pw->pw_gid);
++
++  if (setgid (pw->pw_gid) == -1)
++  {
++    fprintf (stderr, "setgid() failed");
++    return;
++  }
+ #ifdef HAVE_INITGROUPS
+   initgroups (pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid);
+ #endif
+@@ -263,7 +268,13 @@ doit (struct sockaddr *sap, socklen_t salen)
+       fprintf (stderr, "Login incorrect.");
+       return;
+     }
+-  setuid (pw->pw_uid);
++
++  if (setuid (pw->pw_uid) == -1)
++  {
++    fprintf (stderr, "setuid() failed");
++    return;
++  }
++
+   execl (uucico_location, "uucico", NULL);
+   perror ("uucico server: execl");
+ }
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-connectivity/inetutils/inetutils/0002-CVE-2023-40303-Indent-changes-in-previous-commit.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,254 @@
+From 70fe022f9dac760eaece0228cad17e3d29a57fb8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Simon Josefsson <simon@josefsson.org>
+Date: Mon, 31 Jul 2023 13:59:05 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2023-40303: Indent changes in previous commit.
+
+CVE: CVE-2023-40303
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/inetutils.git/commit/?id=9122999252c7e21eb7774de11d539748e7bdf46d]
+Signed-off-by: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ src/rcp.c    | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
+ src/rlogin.c | 12 ++++++------
+ src/rsh.c    | 24 ++++++++++++------------
+ src/rshd.c   | 24 ++++++++++++------------
+ src/uucpd.c  | 16 ++++++++--------
+ 5 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/rcp.c b/src/rcp.c
+index cdcf8500..652f22e6 100644
+--- a/src/rcp.c
++++ b/src/rcp.c
+@@ -347,9 +347,10 @@ main (int argc, char *argv[])
+       response ();
+ 
+       if (setuid (userid) == -1)
+-      {
+-        error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, "Could not drop privileges (setuid() failed)");
+-      }
++	{
++	  error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0,
++		 "Could not drop privileges (setuid() failed)");
++	}
+ 
+       source (argc, argv);
+       exit (errs);
+@@ -358,9 +359,10 @@ main (int argc, char *argv[])
+   if (to_option)
+     {				/* Receive data. */
+       if (setuid (userid) == -1)
+-      {
+-        error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, "Could not drop privileges (setuid() failed)");
+-      }
++	{
++	  error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0,
++		 "Could not drop privileges (setuid() failed)");
++	}
+ 
+       sink (argc, argv);
+       exit (errs);
+@@ -548,9 +550,10 @@ toremote (char *targ, int argc, char *argv[])
+ 	      free (bp);
+ 
+ 	      if (setuid (userid) == -1)
+-              {
+-                error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, "Could not drop privileges (setuid() failed)");
+-              }
++		{
++		  error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0,
++			 "Could not drop privileges (setuid() failed)");
++		}
+ 	    }
+ 	  source (1, argv + i);
+ 	  close (rem);
+@@ -645,9 +648,10 @@ tolocal (int argc, char *argv[])
+ 	}
+ 
+       if (seteuid (userid) == -1)
+-      {
+-        error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, "Could not drop privileges (seteuid() failed)");
+-      }
++	{
++	  error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0,
++		 "Could not drop privileges (seteuid() failed)");
++	}
+ 
+ #if defined IP_TOS && defined IPPROTO_IP && defined IPTOS_THROUGHPUT
+       sslen = sizeof (ss);
+@@ -663,9 +667,10 @@ tolocal (int argc, char *argv[])
+       sink (1, vect);
+ 
+       if (seteuid (effuid) == -1)
+-      {
+-        error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, "Could not drop privileges (seteuid() failed)");
+-      }
++	{
++	  error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0,
++		 "Could not drop privileges (seteuid() failed)");
++	}
+ 
+       close (rem);
+       rem = -1;
+@@ -1465,9 +1470,10 @@ susystem (char *s, int userid)
+ 
+     case 0:
+       if (setuid (userid) == -1)
+-      {
+-        error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, "Could not drop privileges (setuid() failed)");
+-      }
++	{
++	  error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0,
++		 "Could not drop privileges (setuid() failed)");
++	}
+ 
+       execl (PATH_BSHELL, "sh", "-c", s, NULL);
+       _exit (127);
+diff --git a/src/rlogin.c b/src/rlogin.c
+index c543de0c..4360202f 100644
+--- a/src/rlogin.c
++++ b/src/rlogin.c
+@@ -648,14 +648,14 @@ try_connect:
+      to get the privileged port that rcmd () uses.  We now want, however,
+      to run as the real user who invoked us.  */
+   if (seteuid (uid) == -1)
+-  {
+-    error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, "Could not drop privileges (seteuid() failed)");
+-  }
++    {
++      error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, "Could not drop privileges (seteuid() failed)");
++    }
+ 
+   if (setuid (uid) == -1)
+-  {
+-    error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, "Could not drop privileges (setuid() failed)");
+-  }
++    {
++      error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, "Could not drop privileges (setuid() failed)");
++    }
+ 
+   doit (&osmask);	/* The old mask will activate SIGURG and SIGUSR1!  */
+ 
+diff --git a/src/rsh.c b/src/rsh.c
+index 6f60667d..179b47cd 100644
+--- a/src/rsh.c
++++ b/src/rsh.c
+@@ -278,14 +278,14 @@ main (int argc, char **argv)
+ 	*argv = (char *) "rlogin";
+ 
+       if (seteuid (getuid ()) == -1)
+-      {
+-        error (EXIT_FAILURE, errno, "seteuid() failed");
+-      }
++	{
++	  error (EXIT_FAILURE, errno, "seteuid() failed");
++	}
+ 
+       if (setuid (getuid ()) == -1)
+-      {
+-        error (EXIT_FAILURE, errno, "setuid() failed");
+-      }
++	{
++	  error (EXIT_FAILURE, errno, "setuid() failed");
++	}
+ 
+       execv (PATH_RLOGIN, argv);
+       error (EXIT_FAILURE, errno, "cannot execute %s", PATH_RLOGIN);
+@@ -551,14 +551,14 @@ try_connect:
+     }
+ 
+   if (seteuid (uid) == -1)
+-  {
+-    error (EXIT_FAILURE, errno, "seteuid() failed");
+-  }
++    {
++      error (EXIT_FAILURE, errno, "seteuid() failed");
++    }
+ 
+   if (setuid (uid) == -1)
+-  {
+-    error (EXIT_FAILURE, errno, "setuid() failed");
+-  }
++    {
++      error (EXIT_FAILURE, errno, "setuid() failed");
++    }
+ 
+ #ifdef HAVE_SIGACTION
+   sigemptyset (&sigs);
+diff --git a/src/rshd.c b/src/rshd.c
+index 707790e7..3a153a18 100644
+--- a/src/rshd.c
++++ b/src/rshd.c
+@@ -1848,16 +1848,16 @@ doit (int sockfd, struct sockaddr *fromp, socklen_t fromlen)
+ 
+   /* Set the gid, then uid to become the user specified by "locuser" */
+   if (setegid ((gid_t) pwd->pw_gid) == -1)
+-  {
+-    rshd_error ("Cannot drop privileges (setegid() failed)\n");
+-    exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
+-  }
++    {
++      rshd_error ("Cannot drop privileges (setegid() failed)\n");
++      exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
++    }
+ 
+   if (setgid ((gid_t) pwd->pw_gid) == -1)
+-  {
+-    rshd_error ("Cannot drop privileges (setgid() failed)\n");
+-    exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
+-  }
++    {
++      rshd_error ("Cannot drop privileges (setgid() failed)\n");
++      exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
++    }
+ 
+ #ifdef HAVE_INITGROUPS
+   initgroups (pwd->pw_name, pwd->pw_gid);	/* BSD groups */
+@@ -1881,10 +1881,10 @@ doit (int sockfd, struct sockaddr *fromp, socklen_t fromlen)
+ #endif /* WITH_PAM */
+ 
+   if (setuid ((uid_t) pwd->pw_uid) == -1)
+-  {
+-    rshd_error ("Cannot drop privileges (setuid() failed)\n");
+-    exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
+-  }
++    {
++      rshd_error ("Cannot drop privileges (setuid() failed)\n");
++      exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
++    }
+ 
+   /* We'll execute the client's command in the home directory
+    * of locuser. Note, that the chdir must be executed after
+diff --git a/src/uucpd.c b/src/uucpd.c
+index 29cfce35..fde7b9c9 100644
+--- a/src/uucpd.c
++++ b/src/uucpd.c
+@@ -254,10 +254,10 @@ doit (struct sockaddr *sap, socklen_t salen)
+   dologin (pw, sap, salen);
+ 
+   if (setgid (pw->pw_gid) == -1)
+-  {
+-    fprintf (stderr, "setgid() failed");
+-    return;
+-  }
++    {
++      fprintf (stderr, "setgid() failed");
++      return;
++    }
+ #ifdef HAVE_INITGROUPS
+   initgroups (pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid);
+ #endif
+@@ -268,10 +268,10 @@ doit (struct sockaddr *sap, socklen_t salen)
+     }
+ 
+   if (setuid (pw->pw_uid) == -1)
+-  {
+-    fprintf (stderr, "setuid() failed");
+-    return;
+-  }
++    {
++      fprintf (stderr, "setuid() failed");
++      return;
++    }
+ 
+   execl (uucico_location, "uucico", NULL);
+   perror ("uucico server: execl");

meta/recipes-connectivity/inetutils/inetutils_1.9.4.bb

@@ -25,6 +25,8 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/inetutils/inetutils-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://fix-buffer-fortify-tfpt.patch \
            file://CVE-2021-40491.patch \
            file://CVE-2022-39028.patch \
+           file://0001-CVE-2023-40303-ftpd-rcp-rlogin-rsh-rshd-uucpd-fix-ch.patch \
+           file://0002-CVE-2023-40303-Indent-changes-in-previous-commit.patch \
 "
 
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "04852c26c47cc8c6b825f2b74f191f52"

meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-01.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,189 @@
+From f6213e03887237714eb5bcfc9089c707069f87c5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri, 1 Oct 2021 16:35:49 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH 01/12] make OPENSSL_HAS_ECC checks more thorough
+
+ok dtucker
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/dee22129bbc61e25b1003adfa2bc584c5406ef2d]
+CVE: CVE-2023-38408
+Signed-off-by: Shubham Kulkarni <skulkarni@mvista.com>
+---
+ ssh-pkcs11-client.c | 16 ++++++++--------
+ ssh-pkcs11.c        | 26 +++++++++++++-------------
+ 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11-client.c b/ssh-pkcs11-client.c
+index 8a0ffef..41114c7 100644
+--- a/ssh-pkcs11-client.c
++++ b/ssh-pkcs11-client.c
+@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ rsa_encrypt(int flen, const u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+	return (ret);
+ }
+
+-#ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW
++#if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW)
+ static ECDSA_SIG *
+ ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const BIGNUM *inv,
+     const BIGNUM *rp, EC_KEY *ec)
+@@ -220,12 +220,12 @@ ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const BIGNUM *inv,
+	sshbuf_free(msg);
+	return (ret);
+ }
+-#endif /* HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
++#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC && HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
+
+ static RSA_METHOD	*helper_rsa;
+-#ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW
++#if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW)
+ static EC_KEY_METHOD	*helper_ecdsa;
+-#endif /* HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
++#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC && HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
+
+ /* redirect private key crypto operations to the ssh-pkcs11-helper */
+ static void
+@@ -233,10 +233,10 @@ wrap_key(struct sshkey *k)
+ {
+	if (k->type == KEY_RSA)
+		RSA_set_method(k->rsa, helper_rsa);
+-#ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW
++#if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW)
+	else if (k->type == KEY_ECDSA)
+		EC_KEY_set_method(k->ecdsa, helper_ecdsa);
+-#endif /* HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
++#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC && HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
+	else
+		fatal("%s: unknown key type", __func__);
+ }
+@@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ pkcs11_start_helper_methods(void)
+	if (helper_rsa != NULL)
+		return (0);
+
+-#ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW
++#if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW)
+	int (*orig_sign)(int, const unsigned char *, int, unsigned char *,
+	    unsigned int *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, EC_KEY *) = NULL;
+	if (helper_ecdsa != NULL)
+@@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ pkcs11_start_helper_methods(void)
+		return (-1);
+	EC_KEY_METHOD_get_sign(helper_ecdsa, &orig_sign, NULL, NULL);
+	EC_KEY_METHOD_set_sign(helper_ecdsa, orig_sign, NULL, ecdsa_do_sign);
+-#endif /* HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
++#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC && HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
+
+	if ((helper_rsa = RSA_meth_dup(RSA_get_default_method())) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: RSA_meth_dup failed", __func__);
+diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11.c b/ssh-pkcs11.c
+index a302c79..b56a41b 100644
+--- a/ssh-pkcs11.c
++++ b/ssh-pkcs11.c
+@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ struct pkcs11_key {
+
+ int pkcs11_interactive = 0;
+
+-#ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW
++#if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW)
+ static void
+ ossl_error(const char *msg)
+ {
+@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ ossl_error(const char *msg)
+		error("%s: libcrypto error: %.100s", __func__,
+		    ERR_error_string(e, NULL));
+ }
+-#endif /* HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
++#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC && HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
+
+ int
+ pkcs11_init(int interactive)
+@@ -190,10 +190,10 @@ pkcs11_del_provider(char *provider_id)
+
+ static RSA_METHOD *rsa_method;
+ static int rsa_idx = 0;
+-#ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW
++#if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW)
+ static EC_KEY_METHOD *ec_key_method;
+ static int ec_key_idx = 0;
+-#endif
++#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC && HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
+
+ /* release a wrapped object */
+ static void
+@@ -492,7 +492,7 @@ pkcs11_rsa_wrap(struct pkcs11_provider *provider, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+	return (0);
+ }
+
+-#ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW
++#if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW)
+ /* openssl callback doing the actual signing operation */
+ static ECDSA_SIG *
+ ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const BIGNUM *inv,
+@@ -604,7 +604,7 @@ pkcs11_ecdsa_wrap(struct pkcs11_provider *provider, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+
+	return (0);
+ }
+-#endif /* HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
++#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC && HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
+
+ /* remove trailing spaces */
+ static void
+@@ -679,7 +679,7 @@ pkcs11_key_included(struct sshkey ***keysp, int *nkeys, struct sshkey *key)
+	return (0);
+ }
+
+-#ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW
++#if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW)
+ static struct sshkey *
+ pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+     CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *obj)
+@@ -802,7 +802,7 @@ fail:
+
+	return (key);
+ }
+-#endif /* HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
++#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC && HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
+
+ static struct sshkey *
+ pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+@@ -910,7 +910,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+ #endif
+	struct sshkey		*key = NULL;
+	int			 i;
+-#ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW
++#if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW)
+	int			 nid;
+ #endif
+	const u_char		*cp;
+@@ -999,7 +999,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+		key->type = KEY_RSA;
+		key->flags |= SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT;
+		rsa = NULL;	/* now owned by key */
+-#ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW
++#if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW)
+	} else if (EVP_PKEY_base_id(evp) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
+		if (EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(evp) == NULL) {
+			error("invalid x509; no ec key");
+@@ -1030,7 +1030,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+		key->type = KEY_ECDSA;
+		key->flags |= SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT;
+		ec = NULL;	/* now owned by key */
+-#endif /* HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
++#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC && HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
+	} else {
+		error("unknown certificate key type");
+		goto out;
+@@ -1237,11 +1237,11 @@ pkcs11_fetch_keys(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+		case CKK_RSA:
+			key = pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(p, slotidx, &obj);
+			break;
+-#ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW
++#if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW)
+		case CKK_ECDSA:
+			key = pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(p, slotidx, &obj);
+			break;
+-#endif /* HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
++#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC && HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
+		default:
+			/* XXX print key type? */
+			key = NULL;
+--
+2.41.0

meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-02.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,581 @@
+From 92cebfbcc221c9ef3f6bbb78da3d7699c0ae56be Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed, 19 Jul 2023 14:03:45 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 02/12] upstream: Separate ssh-pkcs11-helpers for each p11
+ module
+
+Make ssh-pkcs11-client start an independent helper for each provider,
+providing better isolation between modules and reliability if a single
+module misbehaves.
+
+This also implements reference counting of PKCS#11-hosted keys,
+allowing ssh-pkcs11-helper subprocesses to be automatically reaped
+when no remaining keys reference them. This fixes some bugs we have
+that make PKCS11 keys unusable after they have been deleted, e.g.
+https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3125
+
+ok markus@
+
+OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0ce188b14fe271ab0568f4500070d96c5657244e
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/099cdf59ce1e72f55d421c8445bf6321b3004755]
+CVE: CVE-2023-38408
+Signed-off-by: Shubham Kulkarni <skulkarni@mvista.com>
+---
+ ssh-pkcs11-client.c | 372 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
+ 1 file changed, 282 insertions(+), 90 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11-client.c b/ssh-pkcs11-client.c
+index 41114c7..4f3c6ed 100644
+--- a/ssh-pkcs11-client.c
++++ b/ssh-pkcs11-client.c
+@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
+-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11-client.c,v 1.16 2020/01/25 00:03:36 djm Exp $ */
++/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11-client.c,v 1.18 2023/07/19 14:03:45 djm Exp $ */
+ /*
+  * Copyright (c) 2010 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+  * Copyright (c) 2014 Pedro Martelletto. All rights reserved.
+@@ -30,12 +30,11 @@
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <unistd.h>
+ #include <errno.h>
++#include <limits.h>
+
+ #include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
+ #include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+-#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+-
+ #include "pathnames.h"
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+ #include "sshbuf.h"
+@@ -47,18 +46,140 @@
+ #include "ssh-pkcs11.h"
+ #include "ssherr.h"
+
++#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
++
+ /* borrows code from sftp-server and ssh-agent */
+
+-static int fd = -1;
+-static pid_t pid = -1;
++/*
++ * Maintain a list of ssh-pkcs11-helper subprocesses. These may be looked up
++ * by provider path or their unique EC/RSA METHOD pointers.
++ */
++struct helper {
++	char *path;
++	pid_t pid;
++	int fd;
++	RSA_METHOD *rsa_meth;
++	EC_KEY_METHOD *ec_meth;
++	int (*rsa_finish)(RSA *rsa);
++	void (*ec_finish)(EC_KEY *key);
++	size_t nrsa, nec; /* number of active keys of each type */
++};
++static struct helper **helpers;
++static size_t nhelpers;
++
++static struct helper *
++helper_by_provider(const char *path)
++{
++	size_t i;
++
++	for (i = 0; i < nhelpers; i++) {
++		if (helpers[i] == NULL || helpers[i]->path == NULL ||
++		    helpers[i]->fd == -1)
++			continue;
++		if (strcmp(helpers[i]->path, path) == 0)
++			return helpers[i];
++	}
++	return NULL;
++}
++
++static struct helper *
++helper_by_rsa(const RSA *rsa)
++{
++	size_t i;
++	const RSA_METHOD *meth;
++
++	if ((meth = RSA_get_method(rsa)) == NULL)
++		return NULL;
++	for (i = 0; i < nhelpers; i++) {
++		if (helpers[i] != NULL && helpers[i]->rsa_meth == meth)
++			return helpers[i];
++	}
++	return NULL;
++
++}
++
++static struct helper *
++helper_by_ec(const EC_KEY *ec)
++{
++	size_t i;
++	const EC_KEY_METHOD *meth;
++
++	if ((meth = EC_KEY_get_method(ec)) == NULL)
++		return NULL;
++	for (i = 0; i < nhelpers; i++) {
++		if (helpers[i] != NULL && helpers[i]->ec_meth == meth)
++			return helpers[i];
++	}
++	return NULL;
++
++}
++
++static void
++helper_free(struct helper *helper)
++{
++	size_t i;
++	int found = 0;
++
++	if (helper == NULL)
++		return;
++	if (helper->path == NULL || helper->ec_meth == NULL ||
++	    helper->rsa_meth == NULL)
++		fatal("%s: inconsistent helper", __func__);
++	debug3("%s: free helper for provider %s", __func__ , helper->path);
++	for (i = 0; i < nhelpers; i++) {
++		if (helpers[i] == helper) {
++			if (found)
++				fatal("%s: helper recorded more than once", __func__);
++			found = 1;
++		}
++		else if (found)
++			helpers[i - 1] = helpers[i];
++	}
++	if (found) {
++		helpers = xrecallocarray(helpers, nhelpers,
++		    nhelpers - 1, sizeof(*helpers));
++		nhelpers--;
++	}
++	free(helper->path);
++	EC_KEY_METHOD_free(helper->ec_meth);
++	RSA_meth_free(helper->rsa_meth);
++	free(helper);
++}
++
++static void
++helper_terminate(struct helper *helper)
++{
++	if (helper == NULL) {
++		return;
++	} else if (helper->fd == -1) {
++		debug3("%s: already terminated", __func__);
++	} else {
++		debug3("terminating helper for %s; "
++		    "remaining %zu RSA %zu ECDSA", __func__,
++		    helper->path, helper->nrsa, helper->nec);
++		close(helper->fd);
++		/* XXX waitpid() */
++		helper->fd = -1;
++		helper->pid = -1;
++	}
++	/*
++	 * Don't delete the helper entry until there are no remaining keys
++	 * that reference it. Otherwise, any signing operation would call
++	 * a free'd METHOD pointer and that would be bad.
++	 */
++	if (helper->nrsa == 0 && helper->nec == 0)
++		helper_free(helper);
++}
+
+ static void
+-send_msg(struct sshbuf *m)
++send_msg(int fd, struct sshbuf *m)
+ {
+	u_char buf[4];
+	size_t mlen = sshbuf_len(m);
+	int r;
+
++	if (fd == -1)
++		return;
+	POKE_U32(buf, mlen);
+	if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, buf, 4) != 4 ||
+	    atomicio(vwrite, fd, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(m),
+@@ -69,12 +190,15 @@ send_msg(struct sshbuf *m)
+ }
+
+ static int
+-recv_msg(struct sshbuf *m)
++recv_msg(int fd, struct sshbuf *m)
+ {
+	u_int l, len;
+	u_char c, buf[1024];
+	int r;
+
++	sshbuf_reset(m);
++	if (fd == -1)
++		return 0; /* XXX */
+	if ((len = atomicio(read, fd, buf, 4)) != 4) {
+		error("read from helper failed: %u", len);
+		return (0); /* XXX */
+@@ -83,7 +207,6 @@ recv_msg(struct sshbuf *m)
+	if (len > 256 * 1024)
+		fatal("response too long: %u", len);
+	/* read len bytes into m */
+-	sshbuf_reset(m);
+	while (len > 0) {
+		l = len;
+		if (l > sizeof(buf))
+@@ -104,14 +227,17 @@ recv_msg(struct sshbuf *m)
+ int
+ pkcs11_init(int interactive)
+ {
+-	return (0);
++	return 0;
+ }
+
+ void
+ pkcs11_terminate(void)
+ {
+-	if (fd >= 0)
+-		close(fd);
++	size_t i;
++
++	debug3("%s: terminating %zu helpers", __func__, nhelpers);
++	for (i = 0; i < nhelpers; i++)
++		helper_terminate(helpers[i]);
+ }
+
+ static int
+@@ -122,7 +248,11 @@ rsa_encrypt(int flen, const u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+	u_char *blob = NULL, *signature = NULL;
+	size_t blen, slen = 0;
+	int r, ret = -1;
++	struct helper *helper;
+
++	if ((helper = helper_by_rsa(rsa)) == NULL || helper->fd == -1)
++		fatal("%s: no helper for PKCS11 key", __func__);
++	debug3("%s: signing with PKCS11 provider %s", __func__, helper->path);
+	if (padding != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
+		goto fail;
+	key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
+@@ -144,10 +274,10 @@ rsa_encrypt(int flen, const u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, from, flen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, 0)) != 0)
+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+-	send_msg(msg);
++	send_msg(helper->fd, msg);
+	sshbuf_reset(msg);
+
+-	if (recv_msg(msg) == SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE) {
++	if (recv_msg(helper->fd, msg) == SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &signature, &slen)) != 0)
+			fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+		if (slen <= (size_t)RSA_size(rsa)) {
+@@ -163,7 +293,26 @@ rsa_encrypt(int flen, const u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+	return (ret);
+ }
+
+-#if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW)
++static int
++rsa_finish(RSA *rsa)
++{
++	struct helper *helper;
++
++	if ((helper = helper_by_rsa(rsa)) == NULL)
++		fatal("%s: no helper for PKCS11 key", __func__);
++	debug3("%s: free PKCS11 RSA key for provider %s", __func__, helper->path);
++	if (helper->rsa_finish != NULL)
++		helper->rsa_finish(rsa);
++	if (helper->nrsa == 0)
++		fatal("%s: RSA refcount error", __func__);
++	helper->nrsa--;
++	debug3("%s: provider %s remaining keys: %zu RSA %zu ECDSA", __func__,
++	    helper->path, helper->nrsa, helper->nec);
++	if (helper->nrsa == 0 && helper->nec == 0)
++		helper_terminate(helper);
++	return 1;
++}
++
+ static ECDSA_SIG *
+ ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const BIGNUM *inv,
+     const BIGNUM *rp, EC_KEY *ec)
+@@ -175,7 +324,11 @@ ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const BIGNUM *inv,
+	u_char *blob = NULL, *signature = NULL;
+	size_t blen, slen = 0;
+	int r, nid;
++	struct helper *helper;
+
++	if ((helper = helper_by_ec(ec)) == NULL || helper->fd == -1)
++		fatal("%s: no helper for PKCS11 key", __func__);
++	debug3("%s: signing with PKCS11 provider %s", __func__, helper->path);
+	nid = sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid(ec);
+	if (nid < 0) {
+		error("%s: couldn't get curve nid", __func__);
+@@ -203,10 +356,10 @@ ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const BIGNUM *inv,
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, dgst, dgst_len)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, 0)) != 0)
+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+-	send_msg(msg);
++	send_msg(helper->fd, msg);
+	sshbuf_reset(msg);
+
+-	if (recv_msg(msg) == SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE) {
++	if (recv_msg(helper->fd, msg) == SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &signature, &slen)) != 0)
+			fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+		cp = signature;
+@@ -220,75 +373,110 @@ ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const BIGNUM *inv,
+	sshbuf_free(msg);
+	return (ret);
+ }
+-#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC && HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
+
+-static RSA_METHOD	*helper_rsa;
+-#if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW)
+-static EC_KEY_METHOD	*helper_ecdsa;
+-#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC && HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
++static void
++ecdsa_do_finish(EC_KEY *ec)
++{
++	struct helper *helper;
++
++	if ((helper = helper_by_ec(ec)) == NULL)
++		fatal("%s: no helper for PKCS11 key", __func__);
++	debug3("%s: free PKCS11 ECDSA key for provider %s", __func__, helper->path);
++	if (helper->ec_finish != NULL)
++		helper->ec_finish(ec);
++	if (helper->nec == 0)
++		fatal("%s: ECDSA refcount error", __func__);
++	helper->nec--;
++	debug3("%s: provider %s remaining keys: %zu RSA %zu ECDSA", __func__,
++	    helper->path, helper->nrsa, helper->nec);
++	if (helper->nrsa == 0 && helper->nec == 0)
++		helper_terminate(helper);
++}
+
+ /* redirect private key crypto operations to the ssh-pkcs11-helper */
+ static void
+-wrap_key(struct sshkey *k)
++wrap_key(struct helper *helper, struct sshkey *k)
+ {
+-	if (k->type == KEY_RSA)
+-		RSA_set_method(k->rsa, helper_rsa);
+-#if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW)
+-	else if (k->type == KEY_ECDSA)
+-		EC_KEY_set_method(k->ecdsa, helper_ecdsa);
+-#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC && HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
+-	else
++	debug3("%s: wrap %s for provider %s", __func__, sshkey_type(k), helper->path);
++	if (k->type == KEY_RSA) {
++		RSA_set_method(k->rsa, helper->rsa_meth);
++		if (helper->nrsa++ >= INT_MAX)
++			fatal("%s: RSA refcount error", __func__);
++	} else if (k->type == KEY_ECDSA) {
++		EC_KEY_set_method(k->ecdsa, helper->ec_meth);
++		if (helper->nec++ >= INT_MAX)
++			fatal("%s: EC refcount error", __func__);
++	} else
+		fatal("%s: unknown key type", __func__);
++	k->flags |= SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT;
++	debug3("%s: provider %s remaining keys: %zu RSA %zu ECDSA", __func__,
++	    helper->path, helper->nrsa, helper->nec);
+ }
+
+ static int
+-pkcs11_start_helper_methods(void)
++pkcs11_start_helper_methods(struct helper *helper)
+ {
+-	if (helper_rsa != NULL)
+-		return (0);
+-
+-#if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW)
+-	int (*orig_sign)(int, const unsigned char *, int, unsigned char *,
++	int (*ec_init)(EC_KEY *key);
++	int (*ec_copy)(EC_KEY *dest, const EC_KEY *src);
++	int (*ec_set_group)(EC_KEY *key, const EC_GROUP *grp);
++	int (*ec_set_private)(EC_KEY *key, const BIGNUM *priv_key);
++	int (*ec_set_public)(EC_KEY *key, const EC_POINT *pub_key);
++	int (*ec_sign)(int, const unsigned char *, int, unsigned char *,
+	    unsigned int *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, EC_KEY *) = NULL;
+-	if (helper_ecdsa != NULL)
+-		return (0);
+-	helper_ecdsa = EC_KEY_METHOD_new(EC_KEY_OpenSSL());
+-	if (helper_ecdsa == NULL)
+-		return (-1);
+-	EC_KEY_METHOD_get_sign(helper_ecdsa, &orig_sign, NULL, NULL);
+-	EC_KEY_METHOD_set_sign(helper_ecdsa, orig_sign, NULL, ecdsa_do_sign);
+-#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC && HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
+-
+-	if ((helper_rsa = RSA_meth_dup(RSA_get_default_method())) == NULL)
++	RSA_METHOD *rsa_meth;
++	EC_KEY_METHOD *ec_meth;
++
++	if ((ec_meth = EC_KEY_METHOD_new(EC_KEY_OpenSSL())) == NULL)
++		return -1;
++	EC_KEY_METHOD_get_sign(ec_meth, &ec_sign, NULL, NULL);
++	EC_KEY_METHOD_set_sign(ec_meth, ec_sign, NULL, ecdsa_do_sign);
++	EC_KEY_METHOD_get_init(ec_meth, &ec_init, &helper->ec_finish,
++	    &ec_copy, &ec_set_group, &ec_set_private, &ec_set_public);
++	EC_KEY_METHOD_set_init(ec_meth, ec_init, ecdsa_do_finish,
++	    ec_copy, ec_set_group, ec_set_private, ec_set_public);
++
++	if ((rsa_meth = RSA_meth_dup(RSA_get_default_method())) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: RSA_meth_dup failed", __func__);
+-	if (!RSA_meth_set1_name(helper_rsa, "ssh-pkcs11-helper") ||
+-	    !RSA_meth_set_priv_enc(helper_rsa, rsa_encrypt))
++	helper->rsa_finish = RSA_meth_get_finish(rsa_meth);
++	if (!RSA_meth_set1_name(rsa_meth, "ssh-pkcs11-helper") ||
++	    !RSA_meth_set_priv_enc(rsa_meth, rsa_encrypt) ||
++	    !RSA_meth_set_finish(rsa_meth, rsa_finish))
+		fatal("%s: failed to prepare method", __func__);
+
+-	return (0);
++	helper->ec_meth = ec_meth;
++	helper->rsa_meth = rsa_meth;
++	return 0;
+ }
+
+-static int
+-pkcs11_start_helper(void)
++static struct helper *
++pkcs11_start_helper(const char *path)
+ {
+	int pair[2];
+-	char *helper, *verbosity = NULL;
+-
+-	if (log_level_get() >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1)
+-		verbosity = "-vvv";
+-
+-	if (pkcs11_start_helper_methods() == -1) {
+-		error("pkcs11_start_helper_methods failed");
+-		return (-1);
+-	}
++	char *prog, *verbosity = NULL;
++	struct helper *helper;
++	pid_t pid;
+
++	if (nhelpers >= INT_MAX)
++		fatal("%s: too many helpers", __func__);
++	debug3("%s: start helper for %s", __func__, path);
+	if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, pair) == -1) {
+		error("socketpair: %s", strerror(errno));
+-		return (-1);
++		return NULL;
++	}
++	helper = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*helper));
++	if (pkcs11_start_helper_methods(helper) == -1) {
++		error("pkcs11_start_helper_methods failed");
++		goto fail;
+	}
+	if ((pid = fork()) == -1) {
+		error("fork: %s", strerror(errno));
+-		return (-1);
++ fail:
++		close(pair[0]);
++		close(pair[1]);
++		RSA_meth_free(helper->rsa_meth);
++		EC_KEY_METHOD_free(helper->ec_meth);
++		free(helper);
++		return NULL;
+	} else if (pid == 0) {
+		if ((dup2(pair[1], STDIN_FILENO) == -1) ||
+		    (dup2(pair[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1)) {
+@@ -297,18 +485,27 @@ pkcs11_start_helper(void)
+		}
+		close(pair[0]);
+		close(pair[1]);
+-		helper = getenv("SSH_PKCS11_HELPER");
+-		if (helper == NULL || strlen(helper) == 0)
+-			helper = _PATH_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER;
++		prog = getenv("SSH_PKCS11_HELPER");
++		if (prog == NULL || strlen(prog) == 0)
++			prog = _PATH_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER;
++		if (log_level_get() >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1)
++			verbosity = "-vvv";
+		debug("%s: starting %s %s", __func__, helper,
+		    verbosity == NULL ? "" : verbosity);
+-		execlp(helper, helper, verbosity, (char *)NULL);
+-		fprintf(stderr, "exec: %s: %s\n", helper, strerror(errno));
++		execlp(prog, prog, verbosity, (char *)NULL);
++		fprintf(stderr, "exec: %s: %s\n", prog, strerror(errno));
+		_exit(1);
+	}
+	close(pair[1]);
+-	fd = pair[0];
+-	return (0);
++	helper->fd = pair[0];
++	helper->path = xstrdup(path);
++	helper->pid = pid;
++	debug3("%s: helper %zu for \"%s\" on fd %d pid %ld", __func__, nhelpers,
++	    helper->path, helper->fd, (long)helper->pid);
++	helpers = xrecallocarray(helpers, nhelpers,
++	    nhelpers + 1, sizeof(*helpers));
++	helpers[nhelpers++] = helper;
++	return helper;
+ }
+
+ int
+@@ -322,9 +519,11 @@ pkcs11_add_provider(char *name, char *pin, struct sshkey ***keysp,
+	size_t blen;
+	u_int nkeys, i;
+	struct sshbuf *msg;
++	struct helper *helper;
+
+-	if (fd < 0 && pkcs11_start_helper() < 0)
+-		return (-1);
++	if ((helper = helper_by_provider(name)) == NULL &&
++	    (helper = pkcs11_start_helper(name)) == NULL)
++		return -1;
+
+	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+@@ -332,10 +531,10 @@ pkcs11_add_provider(char *name, char *pin, struct sshkey ***keysp,
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, name)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, pin)) != 0)
+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+-	send_msg(msg);
++	send_msg(helper->fd, msg);
+	sshbuf_reset(msg);
+
+-	type = recv_msg(msg);
++	type = recv_msg(helper->fd, msg);
+	if (type == SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &nkeys)) != 0)
+			fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+@@ -350,7 +549,7 @@ pkcs11_add_provider(char *name, char *pin, struct sshkey ***keysp,
+				    __func__, ssh_err(r));
+			if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, &k)) != 0)
+				fatal("%s: bad key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+-			wrap_key(k);
++			wrap_key(helper, k);
+			(*keysp)[i] = k;
+			if (labelsp)
+				(*labelsp)[i] = label;
+@@ -371,22 +570,15 @@ pkcs11_add_provider(char *name, char *pin, struct sshkey ***keysp,
+ int
+ pkcs11_del_provider(char *name)
+ {
+-	int r, ret = -1;
+-	struct sshbuf *msg;
+-
+-	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+-		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+-	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY)) != 0 ||
+-	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, name)) != 0 ||
+-	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "")) != 0)
+-		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+-	send_msg(msg);
+-	sshbuf_reset(msg);
+-
+-	if (recv_msg(msg) == SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS)
+-		ret = 0;
+-	sshbuf_free(msg);
+-	return (ret);
++	struct helper *helper;
++
++	/*
++	 * ssh-agent deletes keys before calling this, so the helper entry
++	 * should be gone before we get here.
++	 */
++	debug3("%s: delete %s", __func__, name);
++	if ((helper = helper_by_provider(name)) != NULL)
++		helper_terminate(helper);
++	return 0;
+ }
+-
+ #endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
+--
+2.41.0

meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-03.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,171 @@
+From 2f1be98e83feb90665b9292eff8bb734537fd491 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed, 19 Jul 2023 14:02:27 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 03/12] upstream: Ensure FIDO/PKCS11 libraries contain expected
+ symbols
+
+This checks via nlist(3) that candidate provider libraries contain one
+of the symbols that we will require prior to dlopen(), which can cause
+a number of side effects, including execution of constructors.
+
+Feedback deraadt; ok markus
+
+OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1508a5fbd74e329e69a55b56c453c292029aefbe
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/29ef8a04866ca14688d5b7fed7b8b9deab851f77]
+CVE: CVE-2023-38408
+Signed-off-by: Shubham Kulkarni <skulkarni@mvista.com>
+---
+ misc.c       | 77 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ misc.h       |  1 +
+ ssh-pkcs11.c |  4 +++
+ ssh-sk.c     |  6 ++--
+ 4 files changed, 86 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/misc.c b/misc.c
+index 3a31d5c..8a107e4 100644
+--- a/misc.c
++++ b/misc.c
+@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
+
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ #include <sys/ioctl.h>
++#include <sys/mman.h>
+ #include <sys/socket.h>
+ #include <sys/stat.h>
+ #include <sys/time.h>
+@@ -41,6 +42,9 @@
+ #ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
+ #include <poll.h>
+ #endif
++#ifdef HAVE_NLIST_H
++#include <nlist.h>
++#endif
+ #include <signal.h>
+ #include <stdarg.h>
+ #include <stdio.h>
+@@ -2266,3 +2270,76 @@ ssh_signal(int signum, sshsig_t handler)
+	}
+	return osa.sa_handler;
+ }
++
++
++/*
++ * Returns zero if the library at 'path' contains symbol 's', nonzero
++ * otherwise.
++ */
++int
++lib_contains_symbol(const char *path, const char *s)
++{
++#ifdef HAVE_NLIST_H
++	struct nlist nl[2];
++	int ret = -1, r;
++
++	memset(nl, 0, sizeof(nl));
++	nl[0].n_name = xstrdup(s);
++	nl[1].n_name = NULL;
++	if ((r = nlist(path, nl)) == -1) {
++		error("%s: nlist failed for %s", __func__, path);
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (r != 0 || nl[0].n_value == 0 || nl[0].n_type == 0) {
++		error("%s: library %s does not contain symbol %s", __func__, path, s);
++		goto out;
++	}
++	/* success */
++	ret = 0;
++ out:
++	free(nl[0].n_name);
++	return ret;
++#else /* HAVE_NLIST_H */
++	int fd, ret = -1;
++	struct stat st;
++	void *m = NULL;
++	size_t sz = 0;
++
++	memset(&st, 0, sizeof(st));
++	if ((fd = open(path, O_RDONLY)) < 0) {
++		error("%s: open %s: %s", __func__, path, strerror(errno));
++		return -1;
++	}
++	if (fstat(fd, &st) != 0) {
++		error("%s: fstat %s: %s", __func__, path, strerror(errno));
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
++		error("%s: %s is not a regular file", __func__, path);
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (st.st_size < 0 ||
++	    (size_t)st.st_size < strlen(s) ||
++	    st.st_size >= INT_MAX/2) {
++		error("%s: %s bad size %lld", __func__, path, (long long)st.st_size);
++		goto out;
++	}
++	sz = (size_t)st.st_size;
++	if ((m = mmap(NULL, sz, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0)) == MAP_FAILED ||
++	    m == NULL) {
++		error("%s: mmap %s: %s", __func__, path, strerror(errno));
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (memmem(m, sz, s, strlen(s)) == NULL) {
++		error("%s: %s does not contain expected string %s", __func__, path, s);
++		goto out;
++	}
++	/* success */
++	ret = 0;
++ out:
++	if (m != NULL && m != MAP_FAILED)
++		munmap(m, sz);
++	close(fd);
++	return ret;
++#endif /* HAVE_NLIST_H */
++}
+diff --git a/misc.h b/misc.h
+index 4a05db2..3f9f4db 100644
+--- a/misc.h
++++ b/misc.h
+@@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ const char *atoi_err(const char *, int *);
+ int	 parse_absolute_time(const char *, uint64_t *);
+ void	 format_absolute_time(uint64_t, char *, size_t);
+ int	 path_absolute(const char *);
++int	 lib_contains_symbol(const char *, const char *);
+
+ void	 sock_set_v6only(int);
+
+diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11.c b/ssh-pkcs11.c
+index b56a41b..639a6f7 100644
+--- a/ssh-pkcs11.c
++++ b/ssh-pkcs11.c
+@@ -1499,6 +1499,10 @@ pkcs11_register_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin,
+		    __func__, provider_id);
+		goto fail;
+	}
++	if (lib_contains_symbol(provider_id, "C_GetFunctionList") != 0) {
++		error("provider %s is not a PKCS11 library", provider_id);
++		goto fail;
++	}
+	/* open shared pkcs11-library */
+	if ((handle = dlopen(provider_id, RTLD_NOW)) == NULL) {
+		error("dlopen %s failed: %s", provider_id, dlerror());
+diff --git a/ssh-sk.c b/ssh-sk.c
+index 5ff9381..9df12cc 100644
+--- a/ssh-sk.c
++++ b/ssh-sk.c
+@@ -119,10 +119,12 @@ sshsk_open(const char *path)
+ #endif
+		return ret;
+	}
+-	if ((ret->dlhandle = dlopen(path, RTLD_NOW)) == NULL) {
+-		error("Provider \"%s\" dlopen failed: %s", path, dlerror());
++	if (lib_contains_symbol(path, "sk_api_version") != 0) {
++		error("provider %s is not an OpenSSH FIDO library", path);
+		goto fail;
+	}
++	if ((ret->dlhandle = dlopen(path, RTLD_NOW)) == NULL)
++		fatal("Provider \"%s\" dlopen failed: %s", path, dlerror());
+	if ((ret->sk_api_version = dlsym(ret->dlhandle,
+	    "sk_api_version")) == NULL) {
+		error("Provider \"%s\" dlsym(sk_api_version) failed: %s",
+--
+2.41.0

meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-04.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+From 0862f338941bfdfb2cadee87de6d5fdca1b8f457 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed, 19 Jul 2023 13:55:53 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 04/12] upstream: terminate process if requested to load a
+ PKCS#11 provider that isn't a PKCS#11 provider; from / ok markus@
+
+OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 39532cf18b115881bb4cfaee32084497aadfa05c
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/892506b13654301f69f9545f48213fc210e5c5cc]
+CVE: CVE-2023-38408
+Signed-off-by: Shubham Kulkarni <skulkarni@mvista.com>
+---
+ ssh-pkcs11.c | 6 ++----
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11.c b/ssh-pkcs11.c
+index 639a6f7..7530acc 100644
+--- a/ssh-pkcs11.c
++++ b/ssh-pkcs11.c
+@@ -1508,10 +1508,8 @@ pkcs11_register_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin,
+		error("dlopen %s failed: %s", provider_id, dlerror());
+		goto fail;
+	}
+-	if ((getfunctionlist = dlsym(handle, "C_GetFunctionList")) == NULL) {
+-		error("dlsym(C_GetFunctionList) failed: %s", dlerror());
+-		goto fail;
+-	}
++	if ((getfunctionlist = dlsym(handle, "C_GetFunctionList")) == NULL)
++		fatal("dlsym(C_GetFunctionList) failed: %s", dlerror());
+	p = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*p));
+	p->name = xstrdup(provider_id);
+	p->handle = handle;
+--
+2.41.0

meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-05.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
+From a6cee3905edf070c0de135d3f2ee5b74da1dbd28 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue, 26 May 2020 01:26:58 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 05/12] upstream: Restrict ssh-agent from signing web
+ challenges for FIDO
+
+keys.
+
+When signing messages in ssh-agent using a FIDO key that has an
+application string that does not start with "ssh:", ensure that the
+message being signed is one of the forms expected for the SSH protocol
+(currently pubkey authentication and sshsig signatures).
+
+This prevents ssh-agent forwarding on a host that has FIDO keys
+attached granting the ability for the remote side to sign challenges
+for web authentication using those keys too.
+
+Note that the converse case of web browsers signing SSH challenges is
+already precluded because no web RP can have the "ssh:" prefix in the
+application string that we require.
+
+ok markus@
+
+OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9ab6012574ed0352d2f097d307f4a988222d1b19
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/0c111eb84efba7c2a38b2cc3278901a0123161b9]
+CVE: CVE-2023-38408
+Signed-off-by: Shubham Kulkarni <skulkarni@mvista.com>
+---
+ ssh-agent.c | 110 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 100 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c
+index ceb348c..1794f35 100644
+--- a/ssh-agent.c
++++ b/ssh-agent.c
+@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
+-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.255 2020/02/06 22:30:54 naddy Exp $ */
++/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.258 2020/05/26 01:26:58 djm Exp $ */
+ /*
+  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@
+
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+ #include "ssh.h"
++#include "ssh2.h"
+ #include "sshbuf.h"
+ #include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "authfd.h"
+@@ -167,6 +168,9 @@ static long lifetime = 0;
+
+ static int fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT;
+
++/* Refuse signing of non-SSH messages for web-origin FIDO keys */
++static int restrict_websafe = 1;
++
+ static void
+ close_socket(SocketEntry *e)
+ {
+@@ -282,6 +286,80 @@ agent_decode_alg(struct sshkey *key, u_int flags)
+	return NULL;
+ }
+
++/*
++ * This function inspects a message to be signed by a FIDO key that has a
++ * web-like application string (i.e. one that does not begin with "ssh:".
++ * It checks that the message is one of those expected for SSH operations
++ * (pubkey userauth, sshsig, CA key signing) to exclude signing challenges
++ * for the web.
++ */
++static int
++check_websafe_message_contents(struct sshkey *key,
++    const u_char *msg, size_t len)
++{
++	int matched = 0;
++	struct sshbuf *b;
++	u_char m, n;
++	char *cp1 = NULL, *cp2 = NULL;
++	int r;
++	struct sshkey *mkey = NULL;
++
++	if ((b = sshbuf_from(msg, len)) == NULL)
++		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
++
++	/* SSH userauth request */
++	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL)) == 0 && /* sess_id */
++	    (r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &m)) == 0 && /* SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST */
++	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, NULL, NULL)) == 0 && /* server user */
++	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp1, NULL)) == 0 && /* service */
++	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp2, NULL)) == 0 && /* method */
++	    (r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &n)) == 0 && /* sig-follows */
++	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, NULL, NULL)) == 0 && /* alg */
++	    (r = sshkey_froms(b, &mkey)) == 0 && /* key */
++	    sshbuf_len(b) == 0) {
++		debug("%s: parsed userauth", __func__);
++		if (m == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST && n == 1 &&
++		    strcmp(cp1, "ssh-connection") == 0 &&
++		    strcmp(cp2, "publickey") == 0 &&
++		    sshkey_equal(key, mkey)) {
++			debug("%s: well formed userauth", __func__);
++			matched = 1;
++		}
++	}
++	free(cp1);
++	free(cp2);
++	sshkey_free(mkey);
++	sshbuf_free(b);
++	if (matched)
++		return 1;
++
++	if ((b = sshbuf_from(msg, len)) == NULL)
++		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
++	cp1 = cp2 = NULL;
++	mkey = NULL;
++
++	/* SSHSIG */
++	if ((r = sshbuf_cmp(b, 0, "SSHSIG", 6)) == 0 &&
++	    (r = sshbuf_consume(b, 6)) == 0 &&
++	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, NULL, NULL)) == 0 && /* namespace */
++	    (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL)) == 0 && /* reserved */
++	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, NULL, NULL)) == 0 && /* hashalg */
++	    (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL)) == 0 && /* H(msg) */
++	    sshbuf_len(b) == 0) {
++		debug("%s: parsed sshsig", __func__);
++		matched = 1;
++	}
++
++	sshbuf_free(b);
++	if (matched)
++		return 1;
++
++	/* XXX CA signature operation */
++
++	error("web-origin key attempting to sign non-SSH message");
++	return 0;
++}
++
+ /* ssh2 only */
+ static void
+ process_sign_request2(SocketEntry *e)
+@@ -314,14 +392,20 @@ process_sign_request2(SocketEntry *e)
+		verbose("%s: user refused key", __func__);
+		goto send;
+	}
+-	if (sshkey_is_sk(id->key) &&
+-	    (id->key->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD)) {
+-		if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT,
+-		    SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+-			fatal("%s: fingerprint failed", __func__);
+-		notifier = notify_start(0,
+-		    "Confirm user presence for key %s %s",
+-		    sshkey_type(id->key), fp);
++	if (sshkey_is_sk(id->key)) {
++		if (strncmp(id->key->sk_application, "ssh:", 4) != 0 &&
++		    !check_websafe_message_contents(key, data, dlen)) {
++			/* error already logged */
++			goto send;
++		}
++		if ((id->key->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD)) {
++			if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT,
++			    SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
++				fatal("%s: fingerprint failed", __func__);
++			notifier = notify_start(0,
++			    "Confirm user presence for key %s %s",
++			    sshkey_type(id->key), fp);
++		}
+	}
+	if ((r = sshkey_sign(id->key, &signature, &slen,
+	    data, dlen, agent_decode_alg(key, flags),
+@@ -1214,7 +1298,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+	__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
+	seed_rng();
+
+-	while ((ch = getopt(ac, av, "cDdksE:a:P:t:")) != -1) {
++	while ((ch = getopt(ac, av, "cDdksE:a:O:P:t:")) != -1) {
+		switch (ch) {
+		case 'E':
+			fingerprint_hash = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(optarg);
+@@ -1229,6 +1313,12 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+		case 'k':
+			k_flag++;
+			break;
++		case 'O':
++			if (strcmp(optarg, "no-restrict-websafe") == 0)
++				restrict_websafe  = 0;
++			else
++				fatal("Unknown -O option");
++			break;
+		case 'P':
+			if (provider_whitelist != NULL)
+				fatal("-P option already specified");
+--
+2.41.0

meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-06.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+From a5d845b7b42861d18f43e83de9f24c7374d1b458 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri, 18 Sep 2020 08:16:38 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 06/12] upstream: handle multiple messages in a single read()
+
+PR#183 by Dennis Kaarsemaker; feedback and ok markus@
+
+OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8570bb4d02d00cf70b98590716ea6a7d1cce68d1
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/52a03e9fca2d74eef953ddd4709250f365ca3975]
+CVE: CVE-2023-38408
+Signed-off-by: Shubham Kulkarni <skulkarni@mvista.com>
+---
+ ssh-agent.c | 19 +++++++++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c
+index 1794f35..78f7268 100644
+--- a/ssh-agent.c
++++ b/ssh-agent.c
+@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
+-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.258 2020/05/26 01:26:58 djm Exp $ */
++/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.264 2020/09/18 08:16:38 djm Exp $ */
+ /*
+  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+@@ -853,8 +853,10 @@ send:
+ }
+ #endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
+
+-/* dispatch incoming messages */
+-
++/*
++ * dispatch incoming message.
++ * returns 1 on success, 0 for incomplete messages or -1 on error.
++ */
+ static int
+ process_message(u_int socknum)
+ {
+@@ -908,7 +910,7 @@ process_message(u_int socknum)
+			/* send a fail message for all other request types */
+			send_status(e, 0);
+		}
+-		return 0;
++		return 1;
+	}
+
+	switch (type) {
+@@ -952,7 +954,7 @@ process_message(u_int socknum)
+		send_status(e, 0);
+		break;
+	}
+-	return 0;
++	return 1;
+ }
+
+ static void
+@@ -1043,7 +1045,12 @@ handle_conn_read(u_int socknum)
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put(sockets[socknum].input, buf, len)) != 0)
+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+	explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
+-	process_message(socknum);
++	for (;;) {
++		if ((r = process_message(socknum)) == -1)
++			return -1;
++		else if (r == 0)
++			break;
++	}
+	return 0;
+ }
+
+--
+2.41.0

meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-07.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+From 653cc18c922fc387b3d3aa1b081c5e5283cce28a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue, 26 Jan 2021 00:47:47 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 07/12] upstream: use recallocarray to allocate the agent
+ sockets table;
+
+also clear socket entries that are being marked as unused.
+
+spinkle in some debug2() spam to make it easier to watch an agent
+do its thing.
+
+ok markus
+
+OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 74582c8e82e96afea46f6c7b6813a429cbc75922
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/1fe16fd61bb53944ec510882acc0491abd66ff76]
+CVE: CVE-2023-38408
+Signed-off-by: Shubham Kulkarni <skulkarni@mvista.com>
+---
+ ssh-agent.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c
+index 78f7268..2635bc5 100644
+--- a/ssh-agent.c
++++ b/ssh-agent.c
+@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
+-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.264 2020/09/18 08:16:38 djm Exp $ */
++/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.269 2021/01/26 00:47:47 djm Exp $ */
+ /*
+  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+@@ -175,11 +175,12 @@ static void
+ close_socket(SocketEntry *e)
+ {
+	close(e->fd);
+-	e->fd = -1;
+-	e->type = AUTH_UNUSED;
+	sshbuf_free(e->input);
+	sshbuf_free(e->output);
+	sshbuf_free(e->request);
++	memset(e, '\0', sizeof(*e));
++	e->fd = -1;
++	e->type = AUTH_UNUSED;
+ }
+
+ static void
+@@ -249,6 +250,8 @@ process_request_identities(SocketEntry *e)
+	struct sshbuf *msg;
+	int r;
+
++	debug2("%s: entering", __func__);
++
+	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER)) != 0 ||
+@@ -441,6 +444,7 @@ process_remove_identity(SocketEntry *e)
+	struct sshkey *key = NULL;
+	Identity *id;
+
++	debug2("%s: entering", __func__);
+	if ((r = sshkey_froms(e->request, &key)) != 0) {
+		error("%s: get key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+		goto done;
+@@ -467,6 +471,7 @@ process_remove_all_identities(SocketEntry *e)
+ {
+	Identity *id;
+
++	debug2("%s: entering", __func__);
+	/* Loop over all identities and clear the keys. */
+	for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&idtab->idlist); id;
+	    id = TAILQ_FIRST(&idtab->idlist)) {
+@@ -520,6 +525,7 @@ process_add_identity(SocketEntry *e)
+	u_char ctype;
+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
++	debug2("%s: entering", __func__);
+	if ((r = sshkey_private_deserialize(e->request, &k)) != 0 ||
+	    k == NULL ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &comment, NULL)) != 0) {
+@@ -667,6 +673,7 @@ process_lock_agent(SocketEntry *e, int lock)
+	static u_int fail_count = 0;
+	size_t pwlen;
+
++	debug2("%s: entering", __func__);
+	/*
+	 * This is deliberately fatal: the user has requested that we lock,
+	 * but we can't parse their request properly. The only safe thing to
+@@ -738,6 +745,7 @@ process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
+	struct sshkey **keys = NULL, *k;
+	Identity *id;
+
++	debug2("%s: entering", __func__);
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &provider, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &pin, NULL)) != 0) {
+		error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+@@ -818,6 +826,7 @@ process_remove_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
+	int r, success = 0;
+	Identity *id, *nxt;
+
++	debug2("%s: entering", __func__);
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &provider, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &pin, NULL)) != 0) {
+		error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+@@ -962,6 +971,8 @@ new_socket(sock_type type, int fd)
+ {
+	u_int i, old_alloc, new_alloc;
+
++	debug("%s: type = %s", __func__, type == AUTH_CONNECTION ? "CONNECTION" :
++	    (type == AUTH_SOCKET ? "SOCKET" : "UNKNOWN"));
+	set_nonblock(fd);
+
+	if (fd > max_fd)
+@@ -981,7 +992,8 @@ new_socket(sock_type type, int fd)
+		}
+	old_alloc = sockets_alloc;
+	new_alloc = sockets_alloc + 10;
+-	sockets = xreallocarray(sockets, new_alloc, sizeof(sockets[0]));
++	sockets = xrecallocarray(sockets, old_alloc, new_alloc,
++	    sizeof(sockets[0]));
+	for (i = old_alloc; i < new_alloc; i++)
+		sockets[i].type = AUTH_UNUSED;
+	sockets_alloc = new_alloc;
+--
+2.41.0

meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-08.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,315 @@
+From c30158ea225cf8ad67c3dcc88fa9e4afbf8959a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue, 26 Jan 2021 00:53:31 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 08/12] upstream: more ssh-agent refactoring
+
+Allow confirm_key() to accept an additional reason suffix
+
+Factor publickey userauth parsing out into its own function and allow
+it to optionally return things it parsed out of the message to its
+caller.
+
+feedback/ok markus@
+
+OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 29006515617d1aa2d8b85cd2bf667e849146477e
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/e0e8bee8024fa9e31974244d14f03d799e5c0775]
+CVE: CVE-2023-38408
+Signed-off-by: Shubham Kulkarni <skulkarni@mvista.com>
+---
+ ssh-agent.c | 197 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
+ 1 file changed, 130 insertions(+), 67 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c
+index 2635bc5..7ad323c 100644
+--- a/ssh-agent.c
++++ b/ssh-agent.c
+@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
+-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.269 2021/01/26 00:47:47 djm Exp $ */
++/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.270 2021/01/26 00:53:31 djm Exp $ */
+ /*
+  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+@@ -216,15 +216,16 @@ lookup_identity(struct sshkey *key)
+
+ /* Check confirmation of keysign request */
+ static int
+-confirm_key(Identity *id)
++confirm_key(Identity *id, const char *extra)
+ {
+	char *p;
+	int ret = -1;
+
+	p = sshkey_fingerprint(id->key, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
+	if (p != NULL &&
+-	    ask_permission("Allow use of key %s?\nKey fingerprint %s.",
+-	    id->comment, p))
++	    ask_permission("Allow use of key %s?\nKey fingerprint %s.%s%s",
++	    id->comment, p,
++	    extra == NULL ? "" : "\n", extra == NULL ? "" : extra))
+		ret = 0;
+	free(p);
+
+@@ -290,74 +291,133 @@ agent_decode_alg(struct sshkey *key, u_int flags)
+ }
+
+ /*
+- * This function inspects a message to be signed by a FIDO key that has a
+- * web-like application string (i.e. one that does not begin with "ssh:".
+- * It checks that the message is one of those expected for SSH operations
+- * (pubkey userauth, sshsig, CA key signing) to exclude signing challenges
+- * for the web.
++ * Attempt to parse the contents of a buffer as a SSH publickey userauth
++ * request, checking its contents for consistency and matching the embedded
++ * key against the one that is being used for signing.
++ * Note: does not modify msg buffer.
++ * Optionally extract the username and session ID from the request.
+  */
+ static int
+-check_websafe_message_contents(struct sshkey *key,
+-    const u_char *msg, size_t len)
++parse_userauth_request(struct sshbuf *msg, const struct sshkey *expected_key,
++    char **userp, struct sshbuf **sess_idp)
+ {
+-	int matched = 0;
+-	struct sshbuf *b;
+-	u_char m, n;
+-	char *cp1 = NULL, *cp2 = NULL;
++	struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *sess_id = NULL;
++	char *user = NULL, *service = NULL, *method = NULL, *pkalg = NULL;
+	int r;
++	u_char t, sig_follows;
+	struct sshkey *mkey = NULL;
+
+-	if ((b = sshbuf_from(msg, len)) == NULL)
+-		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
++	if (userp != NULL)
++		*userp = NULL;
++	if (sess_idp != NULL)
++		*sess_idp = NULL;
++	if ((b = sshbuf_fromb(msg)) == NULL)
++		fatal("%s: sshbuf_fromb", __func__);
+
+	/* SSH userauth request */
+-	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL)) == 0 && /* sess_id */
+-	    (r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &m)) == 0 && /* SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST */
+-	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, NULL, NULL)) == 0 && /* server user */
+-	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp1, NULL)) == 0 && /* service */
+-	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp2, NULL)) == 0 && /* method */
+-	    (r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &n)) == 0 && /* sig-follows */
+-	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, NULL, NULL)) == 0 && /* alg */
+-	    (r = sshkey_froms(b, &mkey)) == 0 && /* key */
+-	    sshbuf_len(b) == 0) {
+-		debug("%s: parsed userauth", __func__);
+-		if (m == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST && n == 1 &&
+-		    strcmp(cp1, "ssh-connection") == 0 &&
+-		    strcmp(cp2, "publickey") == 0 &&
+-		    sshkey_equal(key, mkey)) {
+-			debug("%s: well formed userauth", __func__);
+-			matched = 1;
+-		}
++	if ((r = sshbuf_froms(b, &sess_id)) != 0)
++		goto out;
++	if (sshbuf_len(sess_id) == 0) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
++		goto out;
+	}
+-	free(cp1);
+-	free(cp2);
+-	sshkey_free(mkey);
++	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &t)) != 0 || /* SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST */
++	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &user, NULL)) != 0 || /* server user */
++	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &service, NULL)) != 0 || /* service */
++	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &method, NULL)) != 0 || /* method */
++	    (r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &sig_follows)) != 0 || /* sig-follows */
++	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &pkalg, NULL)) != 0 || /* alg */
++	    (r = sshkey_froms(b, &mkey)) != 0) /* key */
++		goto out;
++	if (t != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST ||
++	    sig_follows != 1 ||
++	    strcmp(service, "ssh-connection") != 0 ||
++	    !sshkey_equal(expected_key, mkey) ||
++	    sshkey_type_from_name(pkalg) != expected_key->type) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (strcmp(method, "publickey") != 0) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	/* success */
++	r = 0;
++	debug("%s: well formed userauth", __func__);
++	if (userp != NULL) {
++		*userp = user;
++		user = NULL;
++	}
++	if (sess_idp != NULL) {
++		*sess_idp = sess_id;
++		sess_id = NULL;
++	}
++ out:
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+-	if (matched)
+-		return 1;
++	sshbuf_free(sess_id);
++	free(user);
++	free(service);
++	free(method);
++	free(pkalg);
++	sshkey_free(mkey);
++	return r;
++}
+
+-	if ((b = sshbuf_from(msg, len)) == NULL)
+-		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
+-	cp1 = cp2 = NULL;
+-	mkey = NULL;
+-
+-	/* SSHSIG */
+-	if ((r = sshbuf_cmp(b, 0, "SSHSIG", 6)) == 0 &&
+-	    (r = sshbuf_consume(b, 6)) == 0 &&
+-	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, NULL, NULL)) == 0 && /* namespace */
+-	    (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL)) == 0 && /* reserved */
+-	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, NULL, NULL)) == 0 && /* hashalg */
+-	    (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL)) == 0 && /* H(msg) */
+-	    sshbuf_len(b) == 0) {
+-		debug("%s: parsed sshsig", __func__);
+-		matched = 1;
+-	}
++/*
++ * Attempt to parse the contents of a buffer as a SSHSIG signature request.
++ * Note: does not modify buffer.
++ */
++static int
++parse_sshsig_request(struct sshbuf *msg)
++{
++	int r;
++	struct sshbuf *b;
+
++	if ((b = sshbuf_fromb(msg)) == NULL)
++		fatal("%s: sshbuf_fromb", __func__);
++
++	if ((r = sshbuf_cmp(b, 0, "SSHSIG", 6)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshbuf_consume(b, 6)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || /* namespace */
++	    (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || /* reserved */
++	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || /* hashalg */
++	    (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL)) != 0) /* H(msg) */
++		goto out;
++	if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	/* success */
++	r = 0;
++ out:
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+-	if (matched)
++	return r;
++}
++
++/*
++ * This function inspects a message to be signed by a FIDO key that has a
++ * web-like application string (i.e. one that does not begin with "ssh:".
++ * It checks that the message is one of those expected for SSH operations
++ * (pubkey userauth, sshsig, CA key signing) to exclude signing challenges
++ * for the web.
++ */
++static int
++check_websafe_message_contents(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *data)
++{
++	if (parse_userauth_request(data, key, NULL, NULL) == 0) {
++		debug("%s: signed data matches public key userauth request", __func__);
+		return 1;
++	}
++	if (parse_sshsig_request(data) == 0) {
++		debug("%s: signed data matches SSHSIG signature request", __func__);
++		return 1;
++	}
+
+-	/* XXX CA signature operation */
++	/* XXX check CA signature operation */
+
+	error("web-origin key attempting to sign non-SSH message");
+	return 0;
+@@ -367,21 +427,22 @@ check_websafe_message_contents(struct sshkey *key,
+ static void
+ process_sign_request2(SocketEntry *e)
+ {
+-	const u_char *data;
+	u_char *signature = NULL;
+-	size_t dlen, slen = 0;
++	size_t i, slen = 0;
+	u_int compat = 0, flags;
+	int r, ok = -1;
+	char *fp = NULL;
+-	struct sshbuf *msg;
++	struct sshbuf *msg = NULL, *data = NULL;
+	struct sshkey *key = NULL;
+	struct identity *id;
+	struct notifier_ctx *notifier = NULL;
+
+-	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
++	debug("%s: entering", __func__);
++
++	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL | (data = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+	if ((r = sshkey_froms(e->request, &key)) != 0 ||
+-	    (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(e->request, &data, &dlen)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(e->request, data)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(e->request, &flags)) != 0) {
+		error("%s: couldn't parse request: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+		goto send;
+@@ -391,13 +452,13 @@ process_sign_request2(SocketEntry *e)
+		verbose("%s: %s key not found", __func__, sshkey_type(key));
+		goto send;
+	}
+-	if (id->confirm && confirm_key(id) != 0) {
++	if (id->confirm && confirm_key(id, NULL) != 0) {
+		verbose("%s: user refused key", __func__);
+		goto send;
+	}
+	if (sshkey_is_sk(id->key)) {
+		if (strncmp(id->key->sk_application, "ssh:", 4) != 0 &&
+-		    !check_websafe_message_contents(key, data, dlen)) {
++		    !check_websafe_message_contents(key, data)) {
+			/* error already logged */
+			goto send;
+		}
+@@ -411,7 +472,7 @@ process_sign_request2(SocketEntry *e)
+		}
+	}
+	if ((r = sshkey_sign(id->key, &signature, &slen,
+-	    data, dlen, agent_decode_alg(key, flags),
++	    sshbuf_ptr(data), sshbuf_len(data), agent_decode_alg(key, flags),
+	    id->sk_provider, compat)) != 0) {
+		error("%s: sshkey_sign: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+		goto send;
+@@ -420,8 +481,7 @@ process_sign_request2(SocketEntry *e)
+	ok = 0;
+  send:
+	notify_complete(notifier);
+-	sshkey_free(key);
+-	free(fp);
++
+	if (ok == 0) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, signature, slen)) != 0)
+@@ -432,7 +492,10 @@ process_sign_request2(SocketEntry *e)
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(e->output, msg)) != 0)
+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
++	sshbuf_free(data);
+	sshbuf_free(msg);
++	sshkey_free(key);
++	free(fp);
+	free(signature);
+ }
+
+--
+2.41.0

meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-09.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+From 7adba46611e5d076d7d12d9f4162dd4cabd5ff50 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri, 29 Jan 2021 06:28:10 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 09/12] upstream: give typedef'd struct a struct name; makes
+ the fuzzer I'm
+
+writing a bit easier
+
+OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1052ab521505a4d8384d67acb3974ef81b8896cb
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/8afaa7d7918419d3da6c0477b83db2159879cb33]
+CVE: CVE-2023-38408
+Signed-off-by: Shubham Kulkarni <skulkarni@mvista.com>
+---
+ ssh-agent.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c
+index 7ad323c..c99927c 100644
+--- a/ssh-agent.c
++++ b/ssh-agent.c
+@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
+-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.270 2021/01/26 00:53:31 djm Exp $ */
++/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.274 2021/01/29 06:28:10 djm Exp $ */
+ /*
+  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ typedef enum {
+	AUTH_CONNECTION
+ } sock_type;
+
+-typedef struct {
++typedef struct socket_entry {
+	int fd;
+	sock_type type;
+	struct sshbuf *input;
+--
+2.41.0

meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-10.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+From 343e2a2c0ef754a7a86118016b248f7a73f8d510 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri, 29 Jan 2021 06:29:46 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 10/12] upstream: fix the values of enum sock_type
+
+OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 18d048f4dbfbb159ff500cfc2700b8fb1407facd
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/1a4b92758690faa12f49079dd3b72567f909466d]
+CVE: CVE-2023-38408
+Signed-off-by: Shubham Kulkarni <skulkarni@mvista.com>
+---
+ ssh-agent.c | 8 ++++----
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c
+index c99927c..7f1e14b 100644
+--- a/ssh-agent.c
++++ b/ssh-agent.c
+@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
+-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.274 2021/01/29 06:28:10 djm Exp $ */
++/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.275 2021/01/29 06:29:46 djm Exp $ */
+ /*
+  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+@@ -103,9 +103,9 @@
+ #define AGENT_RBUF_LEN	(4096)
+
+ typedef enum {
+-	AUTH_UNUSED,
+-	AUTH_SOCKET,
+-	AUTH_CONNECTION
++	AUTH_UNUSED = 0,
++	AUTH_SOCKET = 1,
++	AUTH_CONNECTION = 2,
+ } sock_type;
+
+ typedef struct socket_entry {
+--
+2.41.0

meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-11.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,307 @@
+From 2b3b369c8cf71f9ef5942a5e074e6f86e7ca1e0c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun, 19 Dec 2021 22:09:23 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 11/12] upstream: ssh-agent side of binding
+
+record session ID/hostkey/forwarding status for each active socket.
+
+Attempt to parse data-to-be-signed at signature request time and extract
+session ID from the blob if it is a pubkey userauth request.
+
+ok markus@
+
+OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a80fd41e292b18b67508362129e9fed549abd318
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/4c1e3ce85e183a9d0c955c88589fed18e4d6a058]
+CVE: CVE-2023-38408
+Signed-off-by: Shubham Kulkarni <skulkarni@mvista.com>
+---
+ authfd.h    |   3 +
+ ssh-agent.c | 175 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
+ 2 files changed, 170 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/authfd.h b/authfd.h
+index c3bf625..9cc9807 100644
+--- a/authfd.h
++++ b/authfd.h
+@@ -76,6 +76,9 @@ int	ssh_agent_sign(int sock, const struct sshkey *key,
+ #define SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED		25
+ #define SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED 26
+
++/* generic extension mechanism */
++#define SSH_AGENTC_EXTENSION			27
++
+ #define	SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME		1
+ #define	SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM		2
+ #define	SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_MAXSIGN		3
+diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c
+index 7f1e14b..01c7f2b 100644
+--- a/ssh-agent.c
++++ b/ssh-agent.c
+@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
+-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.275 2021/01/29 06:29:46 djm Exp $ */
++/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.280 2021/12/19 22:09:23 djm Exp $ */
+ /*
+  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+@@ -98,9 +98,15 @@
+ #endif
+
+ /* Maximum accepted message length */
+-#define AGENT_MAX_LEN	(256*1024)
++#define AGENT_MAX_LEN		(256*1024)
+ /* Maximum bytes to read from client socket */
+-#define AGENT_RBUF_LEN	(4096)
++#define AGENT_RBUF_LEN		(4096)
++/* Maximum number of recorded session IDs/hostkeys per connection */
++#define AGENT_MAX_SESSION_IDS		16
++/* Maximum size of session ID */
++#define AGENT_MAX_SID_LEN		128
++
++/* XXX store hostkey_sid in a refcounted tree */
+
+ typedef enum {
+	AUTH_UNUSED = 0,
+@@ -108,12 +114,20 @@ typedef enum {
+	AUTH_CONNECTION = 2,
+ } sock_type;
+
++struct hostkey_sid {
++	struct sshkey *key;
++	struct sshbuf *sid;
++	int forwarded;
++};
++
+ typedef struct socket_entry {
+	int fd;
+	sock_type type;
+	struct sshbuf *input;
+	struct sshbuf *output;
+	struct sshbuf *request;
++	size_t nsession_ids;
++	struct hostkey_sid *session_ids;
+ } SocketEntry;
+
+ u_int sockets_alloc = 0;
+@@ -174,10 +188,17 @@ static int restrict_websafe = 1;
+ static void
+ close_socket(SocketEntry *e)
+ {
++	size_t i;
++
+	close(e->fd);
+	sshbuf_free(e->input);
+	sshbuf_free(e->output);
+	sshbuf_free(e->request);
++	for (i = 0; i < e->nsession_ids; i++) {
++		sshkey_free(e->session_ids[i].key);
++		sshbuf_free(e->session_ids[i].sid);
++	}
++	free(e->session_ids);
+	memset(e, '\0', sizeof(*e));
+	e->fd = -1;
+	e->type = AUTH_UNUSED;
+@@ -423,6 +444,18 @@ check_websafe_message_contents(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *data)
+	return 0;
+ }
+
++static int
++buf_equal(const struct sshbuf *a, const struct sshbuf *b)
++{
++	if (sshbuf_ptr(a) == NULL || sshbuf_ptr(b) == NULL)
++		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++	if (sshbuf_len(a) != sshbuf_len(b))
++		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
++	if (timingsafe_bcmp(sshbuf_ptr(a), sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(a)) != 0)
++		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
++	return 0;
++}
++
+ /* ssh2 only */
+ static void
+ process_sign_request2(SocketEntry *e)
+@@ -431,8 +464,8 @@ process_sign_request2(SocketEntry *e)
+	size_t i, slen = 0;
+	u_int compat = 0, flags;
+	int r, ok = -1;
+-	char *fp = NULL;
+-	struct sshbuf *msg = NULL, *data = NULL;
++	char *fp = NULL, *user = NULL, *sig_dest = NULL;
++	struct sshbuf *msg = NULL, *data = NULL, *sid = NULL;
+	struct sshkey *key = NULL;
+	struct identity *id;
+	struct notifier_ctx *notifier = NULL;
+@@ -452,7 +485,33 @@ process_sign_request2(SocketEntry *e)
+		verbose("%s: %s key not found", __func__, sshkey_type(key));
+		goto send;
+	}
+-	if (id->confirm && confirm_key(id, NULL) != 0) {
++	/*
++	 * If session IDs were recorded for this socket, then use them to
++	 * annotate the confirmation messages with the host keys.
++	 */
++	if (e->nsession_ids > 0 &&
++	    parse_userauth_request(data, key, &user, &sid) == 0) {
++		/*
++		 * session ID from userauth request should match the final
++		 * ID in the list recorded in the socket, unless the ssh
++		 * client at that point lacks the binding extension (or if
++		 * an attacker is trying to steal use of the agent).
++		 */
++		i = e->nsession_ids - 1;
++		if (buf_equal(sid, e->session_ids[i].sid) == 0) {
++			if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(e->session_ids[i].key,
++			    SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
++				fatal("%s: fingerprint failed", __func__);
++			debug3("%s: destination %s %s (slot %zu)", __func__,
++			    sshkey_type(e->session_ids[i].key), fp, i);
++			xasprintf(&sig_dest, "public key request for "
++			    "target user \"%s\" to %s %s", user,
++			    sshkey_type(e->session_ids[i].key), fp);
++			free(fp);
++			fp = NULL;
++		}
++	}//
++	if (id->confirm && confirm_key(id, sig_dest) != 0) {
+		verbose("%s: user refused key", __func__);
+		goto send;
+	}
+@@ -467,8 +526,10 @@ process_sign_request2(SocketEntry *e)
+			    SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+				fatal("%s: fingerprint failed", __func__);
+			notifier = notify_start(0,
+-			    "Confirm user presence for key %s %s",
+-			    sshkey_type(id->key), fp);
++			    "Confirm user presence for key %s %s%s%s",
++			    sshkey_type(id->key), fp,
++			    sig_dest == NULL ? "" : "\n",
++			    sig_dest == NULL ? "" : sig_dest);
+		}
+	}
+	if ((r = sshkey_sign(id->key, &signature, &slen,
+@@ -492,11 +553,14 @@ process_sign_request2(SocketEntry *e)
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(e->output, msg)) != 0)
+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
++	sshbuf_free(sid);
+	sshbuf_free(data);
+	sshbuf_free(msg);
+	sshkey_free(key);
+	free(fp);
+	free(signature);
++	free(sig_dest);
++	free(user);
+ }
+
+ /* shared */
+@@ -925,6 +989,98 @@ send:
+ }
+ #endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
+
++static int
++process_ext_session_bind(SocketEntry *e)
++{
++	int r, sid_match, key_match;
++	struct sshkey *key = NULL;
++	struct sshbuf *sid = NULL, *sig = NULL;
++	char *fp = NULL;
++	u_char fwd;
++	size_t i;
++
++	debug2("%s: entering", __func__);
++	if ((r = sshkey_froms(e->request, &key)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshbuf_froms(e->request, &sid)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshbuf_froms(e->request, &sig)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshbuf_get_u8(e->request, &fwd)) != 0) {
++		error("%s: parse: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT,
++	    SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
++		fatal("%s: fingerprint failed", __func__);
++	/* check signature with hostkey on session ID */
++	if ((r = sshkey_verify(key, sshbuf_ptr(sig), sshbuf_len(sig),
++	    sshbuf_ptr(sid), sshbuf_len(sid), NULL, 0, NULL)) != 0) {
++		error("%s: sshkey_verify for %s %s: %s", __func__, sshkey_type(key), fp, ssh_err(r));
++		goto out;
++	}
++	/* check whether sid/key already recorded */
++	for (i = 0; i < e->nsession_ids; i++) {
++		sid_match = buf_equal(sid, e->session_ids[i].sid) == 0;
++		key_match = sshkey_equal(key, e->session_ids[i].key);
++		if (sid_match && key_match) {
++			debug("%s: session ID already recorded for %s %s", __func__,
++			    sshkey_type(key), fp);
++			r = 0;
++			goto out;
++		} else if (sid_match) {
++			error("%s: session ID recorded against different key "
++			    "for %s %s", __func__, sshkey_type(key), fp);
++			r = -1;
++			goto out;
++		}
++		/*
++		 * new sid with previously-seen key can happen, e.g. multiple
++		 * connections to the same host.
++		 */
++	}
++	/* record new key/sid */
++	if (e->nsession_ids >= AGENT_MAX_SESSION_IDS) {
++		error("%s: too many session IDs recorded", __func__);
++		goto out;
++	}
++	e->session_ids = xrecallocarray(e->session_ids, e->nsession_ids,
++	    e->nsession_ids + 1, sizeof(*e->session_ids));
++	i = e->nsession_ids++;
++	debug("%s: recorded %s %s (slot %zu of %d)", __func__, sshkey_type(key), fp, i,
++	    AGENT_MAX_SESSION_IDS);
++	e->session_ids[i].key = key;
++	e->session_ids[i].forwarded = fwd != 0;
++	key = NULL; /* transferred */
++	/* can't transfer sid; it's refcounted and scoped to request's life */
++	if ((e->session_ids[i].sid = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
++		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
++	if ((r = sshbuf_putb(e->session_ids[i].sid, sid)) != 0)
++		fatal("%s: sshbuf_putb session ID: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++	/* success */
++	r = 0;
++ out:
++	sshkey_free(key);
++	sshbuf_free(sid);
++	sshbuf_free(sig);
++	return r == 0 ? 1 : 0;
++}
++
++static void
++process_extension(SocketEntry *e)
++{
++	int r, success = 0;
++	char *name;
++
++	debug2("%s: entering", __func__);
++	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &name, NULL)) != 0) {
++		error("%s: parse: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++		goto send;
++	}
++	if (strcmp(name, "session-bind@openssh.com") == 0)
++		success = process_ext_session_bind(e);
++	else
++		debug("%s: unsupported extension \"%s\"", __func__, name);
++send:
++	send_status(e, success);
++}
+ /*
+  * dispatch incoming message.
+  * returns 1 on success, 0 for incomplete messages or -1 on error.
+@@ -1019,6 +1175,9 @@ process_message(u_int socknum)
+		process_remove_smartcard_key(e);
+		break;
+ #endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
++	case SSH_AGENTC_EXTENSION:
++		process_extension(e);
++		break;
+	default:
+		/* Unknown message.  Respond with failure. */
+		error("Unknown message %d", type);
+--
+2.41.0

meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-12.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+From 4fe3d0fbd3d6dc1f19354e0d73a3231c461ed044 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed, 19 Jul 2023 13:56:33 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 12/12] upstream: Disallow remote addition of FIDO/PKCS11
+ provider libraries to ssh-agent by default.
+
+The old behaviour of allowing remote clients from loading providers
+can be restored using `ssh-agent -O allow-remote-pkcs11`.
+
+Detection of local/remote clients requires a ssh(1) that supports
+the `session-bind@openssh.com` extension. Forwarding access to a
+ssh-agent socket using non-OpenSSH tools may circumvent this control.
+
+ok markus@
+
+OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4c2bdf79b214ae7e60cc8c39a45501344fa7bd7c
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/1f2731f5d7a8f8a8385c6031667ed29072c0d92a]
+CVE: CVE-2023-38408
+Signed-off-by: Shubham Kulkarni <skulkarni@mvista.com>
+---
+ ssh-agent.1 | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
+ ssh-agent.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--
+ 2 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssh-agent.1 b/ssh-agent.1
+index fff0db6..a0f1e21 100644
+--- a/ssh-agent.1
++++ b/ssh-agent.1
+@@ -97,6 +97,26 @@ The default is
+ Kill the current agent (given by the
+ .Ev SSH_AGENT_PID
+ environment variable).
++Currently two options are supported:
++.Cm allow-remote-pkcs11
++and
++.Pp
++The
++.Cm allow-remote-pkcs11
++option allows clients of a forwarded
++.Nm
++to load PKCS#11 or FIDO provider libraries.
++By default only local clients may perform this operation.
++Note that signalling that a
++.Nm
++client remote is performed by
++.Xr ssh 1 ,
++and use of other tools to forward access to the agent socket may circumvent
++this restriction.
++.Pp
++The
++.Cm no-restrict-websafe ,
++instructs
+ .It Fl P Ar provider_whitelist
+ Specify a pattern-list of acceptable paths for PKCS#11 and FIDO authenticator
+ shared libraries that may be used with the
+diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c
+index 01c7f2b..40c1b6b 100644
+--- a/ssh-agent.c
++++ b/ssh-agent.c
+@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
+-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.280 2021/12/19 22:09:23 djm Exp $ */
++/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.300 2023/07/19 13:56:33 djm Exp $ */
+ /*
+  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+@@ -167,6 +167,12 @@ char socket_dir[PATH_MAX];
+ /* PKCS#11/Security key path whitelist */
+ static char *provider_whitelist;
+
++/*
++ * Allows PKCS11 providers or SK keys that use non-internal providers to
++ * be added over a remote connection (identified by session-bind@openssh.com).
++ */
++static int remote_add_provider;
++
+ /* locking */
+ #define LOCK_SIZE	32
+ #define LOCK_SALT_SIZE	16
+@@ -736,6 +742,15 @@ process_add_identity(SocketEntry *e)
+		if (strcasecmp(sk_provider, "internal") == 0) {
+			debug("%s: internal provider", __func__);
+		} else {
++			if (e->nsession_ids != 0 && !remote_add_provider) {
++				verbose("failed add of SK provider \"%.100s\": "
++				    "remote addition of providers is disabled",
++				    sk_provider);
++				free(sk_provider);
++				free(comment);
++				sshkey_free(k);
++				goto send;
++			}
+			if (realpath(sk_provider, canonical_provider) == NULL) {
+				verbose("failed provider \"%.100s\": "
+				    "realpath: %s", sk_provider,
+@@ -901,6 +916,11 @@ process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
+			goto send;
+		}
+	}
++	if (e->nsession_ids != 0 && !remote_add_provider) {
++		verbose("failed PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": remote addition of "
++		    "providers is disabled", provider);
++		goto send;
++	}
+	if (realpath(provider, canonical_provider) == NULL) {
+		verbose("failed PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": realpath: %s",
+		    provider, strerror(errno));
+@@ -1556,7 +1576,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+			break;
+		case 'O':
+			if (strcmp(optarg, "no-restrict-websafe") == 0)
+-				restrict_websafe  = 0;
++				restrict_websafe = 0;
++			else if (strcmp(optarg, "allow-remote-pkcs11") == 0)
++				remote_add_provider = 1;
+			else
+				fatal("Unknown -O option");
+			break;
+--
+2.41.0

meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_8.2p1.bb

@@ -27,6 +27,18 @@ SRC_URI = "http://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-${PV}.tar
            file://CVE-2020-14145.patch \
            file://CVE-2021-28041.patch \
            file://CVE-2021-41617.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-38408-01.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-38408-02.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-38408-03.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-38408-04.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-38408-05.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-38408-06.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-38408-07.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-38408-08.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-38408-09.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-38408-10.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-38408-11.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-38408-12.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "3076e6413e8dbe56d33848c1054ac091"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "43925151e6cf6cee1450190c0e9af4dc36b41c12737619edff8bcebdff64e671"

meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/0001-Configure-do-not-tweak-mips-cflags.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+From 326909baf81a638d51fa8be1d8227518784f5cc4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alexander Kanavin <alex@linutronix.de>
+Date: Tue, 14 Sep 2021 12:18:25 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Configure: do not tweak mips cflags
+
+This conflicts with mips machine definitons from yocto,
+e.g.
+| Error: -mips3 conflicts with the other architecture options, which imply -mips64r2
+
+Upstream-Status: Inappropriate [oe-core specific]
+Signed-off-by: Alexander Kanavin <alex@linutronix.de>
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
+---
+ Configure | 10 ----------
+ 1 file changed, 10 deletions(-)
+
+Index: openssl-3.0.4/Configure
+===================================================================
+--- openssl-3.0.4.orig/Configure
++++ openssl-3.0.4/Configure
+@@ -1243,16 +1243,6 @@ if ($target =~ /^mingw/ && `$config{CC} --target-help 2>&1` =~ m/-mno-cygwin/m)
+         push @{$config{shared_ldflag}}, "-mno-cygwin";
+         }
+ 
+-if ($target =~ /linux.*-mips/ && !$disabled{asm}
+-        && !grep { $_ =~ /-m(ips|arch=)/ } (@{$config{CFLAGS}})) {
+-        # minimally required architecture flags for assembly modules
+-        my $value;
+-        $value = '-mips2' if ($target =~ /mips32/);
+-        $value = '-mips3' if ($target =~ /mips64/);
+-        unshift @{$config{cflags}}, $value;
+-        unshift @{$config{cxxflags}}, $value if $config{CXX};
+-}
+-
+ # If threads aren't disabled, check how possible they are
+ unless ($disabled{threads}) {
+     if ($auto_threads) {

meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-0464.patch

@@ -1,226 +0,0 @@
-From 879f7080d7e141f415c79eaa3a8ac4a3dad0348b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Pauli <pauli@openssl.org>
-Date: Wed, 8 Mar 2023 15:28:20 +1100
-Subject: [PATCH] x509: excessive resource use verifying policy constraints
-
-A security vulnerability has been identified in all supported versions
-of OpenSSL related to the verification of X.509 certificate chains
-that include policy constraints.  Attackers may be able to exploit this
-vulnerability by creating a malicious certificate chain that triggers
-exponential use of computational resources, leading to a denial-of-service
-(DoS) attack on affected systems.
-
-Fixes CVE-2023-0464
-
-Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
-Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
-(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20569)
-
-CVE: CVE-2023-0464
-Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=patch;h=879f7080d7e141f415c79eaa3a8ac4a3dad0348b]
-Signed-off-by: Nikhil R <nikhil.r@kpit.com>
-
----
- crypto/x509v3/pcy_local.h |  8 +++++++-
- crypto/x509v3/pcy_node.c  | 12 +++++++++---
- crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c  | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
- 3 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/pcy_local.h b/crypto/x509v3/pcy_local.h
-index 5daf78de45..344aa06765 100644
---- a/crypto/x509v3/pcy_local.h
-+++ b/crypto/x509v3/pcy_local.h
-@@ -111,6 +111,11 @@ struct X509_POLICY_LEVEL_st {
- };
- 
- struct X509_POLICY_TREE_st {
-+    /* The number of nodes in the tree */
-+    size_t node_count;
-+    /* The maximum number of nodes in the tree */
-+    size_t node_maximum;
-+
-     /* This is the tree 'level' data */
-     X509_POLICY_LEVEL *levels;
-     int nlevel;
-@@ -159,7 +164,8 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *tree_find_sk(STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *sk,
- X509_POLICY_NODE *level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
-                                  X509_POLICY_DATA *data,
-                                  X509_POLICY_NODE *parent,
--                                 X509_POLICY_TREE *tree);
-+                                 X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
-+                                 int extra_data);
- void policy_node_free(X509_POLICY_NODE *node);
- int policy_node_match(const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *lvl,
-                       const X509_POLICY_NODE *node, const ASN1_OBJECT *oid);
-diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/pcy_node.c b/crypto/x509v3/pcy_node.c
-index e2d7b15322..d574fb9d66 100644
---- a/crypto/x509v3/pcy_node.c
-+++ b/crypto/x509v3/pcy_node.c
-@@ -59,10 +59,15 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *level_find_node(const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
- X509_POLICY_NODE *level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
-                                  X509_POLICY_DATA *data,
-                                  X509_POLICY_NODE *parent,
--                                 X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
-+                                 X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
-+                                 int extra_data)
- {
-     X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
- 
-+    /* Verify that the tree isn't too large.  This mitigates CVE-2023-0464 */
-+    if (tree->node_maximum > 0 && tree->node_count >= tree->node_maximum)
-+        return NULL;
-+
-     node = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*node));
-     if (node == NULL) {
-         X509V3err(X509V3_F_LEVEL_ADD_NODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-@@ -70,7 +75,7 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
-     }
-     node->data = data;
-     node->parent = parent;
--    if (level) {
-+    if (level != NULL) {
-         if (OBJ_obj2nid(data->valid_policy) == NID_any_policy) {
-             if (level->anyPolicy)
-                 goto node_error;
-@@ -90,7 +95,7 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
-         }
-     }
- 
--    if (tree) {
-+    if (extra_data) {
-         if (tree->extra_data == NULL)
-             tree->extra_data = sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_new_null();
-         if (tree->extra_data == NULL){
-@@ -103,6 +108,7 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
-         }
-     }
- 
-+    tree->node_count++;
-     if (parent)
-         parent->nchild++;
- 
-diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c b/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c
-index 6e8322cbc5..6c7fd35405 100644
---- a/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c
-+++ b/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c
-@@ -13,6 +13,18 @@
- 
- #include "pcy_local.h"
- 
-+/*
-+ * If the maximum number of nodes in the policy tree isn't defined, set it to
-+ * a generous default of 1000 nodes.
-+ *
-+ * Defining this to be zero means unlimited policy tree growth which opens the
-+ * door on CVE-2023-0464.
-+ */
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_POLICY_TREE_NODES_MAX
-+# define OPENSSL_POLICY_TREE_NODES_MAX 1000
-+#endif
-+
- /*
-  * Enable this to print out the complete policy tree at various point during
-  * evaluation.
-@@ -168,6 +180,9 @@ static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
-         return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL;
-     }
- 
-+    /* Limit the growth of the tree to mitigate CVE-2023-0464 */
-+    tree->node_maximum = OPENSSL_POLICY_TREE_NODES_MAX;
-+
-     /*
-      * http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-6.1.2, figure 3.
-      *
-@@ -184,7 +199,7 @@ static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
-     level = tree->levels;
-     if ((data = policy_data_new(NULL, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_any_policy), 0)) == NULL)
-         goto bad_tree;
--    if (level_add_node(level, data, NULL, tree) == NULL) {
-+    if (level_add_node(level, data, NULL, tree, 1) == NULL) {
-         policy_data_free(data);
-         goto bad_tree;
-     }
-@@ -243,7 +258,8 @@ static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
-  * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise
-  */
- static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
--                                    X509_POLICY_DATA *data)
-+                                    X509_POLICY_DATA *data,
-+                                    X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
- {
-     X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1;
-     int i, matched = 0;
-@@ -253,13 +269,13 @@ static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
-         X509_POLICY_NODE *node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(last->nodes, i);
- 
-         if (policy_node_match(last, node, data->valid_policy)) {
--            if (level_add_node(curr, data, node, NULL) == NULL)
-+            if (level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree, 0) == NULL)
-                 return 0;
-             matched = 1;
-         }
-     }
-     if (!matched && last->anyPolicy) {
--        if (level_add_node(curr, data, last->anyPolicy, NULL) == NULL)
-+        if (level_add_node(curr, data, last->anyPolicy, tree, 0) == NULL)
-             return 0;
-     }
-     return 1;
-@@ -272,7 +288,8 @@ static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
-  * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
-  */
- static int tree_link_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
--                           const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache)
-+                           const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache,
-+                           X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
- {
-     int i;
- 
-@@ -280,7 +297,7 @@ static int tree_link_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
-         X509_POLICY_DATA *data = sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_value(cache->data, i);
- 
-         /* Look for matching nodes in previous level */
--        if (!tree_link_matching_nodes(curr, data))
-+        if (!tree_link_matching_nodes(curr, data, tree))
-             return 0;
-     }
-     return 1;
-@@ -311,7 +328,7 @@ static int tree_add_unmatched(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
-     /* Curr may not have anyPolicy */
-     data->qualifier_set = cache->anyPolicy->qualifier_set;
-     data->flags |= POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS;
--    if (level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree) == NULL) {
-+    if (level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree, 1) == NULL) {
-         policy_data_free(data);
-         return 0;
-     }
-@@ -373,7 +390,7 @@ static int tree_link_any(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
-     }
-     /* Finally add link to anyPolicy */
-     if (last->anyPolicy &&
--        level_add_node(curr, cache->anyPolicy, last->anyPolicy, NULL) == NULL)
-+        level_add_node(curr, cache->anyPolicy, last->anyPolicy, tree, 0) == NULL)
-         return 0;
-     return 1;
- }
-@@ -555,7 +572,7 @@ static int tree_calculate_user_set(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
-             extra->qualifier_set = anyPolicy->data->qualifier_set;
-             extra->flags = POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS
-                 | POLICY_DATA_FLAG_EXTRA_NODE;
--            node = level_add_node(NULL, extra, anyPolicy->parent, tree);
-+            node = level_add_node(NULL, extra, anyPolicy->parent, tree, 1);
-         }
-         if (!tree->user_policies) {
-             tree->user_policies = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_new_null();
-@@ -582,7 +599,7 @@ static int tree_evaluate(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
- 
-     for (i = 1; i < tree->nlevel; i++, curr++) {
-         cache = policy_cache_set(curr->cert);
--        if (!tree_link_nodes(curr, cache))
-+        if (!tree_link_nodes(curr, cache, tree))
-             return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL;
- 
-         if (!(curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY)
--- 
-2.34.1

meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-0465.patch

@@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
-From b013765abfa80036dc779dd0e50602c57bb3bf95 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
-Date: Tue, 7 Mar 2023 16:52:55 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] Ensure that EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY is checked even in leaf
- certs
-
-Even though we check the leaf cert to confirm it is valid, we
-later ignored the invalid flag and did not notice that the leaf
-cert was bad.
-
-Fixes: CVE-2023-0465
-
-Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
-Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
-(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20588)
-
-CVE: CVE-2023-0465
-Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commitdiff;h=b013765abfa80036dc779dd0e50602c57bb3bf95]
-Comment: Refreshed first hunk
-Signed-off-by: Omkar Patil <omkar.patil@kpit.com>
-
----
- crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c | 11 +++++++++--
- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
-index 925fbb5412..1dfe4f9f31 100644
---- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
-+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
-@@ -1649,18 +1649,25 @@
-     }
-     /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
-     if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_INVALID) {
--        int i;
-+        int i, cbcalled = 0;
- 
-         /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback. */
--        for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
-+        for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
-             X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
- 
-             if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
-                 continue;
-+            cbcalled = 1;
-             if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i,
-                                 X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION))
-                 return 0;
-         }
-+        if (!cbcalled) {
-+            /* Should not be able to get here */
-+            X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-+            return 0;
-+        }
-+        /* The callback ignored the error so we return success */
-         return 1;
-     }
-     if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE) {
--- 
-2.34.1
-

meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-0466.patch

@@ -1,82 +0,0 @@
-From 0d16b7e99aafc0b4a6d729eec65a411a7e025f0a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
-Date: Tue, 21 Mar 2023 16:15:47 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Fix documentation of X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy()
-
-The function was incorrectly documented as enabling policy checking.
-
-Fixes: CVE-2023-0466
-
-Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
-Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
-(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20564)
-
-CVE: CVE-2023-0466
-Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commitdiff;h=0d16b7e99aafc0b4a6d729eec65a411a7e025f0a]
-Comment: Refreshed first hunk from CHANGE and NEWS
-Signed-off-by: Omkar Patil <omkar.patil@kpit.com>
-
----
- CHANGES                                  | 5 +++++
- NEWS                                     | 1 +
- doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod | 9 +++++++--
- 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
-index efccf7838e..b19f1429bb 100644
---- a/CHANGES
-+++ b/CHANGES
-@@ -9,6 +9,11 @@
- 
-  Changes between 1.1.1s and 1.1.1t [7 Feb 2023]
- 
-+  *) Corrected documentation of X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() to mention
-+     that it does not enable policy checking. Thanks to
-+     David Benjamin for discovering this issue. (CVE-2023-0466)
-+     [Tomas Mraz]
-+
-   *) Fixed X.400 address type confusion in X.509 GeneralName.
- 
-      There is a type confusion vulnerability relating to X.400 address processing
-diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS
-index 36a9bb6890..62615693fa 100644
---- a/NEWS
-+++ b/NEWS
-@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
- 
-   Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.1s and OpenSSL 1.1.1t [7 Feb 2023]
- 
-+      o Fixed documentation of X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() (CVE-2023-0466)
-       o Fixed X.400 address type confusion in X.509 GeneralName (CVE-2023-0286)
-       o Fixed Use-after-free following BIO_new_NDEF (CVE-2023-0215)
-       o Fixed Double free after calling PEM_read_bio_ex (CVE-2022-4450)
-diff --git a/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod b/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod
-index f6f304bf7b..aa292f9336 100644
---- a/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod
-+++ b/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod
-@@ -92,8 +92,9 @@ B<trust>.
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time() sets the verification time in B<param> to
- B<t>. Normally the current time is used.
- 
--X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() enables policy checking (it is disabled
--by default) and adds B<policy> to the acceptable policy set.
-+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() adds B<policy> to the acceptable policy set.
-+Contrary to preexisting documentation of this function it does not enable
-+policy checking.
- 
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies() enables policy checking (it is disabled
- by default) and sets the acceptable policy set to B<policies>. Any existing
-@@ -377,6 +378,10 @@ and has no effect.
- 
- The X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_hostflags() function was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0i.
- 
-+The function X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() was historically documented as
-+enabling policy checking however the implementation has never done this.
-+The documentation was changed to align with the implementation.
-+
- =head1 COPYRIGHT
- 
- Copyright 2009-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
--- 
-2.34.1
-

meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-2650.patch

@@ -1,122 +0,0 @@
-From 9e209944b35cf82368071f160a744b6178f9b098 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
-Date: Fri, 12 May 2023 10:00:13 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] Restrict the size of OBJECT IDENTIFIERs that OBJ_obj2txt will
- translate
-
-OBJ_obj2txt() would translate any size OBJECT IDENTIFIER to canonical
-numeric text form.  For gigantic sub-identifiers, this would take a very
-long time, the time complexity being O(n^2) where n is the size of that
-sub-identifier.
-
-To mitigate this, a restriction on the size that OBJ_obj2txt() will
-translate to canonical numeric text form is added, based on RFC 2578
-(STD 58), which says this:
-
-> 3.5. OBJECT IDENTIFIER values
->
-> An OBJECT IDENTIFIER value is an ordered list of non-negative numbers.
-> For the SMIv2, each number in the list is referred to as a sub-identifier,
-> there are at most 128 sub-identifiers in a value, and each sub-identifier
-> has a maximum value of 2^32-1 (4294967295 decimal).
-
-Fixes otc/security#96
-Fixes CVE-2023-2650
-
-Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
-Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/9e209944b35cf82368071f160a744b6178f9b098]
-CVE: CVE-2023-2650
-Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
----
- CHANGES                  | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
- NEWS                     |  2 ++
- crypto/objects/obj_dat.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
- 3 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
-index 1eaaf4e..f2cf38f 100644
---- a/CHANGES
-+++ b/CHANGES
-@@ -7,7 +7,33 @@
-  https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commits/ and pick the appropriate
-  release branch.
- 
-- Changes between 1.1.1s and 1.1.1t [7 Feb 2023]
-+ Changes between 1.1.1t and 1.1.1u [xx XXX xxxx]
-+
-+  *) Mitigate for the time it takes for `OBJ_obj2txt` to translate gigantic
-+     OBJECT IDENTIFIER sub-identifiers to canonical numeric text form.
-+
-+     OBJ_obj2txt() would translate any size OBJECT IDENTIFIER to canonical
-+     numeric text form.  For gigantic sub-identifiers, this would take a very
-+     long time, the time complexity being O(n^2) where n is the size of that
-+     sub-identifier.  (CVE-2023-2650)
-+
-+     To mitigitate this, `OBJ_obj2txt()` will only translate an OBJECT
-+     IDENTIFIER to canonical numeric text form if the size of that OBJECT
-+     IDENTIFIER is 586 bytes or less, and fail otherwise.
-+
-+     The basis for this restriction is RFC 2578 (STD 58), section 3.5. OBJECT
-+     IDENTIFIER values, which stipulates that OBJECT IDENTIFIERS may have at
-+     most 128 sub-identifiers, and that the maximum value that each sub-
-+     identifier may have is 2^32-1 (4294967295 decimal).
-+
-+     For each byte of every sub-identifier, only the 7 lower bits are part of
-+     the value, so the maximum amount of bytes that an OBJECT IDENTIFIER with
-+     these restrictions may occupy is 32 * 128 / 7, which is approximately 586
-+     bytes.
-+
-+     Ref: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2578#section-3.5
-+
-+Changes between 1.1.1s and 1.1.1t [7 Feb 2023]
- 
-   *) Corrected documentation of X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() to mention
-      that it does not enable policy checking. Thanks to
-diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS
-index a86220a..41922c4 100644
---- a/NEWS
-+++ b/NEWS
-@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@
- 
-   Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.1s and OpenSSL 1.1.1t [7 Feb 2023]
- 
-+      o Mitigate for very slow `OBJ_obj2txt()` performance with gigantic
-+        OBJECT IDENTIFIER sub-identities.  (CVE-2023-2650)
-       o Fixed documentation of X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() (CVE-2023-0466)
-       o Fixed X.400 address type confusion in X.509 GeneralName (CVE-2023-0286)
-       o Fixed Use-after-free following BIO_new_NDEF (CVE-2023-0215)
-diff --git a/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c b/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c
-index 7e8de72..d699915 100644
---- a/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c
-+++ b/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c
-@@ -428,6 +428,25 @@ int OBJ_obj2txt(char *buf, int buf_len, const ASN1_OBJECT *a, int no_name)
-     first = 1;
-     bl = NULL;
- 
-+    /*
-+     * RFC 2578 (STD 58) says this about OBJECT IDENTIFIERs:
-+     *
-+     * > 3.5. OBJECT IDENTIFIER values
-+     * >
-+     * > An OBJECT IDENTIFIER value is an ordered list of non-negative
-+     * > numbers. For the SMIv2, each number in the list is referred to as a
-+     * > sub-identifier, there are at most 128 sub-identifiers in a value,
-+     * > and each sub-identifier has a maximum value of 2^32-1 (4294967295
-+     * > decimal).
-+     *
-+     * So a legitimate OID according to this RFC is at most (32 * 128 / 7),
-+     * i.e. 586 bytes long.
-+     *
-+     * Ref: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2578#section-3.5
-+     */
-+    if (len > 586)
-+        goto err;
-+
-     while (len > 0) {
-         l = 0;
-         use_bn = 0;
--- 
-2.25.1
-

meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.1.1v.bb

@@ -19,17 +19,14 @@ SRC_URI = "http://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://reproducible.patch \
            file://reproducibility.patch \
            file://0001-Configure-add-2-missing-key-sorts.patch \
-           file://CVE-2023-0464.patch \
-           file://CVE-2023-0465.patch \
-           file://CVE-2023-0466.patch \
-           file://CVE-2023-2650.patch \
+           file://0001-Configure-do-not-tweak-mips-cflags.patch \
            "
 
 SRC_URI_append_class-nativesdk = " \
            file://environment.d-openssl.sh \
            "
 
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "8dee9b24bdb1dcbf0c3d1e9b02fb8f6bf22165e807f45adeb7c9677536859d3b"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "d6697e2871e77238460402e9362d47d18382b15ef9f246aba6c7bd780d38a6b0"
 
 inherit lib_package multilib_header multilib_script ptest
 MULTILIB_SCRIPTS = "${PN}-bin:${bindir}/c_rehash"

meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc/check-test-wrapper

@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ elif targettype == "ssh":
     user = os.environ.get("SSH_HOST_USER", None)
     port = os.environ.get("SSH_HOST_PORT", None)
 
-    command = ["ssh", "-o", "UserKnownHostsFile=/dev/null", "-o", "StrictHostKeyChecking=no"]
+    command = ["ssh", "-o", "UserKnownHostsFile=/dev/null", "-o", "StrictHostKeyChecking=no", "-o", "LogLevel=quiet"]
     if port:
         command += ["-p", str(port)]
     if not host:

meta/recipes-core/images/build-appliance-image_15.0.0.bb

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ IMAGE_FSTYPES = "wic.vmdk"
 
 inherit core-image setuptools3
 
-SRCREV ?= "88bec50206d02fef3cdc3eaabb638963144eb63b"
+SRCREV ?= "6d6d43248e003895aa02103b2d239238e97d6167"
 SRC_URI = "git://git.yoctoproject.org/poky;branch=dunfell \
            file://Yocto_Build_Appliance.vmx \
            file://Yocto_Build_Appliance.vmxf \

meta/recipes-core/meta/cve-update-nvd2-native.bb

@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ def nvd_request_next(url, api_key, args):
 
             if (r.headers['content-encoding'] == 'gzip'):
                 buf = r.read()
-                raw_data = gzip.decompress(buf)
+                raw_data = gzip.decompress(buf).decode("utf-8")
             else:
                 raw_data = r.read().decode("utf-8")
 

meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd-systemctl/systemctl

@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ class SystemdUnit():
         try:
             for dependent in config.get('Install', prop):
                 # expand any %i to instance (ignoring escape sequence %%)
-                dependent = re.sub("([^%](%%)*)%i", "\\1{}".format(instance), dependent)
+                dependent = re.sub("([^%](%%)*)%i", "\\g<1>{}".format(instance), dependent)
                 wants = systemdir / "{}.{}".format(dependent, dirstem) / service
                 add_link(wants, target)
 

meta/recipes-devtools/dmidecode/dmidecode/CVE-2023-30630-dependent_p1.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,236 @@
+From 24def311c6168d0dfb7c5f0f183b72b709c49265 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de>
+Date: Mon, 20 Feb 2023 14:53:21 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] dmidecode: Split table fetching from decoding
+
+Clean up function dmi_table so that it does only one thing:
+* dmi_table() is renamed to dmi_table_get(). It now retrieves the
+  DMI table, but does not process it any longer.
+* Decoding or dumping the table is now done in smbios3_decode(),
+  smbios_decode() and legacy_decode().
+No functional change.
+
+A side effect of this change is that writing the header and body of
+dump files is now done in a single location. This is required to
+further consolidate the writing of dump files.
+
+CVE-ID: CVE-2023-30630
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.nongnu.org/cgit/dmidecode.git/commit/?id=39b2dd7b6ab7]
+
+Backport Changes:
+- In the file dmidecode.c, the commit [dd593d2] in v3.3 introduces
+  pr_info(). This is backported to printf() as per v3.2.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de>
+Reviewed-by: Jerry Hoemann <jerry.hoemann@hpe.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 39b2dd7b6ab719b920e96ed832cfb4bdd664e808)
+Signed-off-by: Dhairya Nagodra <dnagodra@cisco.com>
+---
+ dmidecode.c | 86 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
+ 1 file changed, 62 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/dmidecode.c b/dmidecode.c
+index a3e9d6c..d6eedd1 100644
+--- a/dmidecode.c
++++ b/dmidecode.c
+@@ -5211,8 +5211,9 @@ static void dmi_table_decode(u8 *buf, u32 len, u16 num, u16 ver, u32 flags)
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
+-static void dmi_table(off_t base, u32 len, u16 num, u32 ver, const char *devmem,
+-		      u32 flags)
++/* Allocates a buffer for the table, must be freed by the caller */
++static u8 *dmi_table_get(off_t base, u32 *len, u16 num, u32 ver,
++			 const char *devmem, u32 flags)
+ {
+ 	u8 *buf;
+ 
+@@ -5231,7 +5232,7 @@ static void dmi_table(off_t base, u32 len, u16 num, u32 ver, const char *devmem,
+ 		{
+ 			if (num)
+ 				printf("%u structures occupying %u bytes.\n",
+-				       num, len);
++				       num, *len);
+ 			if (!(opt.flags & FLAG_FROM_DUMP))
+ 				printf("Table at 0x%08llX.\n",
+ 				       (unsigned long long)base);
+@@ -5249,19 +5250,19 @@ static void dmi_table(off_t base, u32 len, u16 num, u32 ver, const char *devmem,
+ 		 * would be the result of the kernel truncating the table on
+ 		 * parse error.
+ 		 */
+-		size_t size = len;
++		size_t size = *len;
+ 		buf = read_file(flags & FLAG_NO_FILE_OFFSET ? 0 : base,
+ 			&size, devmem);
+-		if (!(opt.flags & FLAG_QUIET) && num && size != (size_t)len)
++		if (!(opt.flags & FLAG_QUIET) && num && size != (size_t)*len)
+ 		{
+ 			fprintf(stderr, "Wrong DMI structures length: %u bytes "
+ 				"announced, only %lu bytes available.\n",
+-				len, (unsigned long)size);
++				*len, (unsigned long)size);
+ 		}
+-		len = size;
++		*len = size;
+ 	}
+ 	else
+-		buf = mem_chunk(base, len, devmem);
++		buf = mem_chunk(base, *len, devmem);
+ 
+ 	if (buf == NULL)
+ 	{
+@@ -5271,15 +5272,9 @@ static void dmi_table(off_t base, u32 len, u16 num, u32 ver, const char *devmem,
+ 			fprintf(stderr,
+ 				"Try compiling dmidecode with -DUSE_MMAP.\n");
+ #endif
+-		return;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if (opt.flags & FLAG_DUMP_BIN)
+-		dmi_table_dump(buf, len);
+-	else
+-		dmi_table_decode(buf, len, num, ver >> 8, flags);
+-
+-	free(buf);
++	return buf;
+ }
+ 
+ 
+@@ -5314,8 +5309,9 @@ static void overwrite_smbios3_address(u8 *buf)
+ 
+ static int smbios3_decode(u8 *buf, const char *devmem, u32 flags)
+ {
+-	u32 ver;
++	u32 ver, len;
+ 	u64 offset;
++	u8 *table;
+ 
+ 	/* Don't let checksum run beyond the buffer */
+ 	if (buf[0x06] > 0x20)
+@@ -5341,8 +5337,12 @@ static int smbios3_decode(u8 *buf, const char *devmem, u32 flags)
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	dmi_table(((off_t)offset.h << 32) | offset.l,
+-		  DWORD(buf + 0x0C), 0, ver, devmem, flags | FLAG_STOP_AT_EOT);
++	/* Maximum length, may get trimmed */
++	len = DWORD(buf + 0x0C);
++	table = dmi_table_get(((off_t)offset.h << 32) | offset.l, &len, 0, ver,
++			      devmem, flags | FLAG_STOP_AT_EOT);
++	if (table == NULL)
++		return 1;
+ 
+ 	if (opt.flags & FLAG_DUMP_BIN)
+ 	{
+@@ -5351,18 +5351,28 @@ static int smbios3_decode(u8 *buf, const char *devmem, u32 flags)
+ 		memcpy(crafted, buf, 32);
+ 		overwrite_smbios3_address(crafted);
+ 
++		dmi_table_dump(table, len);
+ 		if (!(opt.flags & FLAG_QUIET))
+ 			printf("# Writing %d bytes to %s.\n", crafted[0x06],
+ 			       opt.dumpfile);
+ 		write_dump(0, crafted[0x06], crafted, opt.dumpfile, 1);
+ 	}
++	else
++	{
++		dmi_table_decode(table, len, 0, ver >> 8,
++				 flags | FLAG_STOP_AT_EOT);
++	}
++
++	free(table);
+ 
+ 	return 1;
+ }
+ 
+ static int smbios_decode(u8 *buf, const char *devmem, u32 flags)
+ {
+-	u16 ver;
++	u16 ver, num;
++	u32 len;
++	u8 *table;
+ 
+ 	/* Don't let checksum run beyond the buffer */
+ 	if (buf[0x05] > 0x20)
+@@ -5402,8 +5412,13 @@ static int smbios_decode(u8 *buf, const char *devmem, u32 flags)
+ 		printf("SMBIOS %u.%u present.\n",
+ 			ver >> 8, ver & 0xFF);
+ 
+-	dmi_table(DWORD(buf + 0x18), WORD(buf + 0x16), WORD(buf + 0x1C),
+-		ver << 8, devmem, flags);
++	/* Maximum length, may get trimmed */
++	len = WORD(buf + 0x16);
++	num = WORD(buf + 0x1C);
++	table = dmi_table_get(DWORD(buf + 0x18), &len, num, ver << 8,
++			      devmem, flags);
++	if (table == NULL)
++		return 1;
+ 
+ 	if (opt.flags & FLAG_DUMP_BIN)
+ 	{
+@@ -5412,27 +5427,43 @@ static int smbios_decode(u8 *buf, const char *devmem, u32 flags)
+ 		memcpy(crafted, buf, 32);
+ 		overwrite_dmi_address(crafted + 0x10);
+ 
++		dmi_table_dump(table, len);
+ 		if (!(opt.flags & FLAG_QUIET))
+ 			printf("# Writing %d bytes to %s.\n", crafted[0x05],
+ 				opt.dumpfile);
+ 		write_dump(0, crafted[0x05], crafted, opt.dumpfile, 1);
+ 	}
++	else
++	{
++		dmi_table_decode(table, len, num, ver, flags);
++	}
++
++	free(table);
+ 
+ 	return 1;
+ }
+ 
+ static int legacy_decode(u8 *buf, const char *devmem, u32 flags)
+ {
++	u16 ver, num;
++	u32 len;
++	u8 *table;
++
+ 	if (!checksum(buf, 0x0F))
+ 		return 0;
+ 
++	ver = ((buf[0x0E] & 0xF0) << 4) + (buf[0x0E] & 0x0F);
+ 	if (!(opt.flags & FLAG_QUIET))
+ 		printf("Legacy DMI %u.%u present.\n",
+ 			buf[0x0E] >> 4, buf[0x0E] & 0x0F);
+ 
+-	dmi_table(DWORD(buf + 0x08), WORD(buf + 0x06), WORD(buf + 0x0C),
+-		((buf[0x0E] & 0xF0) << 12) + ((buf[0x0E] & 0x0F) << 8),
+-		devmem, flags);
++	/* Maximum length, may get trimmed */
++	len = WORD(buf + 0x06);
++	num = WORD(buf + 0x0C);
++	table = dmi_table_get(DWORD(buf + 0x08), &len, num, ver << 8,
++			      devmem, flags);
++	if (table == NULL)
++		return 1;
+ 
+ 	if (opt.flags & FLAG_DUMP_BIN)
+ 	{
+@@ -5441,11 +5472,18 @@ static int legacy_decode(u8 *buf, const char *devmem, u32 flags)
+ 		memcpy(crafted, buf, 16);
+ 		overwrite_dmi_address(crafted);
+ 
++		dmi_table_dump(table, len);
+ 		if (!(opt.flags & FLAG_QUIET))
+ 			printf("# Writing %d bytes to %s.\n", 0x0F,
+ 				opt.dumpfile);
+ 		write_dump(0, 0x0F, crafted, opt.dumpfile, 1);
+ 	}
++	else
++	{
++		dmi_table_decode(table, len, num, ver, flags);
++	}
++
++	free(table);
+ 
+ 	return 1;
+ }

meta/recipes-devtools/dmidecode/dmidecode/CVE-2023-30630-dependent_p2.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,198 @@
+From 58e8a07b1aef0e53af1642b30248255e53e42790 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de>
+Date: Mon, 20 Feb 2023 14:53:25 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] dmidecode: Write the whole dump file at once
+
+When option --dump-bin is used, write the whole dump file at once,
+instead of opening and closing the file separately for the table
+and then for the entry point.
+
+As the file writing function is no longer generic, it gets moved
+from util.c to dmidecode.c.
+
+One minor functional change resulting from the new implementation is
+that the entry point is written first now, so the messages printed
+are swapped.
+
+CVE: CVE-2023-30630
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.nongnu.org/cgit/dmidecode.git/commit/?id=d8cfbc808f38]
+
+Backport Changes:
+- In the file dmidecode.c, the commit [2241f1d] in v3.3 introduces
+  pr_info(). This is backported to printf() as per v3.2.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de>
+Reviewed-by: Jerry Hoemann <jerry.hoemann@hpe.com>
+(cherry picked from commit d8cfbc808f387e87091c25e7d5b8c2bb348bb206)
+Signed-off-by: Dhairya Nagodra <dnagodra@cisco.com>
+
+---
+ dmidecode.c | 69 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
+ util.c      | 40 -------------------------------
+ util.h      |  1 -
+ 3 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 59 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/dmidecode.c b/dmidecode.c
+index d6eedd1..b91e53b 100644
+--- a/dmidecode.c
++++ b/dmidecode.c
+@@ -5094,11 +5094,56 @@ static void dmi_table_string(const struct dmi_header *h, const u8 *data, u16 ver
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
+-static void dmi_table_dump(const u8 *buf, u32 len)
++static int dmi_table_dump(const u8 *ep, u32 ep_len, const u8 *table,
++			  u32 table_len)
+ {
++	FILE *f;
++
++	f = fopen(opt.dumpfile, "wb");
++	if (!f)
++	{
++		fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", opt.dumpfile);
++		perror("fopen");
++		return -1;
++	}
++
++	if (!(opt.flags & FLAG_QUIET))
++		printf("# Writing %d bytes to %s.\n", ep_len, opt.dumpfile);
++	if (fwrite(ep, ep_len, 1, f) != 1)
++	{
++		fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", opt.dumpfile);
++		perror("fwrite");
++		goto err_close;
++	}
++
++	if (fseek(f, 32, SEEK_SET) != 0)
++	{
++		fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", opt.dumpfile);
++		perror("fseek");
++		goto err_close;
++	}
++
+ 	if (!(opt.flags & FLAG_QUIET))
+-		printf("# Writing %d bytes to %s.\n", len, opt.dumpfile);
+-	write_dump(32, len, buf, opt.dumpfile, 0);
++		printf("# Writing %d bytes to %s.\n", table_len, opt.dumpfile);
++	if (fwrite(table, table_len, 1, f) != 1)
++	{
++		fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", opt.dumpfile);
++		perror("fwrite");
++		goto err_close;
++	}
++
++	if (fclose(f))
++	{
++		fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", opt.dumpfile);
++		perror("fclose");
++		return -1;
++	}
++
++	return 0;
++
++err_close:
++	fclose(f);
++	return -1;
+ }
+ 
+ static void dmi_table_decode(u8 *buf, u32 len, u16 num, u16 ver, u32 flags)
+@@ -5351,11 +5396,7 @@ static int smbios3_decode(u8 *buf, const char *devmem, u32 flags)
+ 		memcpy(crafted, buf, 32);
+ 		overwrite_smbios3_address(crafted);
+ 
+-		dmi_table_dump(table, len);
+-		if (!(opt.flags & FLAG_QUIET))
+-			printf("# Writing %d bytes to %s.\n", crafted[0x06],
+-			       opt.dumpfile);
+-		write_dump(0, crafted[0x06], crafted, opt.dumpfile, 1);
++		dmi_table_dump(crafted, crafted[0x06], table, len);
+ 	}
+ 	else
+ 	{
+@@ -5427,11 +5468,7 @@ static int smbios_decode(u8 *buf, const char *devmem, u32 flags)
+ 		memcpy(crafted, buf, 32);
+ 		overwrite_dmi_address(crafted + 0x10);
+ 
+-		dmi_table_dump(table, len);
+-		if (!(opt.flags & FLAG_QUIET))
+-			printf("# Writing %d bytes to %s.\n", crafted[0x05],
+-				opt.dumpfile);
+-		write_dump(0, crafted[0x05], crafted, opt.dumpfile, 1);
++		dmi_table_dump(crafted, crafted[0x05], table, len);
+ 	}
+ 	else
+ 	{
+@@ -5472,11 +5509,7 @@ static int legacy_decode(u8 *buf, const char *devmem, u32 flags)
+ 		memcpy(crafted, buf, 16);
+ 		overwrite_dmi_address(crafted);
+ 
+-		dmi_table_dump(table, len);
+-		if (!(opt.flags & FLAG_QUIET))
+-			printf("# Writing %d bytes to %s.\n", 0x0F,
+-				opt.dumpfile);
+-		write_dump(0, 0x0F, crafted, opt.dumpfile, 1);
++		dmi_table_dump(crafted, 0x0F, table, len);
+ 	}
+ 	else
+ 	{
+diff --git a/util.c b/util.c
+index eeffdae..2e1931c 100644
+--- a/util.c
++++ b/util.c
+@@ -247,46 +247,6 @@ out:
+ 	return p;
+ }
+ 
+-int write_dump(size_t base, size_t len, const void *data, const char *dumpfile, int add)
+-{
+-	FILE *f;
+-
+-	f = fopen(dumpfile, add ? "r+b" : "wb");
+-	if (!f)
+-	{
+-		fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", dumpfile);
+-		perror("fopen");
+-		return -1;
+-	}
+-
+-	if (fseek(f, base, SEEK_SET) != 0)
+-	{
+-		fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", dumpfile);
+-		perror("fseek");
+-		goto err_close;
+-	}
+-
+-	if (fwrite(data, len, 1, f) != 1)
+-	{
+-		fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", dumpfile);
+-		perror("fwrite");
+-		goto err_close;
+-	}
+-
+-	if (fclose(f))
+-	{
+-		fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", dumpfile);
+-		perror("fclose");
+-		return -1;
+-	}
+-
+-	return 0;
+-
+-err_close:
+-	fclose(f);
+-	return -1;
+-}
+-
+ /* Returns end - start + 1, assuming start < end */
+ u64 u64_range(u64 start, u64 end)
+ {
+diff --git a/util.h b/util.h
+index 3094cf8..ef24eb9 100644
+--- a/util.h
++++ b/util.h
+@@ -27,5 +27,4 @@
+ int checksum(const u8 *buf, size_t len);
+ void *read_file(off_t base, size_t *len, const char *filename);
+ void *mem_chunk(off_t base, size_t len, const char *devmem);
+-int write_dump(size_t base, size_t len, const void *data, const char *dumpfile, int add);
+ u64 u64_range(u64 start, u64 end);

meta/recipes-devtools/dmidecode/dmidecode/CVE-2023-30630.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+From b7dacccff32294ea522df32a9391d0218e7600ea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de>
+Date: Mon, 20 Feb 2023 14:53:31 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] dmidecode: Do not let --dump-bin overwrite an existing file
+
+Make sure that the file passed to option --dump-bin does not already
+exist. In practice, it is rather unlikely that an honest user would
+want to overwrite an existing dump file, while this possibility
+could be used by a rogue user to corrupt a system file.
+
+CVE: CVE-2023-30630
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.nongnu.org/cgit/dmidecode.git/commit/?id=6ca381c1247c]
+
+Backport Changes:
+- Ignored changes in man/dmidecode.8 file.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de>
+Reviewed-by: Jerry Hoemann <jerry.hoemann@hpe.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 6ca381c1247c81f74e1ca4e7706f70bdda72e6f2)
+Signed-off-by: Dhairya Nagodra <dnagodra@cisco.com>
+
+---
+ dmidecode.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/dmidecode.c b/dmidecode.c
+index b91e53b..846d9a1 100644
+--- a/dmidecode.c
++++ b/dmidecode.c
+@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@
+  *    https://www.dmtf.org/sites/default/files/DSP0270_1.0.1.pdf
+  */
+ 
++#include <fcntl.h>
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <strings.h>
+@@ -5097,13 +5098,22 @@ static void dmi_table_string(const struct dmi_header *h, const u8 *data, u16 ver
+ static int dmi_table_dump(const u8 *ep, u32 ep_len, const u8 *table,
+ 			  u32 table_len)
+ {
++	int fd;
+ 	FILE *f;
+ 
+-	f = fopen(opt.dumpfile, "wb");
++	fd = open(opt.dumpfile, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, 0666);
++	if (fd == -1)
++	{
++		fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", opt.dumpfile);
++		perror("open");
++		return -1;
++	}
++
++	f = fdopen(fd, "wb");
+ 	if (!f)
+ 	{
+ 		fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", opt.dumpfile);
+-		perror("fopen");
++		perror("fdopen");
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+ 

meta/recipes-devtools/dmidecode/dmidecode_3.2.bb

@@ -6,6 +6,9 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE;md5=b234ee4d69f5fce4486a80fdaf4a4263"
 
 SRC_URI = "${SAVANNAH_NONGNU_MIRROR}/dmidecode/${BP}.tar.xz \
            file://0001-Committing-changes-from-do_unpack_extra.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-30630-dependent_p1.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-30630-dependent_p2.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-30630.patch \
            "
 
 COMPATIBLE_HOST = "(i.86|x86_64|aarch64|arm|powerpc|powerpc64).*-linux"

meta/recipes-devtools/elfutils/elfutils_0.178.bb

@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://sourceware.org/elfutils/ftp/${PV}/${BP}.tar.bz2 \
            file://0001-ppc_initreg.c-Incliude-asm-ptrace.h-for-pt_regs-defi.patch \
            file://run-ptest \
            file://ptest.patch \
+           file://CVE-2021-33294.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI_append_libc-musl = " \
            file://0001-musl-obstack-fts.patch \

meta/recipes-devtools/elfutils/files/CVE-2021-33294.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+From 480b6fa3662ba8ffeee274bf0d37423413c01e55 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mark Wielaard <mark@klomp.org>
+Date: Wed, 3 Mar 2021 21:40:53 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] readelf: Sanity check verneed and verdef offsets in handle_symtab.
+
+We are going through vna_next, vn_next and vd_next in a while loop.
+Make sure that all offsets are sane. We don't want things to wrap
+around so we go in cycles.
+
+https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=27501
+
+Signed-off-by: Mark Wielaard <mark@klomp.org>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://sourceware.org/git/?p=elfutils.git;a=commit;h=480b6fa3662ba8ffeee274bf0d37423413c01e55]
+CVE: CVE-2021-33294
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ src/ChangeLog |  5 +++++
+ src/readelf.c | 10 +++++++++-
+ 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/ChangeLog b/src/ChangeLog
+index 6af977e..f0d9e39 100644
+--- a/src/ChangeLog
++++ b/src/ChangeLog
+@@ -1,3 +1,8 @@
++2021-03-03  Mark Wielaard  <mark@klomp.org>
++
++	* readelf.c (handle_symtab): Sanity check verneed vna_next,
++	vn_next and verdef vd_next offsets.
++
+ 2019-11-26  Mark Wielaard  <mark@klomp.org>
+ 
+ 	* Makefile.am (BUILD_STATIC): Add libraries needed for libdw.
+diff --git a/src/readelf.c b/src/readelf.c
+index 5994615..ab7a1c1 100644
+--- a/src/readelf.c
++++ b/src/readelf.c
+@@ -2550,7 +2550,9 @@ handle_symtab (Ebl *ebl, Elf_Scn *scn, GElf_Shdr *shdr)
+ 						 &vernaux_mem);
+ 		      while (vernaux != NULL
+ 			     && vernaux->vna_other != *versym
+-			     && vernaux->vna_next != 0)
++			     && vernaux->vna_next != 0
++			     && (verneed_data->d_size - vna_offset
++				 >= vernaux->vna_next))
+ 			{
+ 			  /* Update the offset.  */
+ 			  vna_offset += vernaux->vna_next;
+@@ -2567,6 +2569,9 @@ handle_symtab (Ebl *ebl, Elf_Scn *scn, GElf_Shdr *shdr)
+ 			/* Found it.  */
+ 			break;
+ 
++		      if (verneed_data->d_size - vn_offset < verneed->vn_next)
++			break;
++
+ 		      vn_offset += verneed->vn_next;
+ 		      verneed = (verneed->vn_next == 0
+ 				 ? NULL
+@@ -2602,6 +2607,9 @@ handle_symtab (Ebl *ebl, Elf_Scn *scn, GElf_Shdr *shdr)
+ 			/* Found the definition.  */
+ 			break;
+ 
++		      if (verdef_data->d_size - vd_offset < verdef->vd_next)
++			break;
++
+ 		      vd_offset += verdef->vd_next;
+ 		      verdef = (verdef->vd_next == 0
+ 				? NULL
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.14.inc

@@ -68,6 +68,8 @@ SRC_URI += "\
     file://CVE-2023-29402.patch \
     file://CVE-2023-29404.patch \
     file://CVE-2023-29400.patch \
+    file://CVE-2023-29406.patch \
+    file://CVE-2023-29409.patch \
 "
 
 SRC_URI_append_libc-musl = " file://0009-ld-replace-glibc-dynamic-linker-with-musl.patch"

meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.14/CVE-2023-29406.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,212 @@
+From 5fa6923b1ea891400153d04ddf1545e23b40041b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
+Date: Wed, 28 Jun 2023 13:20:08 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] [release-branch.go1.19] net/http: validate Host header before
+ sending
+
+Verify that the Host header we send is valid.
+Avoids surprising behavior such as a Host of "go.dev\r\nX-Evil:oops"
+adding an X-Evil header to HTTP/1 requests.
+
+Add a test, skip the test for HTTP/2. HTTP/2 is not vulnerable to
+header injection in the way HTTP/1 is, but x/net/http2 doesn't validate
+the header and will go into a retry loop when the server rejects it.
+CL 506995 adds the necessary validation to x/net/http2.
+
+Updates #60374
+Fixes #61075
+For CVE-2023-29406
+
+Change-Id: I05cb6866a9bead043101954dfded199258c6dd04
+Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/506996
+Reviewed-by: Tatiana Bradley <tatianabradley@google.com>
+TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
+Run-TryBot: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 499458f7ca04087958987a33c2703c3ef03e27e2)
+Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/507358
+Run-TryBot: Tatiana Bradley <tatianabradley@google.com>
+Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/golang/go/commit/5fa6923b1ea891400153d04ddf1545e23b40041b]
+CVE: CVE-2023-29406
+Signed-off-by: Vivek Kumbhar <vkumbhar@mvista.com>
+---
+ src/net/http/http_test.go      | 29 ---------------------
+ src/net/http/request.go        | 47 ++++++++--------------------------
+ src/net/http/request_test.go   | 11 ++------
+ src/net/http/transport_test.go | 18 +++++++++++++
+ 4 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 74 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/net/http/http_test.go b/src/net/http/http_test.go
+index f4ea52d..ea38cb4 100644
+--- a/src/net/http/http_test.go
++++ b/src/net/http/http_test.go
+@@ -49,35 +49,6 @@ func TestForeachHeaderElement(t *testing.T) {
+	}
+ }
+
+-func TestCleanHost(t *testing.T) {
+-	tests := []struct {
+-		in, want string
+-	}{
+-		{"www.google.com", "www.google.com"},
+-		{"www.google.com foo", "www.google.com"},
+-		{"www.google.com/foo", "www.google.com"},
+-		{" first character is a space", ""},
+-		{"[1::6]:8080", "[1::6]:8080"},
+-
+-		// Punycode:
+-		{"гофер.рф/foo", "xn--c1ae0ajs.xn--p1ai"},
+-		{"bücher.de", "xn--bcher-kva.de"},
+-		{"bücher.de:8080", "xn--bcher-kva.de:8080"},
+-		// Verify we convert to lowercase before punycode:
+-		{"BÜCHER.de", "xn--bcher-kva.de"},
+-		{"BÜCHER.de:8080", "xn--bcher-kva.de:8080"},
+-		// Verify we normalize to NFC before punycode:
+-		{"gophér.nfc", "xn--gophr-esa.nfc"},            // NFC input; no work needed
+-		{"goph\u0065\u0301r.nfd", "xn--gophr-esa.nfd"}, // NFD input
+-	}
+-	for _, tt := range tests {
+-		got := cleanHost(tt.in)
+-		if tt.want != got {
+-			t.Errorf("cleanHost(%q) = %q, want %q", tt.in, got, tt.want)
+-		}
+-	}
+-}
+-
+ // Test that cmd/go doesn't link in the HTTP server.
+ //
+ // This catches accidental dependencies between the HTTP transport and
+diff --git a/src/net/http/request.go b/src/net/http/request.go
+index cb2edd2..2706300 100644
+--- a/src/net/http/request.go
++++ b/src/net/http/request.go
+@@ -18,7 +18,6 @@ import (
+	"io/ioutil"
+	"mime"
+	"mime/multipart"
+-	"net"
+	"net/http/httptrace"
+	"net/textproto"
+	"net/url"
+@@ -26,7 +25,8 @@ import (
+	"strconv"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"
+-
++
++	"golang.org/x/net/http/httpguts"
+	"golang.org/x/net/idna"
+ )
+
+@@ -557,12 +557,19 @@ func (r *Request) write(w io.Writer, usingProxy bool, extraHeaders Header, waitF
+	// is not given, use the host from the request URL.
+	//
+	// Clean the host, in case it arrives with unexpected stuff in it.
+-	host := cleanHost(r.Host)
++	host := r.Host
+	if host == "" {
+		if r.URL == nil {
+			return errMissingHost
+		}
+-		host = cleanHost(r.URL.Host)
++		host = r.URL.Host
++	}
++	host, err = httpguts.PunycodeHostPort(host)
++	if err != nil {
++		return err
++	}
++	if !httpguts.ValidHostHeader(host) {
++		return errors.New("http: invalid Host header")
+	}
+
+	// According to RFC 6874, an HTTP client, proxy, or other
+@@ -717,38 +724,6 @@ func idnaASCII(v string) (string, error) {
+	return idna.Lookup.ToASCII(v)
+ }
+
+-// cleanHost cleans up the host sent in request's Host header.
+-//
+-// It both strips anything after '/' or ' ', and puts the value
+-// into Punycode form, if necessary.
+-//
+-// Ideally we'd clean the Host header according to the spec:
+-//   https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7230#section-5.4 (Host = uri-host [ ":" port ]")
+-//   https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7230#section-2.7 (uri-host -> rfc3986's host)
+-//   https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3986#section-3.2.2 (definition of host)
+-// But practically, what we are trying to avoid is the situation in
+-// issue 11206, where a malformed Host header used in the proxy context
+-// would create a bad request. So it is enough to just truncate at the
+-// first offending character.
+-func cleanHost(in string) string {
+-	if i := strings.IndexAny(in, " /"); i != -1 {
+-		in = in[:i]
+-	}
+-	host, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(in)
+-	if err != nil { // input was just a host
+-		a, err := idnaASCII(in)
+-		if err != nil {
+-			return in // garbage in, garbage out
+-		}
+-		return a
+-	}
+-	a, err := idnaASCII(host)
+-	if err != nil {
+-		return in // garbage in, garbage out
+-	}
+-	return net.JoinHostPort(a, port)
+-}
+-
+ // removeZone removes IPv6 zone identifier from host.
+ // E.g., "[fe80::1%en0]:8080" to "[fe80::1]:8080"
+ func removeZone(host string) string {
+diff --git a/src/net/http/request_test.go b/src/net/http/request_test.go
+index 461d66e..0d417ff 100644
+--- a/src/net/http/request_test.go
++++ b/src/net/http/request_test.go
+@@ -676,15 +676,8 @@ func TestRequestBadHost(t *testing.T) {
+	}
+	req.Host = "foo.com with spaces"
+	req.URL.Host = "foo.com with spaces"
+-	req.Write(logWrites{t, &got})
+-	want := []string{
+-		"GET /after HTTP/1.1\r\n",
+-		"Host: foo.com\r\n",
+-		"User-Agent: " + DefaultUserAgent + "\r\n",
+-		"\r\n",
+-	}
+-	if !reflect.DeepEqual(got, want) {
+-		t.Errorf("Writes = %q\n  Want = %q", got, want)
++	if err := req.Write(logWrites{t, &got}); err == nil {
++		t.Errorf("Writing request with invalid Host: succeded, want error")
+	}
+ }
+
+diff --git a/src/net/http/transport_test.go b/src/net/http/transport_test.go
+index fa0c370..0afb6b9 100644
+--- a/src/net/http/transport_test.go
++++ b/src/net/http/transport_test.go
+@@ -6249,3 +6249,21 @@ func TestIssue32441(t *testing.T) {
+		t.Error(err)
+	}
+ }
++
++func TestRequestSanitization(t *testing.T) {
++	setParallel(t)
++	defer afterTest(t)
++
++	ts := newClientServerTest(t, h1Mode, HandlerFunc(func(rw ResponseWriter, req *Request) {
++		if h, ok := req.Header["X-Evil"]; ok {
++			t.Errorf("request has X-Evil header: %q", h)
++		}
++	})).ts
++	defer ts.Close()
++	req, _ := NewRequest("GET", ts.URL, nil)
++	req.Host = "go.dev\r\nX-Evil:evil"
++	resp, _ := ts.Client().Do(req)
++	if resp != nil {
++		resp.Body.Close()
++	}
++}
+--
+2.25.1

meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.14/CVE-2023-29409.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
+From 2300f7ef07718f6be4d8aa8486c7de99836e233f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Roland Shoemaker <bracewell@google.com>
+Date: Wed, 7 Jun 2023 15:27:13 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] [release-branch.go1.19] crypto/tls: restrict RSA keys in
+ certificates to <= 8192 bits
+
+Extremely large RSA keys in certificate chains can cause a client/server
+to expend significant CPU time verifying signatures. Limit this by
+restricting the size of RSA keys transmitted during handshakes to <=
+8192 bits.
+
+Based on a survey of publicly trusted RSA keys, there are currently only
+three certificates in circulation with keys larger than this, and all
+three appear to be test certificates that are not actively deployed. It
+is possible there are larger keys in use in private PKIs, but we target
+the web PKI, so causing breakage here in the interests of increasing the
+default safety of users of crypto/tls seems reasonable.
+
+Thanks to Mateusz Poliwczak for reporting this issue.
+
+Updates #61460
+Fixes #61579
+Fixes CVE-2023-29409
+
+Change-Id: Ie35038515a649199a36a12fc2c5df3af855dca6c
+Reviewed-on: https://team-review.git.corp.google.com/c/golang/go-private/+/1912161
+Reviewed-by: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
+Reviewed-by: Tatiana Bradley <tatianabradley@google.com>
+Run-TryBot: Roland Shoemaker <bracewell@google.com>
+(cherry picked from commit d865c715d92887361e4bd5596e19e513f27781b7)
+Reviewed-on: https://team-review.git.corp.google.com/c/golang/go-private/+/1965487
+Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/514915
+Run-TryBot: David Chase <drchase@google.com>
+Reviewed-by: Matthew Dempsky <mdempsky@google.com>
+TryBot-Bypass: David Chase <drchase@google.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/golang/go/commit/2300f7ef07718f6be4d8aa8486c7de99836e233f]
+CVE: CVE-2023-29409
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ src/crypto/tls/handshake_client.go      |  8 +++
+ src/crypto/tls/handshake_client_test.go | 78 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ src/crypto/tls/handshake_server.go      |  4 ++
+ 3 files changed, 90 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/crypto/tls/handshake_client.go b/src/crypto/tls/handshake_client.go
+index 4fb528c..ba33ea1 100644
+--- a/src/crypto/tls/handshake_client.go
++++ b/src/crypto/tls/handshake_client.go
+@@ -788,6 +788,10 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeState) sendFinished(out []byte) error {
+ 	return nil
+ }
+ 
++// maxRSAKeySize is the maximum RSA key size in bits that we are willing
++// to verify the signatures of during a TLS handshake.
++const maxRSAKeySize = 8192
++
+ // verifyServerCertificate parses and verifies the provided chain, setting
+ // c.verifiedChains and c.peerCertificates or sending the appropriate alert.
+ func (c *Conn) verifyServerCertificate(certificates [][]byte) error {
+@@ -798,6 +802,10 @@ func (c *Conn) verifyServerCertificate(certificates [][]byte) error {
+ 			c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
+ 			return errors.New("tls: failed to parse certificate from server: " + err.Error())
+ 		}
++		if cert.PublicKeyAlgorithm == x509.RSA && cert.PublicKey.(*rsa.PublicKey).N.BitLen() > maxRSAKeySize {
++			c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
++			return fmt.Errorf("tls: server sent certificate containing RSA key larger than %d bits", maxRSAKeySize)
++		}
+ 		certs[i] = cert
+ 	}
+ 
+diff --git a/src/crypto/tls/handshake_client_test.go b/src/crypto/tls/handshake_client_test.go
+index 6bd3c37..8d20b2b 100644
+--- a/src/crypto/tls/handshake_client_test.go
++++ b/src/crypto/tls/handshake_client_test.go
+@@ -1984,3 +1984,81 @@ func TestCloseClientConnectionOnIdleServer(t *testing.T) {
+ 		t.Errorf("Error expected, but no error returned")
+ 	}
+ }
++
++// discardConn wraps a net.Conn but discards all writes, but reports that they happened.
++type discardConn struct {
++	net.Conn
++}
++
++func (dc *discardConn) Write(data []byte) (int, error) {
++	return len(data), nil
++}
++
++// largeRSAKeyCertPEM contains a 8193 bit RSA key
++const largeRSAKeyCertPEM = `-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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++-----END CERTIFICATE-----`
++
++func TestHandshakeRSATooBig(t *testing.T) {
++	testCert, _ := pem.Decode([]byte(largeRSAKeyCertPEM))
++
++	c := &Conn{conn: &discardConn{}, config: testConfig.Clone()}
++
++	expectedErr := "tls: server sent certificate containing RSA key larger than 8192 bits"
++	err := c.verifyServerCertificate([][]byte{testCert.Bytes})
++	if err == nil || err.Error() != expectedErr {
++		t.Errorf("Conn.verifyServerCertificate unexpected error: want %q, got %q", expectedErr, err)
++	}
++
++	expectedErr = "tls: client sent certificate containing RSA key larger than 8192 bits"
++	err = c.processCertsFromClient(Certificate{Certificate: [][]byte{testCert.Bytes}})
++	if err == nil || err.Error() != expectedErr {
++		t.Errorf("Conn.processCertsFromClient unexpected error: want %q, got %q", expectedErr, err)
++	}
++}
+diff --git a/src/crypto/tls/handshake_server.go b/src/crypto/tls/handshake_server.go
+index b16415a..2e36840 100644
+--- a/src/crypto/tls/handshake_server.go
++++ b/src/crypto/tls/handshake_server.go
+@@ -738,6 +738,10 @@ func (c *Conn) processCertsFromClient(certificate Certificate) error {
+ 			c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
+ 			return errors.New("tls: failed to parse client certificate: " + err.Error())
+ 		}
++		if certs[i].PublicKeyAlgorithm == x509.RSA && certs[i].PublicKey.(*rsa.PublicKey).N.BitLen() > maxRSAKeySize {
++			c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
++			return fmt.Errorf("tls: client sent certificate containing RSA key larger than %d bits", maxRSAKeySize)
++		}
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if len(certs) == 0 && requiresClientCert(c.config.ClientAuth) {
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3_3.8.17.bb

@@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2020-15523 CVE-2022-26488"
 # The mailcap module is insecure by design, so this can't be fixed in a meaningful way.
 # The module will be removed in the future and flaws documented.
 CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2015-20107"
+# Not an issue, in fact expected behaviour
+CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2023-36632"
 
 PYTHON_MAJMIN = "3.8"
 

meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc

@@ -137,7 +137,10 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.qemu.org/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.xz \
            file://CVE-2021-3409-4.patch \
            file://CVE-2021-3409-5.patch \
            file://hw-display-qxl-Pass-requested-buffer-size-to-qxl_phy.patch \
-           file://CVE-2023-0330.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-0330_1.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-0330_2.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-3354.patch \
+	   file://CVE-2023-3180.patch \
            "
 UPSTREAM_CHECK_REGEX = "qemu-(?P<pver>\d+(\.\d+)+)\.tar"
 

meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-35505.patch

@@ -20,16 +20,19 @@ Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
 Tested-by: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu>
 Message-Id: <20210407195801.685-7-mark.cave-ayland@ilande.co.uk>
 
-CVE: CVE-2020-35504
+CVE: CVE-2020-35505
 Upstream-Status: Backport [import from ubuntu https://git.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/qemu/tree/debian/patches/CVE-2020-35505.patch?h=ubuntu/focal-security Upstream commit https://github.com/qemu/qemu/commit/99545751734035b76bd372c4e7215bb337428d89  ]
 Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Emily Vekariya <emily.vekariya@einfochips.com>
 ---
- hw/scsi/esp.c | 3 +++
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+ hw/scsi/esp.c | 4 ++++
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
 
+diff --git a/hw/scsi/esp.c b/hw/scsi/esp.c
+index c7d701bf..c2a67bc8 100644
 --- a/hw/scsi/esp.c
 +++ b/hw/scsi/esp.c
-@@ -193,6 +193,10 @@ static void do_busid_cmd(ESPState *s, ui
+@@ -193,6 +193,10 @@ static void do_busid_cmd(ESPState *s, uint8_t *buf, uint8_t busid)
  
      trace_esp_do_busid_cmd(busid);
      lun = busid & 7;

meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2023-0330_2.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+From a2e1753b8054344f32cf94f31c6399a58794a380 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu>
+Date: Thu, 27 Apr 2023 17:10:06 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] memory: prevent dma-reentracy issues
+
+Add a flag to the DeviceState, when a device is engaged in PIO/MMIO/DMA.
+This flag is set/checked prior to calling a device's MemoryRegion
+handlers, and set when device code initiates DMA.  The purpose of this
+flag is to prevent two types of DMA-based reentrancy issues:
+
+1.) mmio -> dma -> mmio case
+2.) bh -> dma write -> mmio case
+
+These issues have led to problems such as stack-exhaustion and
+use-after-frees.
+
+Summary of the problem from Peter Maydell:
+https://lore.kernel.org/qemu-devel/CAFEAcA_23vc7hE3iaM-JVA6W38LK4hJoWae5KcknhPRD5fPBZA@mail.gmail.com
+
+Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/62
+Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/540
+Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/541
+Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/556
+Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/557
+Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/827
+Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/1282
+Resolves: CVE-2023-0330
+
+Signed-off-by: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu>
+Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
+Message-Id: <20230427211013.2994127-2-alxndr@bu.edu>
+[thuth: Replace warn_report() with warn_report_once()]
+Signed-off-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/a2e1753b8054344f32cf94f31c6399a58794a380]
+CVE: CVE-2023-0330
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ include/exec/memory.h  |  5 +++++
+ include/hw/qdev-core.h |  7 +++++++
+ memory.c               | 16 ++++++++++++++++
+ 3 files changed, 28 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/include/exec/memory.h b/include/exec/memory.h
+index 2b8bccdd..0c8cdb8e 100644
+--- a/include/exec/memory.h
++++ b/include/exec/memory.h
+@@ -378,6 +378,8 @@ struct MemoryRegion {
+     bool is_iommu;
+     RAMBlock *ram_block;
+     Object *owner;
++    /* owner as TYPE_DEVICE. Used for re-entrancy checks in MR access hotpath */
++    DeviceState *dev;
+ 
+     const MemoryRegionOps *ops;
+     void *opaque;
+@@ -400,6 +402,9 @@ struct MemoryRegion {
+     const char *name;
+     unsigned ioeventfd_nb;
+     MemoryRegionIoeventfd *ioeventfds;
++
++    /* For devices designed to perform re-entrant IO into their own IO MRs */
++    bool disable_reentrancy_guard;
+ };
+ 
+ struct IOMMUMemoryRegion {
+diff --git a/include/hw/qdev-core.h b/include/hw/qdev-core.h
+index 1518495b..206f0a70 100644
+--- a/include/hw/qdev-core.h
++++ b/include/hw/qdev-core.h
+@@ -138,6 +138,10 @@ struct NamedGPIOList {
+     QLIST_ENTRY(NamedGPIOList) node;
+ };
+ 
++typedef struct {
++    bool engaged_in_io;
++} MemReentrancyGuard;
++
+ /**
+  * DeviceState:
+  * @realized: Indicates whether the device has been fully constructed.
+@@ -163,6 +167,9 @@ struct DeviceState {
+     int num_child_bus;
+     int instance_id_alias;
+     int alias_required_for_version;
++
++    /* Is the device currently in mmio/pio/dma? Used to prevent re-entrancy */
++    MemReentrancyGuard mem_reentrancy_guard;
+ };
+ 
+ struct DeviceListener {
+diff --git a/memory.c b/memory.c
+index 8cafb86a..94ebcaf9 100644
+--- a/memory.c
++++ b/memory.c
+@@ -531,6 +531,18 @@ static MemTxResult access_with_adjusted_size(hwaddr addr,
+         access_size_max = 4;
+     }
+ 
++    /* Do not allow more than one simultaneous access to a device's IO Regions */
++    if (mr->dev && !mr->disable_reentrancy_guard &&
++	!mr->ram_device && !mr->ram && !mr->rom_device && !mr->readonly) {
++	if (mr->dev->mem_reentrancy_guard.engaged_in_io) {
++	    warn_report_once("Blocked re-entrant IO on MemoryRegion: "
++			     "%s at addr: 0x%" HWADDR_PRIX,
++			     memory_region_name(mr), addr);
++	    return MEMTX_ACCESS_ERROR;
++	}
++	mr->dev->mem_reentrancy_guard.engaged_in_io = true;
++    }
++
+     /* FIXME: support unaligned access? */
+     access_size = MAX(MIN(size, access_size_max), access_size_min);
+     access_mask = MAKE_64BIT_MASK(0, access_size * 8);
+@@ -545,6 +557,9 @@ static MemTxResult access_with_adjusted_size(hwaddr addr,
+                         access_mask, attrs);
+         }
+     }
++    if (mr->dev) {
++	mr->dev->mem_reentrancy_guard.engaged_in_io = false;
++    }
+     return r;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -1132,6 +1147,7 @@ static void memory_region_do_init(MemoryRegion *mr,
+     }
+     mr->name = g_strdup(name);
+     mr->owner = owner;
++    mr->dev = (DeviceState *) object_dynamic_cast(mr->owner, TYPE_DEVICE);
+     mr->ram_block = NULL;
+ 
+     if (name) {
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2023-3180.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+From 9d38a8434721a6479fe03fb5afb150ca793d3980 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: zhenwei pi <pizhenwei@bytedance.com>
+Date: Thu, 3 Aug 2023 10:43:13 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] virtio-crypto: verify src&dst buffer length for sym request
+
+For symmetric algorithms, the length of ciphertext must be as same
+as the plaintext.
+The missing verification of the src_len and the dst_len in
+virtio_crypto_sym_op_helper() may lead buffer overflow/divulged.
+
+This patch is originally written by Yiming Tao for QEMU-SECURITY,
+resend it(a few changes of error message) in qemu-devel.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2023-3180
+Fixes: 04b9b37edda("virtio-crypto: add data queue processing handler")
+Cc: Gonglei <arei.gonglei@huawei.com>
+Cc: Mauro Matteo Cascella <mcascell@redhat.com>
+Cc: Yiming Tao <taoym@zju.edu.cn>
+Signed-off-by: zhenwei pi <pizhenwei@bytedance.com>
+Message-Id: <20230803024314.29962-2-pizhenwei@bytedance.com>
+Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport from [https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/9d38a8434721a6479fe03fb5afb150ca793d3980]
+CVE: CVE-2023-3180
+Signed-off-by: Ashish Sharma <asharma@mvista.com>
+
+ hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c | 5 +++++
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c b/hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c
+index 44faf5a522b..13aec771e11 100644
+--- a/hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c
++++ b/hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c
+@@ -634,6 +634,11 @@ virtio_crypto_sym_op_helper(VirtIODevice *vdev,
+         return NULL;
+     }
+ 
++    if (unlikely(src_len != dst_len)) {
++        virtio_error(vdev, "sym request src len is different from dst len");
++        return NULL;
++    }
++
+     max_len = (uint64_t)iv_len + aad_len + src_len + dst_len + hash_result_len;
+     if (unlikely(max_len > vcrypto->conf.max_size)) {
+         virtio_error(vdev, "virtio-crypto too big length");
+-- 
+GitLab
+

meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2023-3354.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+From 10be627d2b5ec2d6b3dce045144aa739eef678b4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Daniel=20P=2E=20Berrang=C3=A9?= <berrange@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 20 Jun 2023 09:45:34 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] io: remove io watch if TLS channel is closed during handshake
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+The TLS handshake make take some time to complete, during which time an
+I/O watch might be registered with the main loop. If the owner of the
+I/O channel invokes qio_channel_close() while the handshake is waiting
+to continue the I/O watch must be removed. Failing to remove it will
+later trigger the completion callback which the owner is not expecting
+to receive. In the case of the VNC server, this results in a SEGV as
+vnc_disconnect_start() tries to shutdown a client connection that is
+already gone / NULL.
+
+CVE-2023-3354
+Reported-by: jiangyegen <jiangyegen@huawei.com>
+Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/10be627d2b5ec2d6b3dce045144aa739eef678b4]
+CVE: CVE-2023-3354
+Signed-off-by: Vivek Kumbhar <vkumbhar@mvista.com>
+---
+ include/io/channel-tls.h |  1 +
+ io/channel-tls.c         | 18 ++++++++++++------
+ 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/include/io/channel-tls.h b/include/io/channel-tls.h
+index fdbdf12f..e49e2831 100644
+--- a/include/io/channel-tls.h
++++ b/include/io/channel-tls.h
+@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ struct QIOChannelTLS {
+     QIOChannel *master;
+     QCryptoTLSSession *session;
+     QIOChannelShutdown shutdown;
++    guint hs_ioc_tag;
+ };
+ 
+ /**
+diff --git a/io/channel-tls.c b/io/channel-tls.c
+index 7ec8ceff..8b32fbde 100644
+--- a/io/channel-tls.c
++++ b/io/channel-tls.c
+@@ -194,12 +194,13 @@ static void qio_channel_tls_handshake_task(QIOChannelTLS *ioc,
+         }
+ 
+         trace_qio_channel_tls_handshake_pending(ioc, status);
+-        qio_channel_add_watch_full(ioc->master,
+-                                   condition,
+-                                   qio_channel_tls_handshake_io,
+-                                   data,
+-                                   NULL,
+-                                   context);
++        ioc->hs_ioc_tag =
++            qio_channel_add_watch_full(ioc->master,
++                                       condition,
++                                       qio_channel_tls_handshake_io,
++                                       data,
++                                       NULL,
++                                       context);
+     }
+ }
+ 
+@@ -214,6 +215,7 @@ static gboolean qio_channel_tls_handshake_io(QIOChannel *ioc,
+     QIOChannelTLS *tioc = QIO_CHANNEL_TLS(
+         qio_task_get_source(task));
+ 
++    tioc->hs_ioc_tag = 0;
+     g_free(data);
+     qio_channel_tls_handshake_task(tioc, task, context);
+ 
+@@ -371,6 +373,10 @@ static int qio_channel_tls_close(QIOChannel *ioc,
+ {
+     QIOChannelTLS *tioc = QIO_CHANNEL_TLS(ioc);
+ 
++    if (tioc->hs_ioc_tag) {
++        g_clear_handle_id(&tioc->hs_ioc_tag, g_source_remove);
++    }
++
+     return qio_channel_close(tioc->master, errp);
+ }
+ 
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-devtools/ruby/ruby/CVE-2021-33621.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
+From 64c5045c0a6b84fdb938a8465a0890e5f7162708 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Yusuke Endoh <mame@ruby-lang.org>
+Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2022 10:49:27 +0900
+Subject: [PATCH] Prevent CRLF injection
+
+Throw a RuntimeError if the HTTP response header contains CR or LF to
+prevent HTTP response splitting.
+
+https://hackerone.com/reports/1204695
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/ruby/cgi/commit/64c5045c0a6b84fdb938a8465a0890e5f7162708]
+CVE: CVE-2021-33621
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+---
+ lib/cgi/core.rb             | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
+ test/cgi/test_cgi_header.rb |  8 +++++++
+ 2 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/cgi/core.rb b/lib/cgi/core.rb
+index bec76e0..62e6068 100644
+--- a/lib/cgi/core.rb
++++ b/lib/cgi/core.rb
+@@ -188,17 +188,28 @@ class CGI
+   # Using #header with the HTML5 tag maker will create a <header> element.
+   alias :header :http_header
+ 
++  def _no_crlf_check(str)
++    if str
++      str = str.to_s
++      raise "A HTTP status or header field must not include CR and LF" if str =~ /[\r\n]/
++      str
++    else
++      nil
++    end
++  end
++  private :_no_crlf_check
++
+   def _header_for_string(content_type) #:nodoc:
+     buf = ''.dup
+     if nph?()
+-      buf << "#{$CGI_ENV['SERVER_PROTOCOL'] || 'HTTP/1.0'} 200 OK#{EOL}"
++      buf << "#{_no_crlf_check($CGI_ENV['SERVER_PROTOCOL']) || 'HTTP/1.0'} 200 OK#{EOL}"
+       buf << "Date: #{CGI.rfc1123_date(Time.now)}#{EOL}"
+-      buf << "Server: #{$CGI_ENV['SERVER_SOFTWARE']}#{EOL}"
++      buf << "Server: #{_no_crlf_check($CGI_ENV['SERVER_SOFTWARE'])}#{EOL}"
+       buf << "Connection: close#{EOL}"
+     end
+-    buf << "Content-Type: #{content_type}#{EOL}"
++    buf << "Content-Type: #{_no_crlf_check(content_type)}#{EOL}"
+     if @output_cookies
+-      @output_cookies.each {|cookie| buf << "Set-Cookie: #{cookie}#{EOL}" }
++      @output_cookies.each {|cookie| buf << "Set-Cookie: #{_no_crlf_check(cookie)}#{EOL}" }
+     end
+     return buf
+   end # _header_for_string
+@@ -213,9 +224,9 @@ class CGI
+     ## NPH
+     options.delete('nph') if defined?(MOD_RUBY)
+     if options.delete('nph') || nph?()
+-      protocol = $CGI_ENV['SERVER_PROTOCOL'] || 'HTTP/1.0'
++      protocol = _no_crlf_check($CGI_ENV['SERVER_PROTOCOL']) || 'HTTP/1.0'
+       status = options.delete('status')
+-      status = HTTP_STATUS[status] || status || '200 OK'
++      status = HTTP_STATUS[status] || _no_crlf_check(status) || '200 OK'
+       buf << "#{protocol} #{status}#{EOL}"
+       buf << "Date: #{CGI.rfc1123_date(Time.now)}#{EOL}"
+       options['server'] ||= $CGI_ENV['SERVER_SOFTWARE'] || ''
+@@ -223,38 +234,38 @@ class CGI
+     end
+     ## common headers
+     status = options.delete('status')
+-    buf << "Status: #{HTTP_STATUS[status] || status}#{EOL}" if status
++    buf << "Status: #{HTTP_STATUS[status] || _no_crlf_check(status)}#{EOL}" if status
+     server = options.delete('server')
+-    buf << "Server: #{server}#{EOL}" if server
++    buf << "Server: #{_no_crlf_check(server)}#{EOL}" if server
+     connection = options.delete('connection')
+-    buf << "Connection: #{connection}#{EOL}" if connection
++    buf << "Connection: #{_no_crlf_check(connection)}#{EOL}" if connection
+     type = options.delete('type')
+-    buf << "Content-Type: #{type}#{EOL}" #if type
++    buf << "Content-Type: #{_no_crlf_check(type)}#{EOL}" #if type
+     length = options.delete('length')
+-    buf << "Content-Length: #{length}#{EOL}" if length
++    buf << "Content-Length: #{_no_crlf_check(length)}#{EOL}" if length
+     language = options.delete('language')
+-    buf << "Content-Language: #{language}#{EOL}" if language
++    buf << "Content-Language: #{_no_crlf_check(language)}#{EOL}" if language
+     expires = options.delete('expires')
+     buf << "Expires: #{CGI.rfc1123_date(expires)}#{EOL}" if expires
+     ## cookie
+     if cookie = options.delete('cookie')
+       case cookie
+       when String, Cookie
+-        buf << "Set-Cookie: #{cookie}#{EOL}"
++        buf << "Set-Cookie: #{_no_crlf_check(cookie)}#{EOL}"
+       when Array
+         arr = cookie
+-        arr.each {|c| buf << "Set-Cookie: #{c}#{EOL}" }
++        arr.each {|c| buf << "Set-Cookie: #{_no_crlf_check(c)}#{EOL}" }
+       when Hash
+         hash = cookie
+-        hash.each_value {|c| buf << "Set-Cookie: #{c}#{EOL}" }
++        hash.each_value {|c| buf << "Set-Cookie: #{_no_crlf_check(c)}#{EOL}" }
+       end
+     end
+     if @output_cookies
+-      @output_cookies.each {|c| buf << "Set-Cookie: #{c}#{EOL}" }
++      @output_cookies.each {|c| buf << "Set-Cookie: #{_no_crlf_check(c)}#{EOL}" }
+     end
+     ## other headers
+     options.each do |key, value|
+-      buf << "#{key}: #{value}#{EOL}"
++      buf << "#{_no_crlf_check(key)}: #{_no_crlf_check(value)}#{EOL}"
+     end
+     return buf
+   end # _header_for_hash
+diff --git a/test/cgi/test_cgi_header.rb b/test/cgi/test_cgi_header.rb
+index bab2d03..ec2f4de 100644
+--- a/test/cgi/test_cgi_header.rb
++++ b/test/cgi/test_cgi_header.rb
+@@ -176,6 +176,14 @@ class CGIHeaderTest < Test::Unit::TestCase
+   end
+ 
+ 
++  def test_cgi_http_header_crlf_injection
++    cgi = CGI.new
++    assert_raise(RuntimeError) { cgi.http_header("text/xhtml\r\nBOO") }
++    assert_raise(RuntimeError) { cgi.http_header("type" => "text/xhtml\r\nBOO") }
++    assert_raise(RuntimeError) { cgi.http_header("status" => "200 OK\r\nBOO") }
++    assert_raise(RuntimeError) { cgi.http_header("location" => "text/xhtml\r\nBOO") }
++  end
++
+ 
+   instance_methods.each do |method|
+     private method if method =~ /^test_(.*)/ && $1 != ENV['TEST']
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-devtools/ruby/ruby_2.7.6.bb

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ SRC_URI += " \
            file://0001-Modify-shebang-of-libexec-y2racc-and-libexec-racc2y.patch \
            file://0001-template-Makefile.in-do-not-write-host-cross-cc-item.patch \
            file://CVE-2023-28756.patch \
+           file://CVE-2021-33621.patch \
            "
 
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "f972fb0cce662966bec10d5c5f32d042"

meta/recipes-extended/gawk/gawk/remove-sensitive-tests.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+These tests require an unloaded host as otherwise timing sensitive tests can fail
+https://bugzilla.yoctoproject.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14371
+
+Upstream-Status: Inappropriate
+Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com>
+
+--- a/test/Maketests~
++++ b/test/Maketests
+@@ -2069,7 +2069,2 @@
+
+-timeout:
+-	@echo $@ $(ZOS_FAIL)
+-	@AWKPATH="$(srcdir)" $(AWK) -f $@.awk  >_$@ 2>&1 || echo EXIT CODE: $$? >>_$@
+-	@-$(CMP) "$(srcdir)"/$@.ok _$@ && rm -f _$@
+-
+ typedregex1:
+@@ -2297,7 +2292,2 @@
+ 	@-$(CMP) "$(srcdir)"/$@.ok _$@ && rm -f _$@
+-
+-time:
+-	@echo $@
+-	@AWKPATH="$(srcdir)" $(AWK) -f $@.awk  >_$@ 2>&1 || echo EXIT CODE: $$? >>_$@
+-	@-$(CMP) "$(srcdir)"/$@.ok _$@ && rm -f _$@
+

meta/recipes-extended/gawk/gawk_5.0.1.bb

@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ PACKAGECONFIG[readline] = "--with-readline,--without-readline,readline"
 PACKAGECONFIG[mpfr] = "--with-mpfr,--without-mpfr, mpfr"
 
 SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/gawk/gawk-${PV}.tar.gz \
+           file://remove-sensitive-tests.patch \
            file://run-ptest \
 "
 
@@ -41,13 +42,20 @@ inherit ptest
 do_install_ptest() {
 	mkdir ${D}${PTEST_PATH}/test
 	ln -s ${bindir}/gawk ${D}${PTEST_PATH}/gawk
-	for i in `grep -vE "@|^$|#|Gt-dummy" ${S}/test/Maketests |awk -F: '{print $1}'` Maketests inclib.awk; \
-	  do cp ${S}/test/$i* ${D}${PTEST_PATH}/test; \
+	# The list of tests is all targets in Maketests, apart from the dummy Gt-dummy
+	TESTS=$(awk -F: '$1 == "Gt-dummy" { next } /[[:alnum:]]+:$/ { print $1 }' ${S}/test/Maketests)
+	for i in $TESTS Maketests inclib.awk; do
+		cp ${S}/test/$i* ${D}${PTEST_PATH}/test
 	done
 	sed -i -e 's|/usr/local/bin|${bindir}|g' \
 	    -e 's|#!${base_bindir}/awk|#!${bindir}/awk|g' ${D}${PTEST_PATH}/test/*.awk
 
-        sed -i -e "s|GAWKLOCALE|LANG|g" ${D}${PTEST_PATH}/test/Maketests
+	sed -i -e "s|GAWKLOCALE|LANG|g" ${D}${PTEST_PATH}/test/Maketests
+
+	# These tests require an unloaded host as otherwise timing sensitive tests can fail
+	# https://bugzilla.yoctoproject.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14371
+	rm -f ${D}${PTEST_PATH}/test/time.*
+	rm -f ${D}${PTEST_PATH}/test/timeout.*
 }
 
 RDEPENDS_${PN}-ptest += "make"

meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript/0001-Bug-706897-Copy-pcx-buffer-overrun-fix-from-devices-.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+From d81b82c70bc1fb9991bb95f1201abb5dea55f57f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Chris Liddell <chris.liddell@artifex.com>
+Date: Mon, 17 Jul 2023 14:06:37 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Bug 706897: Copy pcx buffer overrun fix from
+ devices/gdevpcx.c
+
+Bounds check the buffer, before dereferencing the pointer.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commitdiff;h=d81b82c70bc1fb9991bb95f1201abb5dea55f57f]
+CVE: CVE-2023-38559
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ base/gdevdevn.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/base/gdevdevn.c b/base/gdevdevn.c
+index 3b019d6..2888776 100644
+--- a/base/gdevdevn.c
++++ b/base/gdevdevn.c
+@@ -1980,7 +1980,7 @@ devn_pcx_write_rle(const byte * from, const byte * end, int step, gp_file * file
+         byte data = *from;
+ 
+         from += step;
+-        if (data != *from || from == end) {
++        if (from >= end || data != *from) {
+             if (data >= 0xc0)
+                 gp_fputc(0xc1, file);
+         } else {
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript_9.52.bb

@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ SRC_URI_BASE = "https://github.com/ArtifexSoftware/ghostpdl-downloads/releases/d
                 file://CVE-2021-3781_2.patch \
                 file://CVE-2021-3781_3.patch \
                 file://CVE-2023-28879.patch \
+                file://0001-Bug-706897-Copy-pcx-buffer-overrun-fix-from-devices-.patch \
 "
 
 SRC_URI = "${SRC_URI_BASE} \

meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive_3.4.2.bb

@@ -46,6 +46,9 @@ SRC_URI = "http://libarchive.org/downloads/libarchive-${PV}.tar.gz \
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "d953ed6b47694dadf0e6042f8f9ff451"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "b60d58d12632ecf1e8fad7316dc82c6b9738a35625746b47ecdcaf4aed176176"
 
+# upstream-wontfix: upstream has documented that reported function is not thread-safe
+CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2023-30571"
+
 inherit autotools update-alternatives pkgconfig
 
 CPPFLAGS += "-I${WORKDIR}/extra-includes"

meta/recipes-extended/libnss-nis/libnss-nis.bb

@@ -13,9 +13,9 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=4fbd65380cdd255951079008b364516c"
 SECTION = "libs"
 DEPENDS += "libtirpc libnsl2"
 
-PV = "3.1+git${SRCPV}"
+PV = "3.2"
 
-SRCREV = "062f31999b35393abf7595cb89dfc9590d5a42ad"
+SRCREV = "cd0d391af9535b56e612ed227c1b89be269f3d59"
 
 SRC_URI = "git://github.com/thkukuk/libnss_nis;branch=master;protocol=https \
           "

meta/recipes-extended/procps/procps/CVE-2023-4016.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+From 2c933ecba3bb1d3041a5a7a53a7b4078a6003413 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Craig Small <csmall@dropbear.xyz>
+Date: Thu, 10 Aug 2023 21:18:38 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] ps: Fix possible buffer overflow in -C option
+
+ps allocates memory using malloc(length of arg * len of struct).
+In certain strange circumstances, the arg length could be very large
+and the multiplecation will overflow, allocating a small amount of
+memory.
+
+Subsequent strncpy() will then write into unallocated memory.
+The fix is to use calloc. It's slower but this is a one-time
+allocation. Other malloc(x * y) calls have also been replaced
+by calloc(x, y)
+
+References:
+ https://www.freelists.org/post/procps/ps-buffer-overflow-CVE-20234016
+ https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-4016
+ https://gitlab.com/procps-ng/procps/-/issues/297
+ https://bugs.debian.org/1042887
+
+Signed-off-by: Craig Small <csmall@dropbear.xyz>
+
+CVE: CVE-2023-4016
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/procps-ng/procps/-/commit/2c933ecba3bb1d3041a5a7a53a7b4078a6003413]
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
+
+---
+ NEWS        | 1 +
+ ps/parser.c | 8 ++++----
+ 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS
+index b9509734..64fa3da8 100644
+--- a/NEWS
++++ b/NEWS
+@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
++  * ps: Fix buffer overflow in -C option CVE-2023-4016     Debian #1042887, issue #297
++
+ procps-ng-3.3.16
+ ----------------
+   * library: Increment to 8:2:0
+diff --git a/ps/parser.c b/ps/parser.c
+index 248aa741..15873dfa 100644
+--- a/ps/parser.c
++++ b/ps/parser.c
+@@ -184,7 +184,6 @@ static const char *parse_list(const char *arg, const char *(*parse_fn)(char *, s
+   const char *err;       /* error code that could or did happen */
+   /*** prepare to operate ***/
+   node = malloc(sizeof(selection_node));
+-  node->u = malloc(strlen(arg)*sizeof(sel_union)); /* waste is insignificant */
+   node->n = 0;
+   buf = strdup(arg);
+   /*** sanity check and count items ***/
+@@ -205,6 +204,7 @@ static const char *parse_list(const char *arg, const char *(*parse_fn)(char *, s
+   } while (*++walk);
+   if(need_item) goto parse_error;
+   node->n = items;
++  node->u = calloc(items, sizeof(sel_union));
+   /*** actually parse the list ***/
+   walk = buf;
+   while(items--){
+@@ -1031,15 +1031,15 @@ static const char *parse_trailing_pids(void){
+   thisarg = ps_argc - 1;   /* we must be at the end now */
+ 
+   pidnode = malloc(sizeof(selection_node));
+-  pidnode->u = malloc(i*sizeof(sel_union)); /* waste is insignificant */
++  pidnode->u = calloc(i, sizeof(sel_union)); /* waste is insignificant */
+   pidnode->n = 0;
+ 
+   grpnode = malloc(sizeof(selection_node));
+-  grpnode->u = malloc(i*sizeof(sel_union)); /* waste is insignificant */
++  grpnode->u = calloc(i,sizeof(sel_union)); /* waste is insignificant */
+   grpnode->n = 0;
+ 
+   sidnode = malloc(sizeof(selection_node));
+-  sidnode->u = malloc(i*sizeof(sel_union)); /* waste is insignificant */
++  sidnode->u = calloc(i, sizeof(sel_union)); /* waste is insignificant */
+   sidnode->n = 0;
+ 
+   while(i--){
+-- 
+GitLab
+

meta/recipes-extended/procps/procps_3.3.16.bb

@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ inherit autotools gettext pkgconfig update-alternatives
 
 SRC_URI = "git://gitlab.com/procps-ng/procps.git;protocol=https;branch=master \
            file://sysctl.conf \
+           file://CVE-2023-4016.patch \
            "
 SRCREV = "59c88e18f29000ceaf7e5f98181b07be443cf12f"
 

meta/recipes-graphics/harfbuzz/harfbuzz/CVE-2023-25193.patch

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-From 8708b9e081192786c027bb7f5f23d76dbe5c19e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 9c8e972dbecda93546038d24444d8216397d75a3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Behdad Esfahbod <behdad@behdad.org>
 Date: Mon, 6 Feb 2023 14:51:25 -0700
 Subject: [PATCH] [GPOS] Avoid O(n^2) behavior in mark-attachment
@@ -8,13 +8,15 @@ Comment1: The Original Patch [https://github.com/harfbuzz/harfbuzz/commit/85be87
 Comment2: The Patch contained files MarkBasePosFormat1.hh and MarkLigPosFormat1.hh which were moved from hb-ot-layout-gpos-table.hh as per https://github.com/harfbuzz/harfbuzz/commit/197d9a5c994eb41c8c89b7b958b26b1eacfeeb00
 CVE: CVE-2023-25193
 Signed-off-by: Siddharth Doshi <sdoshi@mvista.com>
+Signed-off-by: Dhairya Nagodra <dnagodra@cisco.com>
+
 ---
- src/hb-ot-layout-gpos-table.hh | 101 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
+ src/hb-ot-layout-gpos-table.hh | 103 +++++++++++++++++++++++----------
  src/hb-ot-layout-gsubgpos.hh   |   5 +-
- 2 files changed, 77 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
+ 2 files changed, 78 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
 
 diff --git a/src/hb-ot-layout-gpos-table.hh b/src/hb-ot-layout-gpos-table.hh
-index 024312d..88df13d 100644
+index 024312d..db5f9ae 100644
 --- a/src/hb-ot-layout-gpos-table.hh
 +++ b/src/hb-ot-layout-gpos-table.hh
 @@ -1458,6 +1458,25 @@ struct MarkBasePosFormat1
@@ -102,8 +104,9 @@ index 024312d..88df13d 100644
 +    //if (!_hb_glyph_info_is_base_glyph (&buffer->info[idx])) { return_trace (false); }
  
 -    unsigned int base_index = (this+baseCoverage).get_coverage  (buffer->info[skippy_iter.idx].codepoint);
+-    if (base_index == NOT_COVERED) return_trace (false);
 +    unsigned int base_index = (this+baseCoverage).get_coverage  (buffer->info[idx].codepoint);
-     if (base_index == NOT_COVERED) return_trace (false);
++    if (base_index == NOT_COVERED)
 +    {
 +      buffer->unsafe_to_concat_from_outbuffer (idx, buffer->idx + 1);
 +      return_trace (false);
@@ -174,6 +177,3 @@ index 5a7e564..437123c 100644
    void set_auto_zwj (bool auto_zwj_) { auto_zwj = auto_zwj_; init_iters (); }
    void set_auto_zwnj (bool auto_zwnj_) { auto_zwnj = auto_zwnj_; init_iters (); }
    void set_random (bool random_) { random = random_; }
--- 
-2.25.1
-

meta/recipes-graphics/jpeg/files/CVE-2023-2804-1.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+From 9679473547874c472569d54fecce32b463999a9d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: DRC <information@libjpeg-turbo.org>
+Date: Tue, 4 Apr 2023 19:06:20 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH] Decomp: Don't enable 2-pass color quant w/ RGB565
+
+The 2-pass color quantization algorithm assumes 3-sample pixels.  RGB565
+is the only 3-component colorspace that doesn't have 3-sample pixels, so
+we need to treat it as a special case when determining whether to enable
+2-pass color quantization.  Otherwise, attempting to initialize 2-pass
+color quantization with an RGB565 output buffer could cause
+prescan_quantize() to read from uninitialized memory and subsequently
+underflow/overflow the histogram array.
+
+djpeg is supposed to fail gracefully if both -rgb565 and -colors are
+specified, because none of its destination managers (image writers)
+support color quantization with RGB565.  However, prescan_quantize() was
+called before that could occur.  It is possible but very unlikely that
+these issues could have been reproduced in applications other than
+djpeg.  The issues involve the use of two features (12-bit precision and
+RGB565) that are incompatible, and they also involve the use of two
+rarely-used legacy features (RGB565 and color quantization) that don't
+make much sense when combined.
+
+Fixes #668
+Fixes #671
+Fixes #680
+
+CVE: CVE-2023-2804
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/libjpeg-turbo/libjpeg-turbo/commit/9679473547874c472569d54fecce32b463999a9d]
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
+---
+ ChangeLog.md | 6 ++++++
+ jdmaster.c   | 5 +++--
+ jquant2.c    | 5 +++--
+ 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ChangeLog.md b/ChangeLog.md
+index e605abe73..de0c4d0dd 100644
+--- a/ChangeLog.md
++++ b/ChangeLog.md
+@@ -1,3 +1,9 @@ quality values.
++9. Fixed an oversight in 1.4 beta1[8] that caused various segfaults and buffer
++overruns when attempting to decompress various specially-crafted malformed
++12-bit-per-component JPEG images using a 12-bit-per-component build of djpeg
++(`-DWITH_12BIT=1`) with both color quantization and RGB565 color conversion
++enabled.
++
+ 2.0.4
+ =====
+ 
+diff --git a/jdmaster.c b/jdmaster.c
+index b20906438..8d8ef9956 100644
+--- a/jdmaster.c
++++ b/jdmaster.c
+@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
+  * Copyright (C) 1991-1997, Thomas G. Lane.
+  * Modified 2002-2009 by Guido Vollbeding.
+  * libjpeg-turbo Modifications:
+- * Copyright (C) 2009-2011, 2016, D. R. Commander.
++ * Copyright (C) 2009-2011, 2016, 2023, D. R. Commander.
+  * Copyright (C) 2013, Linaro Limited.
+  * Copyright (C) 2015, Google, Inc.
+  * For conditions of distribution and use, see the accompanying README.ijg
+@@ -492,7 +492,8 @@ master_selection(j_decompress_ptr cinfo)
+     if (cinfo->raw_data_out)
+       ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_NOTIMPL);
+     /* 2-pass quantizer only works in 3-component color space. */
+-    if (cinfo->out_color_components != 3) {
++    if (cinfo->out_color_components != 3 ||
++        cinfo->out_color_space == JCS_RGB565) {
+       cinfo->enable_1pass_quant = TRUE;
+       cinfo->enable_external_quant = FALSE;
+       cinfo->enable_2pass_quant = FALSE;
+diff --git a/jquant2.c b/jquant2.c
+index 6570613bb..c760380fb 100644
+--- a/jquant2.c
++++ b/jquant2.c
+@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
+  * This file was part of the Independent JPEG Group's software:
+  * Copyright (C) 1991-1996, Thomas G. Lane.
+  * libjpeg-turbo Modifications:
+- * Copyright (C) 2009, 2014-2015, D. R. Commander.
++ * Copyright (C) 2009, 2014-2015, 2020, 2023, D. R. Commander.
+  * For conditions of distribution and use, see the accompanying README.ijg
+  * file.
+  *
+@@ -1230,7 +1230,8 @@ jinit_2pass_quantizer(j_decompress_ptr cinfo)
+   cquantize->error_limiter = NULL;
+ 
+   /* Make sure jdmaster didn't give me a case I can't handle */
+-  if (cinfo->out_color_components != 3)
++  if (cinfo->out_color_components != 3 ||
++      cinfo->out_color_space == JCS_RGB565)
+     ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_NOTIMPL);
+ 
+   /* Allocate the histogram/inverse colormap storage */

meta/recipes-graphics/jpeg/files/CVE-2023-2804-2.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+From 0deab87e24ab3106d5332205f829d1846fa65001 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: DRC <information@libjpeg-turbo.org>
+Date: Thu, 6 Apr 2023 18:33:41 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH] jpeg_crop_scanline: Fix calc w/sclg + 2x4,4x2 samp
+
+When computing the downsampled width for a particular component,
+jpeg_crop_scanline() needs to take into account the fact that the
+libjpeg code uses a combination of IDCT scaling and upsampling to
+implement 4x2 and 2x4 upsampling with certain decompression scaling
+factors.  Failing to account for that led to incomplete upsampling of
+4x2- or 2x4-subsampled components, which caused the color converter to
+read from uninitialized memory.  With 12-bit data precision, this caused
+a buffer overrun or underrun and subsequent segfault if the
+uninitialized memory contained a value that was outside of the valid
+sample range (because the color converter uses the value as an array
+index.)
+
+Fixes #669
+
+CVE: CVE-2023-2804
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/libjpeg-turbo/libjpeg-turbo/commit/0deab87e24ab3106d5332205f829d1846fa65001]
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
+---
+ ChangeLog.md |  8 ++++++++
+ jdapistd.c   | 10 ++++++----
+ 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ChangeLog.md b/ChangeLog.md
+index de0c4d0dd..159bd1610 100644
+--- a/ChangeLog.md
++++ b/ChangeLog.md
+@@ -4,6 +4,14 @@ overruns when attempting to decompress various specially-crafted malformed
+ (`-DWITH_12BIT=1`) with both color quantization and RGB565 color conversion
+ enabled.
+ 
++10. Fixed an issue whereby `jpeg_crop_scanline()` sometimes miscalculated the
++downsampled width for components with 4x2 or 2x4 subsampling factors if
++decompression scaling was enabled.  This caused the components to be upsampled
++incompletely, which caused the color converter to read from uninitialized
++memory.  With 12-bit data precision, this caused a buffer overrun or underrun
++and subsequent segfault if the sample value read from unitialized memory was
++outside of the valid sample range.
++
+ 2.0.4
+ =====
+ 
+diff --git a/jdapistd.c b/jdapistd.c
+index 628626254..eb577928c 100644
+--- a/jdapistd.c
++++ b/jdapistd.c
+@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
+  * This file was part of the Independent JPEG Group's software:
+  * Copyright (C) 1994-1996, Thomas G. Lane.
+  * libjpeg-turbo Modifications:
+- * Copyright (C) 2010, 2015-2018, 2020, D. R. Commander.
++ * Copyright (C) 2010, 2015-2018, 2020, 2023, D. R. Commander.
+  * Copyright (C) 2015, Google, Inc.
+  * For conditions of distribution and use, see the accompanying README.ijg
+  * file.
+@@ -225,9 +225,11 @@ jpeg_crop_scanline(j_decompress_ptr cinfo, JDIMENSION *xoffset,
+     /* Set downsampled_width to the new output width. */
+     orig_downsampled_width = compptr->downsampled_width;
+     compptr->downsampled_width =
+-      (JDIMENSION)jdiv_round_up((long)(cinfo->output_width *
+-                                       compptr->h_samp_factor),
+-                                (long)cinfo->max_h_samp_factor);
++      (JDIMENSION)jdiv_round_up((long)cinfo->output_width *
++                                (long)(compptr->h_samp_factor *
++                                       compptr->_DCT_scaled_size),
++                                (long)(cinfo->max_h_samp_factor *
++                                       cinfo->_min_DCT_scaled_size));
+     if (compptr->downsampled_width < 2 && orig_downsampled_width >= 2)
+       reinit_upsampler = TRUE;
+ 

meta/recipes-graphics/jpeg/libjpeg-turbo_2.0.4.bb

@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ SRC_URI = "${SOURCEFORGE_MIRROR}/${BPN}/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://CVE-2021-46822.patch \
            file://CVE-2020-35538-1.patch \
            file://CVE-2020-35538-2.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-2804-1.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-2804-2.patch \
            "
 
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "d01d9e0c28c27bc0de9f4e2e8ff49855"

meta/recipes-kernel/linux-firmware/linux-firmware_20230625.bb

@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENCE.Abilis;md5=b5ee3f410780e56711ad48eadc22b8bc \
                     "
 # WHENCE checksum is defined separately to ease overriding it if
 # class-devupstream is selected.
-WHENCE_CHKSUM  = "a0997fc7a9af4e46d96529d6ef13b58a"
+WHENCE_CHKSUM  = "57bf874056926f12aec2405d3fc390d9"
 
 # These are not common licenses, set NO_GENERIC_LICENSE for them
 # so that the license files will be copied from fetched source
@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ SRC_URI:class-devupstream = "git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/firmw
 # Pin this to the 20220509 release, override this in local.conf
 SRCREV:class-devupstream ?= "b19cbdca78ab2adfd210c91be15a22568e8b8cae"
 
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "8b1acfa16f1ee94732a6acb50d9d6c835cf53af11068bd89ed207bbe04a1e951"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "87597111c0d4b71b31e53cb85a92c386921b84c825a402db8c82e0e86015500d"
 
 inherit allarch
 
@@ -239,6 +239,7 @@ PACKAGES =+ "${PN}-ralink-license ${PN}-ralink \
              ${PN}-rs9113 ${PN}-rs9116 \
              ${PN}-rtl-license ${PN}-rtl8188 ${PN}-rtl8192cu ${PN}-rtl8192ce ${PN}-rtl8192su ${PN}-rtl8723 ${PN}-rtl8821 \
              ${PN}-rtl8168 \
+             ${PN}-rtl8822 \
              ${PN}-cypress-license \
              ${PN}-broadcom-license \
              ${PN}-bcm-0bb4-0306 \
@@ -313,14 +314,15 @@ PACKAGES =+ "${PN}-ralink-license ${PN}-ralink \
              ${PN}-qcom-vpu-1.0 ${PN}-qcom-vpu-2.0 \
              ${PN}-qcom-adreno-a2xx ${PN}-qcom-adreno-a3xx ${PN}-qcom-adreno-a4xx ${PN}-qcom-adreno-a530 \
              ${PN}-qcom-adreno-a630 ${PN}-qcom-adreno-a650 ${PN}-qcom-adreno-a660 \
-             ${PN}-qcom-apq8096-audio ${PN}-qcom-apq8096-modem \
+             ${PN}-qcom-apq8016-modem ${PN}-qcom-apq8016-wifi \
+             ${PN}-qcom-apq8096-adreno ${PN}-qcom-apq8096-audio ${PN}-qcom-apq8096-modem \
              ${PN}-qcom-sc8280xp-lenovo-x13s-compat \
              ${PN}-qcom-sc8280xp-lenovo-x13s-audio \
              ${PN}-qcom-sc8280xp-lenovo-x13s-adreno \
              ${PN}-qcom-sc8280xp-lenovo-x13s-compute \
              ${PN}-qcom-sc8280xp-lenovo-x13s-sensors \
-             ${PN}-qcom-sdm845-audio ${PN}-qcom-sdm845-compute ${PN}-qcom-sdm845-modem \
-             ${PN}-qcom-sm8250-audio ${PN}-qcom-sm8250-compute \
+             ${PN}-qcom-sdm845-adreno ${PN}-qcom-sdm845-audio ${PN}-qcom-sdm845-compute ${PN}-qcom-sdm845-modem \
+             ${PN}-qcom-sm8250-adreno ${PN}-qcom-sm8250-audio ${PN}-qcom-sm8250-compute \
              ${PN}-amlogic-vdec-license ${PN}-amlogic-vdec \
              ${PN}-lt9611uxc ${PN}-lontium-license \
              ${PN}-whence-license \
@@ -411,7 +413,7 @@ LICENSE_${PN}-mt7601u-license = "Firmware-ralink_a_mediatek_company_firmware"
 
 FILES_${PN}-mt7601u-license = "${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/LICENCE.ralink_a_mediatek_company_firmware"
 FILES_${PN}-mt7601u = " \
-  ${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/mt7601u.bin \
+  ${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/mediatek/mt7601u.bin \
 "
 
 RDEPENDS_${PN}-mt7601u += "${PN}-mt7601u-license"
@@ -563,6 +565,7 @@ LICENSE_${PN}-rtl8192ce = "Firmware-rtlwifi_firmware"
 LICENSE_${PN}-rtl8192su = "Firmware-rtlwifi_firmware"
 LICENSE_${PN}-rtl8723 = "Firmware-rtlwifi_firmware"
 LICENSE_${PN}-rtl8821 = "Firmware-rtlwifi_firmware"
+LICENSE_${PN}-rtl8822 = "Firmware-rtlwifi_firmware"
 LICENSE_${PN}-rtl-license = "Firmware-rtlwifi_firmware"
 LICENSE_${PN}-rtl8168 = "WHENCE"
 
@@ -590,6 +593,11 @@ FILES_${PN}-rtl8821 = " \
 FILES_${PN}-rtl8168 = " \
   ${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/rtl_nic/rtl8168*.fw \
 "
+FILES_${PN}-rtl8822 = " \
+  ${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/rtl_bt/rtl8822*.bin \
+  ${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/rtw88/rtw8822*.bin \
+  ${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/rtlwifi/rtl8822*.bin \
+"
 
 RDEPENDS_${PN}-rtl8188 += "${PN}-rtl-license"
 RDEPENDS_${PN}-rtl8192ce += "${PN}-rtl-license"
@@ -597,6 +605,7 @@ RDEPENDS_${PN}-rtl8192cu += "${PN}-rtl-license"
 RDEPENDS_${PN}-rtl8192su = "${PN}-rtl-license"
 RDEPENDS_${PN}-rtl8723 += "${PN}-rtl-license"
 RDEPENDS_${PN}-rtl8821 += "${PN}-rtl-license"
+RDEPENDS_${PN}-rtl8822 += "${PN}-rtl-license"
 RDEPENDS_${PN}-rtl8168 += "${PN}-whence-license"
 
 # For ti-connectivity
@@ -978,16 +987,21 @@ LICENSE_${PN}-qcom-adreno-a530 = "Firmware-qcom"
 LICENSE_${PN}-qcom-adreno-a630 = "Firmware-qcom"
 LICENSE_${PN}-qcom-adreno-a650 = "Firmware-qcom"
 LICENSE_${PN}-qcom-adreno-a660 = "Firmware-qcom"
+LICENSE_${PN}-qcom-apq8016-modem = "Firmware-qcom"
+LICENSE_${PN}-qcom-apq8016-wifi = "Firmware-qcom"
 LICENSE_${PN}-qcom-apq8096-audio = "Firmware-qcom"
+LICENSE_${PN}-qcom-apq8096-adreno = "Firmware-qcom"
 LICENSE_${PN}-qcom-apq8096-modem = "Firmware-qcom"
 LICENSE_${PN}-qcom-sc8280xp-lenovo-x13s-audio = "Firmware-qcom"
 LICENSE_${PN}-qcom-sc8280xp-lenovo-x13s-adreno = "Firmware-qcom"
 LICENSE_${PN}-qcom-sc8280xp-lenovo-x13s-compute = "Firmware-qcom"
 LICENSE_${PN}-qcom-sc8280xp-lenovo-x13s-sensors = "Firmware-qcom"
 LICENSE_${PN}-qcom-sdm845-audio = "Firmware-qcom"
+LICENSE_${PN}-qcom-sdm845-adreno = "Firmware-qcom"
 LICENSE_${PN}-qcom-sdm845-compute = "Firmware-qcom"
 LICENSE_${PN}-qcom-sdm845-modem = "Firmware-qcom"
 LICENSE_${PN}-qcom-sm8250-audio = "Firmware-qcom"
+LICENSE_${PN}-qcom-sm8250-adreno = "Firmware-qcom"
 LICENSE_${PN}-qcom-sm8250-compute = "Firmware-qcom"
 
 FILES_${PN}-qcom-license   = "${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/LICENSE.qcom ${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/qcom/NOTICE.txt"
@@ -1001,10 +1015,13 @@ FILES_${PN}-qcom-vpu-2.0 = "${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/qcom/vpu-2.0/*"
 FILES_${PN}-qcom-adreno-a2xx = "${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/qcom/leia_*.fw ${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/qcom/yamato_*.fw"
 FILES_${PN}-qcom-adreno-a3xx = "${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/qcom/a3*_*.fw ${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/a300_*.fw"
 FILES_${PN}-qcom-adreno-a4xx = "${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/qcom/a4*_*.fw"
-FILES_${PN}-qcom-adreno-a530 = "${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/qcom/a530*.*"
-FILES_${PN}-qcom-adreno-a630 = "${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/qcom/a630*.* ${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/qcom/sdm845/a630*.*"
-FILES_${PN}-qcom-adreno-a650 = "${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/qcom/a650*.* ${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/qcom/sm8250/a650*.*"
+FILES_${PN}-qcom-adreno-a530 = "${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/qcom/a530*.fw*"
+FILES_${PN}-qcom-adreno-a630 = "${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/qcom/a630*.*"
+FILES_${PN}-qcom-adreno-a650 = "${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/qcom/a650*.*"
 FILES_${PN}-qcom-adreno-a660 = "${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/qcom/a660*.*"
+FILES_${PN}-qcom-apq8016-modem = "${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/qcom/apq8016/mba.mbn ${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/qcom/apq8016/modem.mbn"
+FILES_${PN}-qcom-apq8016-wifi = "${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/qcom/apq8016/wcnss.mbn ${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/qcom/apq8016/WCNSS*"
+FILES_${PN}-qcom-apq8096-adreno = "${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/qcom/apq8096/a530_zap.mbn ${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/qcom/a530_zap.mdt"
 FILES_${PN}-qcom-apq8096-audio = "${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/qcom/apq8096/adsp*.*"
 FILES_${PN}-qcom-apq8096-modem = "${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/qcom/apq8096/mba.mbn ${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/qcom/apq8096/modem*.* ${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/qcom/apq8096/wlanmdsp.mbn"
 FILES_${PN}-qcom-sc8280xp-lenovo-x13s-compat = "${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/qcom/LENOVO/21BX"
@@ -1012,9 +1029,11 @@ FILES_${PN}-qcom-sc8280xp-lenovo-x13s-audio = "${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/q
 FILES_${PN}-qcom-sc8280xp-lenovo-x13s-adreno = "${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/qcom/sc8280xp/LENOVO/21BX/qcdxkmsuc8280.mbn"
 FILES_${PN}-qcom-sc8280xp-lenovo-x13s-compute = "${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/qcom/sc8280xp/LENOVO/21BX/*cdsp*.*"
 FILES_${PN}-qcom-sc8280xp-lenovo-x13s-sensors = "${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/qcom/sc8280xp/LENOVO/21BX/*slpi*.*"
+FILES_${PN}-qcom-sdm845-adreno = "${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/qcom/sdm845/a630*.*"
 FILES_${PN}-qcom-sdm845-audio = "${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/qcom/sdm845/adsp*.*"
 FILES_${PN}-qcom-sdm845-compute = "${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/qcom/sdm845/cdsp*.*"
 FILES_${PN}-qcom-sdm845-modem = "${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/qcom/sdm845/mba.mbn ${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/qcom/sdm845/modem*.* ${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/qcom/sdm845/wlanmdsp.mbn"
+FILES_${PN}-qcom-sm8250-adreno = "${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/qcom/sm8250/a650*.*"
 FILES_${PN}-qcom-sm8250-audio = "${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/qcom/sm8250/adsp*.*"
 FILES_${PN}-qcom-sm8250-compute = "${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/qcom/sm8250/cdsp*.*"
 RDEPENDS_${PN}-qcom-venus-1.8 = "${PN}-qcom-license"
@@ -1030,6 +1049,8 @@ RDEPENDS_${PN}-qcom-adreno-a530 = "${PN}-qcom-license"
 RDEPENDS_${PN}-qcom-adreno-a630 = "${PN}-qcom-license"
 RDEPENDS_${PN}-qcom-adreno-a650 = "${PN}-qcom-license"
 RDEPENDS_${PN}-qcom-adreno-a660 = "${PN}-qcom-license"
+RDEPENDS_${PN}-qcom-apq8016-modem = "${PN}-qcom-license"
+RDEPENDS_${PN}-qcom-apq8016-wifi = "${PN}-qcom-license"
 RDEPENDS_${PN}-qcom-apq8096-audio = "${PN}-qcom-license"
 RDEPENDS_${PN}-qcom-apq8096-modem = "${PN}-qcom-license"
 RDEPENDS_${PN}-qcom-sc8280xp-lenovo-x13s-audio = "${PN}-qcom-license"

meta/recipes-kernel/linux/generate-cve-exclusions.py

@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env python3
+
+# Generate granular CVE status metadata for a specific version of the kernel
+# using data from linuxkernelcves.com.
+#
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+
+import argparse
+import datetime
+import json
+import pathlib
+import re
+
+from packaging.version import Version
+
+
+def parse_version(s):
+    """
+    Parse the version string and either return a packaging.version.Version, or
+    None if the string was unset or "unk".
+    """
+    if s and s != "unk":
+        # packaging.version.Version doesn't approve of versions like v5.12-rc1-dontuse
+        s = s.replace("-dontuse", "")
+        return Version(s)
+    return None
+
+
+def main(argp=None):
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    parser.add_argument("datadir", type=pathlib.Path, help="Path to a clone of https://github.com/nluedtke/linux_kernel_cves")
+    parser.add_argument("version", type=Version, help="Kernel version number to generate data for, such as 6.1.38")
+
+    args = parser.parse_args(argp)
+    datadir = args.datadir
+    version = args.version
+    base_version = f"{version.major}.{version.minor}"
+
+    with open(datadir / "data" / "kernel_cves.json", "r") as f:
+        cve_data = json.load(f)
+
+    with open(datadir / "data" / "stream_fixes.json", "r") as f:
+        stream_data = json.load(f)
+
+    print(f"""
+# Auto-generated CVE metadata, DO NOT EDIT BY HAND.
+# Generated at {datetime.datetime.now()} for version {version}
+
+python check_kernel_cve_status_version() {{
+    this_version = "{version}"
+    kernel_version = d.getVar("LINUX_VERSION")
+    if kernel_version != this_version:
+        bb.warn("Kernel CVE status needs updating: generated for %s but kernel is %s" % (this_version, kernel_version))
+}}
+do_cve_check[prefuncs] += "check_kernel_cve_status_version"
+""")
+
+    for cve, data in cve_data.items():
+        if "affected_versions" not in data:
+            print(f"# Skipping {cve}, no affected_versions")
+            print()
+            continue
+
+        affected = data["affected_versions"]
+        first_affected, last_affected = re.search(r"(.+) to (.+)", affected).groups()
+        first_affected = parse_version(first_affected)
+        last_affected = parse_version(last_affected)
+
+        handled = False
+        if not last_affected:
+            print(f"# {cve} has no known resolution")
+        elif first_affected and version < first_affected:
+            print(f"# fixed-version: only affects {first_affected} onwards")
+            handled = True
+        elif last_affected < version:
+            print(f"# fixed-version: Fixed after version {last_affected}")
+            handled = True
+        else:
+            if cve in stream_data:
+                backport_data = stream_data[cve]
+                if base_version in backport_data:
+                    backport_ver = Version(backport_data[base_version]["fixed_version"])
+                    if backport_ver <= version:
+                        print(f"# cpe-stable-backport: Backported in {backport_ver}")
+                        handled = True
+                    else:
+                        # TODO print a note that the kernel needs bumping
+                        print(f"# {cve} needs backporting (fixed from {backport_ver})")
+                else:
+                    print(f"# {cve} needs backporting (fixed from {last_affected})")
+            else:
+                print(f"# {cve} needs backporting (fixed from {last_affected})")
+
+        if handled:
+            print(f'CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "{cve}"')
+
+        print()
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()

meta/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto-rt_5.4.bb

@@ -11,13 +11,13 @@ python () {
         raise bb.parse.SkipRecipe("Set PREFERRED_PROVIDER_virtual/kernel to linux-yocto-rt to enable it")
 }
 
-SRCREV_machine ?= "8d8179549a233e7517523ac12887016451da2e20"
-SRCREV_meta ?= "465d61ba36f5c7e32d1fddef078d5d2068fcc2cc"
+SRCREV_machine ?= "6a552f5822442183d2487c91903f27085183ca0e"
+SRCREV_meta ?= "25f38de25d47570a132a18a1dc147b10e05b378b"
 
 SRC_URI = "git://git.yoctoproject.org/linux-yocto.git;branch=${KBRANCH};name=machine \
            git://git.yoctoproject.org/yocto-kernel-cache;type=kmeta;name=meta;branch=yocto-5.4;destsuffix=${KMETA}"
 
-LINUX_VERSION ?= "5.4.248"
+LINUX_VERSION ?= "5.4.251"
 
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=bbea815ee2795b2f4230826c0c6b8814"
 

meta/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto-tiny_5.4.bb

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ KCONFIG_MODE = "--allnoconfig"
 
 require recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto.inc
 
-LINUX_VERSION ?= "5.4.248"
+LINUX_VERSION ?= "5.4.251"
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=bbea815ee2795b2f4230826c0c6b8814"
 
 DEPENDS += "${@bb.utils.contains('ARCH', 'x86', 'elfutils-native', '', d)}"
@@ -15,9 +15,9 @@ DEPENDS += "openssl-native util-linux-native"
 KMETA = "kernel-meta"
 KCONF_BSP_AUDIT_LEVEL = "2"
 
-SRCREV_machine_qemuarm ?= "ca5368c73bab4eb276a8e721df28c02ceb8f3eeb"
-SRCREV_machine ?= "abb579170926348d1518bc1a2de8cb1cdf403808"
-SRCREV_meta ?= "465d61ba36f5c7e32d1fddef078d5d2068fcc2cc"
+SRCREV_machine_qemuarm ?= "29ae0b5c67d29249bf00cb8eaaae5914d928bbd6"
+SRCREV_machine ?= "16db12c2685020aa6347a18df5099f40a9176366"
+SRCREV_meta ?= "25f38de25d47570a132a18a1dc147b10e05b378b"
 
 PV = "${LINUX_VERSION}+git${SRCPV}"
 

meta/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto_5.4.bb

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 KBRANCH ?= "v5.4/standard/base"
 
 require recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto.inc
+include recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion_5.4.inc
 
 # board specific branches
 KBRANCH_qemuarm  ?= "v5.4/standard/arm-versatile-926ejs"
@@ -12,16 +13,16 @@ KBRANCH_qemux86  ?= "v5.4/standard/base"
 KBRANCH_qemux86-64 ?= "v5.4/standard/base"
 KBRANCH_qemumips64 ?= "v5.4/standard/mti-malta64"
 
-SRCREV_machine_qemuarm ?= "68775a8671944b96c6a1ee795809f81149951f2d"
-SRCREV_machine_qemuarm64 ?= "54bc3d459501d8df9baf093a34d8bb676c207a07"
-SRCREV_machine_qemumips ?= "ba2d346cc66307fa6332b9fb86eb8ca66f30ebcd"
-SRCREV_machine_qemuppc ?= "6703d4c7c75fab78e0c72227a98aba8071d5b1c3"
-SRCREV_machine_qemuriscv64 ?= "d18af0e8acb7c4cb245739fa8165a44845ff2ba0"
-SRCREV_machine_qemux86 ?= "d18af0e8acb7c4cb245739fa8165a44845ff2ba0"
-SRCREV_machine_qemux86-64 ?= "d18af0e8acb7c4cb245739fa8165a44845ff2ba0"
-SRCREV_machine_qemumips64 ?= "66cac7d41a43594760f6ac48e848d73315cc5dd3"
-SRCREV_machine ?= "d18af0e8acb7c4cb245739fa8165a44845ff2ba0"
-SRCREV_meta ?= "465d61ba36f5c7e32d1fddef078d5d2068fcc2cc"
+SRCREV_machine_qemuarm ?= "9a096c043b453855252aece3716d50fdf4111a77"
+SRCREV_machine_qemuarm64 ?= "25499e5c52ebb2111a3dd7dd863937f56cf2a39d"
+SRCREV_machine_qemumips ?= "12e990899599d1aac8dd8007a8864db68135d6f0"
+SRCREV_machine_qemuppc ?= "19d91ad471bb87a464520283e58d5ff83c7151fa"
+SRCREV_machine_qemuriscv64 ?= "2adacd3242d46ddaff62e5a4695b98edf01cccc5"
+SRCREV_machine_qemux86 ?= "2adacd3242d46ddaff62e5a4695b98edf01cccc5"
+SRCREV_machine_qemux86-64 ?= "2adacd3242d46ddaff62e5a4695b98edf01cccc5"
+SRCREV_machine_qemumips64 ?= "854f6bee15babf95445644cba59691cd45173180"
+SRCREV_machine ?= "2adacd3242d46ddaff62e5a4695b98edf01cccc5"
+SRCREV_meta ?= "25f38de25d47570a132a18a1dc147b10e05b378b"
 
 # remap qemuarm to qemuarma15 for the 5.4 kernel
 # KMACHINE_qemuarm ?= "qemuarma15"
@@ -30,7 +31,7 @@ SRC_URI = "git://git.yoctoproject.org/linux-yocto.git;name=machine;branch=${KBRA
            git://git.yoctoproject.org/yocto-kernel-cache;type=kmeta;name=meta;branch=yocto-5.4;destsuffix=${KMETA}"
 
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=bbea815ee2795b2f4230826c0c6b8814"
-LINUX_VERSION ?= "5.4.248"
+LINUX_VERSION ?= "5.4.251"
 
 DEPENDS += "${@bb.utils.contains('ARCH', 'x86', 'elfutils-native', '', d)}"
 DEPENDS += "openssl-native util-linux-native"

meta/recipes-multimedia/libtiff/files/CVE-2022-3599.patch

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ Date: Tue, 30 Aug 2022 16:56:48 +0200
 Subject: [PATCH] Revised handling of TIFFTAG_INKNAMES and related
 
 Upstream-Status: Backport [import from debian http://security.debian.org/debian-security/pool/updates/main/t/tiff/tiff_4.1.0+git191117-2~deb10u7.debian.tar.xz ]
-CVE: CVE-2022-3599
+CVE: CVE-2022-3599 CVE-2022-4645 CVE-2023-30774
 Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
 
 Origin: https://gitlab.com/libtiff/libtiff/-/commit/e813112545942107551433d61afd16ac094ff246

meta/recipes-multimedia/libtiff/files/CVE-2023-25433.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
+From 9c22495e5eeeae9e00a1596720c969656bb8d678 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Su_Laus <sulau@freenet.de>
+Date: Fri, 3 Feb 2023 15:31:31 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] tiffcrop correctly update buffersize after rotateImage()
+ fix#520 rotateImage() set up a new buffer and calculates its size
+ individually. Therefore, seg_buffs[] size needs to be updated accordingly.
+ Before this fix, the seg_buffs buffer size was calculated with a different
+ formula than within rotateImage().
+
+Closes #520.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/libtiff/libtiff/-/commit/9c22495e5eeeae9e00a1596720c969656bb8d678 && https://gitlab.com/libtiff/libtiff/-/commit/688012dca2c39033aa2dc7bcea9796787cfd1b44]
+CVE: CVE-2023-25433
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+---
+ tools/tiffcrop.c | 69 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
+ 1 file changed, 56 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/tools/tiffcrop.c b/tools/tiffcrop.c
+index 742615a..aab0ec6 100644
+--- a/tools/tiffcrop.c
++++ b/tools/tiffcrop.c
+@@ -531,7 +531,7 @@ static int rotateContigSamples24bits(uint16, uint16, uint16, uint32,
+ static int rotateContigSamples32bits(uint16, uint16, uint16, uint32, 
+                                      uint32,   uint32, uint8 *, uint8 *);
+ static int rotateImage(uint16, struct image_data *, uint32 *, uint32 *,
+- 		       unsigned char **, int);
++		       unsigned char **, size_t *);
+ static int mirrorImage(uint16, uint16, uint16, uint32, uint32,
+ 		       unsigned char *);
+ static int invertImage(uint16, uint16, uint16, uint32, uint32,
+@@ -6384,7 +6384,7 @@ static int  correct_orientation(struct image_data *image, unsigned char **work_b
+        * but switch xres, yres there. */
+       uint32_t width = image->width;
+       uint32_t length = image->length;
+-      if (rotateImage(rotation, image, &width, &length, work_buff_ptr, TRUE))
++      if (rotateImage(rotation, image, &width, &length, work_buff_ptr, NULL))
+       {
+       TIFFError ("correct_orientation", "Unable to rotate image");
+       return (-1);
+@@ -7607,8 +7607,12 @@ processCropSelections(struct image_data *image, struct crop_mask *crop,
+ 
+     if (crop->crop_mode & CROP_ROTATE) /* rotate should be last as it can reallocate the buffer */
+       {
++      /* rotateImage() set up a new buffer and calculates its size
++       * individually. Therefore, seg_buffs size  needs to be updated
++       * accordingly. */
++      size_t rot_buf_size = 0;
+       if (rotateImage(crop->rotation, image, &crop->combined_width, 
+-                      &crop->combined_length, &crop_buff, FALSE))
++                      &crop->combined_length, &crop_buff, &rot_buf_size))
+         {
+         TIFFError("processCropSelections", 
+                   "Failed to rotate composite regions by %d degrees", crop->rotation);
+@@ -7713,8 +7717,13 @@ processCropSelections(struct image_data *image, struct crop_mask *crop,
+ 
+       if (crop->crop_mode & CROP_ROTATE) /* rotate should be last as it can reallocate the buffer */
+         {
+-	if (rotateImage(crop->rotation, image, &crop->regionlist[i].width, 
+-			&crop->regionlist[i].length, &crop_buff, FALSE))
++	  /* Furthermore, rotateImage() set up a new buffer and calculates
++           * its size individually. Therefore, seg_buffs size  needs to be
++           * updated accordingly. */
++           size_t rot_buf_size = 0;
++           if (rotateImage(
++                crop->rotation, image, &crop->regionlist[i].width,
++                &crop->regionlist[i].length, &crop_buff, &rot_buf_size))
+           {
+           TIFFError("processCropSelections", 
+                     "Failed to rotate crop region by %d degrees", crop->rotation);
+@@ -7725,8 +7734,7 @@ processCropSelections(struct image_data *image, struct crop_mask *crop,
+         crop->combined_width = total_width;
+         crop->combined_length = total_length;
+         seg_buffs[i].buffer = crop_buff;
+-        seg_buffs[i].size = (((crop->regionlist[i].width * image->bps + 7 ) / 8)
+-                               * image->spp) * crop->regionlist[i].length; 
++        seg_buffs[i].size = rot_buf_size;
+         }
+       }
+     }
+@@ -7735,7 +7743,6 @@ processCropSelections(struct image_data *image, struct crop_mask *crop,
+ 
+ /* Copy the crop section of the data from the current image into a buffer
+  * and adjust the IFD values to reflect the new size. If no cropping is
+- * required, use the origial read buffer as the crop buffer.
+  *
+  * There is quite a bit of redundancy between this routine and the more
+  * specialized processCropSelections, but this provides
+@@ -7846,7 +7853,7 @@ createCroppedImage(struct image_data *image, struct crop_mask *crop,
+   if (crop->crop_mode & CROP_ROTATE) /* rotate should be last as it can reallocate the buffer */
+     {
+     if (rotateImage(crop->rotation, image, &crop->combined_width, 
+-                    &crop->combined_length, crop_buff_ptr, TRUE))
++                    &crop->combined_length, crop_buff_ptr, NULL))
+       {
+       TIFFError("createCroppedImage", 
+                 "Failed to rotate image or cropped selection by %d degrees", crop->rotation);
+@@ -8515,7 +8522,8 @@ rotateImage(uint16 rotation, struct image_data *image, uint32 *img_width,
+   uint32   bytes_per_pixel, bytes_per_sample;
+   uint32   row, rowsize, src_offset, dst_offset;
+   uint32   i, col, width, length;
+-  uint32   colsize, buffsize, col_offset, pix_offset;
++  uint32   colsize, col_offset, pix_offset;
++  tmsize_t buffsize;
+   unsigned char *ibuff;
+   unsigned char *src;
+   unsigned char *dst;
+@@ -8528,12 +8536,41 @@ rotateImage(uint16 rotation, struct image_data *image, uint32 *img_width,
+   spp = image->spp;
+   bps = image->bps;
+ 
++  if ((spp != 0 && bps != 0 &&
++         width > (uint32_t)((UINT32_MAX - 7) / spp / bps)) ||
++        (spp != 0 && bps != 0 &&
++         length > (uint32_t)((UINT32_MAX - 7) / spp / bps)))
++    {
++        TIFFError("rotateImage", "Integer overflow detected.");
++        return (-1);
++    }
++
+   rowsize = ((bps * spp * width) + 7) / 8;
+   colsize = ((bps * spp * length) + 7) / 8;
+   if ((colsize * width) > (rowsize * length))
+-    buffsize = (colsize + 1) * width;
++{
++        if (((tmsize_t)colsize + 1) != 0 &&
++            (tmsize_t)width > ((TIFF_TMSIZE_T_MAX - NUM_BUFF_OVERSIZE_BYTES) /
++                               ((tmsize_t)colsize + 1)))
++        {
++            TIFFError("rotateImage",
++                      "Integer overflow when calculating buffer size.");
++            return (-1);
++        }
++        buffsize = ((tmsize_t)colsize + 1) * width;
++    }
+   else
+-    buffsize = (rowsize + 1) * length;
++    {
++        if (((tmsize_t)rowsize + 1) != 0 &&
++            (tmsize_t)length > ((TIFF_TMSIZE_T_MAX - NUM_BUFF_OVERSIZE_BYTES) /
++                                ((tmsize_t)rowsize + 1)))
++        {
++            TIFFError("rotateImage",
++                      "Integer overflow when calculating buffer size.");
++            return (-1);
++        }
++        buffsize = (rowsize + 1) * length;
++    }
+ 
+   bytes_per_sample = (bps + 7) / 8;
+   bytes_per_pixel  = ((bps * spp) + 7) / 8;
+@@ -8556,11 +8593,17 @@ rotateImage(uint16 rotation, struct image_data *image, uint32 *img_width,
+   /* Add 3 padding bytes for extractContigSamplesShifted32bits */
+   if (!(rbuff = (unsigned char *)_TIFFmalloc(buffsize + NUM_BUFF_OVERSIZE_BYTES)))
+     {
+-    TIFFError("rotateImage", "Unable to allocate rotation buffer of %1u bytes", buffsize + NUM_BUFF_OVERSIZE_BYTES);
++    TIFFError("rotateImage",
++              "Unable to allocate rotation buffer of %" TIFF_SSIZE_FORMAT
++              " bytes ",
++              buffsize + NUM_BUFF_OVERSIZE_BYTES);
+     return (-1);
+     }
+   _TIFFmemset(rbuff, '\0', buffsize + NUM_BUFF_OVERSIZE_BYTES);
+ 
++  if (rot_buf_size != NULL)
++	*rot_buf_size = buffsize;
++
+   ibuff = *ibuff_ptr;
+   switch (rotation)
+     {
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-multimedia/libtiff/files/CVE-2023-25434-CVE-2023-25435.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+From 69818e2f2d246e6631ac2a2da692c3706b849c38 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Su_Laus <sulau@freenet.de>
+Date: Sun, 29 Jan 2023 11:09:26 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] tiffcrop: Amend rotateImage() not to toggle the input (main)
+ image width and length parameters when only cropped image sections are
+ rotated. Remove buffptr from region structure because never used.
+
+Closes #492 #493 #494 #495 #499 #518 #519
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/libtiff/libtiff/-/commit/69818e2f2d246e6631ac2a2da692c3706b849c38]
+CVE: CVE-2023-25434 & CVE-2023-25435
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+---
+ tools/tiffcrop.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++------------
+ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/tools/tiffcrop.c b/tools/tiffcrop.c
+index aab0ec6..ce84414 100644
+--- a/tools/tiffcrop.c
++++ b/tools/tiffcrop.c
+@@ -531,7 +531,7 @@ static int rotateContigSamples24bits(uint16, uint16, uint16, uint32,
+ static int rotateContigSamples32bits(uint16, uint16, uint16, uint32, 
+                                      uint32,   uint32, uint8 *, uint8 *);
+ static int rotateImage(uint16, struct image_data *, uint32 *, uint32 *,
+-		       unsigned char **, size_t *);
++		       unsigned char **, size_t *, int);
+ static int mirrorImage(uint16, uint16, uint16, uint32, uint32,
+ 		       unsigned char *);
+ static int invertImage(uint16, uint16, uint16, uint32, uint32,
+@@ -6382,10 +6382,11 @@ static int  correct_orientation(struct image_data *image, unsigned char **work_b
+       /* Dummy variable in order not to switch two times the
+        * image->width,->length within rotateImage(),
+        * but switch xres, yres there. */
+-      uint32_t width = image->width;
+-      uint32_t length = image->length;
+-      if (rotateImage(rotation, image, &width, &length, work_buff_ptr, NULL))
+-      {
++        uint32_t width = image->width;
++        uint32_t length = image->length;
++        if (rotateImage(rotation, image, &width, &length, work_buff_ptr, NULL,
++                        TRUE))
++        {
+       TIFFError ("correct_orientation", "Unable to rotate image");
+       return (-1);
+       }
+@@ -7612,7 +7613,8 @@ processCropSelections(struct image_data *image, struct crop_mask *crop,
+        * accordingly. */
+       size_t rot_buf_size = 0;
+       if (rotateImage(crop->rotation, image, &crop->combined_width, 
+-                      &crop->combined_length, &crop_buff, &rot_buf_size))
++                      &crop->combined_length, &crop_buff, &rot_buf_size,
++                            FALSE))
+         {
+         TIFFError("processCropSelections", 
+                   "Failed to rotate composite regions by %d degrees", crop->rotation);
+@@ -7721,9 +7723,10 @@ processCropSelections(struct image_data *image, struct crop_mask *crop,
+            * its size individually. Therefore, seg_buffs size  needs to be
+            * updated accordingly. */
+            size_t rot_buf_size = 0;
+-           if (rotateImage(
+-                crop->rotation, image, &crop->regionlist[i].width,
+-                &crop->regionlist[i].length, &crop_buff, &rot_buf_size))
++           if (rotateImage(crop->rotation, image,
++                                &crop->regionlist[i].width,
++                                &crop->regionlist[i].length, &crop_buff,
++                                &rot_buf_size, FALSE))
+           {
+           TIFFError("processCropSelections", 
+                     "Failed to rotate crop region by %d degrees", crop->rotation);
+@@ -7853,7 +7856,7 @@ createCroppedImage(struct image_data *image, struct crop_mask *crop,
+   if (crop->crop_mode & CROP_ROTATE) /* rotate should be last as it can reallocate the buffer */
+     {
+     if (rotateImage(crop->rotation, image, &crop->combined_width, 
+-                    &crop->combined_length, crop_buff_ptr, NULL))
++                    &crop->combined_length, crop_buff_ptr, NULL, TRUE))
+       {
+       TIFFError("createCroppedImage", 
+                 "Failed to rotate image or cropped selection by %d degrees", crop->rotation);
+@@ -8515,8 +8518,10 @@ rotateContigSamples32bits(uint16 rotation, uint16 spp, uint16 bps, uint32 width,
+ 
+ /* Rotate an image by a multiple of 90 degrees clockwise */
+ static int
+-rotateImage(uint16 rotation, struct image_data *image, uint32 *img_width, 
+-            uint32 *img_length, unsigned char **ibuff_ptr, int rot_image_params)
++rotateImage(uint16 rotation, struct image_data *image,
++            uint32 *img_width, uint32 *img_length,
++            unsigned char **ibuff_ptr, size_t *rot_buf_size,
++            int rot_image_params)
+   {
+   int      shift_width;
+   uint32   bytes_per_pixel, bytes_per_sample;
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-multimedia/libtiff/files/CVE-2023-26965.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+From ec8ef90c1f573c9eb1f17d6a056aa0015f184acf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Su_Laus <sulau@freenet.de>
+Date: Tue, 14 Feb 2023 20:43:43 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] tiffcrop: Do not reuse input buffer for subsequent images.
+ Fix issue 527
+
+Reuse of read_buff within loadImage() from previous image is quite unsafe, because other functions (like rotateImage() etc.) reallocate that buffer with different size without updating the local prev_readsize value.
+
+Closes #527
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [import from debian http://security.debian.org/debian-security/pool/updates/main/t/tiff/tiff_4.1.0+git191117-2~deb10u8.debian.tar.xz]
+CVE: CVE-2023-26965
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+---
+ tools/tiffcrop.c | 40 ++++++++++------------------------------
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/tools/tiffcrop.c b/tools/tiffcrop.c
+index ce84414..a533089 100644
+--- a/tools/tiffcrop.c
++++ b/tools/tiffcrop.c
+@@ -5935,9 +5935,7 @@ loadImage(TIFF* in, struct image_data *image, struct dump_opts *dump, unsigned c
+   uint32   tw = 0, tl = 0;       /* Tile width and length */
+   tmsize_t   tile_rowsize = 0;
+   unsigned char *read_buff = NULL;
+-  unsigned char *new_buff  = NULL;
+   int      readunit = 0;
+-  static   tmsize_t  prev_readsize = 0;
+ 
+   TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(in, TIFFTAG_BITSPERSAMPLE, &bps);
+   TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(in, TIFFTAG_SAMPLESPERPIXEL, &spp);
+@@ -6232,37 +6230,20 @@ loadImage(TIFF* in, struct image_data *image, struct dump_opts *dump, unsigned c
+   read_buff = *read_ptr;
+   /* +3 : add a few guard bytes since reverseSamples16bits() can read a bit */
+   /* outside buffer */
+-  if (!read_buff)
++  if (read_buff)
+   {
+-    if( buffsize > 0xFFFFFFFFU - 3 )
+-    {
+-        TIFFError("loadImage", "Unable to allocate/reallocate read buffer");
+-        return (-1);
+-    }
+-    read_buff = (unsigned char *)_TIFFmalloc(buffsize + NUM_BUFF_OVERSIZE_BYTES);
++    _TIFFfree(read_buff);
+   }
+-  else
+-    {
+-    if (prev_readsize < buffsize)
+-    {
+-      if( buffsize > 0xFFFFFFFFU - 3 )
+-      {
+-          TIFFError("loadImage", "Unable to allocate/reallocate read buffer");
+-          return (-1);
+-      }
+-      new_buff = _TIFFrealloc(read_buff, buffsize + NUM_BUFF_OVERSIZE_BYTES);
+-      if (!new_buff)
+-        {
+-	free (read_buff);
+-        read_buff = (unsigned char *)_TIFFmalloc(buffsize + NUM_BUFF_OVERSIZE_BYTES);
+-        }
+-      else
+-        read_buff = new_buff;
+-      }
+-    }
++  if (buffsize > 0xFFFFFFFFU - 3)
++  {
++    TIFFError("loadImage", "Required read buffer size too large");
++    return (-1);
++  }
++  read_buff =
++    (unsigned char *)_TIFFmalloc(buffsize + NUM_BUFF_OVERSIZE_BYTES);
+   if (!read_buff)
+     {
+-    TIFFError("loadImage", "Unable to allocate/reallocate read buffer");
++    TIFFError("loadImage", "Unable to allocate read buffer");
+     return (-1);
+     }
+ 
+@@ -6270,7 +6251,6 @@ loadImage(TIFF* in, struct image_data *image, struct dump_opts *dump, unsigned c
+   read_buff[buffsize+1] = 0;
+   read_buff[buffsize+2] = 0;
+ 
+-  prev_readsize = buffsize;
+   *read_ptr = read_buff;
+ 
+   /* N.B. The read functions used copy separate plane data into a buffer as interleaved
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-multimedia/libtiff/files/CVE-2023-26966.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+From b0e1c25dd1d065200c8d8f59ad0afe014861a1b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Su_Laus <sulau@freenet.de>
+Date: Thu, 16 Feb 2023 12:03:16 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] tif_luv: Check and correct for NaN data in uv_encode().
+
+Closes #530
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [import from debian http://security.debian.org/debian-security/pool/updates/main/t/tiff/tiff_4.1.0+git191117-2~deb10u8.debian.tar.xz]
+CVE: CVE-2023-26966
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+---
+ libtiff/tif_luv.c | 7 +++++++
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/libtiff/tif_luv.c b/libtiff/tif_luv.c
+index 6fe4858..8b2c5f1 100644
+--- a/libtiff/tif_luv.c
++++ b/libtiff/tif_luv.c
+@@ -923,6 +923,13 @@ uv_encode(double u, double v, int em)	/* encode (u',v') coordinates */
+ {
+ 	register int	vi, ui;
+ 
++	/* check for NaN */
++	if (u != u || v != v)
++	{
++		u = U_NEU;
++		v = V_NEU;
++        }
++
+ 	if (v < UV_VSTART)
+ 		return oog_encode(u, v);
+ 	vi = itrunc((v - UV_VSTART)*(1./UV_SQSIZ), em);
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-multimedia/libtiff/files/CVE-2023-2908.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+From 8c0859a80444c90b8dfb862a9f16de74e16f0a9e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: xiaoxiaoafeifei <lliangliang2007@163.com>
+Date: Fri, 21 Apr 2023 13:01:34 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] countInkNamesString(): fix `UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer`:
+ applying zero offset to null pointer
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/libtiff/libtiff/-/commit/9bd48f0dbd64fb94dc2b5b05238fde0bfdd4ff3f]
+CVE: CVE-2023-2908
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+---
+ libtiff/tif_dir.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/libtiff/tif_dir.c b/libtiff/tif_dir.c
+index 9d8267a..6389b40 100644
+--- a/libtiff/tif_dir.c
++++ b/libtiff/tif_dir.c
+@@ -145,10 +145,10 @@ static uint16
+ countInkNamesString(TIFF *tif, uint32 slen, const char *s)
+ {
+ 	uint16 i = 0;
+-	const char *ep = s + slen;
+-	const char *cp = s;
+ 
+ 	if (slen > 0) {
++		const char *ep = s + slen;
++	        const char *cp = s;
+ 		do {
+ 			for (; cp < ep && *cp != '\0'; cp++) {}
+ 			if (cp >= ep)
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-multimedia/libtiff/files/CVE-2023-3316.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+From d63de61b1ec3385f6383ef9a1f453e4b8b11d536 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Su_Laus <sulau@freenet.de>
+Date: Fri, 3 Feb 2023 17:38:55 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] TIFFClose() avoid NULL pointer dereferencing. fix#515
+
+Closes #515
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/libtiff/libtiff/-/commit/d63de61b1ec3385f6383ef9a1f453e4b8b11d536]
+CVE: CVE-2023-3316
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+---
+ libtiff/tif_close.c | 11 +++++++----
+ tools/tiffcrop.c    |  5 ++++-
+ 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/libtiff/tif_close.c b/libtiff/tif_close.c
+index e4228df..335e80f 100644
+--- a/libtiff/tif_close.c
++++ b/libtiff/tif_close.c
+@@ -118,13 +118,16 @@ TIFFCleanup(TIFF* tif)
+  */
+ 
+ void
+-TIFFClose(TIFF* tif)
++TIFFClose(TIFF *tif)
+ {
+-	TIFFCloseProc closeproc = tif->tif_closeproc;
+-	thandle_t fd = tif->tif_clientdata;
++    if (tif != NULL)
++    {
++        TIFFCloseProc closeproc = tif->tif_closeproc;
++        thandle_t fd = tif->tif_clientdata;
+ 
+ 	TIFFCleanup(tif);
+-	(void) (*closeproc)(fd);
++        (void)(*closeproc)(fd);
++    }
+ }
+ 
+ /* vim: set ts=8 sts=8 sw=8 noet: */
+diff --git a/tools/tiffcrop.c b/tools/tiffcrop.c
+index a533089..f14bb0c 100644
+--- a/tools/tiffcrop.c
++++ b/tools/tiffcrop.c
+@@ -2526,7 +2526,10 @@ main(int argc, char* argv[])
+       }
+     }
+ 
+-  TIFFClose(out);
++    if (out != NULL)
++    {
++        TIFFClose(out);
++    }
+ 
+   return (0);
+   } /* end main */
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-multimedia/libtiff/files/CVE-2023-3618-1.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+From 881a070194783561fd209b7c789a4e75566f7f37 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: zhailiangliang <zhailiangliang@loongson.cn>
+Date: Tue, 7 Mar 2023 15:02:08 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix memory leak in tiffcrop.c
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/libtiff/libtiff/-/commit/881a070194783561fd209b7c789a4e75566f7f37]
+CVE: CVE-2023-3618
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+---
+ tools/tiffcrop.c | 7 ++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/tools/tiffcrop.c b/tools/tiffcrop.c
+index f14bb0c..7121c7c 100644
+--- a/tools/tiffcrop.c
++++ b/tools/tiffcrop.c
+@@ -7746,8 +7746,13 @@ createCroppedImage(struct image_data *image, struct crop_mask *crop,
+ 
+   read_buff = *read_buff_ptr;
+ 
++  /* Memory is freed before crop_buff_ptr is overwritten */
++    if (*crop_buff_ptr != NULL)
++    {
++	_TIFFfree(*crop_buff_ptr);
++    }
++
+   /* process full image, no crop buffer needed */
+-  crop_buff = read_buff;
+   *crop_buff_ptr = read_buff;
+   crop->combined_width = image->width;
+   crop->combined_length = image->length;
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-multimedia/libtiff/files/CVE-2023-3618-2.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+From b5c7d4c4e03333ac16b5cfb11acaaeaa493334f8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Su_Laus <sulau@freenet.de>
+Date: Fri, 5 May 2023 19:43:46 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Consider error return of writeSelections(). Fixes #553
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/libtiff/libtiff/-/commit/b5c7d4c4e03333ac16b5cfb11acaaeaa493334f8]
+CVE: CVE-2023-3618
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+---
+ tools/tiffcrop.c | 14 ++++++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/tools/tiffcrop.c b/tools/tiffcrop.c
+index 7121c7c..93b7f96 100644
+--- a/tools/tiffcrop.c
++++ b/tools/tiffcrop.c
+@@ -2437,9 +2437,15 @@ main(int argc, char* argv[])
+         {  /* Whole image or sections not based on output page size */
+         if (crop.selections > 0)
+           {
+-	  writeSelections(in, &out, &crop, &image, &dump, seg_buffs,
+-                          mp, argv[argc - 1], &next_page, total_pages);
+-          }
++             if (writeSelections(in, &out, &crop, &image, &dump,
++                                 seg_buffs, mp, argv[argc - 1],
++                                 &next_page, total_pages))
++              {
++                TIFFError("main",
++                          "Unable to write new image selections");
++                exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
++              }
++	  }
+ 	else  /* One file all images and sections */
+           {
+ 	  if (update_output_file (&out, mp, crop.exp_mode, argv[argc - 1],
+@@ -7749,7 +7755,7 @@ createCroppedImage(struct image_data *image, struct crop_mask *crop,
+   /* Memory is freed before crop_buff_ptr is overwritten */
+     if (*crop_buff_ptr != NULL)
+     {
+-	_TIFFfree(*crop_buff_ptr);
++       _TIFFfree(*crop_buff_ptr);
+     }
+ 
+   /* process full image, no crop buffer needed */
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

meta/recipes-multimedia/libtiff/tiff_4.1.0.bb

@@ -36,6 +36,14 @@ SRC_URI = "http://download.osgeo.org/libtiff/tiff-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://CVE-2022-48281.patch \
            file://CVE-2023-0795_0796_0797_0798_0799.patch \
            file://CVE-2023-0800_0801_0802_0803_0804.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-25433.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-25434-CVE-2023-25435.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-26965.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-26966.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-2908.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-3316.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-3618-1.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-3618-2.patch \
           "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "2165e7aba557463acc0664e71a3ed424"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "5d29f32517dadb6dbcd1255ea5bbc93a2b54b94fbf83653b4d65c7d6775b8634"

meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-32001.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+From 0c667188e0c6cda615a036b8a2b4125f2c404dde Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: SaltyMilk <soufiane.elmelcaoui@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 10 Jul 2023 21:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] fopen: optimize
+
+Closes #11419
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/0c667188e0c6cda615a036b8a2b4125f2c404dde]
+CVE: CVE-2023-32001
+Signed-off-by: Ashish Sharma <asharma@mvista.com>
+
+ lib/fopen.c | 12 ++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/fopen.c b/lib/fopen.c
+index c9c9e3d6e73a2..b6e3cadddef65 100644
+--- a/lib/fopen.c
++++ b/lib/fopen.c
+@@ -56,13 +56,13 @@ CURLcode Curl_fopen(struct Curl_easy *data, const char *filename,
+   int fd = -1;
+   *tempname = NULL;
+ 
+-  if(stat(filename, &sb) == -1 || !S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) {
+-    /* a non-regular file, fallback to direct fopen() */
+-    *fh = fopen(filename, FOPEN_WRITETEXT);
+-    if(*fh)
+-      return CURLE_OK;
++  *fh = fopen(filename, FOPEN_WRITETEXT);
++  if(!*fh)
+     goto fail;
+-  }
++  if(fstat(fileno(*fh), &sb) == -1 || !S_ISREG(sb.st_mode))
++    return CURLE_OK;
++  fclose(*fh);
++  *fh = NULL;
+ 
+   result = Curl_rand_hex(data, randsuffix, sizeof(randsuffix));
+   if(result)

meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_7.69.1.bb

@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://curl.haxx.se/download/curl-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
            file://CVE-2023-27536.patch \
            file://CVE-2023-28320.patch \
            file://CVE-2023-28320-fol1.patch \
+           file://CVE-2023-32001.patch \
 "
 
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "ec5fc263f898a3dfef08e805f1ecca42"

meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2/CVE-2022-41409.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+From 94e1c001761373b7d9450768aa15d04c25547a35 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Philip Hazel <Philip.Hazel@gmail.com>
+Date: Tue, 16 Aug 2022 17:00:45 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Diagnose negative repeat value in pcre2test subject line
+
+CVE: CVE-2022-41409
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/PCRE2Project/pcre2/commit/94e1c001761373b7d9450768aa15d04c25547a35]
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
+
+---
+ ChangeLog            | 3 +++
+ src/pcre2test.c      | 4 ++--
+ testdata/testinput2  | 3 +++
+ testdata/testoutput2 | 4 ++++
+ 4 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
+index eab50eb7..276eb57a 100644
+--- a/ChangeLog
++++ b/ChangeLog
+@@ -7,6 +7,9 @@ fully read in caseless matching.
+ 24. Fixed an issue affecting recursions in JIT caused by duplicated data
+ transfers.
+ 
++20. A negative repeat value in a pcre2test subject line was not being 
++diagnosed, leading to infinite looping.
++
+ 
+ Version 10.34 21-November-2019
+ ------------------------------
+diff --git a/src/pcre2test.c b/src/pcre2test.c
+index 08f86096..f6f5d66c 100644
+--- a/src/pcre2test.c
++++ b/src/pcre2test.c
+@@ -6700,9 +6700,9 @@ while ((c = *p++) != 0)
+       }
+ 
+     i = (int32_t)li;
+-    if (i-- == 0)
++    if (i-- <= 0)
+       {
+-      fprintf(outfile, "** Zero repeat not allowed\n");
++      fprintf(outfile, "** Zero or negative repeat not allowed\n");
+       return PR_OK;
+       }
+ 
+diff --git a/testdata/testinput2 b/testdata/testinput2
+index 655e519..14e00ed 100644
+--- a/testdata/testinput2
++++ b/testdata/testinput2
+@@ -5772,4 +5772,7 @@ a)"xI
+ /(a)?a/I
+     manm
+ 
++--
++    \[X]{-10}
++
+ # End of testinput2
+diff --git a/testdata/testoutput2 b/testdata/testoutput2
+index c733c12..958f246 100644
+--- a/testdata/testoutput2
++++ b/testdata/testoutput2
+@@ -17435,6 +17435,10 @@ Subject length lower bound = 1
+     manm
+  0: a
+ 
++--
++    \[X]{-10}
++** Zero or negative repeat not allowed
++
+ # End of testinput2
+ Error -70: PCRE2_ERROR_BADDATA (unknown error number)
+ Error -62: bad serialized data

meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2_10.34.bb

@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://downloads.yoctoproject.org/mirror/sources/pcre2-${PV}.tar.bz2
            file://pcre-cross.patch \
            file://CVE-2022-1586.patch \
 	    file://CVE-2022-1587.patch \
+	    file://CVE-2022-41409.patch \
 "
 
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "d280b62ded13f9ccf2fac16ee5286366"

scripts/lib/recipetool/create.py

@@ -745,6 +745,10 @@ def create_recipe(args):
     for handler in handlers:
         handler.process(srctree_use, classes, lines_before, lines_after, handled, extravalues)
 
+    # native and nativesdk classes are special and must be inherited last
+    # If present, put them at the end of the classes list
+    classes.sort(key=lambda c: c in ("native", "nativesdk"))
+
     extrafiles = extravalues.pop('extrafiles', {})
     extra_pn = extravalues.pop('PN', None)
     extra_pv = extravalues.pop('PV', None)

scripts/lib/resulttool/resultutils.py

@@ -58,7 +58,11 @@ def append_resultsdata(results, f, configmap=store_map, configvars=extra_configv
             testseries = posixpath.basename(posixpath.dirname(url.path))
         else:
             with open(f, "r") as filedata:
-                data = json.load(filedata)
+                try:
+                    data = json.load(filedata)
+                except json.decoder.JSONDecodeError:
+                    print("Cannot decode {}. Possible corruption. Skipping.".format(f))
+                    data = ""
             testseries = os.path.basename(os.path.dirname(f))
     else:
         data = f